Prospects for Peace: Iranian Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East

Joshua Pryor

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Iran lies at a crucial crossroads between peaceful nuclear energy and defensive nuclear

weapons production, increasing tensions among Western powers while creating the perception of

decreased regional stability in the Middle East. The apprehension surrounding Iranian nuclear

proliferation largely emanates from an ignorance of the Iranian security situation with a

corresponding misuse of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Iran

has legitimate security incentives to develop nuclear weapons to counter-balance other existing

and potentially antagonistic nuclear states. The inability of the West to recognize Iranian

security fears will ultimately cause Western non-proliferation strategies to fail, unless

deficiencies within Western policies are acknowledged and resolved.

Section one will provide a theoretical background, analyzing multiple views and factors

that influence nuclear proliferation. Section two will investigate the NPT, its application by the

United States, and its impact on Iran’s pursuit of nuclear energy. Section three will identify the

distinction between Iran’s pragmatic regional policy in comparison to its radicalized unstable

relations with the United States and Israel to interpret recent trends towards regional stability.

Finally, section four will analyze and evaluate proposed Western policies through a scenario

forecasting methodology, defining possible consequences of the current American policy

towards Iran. Overall, Middle Eastern stability will be seen as increasingly probable as long as

foreign powers take a constructive approach regarding Iran’s pursuit of nuclear energy, engage

Iran economically, and either allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons or eliminate all nuclear

weapons from the Middle East.

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Section One: Theories of Nuclear Proliferation

Nuclear proliferation theory is divided into two camps, pessimists and optimists.1

Optimists argue the spread of nuclear weapons is a counter-balancing force that creates stability

between states. In support of nuclear proliferation, optimists believe that aggressive state

behavior is significantly ameliorated when faced with the prospect of a nuclear attack or nuclear

annihilation. The presence of nuclear weapons reduces state incentives for either territory or

political power, because short-term material gains may be obliterated with a nuclear counter-

attack. Consequently, regional stability is enhanced by nuclear proliferation, because states are

truly faced with prospects for reciprocal eradication, leading to more amenable behavior in

finding political solutions to inter-state disputes.

The key evidence provided by optimists is great-power behavior throughout the Cold

War.2 The Cold War never turned hot, and optimists argue that the major reason for no nuclear

attacks during the Cold War was because nuclear weapons provided a key variable that dwarfed

all aspects of state-to-state relations. Proxy wars in non-great-power states became the primary

means of warfare, and neither state was threatened by a direct assault on the hearts of their

territory. The prospects for a nuclear holocaust were too great if critical state interests, such as

survival, were threatened by a conventional direct assault. Moreover, nuclear weapons are better

for deterrents than for assaults, because the logistic and environmental consequences would

make any conquer land difficult to use. Optimists extend this interpretation of the Cold War to

all relationships between nuclear adversaries, arguing that nuclear weapons provide an inherent

1 David J. Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” International Security 21, no. 3 (1996-

1997): 89. For additional detailed explanation of both sides, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread

Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (N ew York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995). 2 Karl, 90.

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logic that drastically curtails the likelihood of aggressive state action. Hence, nuclear weapons

become an all-encompassing deterrent that creates a durable “balance of terror” between nuclear

foes.3 In terms of policy prescriptions, optimists argue for great powers to accept the spread of

nuclear weapons technology due to its alleviating impact on state behavior.

In response, many arguments have been made against the pro-proliferation camp.4 There

exists the dangers of asymmetric proliferation, meaning that certain states will pursue a nuclear

weapons program, while other states, for a variety of reasons including international pressure,

decide against such a program. Asymmetric proliferation can lead to nuclear blackmail, where a

state possessing nuclear weapons requires another state to follow specific demands, lest the

weaker state face annihilation. In addition, even though states may be more hesitant to act

military when they and their opponents have nuclear weapons, there are no guarantees against

conventional warfare. The primary problem with the optimist position is that it is founded

inherently on a rational view of state behavior, that the massive destruction caused by nukes

makes their use highly improbable, but not impossible. Mistakes can occur, and nuclear

blunders cannot happen if these weapons do not exist.5

In contrast to optimists, proliferation pessimists interpret the spread of nuclear weapons

among non-great powers as increasing the likelihood of a nuclear catastrophe, because they are

incapable of handling the responsibility that accompanies nuclear weapons.6 For pessimists,

nuclear weapons are not an overriding factor, and their significance must be interpreted

alongside conventional military and political factors. For example, the lack of a nuclear conflict

throughout the Cold War was due to unique characteristic features, including the geographic

3 Karl, 91.

4 Michael R. Kraig, “Nuclear Deterrence in the Developing World: A Game-Theoretic Treatment,” Journal of Peace

Research 36, no. 2 (1999): 141-167. 5 Sagan and Waltz, 117.

6 Karl, 91-92.

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distance between America and the Soviet Union, a lack of historical animosity prior to the end of

World War II, a status quo relationship that reinforced a respect of each other’s territorial

sovereignty, and the distinctive character of the bi-polar international system. 7 Proliferation of

nuclear weapons into contexts without these characteristics heightens the probability of warfare,

because antagonist relationships between states in the Third World are often built upon historical

animosity, and generally occur between states that are geographically close. Hence, the Cold

War was satiated with an abundance of factors, other then simply the presence of nuclear

weapons, that ensured a stable relationship existed between the primary aggressors. These

factors are largely lacking in relations throughout the Third World, leading nuclear proliferation

into a linear path towards destruction. Rather than acting as a deterrent, nuclear weapons would

be seen by nations as encouragement towards conventional military campaigns that culminate in

the use of nuclear weapons. The pessimist worldview has provided the major backing for global

nonproliferation policies, and the gradual reduction of nuclear weapons is seen as the only policy

that can prevent nuclear warfare.

Pessimist logic, however, has experienced a theoretical counterattack, largely because of

its ethnocentric focus, which implies that Western Nations are more capable of handling nuclear

weapons, whereas the rest of the world lacks the political apparatus and composure to best

manage nuclear responsibility.8 In response, pessimists have created three direct responses to the

optimist understanding of nuclear proliferation, reiterating their belief that proliferation increases

the likelihood of nuclear warfare. Specifically, pessimists argue that there are no guarantees that

states with nuclear weapons may not instigate a pre-emptive attack against their foes nuclear

arsenal, providing a strong incentive for state’s to acquire nuclear weapons and use them before

7 Karl, 92.

8 Karl, 93-95.

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their major adversary is capable of a retaliatory strike. In addition, a second-strike or retaliatory

capability requires an additional level of technological capabilities that may not be implemented

by emerging nuclear states, increasing the likelihood that the development of nuclear weapons

will not act as a credible deterrent. Most disturbingly, pessimists argue that the possibility for an

accidental or illicit us of nuclear weapons increases as they proliferate, reinforcing their belief

that these weapons must be contained among as few states as possible and eventually eradicated

altogether. 9

Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke supplement the optimist-pessimist debate with an

analysis of the underlying rationales for the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons. 10

States

are faced with significant challenges in acquiring a nuclear capacity, and these can largely be

represented by whether or not they have such an opportunity. There are three main obstacles that

states must overcome to have the opportunity to create a nuclear program. First, a state must

acquire a significant amount of nuclear technology that allows them the capability of creating

nuclear weapons in the first place.11

Whereas the NPT may present a political obstacle, the

primary reason many states have not acquired a nuclear capability is because they the lack the

necessarily technological networks. Second, states must attain nuclear fissile materials that can

be directed towards a nuclear purpose. International treaties have made the acquisition of these

materials difficult, making this requirement a significant obstacle that must be surmounted. The

third obstacle towards the creation of nuclear weapons is an economic infrastructure that can

support the creation of a nuclear program. Especially if a state is attempting to build a program

clandestinely, they must have the economic resources to hide their nuclear institution from

9 Karl, 95.

10 Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” (2002),

<http://www.columbia.edu/~eg589/pdf/jo_gartzke_nuke_11222005.pdf > (November 15, 2004). 11

Jo and Gartzke, 2.

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external scrutiny, creating a significant economic obstacle that in many cases makes a nuclear

program infeasible.

Opportunity describes the specific capabilities required to create a nuclear infrastructure,

but just because a state has the requisite capabilities does not mean they are politically willing to

use the technology for nuclear weapons purposes. Consequently, the probability that states will

create a nuclear weapons program can be measured by their willingness to pursue such a

program. State willingness can be broken into three categories, their perceptions of international

security, the position of the government vis-à-vis the domestic population, and the government’s

perception of international norms. A states position in relation to these factors can predict

whether or not they will use their capabilities towards the creation of a nuclear program, but

overall state security presents the most overriding concern regarding the development of nuclear

weapons.12

State perceptions of their security are often the prime motivator for the acquisition of a

nuclear weapons program. When an adversary has nuclear capabilities, there exists a strong

incentive to create a corresponding nuclear program as a defensive mechanism. Another

situation where nuclear weapons become prevalent is if a state is threatened by another state that

has a strong conventional military force, and if the state believes its own conventional forces are

not enough to deter a military attack, the state has an incentive to develop nuclear weapons as a

deterrent. On the other hand, if a state is protected by the nuclear umbrella of another, they often

have a reduced incentive to develop a nuclear program, as the economic costs are not justified

when the protection is already provided, which is most evident in the security umbrella the

United States provides for Japan. Finally, security presents a strong incentive for pariah states,

isolated by a lack of defensive allies, to develop a nuclear program in order to counter-balance

12

Jo and Gartzke, 10.

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against regional adversaries, or to remind the international community of their heightened

capability. For example, Iranian fears of an Israeli or American nuclear arsenal provide one of

the most likely explanations to the underlying motives for nuclear weapons program.13

There are many domestic considerations that need to be taken into account when

analyzing a state’s willingness to create a nuclear program. Often times, a nuclear program

serves as a diversion, where the state uses its creation to redirect anti-government sentiment. For

example, the creation of a nuclear program can enhance nationalism, because the implementation

of a nuclear capability, either for energy or weapons, reminds the populace of the tangible

services a state creates to assist the populace. Specific instances where this has occurred are in

India and Pakistan, who were successful in the use of a nuclear program to divert negative

attention away from the government, and there has been evidence of this in Iran as well.14

Another important consideration is pressure from various domestic groups, including highly

organized labor forces or governmental organizations that have a vested interest in the creation

of a nuclear infrastructure or weapons.

The last major factor to understand a state’s willingness to pursue a nuclear weapons

program is the state’s perception of international norms. Norms represent the ideational

concerns a state faces when choosing and implementing policies, and its interpretation of norms

can present either a barrier or an incentive for the development of nuclear weapons. The major

norm that works against the creation of such a program is the NPT. Adherents to the NPT have

promised to not create a nuclear weapons program, which consequently serves as a legal and

moral restriction that pro-nuclear domestic constituencies within a country must contend with in

order to advance their nuclear ambitions. Conversely, perceptions of unequal applications of

13

Jo and Gartzke, 10. 14

Jo and Gartzke, 11, and Shahram Chubin and Robert S. Litwak, “Debating Iran’s Nuclear Aspirations,” The

Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4 (2003): 99-114, especially 104.

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international norms, such as preferential enforcement of the NPT, may undermine a state’s

perception of their treaty obligations. Moreover, if attainment of nuclear weapons is seen as a

symbol of celebrity or eminence, then a state who wishes to achieve international power and

influence have a strong incentive to develop a nuclear program.15

Jo and Gartzke’s discussion of opportunity and willingness allow the creation of specific

predictions regarding the future of nuclear proliferation. Minor powers are less likely to pursue a

nuclear weapons program because they often lack the technological and economic infrastructure

to sustain the program, and are more willing to yield to international norms expressing

nonproliferation. However, regional powers are highly likely to proliferate because they likely

have the economic and technological capability, providing opportunity, and only need a specific

impetus, such as a threat to their security or domestic unrest, to achieve willingness and instigate

a nuclear program.16

Overall, nuclear proliferation theory presents two insightful conclusions. First, theorists

within the optimist and pessimist debate argue that the impact of nuclear proliferation is

inconclusive, because it depends on specific relational factors between opposing states, including

existing conventional militaries and credibility of a nuclear threat. Moreover, the evidence that

proliferation theory is based on is undersized, especially in relation to the proliferation of nuclear

weapons in the developing world.17

More empirical research is required regarding the actual

behavior of nuclear powers in order to create theories based upon solid evidence, rather than

conjecture. Second, the opportunity/willingness debate enhances the theoretical understanding

of nuclear proliferation by specifically identifying major factors that induce proliferation,

15

Jo and Gartzke, 12. 16

Jo and Gartzke, 27. 17

Kraig, 119.

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creating a more applicable understanding of why states would choose to pursue a nuclear

weapons program.

However, neither of these theoretical discussions predicts the actual outcome of a

completely optimist or pessimist world. Ogilvie-White has argued that all theories regarding

nuclear proliferation are severely underdeveloped, and must find answers to a multitude of

questions including the impact of trade on nuclear proliferation, and on the relationship between

the military and the political structure in pursuing a nuclear program, before an all-encompassing

theory of nuclear proliferation can be created and applied to real world situations.18

Nevertheless, the current state of the debate has built a body of theory and evidence, while

incomplete, still provides important incites in analyzing current trends regarding nuclear

proliferation in the Middle East.

Section Two: The Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Impact

In the post-WWII era, states have, through the use of various international treaties and

international institutions, created a nonproliferation regime with the final goal supposedly being

the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. The initial catalyst for the creation of the

nonproliferation regime was the NPT, implemented initially in 1968 and extended in 1995.19

Encapsulated in the NPT is a global consensus towards the complete elimination of nuclear

weapons, as evident by Clause Twelve, where it reads, “Desiring to further the easing of

international tension” through “the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and

the means of their delivery,” and in Article VI where it reads, “to pursue negotiations in good

18

Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate,”

The Nonproliferation Review 4, no. 1 (1996): 12-14 and 56. 19

George Perkovich, “Bush’s Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation,” International Affairs 82,

no. 2 (2003): 2.

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faith” leading to “complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” Suffice

to say, the NPT strictly adheres to the pessimistic theory of nuclear proliferation that includes the

gradual elimination of nuclear weapons in all states, regardless if they powerful or powerless.

In implementation, however, the NPT has been abused by great powers to ensure their

nuclear hegemony, attempting to prohibit other states from acquiring nuclear weapons, while

concurrently refusing to reduce their own nuclear arsenals. In an analysis of the Bush

administrations “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” George Perkovich

has argued that the United States has selectively enforced its counter-proliferation strategy

against outlaw states, while concurrently ignoring its own obligations under the NPT.20

In

defense of their own nuclear arsenal, American officials argue they must be allowed to maintain

a significant portion of their nuclear arsenal in order to act as a deterrent or defeat any potential

nuclear threats. In addition, rogue states and other terrorist organizations are viewed as non-

deterrable, so an aggressive policy of preemption must be utilized against them prior to the

creation of a nuclear weapons program. Hence, where the NPT originally called for a gradual

decrease of nuclear weapons among all states, the American strategy rejects the fundamental

push towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, in favor of a strategy of modernized nuclear

arsenals and a targeted policy of regime change against any unacceptable aspirants of nuclear

weapons.

The consequences of the American implementation and enforcement of the NPT are

deleterious towards international stability. Specifically, there are two reasons as to how the

American policy towards nuclear proliferation threatens the security of the United States and of

the world in general. As long as the United States allows unstable allies such as Pakistan to

obtain nuclear weapons, there exists a strong possibility that at a future date, due to their unstable

20

Perkovich, 4.

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political situation, nuclear materials could be either stolen or proliferated, creating a direct threat

to global security.21

Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons would be much easier in a zero-

arsenal world, because the few nuclear sites that may remain could be placed under strict security

conditions. By accepting nuclear weapons among allies, and refusing to substantially reduce its

only stock of weapons, the United States facilitates the current situation of multiple nuclear

states creating an indefensible security position.

Secondly, the fact that the United States has allowed multiple states to acquire or

maintain nuclear weapons sets a dangerous precedent, because members of the ‘nuclear club’ are

seen as having greater prestige and power than non-members, increasing the overall

attractiveness of nuclear weapons towards aspiring states.22

Consequently, when the United

States or any other member of the ‘nuclear club’ attempt to persuade Iran, North Korea, or any

other state, their propositions ring hollow in the face of the continued hypocrisy of Western

nuclear programs and weapons. American pressure against so-called pariah states like Iran, in

the face of acceptance of states like Pakistan reduces the legitimacy of American non-

proliferation activities as the United States can be seen as ‘picking favorites.’

Unsurprisingly, current Iranian reactions to the American relationship with the NPT are

of an antagonistic nature. Iran was one of the initial signatories to the NPT, signing in 1968 and

ratifying in 1970. As per the NPT, Iran renounced the right to develop nuclear weapons, and to

alleviate fears of a clandestine nuclear agenda, Iran also signed the Additional Protocol, which

allows surprise inspections of most activities regarding the Iranian nuclear program.23

However,

Gary Sick has argued that Iran, seeing that the major signatories of the treaty, especially the

21

Perkovich, 4. 22

Perkovich, 4. 23

“Iran seeks clear-cut assurance from Europeans on nuclear proposal,” Payvand News, 19 December 2003,

<http://www.payvand.com/news/04/oct/1189.html> (15 November 2004).

13

United States, have not complied with all treaty obligations calling for a reduction and eventual

dismantlement of nuclear weapons, has an incentive to bend the NPT according to its own

interests, as that is the exact behavior committed by Western powers.24

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), created to enforce the NPT, has

inspected the Iranian Nuclear facilities numerous times, and while questions are raised about

possible diversions of uranium towards a suspected nuclear program, a ‘smoking gun’ has not

been found. IAEA reports in 2003 and more recently in 2008 argued that Iran has not diverted

uranium towards a nuclear weapons program, though some critics of the reports argues “the

carefully couched language indicated that Baradei strongly suspected Iran was trying to conceal

weapons activities.”25

Similarly, while the IAEA has been unable to find proof of uranium

diversion to a weapons program, it has criticized Iran for not providing enough transparency for

international investigations into Iran’s nuclear program.26

Another strategy pursued against Iran by the United States and the United Nations

Security Council (UNSC) that is against the NPT is a denial of Iran’s right to nuclear

enrichment. Several Security Council decisions, such as Resolution 1803, call upon Iran to stop

enrichment activities.27

Important officials from the European Union have also spoken on the

issue, recently arguing that Iran has a “right to the peaceful use of nuclear weapons,” which is

“distinct from ‘the right to enrich,’ which does not exist.”28

The primary issue Western nations

have with enrichment facilities are their its dual-use capacity – while small levels of enrichment

24

Gary Sick, “Iran: The Adolescent Revolution,” Journal of International Affairs, 49 no. 1 (1995): 148. 25

Kenneth R. Timmerman, The Countdown to Crisis (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 205), 358. For the most

recent IAEA report, see Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant

provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by

the Director General, Derestricted 5 March 2008, document number GOV/2008/4, 8. 26

Chubin and Litwak, 100, and Sick, 153. 27

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1803, S/res/1803, 3 March 2008. 28

Robert Cooper, “Iran’s ‘right’ to enrich uranium does not exist,” Financial Times 7 September 2005, 12. Robert

Cooper is the Director-General for External Relations, EU Council Secretariat.

14

are required to maintain a nuclear energy program, the same facilities could easily be diverted to

create weapons-grade materials. However, regardless of the resolutions of the UNSC, and

statements by EU bureaucrats, the NPT treaty itself says nothing about enrichment whatsoever.

Rather, article IV, as stated above, provides no restrictions on the creation of a nuclear program

for energy purposes, which means that if Iran or any other state needs to enrich uranium, then

they have the right to do so as long as diversion to a weapons program is not found.29

Iran has an often unnoticed economic incentive to enrich uranium domestically, because

the cost of procuring uranium on the global market has risen over 800% since 2001. Iran’s

significant domestic supply of uranium, which is much cheaper than the global price, can easily

be enriched for energy purposes, and the facilities have already been produced. More

importantly, by enriching its own uranium, Iran cannot become dependent on other nations who

may refuse to provide uranium, revoking Iran’s ability to produce nuclear energy.30

Iran is

dependent on foreign sources of refined oil, and Iran’s domestic supply of oil would be better

used in reusable products rather than energy, making nuclear energy production a necessity for

Iran’s future development.

In the debate about a nuclear program in Iran, many analysts often forget that Iran was

the first nation to put forth the notion of a nuclear-free Middle East. Iran has specifically

requesting that Israel move into compliance with the NPT by allowing Israeli nuclear facilities to

be inspected by International Atomic Energy Organization officials, or by gradually

deconstructing Israeli nuclear weapons. These attempts by Iran to create a nuclear-free security

environment within the Middle East were rebuffed by Israel, largely because Israel had little

faith in Iran’s ability to uphold its own commitments not to develop a nuclear program. A

29

Other than the NPT, see also Mohammad Javad Zarif, “Tackling the Iran-U.S. Crisis: The Need for a paradigm

Shift,” Journal of International Affairs 60 no. 2 (2007): 84. 30

Zarif, 82-84.

15

nuclear-free zone was perceived by Israeli leaders as against their security interests.31

Where the

United States took a blind-eye to the construction of an Israeli nuclear weapons program, it

conversely created significant barriers to the importation of peaceful nuclear technology and

reactors to Iran, inhibiting Iran’s right to such technology as expressed in Clause IV of the NPT.

In the face of Israel’s unwillingness to open its nuclear facilities to international inspections and

rejection of a nuclear-free region, Iran has significant incentives to enhance its own programs to

defend their sovereignty and deter possible foreign aggression.

Regardless of the use and abuse of the NPT, the United States still believes Iran is

pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and has created “a coalition of all the leading countries of

the world who are concerned that Iran’s so-called peaceful nuclear program is actually designed

to produce a nuclear weapon.”32

The next section will analyze Iran’s security environment,

advancing specific reasons why Iran may perceive the creation of a nuclear weapons program to

be in its security interests, as well as highlighting elements of its relationships with other

countries to create an overall understanding of trends pushing for and against regional stability in

the Middle East.

Section Three: Iranian Foreign Policy: The Maintenance of Sovereignty

Given that the NPT has been unevenly implemented, and that Western perceptions of Iran

are increasingly hostile since the 1979 revolution, it is helpful to understand why the Iranian

government would choose to pursue nuclear weapons other than simply to threaten the security

of the West. This section will balance Iran’s changing role in the international system, from an

31

Sick, 155. 32

R. Nicholas Burns, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” Vital Speeches of the Day 73 no. 6 (2007): 252, a testimony by the

Under Secretary for Political Affairs, given before the Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington,

D.C., March 29, 2007.

16

ideological fight for survival during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, to a more nationalistic and

pragmatic policy for economic development following the end of the war, with Iranian

conceptions of security as fearing the regional ambitions of primarily Israel and the United

States.33

Overall, nuclear technology not only serves as a new form of energy that can stimulate

economic growth, but also reinforce Iranian sovereignty against a dangerous security

environment marked by possible Israeli or American aggression.

The Iranian government, initially spurred by an ideological zeal towards Islam, became

more pragmatic following the Iran-Iraq war.34

In 1980, shortly after the anti-American, anti-

Shah coup, the newly installed Iranian government became embroiled in an eight year conflict

with Iraq, directly reminding the regime that military threats could easily jeopardize the

existence of their state. The war ended without a clear winner, with millions of lives sacrificed,

the Iranian economy profoundly scarred, and leading to “apathetic youth, economic stagnation,

military weakness and a deteriorating oil infrastructure.”35

After the war, Saddam’s continued

survival, along with a heavily increased American presence, demonstrated to the Iranian

government that immediate threats to its security would dominate foreign policy. Also, the

failure to win the Iran-Iraq war outright dramatically reduced ideological zeal, because God was

seen as abandoning Iranian interests by allowing Iraq to harm Iran so greatly. All these factors

combined to shift Iran’s foreign policy towards a more pragmatic orientation, focused on

ensuring regime survival rather than spreading a specific ideological viewpoint.

33

The most complete analysis of Iran’s pragmatic foreign policy is in Daniel Byman et al, Iran’s security policy in

the post-revolution era (Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute - RAND, 2001). See also David

Menashri, “Iran’s Regional Policy: Between Radicalism and Pragmatism,” Journal of International Affairs 60 no. 2

(2007): 153-167. 34

Shireen Hunter, “Iran’s Pragmatic Regional Policy,” Journal of International Affairs 49, no. 1 (2003): 134. 35

Michael Ryan Kraig, “Forging a New Security Order for the Persian Gulf,” Middle East Policy 13 no. 1 (2006):

86.

17

Iran’s foreign policy is best labeled as pragmatic when discussing its relations with every

state, except Israel and the United States.36

The transformation in Iranian practice is best

exemplified by its policies towards Saudi Arabia. Immediately after the anti-shah revolution,

Iran attempted to export its vision of political Islam throughout the Persian Gulf, creating a

highly tense regional situation that made many observers believe regional reconciliation

doubtful.37

However after revolutionary fervor had waned, Iran started making significant

inroads in alleviating its relationship, especially with Saudi Arabia. The primary reason for

Iran’s rapprochement was economic, where Iran wanted to increase cooperation within the

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as global oil prices declined in the mid-

1990s.

The relationship between China and Iran is also increasingly becoming mutually

beneficial.38

China, as a cheap source of manufactured goods, as well as requiring increasing

amounts of energy, balances well with Iran’s abundant energy resources, because region is able

to pursuit important economic interests. This strategic relationship has fundamentally altered the

ability of the United States to apply pressure on the Iranian nuclear program. China’s UNSC

veto has provided important breathing room for Iran, though the passage of Resolution 1803 may

demonstrate that China is experiencing pressure to accept the American position on nuclear

proliferation. Secondly, the China-Iran relationship has weakened the ability of American

sanctions to precipitate changes the nuclear program of Iran. The United States has had no

trading relations with Iran since the revolution, so any attempt to implement sanctions requires

other nations, most importantly European and Chinese, to cooperate. China’s reluctance to

36

See footnote 33. 37

Byman, et al, 74. 38

Kamrouz Pirouz and Farahmand Rezvani, “The Iran – China Alliance,’ Journal of American Academy of Business

11 no. 1 (2007): 39-49.

18

reduce trade connections, combined with its provision of military technology tears a huge whole

in any sanction regime.39

As such, there have been two primary determinants pushing forward Iran’s pragmatic

foreign policy. On the one hand is economic needs development, which is badly needed after the

Iran-Iraq war. On the other are geopolitical security interests, where Iran wants to support the

status quo to maintain borders with its neighbors, and reduce the likelihood of foreign invasion.

Overall Iran generally places geopolitical and economic desires over its radical Islamic

ideology.40

The switch to a more pragmatic foreign policy demonstrates fundamental domestic

changes within Iran, indicating the government has begun to follow what some call the ‘China

model,” where economic growth, increased jobs, and relative increases in social freedom are

pursued by the government to offer their populace a Faustian bargain in order to maintain

political control.41

The desire to maintain power by the current government indicates there is a

significant potential for economic engagement that may lead to increased regional stability.

With the election of Iranian president Ahmadinejad, who has since made numerous

radical statements, some analysts argue that Iran’s pragmatic foreign policy crested near the end

of the 1990s.42

However, Ahmadeniejad can be seen as making the actual policies pursued by

Iran seem more pragmatic, as his broad statements increase the boundaries of political debate on

various topics from Israel’s right to exist to the legitimacy of Iran’s nuclear program. The

widening of these boundaries makes any policy less radical than Ahmadinejad’s statements seem

39

Pirouz and Rezvani, 47 40

Byman, et al, 100, and Menashri, 155. 41

Afshin Molavi, “Buying Time in Tehran,” International Affairs 83, no. 6 (2004): 9. 42

Menashri, 158. For an overall disagreement with the pragmatic view of Iranian foreign policy, see Timmerman.

19

more pragmatic, providing an increased amount of diplomatic maneuvering room.43

Another

argument used to demonstrate the non-pragmatic nature of Iran’s foreign policy is the continued

support of Hamas and Hezbollah, both considered to be terrorist organizations by the United

States and Israel. However, Iranian support for these organizations stems from the radicalized

relationship between Iran, the United States, and Israel, and does not spillover significantly into

Iran’s relations with, for example, China.44

Unfortunately, regional stability is threatened by the relationship between Iran, the

United States, and Israel, due in part to the inability of American policy to find a constructive

form of diplomacy and engagement with the Iranian government.45

Iran’s relationship with

Israel has maintained a toxic quality. Since the 1979 revolution, Iran perceived Israel as a

continued threat to the Iranian government, because of Israel’s significant nuclear, chemical, and

biological arsenal, complemented by a strong conventional military force. Frighteningly, Israeli

officials have publicly discussed the possibility of a pre-emptive strike on the nuclear energy

facilities of Iran to ensure it does not achieve nuclear status, increasing Iran’s desire for nuclear

weapons as a deterrent. Fortunately, neither state is currently involved in a direct dispute with

each other, mitigating possibilities for outright war, but the Iranian interest in the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict will continue to shape the future tone of debate between the adversaries,

always creating the possibility for Israeli-Iranian conflict.46

The United States continues to ignore pragmatic change in Iranian policy towards non-

threatening neighbors and utilizes a one-dimensional strategy requiring the use of sanctions and

43

Menashri, 159. 44

On Iranian support of terrorist groups, see Menashri, 160-162. 45

Sick, 164. 46

Bahgat, 430-435.

20

verbal denouncements of the Iranian government.47

When the IAEA discovered that Iran had

been enriching nuclear materials, the United States refused to negotiate and instead labeled Iran

as part of the “Axis of Evil,” demonstrating America’s inability to engage Iran constructively,

even though enrichment is not against the NPT.48

The United States is driven by a powerful fear

that if Iran gains nuclear weapons, it would behave more aggressively, utilizing its new weapons

to blackmail other states to comply with Iranian desires.49

Overall, American foreign policy

towards Iran and the Middle East is marked by “a flexible mix of deterrence, coercive

diplomacy, global military superiority, and the preventive or preemptive use of military force

alongside the spread of U.S.-defined democratic and free-market values.”50

Given these current

set of policies, American-Iranian relations are unlikely be alleviated.

The antagonistic relationship between the United States and Iran is likely the single most

important cause for why Iran would pursue a nuclear program, Gawdat Bahgat has argued that

Iranian foreign relations were polarized by a significant fear of Israeli nuclear weapons, the

United States Middle East presence, and Iraq.51

Where Iran perceived its security as not being

threatened, Iran pushed for the normalization of relations, but where Iran perceived threats, it had

a strong incentive for creating non-conventional weapons as a form of deterrence. More

recently, the American invasion and toppling of Iraq, combined with an American ignorance (or

at least non-military confrontation) with North Korea, demonstrated that the major defense

against invasion by the United States was the development of a nuclear weapons program. In

addition, American acceptance of Israeli nuclear weapons, who was not a signatory to the NPT,

47

Sick, 165. 48

Tina Wang, “Conciliation: A New, Clear Iran Policy?” Harvard International Review 26, no. 2 (2004): 11. 49

Kenneth M. Pollack, “Securing the Persian Gulf,” The Brookings Review 21, no. 4 (2003): 22. 50

Kraig, 86. 51

Gawdat Bahgat, “Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Iraq and Iran,” Journal of Social, Political, and

Economic Studies 28, no. 4 (2003): 423-445.

21

reinforced the Iranian impression that the United States held a double standard for nuclear

proliferation, where American says nothing of the Israeli program, but imposed sanctions and

demonstrated other threatening behavior to Iran. Consequently, surrounded by enemies, many of

which have nuclear weapons, the Iranian regime has a profound incentive to pursue nuclear

weapons to protect itself against plausible threats.

Rather than reducing Iranian security and increasing regional instability, Tina Wang has

argued that, American foreign policy has played the ‘bad’ cop in contrast to the European role as

‘good’ cop.52

Specifically, American threats, through military pressure and unilateral sanctions

have made Iran more amenable to economic incentives from the Europeans. Whereas the United

States has remained a bulwark against negotiation, the Europeans have offered to assist Iran’s

development of peaceful uses of nuclear technology, as well as strengthening their economic

connections. In return, the Europeans require the Iranian government to halt uranium

enrichment, which could possibly lead to the creation of nuclear weapons. The overall response

of Iran has been receptive to Europeans appeals, which is largely related to a keen Iranian

interest to avoid economic sanctions from Europe. Whereas the United States has no economic

relations with Iran, allowing Iran to ignore American catcalls without immediate economic

consequences, the Europeans have been responsible for “28 percent of Iran’s exports and imports

in 2001,” with a potential for increased trade if Iran behaves favorably towards European

requests.53

Europe has recognized that since political posturing and threats have only led to a

polarization of American relations with Iran, a policy of economic incentives is much more

likely to lead to compliance, especially given that economic stagnation within Iran will lead to

greater anti-government sentiment from the youthful Iranian populace; hence, increasing

52

Wang, 11. 53

Wang, 12.

22

economic contacts with the West becomes a direct policy for the Iranian government to pursue a

path towards regime stability and legitimacy. Wang concludes by arguing that Iran may become

a locus for a comprehensive American-European strategy that will demonstrate the utility of the

‘good’ cop, ‘bad’ cop approach in future attempts to stop the spread of nuclear proliferation.

However, movements within the American press indicate disillusionment with America’s

standoffish behavior, arguing that any benefits received are nullified by castrating America’s

ability to influence the behavior of other states. The insolvency of American policy towards Iran

was highlighted in a Washington Post editorial describing the contradictory policies between the

Europeans and the United States towards Iran.54

Repeated discontentment from Washington

offset successes in French, British, and German negotiations, because the United States was

effectively removed from being able to inhibit the nuclear ambitions of Iran. Furthermore, rather

than leading to a resolution regarding Iranian nuclear weapons, it is more likely that the

Americans will stand as an obstacle to long-term negotiations between the Europeans and Iran,

neutralizing any benefits from the ‘good cop, bad cop’ perspective. The American

administration, by working against European progress towards cooperation, while

simultaneously refusing to become involved in helpful discourse and instead focusing on a

policy of ‘regime-change,’ only further marginalizes itself from finding a real solution to the

crisis. Hence, the editorial urges the United States to become actively involved in the European

negotiation process, using European ‘carrots’ and American ‘sticks’ in a coordinated manner,

rather than ad-hoc, to demonstrate Western solidarity against nuclear proliferation. As it is,

American policy continues to work in an opposite direction, poisoning European attempts for a

peaceful resolution while remaining unable to forge a satisfactory unilateral policy.

54

“Facing Iran,” Washington Post, 6 December 2004, A20.

23

The Iranian government has proven to be resilient, pursuing flexible policies that place

the maintenance of sovereignty above ideological struggles. The next section will identify and

criticize one of the primary policy prescriptions for American foreign policy towards Iran. Next,

in order to identify a plausible and positive future policy, several scenarios will be quickly

extrapolated to identify possible outcomes of Iranian nuclear proliferation within the region.

Section Four: Prospects for Peace – Possible Futures of Iranian Nuclear Proliferation

The Manoa School of Futures Studies has constructed a unique means of identifying

possible futures scenarios on a particular policy topic.55

Scenarios are defined as “an internally

consistent view of what the future might turn out to be – not a forecast, but one possible future

outcome.”56

Policy futures scenarios can fall into one of any four categories: continued growth,

collapse, discipline, and transformation, and within each category there can be numerous

possible scenarios. Continued growth identifies a scenario where no major impediments occur,

and the status quo continues as normal. Collapse identifies a future where the status quo is

confronted with a crisis that leads to dramatic negative change. Discipline describes a future

where through concerted effort, states are able to control their foreign policies to avoid dramatic

negative events. Transformation defined a future that is profoundly different from the status quo,

through a revolution in the facts on the ground, for example with new regimes or policies First,

this section will identify a set of policies that are like the primary policies to be pursued by the

United States. After identifying the primary policy set, four hypothetical scenarios will identify

possible consequences of American foreign policy on regional and global stability. Finally, the

55

Christopher Jones, “The Manoa School of Futures Studies,” Futures Research Quarterly Winter, (1992): 19-25. 56

Thomas J. Chermack, et al., “A Review of Scenario Planning Literature,” Futures Research Quarterly Summer

(2001): 8

24

primary problems of the American foreign policy will be identified, and another rplausible policy

will be constructed.

American foreign policy towards Iran falls can be identified with four key points..57

First, the United States and Europe must avoid having their historical partnership split over Iran,

as the more polarized the American-European relationship becomes, the more time Iran is

offered to develop its nuclear weapons program until Western actions are irrelevant.

Consequently, Western allies must forge a collective consensus upholding Iranian

responsibilities in the NPT, while concurrently respecting Iran’s ability to have a nuclear energy

program. Second, the United States, Russia, and Europe should provide “a firm guarantee to

supply fresh reactor fuel for civilian nuclear power and to retrieve and dispose of spent fuel in

exchange for Iran’s agreement to permanently forswear its own nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities,

including enrichment reprocessing, uranium conversion and heavy-water production.”58

They

argue that only by ensuring Iran a stable flow of nuclear material that can be used exclusively for

peaceful energy production will a real and long-lasting agreement be reached. Third, the United

States should put its full diplomatic weight behind cooperative diplomatic efforts by the

Europeans, and to economically engage Iran to demonstrate America’s credibility in regards to a

peaceful solution. Finally, if diplomacy fails, both the Europeans and the United States must be

ready to use coercive action to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons program, as they believe an Iran with

nuclear weapons capability presents an unacceptable security threat in the Middle East.

In the continued growth scenario, American foreign policy would likely continue to avoid

Iranian nuclear enrichment and a weapons program, but Iran would achieve its nuclear goals.

Military strikes against Iran would have a low probability, in part because there is no guarantee

57

M. Albright et al., “How to Approach Iran,” Washington Post, 13 December 2004, A21. 58

M. Albright et al., A21.

25

the program could be destroyed, and Iran has the ability to retaliate on American soil through

Hezbollah cells. Additionally, the process of engagement created by this process would increase

the unlikelihood that Iran would use its weapons against the United States or Israel, because such

an attack could disrupt economic relations with China, and lead to the obliteration of the Iranian

government. Using nuclear weapons would lead to a result in direct contradiction to Iran’s

primary desire to maintain control. Throughout this scenario, conflict is experienced through

diplomatic negotiation and a war of words, but no serious violence would result as the global

economy would be harmed and few parties could gain. This scenario is considered to be most

likely because it ultimately relies on no major changes to the actions pursued by all parties, and

identifies the likely consequences of foreign policy drift.

In the collapse scenario, a preemptive strike caused by the United States or Israel, or a

nuclear strike committed by Iran through a proxy organization, either way causing global

destruction. This doomsday scenario is what all parties concerned are trying to avoid, and is also

seen as least likely due to the inhibiting effects of nuclear weapons, the desire for stability by the

Iranian government, and inability of the United States or Israel to create a coalition of states to

attack Iran.

The discipline scenario describes a future where through diplomacy and discussion, Iran

and the United States are able to agree on economic rapprochement, similar to the change in

American policy towards China starting in the 1980s. Iran’s energy exports can assist the

American desire for energy, and Iran would in turn accept some form of Israeli state. This

scenario also emanates from current possibilities towards Iranian-Israeli rapprochement,

identified by a recognition that Iran cannot change the existence of Israel, and that Iran should

not be “more Palestinian than the Palestinians,” demonstrating that Palestinians need to find their

26

own diplomatic solution.59

The likelihood of this scenario is less than continued growth, but

more likely than collapse, because it requires states to make difficult changes in their foreign

policies that are likely to be faced with friction by powerful political actors among all nations

involved.

The transformation scenario is marked by some form of regime change in Iran not

directly sponsored by the United States, likely occurring from many domestic Iranian

organizations looking for a change in the religious structure of their state. The consequences of

such a revolution are difficult to forecast, but would probably lead to an increased opening to

external nations. The likelihood of this scenario would be less than both the continued growth

and discipline scenarios, because the current Iranian regime is unlikely to accept challenges to its

power and would violently fight such changes.

Overall, American policies towards Iran, in their possibilities for economic engagement,

presents a powerful incentive for the Iranian government to cooperate with Western interests, but

will not cause any real change in the tense situation if the security fears of Iran are not resolved.

The core argument put forth in this paper is that the alleged development of the Iranian nuclear

weapons program, if true, is primarily caused by the presence of Israeli and American nuclear

weapons. If left unmanaged, these weapons provide an irreconcilable and legitimate incentive

for Iran to create its own balancing nuclear weapons program as a deterrent against possible

aggression. However, simply blaming Israel, or American nuclear weapons for the alleged

creation of an Iranian nuclear weapons program misses an important conclusion; if the legitimate

security interests of any state are not recognized in the face of an overwhelming and possibly

aggressive nuclear presence, then a long-lasting solution regarding the legitimacy of a states

59

For information regarding changes in Iran’s policy towards Israel, see Menashri, 157-158.

27

nuclear program will remain vaporous and intangible, because of the profound underlying

incentives to build counter-balancing nuclear weapons.

Hence, the ironies and contradictions of proliferation policy continue to haunt American

interests throughout the Middle East. Rather than taking an optimistic view of nuclear

proliferation, allowing any state to acquire nuclear weapons as it will lead to a ‘balance of

terror,’ while concurrently refusing to accommodate a completely pessimistic viewpoint

requiring the gradual and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, demonstrates that a middle

ground policy between the two extremes is untenable. The continued presence of nuclear

weapons in any state, regardless of political persuasion, will ultimately provide a significant

incentive and security threat for other states to develop their own balancing nuclear force. The

United States cannot have it both ways in the Middle East; either Israel is forced to give up its

nuclear weapons program, or other states within the region must be allowed to pursue and

develop their own counter-balancing program.

Achieving regional stability in the Middle East will require a more constructive approach

to Iran’s nuclear program, balancing Iran’s fears of foreign aggression with the need for regional

security.60

Engagement by the Europeans has demonstrated that the Iranian government is

willing to negotiate, due to its vested interest in maintaining economic connections and ensuring

regime survival against potential domestic unrest, but none of these diplomatic advances

displaces the significant destabilizing presence of Israeli nuclear weapons.61

Prospects for peace

within the Middle East will maintain an intervening and tenuous position as long as a coherent

and respectable global proliferation policy, free from preferential enforcement or ignorance of

the NPT, is non-existent.

60

Bahgat, 425. 61

Bahgat, 440.

28

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