New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

75

Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies,

Vol.9, No.17, 2014, pp. 75-98

[ISSN: 1306-682-X] International Strategic Research Organisation, Ankara Turkey

NEW US SILK ROUTE PROJECT FOR POST-2014

AFGHANISTAN: MYTH OR REALITY

Mushtaq A Kaw*

ABSTRACT

Among other alternatives for conflict resolution and empowerment of Afghanistan, is

the new US Silk Route project. It aims at Afghanistan’s intra-regional and trans-

border trade with Central and South Asia after 2014. However, the present article

argues that the project is hard to realize due to some inextricable political, security

and technical complications. Nonetheless, these can be redressed through the

disproportionate involvement of, cordial relations between and mutual cooperation

among all the regional and global stakeholders in the proposed regional and economic

integration project.

Key Words: Silk Route, Afghanistan, US, Pakistan, Taliban

1. Regional Integration: A Concept:

Regional integration defines a process where under a group of sovereign states forge a

regional cooperation arrangement for mutual benefits. Ginkel views it as a broader

understanding between and among sovereign states over issues of common regional

interest.1 Therefore, these states share their individual sovereignty with each other for a

* Professor Centre of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir, Srinagar, J&K, India. He can be

mailed at mkaw@rediffmail.com or kawm_06@yahoo.co.in

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

76

larger goal. Lombaerde and Langenhove mean by it an intra-state interaction that

creates “new forms of organisation” co-existing along with the already existing

traditional “state-led organisation at the national level.” 2

However, to Karl Deutsch,

regional integration is just a process whereas to Ernest Haas, Philip Jacob and Henry

Teune,3 it is both a process and the culmination of its underlying objective, which

varies from situation to situation, region to region and organisation to organisation.

Obviously, the regional integration has multiple dimensions related, per se, to security

as per Karl Deutsch4 and politics as per Lindberg

5 and Haas. To quote Haas, “regional

integration is a process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are

persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new

centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national

states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community,

superimposed over the pre-existing ones.”6 However, apart from political and security

dimensions, regional integration has economic manifestation in some situations

involving “voluntary alignment of national policies and investments in certain sectors

of the economy” within the national and supranational framework of partner countries.

In other words, regional integration can’t be narrowed down to a single but to diverse

fields for enhancing intra-governmental cooperation among sovereign states though in

certain situations, regional integration is led by non-governmental actors. Quite

exactly, William Wallace clearly differentiates between “formal” and “non-formal

integration.” The former points to a high level process of cooperation among sovereign

states, the latter among private actors having just little or no interference from outside.7

Similarly, no integration process, whatever its nature or objective, can function in

vacuum. It has a co-relationship with other allied processes of cooperation. For

1 Van Ginkel and Van Langenhove, "Introduction and Context" In Hans van Ginkel, Julius Court and

Luk Van Langenhove (Eds.), Integrating Africa : Perspectives on Regional Integration and

Development ( UNU Press, 2003),pp. 1-9.

2 De Lombaerde and Van Langenhove, "Regional Integration, Poverty and Social Policy." Global

Social Policy Vol.7, No.3, 2007, pp. 377-383.

3 Cf. Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 6-7.

4 Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, An Enquiry into the Foundations of

Nationality (Cambridge: The Technology Press, 1953).

5 Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integration: Theory and research,

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 46-47.

6 The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957, pp. 15-16.

7 William Wallace, The Transformation of Western Europe, London: Pinter, 1990, 9-11.

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

77

example, a regional level economic programme has a meaning only when it has a nod

from national-level decision-making bodies as “all policies and instruments are

nationally controlled and implemented, although they might be regionally agreed.”

Economic integration often termed as globalisation or neoliberalism is

considered to be the dominant expressions of regional integration with multiple

benefits to the partner states .However, thinkers like Walter Lippmann denies it on the

grounds that sovereignty is dispossessed of its distinctive character owing to

globalisation or neoliberalism allied processes taking place at the local and the world

levels. Consequently, economic integration is thought to dilute the sovereignty of the

partner countries and subordinate their whole concept of statehood to the domination

of external forums and organisations, per se, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

(NATO) and Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) for security purpose,

European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and ASEAN for

trade and World Trade Organization (WTO), GATT, International Monetary Fund

(IMF), World Bank(WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) for transcontinental

funding purpose. Because of their unprecedented influence, cultural imperialists and

conspiracy theorists terminate globalisation or neo-liberalism either as a “reincarnation

of imperialism” or else the manifestation of vested interests of a “secretive

authoritarian elite ” group of politicians and businessmen in the global economic order.

They maintain that globalisation or neoliberalism triggered concentration of wealth in

some regions and left others high and dry; aggravated social inequality, weakened

democratic spirit and promoted “new forms of organisations” at the cost of already

existing state structures. The noted economist Joseph Stiglitz totally negates its

contribution to the development of American and other economies. He instead

attributes their growth to their individual capability to combine their national trade

policies with social pro-activism and legal protectionism.8

Bane or boon, regional and economic integration espouses merger of

neighbouring economies to boost just regional economic growth and equitable

resource sharing among numerous such states as have common political and economic

agenda, create regional trade blocks to build mutual trust and confidence among them

for hassle-free regional trade, traffic and investment and prompt liberalisation of state

8 Stiglitz Joseph E, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: WW Norton & Co , 2002).

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

78

laws and taxation policies for a wider cooperation.9

Such a multifaceted objective has

been of late realized in many Asian and African countries following optimistic

scenarios of globalization and international cooperation, political stability, good

governance, social inclusiveness, advanced communication technology, highly grown

private sector,10

regional and global trade blocks,11

developed infrastructure, soft and

settled national borders and liberal trade and tax laws. 12

Relative improvement

followed this in their gross domestic product (GDP), per-capita income and other

indicators of human resource development.13

In such situations, neoliberalism served

as a useful instrument of conflict resolution, social stability and economic growth and

generated mutual benefits to all regional partners and their peoples.

2. New Silk Route Project:

The new US Silk Route project is also characteristic of a “formal” act of

intergovernmental or supranational engagement among 25 countries of European,

American, South and Central Asian regions. It features Afghanistan’s direct overland

linkages with Central and South Asia for intra-regional trade. Though essentially a

business or commercial initiative, yet the US new Silk Route vision has political and

security connotations also. Given their intertwined processes, the project has

considerable compatibility with the Robert Putnam14

and Miriam Elman’s political

theories of conflict resolution through the medium of regional and economic

integration. To quote Elman: “if weak states with diminished capabilities are isolated

and left alone, their survival will be risky and costs of their exploitation shall be

high.”15

9 Thongkholal Haokip, "Recent Trends in Regional Integration and the Indian Experience,"

International Area Studies Review, Vol. 15, No. 4, December 2012,pp.77-392.

10 "Regional Integration, Poverty and Social Policy," Global Social Policy , Vol.7, No. 3, 2007, pp.

377-383.

11 Duina, Francesco, The Social Construction of Free Trade: The EU, NAFTA, and Mercosur,

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007)..

12 Mushtaq A.Kaw, “Restoring India’s Silk Route Links with South and Central Asia across Kashmir:

Challenges and Opportunities,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 7, No.2, May/June,

2009, pp. 59-74.

13 “Profiling the Impact of Globalization on Central Asian Republics: A Perspective,” Contemporary

Central Asia, Vol. XII, No. 3, December, 2008, pp.1-14.

14 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International

Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1998, pp. 427-461.

15 M. F. Elman, “The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own

Backyard,” British Journal of Political Science, 1995, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 171-217.

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

79

Indisputably, Afghanistan symbolises a weak rather a failed state obviously for

her recorded history of native-alien conflicts, the English and the Soviets, during the

19th-

20th

century on imperialistic, ideological and the grounds theorised by Marx and

Weber in their writings.16

The 21st century US-Taliban conflict, the continuation of

above historical process, emerged after US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and

terminated the Taliban out of power to reprimand them for harbouring Usama Bin

Laden, the mastermind of the 9/11 US terror attack, who allegedly killed “innocent”

US civilians and perpetrated what Clausewitz conceptualizes as “crime against

humanity.”17

To regain power and establish a pure Islamic State, the Taliban declared

Jiha’d (war against infidels) against the US, which the US countered on the grounds of

“Just War Theory” of Plato and St. Augustine.18

The conflict has lasted for more than a

decade now and proved to be the costliest, longest and the deadliest wars of the 21st

century19

in which tens, hundreds, and thousands of civilians, officials, and security

personnel perished, and almost an equal number was traumatized, maimed, disabled

and displaced, damage to infrastructure aside.20

Pertinently, during the conflict, the

US also strived for dialogue with the insurgents, provided relief to the war-striven

Afghans and funds for country’s mining and agricultural development to “wean away”

peasants from poppy cultivation” for being the major financial source of Taliban

insurgency. However, all such measurers went waste either due to the ongoing conflict

or else the corruption-battered ruling elite of President Karzai.21

The predicament was

compounded by the absence of in-state and out-states free border corridors for

marketing of Afghan imports and exports. These rigid borders had emanated from the

16 R.Collins, Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science (New York: Academic Press, 1975);

F. Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique (New York: Columbia University

Press, 1979); T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press,

1979).

17 Clausewitz Carol von, On War, trans. Michael Howard & Peter Paret ( Everyman’s Library,

London, 1993), pp. 58, 83, 87-99.

18 Sorabji Richard and Rodin David (2006) Ethics of War Shared Problems in Different Traditions,

(Ashgate Publishing Limited, Abingdon, Oxon, GBR), pp.190-91.

19 Rozoff, Rick , ‘Afghanistan: War Without End In A World Without Conscience,’ Stop NATO

Opposition to Global Militarism, 27 January, 2010

(http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2011/01/27/afghanistan-war-without-end-in-a-world-without-

cconscience/).

20 Saif R. Samaddy, Education and Afghan Society in the Twentieth Century (Paris: UNES- CO,

2001), pp. 18–19.

21 Thomas E. Ricks, “Corruption in Afghanistan: An introduction to one fine mess,” quoted in

Afghanistan News Centre, January 18,

2013(http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2013/january/jan182013.html#a4).

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

80

genesis of nation states, for instance, Pakistan-India due to their historical conflict on

Kashmir.

In short, Afghanistan’s economic profile is unsatisfactory for her decade-old

conflict, negligible export potential, receding donor support and soaring security

expenditure. In addition, the landlocked country has rough and rugged terrain and only

12% area is arable in a total space of 250, 000 square kilometres. Her export potential

is quite limited: US$ 119 million in 2005 and US$ 492 million or US$ 1612 million in

2010.22

Despite having rich energy deposits, the production of oil and gas is minimal

which does not rhyme with the actual demand of the population. As a result, she

imports bulk of energy from neighbouring Central Asian states. 23

Her crunched

economy is the natural concomitant of above predicament, which the President Karzai

vainly tried to balance through short-cut means: increasing domestic taxes and

curtailing public expenditure.24

Not surprising, therefore, to see the country trailing

behind other South Asian countries in terms of health, education, infrastructure,

security and other indicators of human resource development.25

The poverty and

corruption are rampant and whole scenario explains the underlying reason of Afghan

insurgency and country’s overall poor profile.

In order, therefore, to insulate multilayered problems confronting Afghanistan,

former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, unfolded a new Silk Route project for

her integration with Central and South Asia for trans-border trade.26

Basically a part of

the Asian Development Bank (ADB) aided $US 20 billion mega vision meant to

restore 6 major traditional trade routes in Eurasia, the new Silk Route project is

22 The Central Asia Policy Forum, No. 2, Central Asia Program (USA: George Washington

University, June 2012), p.6.

23 It had 95 million barrels of oil, 5 trillion cubic feet of gas and 494,000kW electricity capacity:

Overview data for Afghanistan, Independent Statistics & Analysis, U.S.Energy Information

Administration, 2011(http://wwweia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=); Energy Consumption

by Country, The United States Energy Information Administration (www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs).

24 Aqib Aslam , et al (2013) Afghanistan: Balancing Social and Security Spending in the Context of

Shrinking Resource Envelope. IMF Weekly Update, Working Paper no. 13/133, May 30,

2013(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40599).

25 Khagram Sanjiv, Clark William and Raad Dana Firas (July 2003) From the Environment and

Human Security to Sustainable Security and Development. Journal of Human Development Vol. 4,

No.2, pp. 289–313, 296.

26 It was announced during a meeting with 25 countries on the margins of the UN General Assembly

in New York in September 2011.

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

81

targeted to commence in 2014 and complete in 2020.27

It reincarnates the second

millennium China-Rome transcontinental trade highway, named as the Ancient Silk

Route by a German scholar Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen in 1877, which was

distinct for soft borders, hassle-free trade and traffic, cross-cultural and ideological

fertilization and people-to-people contacts.28

The underlying objective of the new Silk Route project is multi-dimensional: to

reinstate Afghanistan as a Central-South Asian land-bridge for intra-regional trade;

reinforce her ailing economy and enable her to meet security and other expenses with

extra taxes and transit to accrue from the intra-regional trade and inculcate among the

Afghans a sense of regional competition for sustainable economic growth and thereby

end insurgency and guarantee stability in the otherwise war-torn country.

3. Complications of the Project:

However, the project has following few challenges for its launch immediately after the

US draw down and the formation of the new Afghan government in late 2014:

(3.1) Political Uncertainty in Afghanistan

One is the quite hostile political ambience stemming from unceasing US-Taliban

conflict29

since last one decade. It has heightened especially after the US announced to

leave Afghanistan in 2014. The growing human causalities and infrastructural

wreckages vindicate the ugly scenario. The conflict is unlikely to end because of the

US intention to retain some military forces and air bases in post-2014 Afghanistan and

the Taliban’s ideological incompatibility with the Northern Alliance and other anti-

Taliban factions. The country is, as such, predicted to descend into a civil war between

two diametrically opposite warring factions for power control and alarmingly so with

backing from competing foreign powers for their vested interests.30

The grim situation

is seen to be unmanageable even for President Karzai. To quote a political/security

analyst: “I simply cannot imagine a situation where the Karzai government defeats the

27 “Afghanistan, neighbours discuss Silk Road revival,” Central Asia Online,

23.09.2011(http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/newsbriefs/2011/09/23/newsbrief-07).

28 Mushtaq A.Kaw, “Restoring India’s Silk Route Links with South and Central Asia across Kashmir:

Challenges and Opportunities,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2,(May/June

2009, pp. 59-74.

29 Peter Barker & Elisabeth Bumillar, “Obhama Considers a Strategy Shift in Afghan War,” New York

Times, September 22, 2010(http://nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/asia/23policy.html ).

30 Fedor Lukyanov, “Russia-2011: Regional Conflicts in Focus,” Moscow Defense Brief, No. 3, 2011,

p. 3.

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

82

Taliban, imposes stability over all of Afghanistan and builds an economy capable of

sustaining Afghanistan’s population growth...and supporting a massive security force”

or finding employment avenues for thousands of police and army personnel.31

Under

the circumstances, peace is a distant dream in Afghanistan which shall automatically

push the New US Silk Route Project into a back burner, and, if nothing else, delay its

scheduled execution in 2014 and corresponding completion in 2020.

(3.2) Pak-Afghan, Indo-Pak and US-Pak Impasse

Another complicacy is the trans-border logjam between Afghanistan, Pakistan and

India on bilateral and regional issues, which is a deterrent to Afghanistan’s physical

connectivity with South Asia for intra-regional trade. Afghanistan-Pakistan relations

dented over the issue of Afghan insurgency which Karzai squarely attributes to

Pakistan on the grounds of her historical and ethnic association with the Taliban and its

most dreaded Pak-based Haqqani faction. He also blames Pakistan for sabotaging the

Afghan peace process with the “moderate” Taliban through Afghanistan’s High Peace

Council. The Pak-Afghan trust deficit expressed itself in the oft-recurring Pak-Afghan

army killings along the 2,640 long Durand Borderline and the regular Afghan official

statements condemning Pak involvement in destabilizing Afghanistan. However, their

strained relations smoothened after John Kerry’s appointment as the new US Secretary

of State and Nawaz Sharif’s resumption of power in Pakistan. Accordingly, several

healthy developments occurred to this effect.32

Nevertheless, both lack mutual

confidence and will to do anything substantial to end Afghan conflict and particularly

so when Karzai is soon relinquishing his office and the Taliban is not well-disposed to

him for his allegedly being a US “puppet.” The normalcy of Pak-Afghan relations on

ground would depend upon shaping of political scenario in the country after US pull

and which is but natural to impede the proposed new Silk Route project for and over

Afghanistan.

31 Bing West, “Groundhog War: The Limits of counter- insurgency in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs,

September-October, 2011(http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68133/bing- west/groundhog-wa).

32 Pakistan attended a trilateral Pak-Afghan-US meeting on Afghanistan in Brussels , released some

captive “moderate” Taliban leaders from her jails to facilitate Afghan peace process, allowed them

passage for participation in peace-centric conferences/meetings on Afghanistan in foreign countries

and sent one senior official to Afghanistan under good-will gesture. President Karzai reciprocated by

visiting Pakistan in July 2013 and meeting Nawaz Sharif in London in November 2013 to invoke his

support for the furtherance of Afghan reconciliation process.

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

83

India-Pakistan relations also exhibit a sorry state of affairs since the Partition of

Indian sub-continent into modern India and Pakistan in 1947 and their continued

infighting on Indian part of Kashmir (Jammu & Kashmir or J&K). For their mutual

enmity on Kashmir, both countries fought wars, turned nuclear and enhanced their

defence capabilities to outweigh each other. 33

True, some time back in 2008, under

internal and external pressure, both countries resolved to end conflicts through

dialogue, and under several confidence building measures, they restored two

traditional road links, Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalakot, for limited trade

and traffic to begin with. Soon, however, 26/11/2008 Mumbai terror attack pushed the

whole peace process into the background as India alleges Pak hand in the attack which

Pakistan denies till date. Nawaz Sharif’s assumption of power and John Kerry’s

appointment as the new US State Secretary had signalled signs of recovery in their

impaired ties and created hope for resumption of their stalled peace process for the

settlement of their disputed issues through mutual consultation. Nonetheless, their trust

deficit remains due to Kashmir conflict and is currently heightened by their

intermittent cross-LoC border skirmishes in Kashmir and alleged militant infiltration

from Pakistan into Indian part of Kashmir (Jammu & Kashmir). Consequently, a

heavily militarized Indo-Pak borderline including Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir

divides two countries in the India states of J&K, Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat. Its

rigidity is a technical snag and a major obstruction in the way of the forthcoming new

Silk Route project over post-2014 Afghanistan.

Once strong allies, US-Pakistan relations severed over what US believes as

“Pak duplicity.” These relations mired since the death of 2 Pakistanis by a CIA

contractor in Lahore and the quiet US raid that killed Osama Bin Laden in Abbotabad

Pakistan. Further damage to it was done with the killing of 24 Pak soldiers in a US

airstrike in November, 2011 and the sequential Pak blockade of NATO supplies to

Afghanistan in retaliation. Later, however, the supplies were restored under July 2012

agreement,34

which the US appreciated as a key to reassure Pak support against the

33 India enhanced its defence expenses from US$19 billion to US$30 billion, a 70% increase, during

2005-10 and Pakistan from 142 billion rupees to 514 billion rupees or US$6.4 billion during 2001-

10. Pakistan has yet again hiked it by 15% to rupees 627 billion for the fiscal year 2013-14.

34 Quinn, Andrew and Nauman, Qasim, “U.S., Pakistan reach deal to reopen Afghan supply routes,”

Reuters, 4 July, 2012 (http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/07/03/pakistan-usa-nato-afghan-supply-

idINDEE8620H020120703).

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

84

Taliban and economise expenses on the back-home transportation of her convoys

carrying withdrawing NATO over Pakistan. Their relations improved especially after

John Kerry took over as the new US State Secretary and visited Pakistan to normalised

US-Pakistan strategic and dented ties. He frankly admitted that “we experienced a few

differences in the past,” but we won’t allow the trivial “issues to divide us and the

common interests that united us in big ways.” While he solicited Pak support to

motivate the Taliban for peace talks with Afghan government, he assured to end

forthwith US Drone attacks inside Pakistan. Pakistan’s role in arranging direct US-

Taliban peace talks at Qatar in June-July 201335

and Nawaz Sharif’s October 2013 US

visit, typically exemplify two-way optimism. Unluckily, the US-Pakistan relations

went into rough weather on recent US Drone airstrikes in North Waziristan on

November 1, 2013 killing Hakimullah Mehsud, Pakistan Tahrikh-I Taliban (TPP)

chief only a day before Pakistan was to begin peace talks with him for Pakistan’s

security. Pakistan Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan forthrightly said that

“Pakistan does not see this Drone attack as an attack on individual but as an attack on

the peace process… The bilateral ties with the US will now be reviewed…”36

Whatever the US justification, the said attack without doubt jeopardized the upcoming

US-Taliban and Pak-Taliban peace talks, which is a deterrent not only to regional

security but also to the upcoming new US Silk Route project for Afghanistan.

(3.3)Exclusive Nature of the Project

Despite the announcement of the US President that the underlying aim of the new US

project is to bring about peace, prosperity and stability to Afghanistan as well as to its

neighbourhood,37

China has been left out of it supposedly on three grounds. First, most

of the Chinese export trade is through shipment. Second, China’s National Petroleum

Company (CNPC) is foreseen to optimise all future investment and development

projects in Afghanistan to the great harm of American and western companies. Third,

35 “US commits to Afghan Taliban talks despite Kabul attack,” BBC News, June 26, 2013(

http:/m.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia23058031); “US, Pakistan to resume high-level negotiations,”

Dawn News, August 1, 2013(http://dawn.com/news/1033302/us-pakistan-to-resume-high-level-

negotiations ).

36 Dawn.Com, November2, 2013 (http://www.dawn.com/news/1053627/pakistan-to-review-us-ties-

after-attack-onpeace-says-nisar).

37 Starr S. Frederick, “Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of Nation Building: Giving Economic Strategy a

Chance,” Silk Road Paper, January 2011 (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies

Program, Washington DC),pp. 8, 11, 26.

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

85

China eyes to reorient Central and South Asian countries from the West to Beijing for

future economic cooperation.38

Like China, Iran has been dropped from the new

project obviously for her anti-Israel take, nuclear programme allegedly for deadly

weapons, and her traditional monopoly of the Central Asian energy trade. The US

dubbed Iran as the energy “rogue state” and her nuclear programme a serious threat to

the regional and global security.39

Though Russia is a partner to the new US project,

yet she reads in it a hidden US agenda to outflank Russian trade monopoly of Central

Asian energy to Europe by exploring alternate energy trade corridor to South Asia.

Even otherwise too, US-Russia clash on Central Asian energy pipelines and their

competing military bases in Kyrgyzstan (Manas), Uzbekistan (Khanabad), and

Tajikistan (Qurgonteppa) respectively. Russia equally resents the alleged US role in

anti-Putin public demonstrations in Moscow and elsewhere and the US intention to

retain 5 strong US air bases40

and 30,000 US combat troops in Afghanistan after 2014

purportedly to checkmate Al-Qaeda.41

Central Asian states (CAS) also seem to have

developed doubts about US policy in the region42

for suspected US hand in the anti-

regime revolts, growing Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) influence,

weakening US position in Afghanistan and probable Taliban resurgence after 2014.

Their vacillating foreign policies, bullying tactics to renew the lease of US military

bases regardless of anticipated post-2014 security spill over on their regimes43

and loss

of rentals, per se, US$ 2-200 million to Kyrgyzstan alone44

and their growing

proclivity for economic cooperation with European Union, China, Russia, Iran, India,

38 “The New Great Game in Central Asia,” China Analysis, European Council on Foreign relations

(ecfr.eu), (Asia Centre, September 2011, p.1.

39 Yaphe, J.S and Lutes.C.D , ‘Reassessing the Implications of Nuclear-Armed Iran, McNair Paper 69,

2005 (Washinton DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University), p.1.

40 Moscow, Interfax, in Russian, March 15, 2011, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central

Eurasia (FBIS SOV).

41 “US troops to stay in Afghanistan till 2024: envoy.” Dawn.Com, July 12, 2012

(http://dawn.com/2012/07/17/us-troops-to-stay-in-afghanistan-till-2024-envoy/).

42 Stephan Blank, “Central Asian Perspectives on Afghanistan After the US Withdrawal,” Afghanistan

Regional Forum, No. 2, November 2012, Central Asia Program, Elliott School of International

Affairs, The George Washington University, pp. 7-11.

43 Olimov Muzaffar & Olimova Saodat, The Withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan:

Consequences for Tajikistan, Policy Paper 6, March 2013, Afghanistan Regional Forum, Central

Asia Program(Elliot School of International Affairs, The George Washington University,

Washington), pp.1-6.

44 Elisabeth Bumiller, “Kyrgyzstan: Official Says U.S. Base Must Be Civilian in 2014, is Possible

Obstacle to Exit From Afghanistan,” The New York Times, Asia Pacific, March 14, 2012

(http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D05E6D6133BF937A25750C0A9649D8B63&re

f=elisabethbumiller).

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

86

Pakistan etc., are illustrative of US-Central Asia doubtful relations which, in

aggregate, is due to delay, if not defeat, the new US economic project for 2014

Afghanistan

4. Alternatives:

The new US Silk Route project is prospective provided Afghanistan is stable and

peaceful. This warrants regular therapies of love, affection, aid and assistance to its

restive people till such time they realize that conflict or war is a “bane rather than a

boon.”45

The Taliban can’t be expected to change overnight given their belligerent

past. That does not suggest that should always remain on war-path and stay away from

democratic and peace processes for a viable settlement of Afghan problem. The US

had indeed organized peace talks with former Taliban officials at Duha Qatar in

January 2012 despite strong opposition from some hard-core militant groups46

and the

US policy planners.47

But such peace initiatives foiled due to few ugly incidents of

desecration of holy Qur’an in Afghanistan and the killing of certain “innocent” Afghan

nationals.48

Though these were again scheduled at Duha Qatar in June 2013, yet could

not materialise on certain technical grounds. Pragmatically, the US has no alternative

but to tread the “troubled path”49

and re-engage Taliban in peace talks forthwith as the

timeline for withdrawing US forces is nearing close. Any political arrangement in

Afghanistan without Taliban participation is meaningless keeping more than a decade-

old bitter history in mind. Therefore, reconciliation process especially with Pakistan’s

mediation is quite inevitable. This can be gauged from the given statement of former

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on April 19 2012: “And when it

comes to our relationship with Pakistan my main point is to stress that we need a

45 Elaheh Rostami-Povey, “Outsiders Can’t Defeat the Taliban,” The New York Times, opinion Page,

April 3, 2012 (http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-

afghanistan-now/outside-intervention-cant-defeat-the-taliban).

46 Alissa J. Rubin, “Former Taliban Officials Say U.S. Talks Started,” The New York Times, January

28, 2012 (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/world/asia/taliban-have-begun-talks-with-us-

former-taliban-aides-say.html).

47 “West Willing to leave Afghanistan without settlement: report,” Kashmir Times, March 27, 2012,

Srinagar, p. 8.

48 Rod Nordland & Jawad Sukhanyar, “NATO Convoy Hit By Major Attack in Afghanistan,” The

New York Times, Asia Pacific, March 29, 2012,

(http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/world/asia/afghanistan-security.html).

49 Doucet Lyse, “Troubled path to talks with Taliban,” BBC News Asia, June 20,

2013(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-22980892).

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

87

positive engagement of Pakistan if we are to ensure long-term peace and stability not

only in Afghanistan but in the region.”50

Otherwise peace initiatives by whomsoever to

settle burning Afghan issue may hang on for another decade and naturally defeat the

new US Silk Route project, to say the least

Equally important is the friendly intra-state relations between and among

Central and South Asian countries. While Afghanistan is smoothly situated towards its

northerly Central Asian States, it is not comfortable with Pakistan to the south and so

is Pakistan unfriendly with India. In effect, the new Silk Route project shall be a

distant dream without cordial ties between and among all the countries surrounding

Afghanistan from near or far-near destinations.

Similarly, the said project warrants an inclusive approach and involvement of

all regional players as all of them have respective stakes in Afghanistan and have great

potential to contribute to its future politico-economic transformation. Central Asian

region has been and continues to be a significant partner to the ancient as well as the

new Silk Route vision. The new-born Central Asian states are wedded to a number of

existing or upcoming multi-billion trade, energy, investment and rail network projects

with or over Afghanistan, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas

pipeline project, Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan power transmission line

(CASA-1,000), Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Iran railway project, to name a few only.

These energy rich states are fortunately perched next to the energy deficient South

Asia states including Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Such a geographical proximity

can generate huge cross-border opportunities to them according to the World Bank

experts. Pakistan is no less important for her strategic location on Central-South Asia

land mass and her heterogeneous borders with Afghanistan across the Durand Line.

She offers landlocked Afghanistan the direct, shortest and cheapest land route access

to South Asia and even to the withdrawing NATO troops. In effect, Afghanistan is

“desperately dependent on roads, and the nearest [Pakistani] seaports of Gwadar or

Karachi” by a distance of only 1,000 miles.51

On the other hand, Pakistan banks upon

Afghanistan for her overland access to Central Asia for trade and is just sixteen hours’

50 “NATO asks Pakistan to open transit routes,” Kashmir Times, 21 April, 2012, p. 8.

51 Metin Gurcan, “Countering The Insurgency in Afghanistan: Wrong Diagnosis Wrong Treatment,”

Journal Central Asia & Caucasus, Vol. 6, No. 12, 2011, p.

49(http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/tc9rL7hA2zxjzUNOu9drcsfD0b1P9R.pdf).

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

88

drive from Peshawar to Central Asia over Afghanistan. India factors in the new project

despite being a near-neighbouring state of Afghanistan. Because of her fast growing

economy, she has much to offer to post-2014 Afghanistan’s economic transformation.

Her contribution of around US$ 2 billion aid to Afghanistan’s rehabilitation is on

record, and she holds a soft corner among some, if not all, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara

Afghan communities. President Karzai trusts India more than Pakistan though India

can’t take Pakistan’s place in Afghanistan for geographic, historical and ethnic

considerations.

China and Iran directly border Afghanistan. China has the value addition of

being the growing economy and stimulant to the Eurasian economic integration.

Though most of her export trade is by shipment, yet she does not lag behind in her

overland trade with her western bordering states of Pakistan, Central Asia and

Afghanistan through her volatile but strategically important Xinjiang province. Her

trade turnover with Pakistan52

is estimated to grow to US$ 15 billion in 2015 and

beyond after the US$ 18 billion tunnel construction project between Kashghar in

Xinjiang and Pakistan’s Gilgit region, is complete. China’s trade volume with Central

Asia was € 23 billion as compared to € 21 billion with Europe in 2010, and US$

715.70 million with Afghanistan in 2010.53

If China-Afghanistan bilateral trade is not

worthwhile, be it so. It is sure to grow in the post-2014 scenario because of China’s

nearly US$ 10 billion investment on Afghan railways, coalmines, coal fired power

plants, copper and steel projects, out of which Afghanistan shall be entitled to US$ 808

million for land use and US$ 60 million as annual taxes over 30 years. China’s huge

investment on Aynak copper project, refinery building and oil and gas exploration in

Sari Pul and Faryab provinces,54

provides a cogent reason for her involvement in the

new US trade and transportation project over Afghanistan. It was her long-enduring

potential that was hailed by none else than Gen. Colin Powell in the following words:

“Without China's assistance, almost nothing of sustainable consequence will happen in

South or Central Asia in Pakistan, in Afghanistan, or elsewhere,” which reminds one

52 It was worth US$ 1.07 in 1997, US$ 4.27 billion in 2005 and US$ 12 billion in 2012.

53 It was US$ 19.99 million in 2002.

54 Huasheng Zhao, China and Afghanistan: China’s interests, Stances, and Perspectives. A Report of

the CSIS, March 2012, Russia and Eurasia program (Centre for Strategic and International Studies,

NW, Washington DC), p. 6.

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

89

of the great Chinese contributions to the Afghanistan-bound ancient Silk Route.55

The

US and Iran may clash on nuclear programme. But for Afghanistan’s intra-regional

trade, Iran is as important a stakeholder as others are. Her ethnic Shiites minority

constitute 19% of 28.3 million of Afghan population. She hosts around 1 million

Afghan refugees since conflict and supports Taliban either for “regime security”56

or to

settle scores with the US. She contributes to Afghanistan’s educational and cultural

development to such an extent that made an analyst to say, “…The cultural war is

more important than war led by guns."57

6. Mutual Benefits:

(6.1) General Benefits

Lots of benefits are due to accrue from the said project subject to the condition that

aforementioned requisites are given due thought by the concerned stakeholders. In

general, it can facilitate regional and economic integration, reunite peoples and

communities of Asian Civilization, boost intra-regional trade, ensure regional resource

sharing, build mutual confidence and trust among the partner sovereign states to jointly

counter insurgency and cross-border terrorism, settle disputes through dialogue and

diplomacy, spare defence-centric expenses for works of public utility, diversify Central

Asian energy consumers and salvage acute South Asian energy crisis. For obvious

advantages, the stakeholders need to pool their efforts and extend optimum

cooperation to the US in translating the project into a reality and that too within the

specified time frame.

(6.2) Individual Benefits

The Afghans, the core stakeholders, shall experience and explore in the new US

project an assortment of advantages for their empowerment in the foreseeable future. It

can sooth their restive souls, metamorphose their mind-set from “co-annihilation” to

55 Vine, Steve Le , “Pax-Sinica : why the U.S. should hand over Afghanistan and Central Asia to

China,” FP Foreign Policy, June 30, 2012

(http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/26/pax_sinica_why_the_us_should_hand_over

_afghanistan_and_central_asia_to_china).

56 Toscano, Roberto, “Sources of Tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Iran’s role in Afghanistan: A

Regional Perspective, CIDOB Policy Research Project, Norway: Norwegian Peace Building Centre,

NOREF Norwegian Peace Building Resource Center Policy Brief, January, 2012, pp. 3-4.

57 Sharon Behn, “Afghans Worry About Iran's Growing Influence,” Voice of America, November 27,

2012 (http://www.voanews.com/content/afghan-worry-about-iran-growing-

incluence/1553651.html).

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

90

“co-existence” and assuage their unprecedentedly-grown tribulations since the

inception of the conflict. As regards the country of Afghanistan, the new project can

re-energise her ailing economy, generate her additional resources with taxes and transit

with which to meet security and other expenses after US exit, promote infrastructural

development, attract foreign investment, and boost her GDP, per-capita income58

and

other indicators of human resource development, stimulate her export potential in

mining, agriculture and industry, improve governance, reduce corruption59

and

relocate her being the “Asian Roundabout” for exchange of goods, ideas, services and

people during the heydays of the ancient Silk Route. More important, the project can

minimise her dependence on foreign aid, assistance and illegal opium trade. Presently,

opium cultivation accounts for 90% of world’s opium production simply because its

earnings are far greater than from the traditional crops. It earns an ordinary Afghan

farmer US$ 160 to US$ 200 as compared to one kilo of wheat for 41 cents. Despite

being irreligious, Taliban does not publically oppose it for being supportive to

insurgency. Its cultivation and trade is, as such, so deeply entrenched in the Afghan

society that “no military can undo it” as “there are powerful people out here, and they

will never let it happen.”60

The project can be equally useful to the US in reducing her whopping

expenditure on Overseas Contingency Operations in Afghanistan by billions and

trillions of dollars. According to a new analysis of the Pentagon’s budget, annual cost

on each US soldier in Afghanistan soared from $1.3 million to $ 2.1 million over the

past 5 years,61

which is alarming at a time when the country is experiencing

unprecedented economic meltdown. The proposed shifting of US security

responsibility to new Afghan government and the launch of a new regional and

economic integration project for post-Afghanistan can salvage ballooning of US

expenses on Afghan wars and resituate her image as the emerging “Asia’s commercial

giant.” The US and UK companies can find it easy to step in a country where Chinese,

58 Afghanistan’s GDP was US$19.3 billion and per-capita income was US$ 800 in 2011.

59 “Afghanistan Will Regional Cooperation Accelerate Peace and Development?” World Bank, July

2010, pp. 1-2.

60 Pen Alex, “Some Afghan Police are drawn to poppy trade to boost income,” Stars and Stripes,

Stripes Central, April 20, 2013( http://wwwstripes.com/news/some-afghan-police-are-drawn-to-

poppy-trade-to-boost-income-1.217205).

61 “Collateral damage: Cost of each US soldier in Afghanistan soars to $2.1 mln,” RT Question More,

USA, October 25, 2013(http://rt.com/usa/us-afghanistan-pentagon-troops-budget-721/).

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

91

Iranian and Japanese corporations have already lined up for massive investment on

multilateral projects. Further, the project can open up vistas for her to create regional

influence through the medium of economic dynamism rather than military mechanism.

As regards Central Asian States, they shall eventually find alternate energy

transportation corridors and consumers in South Asia to bargain their energy products

at better terms than offered to them by Russia, Iran, Turkey and of late China. Their

trade volume with South Asian partners shall instantly grow, and broaden the region’s

“production consumption trade prefecture.” More important, the new project can be

instrumental in restoring their direct trans-surface connections with South Asia for

economic, cultural and civilizational amalgamation.

China’s regional influence can reach out to a wider territorial space as the

project can explore her yet another trans-surface corridor to South Asia for industrial

exports and energy imports. Her Xinjiang province is already hooked with newly

constructed Pakistan Gwadar seaport in the Arabian Sea for trade and energy imports

through super tankers via Pakistan’s Gilgit region. The new Silk Route project can

enhance her trade volume with Afghanistan and other South Asian states. Russia can

retrieve her lost Soviet linkages with Afghanistan and she can, besides Europe, find

new energy buyers in South Asia. She has already shown willingness to join the TAPI,

new US Silk Route US vision and other prospective economic projects for or over

Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s relevance shall grow still further as she provides Afghanistan a

direct overland outlet to the Arabian Sea and South Asia. Her annual trade 62 and

exports in rice, wheat, vegetables, textiles, plastic and rubber, pharmaceuticals, fish,

paper, fruits, and cement to Afghanistan and her imports in wool, dried and fresh

fruits, carpets, etc from Afghanistan, can increase onwards from US$ 170 million in

2001 and US$ 2508 million in 2010-11 with considerable trade balance to her favour 63

and she can continue to be the second largest exporter of Afghanistan after United

States. Her annual exports to Central Asia, though insignificant, can also grow beyond

present trade turnover of US$ 10-15 million and her trade turnover of US$ 2,233

62 It was US$ 2 billion (official) and US$ 5 billion (unofficial) in 2013.

63 Pakistan had a trade balance of US$ 2164.7 million in US$ 2508 million trade turn over with

Afghanistan in 2010-11: Rizvi Hasan-Askari, Pak-Afghan Trade, Discussion Paper, December

2011 (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency-PILDAT,

Islamabad, Pakistan), pp. 7-8.

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

92

million with India in 2008 can correspondingly swell to estimated US$ 11 billion by

2015. Besides increase in the accruable taxes and transit fee from the upcoming intra-

regional trade project over her soil, she can join “energy production consumption trade

structure” which will instantly bail out her annual growing energy demand at 6-7% to

the great respite of her nationals. Last but not the least, she can directly go far a wide

trade with South East Asian states.

India’s strategic benefit shall be in her direct physical access to Afghanistan

and Central Asia. Subsequent to the abolition of border barriers, transit hazards and

complex trade patterns, her annual trade with Central Asia and Afghanistan at US$ 1

billion with US$ seven hundred million exports in 2012 can step up to US$ 100 billion

by 2015 “If political economy in the region improves,” and “if just 20%” of India’s

estimated trade of US$ 500 billion with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia and

Europe by 2014, is allowed through road.64

Pakistan has invariably allowed Afghan

goods up to India’s borders under the terms of the Afghan Transit Trade (ATT), and

only Indian goods await Pakistan’s nod for onward transportation to Afghanistan and

Central Asia. Given South Asian acute energy crisis, the intra-regional trade under the

new Silk Route project shall be pre-dominated by energy imports from Central Asia

thereby releasing pressure on India’s speedily growing annual energy demand. Despite

India-US nuclear deal and uranium imports from Kazakhstan, India’s severe energy

deficiency persists.

CONCLUSION:

As an alternative to end fourteen year-old US-Taliban conflict, the US has lately

thought of a viable Afghanistan-bound regional and economic integration project

between Central and South Asia. It represents a trading block of countries having

common politico-economic and security goal in the region. Being multi-dimensional in

nature and based on a sort of compatibility between diplomacy and domestic

reconstruction, the projects supports a new politico-administrative set up for

Afghanistan after Parliamentary elections and US exit in 2014.

64 The Central Asia Policy Forum, No. 2, June 2012 (USA: Central Asia Program, George Washington

University), p. 7.

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

93

The project has, therefore, multiple advantages for Afghanistan and the

regional and global stakeholders provided they are disproportionately drawn into the

project, hold friendly ties between and among themselves and have selfless

commitment towards regional cooperation and reconciliation process in Afghanistan.

Provided further, the international community provide continued support for the

empowerment of the war-ravaged country and its conflict-ridden people. Incidentally,

the US, Germany and Japan stand committed to US$ sixteen billion aid to post-2014

Afghanistan for its reconstruction.

Indeed, the anticipated advantages of the project are numerous for the partner

sovereign states of America, Europe, Central, South and South East Asia. These can be

a catalyst to their multifaceted cooperation in the fields of polity, economy and

security within a mutually agreed trade arrangement; hence, equip them to jointly

resist forces of “fear and doom” in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

*******

REFERENCES:

Aslam, Aqib, et al., “Afghanistan: Balancing Social and Security Spending in the

Context of Shrinking Resource Envelope,” IMF Weekly Update, Working Paper

no. 13/133, May 30,

2013(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40599).

Barker, Peter and Bumillar, Elisabeth, “Obhama Considers a Strategy Shift in Afghan

War,” New York Times, September 22,

2010(http://nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/asia/23policy.html ).

Behn, Sharon, “Afghans Worry About Iran's Growing Influence,” Voice of America,

November 27, 2012 (http://www.voanews.com/content/afghan-worry-about-iran-

growing-incluence/1553651.html).

Blank, Stephan, “Central Asian Perspectives on Afghanistan After the US

Withdrawal,” Afghanistan Regional Forum, No. 2, November 2012 (Central Asia

Program, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington

University).

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

94

Bumiller, Elisabeth, “Kyrgyzstan: Official Says U.S. Base Must Be Civilian in 2014, is

Possible Obstacle to Exit From Afghanistan,” The New York Times, Asia Pacific,

March 14, 2012

(http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D05E6D6133BF937A25750C0

A9649D8B63&ref=elisabethbumiller).

Blank, Stephan, “Central Asian Perspectives on Afghanistan After the US

Withdrawal,” Afghanistan Regional Forum, No. 2, November 2012 (Central Asia

Program, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington

University).

Collins, R., Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science (New York:

Academic Press, 1975).

Clausewitz, Carol von, On War. trans. Michael Howard & Peter Paret (Everyman’s

Library, London), pp.58, 83, 87-99.

Deutsch, Karl, Nationalism and Social Communication, An Enquiry into the

Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge: The Technology Press, 1953).

Elman, M. F., “The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its

Own Backyard,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1995.

Francesco, Duina, , The Social Construction of Free Trade: The EU, NAFTA, and

Mercosur, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

Ginkel, Van and Langenhove Van, "Introduction and Context" In Hans van Ginkel,

Julius Court and Luk Van Langenhove (Eds.), Integrating Africa : Perspectives on

Regional Integration and Development ( UNU Press, 2003).

Gurcan , Metin, “Countering The Insurgency in Afghanistan: Wrong Diagnosis Wrong

Treatment,” Journal Central Asia & Caucasus, Vol. 6, No. 12, 2011

(http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/tc9rL7hA2zxjzUNOu9drcsfD0b1P9R.pdf).

Haas, Ernst, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968).

Haokip, Thongkholal, "Recent Trends in Regional Integration and the Indian

Experience," International Area Studies Review, Vol. 15, No. 4, December 2012.

Huasheng, Zhao, China and Afghanistan: China’s interests, Stances, and Perspectives.

A Report of the CSIS, March 2012, Russia and Eurasia program (Centre for

Strategic and International Studies, NW, Washington DC).

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

95

Kaw, Mushtaq A., “Profiling the Impact of Globalization on Central Asian Republics:

A Perspective,” Contemporary Central Asia, Vol. XII, No. 3, December, 2008.

Kaw, Mushtaq A., “Restoring India’s Silk Route Links with South and Central Asia

across Kashmir: Challenges and Opportunities,” The China and Eurasia Forum

Quarterly, Vol. 7, No.2, May/June, 2009.

Khagram, Sanjiv, Clark, William and Raad, Dana Firas, “From the Environment and

Human Security to Sustainable Security and Development,” Journal of Human

Development, Vol. 4, No.2, pp. 289–313, 296.

Lindberg , Leon N. and Scheingold Stuart A. (eds.), Regional Integration: Theory and

research, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

Lombaerde, De and Langenhove, Van, "Regional Integration, Poverty and Social

Policy." Global Social Policy Vol.7, No.3, 2007.

Lukyanov, Fedor, “Russia-2011: Regional Conflicts in Focus,” Moscow Defense Brief,

No. 3, 2011.

Lyse, Doucet, “Troubled path to talks with Taliban,” BBC News Asia, June 20,

2013(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-22980892).

Nordland, Rod and Sukhanyar , Jawad, “NATO Convoy Hit By Major Attack in

Afghanistan,” The New York Times, Asia Pacific, March 29, 2012

(http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/world/asia/afghanistan-security.html).

Olimov,Muzaffar & Olimova, Saodat, The Withdrawal of NATO forces from

Afghanistan: Consequences for Tajikistan, Policy Paper 6, March 2013,

Afghanistan Regional Forum, Central Asia Program(Elliot School of International

Affairs, The George Washington University, Washington).Parkin, F., Marxism

and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique (New York: Columbia University Press,

1979).

Pen, Alex, “Some Afghan Police are drawn to poppy trade to boost income,” Stars

and Stripes, Stripes Central, April 20, 2013( http://wwwstripes.com/news/some-

afghan-police-are-drawn-to-poppy-trade-to-boost-income-1.217205).

Povey, Elaheh Rostami, “Outsiders Can’t Defeat the Taliban,” The New York Times,

opinion Page, April 3, 2012

(http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-

afghanistan-now/outside-intervention-cant-defeat-the-taliban).

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

96

Putnam, Robert, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,”

International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1998.

Quinn, Andrew and Nauman, Qasim, “U.S., Pakistan reach deal to reopen Afghan

supply routes,” Reuters, 4 July, 2012

(http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/07/03/pakistan-usa-nato-afghan-supply-

idINDEE8620H020120703).

Ricks, Thomas E., “Corruption in Afghanistan: An introduction to one fine mess,”

quoted in Afghanistan News Centre, January 18,

2013(http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2013/january/jan182013.html

#a4).

Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, Pak-Afghan Trade. Discussion Paper (Pakistan Institute of

Legislative Development and Transparency-PILDAT, Islamabad, December,

2011).

Rozoff, Rick , “Afghanistan: War Without End In A World Without Conscience,” Stop

NATO Opposition to Global Militarism, 27 January, 2010

(http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2011/01/27/afghanistan-war-without-end-in-a-

world-without-cconscience/).

Rubin, Alissa J., “Former Taliban Officials Say U.S. Talks Started,” The New York

Times, January 28, 2012 (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/world/asia/taliban-

have-begun-talks-with-us-former-taliban-aides-say.html).

Samaddy, Saif R., Education and Afghan Society in the Twentieth Century (Paris:

UNES- CO, 2001).

Skocpol, T., States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press,

1979).

Sorabji, Richard and Rodin, David, Ethics of War Shared Problems in Different

Traditions, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, Abingdon, Oxon, GBR, 2006).

Starr, S. Frederick, “Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of Nation Building: Giving

Economic Strategy a Chance,” Silk Road Paper, January 2011 (Central Asia-

Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, Washington DC).

Stiglitz, Joseph E, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: WW Norton & Co ,

2002).

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

97

Toscano, Roberto, “Sources of Tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Iran’s role in

Afghanistan: A Regional Perspective, CIDOB Policy Research Project ( Norway:

Norwegian Peace Building Centre, NOREF Norwegian Peace Building Resource

Center Policy Brief, January, 2012).

Vine, Steve Le , “Pax-Sinica : why the U.S. should hand over Afghanistan and Central

Asia to China,” FP Foreign Policy, June 30, 2012

(http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/26/pax_sinica_why_the_us_s

hould_hand_over_afghanistan_and_central_asia_to_china).

Wallace, William, The Transformation of Western Europe (London: Pinter, 1990).

West, Bing, “Groundhog War: The Limits of counter- insurgency in

Afghanistan,”ForeignAffairs,September-October,2011

(http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68133/bing-west/groundhog-wa).

Yaphe, J.S and Lutes, C.D. , ‘Reassessing the Implications of Nuclear-Armed Iran,

McNair Paper 69, 2005 (Washinton DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies,

National Defence University).

*******

“Afghanistan Will Regional Cooperation Accelerate Peace and Development?”

World Bank, July 2010.

“Afghanistan, neighbours discuss Silk Road revival,” Central Asia Online,

23.09.2011(http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/newsbriefs/2011/09/2

3/newsbrief-07).

“Collateral damage: Cost of each US soldier in Afghanistan soars to $2.1 mln,”

RT Question More, USA, October 25, 2013(http://rt.com/usa/us-afghanistan-

pentagon-troops-budget-721/).

Dawn.Com, November 2, 2013 (http://www.dawn.com/news/1053627/pakistan-to-

review-us-ties-after-attack-onpeace-says-nisar).

Moscow, Interfax, in Russian, March 15, 2011, Foreign Broadcast Information

Service, Central Eurasia (FBIS SOV).

“NATO asks Pakistan to open transit routes,” Kashmir Times, 21 April, 2012.

Pak-Afghan Trade, Discussion Paper, December 2011 (Islamabad: Pakistan

Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency-PILDAT, Islamabad,

Pakistan).

New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan

98

The Central Asia Policy Forum, No. 2, June 2012 (USA: Central Asia Program,

George Washington University).

“The New Great Game in Central Asia,” China Analysis, European Council on

Foreign relations (ecfr.eu), (Asia Centre, September 2011).

“US commits to Afghan Taliban talks despite Kabul attack,” BBC News, June 26,

2013( http:/m.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia23058031).

“US troops to stay in Afghanistan till 2024: envoy.” Dawn.Com, July 12, 2012

(http://dawn.com/2012/07/17/us-troops-to-stay-in-afghanistan-till-2024-envoy/).

“US, Pakistan to resume high-level negotiations,” Dawn News, August 1,

2013(http://dawn.com/news/1033302/us-pakistan-to-resume-high-level-

negotiations ).

“West Willing to leave Afghanistan without settlement: report,” Kashmir Times,

Srinagar,March 27, 2012.

********