Organized Hypocrisy and the NPT

Michael LipsonPolitical Science Department

Concordia University1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. W.

Montreal, QuebecCanada H3G 1M8

(514) 848-2424, ext. 2129Fax (514) 848-4072

e-mail: mlipson@alcor.concordia.ca

DRAFT: Please do not quote or cite without permission. Comments are welcome.

Paper prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Association AnnualMeeting, Washington, DC, September 1-4, 2005

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Organized Hypocrisy and the NPT

The nuclear nonproliferation regime is under severe strain. It faces challenges on a

number of fronts simultaneously, and it is not clear whether the regime can be adapted

successfully to the challenges of the twenty-first century.1 It is undermined by both open

and opaque proliferation by non-signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

(NPT), especially since India, Pakistan, and Israel have seen little in the way of negative

consequences as a result of their nuclear weapons programs.2 The uncovering of the

Abdul Qadeer Khan network’s activities revealed the extent to which a transnational

network could spread nuclear weapons technologies, a blind spot for a treaty regime

focused on state-to-state transfers.3 Relevant technology has diffused, and is now traded

by non-nuclear weapons states with nuclear ambitions.4 And state parties – North Korea

and Iran – have pursued secret activities outside of the inspection regime, raising fears of

states taking advantage of the enhanced access to nuclear technology offered by formal

adherence to the treaty and availing themselves, once the capability to build a weapon

was accomplished, of the treaty’s provisions allowing withdrawal upon three months

notice.5 Some have proclaimed a “second nuclear age,” to which the NPT and the

1 Miller 2001, Stanley and Ryan Craig 2003, Cirincione 2005.2 Perkovitch et al. 2005; Cohen and Frankel 1990; Baker 2005; Weisman 2005.3 On the A.Q. Khan network, see: Slevin et al. 2004, Albright and Hinderstein 2005.4 Braun and Chyba 2004.5 Traub 2004. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2002. Under Article X (1), a stateparty may withdraw after giving three months notice to the Security Council and otherstate parties if “extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty,” threatenit’s “supreme interests.” United Stated Department of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation,“Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons”

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nonproliferation regime are poorly adapted.6 Various responses – counterproliferation,

interdiction, new legal obligations on states regarding WMD trafficking and terrorism, an

additional protocol – have been proposed. But the 2005 Nonproliferation Treaty Review

Conference (RevCon) deadlocked amidst acrimonious wrangling between states

alternately concerned with the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, on the one

hand, and the perceived lack of progress towards fulfillment of the nuclear weapons

states’ Article VI disarmament commitments, on the other.7

Nuclear proliferation is a product of systemic, domestic, and normative factors,

which often work at cross-purposes.8 The maintenance of nuclear umbrellas by nuclear

powers can help address non-nuclear states’ security concerns, and persuade them to

avoid acquiring their own nuclear arsenal. But the indefinite maintenance of such

capabilities erodes the disarmament norms that buttress the legitimacy of the

nonproliferation regime. Thus, the logic of consequences of nuclear deterrence and power

politics is at odds with the logic of appropriateness of international nonproliferation and

disarmament norms.9 Such conflicts between material and normative pressures give rise

to a phenomenon Stephen Krasner has called “organized hypocrisy.”10 In organized

http://www.state.gov/t/np/trty/16281.htm#treaty (accessed August 10, 2005).[Henceforth, “NPT.”]6 Bracken 1999, Cha 2001, Keller 2003.7 Sanger 2005.8 Sagan 1996/7. See also: Flank 1993/4 Solingen 1995, Paul 1998, Way and Sasikumar2004.9 March and Olsen 1989, 1998.10 Krasner 1999. Krasner adapted the concept from Brunsson’s (1989) work on “theorganization of hypocrisy.” Brunsson used the term “organizational hypocrisy” in thefirst edition, and has adopted the term “organized hypocrisy” since (2002, 2003) but doesnot appear to have used the term “organized hypocrisy” until after the publication ofKrasner’s book on sovereignty. Krasner credits John Meyer with the idea for explaining

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hypocrisy – a concept derived from sociological organization theory – actors satisfy

contradictory demands from their social and political environment through inconsistent

rhetoric and behavior. This paper argues that the nonproliferation regime exhibits

organized hypocrisy – rhetorical commitment to nuclear disarmament decoupled from

actual nuclear strategies and force structures -- and explores the implications of such

“nuclear organized hypocrisy” for the future of the nonproliferation regime.11 The

nonproliferation regime’s legitimacy depends to a great extent on the maintenance of

nuclear organized hypocrisy. NPT Review Conferences play an important role in

perpetuating nuclear organized hypocrisy. The failure of the 2005 RevCon therefore

raises important questions about the sustainability of nuclear organized hypocrisy, and its

implications for the nonproliferation regime.

The next section explains and refines the concept of organized hypocrisy,

distinguishing different variants of the concept presented by Nils Brunsson and Stephen

Krasner, and situating it in the literature of sociological organization theory from which it

emerged.12 Following that, I establish that the NPT in fact constitutes organized

sovereignty in terms of organized hypocrisy, though it is not clear who suggested theprecise term.11 As I explain below, the term “decoupled” is not strictly accurate here, but I use it forthe sake of simplicity. Methologically, the single case study presented here is of the“disciplined-configurative” type. George and Bennett 2005, 75. The case is selectedprimarily for its inherent importance (and for its relevance to the issue of thesustainability of organized hypocrisy), not for being a strong “test” of the theory. Instead,the paper presents a plausibility probe of an organized hypocrisy interpretation of theNPT. More rigorous hypothesis testing awaits further research, which the plausibilityprobe’s positive result indicates is warranted.12 Brunsson 1989, 2002, 2003; Krasner 1999.

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hypocrisy. Finally, I explore theoretical and policy implications of interpreting the NPT

in terms of organized hypocrisy.13

Organized Hypocrisy

This section explains how the concept of organized hypocrisy has been formulated in the

work of Nils Brunsson and Stephen Krasner, and how their conceptions differ based in

ways corresponding to the theoretical contexts – realist IR theory and institutionalist

organization theory -- in which each author embeds them. A somewhat lengthy and

detailed discussion is necessary for several reasons. First, Krasner’s concept of organized

hypocrisy is underdeveloped theoretically, with little by way of “moving parts” beyond a

definition in terms of simultaneous durability and behavioral violation of institutions, and

decoupled logics of consequences and appropriateness.14 Analyzing the implications of

organized hypocrisy for the nonproliferation regime requires fuller specification of the

mechanisms by which organized hypocrisy arises and operates. Brunsson’s conception

of organized hypocrisy is considerably more complex and elaborate than Krasner’s, and

bears detailed discussion.

Finally, Krasner and Brunsson propose concepts that differ in fundamental ways,

making each better suited to different circumstances. Yet, while each has approvingly

cited the others’ work, neither has addressed these inconsistencies. Thus, in order to

13 The NPT is the core of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. International regimes aredefined as “implicit or explicit sets of principles, norms, rules, and decision-makingprocedures around which actor expectations converge in a given [issue-] area ofinternational relations,” Krasner 1983, 2. See also Smith 1987.14 Kingsbury 2000, 592.

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apply the concept of organized hypocrisy to issues such as nuclear nonproliferation, it is

necessary to understand these differences, and to be explicit and self-conscious as to

which version of the concept is being employed. I begin with Krasner’s interpretation of

sovereignty, both because it is more straightforward than Brunsson’s analysis, and

because it is more likely to be familiar to political scientists and IR scholars.

Krasner, Sovereignty and Organized Hypocrisy

In an innovative analysis of sovereignty as organized hypocrisy, enduring as an

institution yet routinely violated in practice, Krasner adapted the concept of organized

hypocrisy from the work of Nils Brunsson.15 Krasner defines organized hypocrisy as a

condition in which institutions are durable but weakly institutionalized and therefore

frequently infringed.16 Drawing on the concept of “decoupling” from organization theory,

he holds that, in organized hypocrisy, institutional norms are decoupled – or causally

separate – from behavior.17 Thus, in the terminology of March and Olsen, norms conform

15 Krasner 1999, Brunsson 1989.16 Krasner (1999, 58) defines institutionalization as “conformity between norms andbehavior.” Organizational sociology employs a different meaning, referring to theattachment of meaning and significance to practices. From this perspective, “[t]o‘institutionalize’ is to infuse with value beyond the technical requirements of the task athand.” Selznick 1957, 17. For sociologists, “[i]nstitutionalization involves the processesby which social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule-like status insocial thought and action.” Meyer and Rowan 1977, 341. Institutionalization so-defineddoes not necessarily imply universal behavioral conformity, because institutionalizednorms are “counterfactually valid,” consequential even when infringed. Kratochwil andRuggie 1986, 767.17 Meyer and Rowan 1977, 356-358.

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to a logic of appropriateness embodied in normative standards and cognitive scripts,

while behavior reflects logics of consequences or calculations of expected utility.18

Sovereignty has been a durable norm over the previous three centuries, but

Krasner demonstrates that it has been routinely violated by the actual behavior of states.

While the persistence of a norm in the face of repeated violation seems puzzling from a

behavioral perspective, Krasner argued that the puzzle is resolved by recognizing

sovereignty as a manifestation of organized hypocrisy, with the institutional norms of

Westphalian and legal sovereignty decoupled from and often violated by the self-

interested behavior of states.

This argument is based on a significant adaptation and extension of Brunsson’s

original concept. Brunsson developed the concept of organized hypocrisy with reference

to domestic institutions. Krasner argues that it is particularly applicable to international

relations, due to the weakly institutionalized nature of the international system and the

conflicting demands of domestic pressures and the international system.19 However, for

Krasner, the referents of organized hypocrisy are individual rulers.20 This contrasts with

Brunsson’s conception, which applied to formal organizations. Krasner’s rulers are

unitary rational actors, relatively autonomous from the societies they govern, but seeking

to maintain power by promoting the interests of their domestic power base. These

interests, or the values and norms of influential domestic constituencies, may conflict

with norms and pressures at the international level. For Krasner, then, organized

hypocrisy arises from the strategic decisions of rulers seeking to manage inconsistent

18 March and Olsen 1989.19 Krasner 1999, 66.20 Krasner 1999, 43.

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demands. In contrast, the organizations that are the focus of Brunsson’s analysis are not

unitary and often not rational.21 Organized hypocrisy as described by Brunsson is often

the unintended result of the aggregation of independent responses to inconsistent external

pressures by organizational units loosely coupled to, or decoupled from, each other.22

Krasner also argues that, in an anarchic international system, logics of

consequences can always override logics of appropriateness. He writes, “In a contested

environment in which actors, including rulers of states, embrace different norms, clubs

can always be trump.”23 Brunsson, however, does not regard either logic (what he calls

the action and political models) as predominating in this way.24

Accounts of the development of organization theory highlight a progression from

understandings of organizations as closed systems, distinct and autonomous from their

environments and centrally and rationally directed towards fulfillment of organizational

goals, to open systems conceptions, in which organizations are regarded as

interpenetrated by, and constituted by, interactions with their environments.25 Brunsson’s

understanding of organizations falls within the open systems approach in organization

21 Specifically, organized hypocrisy is, for Brunsson, a characteristic of a particular typeof organization which he calls a “political” (as opposed to “action”) organization. Thedistinction between political and action organizations is described below.22 For Brunsson, organized hypocrisy does not carry the negative moral connotationusually associated with the word hypocrisy. This is partly because hypocrisy may be bothunintended, and not a product of a unified actor. It is also due to the fact that organizedhypocrisy can be necessary to organizational survival in inconsistent environments.While Krasner does not explicitly address the ethics of organized hypocrisy, in recentwork he recommends organized hypocrisy as a policy response to state-failure, enablingpartial trusteeships while maintaining rhetorical commitment to sovereignty. Krasner2004. On the political ethics of hypocrisy, see Grant 1997.23 Krasner 1999, 238.24 Brunsson 1989. On this point, see Kingsbury 2000, 592. For a similar perspective,integrating rationalist and sociological perspectives without treating either as dominant,see Schimmelfennig 2000.25 Scott 2003, Katz and Kahn 1966, Thompson 1967.

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theory, while Krasner’s corresponds to the closed-rational system perspective.26 States, in

Krasner’s analysis, better fit the closed system model emphasizing independence and

clear (territorial) boundaries with the environment.27 Thus, Krasner has modified a

concept Brunsson meant to apply to political organizations, reinterpreting it as a

characteristic of rational closed system organizations. Inasmuch as Krasner’s basic unit of

analysis is rulers rather than states, his conception of organized hypocrisy is not clearly

about formal organizations – as opposed to institutions – at all. While this adaptation may

be justified in order to apply the concept to Krasner’s concept of sovereignty, it

undermines its utility with regard to formal international organizations, for which the

original organization-theoretic formulation of the organized hypocrisy concept offers

powerful insights.28

Brunsson, “the Organization of Hypocrisy,” and Organized Hypocrisy

Brunsson’s conception of organized hypocrisy is complex, and involves a number of

subsidiary concepts. First, Brunsson distinguishes between organizational talk (rhetoric)

26 Brunsson writes (of political organizations, on which he focuses), “Instead ofindependence, the organization’s dependence on its environment is emphasized. Andinstead of having clear boundaries with the environment its borders are vague, or sogeneral as to not distinguish the organization from the environment at all. Theorganization is part of the very environment, which is going to judge it. This, and notbecause the organization produces action for its environment, is why it can appearvaluable.” Brunsson 1989, 195.27 For a contrasting open systems interpretation of sovereignty and statehood, see Anselland Weber 1999.28 Elsewhere, I suggest that Krasner’s interpretation is more suitable for closed-systemsettings, and Brunsson’s for open systems. Lipson 2005. For analyses of internationalorganizations in terms of organized hypocrisy, see: Héretier 1999 (European Union),Steinberg 2002 (WTO), Weaver 2003 (World Bank), Lipson 2005 (United Nations).

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and decisions, calling decisions, “a form of talk important enough to warrant

classification as a separate category.”29 Thus, for Brunsson hypocrisy involves

inconsistency among “talk, decisions and actions in organizations” (the subtitle to his

book). As he puts it,

If people who place demands on an organization attach importance not only to the

organization’s actions but also to what is said and decided, the organization can

meet some demands through talk, others through its decisions, and yet others

through action – and thus to some extent satisfy three conflicting demands.30

Further, Brunsson develops broader and narrower conceptions of hypocrisy, but does not

clearly distinguish them in the first edition of The Organization of Hypocrisy. The

introduction to the second edition (unrevised except for the addition of a new preface and

introduction) clarifies this issue, explicitly distinguishing between the broader concept of

“organization of hypocrisy” (OOH) and the narrower “organized hypocrisy.” Brunsson

defines OOH as follows:

Hypocrisy is a response to such a world, one in which values, ideas, or people are

in conflict with one another. Organizations handle conflicts by reflecting them, by

incorporating within themselves elements corresponding to the conflicts.

Conflicting demands are reflected in organizational structures, processes, and

ideologies, which then also become conflict-based and inconsistent. Organizations

29 Brunsson 1989, 26.30 Brunsson 2003, 205.

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coopt conflicting parties on to their managements, they cultivate a plurality of

ideologies, they generalize rather than specialize, they focus on problems rather

than solutions, and they tend to engage in fairly rational decision processes. These

incorporated inconsistencies define the “organization of hypocrisy.”31

OOH, then, seems to refer to symbolic responses to conflicting external demands through

the display of “structure, processes, and ideologies” rather than action. 32 This restates the

basic claim of the influential neo-institutionalist school of organization theory, which

holds that organizations, in order to gain legitimacy and external support, incorporate the

“rational myths” and institutional rules of their institutional environments into their

formal structure.33 This formal structure will often be decoupled from the mechanisms by

which the organization actually acts. Brunsson’s twist on this point is that these myths

and rules may be inconsistent, in which case their incorporation into formal structure will

produce inconsistency within the organization.

31 Brunsson 2002, xiii.32 Other than in the title, the phrase “organization of hypocrisy” does not appear to beused elsewhere in the first edition of the book. Thus, the above quote is the onlydefinition of the concept Brunsson provides, and it came only in the second edition. Theinterpretation I present here of OOH as excluding action is supported by the fact thatBrunsson follows the quote presented above by asserting that most organizations cannotsimply incorporate external inconsistencies but must also produce action. He thenintroduces the organized hypocrisy as a concept distinct from OOH, defining organizedhypocrisy in terms of inconsistent talk, decisions, and action. This suggests that action(or outputs) is part of organized hypocrisy but not the organization of hypocrisy.However, Brunsson writes, elsewhere, that “[i]f there are no actions, there can, bydefinition, be no hypocrisy.” Brunsson 2003, 209. Unless “hypocrisy” is understood inthis instance to refer to organized hypocrisy but not “the organization of hypocrisy,” thisstatement is problematic for my interpretation of the two terms.33 Meyer and Rowan 1977, DiMaggio and Powell 1983. For reviews of neo-institutionalist theory, see Tolbert and Zucker 1996, Scott 2001.

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The concept of OOH corresponds closely to what Brunsson terms “political” (as

opposed to “action”) organizations. 34 The action-politics distinction mirrors the neo-

institutionalist distinction between technical and institutional environments.35 Action

organizations correspond to technical environments, political organizations to

institutional environments.36 In technical environments, organizations are selected on the

basis of their efficiency and effectiveness. In institutional environments, organizations are

evaluated and selected on the basis of their conformity with externally legitimated rules

and standards. Both dichotomies are ideal-typical. Real world organizations typically face

both technical and institutional pressures; an organization may simultaneously face strong

technical and institutional pressures.37 Because all real organizations face both technical

and institutional pressures, political organizations will be required, beyond symbolically

incorporating conflicting elements of their organizations, to produce coordinated action.

34 The second to last sentence in the block quotation on pages 9-10 lists five specificpractices through which conflicting pressures in an organization’s environment areincorporated into the organization’s structures, processes, and ideologies. These fivepractices correspond exactly to the defining characteristics of what Brunsson calls apolitical organization. It seems, then, that the concepts of political organizations andOOH are more or less synonymous: the basic characteristics of political organizationsconstitute the organization of hypocrisy. Brunsson 2002, 13-39 (Chapter 2).35 Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meyer, Scott, and Deal 1983; Scott and Meyer 1991.Brunsson re-labels what Meyer Scott and Deal 1983 called technical and institutionalorganizations. See Brunsson (2002, 14) for the bases of the action-political dichotomy inresource exchange and institutional theories’ views of organization-environmentrelations. For applications to international organizations, see Weber 1994,Schimmelfennig 2000.36 A hypothetical organization facing a purely technical environment would be an actionorganization. It would obtain resources necessary for survival solely on the basis of itsefficient production of outputs through coordinated action. Such an organization wouldexhibit neither OOH nor organized hypocrisy, as both are inefficient in technicalenvironments. A hypothetical purely political environment would exist in a solelyinstitutional environment, but one characterized by conflicting norms. Such anorganization would display OOH but not organized hypocrisy, because it would notproduce action or products, only rhetoric.37 Scott and Meyer 1991.

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Their formal structures and decision-making procedures, adapted to institutional rather

than technical demands, will be poorly suited to doing so. This discrepancy, according to

Brunsson, is the source of organized hypocrisy.

Coupling: Decoupling versus Counter-Coupling

Organized hypocrisy consists of action inconsistent with talk and decisions. Brunsson

notes,

When institutional norms fail to agree with the requirements for action,

organizations will often try to create two sets of structures and processes, one for

each type of norm. These sets should not interfere with one another, but should be

separated or ‘decoupled.’38

Organizations can respond to normative pressures with symbolic formal structures, while

the organization acts through an alternate “informal organization.” Decoupling allows

these two sets of organizational structures to act in contradictory fashion without

interfering with each other. However, in the first edition of The Organization of

Hypocrisy, Brunsson suggested another form of relationship between inconsistent talk,

decisions, and action. Rather than being decoupled – having no affect on or causal

relationship with each other – they might be related so that inconsistent rhetoric and

38 Brunsson 1989, 7. Brunsson cites Meyer and Rowan 1977 on decoupling.

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decisions compensate for one another.39 Brunsson has recently elaborated on this

relationship, writing,

When hypocrisy obtains, there is still a causal relation between talk, decisions and

actions, but the causality is the reverse. Talk or decisions pointing in one direction

reduce the likelihood of the corresponding action actually occuring, while actions

in a particular direction reduce the likelihood of any corresponding talk or

decisions taking place. Talk and decisions pointing in one direction do not

encourage actions in the same direction; rather, they compensate for actions in the

opposite direction, just as actions in one direction compensate for talk and

decisions in a different one. Or, to use the popular concept of “coupling,” when

hypocrisy obtains, the talk and decisions and actions are not de-coupled or loosely

coupled. Rather, they are coupled, albeit in another way than is usually assumed.40

39 Brunsson 1989, 168-172, 188-189. In the first edition, Brunsson does not explicitlyaddress the difference between this compensating relationship and decoupling, in whichaction and rhetoric are independent and not causally related. Thus, on the issue ofcoupling, Krasner’s interpretation of organized hypocrisy as decoupling is consistent withBrunsson’s first edition. In the first edition, Brunsson argues that ideas, as expressed inorganizational talk and decisions, may be decoupled from action, or be causally related inone of three ways: ideas may control action, or they may rationalize and explain actionsalready taken. Finally, Brunsson writes, “In the fourth case, there is no such congruence,but there is a relationship. This is the case when ideas and action compensate for oneanother, i.e., they systematically contradict one another. Organizational talk is adapted tosome norms and action to others. This is hypocrisy.”39

40 Brunsson 2002, xiv. For example, UN Security Council Resolutions (e.g., the “safeareas” resolutions regarding Bosnia, and SCR 918 of May 17 1994 authorizing astrengthened UNAMIR in Rwanda) authorizing interventions by peacekeepers in the faceof ethnic cleansing and genocide without providing necessary resources, by diffusing thepressure to take action, have reduced the chance of effective intervention actually takingplace. Lipson 2005. See also Barnett 2002; Rieff 1996, 173. Samantha Power hassuggested that activists’ efforts to promote the use of the word “genocide” in relation to

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Thus, Brunsson’s understanding of organized hypocrisy, at least in its most recent

iteration, is also distinct from Krasner’s in this important aspect. For Krasner, organized

hypocrisy consists of decoupling between norms and action. For Brunsson, organized

hypocrisy involves what might be called “compensatory” or “offsetting,” or “counter-”

coupling. I will use the latter, is it is slightly less awkward than the others. Organized

hypocrisy, then, is understood here as action decoupled from, or counter-coupled with,

inconsistent rhetoric and symbolic action.

The NPT as Organized Hypocrisy

In 1963, President Kennedy predicted that 15 to 25 states would obtain nuclear weapons

by 1975.41 Concern over this prospect led the United States and Soviet Union to propose

draft nonproliferation treaties in 1964 and 1965.42 These proposals ultimately led to the

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The NPT designates nuclear weapons states (NWS) and

non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS).43 Under Article IX.3, any state that had

“manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to

January 1, 1967” was designated an NWS. Thus, all states except the permanent members

Darfur might detract from actually addressing the crisis with effective action. Whitney2005.41 Lavoy 2004.42 United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1969, ix-xi. The U.S. and SovietUnion held private discussions of a nonproliferation treaty from 1962.43 The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or Nuclear NonproliferationTreaty (NPT) was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. Itcurrently has 187 state parties (the five nuclear weapons states – the U.S., Russia, China,UK, and France) and all non-nuclear weapons states except India, Pakistan, Israel, andCuba. North Korea withdrew from the treaty in 2002.

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of the Security Council are NNWS under the NPT. The NPT is often described as

comprising three “pillars”: nonproliferation, disarmament, and the right to peaceful use of

nuclear technology. NWS agree not to assist in the spread of nuclear weapons to NNWS.

NNWS agree not to try to obtain nuclear weapons, and accept International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on nuclear facilities to verify their non-military use of

nuclear technology. NNWS are guaranteed the right to peaceful use of nuclear

technologies. And NWS are committed, under Article VI, to pursue negotiations in good

faith to end the nuclear arms race, and to achieve nuclear disarmament and “general and

complete disarmament.”44

The Treaty had an original duration of 25 years, with review conferences held

every five years, and a conference of the parties to be held at the end of that period to

decide on indefinite renewal of the treaty. At the 1995 Review and Extension

Conference, the parties agreed to renew the treaty indefinitely, continuing the practice of

five-year review conferences. The 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences adopted measures

reaffirming the pillars of the treaty, including Article VI. As part of the overall agreement

to extend the treaty, the 1995 Review Conference adopted a set of “Principles and

Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament,” including a reaffirmation of

Article VI by the NWS, and a call for,

[T]he determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and

progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of

44 Article VI reads, in full: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursuenegotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear armsrace at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general andcomplete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

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eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete

disarmament under strict and effective international control.45

At the 2000 Review Conference, the parties adopted a final document including the so-

called “thirteen steps,” contained in paragraph 15 of the final document’s section on

Article VI. This provision lists 13 items, characterized as “practical steps,” towards

fulfillment of Article VI and the relevant portions (paragraphs 3 and 4c) of the 1995

Principles and Objectives. The thirteen steps include ratification of the Comprehensive

Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT),

reduced reliance on nuclear weapons for security, and the “engagement as soon as

appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination

of their nuclear weapons.”46 Thus, the NPT links nonproliferation to disarmament, and

the nuclear-weapon states have regularly reaffirmed their formal commitments to pursue

the elimination of nuclear weapons. Yet their actions belie any intention to relinquish

their nuclear arsenals.

The nuclear nonproliferation regime is part of an inconsistent environment,

characterized by nonproliferation and disarmament norms that contradict the perceived

45 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, “Principles And Objectives For Nuclear Non-Proliferation And Disarmament,” in Final Document: Part I – Organization and Work ofthe Conference, NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), 9-11,http://disarmament.un.org:8080/wmd/npt/1995dec2.htm, (Accessed August 18, 2005).46 NPT Review Conference 2000, Final Document, Review of the Operation of theTreaty, Taking Into Account the Decisions and the Resolution Adopted by the 1995 NPTReview and Extension Conference, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Part I and Part II), “Article VIand preambular paragraphs 8 to 12,” Para. 15,http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/NPT2000FinalText.htm (accessed August 13, 2005.)[Hereafter, “Thirteen Steps.”]

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self interest of states concerned with power and security in an anarchic international

system. Realist international theory holds that states, driven by the security dilemma and

the self-help imperative of the anarchic international system, acquire nuclear weapons in

response to perceived security threats.47 In addition, domestic political pressures from

groups such as nuclear scientists and the military, and from nationalist movements and

parties seeking enhanced status for their country, sometimes promote the acquisition of

nuclear weapons.48 These internal and external pressures constitute logics of

consequences with which states and rulers must contend.

At the same time, norms of nonproliferation and disarmament work in opposition

to these domestic and systemic pressures. According to Scott Sagan, a “major

discontinuity—a shift in nuclear norms—has emerged as the result of the NPT regime.”49

Nonproliferation norms have shifted the significance of nuclear weapons acquisition from

the prestige that previously attached to being a member of the nuclear “club,” to the

status of rogue state defying international norms. These norms constitute part of the

international environment facing state actors, and are transmitted through domestic

47 Frankel 1993. Sagan 1996/97. Waltz notes that many states will regard nuclearweapons as unnecessary or counteproductive. Anarchy does not automatically lead towidespread proliferation. Waltz 2003. Security concerns also affect states’ willingness tosign and ratify the NPT. Way and Sasikumar 2004.48 Flank 1993/4, Solingen 1995, Paul 1998.49 Sagan 1996/7, 76. Mutimer (2000) deconstructs NP norms, pointing to way in whichconstruction of “proliferation” as threat understood in terms of autonomous technologicaldiffusion has effect of defining recipient states rather than nuclear weapons states asthreat to IP&S. Paul notes that “India often couches its challenge to the nonproliferationregime in normative and idealistic terms, such as the sovereign equality of states and theneed for global disarmament.” Paul 1998, 1. By coupling at least partially inconsistentdisarmament and nonproliferation frames, NPT’s drafting put it in environment ofinconsistent norms.

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mechanisms, becoming elements of national identity when they are internalized.50 Thus,

the NPT and the nonproliferation regime form part of the kind of inconsistent

environment that gives rise to organized hypocrisy.

The behavior of nuclear weapons states constitutes organized hypocrisy. Nuclear

weapons states are committed by Article VI to pursue nuclear disarmament, yet maintain

nuclear forces and military strategies that presume the indefinite possession of nuclear

weapons. Article VI commits states parties to pursue negotiations towards disarmament

in good faith. However, the current policies, ongoing planning, and force structures of the

nuclear weapons states make clear that they intend to retain nuclear weapons for the

foreseeable future.

A recent assessment of French nuclear forces noted that,

Although France is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and is

bound by Article VI’s goal of nuclear disarmament, it shows no signs of giving up

its remaining arsenal. Instead, it is making plans to develop, procure, and deploy

new weapons, and to maintain its arsenal without nuclear testing, for years to

come.51

This observation in fact applies to all of the NPT-designated nuclear weapons states. The

British government has reportedly decided to develop a replacement for the United

50 Müller 1993, Chafetz 1995, Chafetz et al. 1997. Chafetz (1995) argues NPT rests onLSC identification of interests with regime “on basis of shared core values and a historyof cooperation,” With US as “principal guardian.” Explains apparently hypocriticaldifferential responses to violations. Implication: to extent US abandonment OHundermines its intersubjective basis, regime threatened.51 Norris and Kristensen 2005a.

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Kingdom’s fleet of Trident ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in advance of their

scheduled 2024 decommissioning.52 Russia, while cutting its stockpile of strategic

nuclear weapons under the 2002 Moscow Treaty, is also developing a new land-based

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and a new class of ballistic missile submarines.53

The Russian SS-18 ICBM, which had been slated for retirement, is now expected to

remain in service until between 2015 and 2020.54 Similarly, the People’s Republic of

China, as part of its overall modernization of its strategic nuclear forces, is developing

new ICBMs (the DF31 and DF31A models) and submarine launched ballistic missiles

(JL-2 SLBMs).55 In July 2005, a Chinese General stated that the PRC would have to use

nuclear weapons were the United States to intervene militarily in a conflict over

Taiwan.56 A joint project by two NGOs advocating nonproliferation and disarmament

concluded that, “China claims to be contributing to nuclear disarmament through its

longstanding policy of ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons but it currently appears to be

neither ready nor willing to enter the disarmament process itself.”57

52 Brown 2005.53 Norris and Kristensen 2005b. Cirincione et al. 2000, 109.54 “SS-18 ICBMs to Remain in Russian Arsenal,” Global Security Newswire August 4,2005,http://www.nti.org/d%5Fnewswire/issues/2005/8/4/ceb053ef%2D7a60%2D4e56%2Db85d%2Da01ae38fb304.html (accessed August 11, 2005).55 U.S. Department of Defense 2005, 28. [“Chinese Military Power 2005”]; Norris andKristensen, 2003. However, China’s strategic nuclear forces have traditionally beendeployed in a nonprovocative minimal deterrence profile, and not fulfilled predictions ofarms racing, undermining alarmist portrayals of the Chinese threat.56 Kain 2005. The Chinese Foreign Ministry described the General’s comments as hispersonal views, but did not explicitly renounce them. “China Refuses to RetractGeneral’s Nuclear Threat,” Global Security Newswire July 18, 2005,http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005_7_18.html#A5228CDB (accessed August12, 2005).57 British American Security Council/Oxford Research Group 2005.

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The United States likewise has plans and programs in place to maintain its nuclear

deterrent for the foreseeable future. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) proposed

changes to the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal to ensure, “over the coming decades, a

credible deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with U.S. and allied

security.”58 The 2001 NPR proposed a “New Triad” comprising offensive capabilities,

(including nuclear and non-nuclear weapons), defensive forces, and enhanced defense

industrial, procurement, and nuclear weapons infrastructures. The NPR envisioned an

operationally deployed force of 1,700-2,200 nuclear warheads by 2012 with this figure

later formalized in the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia.59

The U.S. Department of Energy oversees a stockpile stewardship program and

Stockpile Life Extension Programs (LEPs) for individual warhead types.60 The U.S. plans

to extend Minuteman III ICBM service life beyond 2020, and the Navy plans to replace

its existing class of SSBNs in 2029.61 In 2005, Congress established the Reliable

Replacement Warhead (RRW) program, with initial funding of $9 million, to explore the

feasibility of redesigning existing warheads to make them easier to manufacture and

maintain, and to increase their reliability.62 The RRW program is to some extent an

alternative to the LEPs, regarded by its proponents as a more effective way of ensuring

58 “Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts],” GlobalSecurity.org,http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm, (accessed August 10,2005).59 A “responsive force” of non-operationally deployed weapons is available tosupplement the operationally deployed force as contingencies require.60 A life extension program is underway for the W87 warhead (deployed on the MXICBM, and scheduled to replace W62 warheads on Minuteman III ICBMs as the MX isretired). LEPs are scheduled for the B61-7/-11, W76, W78, W80, B83, and W88warheads. Norris and Kristensen 2005c.61 Norris and Kristensen 2005c. A 2004 Defense Science Board study proposedconverting some Minuteman ICBMs to conventional uses.62 Medalia 2005a, Broad 2005.

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the continued reliability of weapons in the stockpile without the need for testing. A recent

Congressional Research Service report on the RRW program noted that, in evaluating the

relative merits of the LEP and RRW programs, “The issue for Congress is how best to

sustain the nuclear stockpile and its supporting infrastructure for the long term.”63 Thus,

the U.S. clearly intends to maintain its nuclear arsenal, adapted in accordance with the

2001 and future Nuclear Posture Reviews, indefinitely. Moreover, the Bush

administration has pushed for the development of a new type of nuclear weapon, seen by

critics as lowering the threshold for use of a nuclear weapon, in seeking funding and

development of a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) or nuclear “bunker buster.”64

U.S. strategies, plans, and programs are strikingly incompatible with the proclaimed

commitment to disarmament under Article VI of the NPT.65 Moreover, the U.S. is no

63 Medalia 2005a, CRS-1 (emphasis added).64 Medalia 2005b. The RNEP has encountered Congressional resistance. Ruppe 2005a.To the extent that they make nuclear weapons more “useable,” bunker-busters areinconsistent with the U.S. commitment, as part of the thirteen practical steps towardsdisarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, to reduce reliance nuclearweapons. Grotto 2005.65 Assistant Secretary of State Stephen G. Rademaker has forcefully defended the recordof the United States with respect to Article VI, arguing that it is “unassailable,” and thatthe U.S. is in full compliance. He points to, inter alia: the end of the Cold War arms race;the ongoing U.S. moratorium on nuclear testing; strategic arms reductions under STARTII and SORT; dismantling on non-strategic nuclear weapons; non-production of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium; and fissile material destruction. Rademaker 2004.Rademaker’s argument implicitly interprets nuclear disarmament, under the terms ofArticle VI, to mean arms reduction rather than nuclear abolition. The US has reduced itsnuclear arsenal to operationally deployed levels of 4,216 strategic warheads and 680nonstrategic warheads. Ruppe 2005b. Approximately 5,000 additional warheads are in a“responsive reserve force.” Norris and Kristensen 2005c. In the late 1960s, approximately32,000 U.S. nuclear warheads were operationally deployed. Norris and Kristensen 2004.Therefore, the current levels do represent significant reductions, and further reductionsare planned. Although the U.S. may be, in a strict legal sense, in technical compliancewith Article VI’s nuclear disarmament requirements, its clear intention to maintain itsnuclear arsenal indefinitely is at odds with its Article VI commitment to pursue nuclear

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exception among the recognized nuclear weapon states, which as one observer notes

“preach but do not practice nuclear abstinence.”66

In addition to the organized hypocrisy inherent in nuclear weapons states’ nuclear

force structures and plans inconsistent with their Article VI commitments, a

manifestation of organized hypocrisy closer to Krasner’s focus on sovereignty can be

discerned in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s role in monitoring compliance

with the NPT. The IAEA is formally committed in its governing Statute to respecting the

sovereignty of its member states, and is “based on the principle of the sovereign

equality.”67 However, in the current dispute over Iran’s nuclear activities, the IAEA has

arguably acted as an instrument of sovereignty-related organized hypocrisy.68 Britain,

disarmament (and general disarmament as well), understood to mean the elimination ofnuclear weapons.66 Thakur 2005.67 International Atomic Energy Agency 1957, Article IV.C. Article III.D of the IAEAStatute requires the IAEA’s activities to be conducted “with due observance of thesovereign rights of states.”68 In 2003, following up on disclosures by an Iranian dissident group, the IAEA declaredthat Iran had been conducting clandestine nuclear fuel cycle activities for 18 years,violating its safeguarding obligations as a party to the NPT. In October 2003, Iran agreedto suspend its uranium enrichment, and in December it signed the Additional Protocol,granting IAEA inspectors largely unrestricted access to both declared and undeclarednuclear sites for snap inspections. The IAEA has subsequently found Iranian declarationsof its nuclear activities to be incomplete, and Iran has yet to ratify the AdditionalProtocol. Negotiations between the Britain, France, and Germany (the EU3) and Iranhave proceeded in fits and starts. The prospect of UN sanctions is complicated both bypossible Security Council vetoes by China and Russia, and by the fact that Iran’s uraniumenrichment activities are not forbidden by the NPT, and it is not clear whether itsviolations of the Treaty’s safeguards requirements constitute sufficient legal basis (that is,a clear enough threat to international peace and security) for enforcement action underChapter VII of the UN Charter. Grotto 2004. Based in part of judgments that previouslysuspected military enrichment efforts parallel to the civilian program did not in fact exist,the U.S. and Israel revised their estimates of Iran’s likely acquisition of a nuclear bomb inthe summer of 2005, with the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate assessing Iran’scapability to produce sufficient fissile material “closer to 2015” than the previousestimate of “within five years.” Linzer 2005a. Revised Israeli estimates hold that Iran

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France, and Germany (the “EU three”), negotiating on behalf of the European Union and

with U.S. support, have employed both carrots and sticks in an effort to induce Iran to

agree to abandon efforts to produce fissile material that could be used in nuclear

weapons. While offering to provide fuel for Iranian civilian nuclear reactors in exchange

for Iran’s verified abandonment of efforts to enrich uranium itself, the EU and U.S. have

also threatened that if Iran ended its voluntary suspension of uranium processing they

would take the issue to the IAEA’s board of governors for referral to the UN Security

Council and possible sanctions. The terms of a U.S.-backed August 4, 2005 proposal by

the EU3 requires Iran to agree that IAEA inspectors could “visit any site or interview any

person they deem relevant to their monitoring of nuclear activities in Iran.”69 Thus, the

EU3 are seeking to induce Iran to agree, in negotiations backed with a threat of coercive

sanctions, to forgo rights to nuclear technology and accept a limited surrender of

Westphalian sovereignty to the IAEA, in exchange for security assurances and nuclear

energy assistance. If successful, such efforts would constitute what Krasner terms a

contract compromising Westphalian sovereignty. If failure of the negotiations resulted in

the imposition of sanctions, or Iranian capitulation in the face of sanctions, this would

constitute coercive infringement of Westphalian sovereignty.70

The nonproliferation regime, then, conforms to the overall framework of

organized hypocrisy. But, as outlined above, Brunsson and Krasner present different and

could not produce a nuclear weapon before 2008, and is likely to acquire nuclearcapability by 2012 if not stopped. Halpern 2005. See also, “Israel Disputes U.S.Intelligence on Iran, Predicts Nuclear Capability Within Three Years,” Global SecurityNewswire August 17, 2005,http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005_8_17.html#F6093CB2 (accessed August 17,2005).69 Linzer 2005b. Iran rejected this proposal immediately.70 Krasner 1999, 25-40.

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partially incompatible models of organized hypocrisy. To what extent does the nuclear

nonproliferation regime correspond to the alternative types of organized hypocrisy?

Decoupling vs. Counter-coupling in Nuclear Organized Hypocrisy

In his discussion of decoupling, Brunsson lists four methods by which talk, decisions, and

action are decoupled: separation by time, topic, environment, and organizational unit.71

Nuclear organized hypocrisy exhibits all four. In separation by time, action in one

direction occurs now, while talk and decisions promise contrary behavior in the future.

The NPT takes this form, requiring safeguards, export controls and other nonproliferation

measures in the present, while disarmament is held out as a future goal. In separation by

topic, some topics are addressed through rhetoric and symbolism and others through

action. The NPT can also be interpreted as addressing the spread of nuclear technology

through action (inspections, export controls, sanctions, interdiction, and

counterproliferation) while the topic of disarmament is addressed through talk and

negotiations. Separation by environment consists of the employment of talk and decisions

in some organizational environments (such as interactions with the developing states) and

action in others (such as interactions with alliance partners or export control regime

members). Finally, in separation by organizational unit, some organizational entities (e.g.,

the Conference on Disarmament) produce talk and decisions, while others generate action

(the Nuclear Suppliers Group) decoupled from the others’ rhetoric.

71 Brunsson 1989, 32-39.

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More recently, Brunsson has developed a conception of organized hypocrisy in

terms of talk and decisions being coupled with one another in a compensating fashion,

such that rhetoric compensates for contradictory action and vice versa. This conception

appears more suited than a decoupling perspective to understanding the significance of

organized hypocrisy for the NPT. For example, institutional decisions such as the

adoption of the “thirteen practical steps” toward disarmament at the 2000 Treaty Review

Conference are not causally unrelated to the NWSs’ continued possession of nuclear

arsenals. Such measures, by responding rhetorically to normative and political pressures

for disarmament, have the effect of diffusing pressure to dismantle nuclear forces,

making their retention less politically costly. The notion of counter-coupling captures this

better than does decoupling.

The distinction between decoupling and counter-coupling matters, therefore, to

our assessment of nuclear organized hypocrisy. If Article VI disarmament commitments

and decisions such as the thirteen steps are merely decoupled from action, they have no

causal effect one way or another on the size or structure of nuclear forces. If, on the other

hand, they are counter-coupled, then as Brunnson writes, “the likelihood of an action

decreases the more it is talked about and the more clear decisions are made about it.”72

Under counter-coupled nuclear organized hypocrisy, in other words, decisions such as the

thirteen practical steps actually reduce the likelihood of disarmament in practice.73

72 Brunsson 2002, 205.73 Conversely, according to this logic, the failure to reach a decision, as with the 2005RevCon, may lead to greater likelihood of disarmament, or greater political cost ofproducing new types of nuclear weapons such as bunker-busters, than would have beenthe case had a symbolic decision been reached.

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Implications

If the above analysis is correct in characterizing the NPT as organized hypocrisy, then

several implications follow. Most prominently, the ability to sustain this hypocrisy may

be critical to survival of the nonproliferation regime. Brunsson emphasizes the point that

organized hypocrisy is often “to the benefit of organizational legitimacy and survival.”74

Indeed, in his analysis, “Hypocrisy is seen as a solution rather than a problem, it

possesses some moral advantages, and it is often impossible to avoid it.”75 Krasner is less

explicit about the virtues and benefits of hypocrisy, but in a recent article on dealing with

failed states he recommends the use of euphemistic language to describe proposed

arrangements compromising sovereignty in failed states so as to “let policy-makers

engage in organized hypocrisy,” to deal more effectively with the challenges of state

failure than conventional sovereignty arrangements permit.76 Thus, Krasner also

recognizes that organized hypocrisy can be politically necessary to legitimize actions and

institutional arrangements (such as “shared sovereignty”) in the inconsistent environment

of international politics.

Organized hypocrisy in the NPT has allowed the regime to successfully respond

to inconsistent pressures: normative and political pressures for disarmament, and great

power unwillingness to relinquish nuclear weapons; sovereignty norms and intrusive

nuclear inspections; demands to spread nuclear technology for development and energy

generation, and controls on such technologies to prevent proliferation. Organized

74 Brunsson, 2002, vii.75 Brunsson, 2002, xi.76 Krasner 2005, 108.

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hypocrisy in the nonproliferation regime has allowed for the relatively successful

arrangements for limiting nonproliferation to coexist with a lack of progress towards

genuine disarmament. Given the unwillingness of the NWS to relinquish their nuclear

arsenals, without at least the symbolic commitments of Article VI it would have been

politically difficult for developing countries to sign and ratify the NPT.77 Without

renewed rhetorical commitments in the 1995 Principles and Objectives for Nuclear

Nonproliferation and Disarmament, and the “thirteen steps” adopted at the 2000 Review

Conference, prospects for the treaty’s indefinite renewal and continued support would

have been doubtful. The U.S. stance at the 2005 Review Conference, refusing to

acknowledge continued commitment to the thirteen steps or seriously engage in efforts to

strengthen the regime, raises the prospect that, by failing to cultivate the organized

hypocrisy that underlies the regime, the U.S. may be endangering its continued

viability.78

A skeptic might ask why one should care about the survival of a regime that

embodies hypocrisy. The answer to this question depends on judgments about the

feasibility of non-hypocritical alternatives, and – in the specific case of the

nonproliferation regime – the desirability of preventing further nuclear proliferation.

Regarding nuclear abolition as a desirable and politically achievable goal would imply a

negative assessment of nuclear organized hypocrisy as short-circuiting one of the

77 Non-aligned states made clear in early negotiations in the Disarmament Commissionduring 1964, and in response to a 1965 draft treaty without a disarmament articleproposed by the US, that linkage of nonproliferation with disarmament was a priority forthem. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1969, 17-20. The U.S. andSoviet Union resisted linkage between nonproliferation and disarmament. United StatesArms Control and Disarmament Agency 1969, x.78 On U.S. neglect in the run-up to and meetings of the 2005 Review Conference, seeCirincione 2005.

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nonproliferation regime’s purpose. Alternatively, if one regards genuine disarmament as

unfeasible but nonproliferation as desirable, this would imply that organized hypocrisy is

both necessary and beneficial, enabling nonproliferation efforts without making them

contingent on politically impossible disarmament measures. On the other hand, under the

Waltzian view of proliferation as promoting stability and reducing the likelihood of war,

nuclear organized hypocrisy – by preventing proliferation that might increase stability –

would be evaluated more negatively.79 For the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that

large scale nuclear disarmament or abolition are, in the near to medium term, politically

unfeasible, and that non-negligible risks and extreme consequences of the use of nuclear

weapons make preventing proliferation highly desirable.80 This perspective raises the

question of the stability and sustainability of organized hypocrisy. If the nonproliferation

regime depends on nuclear organized hypocrisy, what are the challenges and limits of

organized hypocrisy, and what policy responses are available?

How Stable Is (Nuclear) Organized Hypocrisy?

If the nuclear nonproliferation regime depends for its legitimacy on the maintenance of

hypocrisy, understanding challenges to maintaining organized hypocrisy becomes an

important concern for both theory and policy. Brunsson notes that, “Hypocrisy may be a

more or less stable phenomenon – it may persist or it may disappear over time.”81 How

79 See Waltz’s contributions to Sagan and Waltz 2003.80 On the risks and consequences of nuclear weapons, see Sagan and Waltz 2003. On thedesirability and feasibility of nuclear disarmament and abolition, see CanberraCommission 1996, Payne 1998, McGwire 2000.81 Brunsson 2003, 216.

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might organized hypocrisy end? Brunsson and Krasner propose two basic mechanisms.82

For Krasner, in the international system “clubs can always be trump”: logics of

consequences will, as a rule, override logics of appropriateness.83 Thus, behavior will be

dictated by the political interests of rulers, a function of power politics at the domestic

and international levels. If norms inconsistent with these interests are enduring, organized

hypocrisy will persist. These norms, however, may change, erode, or collapse. In the case

of nuclear organized hypocrisy, a Krasnerian perspective would predict that NWS will

retain their nuclear arsenals, and that if nuclear organized hypocrisy were to end it would

be by means of the abandonment or erosion of norms delegitimizing nuclear weapons.

(States would “stop worrying and learn to love the bomb.”) Brunsson calls this

mechanism “justification,” indicating that norms change to conform to existing practice.84

While the norms underlying the nuclear nonproliferation regime have proven durable

over the last thirty-five years, it is disturbingly easy to envision plausible scenarios, such

as a North Korean nuclear test triggering crash nuclear weapons programs in Japan and

South Korea, under which nonproliferation norms would be severely tested.

Organized hypocrisy can also cease if action is made to conform to rhetoric.

Brunsson calls this “implementation, ” signifying that actions implement talk and

decisions. The conditions that produce organized hypocrisy by definition oppose

implementation. However, over time the hypocrisy may become increasingly obvious,

82 Brunsson presents three mechanisms, arguing that, “[t]he stability of hypocrisy isthreatened by tendencies towards implementation, tendencies towards justification, andby the norm of consistency.” Brunsson 2003, 217. However, the norm of consistency(i.e., that talk, decisions, and action should be consistent), is not independent of the othertwo but manifests as pressure towards either implementation or justification. These arediscussed above.83 Krasner 1999, 238.84 Brunsson calls justification, “preaching what we practiced.” Brunsson 2003, 218.

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and promises of future consistency may lose their credibility, with the consequence that

organized hypocrisy can no longer protect organizational legitimacy.85 In that event,

pressures for implementation may override countervailing pressures for hypocrisy,

leading to the collapse of organized hypocrisy. In the case of the nonproliferation regime,

this would take the form of disarmament norms and the accumulated commitments of

past disarmament promises inducing the NWS to actually undertake negotiations aimed

at full nuclear disarmament. However, implementation pressures can be weakened by

judgments that changed circumstances make past talk and decisions no longer relevant, as

with the Bush administration’s view of Cold War arms control treaties.86 For reasons of

both material power and national culture and identity, it is unlikely that decision makers

in the U.S., Russia, France, China, and Britain, will abandon nuclear weapons in the

foreseeable future.87

If the conditions underlying organized hypocrisy persist, pressures to implement

past commitments will most likely be addressed through repeated hypocrisy.88 In the

nuclear nonproliferation regime, the practice of holding Treaty Review Conferences

every five years, at which disarmament commitments are typically formally reaffirmed

without practical action, institutionalizes this response through iterated organized

hypocrisy. While the most likely prospect for nuclear organized hypocrisy appears to be

repeated enactment at five-year Review Conferences, repetition of the 2005 Review

85 “Implementation de-stabilizes hypocrisy by actions being adapted to past talk anddecisions.” Brunsson 2003, 218.86 Implementation pressures are also mitigated if past commitments are forgotten. On howperceptions of change and forgetting can buffer organized hypocrisy againstimplementation pressures, see Brunsson 2003, 216-217.87 However, a recent survey found that most Americans say that no country should havenuclear weapons. Associated Press 2005.88 Brunsson 2003, 217.

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Conference’s failure to reach agreement would threaten the continued viability of this

means of managing pressures on the regime. The next most likely outcome would appear

to be the erosion of nonproliferation and disarmament norms under the strain of

continued violations. However (from a counter-coupling perspective), if RevCon

consensus documents were to cease buffering disarmament pressures, this could have the

effect of increasing the pressure on NWS to actually pursue nuclear disarmament with

action, since talk would no longer be compensating for the lack of action.

Organized hypocrisy will also be more stable when there is no authority capable

of enforcing commitments or violations of norms, when hypocrisy is more difficult to

discover, or concerns matters regarded as unimportant, when the organization in question

is regarded as internally divided (making inconsistent behavior appear unintentional

rather than hypocritical), and when external actors are satisfied with outcomes and have

no incentive to complain.89 The anarchic nature of the international system therefore

enhances the stability of nuclear organized hypocrisy.90 Secrecy surrounding nuclear

weapons also stabilizes nuclear organized hypocrisy by making it more difficult to

monitor and document. Institutionally divided democratic systems of government and

regular changes in administration, by mitigating the applicability of the “norm of

consistency” (under which unitary actors are expected to act in accordance with their past

and present rhetoric), facilitate organized hypocrisy.91 Conflict among members of the

IAEA’s board of governors may also serve to buffer the IAEA against accusations of

hypocrisy. And, to the extent that states are satisfied with benefits such as “fullest

89 Brunsson 2003, 216-220.90 Krasner argues that anarchy increases the scope for organized hypocrisy. Krasner 1999,66.91 On the norm of consistency, see Brunsson 2003, 218-220.

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possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information

for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,” as promised in Article IV of the NPT, or

protection under the nuclear umbrella of a NWS, they are less likely to challenge nuclear

organized hypocrisy.

Organizations responding to conflicting demands by means of organized

hypocrisy do so within a global cultural context that includes a norm against hypocrisy on

the part of actors, whether individual or organizational.92 Organizations perceived as

talking and acting hypocritically endanger their recognition as coherent actors, and

therefore their legitimacy.93 Thus, organizations must respond simultaneously to

irreconcilable external pressures – which sometimes requires organized hypocrisy – but

also obfuscate the inconsistency that constitutes the organized hypocrisy. Brunsson

writes, “Doing that it itself a form of hypocrisy, but on a higher level – a ‘meta-

hypocrisy’ – the posture that a hypocritical organization is not a hypocrite. Meta-

hypocrisy is a crucial factor in the success of the underlying hypocrisy.”94 Meta-

hypocrisy is typically manifested in assertions that action and talk are, in fact, consistent

(as with U.S. denials of any inconsistency between its commitment to disarmament and

its retention and planning for long-term stockpile maintenance and replacement), and

through reform initiatives which demonstrate an ongoing effort to reconcile discrepancies

between rhetoric and behavior. Five-year review conferences have been a key basis for

92 Ibid.; Meyer and Jepperson 2000.93 Brunsson 2003, 214-215. “An organization can, for example, be accused of not reallybeing a coordinated unit. Its hypocrisy is taken as proof that the organization is notactually one actor, but consists of many independent and uncoordinated individuals ordepartments each being an actor on its own.” Brunsson 2003, 214.94 Brunsson 2003, 215.

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the latter method. Repetition of the 2005 RevCon outcome would undermine the capacity

of meta-hypocrisy to stabilize the nonproliferation regime.

Conclusion

Organized hypocrisy assumes, by definition, that legitimacy is consequential for political

and organizational survival, even if norms do not always determine behavior.

Recognizing the role of organized hypocrisy in the nuclear nonproliferation regime

implies that policy-makers seeking to strengthen the nonproliferation regime should be

attentive to the need to demonstrate commitment to the regime’s basic norms even, or

especially, when it is not feasible or desirable for the time being to fully comply in

practice with those norms. If political elites not intend to pursue genuine disarmament,

the nonproliferation regime will depend on their cultivation of organized hypocrisy. This

will require adroit use of diplomatic language and symbolism, and would be aided by the

projection of a more general commitment to multilateralism. Having failed at the 2005

Review Conference, NWS leaders should still seek further opportunities to restore

confidence in the NPT damaged by the 2005 RevCon’s deadlock, such as a proposal by

seven non-nuclear weapons states for a declaration on nuclear nonproliferation to be

adopted at the 2005 high level plenary meeting (the so-called “World Summit”) at the

opening of the UN General Assembly’s 60th session September 14-16, 2005.95

95 Reuters, “Nations Seek UN Summit Crackdown on Nuclear Arms,” Reuters AlertNetAugust 2, 2005, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N02637124.htm, (accessedAugust 3, 2005).

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Organized hypocrisy, though often the unintended result of loosely coupled

responses by different organizational elements to disparate demands, can sometimes be

useful as a consciously adopted strategy to make possible or reduce the cost of actions

that would otherwise be normatively proscribed. Arrangements resembling trusteeship

may prove to be the most effective means of managing the challenges of failed states,

helping to bring stable resolutions to brutal conflicts, and reducing human suffering.96

However, norms against colonialism, until recently, largely foreclosed serious

consideration of neo-trusteeship.97 Organized hypocrisy may make more effective

responses possible, without rejecting or denying the principles of self-determination and

sovereign equality.98 Similarly, addressing the proliferation challenges of Iran and North

Korea may require organized hypocrisy in the form of proclaiming respect for their

sovereignty while negotiating intrusive inspections and other arrangements that would

compromise their rights (assuming North Korean return to the NPT) under Article IV to

develop and receive nuclear technology.99

A further implication of the preceding analysis applies to NGOs and activists

seeking to promote disarmament. A counter-coupling conception of organized hypocrisy

holds that, under the conditions that give rise to organized hypocrisy, the adoption of

96 Caplan 2002, Fearon and Laitin 2004.97 Paris 2003. I take the term “neo-trusteeship” from Fearon and Laitin 2004.98 Krasner 2004.99 “North Korea Could Return to NPT, Russian Envoy Says,” Global Security NewswireAugust 17, 2005, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005_8_17.html#7C884D57(accessed August 17, 2005). Specifically, any arrangement acceptable to the U.S. and (forNorth Korea) the other participants in the six-party talks and (for Iran) the EU3 wouldpresumably infringe the “inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to developresearch, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes withoutdiscrimination,” and the “right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange ofequipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses ofnuclear energy.” NPT, Art. IV.

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formal decisions actually reduces the chances of the decision’s content being fulfilled. So

activists may be well advised to adopt a strategy of reverse psychology. Thus, Brunsson

notes, “If lobbyists succeed in convincing the decision-makers to make the right decision,

they may well lose out the chance of seeing the desired action actually being carried out.

Maybe they should push for the opposite decision instead?”100 If formal decisions

advocating disarmament, by diffusing political pressure to actually disarm, reduce the

prospects for nuclear disarmament, perhaps disarmament advocates should have

supported the appointment of John Bolton as U.S. Ambassador to the UN, given his

reputation for blocking decisions of that sort. The prospect of anti-nuclear activists and

disarmament NGOs promoting “the opposite decision,” seems, however, plainly

ludicrous, and in fact such a radical step is not really implied by the theory. Brunsson

suggests it, apparently facetiously, on the basis that, if decisions prevent corresponding

action, then opposite decisions should prevent the opposite (undesired) action. But a

decision in favor of a nuclear arms buildup would not cause disarmament (or prevent an

arms buildup) because such a decision would not address a normative demand at odds

with a logic of consequences, as decisions supporting disarmament do.

Furthermore, as Brunsson points, organized hypocrisy only works if people take

organizational decisions and action seriously. If they do not, rhetoric will not satisfy

external demands for action, and organized hypocrisy will be ineffective. “So it is

difficult to offer a prescriptive theory of hypocrisy: management books recommending

hypocrisy as a strategy would destroy the basis for their own prescriptions.”101 A more

plausible recommendation would be for activists to oppose, when conditions promoting

100 Brunsson 2002, xvii.101 Brunsson 2002, xv.

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organized hypocrisy are present, formal decisions that seem merely symbolic and lack

clear commitments to specific, verifiable actions.102 Such action, by complicating and

destabilizing organized hypocrisy, would involve costs to the legitimacy – perhaps even

putting at risk the survival – of organizations and institutions caught in inescapable

dilemmas imposed by irreconcilable external demands.

The analysis presented in this paper also suggests that the concept of organized

hypocrisy is of more general theoretical relevance for the study of international relations

than is currently recognized. Brunsson terms organized hypocrisy a “not very unusual

phenomenon,” and Krasner makes the case that it should be especially common in

international relations.103 Indeed, the conditions of conflicting technical and institutional

pressures that give rise to organized hypocrisy are commonplace in international

relations. Organized hypocrisy should be common, even pervasive. To date, following

Krasner, the concept has been employed in the IR literature almost exclusively with

reference to sovereignty.104 However, the concept was originally developed to apply to

formal organizations, suggesting its applicability to formal international organizations as

well as institutional arrangements like sovereignty. Advancing our understanding of

102 This might have required opposing even the “thirteen practical steps” towardnonproliferation adopted at the 2000 RevCon, as some of the points listed were not, infact, “practical steps” (i.e., step 5 “the principle of irreversibility to apply,” to armscontrol and disarmament measures, and step 11, requiring a reaffirmation of commitmentto general and complete disarmament). “Thirteen Steps.”103 Brunsson 2002, xiii; Krasner 1999, 66.104 In addition to Krasner’s book and various articles and chapters summarizing it, see:Inoguchi and Bacon 2001, Steinberg 2001. For studies taking the concept “beyondsovereignty,” see: Héretier 1999, Weaver 2003, Lipson 2004, 2005. Citing Brunsson,Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) address a similar phenomenon, although they do notframe their analysis in terms of organized hypocrisy.

37

organized hypocrisy in international relations will require addressing several outstanding

questions and problems in future research.

One such problem for future research will be the need for greater precision in

defining and operationalizing the organized hypocrisy concept (such as the decoupling

and counter-coupling variants of organized hypocrisy). Also, we need to know more

about various thresholds: at what point do environmental inconsistencies make organized

hypocrisy necessary for institutional survival? At what point does organized hypocrisy

become unstable and collapse?

In the case of nuclear organized hypocrisy, can inconsistencies between formal

commitments and behavior be sustained more or less indefinitely? If not, can the

nonproliferation regime survive? The nonproliferation regime’s resilience to date in the

face of changing circumstances suggests that the answer to the first question is a

conditional yes, if the NWS continue to credibly reaffirm their commitment to

disarmament norms. The 2005 Review Conference casts doubt on whether that condition

will continue to be met. In light of both the political-military imperatives pushing the

existing nuclear powers to retain their nuclear weapons, and the robustness and strength

of disarmament norms as a logic of appropriateness, as long as the NPT couples

nonproliferation and disarmament it is unlikely that the nuclear nonproliferation regime

could survive the end of nuclear organized hypocrisy.

38

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