(pP. 10,280 - 10,439 ine.) r. r;. ". ('

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

FOR THE FAR EAST

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

(pP. 10,280 - 10,439 ine.)

NOVEMBER 13. 191§

/. "···.1· r. r;. ". (' ( .. . .... j '-

DAVID NELSON SUTTON

PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c690e4/

Doc. Pros. Dof. __ No. JIq.!..... . 1; 0 •

163 2W( 80) 1151

1468A 1152

2501 1153

2501A 1153-A

163 2W( 81) 1154

1632W(110)1155

163 21J1l( 82) 1156

4160 1157

4160A 1157-A

13 NovmmER 1946

I N D E X

Of

(nono)

r. N D E X

Of

EXHIBITS

12.sU?.£rl.:.P.t :\.9l}

Extr8ct from KIDO's Diary d8tod 16 Octc)ber 1941

KONOYE's Lcttor of Re signa-tion

PArent documont of TOJO tntA~togat1on' of llFleb"" ruory 1946

Extract tburefrom

Entry from KI DO IS Diery dated 17 October 1941

Entry from KIDO I s Diary dated 18 OctobGr 1941

Re the A fmointrwnt of TOJO 35 Pr(-)mier

P3ront document of TOJOrs intcrrog8tion ary 1946

of 28 Janu-

Extrr:ct therefrom

For In Itent!,. Evic1enc~

10281

10284

10289

10289

10291

10293

10294

10301

10301


Doc. PI' os. Def. _No. No. -E0o!.---.--4160B 1157-B

4160c 1157-C

2510 1158

2510-A 1] 58-A

15-E 1159

2745 1160

1532D (1) 1161

1632VV(112) 1162

1532D( 2) 1163

I N D E X

Of

EXHIBITS

(cont.)

For In DescriDtion I dent. Evidence

Extrr'cts from tho TOJO interrogation. (p. 3) dr\tcd 28 Janurry 1946

Extrncts frc,m the TOJO interrogation (pD.4 ond 5) deted 2P January 194·6

Parent document of TOJO·t s int0rrog~tion doted 12 H::'rCD 1946 10308

Extr~cts from raJa's intcrrogntion (pp. 1,4,6,8, q rnd 10) dated 12 M~rch 1946

TG1egror:l dated 16 October 1941 froM F creign Mini ster 1'OYODA to NOHMURA, in rashinr:ton

Ccrtificotes of tho Japanese Foreign Office 1'0 itens found theroin ro JapBneseIncrican Ncgctintions of 1941 (not read)

Telegram dated 22 October 1941 froM NOMURA to the Nev! Foreign Minister TOGO

Entry froD KI DO f S Dj-Dry dated 29 October 1941

Tc'1cgrBT'1 frorl TOGO to rWI:iFRA dc:ted 2 Novenbor 1941

10304

10305

10308

10309

10311

10312

10314

10315


Doc. _N~

2593D( 7)

2 593D( P.)

1449D

1632W(83)

790t ...

2593D( 9)

Pros. Def. No. No,

1164

1165

1166

1167

1168

1169

1170

I N D E X

Of

EXHIBITS

(cont. )

For In DescriDtion Ident. Evidence

Tc1egroM of 4 Novenber 1941 fran Tokyo to ,"Tnshington (3 ports) 10318

Telegrnm dnto~ 4 Novenber 1941 fron Tokyo to NOHUM 10323

TelegrDT1 noted 4 Novonber 1941 fron Foreign Hini ster TOGO to Nm.ruRi~ ro KURUSU bein[ sGnt to the United States 10328

Policy for Guiding Public Opinion on British nnd Ancric~n ProbleMs Agreed by the Cnbinct Meeting on 4 Novc~ber 1940 -Bo~rd of Infornrtion 10330

Extr~ct fron entry of M['rquis KIDO's Dinry 5 Noverber 1941 10331

llODsures Tounrds Foreign Countri.cs in Rclction to the "Principle of Execution of Nrtionol Policy of the Enpire!! v.rhich WDS decided st the Mesting in Presence of the Emperor on 5 Novenbor . 10333

Te1egrr.n frOp.l Tokye· to NOVIURi'. do t EJd 5 N ovenb€; r 1941 10343


Doc. Pros. Def. ....Nsh No. No.

2 593D( 10) 1171

4058A 1172

2537A 1173

2593D(11) 1174

990 1175

1443 1176

2 593D( 13) 1177

2 593D (14) 1178

1532D( 5) 1179

1532D( 6) 1180

I N D E X

Of

EXH~BITS

(cont1d)

For In Qescription Ident. Evidence

Te.legram from Tokyo to NOMURA doted ~ November 1941

Telegram from the German Foreign Office to Washi~gton and Rome elated 8 November 1941

Extra ct from liT he Tokyo NichiNichi" datel) 12 Nov8mber 1941 commenting on Winston Churchil]ts Speech

TeleGram from Tokyo to Washington dated 11 November 1941

Principal Reasons Alloged for the Commenc(~ment of Hostilities Against the U. G. A. and Britain

General Outline for ilastening the Conclusioll of War Against the U. S. A. Great Britain, Nether-1andr, anJ the Chunking Regime, elated. 12 November 1941

TEllegram from NOM1JRA to Tokyo da tE)Q 14 November 1941

Telegram of 16 Novomber 1941 from TOGO to Washington

Telogrum from KURUSU tu Foreign Minister TOGO dated 18 Novomb(:-)r 1941

Telegram frmn TOGO to NOMURA JDted 20 Novomber 1941

10345

10351

10352

10354

10373

10376

10380


Doc. Pros. NQ.!. .Ji2.!.-

1632W( 84) 1181

1072B 1182

2593D(16) 1183

1532D(7) 1184

1532D ( 8 ) 1185

15-J 1187

2 593D (41) 1188

Def. No.

I ]"f D E X

Of

EXHIBI'N;

(contrd)

For In Jdcrlt. ]}vid()nQ:.~

Extract from Entry of Marquis KIDO's Dirry dntod 19 17 OVEHnbe:c 194·1

Excerpts frow the rocords of the Inv8stig&tioJl ComIni tt(j(: of th~J Pr:tvy COl~nci1 r'o Prolongation of Anti-CominLcrn Poct (~P.1-7 inclusive; pp.l1, '4 1 r' .... , .)

Te1ogrom from TOGO informing NOMUIiA DDd KLnUSU of ;:m oxtonE;ion of thn D0gotia tiuDs deadline from 25 Novomber to '-'9 .,TO'~C r' 1·. ,~ 19 " ] c. J.\J y ;jd..)I';.l., ~ "·r.

Tolcgr::-~m from NOLIUEA to TOGO ro interviow which he and KURUSU h,1d with Mr. Bul1anti.ne and the Secretory of St3te on 23 NovcnJ:x:r 19!r1

'r e 1cgram to NOTvlUHA from For(;i.f,n Minister TOGO d~ted 24 Nov(;mber 1':'41

T(;logrnm from TOGO to NOMURA dDtC:cl 24 HOVC;l)::)Cr 1 ;~1

To1egrom from thu Ja.pcmoso Amb3ssador at Unnoi doted 25 1J ovembET 1941 to T o}~yo

Report from tho JapGnGso Amb:)ssDdor Dt Bangkok to Tokyo dJtcd 25 November 1941

10391

10399

10L~01

10407

10410

10411

10414


Doc. _No.

2593D(19)

1632W(85)

15-G

2539A

Pros. Daf. No. No.

1189

1190

1191

1192

I N D E X

Of

EXHIBITS

(cont'd)

For In Description

TologrDm fron NOMURA and KURUSU to Tokyo dotod 26 Novombor 1941

Ident. Evidence

Extr[Jct from an Entry in Morquis KIDO's Di:ry dated 26 Novc:mber 1941

Extract of t'.:lephone conv(Jrsation of 27 NovcmouT' 1941 betw(Jon KURUSU and YAMAMOTO of the Foreign Office

Extract from liThE: Tokyo NichiNichi" of 29 November 194-1 1'e Cabinet Recognizes Pross Now System - "Journ81istic PIGn Proposed by Newspapor Leaders Given Approval"

10418

10429

10430

10438


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10,280

Wednesday, 13 Novetlber, 1946

INTERNIl.TIONAL rULITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE F LR E:.ST

Court House of the Tribunal Wor llinistry Building

Tokyo, Japon

The Tribunal roet, pursuont to odjournr;;ent,

10 at 0930.

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Jl. npcnror.cc s:

For the Tribunol, sar:::e DS boforc rJith the

exception thnt the HONOR,:\BLE JU-,\O-tIEI, 1.1er::ber froe

tho Republic of Chino is nO\7 sitting and tho HONOPu\BLE

R. B. PAL, Ecr.:bor fror::;. IndL:l, not sittj_ng.

For the Prosecution Section, sare as before.

For the Defense Section, SODe as before.

(Eng1is~ to Japanese ond Jopanese

to Engli sh interpre;totion wa s roD de by the

Langu:Jge Section, UlTFE.)

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o r s ()

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----~-l

NARSHAL OF TP.E COURT: The International

MiJ_itary Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present

except OKA'flA and HIRANtJI;/IA, who are represented by

their respective counsel~ We have a certificate from

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I

I I

the prison surgeon at Sugamo certifying that the accused I HIRANUIIlA is too ill to attend today. The certificate

will be recorded and filed.

MR. F IHELLY: 1Ve had reD ched in the chrono-

logical order of events yesterday, the date October 16,

1941.

We next offer in evidence a f~rther extract

from the KIDO Diary of October 16, 1941~ International

Prosecution document 1632-1Q-80, which relates to

the resignation of the third KONOYE Cabinet.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF TH~ COURT: Prosecution's document

no. 1632-V! -80 will receive exhibit No. 1151.

(Whereupon, the document above

referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit

No. 1151, and was received in evidence.)

MR. FIHELLY~ I now read from prosecutiGn

i I

24 exhibit No. 1151:

25


10,282

1 "Extrr> ct frcn Entry fr:'D ~.II~rquis KI DO f s

2 DL~ry, 16 Oct 41.

3 "Ii t 8: 30 t1. D. Pre sident suzmu visited r}8,

4 ~nd De discussed the Prince1s Crbinet. The re~sens I

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gnve hin fer onprsinr the Prince's C'binet nro rs

fc11C'ws:

shru1d be cprried out rn1y vilion unrv(idrble, fer ex-

rf circunstnnco nokc sit nE.'cessnry t~ hnvc, [1 Prtnc(:

"3. In n wry the frrnrtirn rf this Drince's

subjocts, ~>nd n rrc:n t l)rcblcn wC'u1d be

crc)·' ted if v!nr vltth the U.S." .• wen:; tc breck cut when

such r Cr:binet existc.;cl. There VIer· tnnrrt'· nt re r sens

v:hy even Prince KONOYE vvt'.S prcvcmtcd frcl[ cr:rrying cut

the pr1icies decided rt Cruncils in the In~Grio1 pros-

ence, rn(~ if ';10 rsk n ;"enbcr (f tho Innerirl Hruse t(,

rSSW1C r rcs~rnsibi11ty ho crnnct fulfil, it wluld

cruse the Ir,'}orirl H;nsc tc bec(~"e ~n cbject cf ---"..1.b11c

hrtred. 1I


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"At 3:00 p.m. ')'nr Hinister TOJO celled on

l'1e to rCr)('rt cn the lJrcssinp T)('1iticol situotiC'n. I ''R-1/~i

C;l'1('sed }1is ide<'. (Of the PI'j nce' s C:--binet fer thE. S<'.1"18 . '1. ' I PO)>') Lea ,jc < ~ -fA.£- dpc,/§., '/;0: ~* «I The .L'y>,pn-,4./ . '~/:,~rC'/l"C- /,h ,'),; *",;'n,,j~'f

rer s ['nS wl'ich I hnd Declo cler'r tc SUZUKI 'hi" ftt¥g:e{ttFre I ~ tu.;; e. r?i 1/),..:,;-- t!4rc. leGS' 4/i j J (/" 4"'0' +A<'-. ' I

revjsirn cf the resolution rf the Council in the In- I • i /'! )

.r~ j-l;-<""'5eo'-,1,,,,, .>J<.<'vt's s'7 <:J.,L '7'?-tA:!' {-I'r. .,; .. z~

DEri01 presenco 9 ond ~ ~if3.ed ne}~;l ~-t-ltt:--~~ -J.J,-c:. Ih n',! d- fA..c N-':f. Z ... 5~SS ed~.., >'= -7"~ 'S 1<..45' ~.e /'C"45",L dLr ',1,,<~~7'

-the N"'lTYT,-twe-fulIdtdlOttrR4:~foo 6, Il~, wi thcut which no /'o~L.

nrt}cnol "lr0F!rcss cculd bo expected,

"ll. t 4: 00 1') .n, Princ c KG:'JOYF. tele phrned tn

soy th~t the Crbinot wes going to rosign 'en bloc'. I

w['s c'strnished by the snddcnnc~ss ct"' this announconont.

I visitod the Emperor nt 4 p.n. tr ropert upen the

generDl rcsignrtion rf tho KONOYE C~binot. ~t 5 p.n.

Prince KONOYE tonclorod the Cnbinct Hinisters' rosign[l-

ti 0ns to thE'; Thrcne. I YJ"O S racei vod in [mdionce by

tho Emnorcr fron 5:30 p.m. to 5:45 p.n. to Dnswer his

quest:i.cns rogrrding the SUccoGcUng Crb:i.nc;t."

- , ""'5 ....... 4'. 0"" :7


And as a part--

2 THE PRESIDENT: It seems in the penultimate

3 paragraph you should have inserted; "I pointed out

4 that the decisions made at the Imperial Conference on

5 September 6 were rather careless, and I urged. . ."

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MR. FIHELLY: There is inserted at the bottom

in ink, there is a line which should have gone in the

fifth paragr~ph, as your Honor was just reading:

flI pointed out that the decisions made at

the Imperial Conference on September 6 were rather

careless, and I urged the revision of the resolution.

as I read it.

We now offer in evidence International Prose-

cution document l468-A, which is KONOYE' s lettE:Jr of

resignat1on.


CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document

No. l468-A will receive exhibit No. 1152.




rim. FIEELLY: I now read prosf3cution exhibit

No. 1152.

"LETTER OF RESIGNLTIO:f\! AS FRHliE MINISTER BY PHINCE FDMIM1.RO KONOYE TO H. M. 'TIm

EMPEROR

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".fiY His Mejestyts Humble Servf'nt, Fumim8ro

"When I, Your Mejesty's humble servent un

expectedly received pn Imperic>l Comm2nd to orgenize

c Cebinet for F third time, it WE: 8 Tny firm conviction I

thet, in order that we cen mpncge the present politi-

cEI situ2tion 80 ['s·to enable future nFtionrl expen-

sion, "Ie mu",t find e speedy soluti.on for the China

Incident bv C'djusting rel2tions with the Uniteo StE'tes

on friendly terms. Therefore, I heve expressed my

wishes to the United Ste'tes Government soliciting f'n

opportunity for friendly pFrleys.

"Recently ~ however, 1'rmy IHlinister TOJO, who

judged that such negotiEtions could not possibly be

m2teri2lized before the ~esired time ([bout ~he middle

or lrtter pErt of Ortober), 2nd who bel,ieved the sit-

u~tion hrd come to ~ point 'When no other merns cpn

be founc to cE'rry through our C'emends •• ' found in

the 3rd rrticle of tAn Outline of How to Execute the

NE'tionE'1 "olicies of Our Eplylire, I 'which met Imperial

0[nction following the conference in the ~resence of

His Mrjesty h8ld on the 6th of September, this ye[>r,

hE'S corne to the conclusion th['t the time he's E'rrived

24 to open VJE'r cgc:inst the Pnited 8tetes. I

15 I "When I consider the mc.ttE::r Cc reful1y, how-

ever, I still believe th2t provided we hc:ve pmple


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time, not onJy is it erroneous to think thot 211 nego

tietions VJith the United Stetes rre hopeless but that

pven the most difficult 0uestion involved, the ques

tion of with~rpwing our troops, cen be settled if we

trke the ottitude of yielding to her in rppeerence

by keeping for us the substrnce rnd c2sting ew~y the

nrme. It is utterly impossible for Your Mrjesty's

humble servrnt FumimC'ro, 'who is feeling much respon

sibility ever since the outhreek of the Chinr Inci-

dent, to endure plunging the netion ogrin into 0

titrnic ~er the outcome of which crnnot be forec2st

when even thG Chinp Incident hrs not yet been settled.

"For these reF80ns Fumimrro believes th2t

now is the time for the Government rne the militery

16 to coopcrr te in unity towprds mfterirlizing our nc-

17 fotiE'tions with the Unit(~d Stt'tes by exerting our

18 very utmost, thus to bring ['bout settlement viii th

19 Chinr, which is now urgent necep-sity from the stend-

20 point of recovering nationel strength 28 well rs

21 stEhilizinf" populr-r f1orrle. And if 'we hc:ve c:ny de-

22 sire for rdvencing our nrtionel fortunes now is the

23 vEry time for us to step beck r bit to prepere for 24

a for~frd leop, rnd to ~fke the people struggle for-25

wprd ~ore brrvely for the sovereign rnd the strte

endurj,ng _hcLrdsh:i.--P_fnd DriVe tien. " -.---.--~--.--.- - ." .. - -- --.-=---. ..:._--,---_ ...


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"I, Your Mf'jesty's humble servrnt, hcve

done r:y best to prevril upon Army Minister TOJO by

l<'ying opcn to him my inmost feelings. However, the

A~my Minister"persistently clr:imed thet though he

pErfectly understood the toil rnd feelings of the

Prime Minister, it wes im~ossible to consent to the

v~lithdrc.'wC'l of troops from the stE'ndpoint of mpin

trining their morr'le, ['nd moreover, thet once the

United St~tes WeS yielded to, she would epply still

more overberring ms['sures t'nd might even forget

where to stop; fnd thr't even if the Chine' Affpir WFS

settled, it wrs possible thf't r repture might occur

pgrin in two or three years; Fnd thrt ps internel

i:'lerknesses were existrnt both in the Dni ted Stptes

endlr'prn we should not lose this opportunity for p

y,lrr with her.

"I, Fumimrro, conferr0·d \1111 th him on four

sepcrrte occesions but hpve failed to meke him ,'gree

vJi th me, rnd rm now um'b16 to carryon the grrve

responsibilities of rssisting the Throne ~ccording

to my QV"n convictions, due solely to my wrnt of

ebilities, for which I humbly beg Your Mrjesty 1 s

T)ordon.

111, Your ~.~r,jesty's humble servtnt, beseech

Your Mrjesty to rele['se me from this importrnt post. lI

----.----- ._-


10,288

"October 16, 16th yepr of Shown (1941)

"Prime Minister of CebinE-t, Prince !:t'uminiaro KONOYE."


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We next offer in evidence International

Prosecution document 25'Ol-A, which is an extract

from the TOJO interrogation of February 11, 1946,

pages 2 to 5', and ask that the parent document be

marked for identification.

CLERK OF TEN' COURT : ~irosecution t s d ocumen t

No. 25'01 will receive exhibit No. 115'3 for identifi

cation onl~r.



No. 1153 for identiflcation.)

THE PRESIDENT: The excerpt is admitted on

the usual terms.


No. 2501-A, an excerpt from the foregOing, will be

given exhibit No. 1153-A.


referrec to was marked prosecution's exhibit

No. 115'3-A, and was received in evidence.)

VIR. FIHELLY ~ I now reae. fror.1 prosecution

21 exhibit 1153-A, from pages 4 and 5' of the interrogation

22 found on pages 1 and 2 of the exhibit referring to

23 tho gGner,q 1 date Oc tober 17, 1941.

24 IIQ Did JTou feel, at the time the KONOYE

2) Cabinet fell on or about 17 October 1941, that war


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should be declared against the United States and the

other three riations?

"A At that time I felt, as War Minister,

that the opportune time Jor fighting was in danger of

being lost and the Imperial Conference had set the

mi6dle ten cays of October as the limit for waiting

for R favorable diplowatic break."

Page 5 of the interrogation extract:

ItQ Vias it not because of the fact' that

you, as War J}anistGr, favor~d war with the United

States that the KONOYE Cabinet fell on or about

17 October 194~?

"A Theoretically, yes. IONOYE thought

that a diplomatic solution was still possible if Japan

would withdraw troops from China, but the Army felt

that there would be no guarantee that the unlawful

acts of the Chinese, which had caused the Incident,

would not be re sur::"ied if the troops were withdrawn

before their purpose had been achieved, and the Army

eo uld not bertr to so wi thdrR'W tho troops.1I

Following the resignation of the third

;'ONOYE CabinE,t, a Sonior Statesmen I s Conference was

convened by KIDO nnd at this conference the defendant

KILO proposcld the name of trw defendant TOJO as the

~ new PrGoier. KIDD's account of this is set forth in


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10,291

his diary entry of October 17, 1941, which we now

offer in evidence;, 1nt ernationa1 Prosecution document

No. 1632-W-81.

THE PRESIDE~IT: Admitted on 'the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COtffiT: Prosecution's document

No. 1632-W-,s1 will receive exhibit No. 1154.


referred to wr; s marked prosecution t s exhibit


MR. FIHELLY: I now read from prosecution

exhibit 1154, the K1DO Dtary extract of October 17,

1941.

"A t 11 [t .m. Chief Secretf'ry MATSliTIAIR.A

visited me to mr:ke crrrngements for e senior stete ..

menrs conference. It wrs held from 1:10 p,m. to

3:45 p~m" :.1.:n the west ante-chember of the Pr-lDce.

Those presE'nt were \Ed ~cO'",:t KIYOURA (92 yee.rs old),

Mr. WAKATSUKI, !zsMiPt'.1 OKADA, ~cne!ftd HAYLSHI, Mr.

RIBOTA, C--efiorcl LBE, ildmttt:tl YC\~AT, all cx .. Premiers

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I exp18 ~ned . .I1 I -;> I- v(' <"/?f-~ .(-

the situption of' the generDl resigDe·i:l:Y1.,. .M?_. {-I i ~. /U ~J-7yz...ryL&A·{(la.~·u Vi &:r'~ 1('f;.~ -h;l /fkt/YI/ iv~d.(~l/ v~¥J.l'8VlH re~ded Genc! aI:eU~LKI t(s-'~ 3ucceed- _j i

tit··.tL IA.t ./!.u~~ ~ ~ r:!~ /.k.<)"~~ a. /' Y~r~ ~ 27l.e.- ;

~ng Pre:n~~~ alCi ~eneJ'cl1-·--HA¥A&H±· di;:,',: Wei .:>ed :the ( ... ' "1.. / i)yfrtfflf! ~tc::z...~· . t!.-....,..... ",.Q...L-:y_~ J(!/i.~,;,-,~<....- ~ ,/x1 y/LL... ~i?~

"'EI'! ~ J:"V'Ir r< • ,,;. 1'> {. . n ~Lul ... ~".iL.. ~;'d.£ /~>)-"<""-tr/,,/,

I t'I asserted thE.t the most important things 1--., ... __ ._-_.


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10,292

were the rE~vision of the decision of the lest Council i'2fd: &'

in the Irrll')erif:'l prGSEncE!, pnd the unity of opinion

TOJO rs Premier end VIer Minister~ even though he

is on~tfi~tery~~e. I met no objection to my

--ro':'osC'l, Kr. HIROTJ..., eenerrl LEE, ['nd Mr. lli.RL,

('riving me p05i ti ve C'.~:,,::,rovf'l. The meeting broke

up [It 4 p.m. I rei::"orted to the Emperor the det('ils

of the progress of the ex-Premiers Conference ['nd

telked with him until 4:15 n.m. The VIer Minister i

i proceeded to the PalBce C'.t the reauest of the I

Emperor to receive th~ ImperiC'.l Order for the formetion! /' ! ....::.. ,,' -~ '"

;-Y~L-t--"'-f',.!.-i-; ..... <-Z,_>(~/-4.--0 /¥~~ '--'L-~/~/?-/,_ .... //,--,<'y:"-I I '/ of c: new Ct'binet. ~--4w~ r6J lo¥rW--i=J.y--t-fi-e---¥i-s:i:t Gf- I

-< .. .,1-. /d- /> . . /1 .; . , 1....!,:.a/ y'~' ,?/J.--""""- ---4"._"& <?f/t:.._.J.,~. < '-(/L---'=e:-:: -.Y/~//-,/c: __ -' .. /~- ";;,-- L_...-~--;t.-0

Ne'mr Mini':i"l;Er OIKLWj, ~-WhBfB:~~--EJ1h').C.X.cr--P;.c.:v:.e..---f'...a~~· ! -: v J .L ,_

t~-(;- .-t;L/2-'-£-'/r..._~'L~?::A.·_~")/L/ 0'dL-b'L-~2... ___ :2rc ... / >!_./,..L-G. :::'-""'2-/~"< -c.-- ," ~/rI- ?->.!-i>~'-/'t trt7--t-!1:€~-'0."f::;·r:"'rt---tfl.e.t-t...ae--tffii..t-y.--ef---e~"'·iTICl<f .. :p"-:-: .. -....2:.7gt--¥\r-een 7

i tfie.-rd~----,-:"ldQ-G. ---t-Re--~W-v-y-v~-B-~:y-4€.g-±±,~-b~" I pC' sse d f

on to the~.ro,irl_. p.n. r n. te-:.r . . 9pm. t.'h~.:r. 011. o.wincg?0 S S2,g~ /1 .;" -,1".", ,"';"<!;L.;~:;;. _ ,'-~ ':."j/d,/ J_-2,CA.../~~·/j,c'<~r:"--'lJ../ ;;{", ~""'-/7L/(~r(-c/c

rS OrCET~(rf~ytf{e Einper"or::~ -In'/CI~-1iding thG fundt'ment['l i

-;/""..-L

::,cJ iC;,t of our country .. -e need not neces:::::-clly follow

the decisions of the Council in the Imperirl presence

on the 6th of September, but should study ct'refully

conditions both ['t home rnd E'brorc."


10,293

L .-!

1 We next offer in evidence an entry from..~he· .. i.

2 KIDO Diary of· October 18, 1941, International Prosepu-

~, tion document 1632 .. W-IIO, which relates to the .dei:en-

4 dent TOJO :remaining in active military.' service.when.

5 he was Premier and also being a full general.

G

n o

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12

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual teTms t' '.

CLilltK OF THE COURT: Prosecutiontsdocument

No, l632-W-lIO will receive exhibit No~ 1155.


referred to was marked prosecutionts exhibit

No. 1155, and was received in ovidence.)

HR. FIHELLY: I now read the entry of .

October 18, prosecution exhibit 1155~ I "I proceeded to tho Palace at 9 a.m. an4 WetS ' I

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I

recoived in audience by tho Emperor at 9cl5 to pre-

sent a memorial to tha throne from Prince KANIN, to

which the Emperor gave his sanction. The nemorial

was concerned with War Minister TOJO's remaining on

active service and with his promotion to full genera~.

",\'jent to _~II

I agr(>3 there is nothing important in the

rest of it, unless someonE) else wants me to rea.¢. it,

There is one statement: "War Hini;;ter TOJO

was rc;ceived 'in audicmce at 3 and presGnted the list

of his cabinet members." " .. 1. ... - ..... - .. -.

' ..


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I We now come to an extract from the KIDO

Diary of Octobor 20, 1941, relating to the appointm.ent

of TOJO as Premier and the part that the defendant

KIDO played in it. This is International Pros0cution

document No. 1632-W-82, which we now offer in ()videriCe.


CLERK OF THE CotmT: Prosecution's document

No. 1632-VI-82 will recei va exhi bi t No. 1156.


referred to was markod prosecution's exhibit



10,295

r---'-~-~-~ -.. -.---------- .. -.------.- -----.-.- ... -----------.-- --... --. ---J

" I MR 0 FIHELL Y: We put this entry in evidence

: jin fairness to the defendcmt KIDO, but it will be for

- !the Tribunal to form its O"NI1 opinion 2S to KIDO's reel o i ) I

Imotives in sponsoring TOJO for the premisrshj.p. I now 4\ 5 lror-d from prosecution

61of October 20, 19L1·l:

exhibit No. 1156, KIDO's entry

I 7

"I received grc::cious words from His l'.:c-.jcsty

on e ccount of my efforts in connection wi th the c2..b1net 8

9 chc:mge. I WeS truly moved.

10 "I told His :'lC: j e sty thc.t onrc; mistcJ;;:c,n step

II taken in the present cC'binet chrmgc might heve inrd-

12 vertently plunged us into war. Lfter crr0ful consider-

13 etion I beli~ve this to be the only way of giving c new

14 turn to the si tuc::tion r.nd hE'd thus recommended it. His

\5 M2,jE:Sty understood me WE'll replying ',As it is seid you

l() know, -- I He who will not go into the tigrr I S den will

17 not get the tiger cub. I

18 "I V12S impressed."

19 Hill. LOGAN: If the Tribunal pler.se.

20 THE PR~ SIDENT: Mr. Logem 0

21 MR. LOGAN ~ -'iTe seriously nb j Gct to prosecu-

22 I tion making statements thct he intends to show Mr.~rquis I

23 IKIDO' s reel motive. I

24 II th~ t th . t - ere ere two different motives and I 2m qUl e

In tho first place, it is assuming

25 I ICGrtain thp.t these documents 2S submitted of f1Jntrif)S

L_~ _______________ . ________ .___ _ _ __________________ .. ______ ~ _____ .. __ _ PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c690e4/

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-------~-~"--~-'-~'-.-- ------~

from Mc.rquis KIDO' s diary, when corrf:ctly trcmslc:ted

2nd correctly interpreted, will show there is only one

reel renson, not two different rec:sons DS the prosccu-

tion is trying to present to this 'Tribunal.

THE F3ES IDf,NT ~ I t is too enrly to hc:ve d is-

cussions about the meaning of documents. ;"e 3rc con-

fined, for the time being, to their actuel vITording.

MR. FIHELLyg If I mc.:y say, il'Ir. President, I

think counsel is mistaken in saying thDt I made such

[; stftement. I said we were offering this entry in

fc.:irnoss to KIDO end it was for the Tribunal to 2sccr-

t8in what his real motives were. Th~t is ell I s~id.

THE PRES IDENT ~ You mc:~y hc:ve gi.ven the impres-

sian that you qUGstioned his motives. l·i

15 MR. FIHELLY~ H[lving r(;2chcd tho Doint where

16 the C2binet wC':s formed which held offico et the out-

17 brec.k of the Pncific Wer ~nd for some time thcreofter,

18 we desire to call the Court's attention to the posi-

19 tions, if any, held during the regime of the 'l'OJO

20 Cebinet until the Pcr.rl H~rbor and [~ssociat8d attccks

21 by erch of the Lccused, 2S shown by Pros()cution (::xhibits

22 Nos. 102 to 129, inclusive.

23 TOJO wes Prime Minister, Wer Minister end for

24 0 short time Home Minister, President of the China

25 Affairs Board and 2 Supreme "or Councillor. TOGO was

---------------- --,


10,297

1 Foreign Minister, Overseas Minister, Vice ~r6sident

2 of the Chine Aff2irs Board Dnd n Supreme War Councillor.

3 SHI1'.'lJ)A was N2VY I:t~nister nnd Vic8 Prestdent of the

4 China Affairs Board. KAYA was Finance I\Unistcr c;nd

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Vice President of the China Affairs Board. SUZUKI wrs

Minister of state end President of the Planning Board

['.nd 2: member of the Committee on Thought Control ond

the Totel War Institute end Chief Director of the China

Iffairs Bureau. HOSHINO was Q Minister of St2tC and

was Chicf Secretary of the C,binct. KIDO vvF.'s Lord

Keeper of the ?rivy Sep.l. KIMURA W?,S Vice Ihnistcr of

12 vier • OSHII:r.A WD s j mbas spdor in Berlin .snd J2p2nesc

13 member of the Germcn-Itslic>.n-Jnpenesc Snccir:l Council

14 in Berlin.

15 The following accused were holding navrl 2nd

16 mili t2ry appointments. NAGANO W[~S Chicf of the }h':vc,l

17 Gcnerc::l Staff and a Supreme Wer Councillor. ]'.:1UTO we s

18 Chief of the Military Affairs Board in the Foreign

19 Ministry, and SATO WeS his Chief ! ssistent r.::nd Sccrc-

20 tery of [: number of government commi ttces. OK..A hE'.ld

21 the corrcsnonding position in the NDVY Ministry cs

22 Chicf of the Bureau of Naval and :~ilit&ry tfrairs nnd

23 assistant to the Navy Minister in Imperial He2dquartsrs.

24 He was r.::lso 2 Japanese member of the Gcrm2n-Itnlirn-

25 Jc;pancse i\~ixcd Experts Commi ttce in 'l'okyo c:nd 2 I

i ------------~.,..--...~"I"'r.......---------.~--------.. -~-.~.---.---~~


Councillor of the Burecu of l!1onchurir'n Aff[:irs.

2 DOHIHARA we.s Chic:f of the Air Insnectorcte [md (}

3 Supreme iJar Councillor. HA'l'l~ W[,S Commc:mder-in-Chlcf

4 of the Expeditionary Force in Central Chin8.. 11'LGl~=~I

') W2S Commender-in-Chief of the KW2ntung Army 2nd

6 Ambo; s sE.dor to Mc,nchukuo. rUNAMI wcs Govcrnor-Genere,l

7 'of Koree;, 0 Of the rem2inder, SHIGn.nl'ZU WeS cn 2dviro'r

8 to the Foreign Ministry. KOISO wes n gener8.l on the

9 reserve list. Ml.l'STJI, c;, general retired. HIRJ..NtT:1jIA

10 e.nd IIIROTA were ex-Premiers cmd as such 2ttendcd the

11 meetings of Senior Statesmen. ThE former wos also (}

12 member of the Thought Control COElmi ttee 0. OKNlITA 1;1Tr.:.S

1.3 Director General of the [cst Asi2 Rese2rch Institute

14 atteched to the South NLc:nchurio Rr-:ilway, while ARLKI ~

15 HASHIMOTO 2nd SHIRATORI, [S wall c:s the deceased

16 1VIP"l'SUOKA~ hod cccsed to hold Dny officic:l positions.

THE PRESIDENT~ l:Iejor Furness.

1,'1Rt'FURNESS g If the Court plc2sa, I think

t9 c.t lcrst t\I'1~terrors were mede in th:Jt statement: one,

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thet MUTohad '.ny connection with the Foreign Office;

two, tho;t uUI'ing this period SHIGmUTSU h(~ld eny office

in the govu'nmcnt.

THE PRESIDENT ~ C2ptnin Brooks •

IvrR. BROOKS: In the case of Gener['l KOISO, I

record to show thot in 1940, July


.,.. ".: ": .'~; .. : ;"',

10,299

-- - - --- ~-----~----- -----~-~------------ -- ------- --, 1 the 22nd, the exhibit referring to Goner8l KOISO shows

2 that ho retired at thnt time 8S 2 priv2te citizen, did

3 not hcvc ~ny official or milit2ry post for 8 period of

4 ye2rs ofter 1940. Exhibit 114, to which lcprned

5 counsel hEls referred, shows thc::t he wrts pl~ced on the

6 reserVE; list, ['t his own request, on July 29'] 1938~

7 ['nd retired from mili trry service since th[:t period.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. How['rd.

9 JYITL HOWARD~ Mr. President) v'e think thrt the

10 prosecutor W[~S in 8rror when h8 stcted Mr~ H0811INO W2S a

11 Minister of Stcte at thet time.

12 THE PRESIDENT~ Mr. Levin.

13 MR. LEVIN: 2fr. PreSident, I 7JOuld like to

1.4 suggest the impropriety of c;g['in referring to [) ll2tt8r

15 which is 2lrc:cdy in evidence. The personnel record

16 of ('nch of the nCCllsed WFS "Out in evidence in the

17 early steges of this co.se. It seems to us it is 2

18 matter of summc:tion 2nd 2rgumcnt to direct o..ttcntion

19 to p2rticular evidence th,:, t is 2lr(;['dy in the cc,sc,

20 and under the circumstances we object to the reference

21 to evidence thElt is 2lrc8dy in. 22

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s p r a t t

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10,300

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it is a gre8.t con

venience to the Court to have the names of the ac-

cus~d who are alleged to have been taking part in

the more important events as we receive the evidence

of those events, but only, of course, if we get

correct info~mation.

1ffi. FIEELLY: We will check the record again.

]li.R. LEVIN: My associates call my attention

to the fact that the statement with reference to . Gener~l Suzuki was also inaccurate. We will correct

it at the proper time.

ER. FIHELLY: This data, Mr. President, was

taken from the exhibits I have mentioned -- 102 to

129. I will be glad to go over it again and also

t~ke into consideration the statements counsel made

in that connection and make any proper statement to the

Court if the corrections are warranted.

THE PRESIDENT: You might revise the exhibit.

Perhaps it is not quite correct.

MR. FIHELLY: We will be? glad to check on

th.? t too, your Honor.

'1Ile now offer in evidence International

Prosecution document No. 4l60-A, extracts from the

l'0J·O interrogation of Januery 28, 1946, pages 1 and 2.

TIlli PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.


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lO,3~1

MR. FlEELLY: I ask that the basic one be

marked for identification.


No. 4160 will receive exhibit No. 1157 for identifi-

cation only.


mentioned was marked prosecution's exhibit

No. 1157 for identification only.)

CLERK OF TIm cot~T: And the exeerpt there-

10 from, to-wit, document No .. 416o-A, will receive

11 exhibit No. 1157-A.

12 ('Nhereupon, the document above

13 referred to was marked prosecution!s ex-

14 hibit No. 1157-A and r~ceived in evidence.)

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MH. FlHELLY: I now read ... he extracts from

proseoutionts exhibit No. 1157-A from the 1nterroga

tlon of Janurtry 28, 1946:

"Q. On 20 January 1941, Mr. Yosuke HA':'GUOKA.,

who was then Foreign Minister in the Japanese Govern-

ment, is reported to have said to the Diet in part: n I

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"'Needless to saYt the aim of Japanese foreign

policy is that of enabline all nations of the world

each to take its own proper place in accordance with

the spirit of Hakko Ichin, the ideal which inspired

the foundation of our Empire. The object of the

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10,302

1 Three-Po~er Pact, concluded between Japan, Germany,

2 and Italy, on September 27 last, is none oth~r than

3 the realization of the same great ideal •••.• The

4 pact state s t1:-'at Germany and Italy recognize and re-

5 sjJect the leadership of the Japanese in the establtsh-

6 ment ~f a new order in Greater East Asia.'

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IIQ Did you agree with this at that time?

\lA. I do not remember whetller this was spoken

on tbe main floor of the House or not, but I think

it is reasonable. I did agree with it at that time.

ilQo Did not Japan, by the terms of the Three-

Power Pact, also recognize the leaders~ip of Germany

and Italy' in the European sphere?

riA. Yes. I have explained before that by the

word 'leac}ers>ip', it was intended that the one Power

would have the ini tiati ve. The languap-e of the Three-

P~wer Pact differs slif'htly from this quotation in

that the words 'position of leadersbip' are specifi-

cally mentioned. One thing I would like to remind

you of - at that time I was not Premier, I was only

--Tar I"inister so I didn't have tt..e responsibility for

ad ministra t ion.

II Q. You became Premier in October of 1941, did

you not?

itA. Yes.


10,30 3

1 II Q. Did not you and the members of your cabi-

21 net, from that time on, work and act in accordance

3 with those same principles stated, f~rst, by MATSUOKA

4 und, secondly by the Tripartite Pact?

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"A.

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Yes~ Of course we did. 1t

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10,304.'

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;,~

VIe next offer in evidence Inte'rnational

Pros~ption document No. 4l60-B, which contains

extrpcts from the TOJO interrogation of January 28,

1946, page 3, and ask that the parent document be

marked for identific~tion.

CLEEK OF THE COTJRT: It "is the s,qme one.

!Vill. FIHELLY: I see , it has already been

8 marked. I se2. Pardon me. So we only want the

9 extract.

10 THE PHESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

11 CLERK OF THE COlffiT: Prosecution's document

12 No. 4l6o-B vIill; receive exhib:i t No. 11 57-B •

13 (~~ereupon, the document above

U referred to wasmarknd prosecution's ex-

15 hibit No. 1157-B and received in evidence.) 16

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rm. FIHELLY: I now read from prosecution's

exhibit No. l157-B, the extract from interrogation

of January 28, 1946:

"Q Did not the sp,p.ere ~f influence to be

qllotted to Germany and ~tf:)ly in Europe also include

countries they were th~n. at W8.T 1,~ith, such as England?

"ll. No, Engl:md wa~ not, I believe, included,

nor were Spain or Portuga~ included in this sphere.

I believe thGt the gene~al matter of what countries

were to be included in the new order in Europe and


1(',105

1 the new order in Asi~ was prob2bly discussed between

2 J apr:n ['no Gerl1:cmy be: sed upon the distribution of

3 forces ct thet timE-~

4 ilQ Then 2S soon 8S countries vvere conqubred,

5 th8y were to be added to this sphere?

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"A Yes."


Prosecution document No. 4160··C, which contains

extracts from the TJJO interTog~tion of Janurry 28,

10 1946, ppges 4 2nd 5. I understend the pE'rent docu-

11 ment hr's been merked for identificption.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Adrd tted on the usu21 terD:s.

13 CLLRK OF TIE. (.()Ulil; Prosecution I s aOCU[flent

14 l~O. 4160-c ·will receive exhi bi t l~o. 1157-C 0

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referred to ~as merked prosecution's exhibit

No. 1157-C ~nd received in evidence.)

.;..ili. FIHLLLY; I nov;' rGad froL prosecution IS

exhibit l~o. 1157-C, questions p·nd ronSVJers from thG

extr~ct of interrogrtion of the dE-fendent TOJ0,

Jrnucry 28, 1946, peges 4 2nd 5:

"Extract frorL Interrogr tion of HiCieki TOJO

"28 Janut;ry 1946 p.4-5 24 ~-+

Then both in Europe 2nd in Asia the sphbre !

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to be included in the new order decrersed or incrGPsed'


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-_. __ ... _--- --------------_. __ .... _-

with the milit~ry situotion?

"A l'hnt w[:s cbout thE.. long 2nd short of it.

I'Q W~J s all of this then in Dccordnnce wi ~h the

spirit of Bakko Ichiu?

itA Yes. As I 8xplained before, it is [' ~on-

6 cept of virtue, not f' territorinl concept.

7 "Q. rins the SF'me concept of virtue'to be [I p8rt

8 of thE: sphEre to be controlled by Germany rnd Italy

9 in Europe?

10 "A JnpC:1n's interprctrJtion \'Vns th[~t it was to be

11 ~imilrr, with no exploitotion or special interosts.

12 In fnct, in the Three-Power Trerty, it is expressly

13 stated th:', t each country is to have its ovm plnco

14 2nd thDt there is to be co~e:xi:sten~e snd-eo-prosperity

15 in both the East Asiatic ~nd European spheres.

16 "Q l~h[!t reC::lson ',-;['5 there to believe that Ger-

17 mony"nd Italy would hnve this virtuous underst8nding

18; of the new order in EuropG?

19 "P. (Lnughter by the vdtness.) I believe that

20 I GE:,Tm8ny 2nd Itrlly, both of whom hed been exploited as

21 a result of defert in ~orld War I, hrd found it nec-

22 essary in order to exist to set up a sphere within

23 rrIlieh th(~ various countries could minist()r to ench

24 other!s needs. This was a concept within the merning

25 of the 1;yord I virtue! ."


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"Q But this ministrC'tion Vir'S to be done under

t.he supervision of Gsrmony rnd Itnly?

"A It wc-s not supe:rvision but leadership. Gor-

4 mnny end Italy wer0 to hrve the initiative in bringing

5 about a new order of co-existence nnd co-prosperity of

(j I all the countries coneerned.

"Q r.hat VJould h1'1ppcn if one; or more of the con-

E q~cred countries did not wish to join such en or~er?

"A I hc>ve been sper-king of the trE;clty [>.5 it was

10 understood in Jeprn. When you get dorm to specific

11 problems like thr-t, I c."nnot rnswe;r o I might S(1Y

12 th2t I believe th?t 2ny country is not uninterested

L; in its ovm prosperi ty. II

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iNe next offer in evidence International

Prosecution document No. 2510-A, containing extracts

of the interrogation of TOJO, March 12, 1946, pages

1, 4, 6, 8, 9, and 10. We offer that in evidence,

and if the parent has not been mqrked for identifica

tion that it be marked.

CLEEK OF THE COURT: Prosecutton's docum(mt

No. 2510 will be given exhibit No. 1158 for identi

fication only.

(1i'lhereupon, the document r:tbove

mentioned was marked prosecution's exhibit

No. 1158 for identification only.)


CLERK OF THE COURT: The excerpt therefrom,

to wit, document 25l0-A, will receive exhibit No.

1158-A.

(Vfuereupon, the document above

referred to was marked prosecution's ex

hibit No. 1158-A and received in evidence.)

~m. FlHELLY: I now read the two questions

and answers contained in prosecution's exhibit No.

1158-A, found on page 4 of the interrogation extract,

page 1 of the exhibit:

IIQ Yesterday, you explained that the policy,

after the 6 September 1941 Imperial Conference, was,


1 on the one h3nd, to negotiate for pea~e, and on the I

2 f other, to prepare for war. Did you continue that I

3 policy?

"A Yes. I undertook the work as Premier.

5 . I

What matters were discussed and what policies! lIQ

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decided on at the Imperial Conference of 5 November

1941?

"A There wasn't !my Imperial Conference on the

5th of November."

To show that at this stage of the negotia

tions Japan was helping Germany as a member of the

Tripartite Pact, we now offer in evidence Interna

tional Prosecution document No. 15-E, a wire dated

October 16th from TOYODA, as Foreign Minister, to

NOIillRA in Vvashington.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual term~.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution ' s document

No. 15-E 'will be gi van exhibl t No. 1159.


referred to was marked prosecution ' s ex

hibit No. 1159 and received in evidence.)

MR. FlHELLY: I now read prosecution's

exhibit No. 1159:"

"From: Tokyo; To: 1'Jashington. October 16,

1941. #672.


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"The Imperird J apane se Government ha s re-

pea teeny affirmed to the American Government the: t

the ['im of the Tripartite p[:ct is to conjribute

to,:lerd the prevr-mtion of a further extension of

the Europeen WBr. Should, however, the recent

tension in the German-American relotions suffer

aggr~vation, there Dould arise a distinct danger

of n war between the two pov:ers, a state of aff[lirs

over which Jap~n, as a sign~tory to the Tripartite

Pact, naturally cannot help entcrtein ~ deep coh~

cern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that

not only the Gorm~n-Americen relations will ce~se

further deterioration but the prevriling tension

will also be allevieted ns quickly ~s possible,

the JElpenese Government is no·,".! requesting the

earnest consideretion of the Americ['n Government."

We next offer in evidence InternFtionnl

Prosecution document No, 2745, which is a group

certificate of the Jrpenese Foreign Office for

items found et the Jvpc:>nese Foreign Office listed

therein, These items all relete to the Jeppnese-

23 American negotirtions of 1941.

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THE PHESIDENT: J,dmi tted on the usual terms.

CLBRK OF THE; COURT: Prosecution's document

No~ 27.5 will receive exhibit No, 1160.


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(Whereupon, the document Bbove

referred to ~as mrrked prosecution exhibit

No. 1160 and received in evidence.)

1m. FlHELLY: IIC1ving dCf'3cribed the certifi-

cpte, I ,see no npcessi ty for reading it un1pss the

Tribunr1 requests it.

THE PRESrrENT: Do not reed it.


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MRo FlEEtLY: We next offer in evidence

International Prosecution Document 1532-D( 1), a tele

gram dated October 225 1941, from N01ruRA to the new

Foroign Minister TOGO, as tending to show that NOMURA

realized that a sucdessful termination of the negoti

ations was hope18sS~

THE PRESIJ):.!~NT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COUF:T: Prosecut ion t s document

No. l532-D(1) will receive exhibit No. 1161.

(VJher eupon, the; document above I' E;ferr ed

to was marked pros()cution's exhibit 1161 Rnd

received in evidence.)

1IIR. FIHE:LLY: I now road ).J}"osf2cution t s exhibi t

No. 1161:

"Dispatched from WASHINGTON~ Oct. 225 p.m.,

1941. Received by the Foreign Ministry Oct. 23, a.m.

"To: Foreign Minister TOGO

"From: Ambassador NOMlJRA

"(Strictly confidential. Ambassador t s Code.)

"I haVE: already wired you about my present

position. I am sure that I, too, should go out with

the former cabinet. I know that for some time the

Secretary of State has known how sincere I was 7 yet

knew how little influence I have in TOKYO. I hear that

the President also holds the same opinion. There are ---- ~~ ~- --~---~-~----- ...


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some, Americans who trust me and say that I am the

hop~ for preventing disaster, but, alas, their

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3 c'nconr a fIGment is not enough. Among my countrymen

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her,) in the UnitGd states thero are also some who

feel the sams way, but it is a superstitious mis

und (')1' standing.

"As for Your Excell ency' s instruct ions,

VJAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine

that you all have any objections at the /Foreign/

Ministry when I am already done with. I don't want

to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving

othor people. Please do not think I an trying to

fleo from the field of battle, but as a man of honor

this is the only way that is open for me to tread.

Plca5e sGnd me your permission Ito return to .JAPAN/.

Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have

injured your dignity and I prostrate myself bt:fore you

in the depth of my rudeness."

Ve next offer in evidence an entry from

the KIDO Diary of October 2~71941, International

Prosecution Docum2nt No. 1632-W(112) to show that

a liaison conference was held on this date and for

rather pertinent matter contained therein.

THEJ PEl 3SIDENT; Admitted on the usual terms.

CLEEK OF TW::: COURT: Prosecution's document


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No. 1632-W(112) will receive exhibit No. 1162.

(Whereupon, the document abov'~ referred

to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1162

and received in evidence.)

JilR. F'IHELLY: I now read from prosecution's

exhibit No. 1162, the entry of October 29, 1941~

KIDO's Diary:

"At 9 a.m. General SUZPKI 1 President of th8

Planning Board called on me, reported on the progress

of the liaison conf(~rence IRcnraku Kaigil and we had

a talk. Mr. HAnA, PrGsident of the Privy Council,

visited ~e at 10.30 R.m. to consult about tha recom-

mendation to thE: T~'1rone of Mr. Seihin IKZ,DA as a member

of the Privy Council. At 11.30 a.m. I heard from

Premier TOJO of the progress of tho liaison conference,

the extension of the Anti-Comintcrn P8.ct and our

maneuvers vis a vis Yen Rsi-Shan. The Chi.ef Aide-

de-Camp visited me at 12.45 p.m. and we talked

about the latest political situation. Had an audience

with His Majesty from 1.15 to 1.55. The Juichi-Kai

IT.N. Literal1y~ The Party of Elevenl was held to

exchange views regarding the recent political situation.

Those prc2Emt wore Prince KONOYE, HIROHATA, URAMATSTJ,

OKABE~ KUROKI~ SAKAI, ODA and YANA.GISAWA."

We last mentioned the Pearl Harbor plan


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showing that the fl$et were practising at the Naval

War College at the early part of September, 1941.

I novv read from page 1, paragraph 3, the last

eight lines of that paragraph, in connection with

6vents that were happening at this particular period.

"By Novemb or 1, 1941 ~ the ftnal test of

Combined Fleet Secret Operational Order No. 1

had been agreed upon and printtng was begun.

The Order, together with its Annexes, detaiJed

the plans and schedules for attacks on Pearl

Harbor and various other Br i ti8h and AlTIer ican

Dutch possessions."

We next offer in Gvidence International

Pros ecut i.on Document l532-D( 2), a telegram fr om TOGO

to NOMt~A on November 2nd to show that between the

time the TOJO Cabinet came into power and Novemb,::;r

2nd that a nl~ber of liaison conferences were held.


CLERK OF THE COURT: Pros(:;cution's document

No. 1532-D( 2) wi Ll rocei VE; exhib it No. 1163.

(Whereupon, the document nbove referred

to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1163 and


MR. FIHELLY: 1 will now read prosecution's

exhibit No. 1163:


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"To: Ambassador NOMURA

IlFrom: Forc:;ign Minister TOGO

"Despatched: 2 November 1941,6:15 p.m.

"Telegram 722 (J-imbassador Telegram)

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"Since the formation of the new Cabinet, the

GI)vcrnment has b(:en holding conferences for a number

of days with th~ I~perial Headquarters. We have

carcfu1.ly consid(:;rl:d and discussod a fundamental

polJ.cy for the himrovement of relations between Japan

and AmericJ, but we; C:;J\':pc:ct to r(;ach a final docision

D.t the mc(;ting in the; prcsonce of the Emperor, on

the morning of the 5th, and will let you know the

result immediatGly. This will be our government IS

last effort to improve diplomatic relations. 'The

situation is very grave. Wh,::;n W'Z2 resume negotiat ions,

!;6 every aspect of the situation makes it urgent that we

17 reach a decision at once. This is to be strictly

18 kept only for your information. Now W2 trust your

'1.9 most prudent atti.tudG towards handling everything

.m before WE) take up the negotiations once mors in the

21 very near futur e. II

22 We have now reached the first days of

23 NovGmbl'jr~ 1941, and I re8d from prosecution's exhibit

24 No. 809, page 66, to show that NAGANO, the Accused here,

25 admits himself that he gave the ordE:-::r on November 3rd


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to uttack Pearl Harbor.

I read Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 on page 66 of

that Exhibit.

II (Note: ThE:; following paragraphs 5, 6 and

5 '7 arc based on the recollections of Admiral NAGANO,

6 Osami, thEm Chief of the Naval General Staff.)

7 u 5. Vi/hen was it decided to attack PEARL

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9 "3 Nov. 41. This date was set by the Chief

10 of the Nnvy General Staff ~ NAGANO ~ when Cine, Combined

11 Flcct, YAMAM01'O came to TOKYO

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"6. Who made th0 foregoing decision?

"Chief of' the Naval General Staff NAGANO.

117. If the decision was made in conference,

give time of said conference and names of all persons

present. -

"It was not made in conference. 1f

We next offer in l3vidence a telegram of

November 4th from Tokyo to Washington~ International

Prosecution Document No. 2593-D(7), which is offered

to show the tenseness in the United states-Japanese

relations and as also indicating that another Imperial

Conferenc(l was to be held on November 5th.

TIr:~ PRCSIDENT~ Admitted on tho usual terms.

CLEEK OF THE COURT: Pros Gcntion' s document

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No. 2593-D(7) will receive exhibit Fo. 1164.

(1f'hereupon, the document above referred

to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1164

and received in evidence.)

~JJR. FlHELLY: I now rEO-ad from prosGcut ion's

6 document No. 1164:

7 "From: Tokyo

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"To: Washington

"NovombGr 4, 1941

11 Purple (CA) (tTr gent)

(Part 1 of 3)

"Concerning my 11722a.

"1. Well ~ rE;lations between Japan and the

Unit2d [~tatcs have reached the odge, and our peop18

arc losing confidence in the possibility of ever

adjusting them. In order to lucubrate on a funda-

mental national policy, th:::: Cabinet has beF.m m.;cting

with the Imperial Headquarters for some days in suc-

cession. Conference has followed conference, and now

we are at length abl(~ to br ing forth a count 8r -pr oposal

for thE:; resumption of Japanese-Amorican nGgotiations

based upon the unanirr;ous opinion of the Government

and the military high command (ensuing Nos. 726 b 24

25 and 727 b). 1:his and other basic po]j.cies of our

Empire await the sanction of th0 confersnce to be held


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on the morning of the 5th.

"2. Conditions both wtthill and without our

Emptre arc so tense that no l,nger is procrastination

pos sible, yet in our sincert ty to maintain pactfic

rel8.ti)nships between the Empire of Japan and the

United states of America 5 we have decided 5 as a result

of these deliberations, to gamble once more on the

continuance of the parleys, but this is our last

effort. Both in name and spirit this counter-pro-

posal of ours is, indeed, the last. I wont you to

know that. I f through it wed 0 not r E,ach a qui ck

accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certairtly

be ruptur edt Then, indeed, will r elations between

our two nations be on th .. ,:: brink of chaos. I mean

that the success or failure of the pendtng discussions

will have an immense effect on the destiny of the

Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled thE:: fate of

our land on the throw of this die.-"

I only had intended to read part 1. If the

Court desires it, I will read the other two parts of

the t 61 e gr am • ,

THZ PR 3SIDENT ~ Yes, I think you. should.

WiR. FIHELI,Y: All right, sir. I now read

pnrt 2 of the same exhibit:

"From: Tokyo ,- ---' - --,---------------


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"To: Washington

"November 4, 1941

"Purple eCA) (Urgent)

"#725 (Part 2 of 3)

F'ror.:: Tokyo

"When the Japanese-Arnerican mGetings began ')

who would have 8ver dreamt that thsy would drag out

so long? Hoping that we could fast come to sarno

undE:;r standing) we have already gon(; far out of our

way and yielded and yielded. '1'h8 Urdted statc=;s

does not appreciate this, but through thick and

thin sticks to the self-same propositions she made

to start with. 'fhose of our peopl() and of our

officials who suspect the sincerity of the Amoricans

are far from fECow. Bearing all kinds of Immiliating

things, our Government has repeatodly statE::d its

sincerity and gone far, yes, too far, in giving in

to them. There is just one reason why we do this

to maintain peace in thf:J Pacific. There seeDS to be

some Arnericans who thin):\" we would make a ohCO,-s idod

deal, but our temperance ~ I can tell you, has r:ot

come from weaknes s, and naturally thore is an end

to our long-suffering. Nay, when it comes to a question

of our existence and our honor, when thC:'; tinw comes we

will defend tham without recking the cost. If the

UnitE;d Statss takus an attitude that overlooks or shuns

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1 this position of ours 9 thccre is not a whit of use

2 in ever broaching the talks. This t imc 1Ne ar 0: showing

3 the limit of our friendship; this time we arc ma~ing

4 our last possible bar gain 9 and I hope that vm can

5 thus sf"Ottle all our troubles with the United Stat2s

6: peaceably."

7 I now read part 3 of the same telegram, the

8 heading being the same:

9 "3. It is to be hopod earnestly that

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looking forward to ~hat may come at tho end--at the

last day of Jap~nese-Arn8rican negotiations--the Govern-

ment of the United sto.t~.s will think Aver so sob(?rly

hoVJ much better it wouJd be to malco pence with us;

how much better this wou.ld bo for the 'l"1ho10) vv'Orld

situation.

"4. Your Honor will- see from the; consiclerations

above how important is your rrcission. Y011 aro at 8. kGY

post, and we place groDt hopes in your being able to

do sOIT18thing good for our n:::tion's destiny. Will you

pleas t3 think deeply on that and compose yourself ,jod

make up your milJd to continue to do your best. I hope

you will. Now just as soon as the conference is over,

I will let you know immodiately, and I want you to go

and talk to President ROOSEVELT and Socretary HULL.

I want you to tell th~}m how G.Gtermined. we are and


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try to get them to foster n speedy understandtng.

2 11 5. In vi sw of the gra vi ty of those t fllks 5

3 as you mBke contacts there ~ so I wilJ make them herG.

4 I will talk to the American Ambassador here in Tokyo~

5 and as soon as you hav() got the concensus of the

6 American officials through talking with thcm~ pleose

7 wire me. Naturally 5 as these things d0J\Tclol)~ in case

8 you take any new steps, I want you to let me know

9 and get in contact with me. In this way W':; vdll

10 avoid letting anything go astray. Furthermore, l~st

11 anything go aV'!ry 5 I want you to fo! low Ply instructions

12 to the let tor. In my 5. ns truct ions 5 I vnmt you to

13 know there \1;111 be no room for p',.Tsonal intc~rpreta-'

14 tion.1I

15 We next offer in evidence --

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THE PHBSIDEN'.r~ Those three messages from

To1<yo to Washington were intercepted?

IvJR. FIHEIJLY: That is right.

THE PHESIDEI\ifT~ We 'will recess for fiftE;en

m.inntos.

(Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was

taken until 1100, after which the proceedings

Vlere resmned as follows:;)


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lVi/RSHtL OF 'i'HL COUhT: The Internrtionn1

Military Tribunel for the Fer East is now resumed.

THE FR1S!DLNT: Mr. Fihelly.

~ill. FIHELLY: Mr. President, I don't know

wheth8r the record shows thpt I answered your 18st

question just before recess. The document offered was

intercepted message.

THE PRES 1 DEN'l' : The certific::->tc I c['n on1y

note from the documents before me.

lVili.. FIH11LY: We next offer in E::vidence

Intern~tionnl Prosocution document 2593-D (8), another

wire of thr. t dp te from TOGO to NOliiUh/ bop ring p!' rti';'

cU1arly on the r:ttitudc of thE.: Japc,nese Government [It

this stage of th(~ negotietions, ~'nd I mpy sny ttu'·t the

wire itself snys "Tokyo" r2ther tha.n TOGO's particular

neme being mentioned.

TEL PRESIDENT: i,dmi tt8d on the usu2.1 terms.

CL.Uu\ OF THE COURT: Prosecution I s document

No. 2593-D (8) will receive exhibit No. 1165.

(Whereupon, the document ['bove referred

to WD s marKE)d prosecution's exhibit No. 1165 Fnd re

ceived in evidence.)

Mh. FIHELLY: I now repd fr()m prosecutton

25 exhibit 1165: "FrOl:: Tokyo. To: ~'hsl-:.i gton. IJov8n ...

ber 4, 1941. Purplo (CA) (Urf;cnt.). #726."

,. PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c690e4/

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II (Part 1 of 4.)

nproposal "A II.

"l. Thj.s proposal is our revised ultimatum

made as a result of our attempts to meet5 in so far

as possible? the wishes of the Americans? clarified

as a result of negotiations based on our proposals of

September 25. lile have toned down our insistence as

follows:

if (1) The question of non-discrirrlination in trade.

"Should they appear n(t to accede to our pro-

posal of September 25 in this respect 9 insert the

following statement; 'The J-apanese Government is

prepared to carry out this principle in the entire

Pacific area; that is to say, China as well? pro--

viding the principles of non-discrimination are ap-

plied to the entire world.'

"(2.) The question of our understanding and

application of the Tripartite Alliance.

IIAt the same time that you clarify to them that

we intend no expansion of our sphere of self-defense?

make clear, as has been repeatedly explained in the

past, that we desire to avoid the expansion of

Europe's war into the Pacific."

I now read part 2:

"(3) The question concerning the evacuation of


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troops.

2 , "We are tonj.ng dO'wn our stipulations in this

,,: con.nection as follows:

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11 (A) 'The stationing and evacuation of troops

in China since the outbreak of the Chi.na Incj.dent.

IIJapanese troops which have been sent to China

will be stationed in Horth China? on the IVlongo1ian

border regions? and on the Island of hainan after the

establishment of peac..J between Japan and China, and

will not be evacuated until tbe elapse of a suitable

interval. The evacuation of othe.!.' troops will be

carried out by Japan and China at the same time

that peace is established. In order to maintain

peace and order~ this will be carried out within a

period of two years. (Note: Should the American

authorities question you in regard to 'the suitable

period,' answer vaguely that such a period should en

compass 25 ~rears.)

II(B) The stutioning and evacuation of troops

in French Indo-China.

liThe Japanese Government respects the territorial

integrity of the French possession, Indo-China. In

the event that a just pee.ce is established, or that

the China Incident is brought to a successful con-

clusion~ Japanese troops which have been dispatched


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I evacuated.

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U(Ll,..) As a matter of principle, we are anxious to

avoid havin~ this inserted in the draft of the formal

5 i proposal reached between Japan and the United States

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SODe other sort of a statement.)

"Part 3.

"2. Explanation.

11(1) Of course~ there is the question of geo-

graphical proximity vJ1en we come to consider non-

discrimination in commerce. However, we have revised

our demands along this line hitherto and put the

question of non-discrimination on a world-wide basis.

In a memorandum of the American ~lovernment, they state

17 i in effect, however, that it might be feasible for

ls1 either country within a certain specified area to

19 j adopt a given policy and for the other party within

201 another specified area to adopt a complementary policy.

21 : Judg:},pg from this statement, I do not believe they I

22 i will oppose this term. I think that we can easily

23 reach an understanding on this matter.

24 "( 2) J'l.s for the question of the Three -Power

25 : Pact; your various messages lead me to believe that

the United States is, in general, satisfied with our


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1 proposals, so if we 'make our position even more

2 clear by saying that we will not randomly enlarge

3: upon our interpretation of the right of self-defense,

4 i I feel sure that we will soon be mutuallY agreed on

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this point."

I now read part 4 of the exhibit:

"(3) I think that in all probability the ques-

tion of evacuation will be the hardest. However, in

view of the fa~t that the United States is so

much opposed to our stationing soldiers in undefined

areas, our purpose is to shift the regions of oc-

cupation and our officials, thus attempting to dis

pel their suspicions. We will call it evacuation;

but although it would please the United States for

us to make occupation the exception rather than the

rule, in the last analysis this would be out of the

question. Furthermore, on the matter of duration of

occupation, whenever pressed to give a clear state

ment we have hitherto couched our answers in vague

terms. I want you in as indecisive yet as pleasant

language as possible to euphemize and try to impart

to them the effect that unlimited occupation does

24' not mean perpetual occupation. Summing this up,

25 Proposal A accepts completely America's demands on

two of the three proposals mentioned in the other


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proposal, but IHhen it comes to the last point con-

2 cerning the stationing and evacuation of forces, we

3 have already made our last possible concession. How

4: hard, indeed, have we fought in China for four years!

); ":"}ha t tremendous sacrifices havl;3 'Ne made! They must

6' know this, so their demands in this cor;nection must

7 have been only 'wishful thinking. I In any case,

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our internal si tuation also mal~es it j.mpossible for

us to make any further compromis£; j.n this connection.

As b'3st you may 1 please endeavor' to have the United

States understand this? and I 8arnestly hope and pray

that you can quickly bring about an understanding."

All the 2593's, as the certificate shows,

are intercepted messages.


Prosecution document 1532 D (3), a wire of Nov3mber

4 from Foreign Minis ter TOGO to NOlVIlIdA, stating that

KUBUSU VJaS being sent to the United States.

THE PRESIDEHT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLEhK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document

No. 1532 D (3) will receive exhibit No. 1166.

(Whereupon, the document above re

ferred to was marked prosecution IS extdbi t


IvlR. FIHELLY: I nov! read prosecution exhibit


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No. 1166:

"From! The Foreign L~inj.ster TOGO e

liTo The Ambassador NOKUhA~ in U.S.A.

1l1espatched: 8:50 p.m. November 4, 1941

(Shov'la 16).

"§730 (iimbassador Code)

"Re my !725

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"In vie,,'! of the gravity of the present l1egotia-

tions and in view of your request, VIe &re sendinr,

Ambassador KUJ\USU to you by clipper leaving Eongkong

on the 7th (through the kind offices of the U.S.A.

12 Government). Secretary Y~{I shall accompany Am-

13 bassador KURUSU, if we can manage to get a seat for

14 him.

15 "We are despatching Amb2ssador 1\:lJl~USU to assist 16 you in the parleys. He is carrying with him no ad-17 di tional instructions besides what I have wj_red you 18 already. I WEm t you to facili ta te future talEs, to 19 make arrangements so that he 'will be able to see the 20

President immediately upon his arrival. 21 !lBy the waY9 we are keeping 1mbassador KURUSU's 22

activities strictly secret for the time being." 23 We next offer in evidence International 24

Prosecution document 1449-D. On the same date, 2" : -' I J.,Jovember 4th, the Cabinet met and issued instructions


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to the Information Board in connection with releasing

news on preparations for war and strategic moves, as

set forth in this IPS document we offer in evidence.

THE PRESIDEN':~ Admitted on the usual terms.

CLBHK OF ThE COURT: Prosecution's document

No. 1449-D l,Nill receive exhibit No 0 1167.

UJhereupon~ the document "-"boilo re-

ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit


IvJR. FIHZLLY~ I now read prosecution ex-

hibit No. 1167~

tlMOST SI:;(;hET'

13 IIpolicy for Guiding PubLLc Ob)inion on British

14 and American Problems.

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2)

"Information Plan A fTo. 10. Agreed by the

Cabinet meeting on Nov. 4, 1940. Board of Information.

(tlprecautions for handling). Sam2 as Information

Pl.an A No.8.

"I. The suppression of reports on objective

facts concerning the tenseness of diplomatic re-

lations vIith Great Britain and the lJnitod States

shall be eased as compared with that of the past.

"2. We shall endeavor to guide public opinion

so as to raise the spirit of the people naturally ar.d

to make them hold hope for the future. We shall be


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careful not to let public opinion become e single

uniform pnttern.

"3. The following types of news and speeches

shall be excluded~

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II (A) .such ne':"IS D.nd speeches as will enable the

enemy to perceive Ollr war preparations and strategic

activities.

"(B) Such sensational speeches and activities

as 1t'Till cnuse the public to lose the pride of a great

people and take direct actions against residents of

third pOVler s. II

On Novembel" 5 there VIas b.eld a most in-

portant Imperial Conferenco? in regard to which VIe

refer to the following document: We next offer in

evidence the KIDO Diary entry of Novembel-> 5, 1941,

IPS document l632W (83).

TEE PhE8IDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

18 CLIItK OF THS COlJRT: Prosecution! s document

19 No. l632W (83) Ifill receive exl'.ibit IJo. 1168. 20

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(Nhereupon, the document above re

ferrE:d to w'ns marked prosecution! s exhibit


ME .• FIEELLY~ I noViT read from r::rosec:ltion

exhibit No. 1168 7 a copy Gxtract from the 1iary

en try of November 5? 1941:


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"The Council in the presence of tl;e Emperor was

held at 10:30 a.m. and continuod until 3:10 p.m. and

a policy towards the U.S.A., England? and the 3.

4 Netherlands was decided. It 3:40 p.m. PrGmier TOJO

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visited me to inform me of such matters as the for-

mat10n of the Southern Army and the dispatch of lvir.

KTJ1\USU to the U.S.A. 1:r. ElhOSE visited L1e at 7 p.m."

I now read from prosecution exhibit II07?

9 page 4, the list of these pres~nt at the Imperial

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11 TOJO") Prime kinister and VJar V1J_nister concurrently;

TOGO, Foreign HiD.ister; SEHUU)A, Navy Minister; KAYA,

Finance Minister; S~TZUKI, President of .?l2nning Board?

SUGlYA:0:LA} Chief of nrmy General Staff; l\~AGANO, Chief

of Naval General Staff; hOSHINO, Chief Secretary of

the Cabinet; MUTO, Director of 1:rili tary Affairs

Bureau, War ~1inistry; OKA, Di.rector of Military

Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry, TSUKA.DA, Vice-Chief

of Army General Staff; ITO, Vi.ce-Chief of Naval

General Staff; HAM, President of the Privy Council."

... ---_._- --_._---._---_._-


10,333

1 MR. FIHELLY: We next offGr in evidence an

2 unda -led document found at the Foreign t1inistry showing

3 certain of the matters acted on and policies decided

4 on at this November 5th Imperial Conference. This

5 is International Prosecution SE"ction document No.

6 790-A, which we now offer in evidence.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Admitt8d on the usual terms.

8i CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document

9 No. 790-A will receive exhibit No. 1169. 10

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(Whereupon, the document ahove referred


I'3ceived in evidence.)

rim 0 FIHELLY: I now read prosecution's ex-

hibit No. 1169, headed:

"ViEAS1ffiES TOWARDS FOREIGN COUNTRIES IN RE

LATION TO THE 'FRINCIPLE OF EXECUTION OF NATIONAL

POLICY OF THE Er~PIRE I WHICH WAS DECIDED AT THE ~.·:EETING

IN PRESENCE OF EMPEROR ON NOVEL'IBER 5.

II 1. Towards Germany and Itf±ly.

IIWhen it is recognized that the Japanese-

American negotiation comes to an end and warfare is

inevitable (imagined to be after November 25, probably),

we inform Germany (I~aly), without delay, Japan has an

intention to open ho&tilities against the U.S.A. and

Britian before long as soon as the preparation will


10,334

! .---

I 1 I be completed and being a part of the preparation,

2 we negotiate on the following j. terns ~

3 !lA. Germany's (Ita1y 1 s) participation in

4 tb2 war against the U.S.A.

5 liB. Non-separate peace making.

6 "Note: In case when Germany demands .Japan IS

7 participation in the war against Soviet, we answer

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Japan cannot do it for the present. Even if the

Germany!s participation in the war, because of it,

would be postponed, it cannot be helped.

II 110 Towards Brjtian.

"We ta]{e measures prevj.ous1y so as to get

Britian to accept and to coo~erate positively the sub

jects concerned to Britian in the understanding which

is the fruit of the negotiation with Amerj.ca. We will

not adopt any other diplomatic schemes purposely to

keep the intention in secret.

IIIII. Towards Dutch Indies.

"In order to hide and camoufJage our inten-

tion, we shall open the dj.p10me.tic negotiation at the

earliest oppo:rtunity with her one by one, after the

manner of continuing the former negotiation, princi-

pa11y aiming at the supply of necessary materials for

the En,pire,

"IV. Towards the Soviet Union."


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IIWe continue thc" negotiation founded on the

c Lmse No. 1 of the 'PrinciplE; of negotiation wi t'h

the Soviet Union' decided at the Liaison Conference

between the Government and tl18 Imperial Headquarters

on August 4, 1941.

1iV. Towards Thailand.

"A. We request and get it to admit quicldy

the following just before dispatching troops.

"fven if Thailand does not consent it, the

troops shall be dispatched as prearranged. However,

we avoid wi.th all our n:ight the outbrE;ak of hostile

activities between Japan 2.nd Thailand.

II 1. Passage of the Japanese military forces

and affording facilities for it.

"2. Instant execution of meaSUX'es to avoirl

conflicts between soldiers of both countriss on the

occasion of thG passage of th8 Japanese forces.

"3. Conclusion of a joint defense pact, if

she hopes.

"Note~ Bc;fore the: said negotiation is begun,

22 there must not be any peculiar change (in our attitude

23 towards Thailand) than usual, and we should pay at-

24 tention to hide the intention of opening a war.

25 liB. Soon after the dispatch of the Japan8se

military forces, we make arrangements of a concrete


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-----,--- -~------... -_ ... -_ .. _-_._-------------- --------"---------- ------------~-

nature in thet plqce in regards to the following

itcrrs~

"l. Concerning the p8.ssage and occupation

of the Japanese forces.

"2. Offering for thE; use of the Japanese

-,~orc\'~!s n~~w construction and strengthening of the

rri 1i tary establishments.

113, To fur'Dish trw necessary communication

f),nd trarlsportation measure and factof'Y establishments.

lIiL l3illets unci supplies for the military

forces pas~ing and stationing"

lIr:,' T ' t 'I' ." 0 glve 0 loan for he necessary m1 1-

"N(}te: In o:rdc,r to ma}<::e those negotiations

favora~le, at thp negotiation of Item Nos. 1 and 2,

vve will promise to respect her sovE,reigrJty and terri-

tory ~vi'~ ~'rthpr < , .• J, \, ,'" •.• '. , we will suggest in the effect that

'according to her attitude, we will consider to give

a po:rttol1 of Burma or Lialay to her in the future),I

"VI. Toward::; China.

"Pay:tng attent:Lon tu the sE:'curj,ng of the

23 i JapC:lnCS(; syntb;tic war pOWE"r with which we must prepare 1

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the long world wart avoiding consumption of national

energy cUld to,king precautions against dj minution of

I military forc~s in tho future, we take the following l ___ . _______________ .. _~ _____ . _____ ~_~ __ _


10,337

neasures~

2' \IlL To clear away tLe armed forces of the

:- U 0 So and Bri tian out of Chinr:.

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"B. '110 secure the hostile concessions in

China (including the Peking Legation area) and the

irrportant rights ana interests (customs, mines, etc.)

of tbe hostile c01mtries lmder our power, materially.

T:~ut 1j':8 rnust be careful to diminish as far as possible

our personal Qnd material burdens.

"Note;; Though iNC clear up the hostile forces

out of the Corrp~on eonce ssions and Peking Legation

are,'.:t and ts~ke them u..11der our real power, they con-

tab1 int(;rests which belong' to thl~ friendly countries,

and so we will not take such ~ measure as to occupy

them.

IIC. 'TbE: commencerrcnt of the abovE', measure s

sball be postponed until aft0r we O:O(':n the war against

the lic S. and Britia~, for the purpose of not exposing

our intention.

liD. ~:he Jj1otior of b3l1igerent rights against

Cr)ungldng shall not be taken in such 8, special manner

as to declare it, but we shall gain its real effect

materially by beginning war against the U.S. and Britian~ I

HE. 7C ven hostile countries t rights and in-

terests which are concerned with the National Govcrn-


10,338

1 r\,E:~nt sl'2l1 be secllred l:md er 01..1r power, for the pre sent?

according to our necessity, and measures to arrange

their interests shall be taken on another occasion.

"F 0 Through measures to induce a.nd accelE;r-

ate as strong as possible the activities of inflw::nce

of th(j C1:'dn888 in the occupied area, and endeavoring

7 to pdn the peoplo I s fe81ing in cooperating with Japan

8 and China. ·iJe will realise gradually partial peace,

9

I district by district, beginning from the pos 8j.ble area.

10 ! "G. As for the economical relations to China

11 we 2tt~ch importance in gaining leads fro~ the unoccu-12

pied area and we adjust reasonablv the existing various 13

controls .tt 14

Headingg llPFlTCIPLE OF ACCELEnATIOH OF TER-15

EINLTIOI\f OF TEL !lvAIi LGAINST Th~ UNITED STLTES, BrIT IAN , 16

HOILAND AND CHIANG.!1 17

Sub-hc;ading; tlForeign Offi.ce. 18

111. '1'0 cone lude arrangement with Germe.ny and 19

Italy not to cease war individually. 20

"2. VIe shaJ.l manage to assist to makE:; peace 21 I

I

22 bebleHl Germany and the Soviet, accordi.ng to results

23 of talks h8twecn Germany and Japan, to restore the

24 continental connEction between Ger~any and Japan and

25 readjusting, on the other hand, the relation between

JaT!!-lD 2.l1d tb.c i30vi.et (if possiblE:, we shall conclude ... - ......... --------


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:l treaty of territorial inviolability), we will take {

n:easures so as to help the Soviet to advance to the

dirc:ction of India and Persia.

"3. To contri.bute to the settlement of the

shall cut tht~ 'Burmese and Hongkong

Chinng-supporting Route', and restore the concessions

fer China, and leading and utilizing the Chinese mer-

chants in the South Seas reo ions, we shall in

tensify the pr(~SSUr8 on the Chiang Rt~gime.

"4. Vfc shall admit thE: Phi1ipincs' inderend-

encs after our occupation and declare to the world as

fast as possible.

"5. We shall make a portion of Dutch Indies in-

deDendent and secure the necessary portions for the

Empire.

"6. iftJe shall make Burma i.ndependent and

stimulate and assist the independence ~ovement of

India.

"7. We shall support the restoration of

Thailand's lost territories from Britain. (As for

French Indo-China, we shall Raintain the present

cOLditions.)

tiS. VIe shall not restrain the reople's life in

the occupied area and keep strictly the policy not

to intc·rfere in its internaJ administration. "

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"9 •. 'v1hen a suitable time arrives, we shall

make it clearly known that we shall be ready to secure

impartial supply of tin and rubber in the South Seas.

re~ions. ",.

"10. Though it is possible to take into con-

sideration for once to utilize .Americans of German

descent to make public opinions of America disunited,

it is impractical and ineffective~ as was shown in

the e:xample of the former World War.

10 "11. We cannot expect much in manouever towards

11 Central and South i;merica."

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10,3L1-1

1 MR 0 FIHEI,LY: On the same d2te TOGO sent a o r :z telegram to NOM1TRA --

3 THY: PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSE:

DRo KIYOSE: I hnve just seen the originol of

Tl 5 the document just reod to the TribunB_l. On the certifi-

r 6 cr~te ntt:::ched thereto the date is November 5, whereas t o '1 the -uste on the cover of se id document is November 13. n

8 Although the texts of these documents 2_re identic['l --

f;' just 2bou t identicr.:l -- there being two d ocuments ~ we

J.O 'W ould like to know which is to be rdmi tted by the Court.

11 One of them is undC1ted. I should like to hove the

12 I matter referred to the Longuage Arbiter or some other

13 2ppropricte step teken.

14 THE ·:)RES IDFNT: Hc::ve you tendered both docu-

15 ments?

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YIR. FIEELLy: Tendered both. Some of these

documents vnry in some respects but they Dre 211 found

in the Jf1p2neSe Government files of November 1, 1941.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the cover bear that d[;te,

13th of November?

l',\fR. FIHELLY~ I will t[!ke Dr. KIYOSE' sword

for the foct th~t it does. It isn't on our processed

copy. But I will strte to the Court that between

November 5 Dnd, roughly, November 13, there were about

six d_ocuments found in the various files of the Japanese

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Government, some c:lmost identi~al but showing the evo-

lution and genesis of plans of what happened in the wey

of policy E't the November 5 conferenee,. thE: t we think

E're all admissible.

THE PRESIDENT: There is nothing to refer to

the Lrnguage Section.

DR. KIYOSE: I should like to S2Y, your Honor,

thst even if those documents are generE'lly the snme,

inasnl1ch as these documents hFlve been revised from

time to time there are differences in the subtance or

contents of these documents 2nd I should think thr:t

the Court should determin on one document end as to

which document the Court will determine unon I would

like to know.

THE MONITOR; lmd which one should be trans-

16 10. ted.

17 THE PR::-,sIDENT: If there is eny substantial

18 difference between the two upon which the defense would

19 ccre to rely, they may do so in the course of putting

20 their cnse. They hsve the 8ssistance of the Language

21 Section without apperling to us.

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MR. FIHEI,LY: On the sc.me date 5 TOGO sent a

telegrem to NOMTJRA, 1;his comes r[:ther from Tokyo to

NOVIl,"RA, with regnrd to the proposr'ls decided at thrt

conference. This is Internotional Prosecution document

-- -----~- -- ------ --- - -- ---- . - --_._--------- - ------.. ----_._------- -.--~------ ._-----


10,343

1 No. 2593D (9) which we now offer in evidence to show

2! thc:t the Imperic,1 Conference was held on November 5

'): and ('s tending to show th['t the Japanese Government I

4; w~s m2king its lost offer to the United St2tes before

'): going to were

6; THE PRES IDEI\IT : Admitted on the usuol terms.


8! No. 2593D (9) will receive exhibit No. 1170.

9 i (Vv11ereupon ~ the document Dbove referred

10 to wrs marked prosecution!s exhibit No. l1700nd i

11 i recei ved in ev idence. )

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.ME 0 FIHELLY~ I now reDd nrosecution' s

exhibit l170~

!lFrom~ Tokyo.

!ITo: W2shington.

!I 5 November 1941

!I (Purple-CA)

!II. Our cOlmter nroposcl in the Japc:mese-

U.s. negotisti6ns referred to in my message #725 was 21 ~

: tDken up at the Imperial Conference on this, the 5th, 22 i

2nd WES given opprovnl. Therefore, will you please 23 !

begin the talks olong the lines given in my instruc-24

tions. 25 :

712. We ['~ssume thr::t it would meet with the


lO,3114

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U.S. approval, in" view of the Dast developments, if,

for the time being, the 21 June Dropos~l -- 25 Sep-

tember'f:1 from our point of view wrs used as a basis

of these new tr:lks. 2ubsequently, we feel thrt from

the standnoint of the likelihood of reaching an early

~greement, our Pronosal A (contained in my message

7i726) should be submitted for discussion. (As 2 matter

of f[~Gt, there 2re 2. number of points in the form nnd

~n the expressions used in the U.S. proposal which do

not meet with our complete c~pproval. However, we- feel

that for qonvenience and speed's sake, Propos<,l A

should bE': submitted first.) Please, thl"'refo-r8 , ex"lain

these points to the Unittsd states end at the same time

heve them cle~rly und0rsteno. the circumstr:nces contcined

in my message #725. ThereuDon, do your utmost to have

them n.cept thrt proposal in the shortest possible

time,

"3. If the United States expresses too many 18

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points of eisannroval to Propos~l A and if it becomes

apparent tha t fln (' greement cnn.not be reached, we intend

to submit our ebsolutely finDI proposc:l, Proposal B

(Contained in my message #727). Pleese, therefore,

ascertain the U.S. attitude to Proposal A as soon as

possibl.e, lind E'..dvise this office. Be sure to [,dvise'

this office before ?ro1.ios[ll B is submitted to the United


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Stetes.

114. As stated in my previous message, this is

the Imperio1 Government's fine..l step. Time is becoming

excE:ed ingly short ~nd the si tUl.'!tion very critical •

Absolutely no delrys can be rermitted. Please bear this

ion mind 2.nd do your best. I wish to stress this point

ovc:r·.nd over.

"5. ~l1e wish to 1::void giving them the im

pr8ssion th~t t~ere is a time limit or thrt this pro-

pos8l ts to be tcken 25 en ultimt:tum. In Cl friendly

menner, show them th~t we 8re very anxious to have them

aCCGpt our proposfll. 1I

On the s[;me date, November 5, 1941, TOGO sent

Elnothcr telegram to NOMURA ~ Internatiow::1 Prosecution IS

documH~t 2593D (10), which wes mnrked "Of utmost

secrecy," which we now offer i.n evidence a s tending

to show that w~r wns to begin very shortly with the . ,

U.s. THE PHESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

C, FliK OF THE COURT Prosecution's d~cument

No. 2593D (10) will receive exhibit Ho. 1171

(VJ:1eT'€'UDon, tho documcmt ebove referred

to wes mDrked prosecution's exhibit No. 1171 and


ThIR 0 FIHELIJY~ I now rec:d prosecution IS exhibit

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1 No. 1171:

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llFrom: Tokyo

l1To: VIC' shington.

II 5 November 1941

" (Pur') Ie -eil.)

(Of utmost secrecy).

lIBecnuse of various circllmstDnccs? it is

10,346

8! ebsolutely necessary thrt all ~rr8ngcments for the

9; signing of this <:~greernent be completed by the 25th of

10 : this month. I re21ize th~t this is a difficult order,

but under the circumstances it is on unro oid2ble one. lli

12 • PleClse understr-'nd this thoroughly :ilK} tc-cklc the nroblem

]3 of s[ving the Japanese U.S. re12ti0ns from frlling

14 into <: chLotic condition. Do so with greet dctcorrGinction

]5 I 2nd with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

16 : IIThis information is to be l'~ept strictly to I

17 yourself only. 11

18 On November 5, the s[:me dC'te on which the dc."'d-

19 line w::s set ,:s November 25, rnd on the sr:me dc.tc thc>t

20 the Impcrinl Conferonce was held, the defendc:nt I'TAGANO

21 issued the first order ~hich cLusod the ?errl Hrrbor ./

22 attack pl~n to be put into execution.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

24 ! MR. IJOGAN~ If the Tribunal plcrse, vlith

25' respect to the lest document offered in eVidence, counsel


10,347

1 stated it W2S offered as tending to show wcr W2S to

2 begin very shortly with the H.S. In thE- first p12ce 3

3 I don't think thrt the reading of the telegrom bC2rs

4 out that statement. In the second p12ce~ he has f2ilcd

5 to read the nototion at the bottom: "CD) Nrvy

6 Translation, November 5, 1941."

7 THE P:EtES IDENT ~ We note who. t you sC'Y, Mr. Logan.

8 MRo FIHILLY: I now refE-r, in connection with

9 Novem~,er 5, as I hc:we just ste. ted, the date of the

10 Imperial Conference and the drte of this lest telegram

11 with respect to November 25 being the de2d-line. I I

12 I now quote from exhibit 809, page 75, the order appear-

13 ing 2.bout helf W2Y down the page, November 5, 1941~

14 tlFrom~ Chief of Naval Gener2,1 Steff, NLGANO,

15 OSClmi.

16 "To~ CinC Combined Fl€et,YAMAl'IOTO.

17 "Ao Because it is fe2red thc::t W2r with the

18 United states, Gre2t Britain 2nd the Netherlands is

19, inevitable, it has been decided thot for the sake of

20 the Empire's defense general operrtional preoorrtions

21 will be completed by the first pc',rt of December. 22 ItB. The CO,"Jmander-in-Chief Combined Fleet

23 will carry out the necessary op~rrtion2l preparrtions. 24 "C. The dct2ils will be set forth by the 25 Chief of the Nr vel Generel Stnff. "


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10,348

"Imperi['l Hep.dqup.rters N['vy StC'ff Section

Directive I (essentials)."

It will be shown in Admirel 3ichordson's

testimony IGter thct on thet seme d['te, November 5,

pursuant to thct particular order of NAGANO, YJ.:;,~A:iTOTO

issued the second order which WeS the first Combined

Fleet Operational Order No. 1 in connection with the

Pearl Harbor atteck.

On November 7 iNe hr:ve ['.nother order being

issued in cOIl':ection with the Peerl Herbor c::tteck, and

I now read from exhibit 809, p2ge 77, the order of

November 7 in the middle of the p8ge:

"7 November 1941

"YAM.MIOT <1 Isoroku

"CinC Combined Fleet.

"Combined Fleet Order

"The Tc.sk Force will grther in HI TOKAPPU-vuPJ·r

2nd remain there to tc::ke on sunplies until 22 l!(wembcr.

Every precaution will be token to insure a secrecy in

movements. '.

IINote: About the time the c::,bove order W:1S

issued, e Combined Fleet order (giving directions for

c2rrying out the Operation Policy) based on Imperial

Hec::dquarters Nrvy Staff Section Directive 1 was also


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--------------------------- ~-~------------------------~--------

issued. Detailed informrtion 2S to its contents is

not available. (It is thought thrt it W2S about the

same as Parcgrcph 1 of Trsk Force Operation Order 1,

which W2S issu8d l[\ter)."

This sane prosecution exhibit 809, on page 11,

hrs some other informrtion. I r0cd from Dags 11, the

herding of the second column~

"5 November

"Combined Fleet Secret Ope"retion Order No. 2

"Y-Dey will be 23 November.

"10 NovembE:r.

"Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No.3.

"X-Dey will be 8 December."

On November 10, 1941, there W?S issrwd

Striking Force Operation Order No. 1 for all ships to

16 complete bettIe preparations by Novemb8r 20. I again

17 refer to prosecution's exhibit 809 End re2d the per-

18 tinent passage on pege 10 r8ferring to this order.

19 Thet pc'.ssage Etnpeors in the middle of the first column

20 on the page:

21 t'Flageship AKAGI, SAIKI WAN

22 "10 November 1941

23 "s triking Force Opcrr:t ion Order No.1.

24 "1. All ships will complete battle prepara-i

251 tions by 20 November." I i 1------


10,"350

1 "2. Tho fleet will rendezvous nt TANKAN WAN

2 (HITOKAPPU BAY~ :;::;TOROFU ISLAND~ KURILES).

3 "3. Inc:smuch c. s the pltns for tho coming

4 opcrrtion must be kept tbsoluteJ.y secret, strick

5 security will be mnint2ined in regard to them, up to

6 the time they ere expll?ined to the crew cfter 00rt of

7 departure in Japan has been clcered.

8 "4. BreC}k-down of Attnck:Jlane 'Uni ts.

9 "The AKLGI First Att~:.ck plene Unit.

10 "Dni t CormnGnder; Lieutenant Commend or :xx. 11 "First Cl?rrier{l_ttack Unit.

12 "Etc. (det,ils not recalled by prisoner of

13 w2r) •

14 "5. Fleet cruising form2tion (Including

15 rEtiring formntions)0

16 116. A.Il tr[;'.nsmission of mess2ges is strictly

17 forbidden.

]8 "Tronsmission Lnd recGDtion will both use the

19 Tokyo No. I bro2dc8st co~unic2tions system. 20 "NAGUHO, Chuichi 21 "Commanding, Striking Force. 22

MR. LOGAN~ If the Tribunal plcpse, I wish to 23

call your Honor's nttention to the fret thF't these


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10,351

chief yeoman who was captured at Se.ipan.

THE PRESIDENT: We are aware of thc.t fact.

MR. FlHELLY: We next offer in evidence Inter

nttional Prosecution Section document No. 4058A, dated

November 8, 1941, from the German Foreign Office to

Washington and Rome 85 berring on the gravity of the

negotiations and to show thct Germany was kept well-

informed of their stntus.

THE PRES IDm:T: Admi tte d on the usuc:> 1 tE:;rms.

CLERK OF T1m COURT: Prosecut ion I s document

11 No. 4058A will receive exhibit No. 1172.

)2 i (V-hereuDon, the document 2bove referred

}~. to wns m~'rked prosecution's exhlbit No. 1172 [md

14 received in evidence.)

[5 full. FIHELLY~ I now read prosecution's exhibit

16 1172:

1i "Te1egre.m IZ (Secret Cipher Process)

] ~ "Berlin, 8 November 1941.

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"German Embnssy: a) Rome. b) WC\shington.

"Reviewer: 1.V.L.So/TN?/ Dr. Braun.

"Re~ Conversation OTT-TOGO on KURUSTT Mission."

'l'here are some symbols appearing on the other

side th2t I will not read.

lIEmbassy Tokyo wires the fo1lowi.ng on the

KlTRUSU Mission~1I


10,352

IIIIns. /TN.?/ from Telegram No. 2354 of 6 November

from Tokyo from ( to

3 "TOGO stated th2t a firm attitude on the pRrt

4 of Japan had been expressed in the instructions for

KURUSU. In his ncgoti.ations with the United stE:tes

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he was given a definite limit which he could not cross.

The dispatch of KURUSU was only recentlydocided upon,

['s is borne out by his hurried departurE: itself.

tlrlns. /TN.r?/ from telogram No. 2354 of 6,

November from Tokyo from ( to ))'

"End of the report."

Erdmannsdorff is apparently the npme signed

2.t the end.

Th&t the.British cttitude WAS fully under

stood by Japan at this time is proven by Intern2tionel

Prosecution Section dcoumcnt 2537A, an item dctod

November 12, which we now offer in evidence, quoting

from E: 'Nell-known speech of Prime Minister Churchill

on November 10.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usuC'l terms.

CLEEtK OF THE COURT· Prosecution's document

22 No. 2537A will receive exhibit No. 1173.

B (Whereupon, the document above referred

24 to W2S marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1173 end

25 received in evidence.)


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THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Cunningham.

MR. CanUNGHAJvI: If the Tribunal plee se, I

wrnt to object to the last rnd this statement as

:::rgum0nt2tivE; and interpretc:tion of documents not

cmbrnced wi thin tho lr:mguage of the document. I call

attention to the former statement and elsa to the one

7; pertaining to this documE,nt. The former one stc:tod g' that the document indicrtcd th8t GermDny was kept well-0' / , informed. I meroly submit thet this is stretching

the f.qcts 0

Ili THE PRL.sIDrNT~ I see nothing cxcossivc in J 2 : 1 either statement) but ]l,Ir. Cunningham's r€prcscnt('tL)ns

, 13: are noted. 14 '

1ill. FIHELLY: I now rerd from prosecution's I.S exhibit 1173: If) :

"Extract from 'The Tokyo Nichi Nichi' l7 ,

"November 12, 194-1.

"Churc.hill Claims Britain is Ready for Action

in India, Pccific OceLlns. Will Fight IUppon if AmcriccJ 20

Does. 21

"London Frime IffinistGr Declnres no Negoti-22

ations will be Conducted with Hitler or Nazi Regime;

LeGse-Lend bill and Chungking Given L'}vish Praise. 24 i

25 ; "Speciel to Mainich-Nichi Nichi.

"London. November 10. Prime !.1inistcr l'rinston


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10,354

Churchill, in 2 speech c,t the Lord Tvlayor' s luncheon ot

M&nsion House, werned thet the W2r might soon spreed

throughout the world.

"'Should the rnited st<2tcs be involved in D

wsr with Joo2n,' the Prime Minister declarod, 'n

British declaration will follow within en hour.'

IIIWe do not know whether the efforts of the

United ststos to preserve pecce in the P2cific will

be SUCCE:,ssful.

IIIBut if they f[,il, I toke this occe.sion to

SC:Y -- 2nd it is my duty to SDY--- thot should the

United St9tes be involvE:~d in [; wr'.r with Jap2n, a

British declnration 'will follow wi thin [',n hour.'"

We next offer in evidence e telegram deted

November 11, from Tokyo to Weshington to NOIEGRA,

Internntional Prosecution Section document 2593D (11),

which shows that the British Government -- show the

relntionship of the British Government to the negoti

ntions then pending between J2,pan and the United StBtGS.·

THE PRESIDENT; Admitted on the usu:';l tnrms.

CLLRK OF 'IHE COlffiT~ Prosecution's document

No. 2593 will teceive exhibit No. 1174.

(Whereupon, the document nbove referred

to W2S m2rked prosecution's exhibit No. 1174 end



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-- ------------ ---

THE PRESIDENT: You mey reed it efter the

recess. We will recess noW' until h21f P[~st one.

(WhereuDon, at 1200, 2. recess was taken.


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AF'TERIWON SESSION

The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at

1330.

I![ARSH;~L OF THE COURT g The Internetion81

rU1it2I'Y Tribunal for the Fer ~~ast is now resumed.

rr'HE PHESIDENT: Hr. Fihelly.

MR. FIHELLY~ I will now rend from prosecu

tion exhibit 1174:

"From: Tokyo.

"To V'eshington.

"11 November· 1941

(Purple)

1'#764 (In 3 parts ~ complete).

"I. On the 11th, the Britj.sh Ambassador,

'while calling on me on some other business, brought

up the subject of the conversations •. He advised me

that he reported my tal~s of the other day (see con-

tents of 2 of my message #723*) to his home govern-

ment, to v'hi-ch hi s government repliE?C1 810ng tho fol

lowing lines, he said:

"'The British Government is not tlware of the

details of the conver~;ations being conducted in v'ash

ington. Since its success would be of interest to

Britain and Japan, it is fervently hoping for the


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10,?57

success thereof. However, unless the basis of dis

cussion j.s first settled upon, it would he useless

to go ahead and enter into neRotiations of the details.

The British GovE:;rn1'!l.ent feel·s that discussions a s to

the basic nrinciples could safely be left up to the

U. So Government. However, as soon as the real ne-

gotiations begin, the United states is to confer with

8 Great Britain according to arr~ngement. Therefore,

9 when that time arrives, negotiDtions will be carried

10 I on jointly with the United States and Japan.' I

11 1120 I replied tbat in the matters being

12 disLussed between Japan and thS United States there

13 were sone phases which greatly affected Great Britflin.

14 In t~e event of an agreement between Japan and the

15 United states, J&prm will simultaneously seek Britain's

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agreement. I wish to arrange matters so that the

two agreements may be signed at exactly the same timeo

In view of the fact that to do tho above is necessary,

we have already reqnested· the United States to give

their acnroval to the terms, I said to the British

Ambassador.

"The British Amba ssador said that he 'I\'2.S

not aware as to how much progress had been made be-

tween the United States and Japan, but he assumed

that they were still in the preliminary stages.11


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"I, therefore, replied that his 8SS11l!lption

may have fitted in the past, but that at present

they had already entered into the realm of the actual

negoti.ations. Moreover, the Imperial Government heel s

already submi.tted tts fi.nal proposal? thus bringing

the negotiations to the final phase. We have made

this fact absolutely clear to the United States, I

an.ded.

"I VTent on to say that I hea yo tha t the

British Prime Minister made a speech at a luncheon

given by the Mayor of London in wl'lich he statsd that

though he d5,d not know the dove1opments in the U. S.-

Japanese negotiations, he would issue a warning to

14 JDpan. Wonld it not be more tQ the point, I chal-

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lenged, if, instead of making threats lrlthout knOWing

of what he spoke, he were to try to more c1enr1y

'Lll1derstand the is'sues and to cooperate in an effort

to clear them lJP? However, I said, with tho U 0 S.

Japanese talks in the ohase they are today, and in

view of the fact that I realized that there were

certain relationships hetween the United states and

Great. Britain, I have no intention of urging or op

posing ~ritish participation in these talks at this

I time. 25

liThe Imperial Government has made the rnaxi-


mum concessions shu can in drawing up its final pro-1

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posal, I exnlainecl. \"'e cHe of t11e opinion that th0

United States will find no objectionable points in

it. I believe that it will be possible to sign the

agreement within a week to ten days, I said. If,

unfortunately? the United States refusos to accept

those terms ~ it would be useless to contin1l(} the ne

gotiations. Our domestic politic8l situation will

permit no further delays in reaching a decision.

"I 2m maki.ng superhuman efforts clt this time,

I pointed Ollt? in the attempt to ride out the crisis

in the U.S.-Jaoanese and the British-Ja9anese rela

tions. There are factions in the country which in

sist that t~ere is no need for negotiating and point

out the uselessness of doin~ so. The negotiations

are heing contirnlcd only after these factions were

ctecked.

"F or the se rea sons? j tis absolutely j m

possible that there be any further delayso

I1A SD(30dy settlement C3n be mede depencEng

entirely upon the attitude of Britain and the United

States, I said~ and suggested that his country give

serious consideration to this, and cooperate in bring

ing about an GDrly agreemEnt.

itT n the above manner, I pointnd out tho


lO~360

I~----- -------

i 1 I criticalness of the situation. The Ambassador listen-

21 cd to what I said very attentively~ giv:Lng indications

3 that he was realizing for the first time how critical

4 tho situation was. He advised me that he would send

5, his government a report of the above conversation

61 8.nd that he himself would do bis best to bring about

7 a speedy settlement,

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113. Thus, there are"indications that the

Uni ted states Government is still under the hnpres-

sion that tho negotiations are in the nreliminary

stages and that we are still merely exchanging opin-

ions. This is further suoported by the words of

President Roosevelt reported by you in your message

#1070** (that part in which he says that he hopes

that these preliminary discussions will lead to tho

basis of the real negotiations, etc o )

"That the United States taJ\:es this lazy and

easy going attitude in soite of the fact that as

far as we are concerned, this is the final phase,

is exceedingly unfortunate. Therefore, it is my

fervent hope that Your Excellency "will do everything

in your power to make them realize this fact and

bring about an agreement at the earliest possible

moment."

-------~" ------


10 ~(l - '--' .)

1 Some sJl!:bols be101;v that do not SO(olll to be

2' of importance.

,

We now ceme to all important grou!) of docu-

4: mE'nts which were found at the Japanese lr oreign

5 Hinistry which show [~ctl.on taken by J::.pan following

6 upon the decisions of the Imperial Conference of

7: November 5, 1911. The first of these docu~cnts

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which we now offer in evidence is Intcrn2tional

Prosecution No. 990 which j.s a draft of reasons for

war with the United status and Gr€:at l~ritain, c1r.ted

November 11, 1941, adopted at the Liaison Conference

of that date.

Wi. Ff.EEMAN: If the 'J'ribu:lul ploas(l,

document 990 has an affide,vi t by Gell(~ral TANAK;';.

I would like to call a ttontion of the 'rri bunGI to thE'

second paragraph where he certifies that to the best

of his knovvleclge and belief tho attc,ched document

was prepared by or under the direction of SATO,

Kenryo, then Chief of the Military Affairs Section

of the Military Affairs Bureau. He does not give

any basis for the grounds of his belief or any

renson for his statement; and I, therefore, respect-

fully submit that the certificate is tantamount to

no certification at all. It :1.s, thus, reducing the

document to such a doubtful kind of €vidEmce as to


1 be stricken by the Court or to have no probative

2 value.

3 THE PRESIDENT: We must pay regard to the

4 first paragraph ~n the affidavit. If he does not

5 know, who would? A 1\raJ" 01' Gennr"l ... ~.1...t . . .... c; cL ? Chief of the)

6 Military Service Bureau; he attended meetings at

7 which the docu~ent was read; and, according to him,

8 the t~ccused, SATO, I\enryo? W2S then Chief of the

9 Military Affairs Section of the Iv=ili tary Affairs

10 Bureau. Me.jor Gener2.1 TANAKA should have a fair

11 iden who vms resTJonsible for thE.:: docuP"ent.

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~m. FREEI'UI.N~ The wordj.ng of the certifi-

cate there is such that he appaTently was not sure.

THE PREElIDENT~ That is a mere form.

Affidavits are always based on knowledge and be-

lief.

The document is admitted on trw uSUD.l terr:s.

CLERK OF '1'HE COUET ~ Prosecution t s docurrcnt

No. 990 will receive exhibit No. 11'15.


ferred to vvas marked prosecution IS exhibit


MR. FIHELLY: I now read from pr02ecution

exhibit 117t;': tI.q. or 5 parts (State Seeret)" -

Heading:


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10,363

"Principal roC'sons nllcg'od for the comY'lcncemcnt

of hostilities cg~inst the U.S.A. nnd Britnin.

II (Drcft)

1111 NovEmber SHOVIA 16 (1941)

"Drnft ndopted ~t the 1inison Conference

"1. Thr:t it :i .. s the unshaknblc n£1tionnl policy

7 of our Empire to ostcblish permanent perce by crenting

8 ~ new ardor in Grantor Enst Asio, and to voluntarily

9 contribute to world peccG.

10 "2. Thf't thE.; Chinn Affair Dims, in accordance

11 with this national policy, to do aBDY with nll cnuses

12 which disturb the stability of Greator Erst ASia, and

13 to ro~lize the results of co-prosperity of all peoplos, 14 building upon poaco on the brsis of the Nc~ Order, nnd 15

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thrt ,Topnn must do all in he r pOYJCr to bring it to n

successful issue.

"3. T'h[1t the Uni te:d st['tcs and Britain h£1ve bE:'en

trying for n long time in the Frr E~st to obstruct tho

mcnsures nnd nctions of tho JaornesG Emnire. Above nIl,

~ith the outbreak of the China Affair, they hove openly

incrC'rsed their mODsures of assistance of the Chungking

Regime rnd stoalthily grvc rein to their inordinate

nmbition to dominate the Frr East nt the expense of China. 24

In ad~ition, thoy hrve ~crsunded othe:r powers to strongth-25

on the: encirclement of Jrpnn, and also adopted such


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measures as the direct disruption of economic relations

wi th our Empi!'8, and rel.nforCed military prepartions.

~hus they have thrertened the security of our Empire

by dr-lring to conduct virtual war opcratif'ns ap,ainst us.

"4. Thnt c·ur Empire, exhausting every possi

ble means and nutting up with the unboarab1e, has pro~

posed to tho TTni ted Strtes the: perc(!ful settlement of

the situEltion and hes already conducted ncgotictions

with tIl(' Unit(·)d Str:tes fc,r the post 8 menths. Hovwvcr,

there is n fundomental opposition between the Dssertions

of Japan rnd tho Un:i ted St.!.1t\js in rE")g8rd to tile estDb-

1ishment of [l lr.:sting perce in the Far Fest. Wo cCln

hnrdly J'e~lize our np.tinnal policy and C8n by no moans

bring about the stability cf Groat0r East Asia if ve

once Dccede to the assertions of the United strtes.

"Undc r such circurnstanc()s, all the efforts

exerted by us during the past four ye~rs in order to

successfully crosceuta thB China Affair would come to

20 naught. This our Empire cannot tolerate from the stand

I point of hBr existence Dnd prestige. 21 \

22 115. That in the c:ttitudcs of the Unitt.Jd Stotcs

23 flnd Britain we cnn rend nothing but a hosty n10Ve to

srtisfy their own inordinate Clmbitions, ~nd ~ee no

25 trrce of a sineoro dosire on their cart fer ~orld peace,

a nd to rescue !!1[mkjnd l.mfortun!1to dist') stcr·s. II ._._ .. _--_.------ .. _-_.1


10,365

"Grontor E[~st Asia is nov! on the brink of n ., "-I

I cri~is, end tho Gxistence of our Emnire is in jeopordy. 31

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"Such bc:i.ng the 81 tuation, we rre compelled to

riso up to tnkc up 8r~s on the side of our ollies to

snf2sh nll tho obstncles in our way.1I


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10,366

We now refer to prosecution exhibit 878, a

Liaison Decision dated Nove!l1ber 13 which 'was intro-

duced by Mr. English, and certain pr.uts were rend

by him. We ask permission of the Court to read the

exhibit because of its pertinency at this staSG in

this same connection.

I nOVi/ read from prosecution exhi bi t No. 878:

Heading:

"Measures to bc: taken towards Ford_gn Countries

relative to the Outline for thc) execution of Nptiona1

Policies, which was decided at the Council in the

presence of' th~" Em'')eror held on November 5'.

IlLiaison Conference Division

NovembRr 13, 1941.

lip ollcy Toward s Germany and Italy.

"When the present negotiations with the United

stetQs of America brnal{ dmvn and a war with her becomos

unavoidable (presumed to be after November 25th)~ tho

2f' ; Japanese Government shall notify Germany (and Italy), \J i

! iJlli thout delay, of our intE:mtion to start war against 2J

2) the United States of America and Britain as soon as our

?~ 'war preparations are ready, and shall open necessary L'_ J

24 negotiations with them in connection with the follow-

ing matters, telling them that these ene a Dart of our

war preparations: "


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"1. PnrtictpDtion of Germany (and ItDly)

in the wpr ()f.r:inst tho United ste-tos of America.

"2. No sep<n[te Doace.

"Remarks:

"If 'TNO are r8quested by Germany to join in

the war ogDinst tho Sovint Union, we shall reply that

we will not enter it for tho time baing. It cannot

bo helped if, LS D result of it, Gcrnmny's pDrticipa-

tion jn the war agojnst the United StntcG of America

is delayed thereby.

I!~olicy tm,,'cJrds BritlJin.

"Prom~t mc~surcs shDD_ bc: trkcn directly or

through the medium of t~e Unit0d States of America

to make Britain accept, and positiv8ly cooperate with

us in the matters inc]un.c,d in tbe understandings

re~chcd in the negotiations butwoen Japan and tho United,

Stotes of America.

"In ordc!r to concenl our intcntlons, no other

speclal diplomotic measures shall be taken.

IIp olicy tov-Jr'rd s the Duth E[1 st Indies

"In order to holp concH)1 ["'nd disguise our in-

tentions, we shall open as sorn as possible [J series

of diplom~tlc negotiotions /v-vi th tlJe Dutch EDst Indies/,

in the form of contlnuation of previous negotiations,

with the chief object of obtDining commodities needed _ ..... _ ... _____ ._. ____ . __ ... __ ...... _._ .. _ .... _ •.. __ ._ .. ______ ._._._._. __ . __ .. __ . _____ . ____ I


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by our country.

"Policy tomnds the Sovie;t Union

"DiplomE'tic negotiotions /with the Soviet

Union/ sholl be continued in conformity with Item I

of tho Outline of DiplomDtic Nogotit1tions with the

Soviet Union, which VIC'S deddcd 8t the Linison Con-

fcrence of Imperiol H8~dqurrtors ond tho Government

held on AUEust 4th, 1941.

"Policy tow[Hds Thoil, nd.

"l. Just beforo commcncinp the nrlvnnce into

/Thnilnnd/, the follo~ing demonds shaJl be; m2de Dnd

their imrnucUoto complinncL obtrined:

II Our troo'iS shalJ ndvrncc /into Thnilcnd/, cJ s

pronrrnngod, oven if our d0mnnds nro rejocted by

ThnilBnd. Houover, 0fforts shoJ·l be mnde to localize

as much as possible militpry collision betweon Japan

ond ThailDnd.

II (~) Rif-ht of pD S sOf,u of J[l ps.nc se troops

through hor territory rnd the grrnt of vprious fDcil-

itios incidontnl thereto.

II (b) ImrlCdinto enforcement of measnres to

o~oid Dossiblc collisions bot~ocn tho troops of Jopon

and Thnilond, owing to the onssoge of J8p~nosc troops.

11 (c) ConcJ usion of n jo:tnt defence ngrcemcnt,

:i.f Thailond desires it. II


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tl~Iote : No special change in our attitude towards

ThC"iland shall bo nadc? beforQ the corr.ITlencement of the

negotiations. In particular, great care shall be

t,~ken to conceal our plan of opening iJV8r.

"2. Aftor thE] pcnotrntion of our troops, vve

shall immc!dir: tc ly open negotia tions wi th the Govornment

of Thailand for concrete arrangoments on tho following

mnttors:

II(D) Hnttcrs concerning tto D[[:3S[lgr; and

stationing of Jaoonese troops.

II (b) Provision, constructj.on Elnd enl,ngomcnt

of milit2ry establishments.

11 (c) Provision of ncccsscry trtlffic 8nd com-

mnnicc·!tj.on f[1cilities as "'(~ll ['s factory facDitj.cs.

lI(d) MCltters concerning billctin;,! ['TId sus-

tenDnce for thp JrprnesetrooDs passing through or

stC"tioned in Thailand.

11 (e) Lonns to d efr8Y nocos snr:v m.ili tary ex-

pcnditure.

"Remr.:rks: In the ncgotinttons cn Items 1 Dnd

2, we shall definitely promise to respect har sovar-

eignty ond territorial 5ntegrity in conform.ity with the

Ou tl ina of Policie s to;(T[1rds Ii'ranch Indo-ChinG ond

ThailRnd, which was decided at tho Liaison Conference

of Inmed.Gl Hn~dquartcrs and tIle Government held on


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Febru8ry 1st, 1941.

"MorGovGr, de DE:nding on the D tti tude of

ThDiland, "TO snDll +ry to turn the negotirticns to

our ndvDntoge by suggesting th~t ~e will in futuro

consider tho cossion of n port of Burma or MolDY to

The.iIend.

"? oli cy tm'!t'rds C}!ina.

"The follovling m8csurcs sh811 bo trken, bet'r

ing in mind tho ncc0ssitv of proserving our nl1-round

fighting power to cone with 0. protr~cted ~orld wor by I

nvoiding mi1itory attrition in Chino f'S f~r os nossiblo, )

of our I Dnd Dlso barring in mind the probrble decrcnse

militrry strength in the future:

fIle To drivo out tho militcry forces of the

United strtos of Amoricn nnd Britain in Chinn.

"2. To plnco under our rctuol control onomy

concessions in Chinr (including tho LogDtion Quertor

in Pokj,ng) rnd importnnt enemy interests (such os the

mrritime customs ond mines), but ccre shDll bo tnken

to lighten ns f(>r os 1)05sib1c our burden in respect to

mon-power nnd rnntcr1ols.

Though tho 1 ntorl1C'!tion<.'l Sc;ttlements and the

Logntion Q1.wrter jn Peking sholl be brought under our

n ctuo1 control nft(~r drivi ng out tr'o enomy f s mn,i tory

forces, those rrof'S shoJI not be comnlctcly token over , - ---------- - ----- ----- - -- --.. -.----- .------- ------.--------' .. ----,-.----------.------~-.-------~--------- --~ _____ ~._._. ______ ~ 1

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10,.371

1 since they ~lso include interests of countries friendly

2' ! to iJS.

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, ".3 • The abovementioned plans shall be carried 41

out only after the decl~ration of w~r against tho United 5 !

I stc::tes of A;~1Crica 2nd Bri tOin, lest our intentions be 6!

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"4. Our right of helligercncy c~gninst tho

Chungking Regime shall not be obtained by a d0clrra-

tion or other forrrwlitios, but the nctunl effect of

belligerency will be obtainod by [,.declarotion of

vrr against the United St.:::tes of Amcrjc[r ond Britain. 12 I

13 "5. Among UlG enemy inter(~sts in Chlna, even

14 those interests connected vrith tho. Nrti onal Govcrnmc'nt

shall, if necessary, be brought under our control for 15 :

16 1 the time being, ond adjustment made separately.

"6. The rcti vi ties of :i..nfluontinl CLine se in

lSI the occupied area shall be encouraged nnd fostered as

ill . ~! frr as nos sib e, so as to win the people s rnlnd to

20; Sino-,Tc.pr:nose coop8rr>tion ond thereby groduolly cstab-

21 i lish localized per.ce in tho nreas \"1b.erc this is possible __

22 "7. I n our econom:i..c reia t:i..ons vd. th Chinn, we

23 I shall loy special stress upon the ncquisition of goods.

24 For this purpose reC's(mnble nd iustments shall be I'1ode '" , l.'

2"", . / in the veri.ous existinp: restrictions."


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--------- --- ---------------- -------------------

THE PHESIDEN'I': Mr. FihE.'11y, I suppose you

have compared exhibit No. 1169 with the exhibit you

just read, 878. Is there something more than a

difference in wording? I think there is, but there

may not be.

MH. FIHELLY~ Mr. Preside'nt and Members of

the Tribunal, as I stated to you this morning, there

are five or six of these rJ.ocumcnts that I have tried

to compare; and I found in each instance there were

some differences although there :i.s the same general

background in mnny of them, and in some instances

the same paragraphs of the same words; but the whole

document has slight changes. But all of them come

from various departnwnts of the Japanese Government,

particularly the Foreign Office, covering Liaison

Conferences and drafts made for same or decisions

arrived at at Liaison Confer8nces on or about

November 11 and November 13. Some are decisions~

SOme are drafts.

THE PRESIDENT: Leave it at th[;.t.

MRo FlHELLY: ~rhere 58 only one more of

such documents, and it j.s a one-page docU1nent dated

November 12, 1941. Might I take that up, your Honor,

at this time?

THE PEESIDENT: Procecd to read it. ------------ ---- ---------- --- ---


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MR. FlHELLY: I now offer in evidence lnter-

national Prosecution document 1443, dated Nove:nber

l r) <'.:. , 1941, which contains certain basic principles

for r.3.pid conclusion of war against the United States,

Great Britain and the Netherlands.

THE PRESlDENT~ Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution1s document

No. 1443 will receive exhibit No. 1176.

(Wh,::reupon, the docuD18nt above re

ferred to was marked prosecution1s exhibit


Wi11.. FlEELLY: I now read from prosecution


15 Heading:

16 "GENERAL OU'TLINE FOR H~STENlNG THE CONCLUSION OF WAR AGAIl~ST THE UNITED S11AT1:,s, GREAT BRITAIN, NETRER-

17 Ln-mS, AND l;RE CRUNKING REGIME.

IS "(FOREIGN MINISTRY I

Dnted: Nov 12 1941 (Showa 16~) 19

20 Ill. A I No-Separate-Peace i'lgreement l shall be

21 concluded with both Germany and Italy.

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112. Through mutual consent with Germany, we

shc:ll rnediDte for peace between Germany end the Soviet

Union [,nd restore our trens-continentDl communicDtion .. 25 wi th GermE'ny. On the other hand, while adjusting our

rcletion wit'J1 the Soviet Union, we shc:ll take measures ---.-_______ . ______ . ______ .. ______________ .. ______ .. ___ . __ ..•. ___________ ...• _. __ . ____ . ______ . ____ . ________ I

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--- ------- ------. --- -----_._------------ - ----------_. __ ._-_._---------to promote her edvpnc~mEnt into the direction of

Indie and Persie.

113. We shel+ completely cut off the supply

rC'1te to the Chungklnf" HE:gime, end bring ell the con

c,::~sions in Chine l.md(':'T Jepc>nls power. On the other

6 h(1nd, we sh['11 induce end utilize the Chinese mer-

7 ch~nts re5iding in the South Pees to strengthen our

S oupression Ul)on the Chungking Regime, thereby con-

, trihuting to the settlement of the Incident.

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"4. The independence of the Philippine •

Isltnds sh8ll be recognized 2nd procleimed to the

world rt the eerliest possible occ~sion efter thp

occuuation of the Is~end~.

"5. Inde,endE:nce shell be ellowed to

part of the rutch Eest Indies while other necessery

[re['~~ shE'll be meintained by Jepen.

"6. We shell givo inoetlcndence to Burma

rnd t.hu ~ incl tEl end promote Ind1.e.' s independent

novmncnt.

,,~;. 'INe sh",11 support Tbe il~'nd 1 s· rnoveJ11ent

E'[!Finst Englrnd for the recovery of lost territories.

(French Indo-Chine 811.[111 )""ninte in her stetus· quo).

"8. R(;gerding our Eldministrctive policy in

the occur:ied prep s, iNe sh.t1l not oppress the lives

of the people; End shpll rdopt, rs frr ps possible


10, ~75

1 e- non-interferEnce \::,olicy i-o,r,IFrcl[; the internf'l 2f-

2 frirs, thereby shEll CErn the heprts of the people.

"9. When the time becomes suite-ble, v'e

~ ~hFll declErs our intentions to gUErentee En eou21

5 'sur~ly of tin rnd rubher in the South Sees to the

6 UnitHl F"t,e.tes end Gre~'t BritFin.

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11 (Hemerks)

"(1) Judging frcm the fect nroved in World

"Trr I, the :,oolicy t,o utili"s tmericens of Ge:rme-n

descent for the :,)1.'.rpose to hre[k n~ the public opin-

ion in the United States :r:1r:,r I"t lcC"'st be considered,

but it will prove impre~tic['ble end fruitles:;. (2)

We cFnnot exnect ~uch from pctivities in CentrEl II

rnd South l' merice.


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I may say, Mr. Pre~ident, that this is

typical of the situation I have explained to the

10,376

3 Tribunal. Part of this, in substan~e, has been

4 read before, and other paragraphs are different.

5 I wish to offer in evidence International

6 Prosecution document 2593 D (13), q wire of November

7 14 from NOMUHA to Tokyo stating that the course

8 adopted by the Japanese Government would well result

9 in war with the United States.

to

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CL&~K OF THE COTlliT: Prosecution's docume~t

No. 2593 D (13) will be given exhibit No. 1177.


ferred to was marked prosecutionts exhibit


m. FIHELLY: I now read prosecution ex-

hibit No. 1177:

"From: WE:shington (Nomurr)

"To: Tokyo

"November 11.1·, 1941

"Purple

"41090 (Pert 1 of 3)a (Dep8rtmentBl Pecret)

(To be hc1TIdled in GoveJ;'rtrhent Code)

"l 8m telling Your Fxcel1ency this for your

own inform£' tion only. tI

L---------------------------_________ _ PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c690e4/

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"I believe th2t I '/I/ill wln out in the long

run in these negotirtions, Erid I will fight to the

end. I will do my very best '\j\Jith infinite petience

rnd then leC've the outcome up to God Llmighty. How

ever, I must tell you the follovl7ing:

"1. 1\s I told you in [' number of messages,

the nolicy of the Anericrn Government in the Pecific

is to stop rny further moves on our pert either

southwFrd or northwC'rd. With ev€-ry econoT1ic weapon

C't their cor11F.pnd, they hev8 (? ttempted to 2chieve

V'is objective, 2nd nov., the;T pre contrtving by every

popsible mEEns to prepere for ectuel w2rf~re.

h2. In short, they C're mekinf every pili-

tel', rnd every other kind of prep2retion to prevent

us from F thrust north,NETd or G. thrust south"wprd;

they pre conspiring most vctively with the netions

concernE;d end rether then yield on this fundementc:l

poli ticrJ. polic;! of theirs in inhich the v believe so

fir~ly, they ~ould not hesttete, I 2m sure, tofight

us. It is not their intention, I know, to repert

such p thing r:s the Munich conference which took

pIece severrl yerrs ego rnd which turned out to be

such F' fpilure. t,lreC'dy I think the epex of Germ~m

victories hes been pessed. Soviet resistence persists,

2nd the possibility of C' separFte peece hes receded, 1--__ . _____ .. __ .. ______ .. ____ . ____________________ _

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10,37P

end hererfter this trend ryi11 be ~ore end more in

2 t,videDce.

3 "3. The United Ste te sis sea ling over-fri~nd-

4 I lier""eLctions "dth ChinE, [nd in so far as possible

5 ~he is p s si c~ting C}-IIJ,NG. For the sPke of pep-ce in

6: the P~cific, the .~nited ~tetes would not frvor us

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rt the Frcrifice of Chine. Therefore, the China prob

lem mip'ht become the stumbling block to the pecifi-

cetion of the Ppcific fnd cs [ result the ~ossibility

of t.he United Str·tes ~nd JrpFn ever rneking up might

vpnish."

Part 2 - seme heC1ding.

"4. There is Flso the question of vThether

the officirls of the Jrprnese Government ere tying

UTI very intimetely with the Axis or not. We ere re~

grrded rs hrving r very flexible policy, reedy, never-

theless, in r.:ny cn~e, to st,b the United Stetes right

in the b~ck. Lc>tely the newspepers Ere writing in

2 1"'12nn~~r to show how grFduc'l1.y we f:re ty~ng up

closer rnd closer with the Axis.

IT 5. If ~r.le cFrry out C' venture southwFrd !

23 : for the srke of our existence and our lives, it

24 i n2turtlly follows thrt we will hpve to fif,ht Englcmd

25 ' Fnd the United Stetes, end chC'nces ere ;:lso greet

th2t the Soviot will perticiDete~ Furthermore, emonr


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10,379

the neutrrl ne'tions, tho~e of Centr21 Americp ere cl

reedy the pupnots of the United St2tcs, pnd 23 for

those of South f~ericp, whether they like it arnot,

they ere dependent for their economic existence on

the Dnitec3 Str-tes rnd must l'!'\rintein [- neutrelity per-

tiel thereto.

"6. It is inevitcble thrt this Wer 'will be

long, ['nd this little victory or thrt little victory,

or this little defert or thFt little oefert do not

pmount to much, rnd it is not herd to sec thCl t ~""ho

ever cen hol~ out till the end ~ill be the vi~{or.

tI" t • It is true tht't the United StC'tes is

gredv2llv getting in deeper end deeper in the Atlrn-

tic, but this is merely C' sort of convoy w['rfere, .

rnd C's thing s nov' stend she miRht r t poy l.'1oment trrns-

fer hGr I"1rin strength to the Prcific."


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THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

1m. LOGAN: If the: Tribunal please, with

respect to those some few symbols at the bottom, may

we have a direction for the prosecution wherever it

appears on nny of these documents which were intnr

cepted and decoded that the prosecution be required

to read the dates they were translated, which are

the symbols the prosecution just referr4d to. ,

MR. FlHELLY: I will be glad to do that,

Mr. President. I am sure no directive will be

necessary. I will be glad to do it.

This particular document, 1177, shows that

it was translated, according to the number at the

bottom, "trans. 11/17/41 (2).,1

We now offer in evidence International

Prosecution document 2593-n(14), a wire of November

16th from TOGO to Washington.

THE PRESIDEN'l': Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COUET: Prosecuti.on's document

No. 2593-D(14) will receive exhibit No. 1178.

("Whereupon, the document above

referred to w~s t:larked~~prosecution's exhibit


1m. FlHELLY: I now read prosecution's

exhibit No. 1178:


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10,381

"TOP SECRET. From: Tokyo. To: Washing

tOl\. November 16, 1941. furple""- c-a- or c-o- in

parentheses; I can't make out just what it is.

"(URGENT) •

"#---

"For your Honor's own informrtion.

"1. I have read your #1090a , and you may be

sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts

you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs

by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight

harder than you ever did before.

"2. 1IJhflt you say in the last paragraph of

your message is, of course, so and I have given it

a1reudy the fullest consideration, but I have only

to refer you to the fumamental policy laid down in

my #725b • Will you pleasE:" try to realize what that

means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see

what turn the war takes and remain patient. However,

I 3m awfully sorry to say that the situation renders

this out of the question. I set the deadline for

the solution of these negotiations in my #736c"-....

and this refers, and the evtdence will show it, to

November 25th "and thsre will be no change.

Please try to understand that. You see how short

the time is; therefore, do not allow the United

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-----~----- -- -~---~-- ---------~-------------~--- - ------- -------- ---~------ -

States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations

any further. Press them for a solution on the

basis of your proposals, and do your best "to bring

,qbout an immediate solution."

At the bottom appears:

Ita - See JD-;6553 in which NOMURA gives his

views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.

lib - S. 1. S. # 2433b in which TOGO says that

conditions both within and without the Japanese

Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching

a settlement with the Un1ted states.

"C - S. 1. S. #24373 i.n which TOGO says that

it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for

the signing of this agreement be completed by the

25th of this month."

"SECRET" appears at the bottom, ,md under

that, "TOP SECRET." To the right, "Trans. 11/17/41 (S) "

On November 18th KURUSU sent a strong state

ment as to the United states negotiation! with Japan

2nd included some advice in it. This is International

22 Prosecution document 1532-D( 5), which we now off~r in

23 evidence ..

24 THE PRESIDENT: " Admitted on the usual terms.

25 CLERK OF THE COUHT: Prosecution's document

No. l532-D(5) will receive exhibit No. 1179. -.~--.--~~

---~- --- - - - ---~---~--~------ -- ----


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10,383

----------------------------------.. _-------

(Whereunon, the do~ument above



Nut. FIHELLY: I now read prosecution 1 s

5 exhibit No. 1179:

"Despatched: 18 November 1941. P.M. ---/ WASHINGTON n o

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"Received: 19 November 1941. P.M.

Foreign Ministry

"Strictly Confidential -- Ambassador's Code

"From: Ambassador NOMURA

"To: Foreign Minister TOGO

"#1133

"KURUSU s ta to s :

"(l)-----According to the viows held by

Ambassador NOMURA and myself, although the President

maintains calm attitude outwardly, we feel that the

President possesses keen desire to conclude the U.S.

-Japanese negotiation. Now, that just because the

other party does not take in whole-heartedly our pro-

posal there is no roason for an immediate conjecture

that it is a willingly-delayed policy. Moreover it

is most important at this time not to resort to ac

tions that could not be amended afte~watds.

"(2)-----Through the establishment of the _______________ • ____________________________________________ -1


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Revised Neutrality Law, etc., the u.s. interests

were all the more focused to the Atlantic, and there-

fore, nlthough they are affirming preparations and

determination to fight Japan if compelled to, it

seems that they are seeking if possible to maintain

security in their back front by negotiating with our

country. In both of our interviews, with the Pres

ident on the 17th and vii th H1JLL on the 18th, much em-

phasis was placed on the q-:..wstion of thE:: Tri-Partito

treaty. The reason for their giving more force to

their assertion than is usual could be nttributed

chiefly to the consideration given therein. That is,

as an assumption to U.S.-Japnnose compromise, the

u.s. Government shall give the American public in

general, the impression of Japanese-German estrange-

mente To do this, it is desired that utilization be

made regarding U.S.-Japanese joint declaration con-

cerning non-discrimination in trade~ or to let Ja

pan partiCipate in the agreement regarding the same

question now being negotiated between the u.S. and

Britain, or to utilizE:: messages mnnifesting peaceful

aims on the part of JAPAN as suggested by the Secre

tary of State HULL in our interview of the 18th.

II 0) -----An acute change in the present

state of Japanose-German relations is, of course, an


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10,385

impossibility, and in view of the aforementioned con

ditions, I believe it is most important for our coun

try to give the United states sufficient security pos-

sible so that they could all the more concentrate

deeply to the Atlantic, thereby enabling us to occupy

favourable posttions in the international situation

that is to arrive after tho war, not mentioning our

full scale execution of the present Sino-Japanese

hostilities.

(Part 2) In regard to the question of whother the

U.S. and Britain will, or will not turn the point of

their swords to us after the present war and start

suppressing us, I stated this at the Conference on

the 17th pointing out the bitter experience our coun·

try underwent during after the last World War (I)

and bluntly E)xplained the suspicion embraced by a

group of our people toward the Anglo-Americans. To

this, the President unhesi tantly repliE:~d that the new

agreement also covers such points. (Cover it all).

II (4)-----In view of the present state of

affairs in our country's internal situation, I be

lieve there are various difficulties to be met before

being able to attain some measures along the lines de-

25 sired by the Uni ted States. For the timE:; being, as

a link to fill the lapse in time; it is most desirous --.----~- ----~~--------- ~---.~-~---. --_ .. -. _ .. _-


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that a time limit be set in regard to American-

Japanese negotiation and to pave a way through this

confronting situation, I think that it is necessary

to ask for an assurance to import a set quantity of

petroloum nncl also the rescinding of freezing orders.

In my interview of the 18th, I,togcther with Ambassa

dor Nm,'nJRA ,sugge stcd a return to the condi tion prior

to 24 July. As an equivalent to this, I think that

the U.S. might not consent with only our B proposal

stipulnting the non-advancement of our armed forces

outside French Indo-China, and our testimony given

vague in condition regarding evacuation of troops

from French IndO-China, as evidenced by our past ne-

15 gotiation. I suggest that at this time, you vd.ll show

16 in advance, some degree of sincerity such as to com-

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mence evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-

China.

"Now, as there is the question of your in-

structed time limit, I would like, if possible, to

effect immediate disposal of the matter while the

President is still in Washington, which I am urgently

advising."

'----- ~----------------~---,-- ----


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10,387

We next offer in evidence a cable of

November 19th from TOGO, Foreign Minister, to

NOMURA, whic~1 is L.lternrl. tion8.l Prosecut ion document

No. l532<D (6)) which is self .... explana tory.

TH3 PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLE::-i.K OF THE COURT: Prosecution I s document

7 No. 1532-D(6j will receive exh:tbit No. 1180.

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(Whereupon, the document o.bove

referred to wa~ ma.rked prosecution:s exhibit

No. 1180 and received in evide~ceG)

MR. FlEELLY: I now read prosecution's


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Urgent.

"To: Ambassador No]:1URA in Amorica .

"From: Foreigll Minister TOGO.

"Despatch No. 43905.

"Despa tched: 20 No~,~<::mber 1941 - 0030.

liBra ft~d :'. ~~9 iovAml.er 1941.

"Telegram No o 800 (Ambassador Code) Very

liRe my Telegram No. 799.

"Re paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 780,

Southeast Asia 8.nd South Pacific includes Dutch

Indies and Thailand, but not China.

"Re item 2 of paragraph 3, it is desirable

that the required quantity be decided upon by


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agreement of both governmEmts before the signatures

are affixed to this present agreement.

"Re paragruph 4, please bear in mind th'1t

it means the cessation of aid to Chiang by the Un'i.ted

States.

liRe paragraph 5. .::'rt iele 2 (my #801) is nn

7 important concession we venture to make for the sake

8 of speeding the conclusion of the ~greement.

9 liRe paragraph 6. VIe could not agree to

10 the principle of non-diserimina tion in trade being

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2)

Ii d 1 t en· npp e on y 0 .... :tna, as I have stated in my #784_

liRA par.1.graph 7, latter D8.rt r::f 1. tem 2.

As an explanation of our attitude ps exprpssed in

'Japan would decide entirely independently' in C<lse

the U. S. should enter the European 1[:Ja1', you rno.y

point out that the Empire Can decide indep~nd8ntly

as to whether or not there hrld been an attack,

without being bound to the interpretations of the

other countries involved in the Tripartite Treaty.

You may make it clear that there are no secret

agreements in the Tripartite Trr.;aty. (However, you

will please withhold your explano.tion of this item

until you see prospects of this ngrE>{c3ment material

izing)."

We now offer in evidence an entry from the


10,389

1 KIDO Diary of November 19, 1941, International Prose-

2 cution document 1632-W(84)~ showing the imminence of

3 war with the United States on that date.

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CLERK OF THE COtT.8.T: Prosecution t s document

No. 1632-W(84) will receive exhibit No. 1181.

(1J'Jhereupon, the document above


No. 1181 ,'1nd received in evidence.)

laL FIHELLY: I now read prosecution t s

exhibit No. 1181, Extract, KIDO Diary, November 19,

1941:

"I talked I'vi th the Emperor from 10: 25 a. m.

to 10:50 a. m. I made a statewent to the following

effect:

"The prospects of our negotlations with

Washington were incalculable, but if the Erlperor was

resolved on war with America by t he end of November,

the following situations might orise. . ~ v-uc:ci ~ -<..<./.u~

"1. The TUflaindGr orthep.arley would not-

advanc~YOnd its preaiminary stage. ~ "2. ~ acceptance of our demands. ,

~~~~~J "a. .partial acceptance of A our demands.

"b. Acceptance of half of them.

"c. liccept,ance of the mnjority of them."


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"~. The successful conclusion of our nego ..

tiations with the U. S. A., but consent would be re

quired on the part of England and the Netherlands.

,!..l.t--.:we-l.tl-d no t-be···a·-g~-FGl-i-Gy-qt·o·p-lung·e

lllto a ....w.a.r_...m.e..I'-k?1-y--by-·-r e a S on-e.f--·tfl.e.--f'aet-··-t4rfrt ,·the

~ 0-£ Nol,'@m'bel'--hd:d expir ed, cmd -i--f--we--fiM- so, the

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'fI/ /IJ , {I'


10,391

1 MR. FIHELLY: On November 20th~ 1941,

2 NOMURA and KURUSU, by instructions of the Foreign

3 Ministry, presented to the Secretary of State what

4 turned out to be Japan's last proposal for a s0ttle-

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ment which was a revised form of th(~ proposal "B'I

agr8c~d to in the Imperial Conference of November 5th.

This particular presentation will bo dealt with by

Mr. Ballantine in his evidence.

Meanwhile the original Anti-Corrlintern

Pact of 1936 was about to expir 0 and International

Prosocution Document l072-B, dated November 21, 1941,

is now off8red in evidence; and consists of excerpts

from the records of the Investigation Committee meeting

of the Privy Council showing the negotiations for its

r onawal.

THE PRe~SIDEl\TT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docum~nt

No. lO'72-B will receive exhibit No. 1182.

(Whereupon, tho documont above referred

to vias marked p~~'osccution's (:xhibit No. 1182

and recoived in evidence.)

TJIR. FIHE11Y: I now read prosecut5.on's exhibit

24 No .. 1182:

25 "Tho Excerpts fron 'Records of thE; Investi-

gation ComT1ittoe Mooting of Privy Council in re:"


10,392

I--I 11 Prolongation of Anti-Comintern Pact.'

21 ttpp 1-7 inclusive; PP 11, 14, 15

3 1 111. Investigation Committee MeGting, about

4 the conclusion of protocol on the prolongation of

5 Anti-Comintcrn Pact among Japan, Germany, Italy,

6 Hungary, Manchukuo, and Spain, and about the inter-

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charlge of secret documents between Japan and Germany

concerning the abrogAtion of tho secret attached

protocol of above pact.

IIHeld on November 21st (Friday), 1941~ in

the Privy Council Office.

II Att<:mdants:

"Vice Prcsid(--mt SUZUKI

"Chairman of the Committee

ISHII? Councillor

flMombers of the Committee:

II AR BrA, Councillor

"ISHIZUKA, Councillor

!!~HNAlVII, Councillor

If NARA, Councillor

"FUTAK.A1vII, Councillor

"OBATA, Councillor

"TAKEKOSHI, Councillor

"IZAWA, Conncj.llor

•


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"Ministers of state Affairs:

ttTOJO P' " lI/ii . t lIf" t , r lm8 111 nlS er, dlnlS er

. of Home Affairs and War Min-

ister

flIWAMURA, Minister of Justice

"TOGO~ Minister of Foreign

Affairs and concurrently of

Overseas Affairs

"Explainer s:

flMORIYAMA, Directory-General

~: the Legislative Bureau

11 SATO ~ Councillor of the

LGgi.slat:i.ve Bureau

"T;;'IYATTCHI C . 11 of the .,' _ _ .' _, ounCL or

Legislativ(j Bureau

"t~ATSUMorro, Director of the

Bureau of 'rreaties in the

Department of Foreign Affairs

IISAKAM01'O, Director of the

Bureau of Eur opoan and

Asiatic Affairs in the De-

partment of Foreign }\ffairs

It NIS HIlvIlJR A , Chief of the Second

S eet ion of the Bur Gau of

Treaties in the Department


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of Foreign Affairs

"NEMICHI ~ Chief of the Third

Sect ion of th(-? Bureau of

East Asiatic Affairs in the

DC';partm3nt of Foroign Affairs

"NARITA~ Chief of the First

Soction of the Bureau of

European and Asiatic Affairs

in the Department of Foreign

Affair s

"YCZAN0 5 Chief of the Second

Section of the BurGan of

E~ropean and Asiatic Affairs

in the Department of Foreign

Affairs

"IMAMATSU~ Director of National

Police Bureau in the Depart-

ment of Home Affairs

"NAGANO~ Chief of the Public

Order Section of National

Police FUJ'eau in the Department

of Home .\ffair s

"IKEDA, Director of tht Criminal

.Bureau i.n the Ministry of

J'ustice; IDE, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs


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10,395

---------------- .. _------_._-----._--

"HORIE, Chief Secr(:;tary

"MOROHASHI, Secretary

"TAKATSUJI, Secretary

II(Mf::6ting opens at 1.35 P.M.)

"Cl'-airman of the Committee ISHII declares

the opening of the meeting.

"Foreign Minist~r TOGO explains the circum

stunces leading to the settlement of this proposal

and the outline of the contents o

IICommittee Member ISHIZUKA asks a question

about the relations betwE:::on .Tapan and Germany re-

12 garding the South Sea regions. Foreign Minister

13 TOGO replies that Germany has already recognized

14 Japan's construction of a New Order in Esst Asia,

15 ans as for such a problem as how to deal with Dutch

16 East Indies, consultation shall be effected by degrees.

17 MATSUMOTO ~ the Director of the Bureau of Tr eat ies in

18 the Department of Foreign A~fairs answers that concern-

19 ing the South Seas Mandated area, former Foreign

20 MinistE;r MATSUOKA" -- a word blotted out -_ "( and

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Germanl Ambassador OTT had exchanged letters to make

the islands Japanese territory for a nominal compensa

t ion by .Japan to Germany.

"Committee Member MINAMI asks many questions,

namely, "

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~~--"-----'-~--~--l

II (1) H,:. th inJ<s th:l t GcrrrJ(:;ny 's C0 ncll1s inn c f tho

Tr O[:ty ('f Terr it o:r in1 Invi~)l~b :ill ty vii th 20vict is ['n

infr ingcm(Jnt on the sp ir it of the; PI' ,amb 1_; Gi' the

_,nti-Cor~dntcrn Pact and, therefor'\; , the Fact had

o.lrcndy lost its vC11idi ty 2 S far D. s G;rmrny is c(~n-

7 corned. ?0rci gn r'~inistc;r TrGe r ,,;pJ i -;s th-d: though

8 thero is c10~rly 2 close connection bctD~Gn tho Third

9 Int(;;rnoti()fltl nnd the Soviet Govcrmcnt, still ther()

10 exists [' slight aii'f "renee bobJccn tb"rr, sc! 5 it is

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not ij,l,possiblc; to think of then scprll'ntoly, f1'(:,[,1

,:':hich vi~npcint '} Jap':'n hClS C(l11clucul the ncutril1j ty

trC:lty .. :lth Soviet.

"(2) uIi'T'J"I "s'rs r'b 0 ut 'tt-, '-'h~n!"~'f Cl"r'CUYnct'll-C C J,., \,I-!:'" r ... ~ l' ':..' 1..1.\ ..... \.,... (~~ t:~~; ,) ......... l!.'.u ", 1 .. ..,1:)

Germany unnecess~ry. Thinking (\f the: p()ssibility

If rec0ncili[,tjr m bctr'oon GcrF~(iny ,:nd f>viet ~ he

Prct.

"8.

in ci7"cl?mst~mccs r:rc LJ the: outbreak (;f ~,mI' bohlcn

PcICt bctwccr: J:.p[~n o.nd Soviet, (P) Forrn~:,tj,)r. of r'llL1DCC

b ctVJVJn JapL n ~lnd Cicrrnc;ny. H:o rdds in thl- C[tS G if

--~--~- --~----~.-----~------ ".-----------.-. ~-----.. --- -.-- ---..


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10,397

resort to different mG8nS, beforehand or at the same

time, to protect her interests.

"/P. 11 Line 4-10/ Committee IV.tembor FUT AK P.M I

asks abClut Japan! s prc~sent forE;;i~n relations. ForGign

Minister TOGO, 2ftE:r the explanation abol't the whole

circmnstances of the JapcmosG-American negotiations,

statGS that Mlericn, after all, stic1rs to her tra-

ditional theory on intornathmal policy and 8.SS1.1.ITlOS

an tinrc~alistic attitude which makes it difficult to

come to terms; for all this, however, a compromise

11 is being attf'mpted: A.s for the; relation between

12 Japan and Soviet, it is gojng, at present, on the

13 foundation of the Neutrality Trcnty.

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" /r. 13, 1 inc 10/ Comm i ttee Member IZAViJA asks

what are the concrete results of the Anti-Comintcrn

Pact during these five years since it was concluded.

II /P .14/ I NJJvTATSU , the Director of the

National Police Eureau in the Department of Home

Affairs, answers that by mutual informatinn and con-

nection, changes of the methods of communist' movements

or such were lenrned, and thus, not a few facilities

Prime Minister TOJO states he will 23 I

, are given by it.

i utilize more and more the Anti-Comintcrn Pact to 241

I control communism. 25 !

I 1 1 ______ _

"President HAHA says it is very doubtful that


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the ii.nti-Cominte:cn P::'lct has been USE';'d fully to realize

its ObjOCt5 and he hopes noy] th:lt the Government is

going to prolong it, they ought to utilize it com

pletely so as to destroy the Communists at the r()ot.

"/151 After this, Chairman ISHII asks the

Ministers and the Explainers to retire.

"(Ministc:~rs and :-3xplainers go cut)

IIThen nfter the discussion 81'l0ng tho corn-

rd.tteu members? it is clecided ul1e.nir10usly to pass

it as it is with requ(';st that the Government will

make effort to make the Pact effective. positiv01y

making the most of its provisions. The drawing of

the record of the invcstigati.on is cOI"lmittod all to

the eha irman.

IIThen Chairmcm of the Coml~littee ISHII declares

the closing of the me~ting.

II(ClOSE:d at 4.20 P.M.)"

THE PHESIDENT ~ C?ptnin Brooks.

:MR. BROOKS: I would like; to call thc; attention

of the Tribunal that the MINAMI mentioned h(:;re, as

Councillor is Hiroshi MINAMI nnd not the accused Jiro

VINAMI, as can be confirmed by reference to prosecution

exhibi~ No. 102 which gives the Privy Council.

THE PFE8ID3NT: That has been Doi.nt'3d (Jut

already.


- ----------_._---------------------------------1 --------------------------

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Mr. Levin.

MR. LEVIN: Mr. Pr2sident~ the: accused

SUZUKI W8S at no time Vice-Pl"usident of the Privy

Council, and the one named is not the accused.

TEB PRZSIDEl\TT: We were a'dare of that also,

6 Mr. Levin.

7 NIB. L~~VnT: If attention to that reference

8 has been made, I shall not bother to call the attention

9 of the Tribunal to that fact.

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NlR. FIHELLY: On November 22nd 'llOGO informed

NOMURA and KURUSU by telegram of an extension of

the negotiation deadline from November 25 to 29.

This is International Prosecution DocumEmt No. 2593-

D-16 which ws now offer in evidence.

No.

THE PH;::;8IDEl\TT~ Admitt8d on the usual t,:;rms.

CLERK OF" THE COURT: Prosecution's document

2593-D-16 will receive exhibit No. 1183.

(VJher eupon, the document above referr ed

to wa s nark8d prosec11tion' s exhibit No. 1183 and


MH. FIHELLY: I now read Drosecution's exhibit

No. 1183:

Headed "TOP SECn:::T"

"From: Tokyo I ! If To: Washington 1 __________________________________________________________________ l


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--------- ----------~-- -----------

II Novemb or 2?, 1941

"Purple CA (Urgent)

"#812

liTo both you Ambassadors.

10,400

----------

"It is awfully h3rd for us to consider

changing the date we set in my #736a, as you know.

7 However, I know you are working hard. The Imperial

8 Government is maintaining its fixed policy and doing

9 its very best sparing no efforts to try to bring

10 about the solution we desire. We desirE:: by all

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means to prevent a breakdown b in Japanese-American

relations, but if vi!ithin the next three or four days

you can finish your conversations with the Americans;

if the signing ce_n be completed by the 29th;C if

we can get an understanding with Great Britain and

the Netherlands through the exchange of notes and

S "Jrth; and in short if everything can be finished,

despite difficulties unbelievably great, we (will?)

make arrangements to wait until that date. This time

we ~ean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be

changed. After that things are automatically going to

happen. Please take th:i..s into your careful consider

ation and work as hard as you have in the past. This

is for the inl'ormation of you two LmbassCldors alone.

"a - See S.I.S. -#24373. Tokyo wires Washington

1-------


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--_ .. _-------------------------------

that because of the:: varlous circumstances it is

absolutely necess8ry that arrangements for the signing

of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this

month."

The trans. date: "Trans. 11/22/41 (S)

ttTOP Sr.:;CRET" at thc; bottom.

On November 23rd 1 NOML1f,.t cabled 'fOGO an

account of an interview which he and KURUSU had with

the Secretary of Stc:~te and Mr. Ballantine on that day

in which the recent acts of Japr:m wsre again comn:ented

on. This is International Pro3::::cl.~tion Doc'tunent

No. 1532-D-7, which we now offe:''' in 8vJdence.

THS PRESIDENT: Admittod on the usual terms.

CTJERK OF TWi; C01JR~_': Prosecution's document

No. l532-D-'1 will receive exhibit No. 1184.

(Whereupon, the document above r8ferred



1ill. FIHELLY: I now read prosecution's exhibit

No. 1184:

ttFrom: Ambassador NOMURA.

ttTo: Foreign Minister TOGO

ttDespa t ched. .M1 23 November 1941, WASHINGTON

"Received: PM 23 November 1941, Foreign

Ministry .. "


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10,402

----------~- --~-------- - --- -~---~---- - -- - --- - -- --- -- --- - - -- - -~-----

"r,~achin8 cipher ~~(1159 O~os t Secret: Ambassador

Code)

"On the 22nd, I, together with i'-,...tlbas sador

IG'RU~1U, had a mGeting with Secretary of State ~ HULL

(BATJLNTHIE attcmded). The resume was as follows:

"Th.::: Secrc.tary confer'!';Jd with tho Ambassador

and Einisters of Britain, Austrcllia and the Nether

lands on the 22nd ~ (according .~) tl'F) press reports,

about two and il half hours) ani h,,: (-i,Sl~cd for their

opinions on the Japanese propo3~~S. They all said

that if Japan hDs firm intentL;r~;-c.:' cr..rJ'ying out a

peacc)ful policy ~ they woulc-\ nacC'::;1~'l~_/ V'(:l-::ol~.e it and

th(;~y would be glad to C001JCrate in r0;3tL'JiL1~ normal

trade relations. H o'w ever , they said, J'apan is express

ing her peacsful intention oven to the extent of

dispatching a special envoy while on the other side,

the speech of the politician and the commentary of

the press of Japan seern to be running in a complotely 19

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opposite direction, and so, there are some greatly

incomprehensible points in J2pan's real intentions.

Furthermore, they pointed out that the amount of

Japanese petroleum imports up to the ex<-:cution of the

frf:Gzing order took a very sudden Up\A12rd swing and

that it Wasn't to be used solely for peaceful under

takings but Vias being stored away by the 'lofavy. 1/

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1 best to lift the embargo in slow degrees. However,

2 he said~ as it is expected that all the concerned

3 ambassadors ana ministers will seek their home

4\ I govern:r.1ent t s l.nstrlJ.ction and will receive replies by

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Monday, he will make a reply again one way or the

other at that time. (PART II) Then he expressed

much concern over the recent trend of public opinion

in Japan. He emphasized that the clarification of

peaceful :i.ntention by the Jap':,n(~se Governrnent would

b(~ very important for mal:·j.ng thE:; l\merican public

opinlon accept corrprorrdse with Japan.

said that the conv\jyance 1Jbroacl of sincerity of the

Ja:panese Government h2ads toward the Japanese them-

selves would be more eff2ctive than the propaganda for

foreign consumption sent through foreign prE:SS cor-

17 I' esponc. :,mt S 8nd other s. ) He even 'went on to say that,

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to speak the truth 5 was it not the duty of every

~olitician to strive for peace up to the very day

before war is un8voidable? He said that the president

and he made the policy of peace clear five times

end so it is desired that e r€sponse be made at

loost once. Then we asked, leaving British,

Australian, and Dutch opinicn aside for th~ time

being, what the intention of America herself was re

garding our proposal."


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10,404

'I To this, recognizing that an item by item reply was

seemingly our demand, he showed a p8rplexed look

3 and avoided to answer. In short, he said, the desire

4 of AMERICA, BRITAIN, AUSTRALIA, etc., 1.S to dis ....

5 solve the pressing situation in the South Pacific

6 area and they are eagerly desiring that the forces

7 kept in check in the same area may be transferred

8 for action in other parts. (PART III) And he

9 said, from the viewpoint they, unfortunately, can-

10 not recognize that our proposal is sufficient. I

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pointed out that our troop concentrations in the

northern nart of FRENCH INDO-CHIKA were a~.med at

CHUNGKING's lifeline, therefore, they were for the

most part directed toward YUNNAN and were not in

tended to menace the South Pacific area. Then

KURUSU snill that the acceptance of our proposal would

ho. turally leaa to tne e6hd1 tions desired not' erlly' by

AAtERICA but by the other nations as well. To this,

he /HULLI replied, what these countries desired lay

in the quiek turn ... about in the situation and with

regard to resumption of normal trade relations, a

rradual advance is desirable for the time being, but

when JAPAN's peaceful intention becomes clear, a

rapid change wl1i be seen in a few days. He further

replied that with ~bgard to stopping aid to CHIANG, 1 ___________ . _____ •. __ ..... ______ • ________ _

.. _._----_.-------- -----


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they canno"!; be a fair mediator if they make such

a promise to JAPkN, considering the case when

AMERICA acts as an intermediary. (PART IV) Further

more, if they stop the aid with the opening of the

negotiations, even though they made such a promise,

its value will not be so high. In view of the

fact that ih any event, the so-called aid to CHIANG

KAI-SHEK is not as great as it is propagandized, he

replied he cannot accept the insertion of the above

items considering ths SUbstance of Japanese pro

~osals which intends to improve the pressing situa

tion by the solution of immed iate p.roblems and to

reach fundamental solution by going further on .•

"Furthermore, he replied that the time was

not yet ripe for the president's mediation at present.

I believe that on Monday, AMERICA will submit some

sort of a counter proposal, but as I discerned that

she would seek out participation in some kind of a

proposa.l which aims to maintain peace on the Pacific

and promote trade, I hastened to suggest that it is

necessary to make the present problem on hand the

agreement between ArIJERICA and' JAPAN, and take the

formality of making theother nations participate in

this, and KURUSU stated that if it was intended that

the above be a sort of a group organization and if it


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10,406

was an arrangement suah as to vote us down by

majority of voters, we would not accept such a

proposal~ (End) It

THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen

minutes.

(Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was

taken until 1500, after which the proceedings

wer~ resumed as follows:)


G r e c n b e r g

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MARSHJ.L OF THE COtm.T ~ The: Intsrnr' tiorr 1

Mi1it['ry Trib1.lTIr1 for the Fr'r Erst is nov.T resumed.

THE PRESIDFNT: Mr. Fihe11y.

])fiR. J?IHELLY: On Novenber 24 the Fore ign Offi-4 : ! •

ce, Tokyo, sent to NOMUHI on r CC01J.nt of the dj scussicn 5 :

e. I which "ivrs hrd 1;'ith Lmbo.sscdor Grey' re1cting to the

B a r ·t o n

6: ryithdr['~p1 of troops fron French Indo-Chinp rnd oth~r

7 pertinent metters 'phich is nov.' offered iT evidence. i

8 : i This is Internc-tion[l Prosecution docuJ'1(;nt ]\To. 15.l~ D (P.) ~

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~'HE PRESIDENT: Ldmitted on thE? lJsur1 term;".

CLERK OF 'l'HL COURT: Prosecution!c; c1c>cut'1cnt

No. 1532 D (8) 1"'i11 recE'Jive exhibit No. 1185.

(Whereupon, the dOCUMent [bove re-

ferred to ':7[' s mrr1:'ed pros0cution t S Gxhibi t

No. 1185 rnd received in evidence.)

]Jffi. FlHELLY: I shell nm7 rerd prosc::cution

exhibit 1185:

"Supervised by: Ch1.ef of thE; AnericE' Bureru Y],MLHOTO

"Person in Chrnge: Chief of the First Sect. of the

J~meric[' Burer.u.

"Drrfted on November 2L1 , 1911 1

IfCc:b1e No. 44502

23 i IfDesprtchcd: 8.:10 P.H. Nover:bE::r 24, 1941

"SEmt to Ambrssrdor NOMURI in the V.Sol.

"Sent by Foreign Hinister TOGO

"Subj ect: Nr gottr tions betl,-lfen J rnrn [-nd the U. S.L • II


"(ConferEnce with J..mbC'ssf'dor GREW).

"By Code: No. 822 (Amb['sspcor's Code)

10,408

liRe: My former telegrBm 821 A :;

"I ['sked the lmericrn AmbC'ssf'dor in Tokyo

to c['ll on me on the 23rd rnd exple'ined to him ec-

cording to the Tlur-port of my former telegrBm mention-6

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cd rbove. I stetec Dt th~t time that the removrl

of the Jrprncse troops frOM the southern pBrt of

French Indo-Chine to the northern nert is of grert

militrry sirnificrnce, thrt our rdvrnce into the

northern prrt of French In60-Chinf' We'S ori.g:5n2lly

und.ertpken in connE ction 'ilt th the settlerrent of the

ChinB Incident, end the dettils of ho~n Americf' Bnd

Bri t[: in h['ve frozen our crpi tel upon our 2.dvf'nce

into southern French Ineo-Chinf'. Further I releted

thr: tit is now rbsolutely i1111) os sible to wi thdrrw

t~ troops entirely; thrt it is not only the nC'tur['l,

bu~ [:180 the only rnd best wry for the settlement of

the Chinese problem thr-)- we dem['nd th2t U. S. A.

not interfere with our effor+s for pe['ce, on the oc

cpsion thrt the fm€ricrn President 2S p medietor in

connection v,1ith the Chine2e Droblerrt he'S CHJ;NG-Kri'"

Shek propose perce to J1'(")(1') f'nd Jrprn enters upon

negotiC'tion in tccept['nce of the proposrl; thrt it

is elso ['bsolutelv impossibJ.e, from the point of


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Jf~pnese nptioh2l feeling to sett~e the ncgotiFti~n

between JrpEn rnd D.S.A. before tnis point is c10ri-

fied, rnd thrt we crnnot understf'nd 'nhy the D.,S.A.

eoes not ~gree to this point. I ['ddce thFt in our

ne,"' proposel I hFve mf'de the utrnost effort to sim

plify the sj.tul'tion Fnd to reduce the desired terms

of thE-; JC'ppnese side in ordE';r to cooperrte with the

U.S.A. in her ,epce policy fnd we intend to Fdv0nce

the Jrj}rnese policy more pnd w>re pef'cefully C'ccord-

ing to the rhove pur~ort rfter conclusion of those

negotirtions. The 1'.mbc· 88[0.or took his lerve spying

th0 t he would ir'lmedie tely Cp ble the rbove to his

home government."

." PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c690e4/

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10,410

We noxt offer in evidence Intern~tional

Prosecution document 1532 D (9), a telegran: from TOGO

to NOMUR1>., dated November 24, which again fixes the

negoti2,tion de[ldline as NovE:mber 29 Tokyo time by the

statement made therein.

THE PRESIDENT; Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COllnT~ Prosecutionts document


(Vmereupon, the document above re-

ferred to was marlced prosecution I s exhibit


~ffi. FlEELLY: I now read from prosecution

exhibit 1186~

"Supervised b~T~ Chief of the .'\.!1.'srican

16 Dureau, YAMA1\WTO.

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"Person in charge~ Chief of the First Secre-

tary of the America Bureau.

"Drafted on November 24, 1941.

lIeable No. 44503.

"Despatched 8: 15 -f) .m. November 24, 1941.

"Sent to Ambassador NOMUHA

"Sent from Foreign Minister TOGO

IIBy Code~ No. 823 (Ambassador ' s code)

liTo both Ambassadors

_____________ ~~l'he date of my forIrer te1egrnm No. 812 is --------------- ---------- ----- ---------- ------- -------------- ---


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10,411

in Tokyo time.

"By Way of Precaution. 1I


ProSE':cution document 15-J, a telegram from the Japan-

ese I..mbassador at Hanoi, dated November 25, as tend

ing to show that Japan was about to go to war with

the United States and Groat Britain and to show the

extont and completeness of preparation.

1'HE PEESIDEl'TT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COUnT: Prosecution's document

11 No. 15-J will receive exhibit No. 1187.

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ferred to was marked prosecutionts exhibit

No. l1e7 and received in evidence.)

MHo FIHELLY~ I now read from prosecution

exhibit No. 1187~

liTo .. Tokyo.

1125 November 1941

IITf118

"(Strictly secret)

"We are edvised by the militc::ry that we

ere to he·ve a reply from the United St2tes on the

25th. If this is true, no doubt the CC'.binet will

meke c:'- decision bet'ween 'Deece 2nd vwr within the


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10,412

I - ---- -- ------- -- --~- .. ----.-~"---.----------

I I next df'Y or two. It goes 1:1ithout scying here, of

course, th['t if thc U.S.-Jr}Jrnes8 negotirtions f're

hrought to r successful terminrtion, the vr-rious

E:nter'lrises sh,ll he lr'unched in f'ccord['nce 'VlJith

the plens which h['ve bE:en 1rio down in C'cvrnce.

118hou1d, hmvE;i!er, the ncrotirtions not

end in [' success, since prrctict'lly 0-11 preprrrtions

8 for the ccmppign hrve been complet(,(!, our forces

9 sh[' 11 bE': ,ble to :r10ve yl i thin the dry.

10 ItUnder these circumst,nces, howevcr, there

11 sh['-ll hcve to be some ,I ter,tions in the progr['m ,pc

12 hrve l['io out for the v['rious enterTlriscs. We shell,

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'lmdoubtecly, h['ve to cst,blish orgf'ns 2nd conduct

negotictions ~hich will not conflict with the

15 c['mpC'ign. The thing th~t 'po ere r.1ost concerned

16 ['bol..,~t is "1hethEr or not, in the event of '"Jer, the

17 strtus quo "ill be r1cintcined CS ff'r rs the French

18 Indo-Chinpls government setup is concerned. I feel

19 thct it is essentirl th['t ne not only be rdvised

20 of thiS, but it must be done irnmedirtely ['s we

21 vlish to mrke [' 11 prc['rrf'ngements t's ff'r in ['c1vrnce 22

['s possible. 23

"If you h['ve cny o::)in1ons [' s to the out-24

cor'le of the J2pf'.nese-U.S. negotietions, will you 25

plef'se inform this officc of them together ~ith


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10,413

whatever othor pertinent information you mrty deem

vdse to imp::'l't to us.

"Of course, I rec.lize thnt sec:recy is of

the utmost iMportr.nce. According to press reports,

hoywver, the United Stntes conferred with the repre

sentrtives of Britpin, Australia, the Netherlands,

D.nd even of ChinE!, in vVr~ ~hington, [md hence the

governmonts of these countries are new aware of

9 the mntters bc:ing discussed in the Jepanese ... U.S.

10 n\~gotip tions. Moreover, by means of (courier?)

1] sGrvice, the mili tr'ry here arc aware of not only

[2 our stand in the ncgotirtions but also of the

!3 genE:ral otMosphere of the sflid negotiations."

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10,414

1 I "\Tve feel as if we, a Foreign Office organ,

1 alone have been left out of the picture. As you 2\ I

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pointed out in your circular message #2353" -- it says tI J...' at the bottom "Available, dated 19 November ll

-- L.ne

situation is becoming exceedingly critical. Please~

therefore) make arranfem0nts to advise us on these

points by means of either cable or by special mes-

senger services."

Below ~ "( D) Navy Trans.

11-26-41 (S-TT)"

On the S2Jl1e day the Japanese Ambassador at

Bangkok reported on the Foreign Office in Inter-

national Prosecution document 2593 D (41) which we

now offer in evidence for the' same purpose as the

last telegram was offered.

THE Pn.ESIDENT~ Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COunT: Prosecution t s docUIT'.ent



ferred to was mQrked prosecutionts exhibit


NIB. FIHELLY~ I now read prosecution exhi'oi.t

l~o. l188~

I flFrom~ Bc:'1.ngkok. 25

"To ~ Tokyo.


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1125 November 1941

11 (Purple)

11#849 (I n 2 D2,rts, complete)

10,415

tlIn the event of the Emp1.re l s taking deci-

si ve action in p southv:TF'rd Adv811ce , it will of course

be necessary in the exercise of a belligeronts rights

to mnke clear the relatj,ons of sovereign end subjects.

On the 'one hc>nd it will be c:bso1utely necessc·ry to

bring Thai into our ermp. My conversrtion with Pibul

as reported in my #834 wes undcrtpken "'lith this as

the underlying motive. If F'no when Jppan 8t last

does make her proposrls of joint defense, the follow-

ing three points should be made eSDE~ciF'lly definite,

end Thcd should bG 1 f:d to vnluntEl':i.ly ta}:o em Cl tti-

L tude of cooperation with ';s.

21

"(I) In the eVt~nt of em att2ck upon Burma

0nd l,i[' lay , thore 'would ,of course, be a tnE1'lOrary in

fringement upon the territoriel sovereignty of Thai-

lanc~, but after our objectives have been rttained,

restoration would irlmediately be mElde, and the in-

de '')endel1ce of Thai 'would be respected even more than

£1 t present 'while 'l'hei is maintC'ining neutre.li ty.

"(2) In c~se s:be cooperat(:;s in F' Dositive

~ay with Jap2n~ full assurances will be given that

Thail~ndts swpmp l~nds will be recl~im(d in the areas


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10,416

concerned.

It (3) In the event of Thc:;i' s assets in

Englrnd beinp frozen proet fluctuation would result

in the value of Thails money~ but J8nan would me-ke

avail~ble sufficient f"nds to crsete p foundation for

a yen 'block' money system, ~nd also give every con-

sideration to ~roviding Detroleum Bnd other eS~Gntial

c orm:1odi ties.

"To summarize ~ By COOpoT'c:ting "/,i th J2p~,n

the racial longings of Thailcnd will be realized,

and with indivisible re18tions with Jcpan her Gxis-

tence RS an independent notion will be strengthened .

(three lines missed) --- stop with 8S simple a

" [: s Dossible to th(J effect th8t 'will coo),)er2:te in

every way for the realization of the objectives of

Ea st Asia coprosperi ty ~nd stability 1 t vlhile the Dar-

ticulars as necessity may r~quire ~ill he ry,t into a

secret treety ---

"Fnrthermore, in the light of J8 pan f s be sic

netional policy which hG's for its purDose tbe es-

t"'blishment of <'n Erst ,A,sia coprosner5_ty sDherc, clOd

the emanciprtion of the Asiatic peoples, it goes with

out spying that Thailond's sovcreip:nty must not be

impaired beyond the uinimum li.mi ts of neccssi ty, cmd

that her standing 8S an independent nation must be


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.- ~.~ _. ~.---. --------------------maintained to the very last; while strictest military

cl1.sci:,>1jne must be used to reassure the Thai popu18ce

[:ncJ. strict control should by 811 mccms be exercised

o~.rer 8.ny attempts at profi tearing.

"H,-1ve sent ---. by the hpnd of Consu1- General

ASADA,who has returned to JClpan, but to make doubly

sure I am also cabling it to you.

IlAvailabJe~ Purple dated 21 November."

IfSocret tl at the bottom of the page, II(F)

Nrvy Trcms. 11-27-41 (S-TT)."

._-_1


10,418

On November 26 NOMURA and KURUSU sent to

2 Tokyo by cable their last suggestion with an admis-

sion of failure as to the negotiations but suggested

4' or stated that Jannn might gain a little time, This

') i is Intern2.tionD.l Prosecution documont 2593 D (19)

6' which we now offer in evidence.

7 T.HE PRESIDENT ~ Admitted on the usual terrls.

CLE.rtlC OF THF COULT ~ ProsEJcution I s document

91 No. 2593 D (19) will receive exhibit No. 1189.

10 (Whereupon, the document above re-

11: ferred to was Garked prosecution's exhibit

ill No. 1189 and received in evi1ence.)

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IvIr~o FIHFLLY: I now read prosecution exhi'·it

No. 1189:

f!TOP SLCRET

"From: Washington

liTo: Tokyo

"November 26, 1941

II Purple, (Extremely urgent)

"i/1180. (Pnrt 1 of 2)

tlFrom NOMURL end KURDSU.

IIjJ.S we hC:l.ve wired you severel times, there is

hardly eny possibiltty of hav5ng them consider our IB'

proposal in toto. On the other hemd, if we let the

situ2tion remain tense as it is now, sorry as we ere to


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sny so, the negotiations vvill inevitably be ruptured,

if indeGd th~y mry not already be called so. Our fail-

thing for sDving the situation. Although we have grave

misgivings, we might propose, first, thDt President

R002EVELl' wire you thClt for the S8ke of posterity he

hopes thDt J~pnn r-nd thb United StDtes will cooperDte

for the maintainDnce of pence in the Preific (just ~s

soon rs you wire us what you think of this, we will

negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with ~ll we

h[1ve in us), ;:md th[lt you in return reply with [l cord ..

inl messrge, thereby not only cle[lring the F'tmosphcre,

but also g~ining r little tihle, Considering the possi

bili ty thet Englrmd a.nd the Uni t(;d Stntc:s arG scheming

to bring the Nc:therlands Indies under their protection I

I through military occuprtion, in. order to forestpll this,j

I think we should propose the establishment of neutral

nrtions, including French Indo-ChinD, Netherlpnds India

19 (lnd Thei. (Is you know, lest SeptembE;r President

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ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrc'li ty of French Indo-China

and Thri.)

IIj~RlvlY 6891 25435 Secret Trpns. 11-28 ... 41 (l)i

"TOP SECHET"

I now rS[1d prrt 2 of th2t S(1l11e exhibit:

1I~~'e suppos e th(1 t the rupture ()f the; present


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10,420

----------------------------------- -----------------------

negoti~tions does not n0cess~rily me~n war between

Japan and the United States, but ~fter ~e br£ak off,

e3 we said f the militAry occup8tion of Netherlqnds

Indie is to be expected of 1ng12nd and the United States a

'l'hen we would etteck them and R clC'sh with them would

be inevitFlble Q Now, the question is whether or not

GerE~any vilould feel duty bound by the third article of

8 the tr6f1.ty to ht.::lp us. \\e doubt if she wcmld. Hgnin,

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you must remember thf.:'t the Sin:J-J'apanesc; incident would

h2ve to wait until the end of this world wrr before it

could possibly be settled$

.IIn this telugrnn we pre expressing the Jest

personrl opiniJns we will hrve to express, so will

Your Excellency ple~se be good enough ot lcC'st to show 14

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it to the Minister of the Npvy, if only to him; then

we hope thet you will wire us back inst~ntly~

"Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

"TOP SECRET"

1 ______ -


10,421

I 1 I On the Sc~lile day, the Secret8.ry of state

21 handed to rmmmA the last couDter-pro~:lOsal of the

I 3 i United States, o.nd this metter will be dealt with by

4 Er. Bal12ntine in his tGstimony.

5 As showing that the Peerl Harbor attacking

6 task force left for the actual attack on Pearl Har-

7 bor on November 26, I now rend fron: prosecuti.on ex-

8 hibit 809, page 72, the brief but pertinent data in

9 thatconrection, questions 30 to 32, inclusive~

10 "30. Vlhen did the T2Sk Force be£;in to form?

11 I'The various forces were to ].eavo the

12 several areas w~ero they ~ight be on or about l~

13 November, to proceed as single vessels or in small

14 forrr;2,tions and to rendezvous in Ti.NKAPPU-·vvAN by

15 22 November. 16 "31. Where Wo.S the re:r.dczvous?· 17

" ':[,;~NKAPPU -II/AN.

18 "32. When die the T2.sk Force got underwCl:~T on

19 its mission?

20 "It s2.iled from TLNKAPPU-WLlT 2.t OtOO hours

21 20 NovE';mber."

22 In this same connection I refo r to prosecu-

23 tion cyhibit l128A which is an abstract from the

24

25 SHIHADA interrog.":.tion of January 23, nnge 33, and

read another part of the exhibit referrir.g to the


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10,422

task force which rendezvoused at Tanken Bay.

THE PRESIDENT; Dr. KIYOSE.

DE. KIYOSE: I should like to refer your

Honor's attention to exhibit 1189 -- at the end of

1189. In the English text at the end of PQge 2 there

are the words "Minister of the N2VY." I should like

to call your attention to the fact thLt the Ninister

of the Navy at that time was Admirnl YONAI. As a

~atter of fact, the telegram refers at the end to,

in the Japanese word 5 uNAIDAIJIN," mectning: The

Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. And, perhaps bec,'?.U"'E

of ah o:rnnJission of some· syllccble, it was consj.dered

as IIYO!~AI," and, therefore,· the words "Minister of

the Navyll entered into the text. I should like to

point out that the reference was ITade to the Lord

Keeper of the Privy Seal.

THE PRESlDENT~ What you say is noted, Dr.

KIYOSE.

1m. FlEELLY; Referring to exhibit 112BA,

I now rCB.d f'ror:, pa se 78 froIT that exhi bi t • I am

wrong On rry page number. I read the nart of that ex

hibit which appears on nage 1 and takes in the rest

of the nage, startinp wJ.th the question, II Now , on

November 10, 1941 •••• II (Reading)


10,423

"Q. Now, on Noverrber 10, 1941~ didn't Vice-

2 Admiral NAGULO is sue n::lonrd his flagship, aircraft

3 'Akagi' striking force operation order No.1, which

4 ordered all forces to corr.-plete b2tt1e operations by

5 November 20, 1941?

"A. I think thnt is so.

7 "Q. Tankan (Hitokappu) Bay of Etorofu Island in

8 the Kuriles WEl.S designated in the striking force

9 order No.1 as the rendezvous for the task force, 10 wasn't it? 11 !lA. Yes. 12

"Q. Between November 21 nnd Nover!lber 27, 19/n, 13

the task force rendezvoused at Tankan Bay, didn't it? 14

"A. Yes. 15

"Q. The t2.sk force left Tankc:!.l1 Bay o!' Noverrber 16

27, 1941, and sailed East until Decernber 4th or 5th, 17

didn't it? 18

"A. Yes. 19

"Q. Then it altered its course to the Southeast 20

tOW~trd Eavmii? 21

"A. Yes." 22

23 THE PRESIDENT~ Are you going to read from

24 page 2? I

I 25

ME. FIHELLY~ I might as well read the rest

of it although it fits in at a later date.


10,424

TH[ PRESIDENT~ 1

I

Vv'hatever course you set out,

do not change because of any suggestion frorr me. Do

3 I I as you intended.

l~E. FIHELLY~ I had made no definite decision I

5 on it, your Honor. I will rend the two or three

questions and answers although it does get a little

bit out of the present t~re neriod that we are in,

8 as of a particular date.

9 Page 2 of the exhibit:

10 "Q. Upon reaching a Doint 2,pT)Y'oximat=::ly 250

11 miles from Hawaii the first wave of Dlanes was

12 launched, wasn't it?

13 "A. Yes.

14 "Q. b fleet of from 20 to 30 Jc~panese sub-

15 ~arines from the Sixth Fleet was ~atrolling outside

16 Pearl Harbor before the strike, wasn't it?

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llA. Yes.

"Q. And a fleet of SOrle 5 or 6 midget subm2r-

ines attenpted to gain entrance to the Hnrbor, didn't

it?

II Yes . . . ,. That the task force sailed for Pearl Harbor

on this date, we now r~fer to page 78 in exhibit 809

and read the very order itself providing therefor.

It apnears at the top of the page.

!

l


Ie ,425

1 "Combined Fleet Order

2 liThe To.sk Force will pove out of HITOKAPPU-

3 V!AN on 26 November and proceed without being detected

4 I',

to the evening rendezvous point (Lat 400 N, Long 5

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IS

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1700 IN), set for 3 December, vJhere refueling and

supply will be carried out as ~uickly as possible.

NOTE~ In accordance with this order the Task Force

movEd out of HITOKA.IJPU-Wj .. N at 060r; hours on 2(;

Novernber.

"Combj.ned Fleet Dispatch Operation

Order ___ _ (essentials).

'tTime of origin: ApproxiIT'['.tely 1730 hours,

2 Dec. 41.

IIText: X-Day will be t3 Decerr:b(:?I'.

"Task Force Ultrasecret OperQtion Order 1

(essentials).

"Flagshj.p ru~AGI, HITOKAFPU-VV1~N

23 Nov. 41.

"NAGUEO, Chuichi

"Task Fm~ce COI,(;)'~ander 0 II


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THE PRES IDENT ; llir. Br ennan.

IvIR. BRENl,\iAN: We wish to remind the Tribunal

that this is not the order that was issued but the

recollection of several Japanese Naval Officers.

THE PRESIDENT: This must be the order. It

would require photographic memories to recollect

that, but it may be as Mr. Brennan says. You can

clear that up ~ IVIr. Fihelly. Perhaps Admiral

Richardson will clear it up when he comes, liIr.

Fihe+ly, so proceed.

lvill. J:l'IHELLY: This Appendix B, your Honor,

is a reply to what is known as the Colonel Ij~nson

~uestionnaire, some thirty or more questions that

was sent to the Japanese Naval Department to answer

the specific question.

lvrn.. BRENNAN: I refer to paragraph 29, on

page 75, the last sentence. The information is

based on recollection from inquiries of the fol-

lowing three men.

IvIR. F.IHELLY: You could go further, Hr.

Brennan. All copies of the above items were

burned at the time of surrender and as a result no

documents are available. The es sentj.al points in

the orders relative to carrying out the operations

are hereby submitted. You appear to be right, lvlr.


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Brennan.

1lR. BRENLAN~ I wanted to state that I may

be altogether in error. The prosecution appears

to be~eady to introduce another operational order

that was recovered from ~ sunken Japanese ship, which

may render much of this report rybselete; therefore,

I have been questionin~ why the prosecution was

placing so much reliance on this memory report, when

they appear to have a document that actually was a

copy of an official Japanese order of the same

nature.

ThE PRESIDENT: If by "the same natur'e" you

·13 mean to the same effect, it will be in the interest

14 of the prosecution to use it and will be against you.

15 MR. BREHhAN: I mean pointing to the same

16 subject matter.

17 };iR. FIHELLY: IPS document 17, to which the

18 counsel refers only refers to General Secret Op-

19 erational Order No. land 2. That document will

20 be introduced during the testimony of Admiral

21 Richardson. I did in general state to the Court

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this morning that it would show, not in contra

distinction or in opposition to what is here stated,

but in direct coincidental date with date on

November 5th that the Operational Order Eo. 1 was


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10,428

issued. Before going on to another document I did

just want to make this additional observation, Ivlr.

President. It was stated this morning that in a

4 certain part of a quote from this exhibit it was

5 the recollection of a Japanese yeoman of the

6 J"2panese Navy. These lilunson Questionnaire questions

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are the recollection of the best men in the

Japanese Navy, who could answer these questions.

I only mean to state, not that Idr. Loganfs state

ment was incorrect, but tllat this particular answer

or order is in a different category because it is

recollection of high officers of the Japanese fleet,

just as to another question Mr. NAGANO gave his

recollection, saying that on November 3rd he de

cided to attack Pearl Harbor.

THE PRES IDi..,lJT: IvIr. Brennan.

IvIH. BRENNAN: 1\11'. President, we do not

choose to make an argument of this at this time.

v\;e only wish to call the Court I s attention to the

fact that what he read was based upon the memory

of three Japanese Naval Officers, whether it be a

Munson heport, or what it is, and they are all

alive and in Tokyo today.

LiB.. FIHELLY: So if there is any error i.n

this answer I am sure the defense will clear it up.


10,429

1 MR. FIHELLY: I now reDd from Intern2,tion['1

2 IProsecution document No. 16321N (85), the KIDO Dinry

3 6 lentry of November 2 , to show events which were t2king

4 iPlnce in Japan at thr:t pc:rticuler time. 5 THE PR:E:SIDF.:NT: Admi ttcd on the usuel tE:rms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document 6 I

7 INo. 1632W (85) will receive exhibit No. 1190. 8 I

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(WherGlrron, tL~ document above referred

to WBS m[!rked prosecution's exhibit No. 1190 Gnd


MR, FIHELLY: I nOiN reed from prosecution IS

exhibit 1190; Extrnct from KIDO Diary, 26 November

1941-~

"I met HARA, PrGsident of the Privy Council,

to consult with him about a Senior statesmen's confer-

tence. I SQW the Emperor firom 11:15 a.m. to 11:45 a.m. 17

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He said thpt as for the future outlook of the Jauanese-

fmlricnn t2lks it was fe8red to our regret that the

worst might come to the worst. Under these circum-

stances, our final decisions es to the war should be

carried into practice eftcr cnother Senior Strtesmcn's

conference which should be convened to have broader

nnd more complete discussions on the mntter. The

Emperor also seid that he wpnted to tell his idea to

Premier TOJO."

---------,!


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--- -- - ----------

converS8tion between -- of Novemb(-,r 27, 1941~ between

KURUSU c:nd YA:'!1Al'1OTO of the Foreign Office, this being

Internotional Prosecution document 15-G.

THr PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usuc:l terms.

CLLRK OF THE COURT ~ Prosecution's document

No. 15-G will receive exhibit No. 1191.

(Whsreupon, the document c::bove referred

to WEtS marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1191 2nd

received in evidE:nce.)

MR. FIHELLY: I now rel'.d Exhibit No. 1191

which is one of the intercepted diplomatic messages:

#25344) II

"PegGs'188 to 191, inclusive.

"From: W2shington

"To: Tokyo. (Secret)

1127 NOV8mber 1941 (2327-2334 EST)

(Te18phonc Code)--(Sc8 JD-l: 6841) (S.LS.

\ ~.-.. -------- ---_._------------------ ---


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"Trc:ns-Pncific TE:-lcphonc.

"( Converse-tion between Ambf: ssndor KURUSU "nd

Jnpnnese Foreign Office Amcricen Division C~li(f,

YAl-'lAMOTO)

"Li tero.l trnnslc-. tion" gi von on the onc, side

<".nd "Dc)code of Voice Code" given on the other.

"(After conn(:ction w[;S completed~)

"KURUSU: 'Hello, hello. This is KURUSU,'

"YAMAMOTO" I This is YA~d.iL;mTO. t

"KURUSU ~ f Yes, Hc:llo, hello. I

It (Unrble to get YAr.'LAMOTO for ebout' six or

eight seconds, he so.id nside to himself, or to someone

neer him:)

"KtJRUSU~ 'Oh, I see, tlley'rc mc:kc [' record

of this, huh?'

"( It is belic.-eved h8 rnecnt thrt the six second

interruption wos m[:de so th,t c record could be stnrted

in Tokyo. Interceptor IS mnchine hcd been stnrtcd sevc·rf:li I !

minutes cerlicr.)

"KURUSU; 'Hello. Sorry to trouble you so

often. I

"YA!~'IAHOTO: r How did the mo.trimoninl qUF:stion

get clang today?,ll

Decod€; of Voice Code: '" How did tho ncgotic:-

tions go today? I

-- -_._---- ---_ .. _--- .. ----------


1-------------------------- ----~--~.- -~-.-.------------- .. --_ .. ---- -----._----------------

'Oh, haven't you got our telegram 1 I II KURTTSU ~

: I yet? It wes sent -- let mEc SOE;

seven o'clock. Seven o'clock. I

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-- 2t r.bout six -- no,

About threo hours ['go.'

II T Thcre w(~sn' t much th::::t WC'S different from

what f.[iSS UL~KO said yc:stcrdc_y.' II

Decode: "' There YU}sn' t much thct V18S differE:,nt

from Hull's talks of yesterday.'

YAMf-JJ1OTO g 'Oh, there wasn't much difference?'

"KURUSU: 'No, there wnsn't. Is before, thrt

southwnrd metter -- thrt south, SOUTH -- southwnrd

matter, is h[ving considerable effect. YO'l1 know, south-

ward me tter. '

"YAl'~AHOTO: (Obviously trvinf to indice te the

serious cff8ct thrt Japcncse concentrrtions, etc. in

French Indo-Chine} were hnving -~;n tbe convf~crsctions in

VJrshington. He tries to do this without getting away

from the 'Miss UlmKO childbirth, me,rricgc' ch[:recter

of the voice code.)

"YAMALlO'I'O~ tOll, the south m~ttE;r? It's

effectiv8?'

"KURUSU: 'Yes, r~nd at onc time, thE.; motri-

moni[;";l question seemed 2_8 if it would b(:! settled.' ,I Decode: "' Yes, end ~. t one time it looked t s

, though we could reach [m rgreement.'

"KURUSU: 'But -- well, of coursc, there ere

--- ---~------- ----- -- - -- - -- ----- ------------------------------------------


•

lC~433

1 other mcttErs involved too, but -- thrt vn's it -- thrt

2 "VB s the monkey vvrGnch.. Det8 ~~ls eI~e included in t11f;

3 telQgrr:m which should c::rrive very shortly. It is not

4 very long Dnd you'll be <::ble to rC2d it quickly.'

5

6

"YAffiliI'.1OTO~ 'Oh, you've dispat~hcd it?'

"KURlTSU~ 'Oh, yes? c:tlitc ['. ",:hile ('go. 1-.t

7 Gbout 7 0 I clock. '

8 It(P[nlse.)

9 "K-r.:rrusu;: tHow do things look there? Does

to it seem cs if [' child mlght be born?,11

11 Decode~ "'Does it scem ~:s if [1 crisis is r:t

12 h('nd? '

"YAEPJWTO: (In C1 very definite tone): 'Yes,

14 thE birth of the child seems immin:nt. I II

15 Decode ~ '" y~ s, ·a crisis dOt.:.§.. CpDGf'r imuincnt.'

16 "Kl:11USU: (In 2 somewhc:t surprised tone, re-

17 pCCJting YANfAHOTO! s stctcment): I It does SE~em rs if the

18 birth is goi.ng to trlkE; pl~cc:)f"

19 Decode: "'il crisis ~ 2pfoc-r imminent?'

20 "(Pause)

21 If KTIRUSU: t In which dirc;ction. 0 ~ (broken off)

22 (stopped himself very abruptly at this slip which wont

23 outside the charc::ctcr of the voice code. After a

24 slight pause he quickly recovered? thEn to cover UP

25 I th~ I'~

slip ~ continued: ) II

___ .l


2

1(' ,434

11 KURUSU ~ I Is it to be D boy or c. girl?'

lIYA."ILMOTO; (Hesi teteC'. , then 1c::ughine et his

.:.' hesi tc!t ion took UD KURFS'(}, s CUE: to re-cst2blish the

~ voice code ch2ract8r of thE: telk. The 'Boy, girl,

5 hcolthy! byplay hes no other signigic~nce):

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II YAr:1ArWTO ~ 'It scorns f..:S if it will be ""

strong heclthy boy.'

"KURUSU~ 'Oh, it's to be 2. strong hcrlthy

boy?!

"(REther long p2use.)

"YLI.~PJ'WTO~ 'Yes. Did you m~)k(; any stctcrncnt

(to the newspc:pers) regarding your t[:lk wi th Miss

. KBUKO toda y? t II

Dccode~ "'Did you m['ke [:ny stc:tement regcrding

your talks with the President today?!

"K1JRUSU~ 'No, nothing. Nothing E:xcept the

mere fact thct we met.'

"1A:vIAMOTO ~ I Regr~rd ing the matter contcined

in the telegram of the other day, although no definite

decision h2S been made yet, plccsE be rdvised thrt

effecting it will be difficult.'

If KURUSF~ 'Oh, it is difficult, huh?'

"Y1UflAl'!WTO ~ rYe s, it is.'

"KURUSU: I Well, I guess thore' s nothing more

thet cen be done then. 'II


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"YAfIT,AM01'Q: 'VeIl, yes. f

"(Pouse.)

"YjJ~ArvIQTO: f Then, todry ••• I

"KtTRUSU: 'Tod['y?'

ItYAMl:.MOTO ~ f ThE; mO'. trimoni&l que st ion, thrt is,

the m8ttcr pcrtc ining to c::rrcnging c mcrriC'.gc -- don't

broe k them off. '"

Decode: '" RcgC'rd ing negotir.tions don't breE'.k

them off. I

"KURUSU: 'Not brcr.:k them? Y01J mc~n tolJ\s?'

II (Helplessly: )

"KURUSU: I Oh, my.'

II (Pause, Dnd then with c resigned lough:)

I'KURUSU ~ 'f Vlcl1, It 11 do whrt I cnn.'

It (Continuing (::fter r: peuse:)

IIKURUSU: 'PleLs€: rerd crrcfully whc:t miss

KIMIKO had to S[y c:s cont[;ined in todry's telegram.'"

Decode: '" Please reed crrcfully wh['.t the

President hod to soy [s contcined in tod~y's telegrem.'

"YAMAMOTO: I From whet time to wh['t time were

your talks today?'

flKTJRUSU: 'Oh, todc::y's W[,S from 2:30.'

"(Much rep0rting of th8 numcrol 2)

"KURUSU~ t Oh, you mum the dur['tion? Oh,

thrt wes for obout cn hour.'"


1 1----" YA).Ib~o~~~-,:~g 2r~ in~·· the ~~t:i:~~i:~-q~cst i oJ I' "

I '

2 i Decode ~ "I Rcgo.rding the negotiations.' I I ~ I i 3 I " t I sholl send you [mother messcge. However, I

plE'f.se bsc.r in mind thct the mc.ttc:r of the other dry I

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is e. v ..... ry diffi cuI tone. I II

"KURUSU~ 'But without [:nything, -- they wont

to keep cnrrying on the mntrimonicl question. They do.

In the mer.ntimc we're fcced with the Gxcitement of

hc-vlng a child born. On top of th2t TOKUGAwt_ is

rec.lly chomping ['t the bit, isn't he? TOKUGj\J?\.'A is,

isn I the? ' II

Decode: " t But without e:nything, they wt"nt to

keep on negoti[:ting. In the mcrntime, we h~ve [: crisis

on hend and the crmy is chC'mping ot the bit. You know

the nrmy.!

11 (Laughter md pc:use).

11 KUReSU : 'ThE' t t s why I doubt if cmything

cc::n be done.'

"YAMAtJIOTO ~ I I don't think it's r s bad c:: s

thet. I

"YAllAMOTO: '~'.rc'll, -- we con I t sell [l mount"' in. ' '1 Decode ~ 1" Well, -- we c[:n I t yield.'

"KURUSU: I Oh 1 sure, I know thr.t. The t isn 't

even a debatable question cny more.'

"YA:MAiJIOTO; '''ell, then, r.lthough we cc~n!t

yield, we'll give you some kind of a reply to thrt

------,,[


10,437

1 telegrnm. I

2 "KURUSU: I In r.ny event, Miss KUUKO is

3 leaving tovm tomorrow, nnd will remain in th,:; country

4 until yifJdncsdr:y. til

5 Decode: "'In <'ny event, thE- President is

6 leDving tOv\rrl tomorrow, end will rGIDc'in in tho country

7 unt il Wednesdoy.'

8 "YAMAMOTO ~ '\7il1 you nle,:;,sE: continue to do

9 your best.'

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"Klmmm~ 'Oh, yes. I'll do my best. And

NOMURA's doing everything too.'

l1YM:1AMOTO~ 'Oh, 011 right. In tod:->y's tc:J.ks,

13 there wosn't c:nything of spccir.l interest then?'

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"KURUSU: t No, nothing of p~rticular interest,

exccpt thrt it is quite clcrr now thl't thct southw~:rd -

oh -- the south, the south matter is hcving considerable

effect. '

"YAMAMOTO ~ 'I see. W81l, then 1 good bye. t

"KURUSU: 'Good bye. III

11 (M) Ncwy Trans. 11<~8-4l."

At the bottom nre cert~:in symbols 2nd "Outline

of interview on 27 November with Roosevelt-Hull-KURrSU-

NorvIDRA.

"ProbCibly;1bl189 (S.I.S. #25441-42). (JD-l:

6896) •

2S I by the

I

W['~shington reports the two propos2ls prc~ented

U.S. on 26 November.1f 1 _________ . __ _


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.. -- .~-----.- -_._-------._-_ .. _-_ .. ----

lJt. FlHELLY; To show further war-like pre-

parations at this time, we next oifer in evidence

International Prosecution document 2539-A, indica

ting that the Cabinet in a meeting of l~ovembGr 28

recognized and approved a new press system that put

the Japanese press on a war-time basis.

TI-IE PHESIi.JENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK uF THE COTJhT: Pl'osecu.tion I s document

No. 2539-A will receive exhibit J\)o. 1192.

(V;1hereupon, the document above re-

ferrec: to ws.S marked prosecution I s eL1J.ibi t


13 MH. FlhELLY: I now read exhibit 1192: Eeading:

1: "EXTHACT FhQl;j I TliE TOKYO tHCHI NIChI I

ij November 29, 1941. CABUmT hECOGl'nZES PEESS l'HG\lJ

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SYSTEM.

"JOlTitNALISTIC PLA£.: PROPOSED BY l~E~ifSPAPER

LEADEHS GIVEN APPhOVAL.

lIA plan for the establishment of a new system

in press Circles, formulated by the board of

directors of the Press Federation, was recognized

in the regular C2binet meeting on November 28.

"For the early execution of the scheme, an

Imperial ordinance concerning the croatian of the

new system will be tssued by virtue of Articles .'

. - I


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16 and 18 of the National Mobilization Law.

liThe new system is aimed at placing newspapers

on the wartime basis for the fulfilment of their

national mission as an organ of the state and the

people in the face of the present strained

situation."

THE PhESrDENT~ We will adjourn now until

half past nine tomorrow morning.

(1Hheroupon, at J.600, an adjournment

was taken until Thursday 9 14 November 1946~ at

0930. )


(pP. 10,280 - 10,439 ine.) r. r;. ". ('

Documents

Transcript of (pP. 10,280 - 10,439 ine.) r. r;. ". ('