An Indian Ocean Dilemma: Sino-Indian Naval Competition

and the Strategic Balance in the Indian Oceanpresented at the Indian Ocean Futures Conference, Perth,

March 2014.David Brewster

Good morning and thanks to everyone for being part of this

discussion.

This week has included a fantastic program covering so many

aspects of the Indian Ocean. This morning I’m going to turn

to the strategic element and specifically the strategic

imperatives and ambitions of major powers in the Indian

Ocean. In particular, I’m going to look at aspects of the

relationship between India and China and what it means for

the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean.

I can see that we have quite a diverse audience today, so I

will take some time out to explain a few concepts. I’ll try

to keep in reasonably short to allow for discussion.

In talking about the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean I

want to see a lay down some words of caution. Despite lots

of talk about its relative decline, the strategic reality is

that the United States is by far the predominant military

power in the Indian Ocean and that reality is likely to

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continue for some decades to come. Despite this, the India-

China relationship remains an extremely important to the

strategic dynamics of the region, both see themselves as

becoming the predominant powers along the Asian littoral.

There can be little doubt that strategic friction between

major powers of this size can have a major impact on the

stability of the Indian Ocean and Australia’s security.

I will start by looking at three developments that have

occurred within the last two months and ask what they mean.

How do they fit together and how should they be interpreted?

Let’s look at them.

[I’ll start with a picture of the Indian Ocean turned on its head. It may help

us imagine that there are different perspectives of how the Indian Ocean

should look.]

Development No. 1: On 29 January a small Chinese naval task

force, including an amphibious landing ship and two modern

destroyers steamed south through the Sunda Strait into the

eastern Indian Ocean. The Chinese vessels conducted a

series of exercises in international waters probably between

the Indonesian island of Java and Australia’s Christmas

Island which according to Chinese official media involved

quick response training for electronic war in the Indian

Ocean. The ships then returned to the Pacific through the 2

Lombok Strait. The exercise, which had not been announced,

was the first of its kind by the Chinese navy in the eastern

Indian Ocean.1

[Here is an official picture of Chinese conducting quick response training.]

Development No.2: Just a few days later, on 3 February,

India commenced its premiere multilateral naval exercise,

called Exercise Milan, in the Andaman Islands in the Bay of

Bengal. The exercise is held every two years and this

year’s event was the largest ever including the navies and

coastguards of some 16 states in addition to India. This

included representatives from South Asia, many Southeast

Asian states, Australasia and even a strong representation

from the western Indian Ocean.

[Here is a picture from Exercise MILAN, which, according to an official

statement of the Indian Navy, was of ships “manoeuvering in harmony” at

the culmination of the exercises.]

Development No.3: Just a few weeks later, on 7 March,

India’s National Security Advisor, Shiv Shankar Menon,

announced that the Indian Ocean island states of Seychelles

and Mauritius had joined India’s existing naval arrangement

with Sri Lanka and the Maldives, in a new Indian Ocean

security grouping that some have called the “IO-5”. Menon 3

also foreshadowed that in the future the arrangement may be

expanded to encompass the Bay of Bengal or that a similar

arrangement may replicated with relevant Bay of Bengal

states.2 There can be little doubt that India’s

announcement was very much directed at China.

[Returning back to our upside down map of the Indian Ocean ….]

How do we make sense of these events? Are they evidence of

heightened strategic competition between India and China? Do

they presage a new era of strategic instability in the

Indian Ocean? Many see these developments are indicative

of a new era in Indian Ocean security – manifestations of a

fundamental power shift that is occurring in the Indian

Ocean. Some might argue that China may be seeking to fill

any space left by a relative decline in the US regional

presence.

A common narrative about China and the balance of power in

the Indian Ocean would see China as expanding its economic

and political influence among many states in the region

while also laying the groundwork for a permanent military

presence in the region. According to this narrative,

China’s actions in the Indian Ocean may be creating a

security dilemma for India which is being forced to respond

by building its own capabilities. 4

For those who may not be familiar with the concept, the idea

of the security dilemma forms a basic part of our thinking

about international relations. The essential idea is that

attempts by states to look after their own security needs,

regardless of their actual intention, tend to increase

insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as

defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening.

Security dilemmas exist all over the world. But

international relations theorists classify them as more or

less intense according to various factors. This includes

whether offensive or defensive military action has an

advantage in the particular circumstances and how difficult

it is to tell the difference between offensive and defensive

military preparations. Thus, for example, where offensive

military action has an advantage over defensive action and

it is difficult to tell the difference between offensive and

defensive military preparations, then the grounds exist for

a very intense security dilemma.

Thus, so the narrative goes, China’s actions in the Indian

Ocean are increasing the insecurity of other states such as

India and causing a security dilemma to arise. This is

therefore laying the basis for naval competition and

strategic instability in the Indian Ocean.

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Today I will question this common narrative and will make

the following arguments:

First, China’s strategic vulnerabilities in the Indian

Ocean region are profound. China’s strategic position

in the Indian Ocean, is characterised much more by

strategic vulnerability than of strength

Second, China cannot overcome its strategic

vulnerabilities except in some isolated areas and for

specific purposes.

Third, rhetoric about China’s so-called String of

Pearls does not have a strong basis in military logic.

Fourth: A failure to acknowledge China’s strategic

vulnerability and work with vulnerability could in fact

lead to greater strategic instability.

China’s strategic imperatives in the Indian Ocean

China’s overwhelming strategic imperative in the Indian

Ocean is the protection of its sea lines of communication

(or in naval jargon, the ‘SLOCs’) across the Indian Ocean,

particularly the transport of energy.

[Here is a picture of the major SLOCs across the Indian Ocean]

The most important of these SLOCs transit the Strait of

Hormuz, circumnavigate the Indian subcontinent and then 6

transit the Bay of Bengal and the Strait of Malacca. The

peculiar geography of the Indian Ocean means that the SLOCs

across the Indian Ocean must transit a handful of very

narrow straits or chokepoints that means they are very

vulnerable to blockade or other military interdiction.

China is probably most vulnerable in the Malacca Strait,

through which around 82% of China’s oil imports pass.3

According to former Chinese President Hu Jiantao this

chokepoint represents China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’. But China

also faces a so-called ‘Hormuz Dilemma’ in the Persian Gulf,

where some 40% of China’s oil imports transit the Strait of

Hormuz. Beijing is keenly aware that its SLOCs in the

Indian Ocean are highly vulnerable to threats from state and

non-state actors. Obviously, any blockade of China’s

energy imports would have a major economic impact on China 1 For details see Rory Medcalf, ‘China makes statement as it

sends naval ships off Australia's maritime approaches,’ Lowy

Interpreter, 7 February 2014.

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/02/07/China-makes-

statement-as-it-sends-naval-ships-off-Australias-maritime-

approaches.aspx2 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/seychelles-mauritius-

join-indian-ocean-maritime-security-group/article5758402.ece?

css=print3 United States Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military

and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012, p.42.7

and the world. Chinese strategists are particularly

concerned that China’s inability to protect its SLOCs could

be used as a bargaining chip against it in the context of a

wider dispute.

So what is China trying to do about these vulnerabilities in

the Indian Ocean?

One way is to building capabilities to project naval and air

power from China into the Indian Ocean. As most of us

know, China has embarked on a major naval expansion program

which has the potential in coming decades to change the

balance of power in the Western Pacific.4 As a result

China’s overall naval capabilities now theoretically exceed

India’s and that margin is likely to grow in coming years.

But, and this is a very important but, China’s power

projection capabilities in the Indian Ocean are very limited

and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The

Indian Ocean is a long long way from China and China can

only access the Indian Ocean through these narrow

chokepoints. The Chinese Navy also has extremely limited

experience in projecting power beyond coastal waters.

4 For a detailed discussion of China’s naval capabilities and

doctrine, see US Congressional Research Service, China Naval

Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for

Congress, 31 July 2012.8

Except in some limited respects, none of these fundamental

constraints are likely to change any time soon.

According to some, China is trying to address these

geographic constraints through the so-called String of

Pearls strategy.

[Here is a picture of what some regards as China’s the String of Pearls]

This is a term initially coined by some US management

consultants that has taken on a bit of a life of its own.

The strategy focuses on the fact that over the last decade

or so, several Chinese infrastructure companies have been

involved in the funding and construction of commercial port

facilities in many places in the region, including at Gwadar

in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in

Bangladesh and at several ports in Myanmar. According to

some analysts, China has negotiated secret access rights to

allow the Chinese navy to use these ports as logistics hubs

or naval bases across the northern Indian Ocean in the event

of conflict. According to this argument, China is building

a string of secret military bases that will threaten India.

The String of Pearls narrative in its various forms has now

become a prominent factor in Indian public debate about 9

China and its intentions in the Indian Ocean. To many, the

String of Pearls is the most concrete manifestation of

Beijing’s strategic plans in the Indian Ocean.5 It is, if

you like, Exhibit A in the case against China - that Beijing

is illegitimately disturbing the status quo and these

actions require a defensive response from India. China may

not actually have any military bases in the Indian Ocean

region, but they may as well be regarded as having them. So

the argument goes, this state of affairs has arisen because

of New Delhi’s dithering and its failure to properly check

China’s assertive moves. China’s recent naval exercises

should therefore be seen as just another step in Beijing’s

moves to establish a naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

I see things somewhat differently. In fact, I see China’s

recent naval exercises as more as an expression of

vulnerability than of strength. In my view, China’s

strategic behaviour in the Indian Ocean is driven by

strategic vulnerabilities that it will find extremely

difficult to overcome. I am very sceptical that these so-

called Pearls, even if they existed, could realistically

allow China to overcome these fundamental strategic

vulnerabilities.

5 See, for example, Ramtanu Maitra, ‘India bids to rule the

waves,’ Asia Times, 19 October 2005; and Sudha Ramachandran, ‘China

moves into India's back yard,’ Asia Times, 13 March 2007. 10

Indeed, many analysts outside of India, are sceptical that

China intends to develop any naval bases in the Indian

Ocean.6 Converting Gwadar and Hambantota into naval bases

would require billions of dollars worth of military

equipment and infrastructure in order to ensure their

viability in wartime. Even then, the exposed position of

these facilities makes their wartime utility dubious against

an enemy equipped with long-range precision strike

capability.7 Gwadar is not readily defensible and would not

prevent the interdiction of Chinese energy supplies inside

the Persian Gulf.8 As one Chinese analyst commented, given

the distances separating any Chinese interests in the Indian

Ocean, these ports look more like ‘sitting ducks’ than a

String of Pearls.9 Borrowing from the terminology of

nuclear deterrence, I would argue that China’s naval

capabilities in the Indian Ocean might at the most be

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described as ‘recessed’ - i.e. an inchoate capability that

can be activated if the circumstances require.

Instead of naval bases, there is a good case that in the

Indian Ocean the Chinese navy is instead pursuing a policy

similar to the United States of finding ‘places not bases’

i.e. finding ports such as Salalah, Colombo and Singapore

where PLAN vessels are able to receive logistical support

for limited purposes.10 These ports are open for commercial

use by many navies. But while these ports may be useful

logistics nodes in conducting say its anti-piracy

operations, many of them would not appear to be terribly

6 See for example, Andrew Selth, ‘Chinese Military Bases in

Burma: The Explosion of a Myth’, Regional Outlook Paper no. 10,

Brisbane: Griffith University, 2007’; and You Ji, ‘Dealing with

the Malacca Dilemma: China’s Effort to Protect its Energy

Supply’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 3 (May 2007), pp. 467-89.7 Daniel J. Kostecka, ‘The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support

Network in the Indian Ocean’, China Brief, Vol.10, Issue 15, 22 July

2010, pp.3-5.8 Holmes and Yoshihara, ‘China’s Naval Ambitions in the Indian

Ocean’.9 Ye Hailin, ‘Securing SLOCs by Cooperation – Chinese

Perspectives of Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean’, paper

presented at Karachi, Pakistan, 2009.10 Kostecka, ‘The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean’.

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useful in the event of conflict with India or another major

state.

One limited exception to this analysis may be Gwadar in

western Pakistan. Unlike say the new ports in Sri Lanka

and Myanmar, a naval port at Gwadar potentially has

considerable military significance for Pakistan and could

help provide important strategic depth for the country.

Also, unlike the ports in Sri Lanka and Myanmar, the

strategic benefits to Pakistan of a naval base at Gwadar

would be potentially heightened by a Chinese military

presence there. This gives Pakistan good reason to press

China to establish a presence there, even if such a presence

might ultimately have limited military value for China.

These debates and speculation about China’s intentions tend

to distract us from remembering the fundamental strategic

vulnerabilities that it faces in the Indian Ocean. Indeed,

unlike other areas of strategic competition between India

and China, such as the balance of conventional military

forces, nuclear weapons or the balance of economic power,

the Indian Ocean is the one area in which India holds a

clear military advantage over China.

A Sino-Indian security dilemma in the Indian Ocean?

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So, is there a Sino-Indian security dilemma in the Indian

Ocean? There are certainly grounds to believe that in

coming years there is likely to be real strategic

competition between them.

As we know, there are many unresolved strategic and

political issues between them, including a major border

dispute in the Himalayas, Tibetan autonomy, China’s de facto

alliance with Pakistan and its relationships elsewhere in

South Asia. Probably most infuriating of all for New Delhi

is China’s refusal to recognise India’s claims to great

power status. Some observers see a material deterioration

in the Sino-Indian strategic relationship in recent years,

propelling the countries towards a wider strategic rivalry.

Underlying Sino-Indian competition in the Indian Ocean is

Beijing’s opposition to India’s strategic aspirations to

become the leading power in the region. As General Zhao

Nanqi, Director of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences,

commented, ‘we are not prepared to let the Indian Ocean

become India’s Ocean’.

These feelings are reciprocated. While the Indian Navy’s

immediate objectives in the Indian Ocean involve countering

Pakistan, enforcing control over India’s exclusive economic

zone, and protection of trade, the potential for China to 14

project naval power into the Indian Ocean has become its

principal long-term source of concern.

Based on this, one could conclude that there is scope for an

intense security dilemma between India and China in the

Indian Ocean. In protecting sea lines of communication,

offensive actions frequently have the advantage and

offensive – think of the U-Boats in the north Atlantic

during World War II. But offensive and defensive naval

build ups can now be difficult to distinguish. There is

considerable overlap between the capabilities a state would

require to protect its own maritime trade and the

capabilities required to interdict another state’s trade.

The String of Pearls narrative also seems to be proof that

China is preparing the ground for a naval build-up in the

Indian Ocean.

While there is certainly a degree of strategic competition

between them, I don’t think that a real security dilemma

exists between India and China in the Indian Ocean. The

Indian Ocean is but one theatre of strategic interaction

between India and China and it is secondary one.

Of greater significance is India’s overwhelming geo-

strategic advantage over China in the Indian Ocean. Indeed,

unlike other areas of strategic competition, the Indian 15

Ocean is the one area in which India holds a clear military

advantage over China. The Indian Ocean represents ‘exterior

lines’ for China and ‘interior lines’ for India. India’s

natural advantages in the Indian Ocean, including short

lines of communication to its own bases and resources,

correspond with China’s disadvantages.11

The proximity of maritime chokepoints around the Indian

Ocean to Indian territory or facilities provide another

major advantage for India that is difficult for China to

counter. Indeed, it is difficult to see China ever being in

a position to militarily defend the entirety of its SLOCs

that run from the Strait of Hormuz around the Indian

subcontinent and through the Malacca Strait. One should

remember that from China’s standpoint there is little value

in having the capability of defending only a portion of the

SLOCs – to reduce its vulnerability China must be capable of

defending the SLOCs in their entirety against both state and

non-state actors.

In short, in my view there is no security dilemma in the

Indian Ocean. As I said, that is not to say that there is

no strategic competition. There is. In my view, China is

11 James R. Holmes, ‘Inside, Outside: India's ‘Exterior Lines’ in

the South China Sea,’ Strategic Analysis, Vol. 36 No.3 (2012), pp.358-

363.16

in fact highly vulnerable in the Indian Ocean and its

strategic vulnerability may even be increasing.

Let’s look back at these recent developments that I

mentioned at the beginning of this presentation. The

formalization of a maritime security arrangement between

India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius can

only be seen as reinforcing the disparity of positions

between India and China in the Indian Ocean. The new

security arrangement between India the Indian Ocean states

formalises a role that India has held for decades. Since

the 1980s, of patrol boats, helicopters, training and senior

military secondments to the navies and coast guarads of Sri

Lanka, Maldives12, Mauritius13 and Seychelles. India has also

installed coastal radar networks in the Maldives, Mauritius

and Seychelles. There have also been rumours of the

possible development of an Indian security presence, in one

form or another, in the Maldives and Mauritius, although

nothing concrete seems to have eventuated yet.

12

http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/southasiamasala/2009/11/26/in

dias-string-of-pearls/13 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/07/12/New-Delhis-

rising-star-in-the-Indian-Ocean.aspx17

The new maritime security arrangement between the five

Indian Ocean states could also be seen as a major step

forward in the region’s security architecture. For the

first time India has explicitly taken a security leadership

role in the Indian Ocean. Indeed one could even

characterise it as the first multilateral security

arrangement that India has ever entered into. It is also

one of the first homegrown multilateral security

arrangements in the entire region. And it is led by India.

This is not good news for Beijing.

So how should we see China’s recent naval exercises? Do

they presage a major Chinese naval build-up in the Indian

Ocean. I think not. I would contrast China’s minor and

tentative naval exercise in the Eastern Indian Ocean with

India’s Exercise Milan, held only a few days later. To me,

the contrast could not be starker between India’s

cooperative engagement with the region where it is starting

to show a real leadership role and China’s mildly

threatening unilateral demonstrations.

China’s exercises were no doubt intended to send a message.

But it is not clear what that message was. It is well

known that China has the capability of deploying naval

vessels to the Indian Ocean – as does some half a dozen

other East Asian states. China’s brief exercise therefore 18

demonstrated nothing that we didn’t already know. Perhaps

of greater interest than the supposed message is why China

felt the need to send it. Indeed, one might argue that the

need to send this message, and the manner in which it was

sent, may be more indicative of strategic vulnerability than

strength.

China and India’s Options

Let us now turn to China and India’s options in the Indian

Ocean. China’s military options in the Indian Ocean are in

fact limited. As I have argued, China is at a major

geographical disadvantage in the Indian Ocean and the

putative ‘Pearls’ would do little to affect the overwhelming

balance in India’s favour

Another, more realistic, strategy for Beijing would be to

focus its resources in the Pacific Ocean where it possesses

the strategic advantage. If China is not ultimately able to

protect its Indian Ocean SLOCs from India then it would be

better to act cautiously in that theatre, building its

capabilities and relationships there slowly. Some in

Beijing may see some short-term advantages in stoking

unrealistic fears about a Chinese naval presence, while

others may recognise such provocations as being detrimental

to China’s long-term interests. 19

Despite its geographic advantages, India also faces some

difficult choices. The real challenge for India may be to

determine how its strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean vis

a vis China should be best used. One approach could be for

India to try to leverage China’s strategic vulnerability.

Some may see this as potentially restraining China from

taking an overly assertive stance in, say, the South China

Sea or the Taiwan Strait. Some would argue that a strategy

of strength must be the correct one. But it also carries

significant risks of instability and strategic rivalry in

the Indian Ocean, unless it was undertaken for the purpose

of establishing the basis for a broader understanding on

maritime security in the Indian Ocean. To my mind it is no

use increasing China’s strategic vulnerabilities in the

Indian Ocean unless a solution is also offered to Beijing.

In reality, and despite some of the rhetoric, both India and

China have been cautious about developing any significant

naval presence in each other’s primary maritime sphere.

Each has largely resisted attempts by other countries to

draw them into disputes. China has been careful not to

establish any significant naval presence in the Indian Ocean

beyond the anti-piracy deployment. Similarly, despite much

talk about an Indian naval presence in Vietnam, it has not

established such a presence in the Western Pacific and the 20

Indian Navy as confirmed that any active deployment of the

Indian Navy to the Pacific and South China Sea ‘is not on

the cards’.14 An understanding between China and India not

to develop a permanent presence on each other’s ‘patch’ may

be helpful in reducing tensions. However, given the broader

context of Sino-Indian strategic rivalry, it seems unlikely

that China would be prepared to rely on India for its

maritime security needs in the Indian Ocean region in the

absence of a broader strategic understanding.

The larger issue is whether India and China can work

together to help manage the complicated regional security

environment in Asia. This would need to include finding

ways to facilitate the development of China’s role as a

legitimate and responsible stakeholder in Indian Ocean

security. India’s preference is for the open security

architecture and the sort of multi-polarity that China too

has advocated previously for global issues, and from which

we have both benefited in the recent past. There have been

tentative suggestions from both Indian and Chinese sources

about the desirability of reaching an understanding of their

respective roles in the Indian Ocean. For such a system to

work, India, China and other Asian powers must be willing

and capable of contributing to global public goods in terms

14 ‘India against direct intervention in South China Sea disputes

despite having stakes in the region’ India Today, 8 August 2012. 21

of security, growth and stability that the region and world

require. How will we help to preserve security in the

global commons?15 India will also expect China to

acknowledge India’s special role in the Indian Ocean.

Whether this can be achieved is a big question.

Another big question for us is what role does Australia play

in all of this.

15 Shiv Shankar Menon, ‘India and China: Public Diplomacy,

Building Understanding’, speech at the Indian Council of World

Affairs, New Delhi, April 2010.22

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