New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
75
Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies,
Vol.9, No.17, 2014, pp. 75-98
[ISSN: 1306-682-X] International Strategic Research Organisation, Ankara Turkey
NEW US SILK ROUTE PROJECT FOR POST-2014
AFGHANISTAN: MYTH OR REALITY
Mushtaq A Kaw*
ABSTRACT
Among other alternatives for conflict resolution and empowerment of Afghanistan, is
the new US Silk Route project. It aims at Afghanistan’s intra-regional and trans-
border trade with Central and South Asia after 2014. However, the present article
argues that the project is hard to realize due to some inextricable political, security
and technical complications. Nonetheless, these can be redressed through the
disproportionate involvement of, cordial relations between and mutual cooperation
among all the regional and global stakeholders in the proposed regional and economic
integration project.
Key Words: Silk Route, Afghanistan, US, Pakistan, Taliban
1. Regional Integration: A Concept:
Regional integration defines a process where under a group of sovereign states forge a
regional cooperation arrangement for mutual benefits. Ginkel views it as a broader
understanding between and among sovereign states over issues of common regional
interest.1 Therefore, these states share their individual sovereignty with each other for a
* Professor Centre of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir, Srinagar, J&K, India. He can be
mailed at [email protected] or [email protected]
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
76
larger goal. Lombaerde and Langenhove mean by it an intra-state interaction that
creates “new forms of organisation” co-existing along with the already existing
traditional “state-led organisation at the national level.” 2
However, to Karl Deutsch,
regional integration is just a process whereas to Ernest Haas, Philip Jacob and Henry
Teune,3 it is both a process and the culmination of its underlying objective, which
varies from situation to situation, region to region and organisation to organisation.
Obviously, the regional integration has multiple dimensions related, per se, to security
as per Karl Deutsch4 and politics as per Lindberg
5 and Haas. To quote Haas, “regional
integration is a process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new
centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national
states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community,
superimposed over the pre-existing ones.”6 However, apart from political and security
dimensions, regional integration has economic manifestation in some situations
involving “voluntary alignment of national policies and investments in certain sectors
of the economy” within the national and supranational framework of partner countries.
In other words, regional integration can’t be narrowed down to a single but to diverse
fields for enhancing intra-governmental cooperation among sovereign states though in
certain situations, regional integration is led by non-governmental actors. Quite
exactly, William Wallace clearly differentiates between “formal” and “non-formal
integration.” The former points to a high level process of cooperation among sovereign
states, the latter among private actors having just little or no interference from outside.7
Similarly, no integration process, whatever its nature or objective, can function in
vacuum. It has a co-relationship with other allied processes of cooperation. For
1 Van Ginkel and Van Langenhove, "Introduction and Context" In Hans van Ginkel, Julius Court and
Luk Van Langenhove (Eds.), Integrating Africa : Perspectives on Regional Integration and
Development ( UNU Press, 2003),pp. 1-9.
2 De Lombaerde and Van Langenhove, "Regional Integration, Poverty and Social Policy." Global
Social Policy Vol.7, No.3, 2007, pp. 377-383.
3 Cf. Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 6-7.
4 Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, An Enquiry into the Foundations of
Nationality (Cambridge: The Technology Press, 1953).
5 Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integration: Theory and research,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 46-47.
6 The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957, pp. 15-16.
7 William Wallace, The Transformation of Western Europe, London: Pinter, 1990, 9-11.
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
77
example, a regional level economic programme has a meaning only when it has a nod
from national-level decision-making bodies as “all policies and instruments are
nationally controlled and implemented, although they might be regionally agreed.”
Economic integration often termed as globalisation or neoliberalism is
considered to be the dominant expressions of regional integration with multiple
benefits to the partner states .However, thinkers like Walter Lippmann denies it on the
grounds that sovereignty is dispossessed of its distinctive character owing to
globalisation or neoliberalism allied processes taking place at the local and the world
levels. Consequently, economic integration is thought to dilute the sovereignty of the
partner countries and subordinate their whole concept of statehood to the domination
of external forums and organisations, per se, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) and Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) for security purpose,
European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and ASEAN for
trade and World Trade Organization (WTO), GATT, International Monetary Fund
(IMF), World Bank(WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) for transcontinental
funding purpose. Because of their unprecedented influence, cultural imperialists and
conspiracy theorists terminate globalisation or neo-liberalism either as a “reincarnation
of imperialism” or else the manifestation of vested interests of a “secretive
authoritarian elite ” group of politicians and businessmen in the global economic order.
They maintain that globalisation or neoliberalism triggered concentration of wealth in
some regions and left others high and dry; aggravated social inequality, weakened
democratic spirit and promoted “new forms of organisations” at the cost of already
existing state structures. The noted economist Joseph Stiglitz totally negates its
contribution to the development of American and other economies. He instead
attributes their growth to their individual capability to combine their national trade
policies with social pro-activism and legal protectionism.8
Bane or boon, regional and economic integration espouses merger of
neighbouring economies to boost just regional economic growth and equitable
resource sharing among numerous such states as have common political and economic
agenda, create regional trade blocks to build mutual trust and confidence among them
for hassle-free regional trade, traffic and investment and prompt liberalisation of state
8 Stiglitz Joseph E, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: WW Norton & Co , 2002).
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
78
laws and taxation policies for a wider cooperation.9
Such a multifaceted objective has
been of late realized in many Asian and African countries following optimistic
scenarios of globalization and international cooperation, political stability, good
governance, social inclusiveness, advanced communication technology, highly grown
private sector,10
regional and global trade blocks,11
developed infrastructure, soft and
settled national borders and liberal trade and tax laws. 12
Relative improvement
followed this in their gross domestic product (GDP), per-capita income and other
indicators of human resource development.13
In such situations, neoliberalism served
as a useful instrument of conflict resolution, social stability and economic growth and
generated mutual benefits to all regional partners and their peoples.
2. New Silk Route Project:
The new US Silk Route project is also characteristic of a “formal” act of
intergovernmental or supranational engagement among 25 countries of European,
American, South and Central Asian regions. It features Afghanistan’s direct overland
linkages with Central and South Asia for intra-regional trade. Though essentially a
business or commercial initiative, yet the US new Silk Route vision has political and
security connotations also. Given their intertwined processes, the project has
considerable compatibility with the Robert Putnam14
and Miriam Elman’s political
theories of conflict resolution through the medium of regional and economic
integration. To quote Elman: “if weak states with diminished capabilities are isolated
and left alone, their survival will be risky and costs of their exploitation shall be
high.”15
9 Thongkholal Haokip, "Recent Trends in Regional Integration and the Indian Experience,"
International Area Studies Review, Vol. 15, No. 4, December 2012,pp.77-392.
10 "Regional Integration, Poverty and Social Policy," Global Social Policy , Vol.7, No. 3, 2007, pp.
377-383.
11 Duina, Francesco, The Social Construction of Free Trade: The EU, NAFTA, and Mercosur,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007)..
12 Mushtaq A.Kaw, “Restoring India’s Silk Route Links with South and Central Asia across Kashmir:
Challenges and Opportunities,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 7, No.2, May/June,
2009, pp. 59-74.
13 “Profiling the Impact of Globalization on Central Asian Republics: A Perspective,” Contemporary
Central Asia, Vol. XII, No. 3, December, 2008, pp.1-14.
14 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International
Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1998, pp. 427-461.
15 M. F. Elman, “The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own
Backyard,” British Journal of Political Science, 1995, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 171-217.
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
79
Indisputably, Afghanistan symbolises a weak rather a failed state obviously for
her recorded history of native-alien conflicts, the English and the Soviets, during the
19th-
20th
century on imperialistic, ideological and the grounds theorised by Marx and
Weber in their writings.16
The 21st century US-Taliban conflict, the continuation of
above historical process, emerged after US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and
terminated the Taliban out of power to reprimand them for harbouring Usama Bin
Laden, the mastermind of the 9/11 US terror attack, who allegedly killed “innocent”
US civilians and perpetrated what Clausewitz conceptualizes as “crime against
humanity.”17
To regain power and establish a pure Islamic State, the Taliban declared
Jiha’d (war against infidels) against the US, which the US countered on the grounds of
“Just War Theory” of Plato and St. Augustine.18
The conflict has lasted for more than a
decade now and proved to be the costliest, longest and the deadliest wars of the 21st
century19
in which tens, hundreds, and thousands of civilians, officials, and security
personnel perished, and almost an equal number was traumatized, maimed, disabled
and displaced, damage to infrastructure aside.20
Pertinently, during the conflict, the
US also strived for dialogue with the insurgents, provided relief to the war-striven
Afghans and funds for country’s mining and agricultural development to “wean away”
peasants from poppy cultivation” for being the major financial source of Taliban
insurgency. However, all such measurers went waste either due to the ongoing conflict
or else the corruption-battered ruling elite of President Karzai.21
The predicament was
compounded by the absence of in-state and out-states free border corridors for
marketing of Afghan imports and exports. These rigid borders had emanated from the
16 R.Collins, Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science (New York: Academic Press, 1975);
F. Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1979); T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1979).
17 Clausewitz Carol von, On War, trans. Michael Howard & Peter Paret ( Everyman’s Library,
London, 1993), pp. 58, 83, 87-99.
18 Sorabji Richard and Rodin David (2006) Ethics of War Shared Problems in Different Traditions,
(Ashgate Publishing Limited, Abingdon, Oxon, GBR), pp.190-91.
19 Rozoff, Rick , ‘Afghanistan: War Without End In A World Without Conscience,’ Stop NATO
Opposition to Global Militarism, 27 January, 2010
(http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2011/01/27/afghanistan-war-without-end-in-a-world-without-
cconscience/).
20 Saif R. Samaddy, Education and Afghan Society in the Twentieth Century (Paris: UNES- CO,
2001), pp. 18–19.
21 Thomas E. Ricks, “Corruption in Afghanistan: An introduction to one fine mess,” quoted in
Afghanistan News Centre, January 18,
2013(http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2013/january/jan182013.html#a4).
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
80
genesis of nation states, for instance, Pakistan-India due to their historical conflict on
Kashmir.
In short, Afghanistan’s economic profile is unsatisfactory for her decade-old
conflict, negligible export potential, receding donor support and soaring security
expenditure. In addition, the landlocked country has rough and rugged terrain and only
12% area is arable in a total space of 250, 000 square kilometres. Her export potential
is quite limited: US$ 119 million in 2005 and US$ 492 million or US$ 1612 million in
2010.22
Despite having rich energy deposits, the production of oil and gas is minimal
which does not rhyme with the actual demand of the population. As a result, she
imports bulk of energy from neighbouring Central Asian states. 23
Her crunched
economy is the natural concomitant of above predicament, which the President Karzai
vainly tried to balance through short-cut means: increasing domestic taxes and
curtailing public expenditure.24
Not surprising, therefore, to see the country trailing
behind other South Asian countries in terms of health, education, infrastructure,
security and other indicators of human resource development.25
The poverty and
corruption are rampant and whole scenario explains the underlying reason of Afghan
insurgency and country’s overall poor profile.
In order, therefore, to insulate multilayered problems confronting Afghanistan,
former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, unfolded a new Silk Route project for
her integration with Central and South Asia for trans-border trade.26
Basically a part of
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) aided $US 20 billion mega vision meant to
restore 6 major traditional trade routes in Eurasia, the new Silk Route project is
22 The Central Asia Policy Forum, No. 2, Central Asia Program (USA: George Washington
University, June 2012), p.6.
23 It had 95 million barrels of oil, 5 trillion cubic feet of gas and 494,000kW electricity capacity:
Overview data for Afghanistan, Independent Statistics & Analysis, U.S.Energy Information
Administration, 2011(http://wwweia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=); Energy Consumption
by Country, The United States Energy Information Administration (www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs).
24 Aqib Aslam , et al (2013) Afghanistan: Balancing Social and Security Spending in the Context of
Shrinking Resource Envelope. IMF Weekly Update, Working Paper no. 13/133, May 30,
2013(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40599).
25 Khagram Sanjiv, Clark William and Raad Dana Firas (July 2003) From the Environment and
Human Security to Sustainable Security and Development. Journal of Human Development Vol. 4,
No.2, pp. 289–313, 296.
26 It was announced during a meeting with 25 countries on the margins of the UN General Assembly
in New York in September 2011.
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
81
targeted to commence in 2014 and complete in 2020.27
It reincarnates the second
millennium China-Rome transcontinental trade highway, named as the Ancient Silk
Route by a German scholar Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen in 1877, which was
distinct for soft borders, hassle-free trade and traffic, cross-cultural and ideological
fertilization and people-to-people contacts.28
The underlying objective of the new Silk Route project is multi-dimensional: to
reinstate Afghanistan as a Central-South Asian land-bridge for intra-regional trade;
reinforce her ailing economy and enable her to meet security and other expenses with
extra taxes and transit to accrue from the intra-regional trade and inculcate among the
Afghans a sense of regional competition for sustainable economic growth and thereby
end insurgency and guarantee stability in the otherwise war-torn country.
3. Complications of the Project:
However, the project has following few challenges for its launch immediately after the
US draw down and the formation of the new Afghan government in late 2014:
(3.1) Political Uncertainty in Afghanistan
One is the quite hostile political ambience stemming from unceasing US-Taliban
conflict29
since last one decade. It has heightened especially after the US announced to
leave Afghanistan in 2014. The growing human causalities and infrastructural
wreckages vindicate the ugly scenario. The conflict is unlikely to end because of the
US intention to retain some military forces and air bases in post-2014 Afghanistan and
the Taliban’s ideological incompatibility with the Northern Alliance and other anti-
Taliban factions. The country is, as such, predicted to descend into a civil war between
two diametrically opposite warring factions for power control and alarmingly so with
backing from competing foreign powers for their vested interests.30
The grim situation
is seen to be unmanageable even for President Karzai. To quote a political/security
analyst: “I simply cannot imagine a situation where the Karzai government defeats the
27 “Afghanistan, neighbours discuss Silk Road revival,” Central Asia Online,
23.09.2011(http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/newsbriefs/2011/09/23/newsbrief-07).
28 Mushtaq A.Kaw, “Restoring India’s Silk Route Links with South and Central Asia across Kashmir:
Challenges and Opportunities,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2,(May/June
2009, pp. 59-74.
29 Peter Barker & Elisabeth Bumillar, “Obhama Considers a Strategy Shift in Afghan War,” New York
Times, September 22, 2010(http://nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/asia/23policy.html ).
30 Fedor Lukyanov, “Russia-2011: Regional Conflicts in Focus,” Moscow Defense Brief, No. 3, 2011,
p. 3.
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
82
Taliban, imposes stability over all of Afghanistan and builds an economy capable of
sustaining Afghanistan’s population growth...and supporting a massive security force”
or finding employment avenues for thousands of police and army personnel.31
Under
the circumstances, peace is a distant dream in Afghanistan which shall automatically
push the New US Silk Route Project into a back burner, and, if nothing else, delay its
scheduled execution in 2014 and corresponding completion in 2020.
(3.2) Pak-Afghan, Indo-Pak and US-Pak Impasse
Another complicacy is the trans-border logjam between Afghanistan, Pakistan and
India on bilateral and regional issues, which is a deterrent to Afghanistan’s physical
connectivity with South Asia for intra-regional trade. Afghanistan-Pakistan relations
dented over the issue of Afghan insurgency which Karzai squarely attributes to
Pakistan on the grounds of her historical and ethnic association with the Taliban and its
most dreaded Pak-based Haqqani faction. He also blames Pakistan for sabotaging the
Afghan peace process with the “moderate” Taliban through Afghanistan’s High Peace
Council. The Pak-Afghan trust deficit expressed itself in the oft-recurring Pak-Afghan
army killings along the 2,640 long Durand Borderline and the regular Afghan official
statements condemning Pak involvement in destabilizing Afghanistan. However, their
strained relations smoothened after John Kerry’s appointment as the new US Secretary
of State and Nawaz Sharif’s resumption of power in Pakistan. Accordingly, several
healthy developments occurred to this effect.32
Nevertheless, both lack mutual
confidence and will to do anything substantial to end Afghan conflict and particularly
so when Karzai is soon relinquishing his office and the Taliban is not well-disposed to
him for his allegedly being a US “puppet.” The normalcy of Pak-Afghan relations on
ground would depend upon shaping of political scenario in the country after US pull
and which is but natural to impede the proposed new Silk Route project for and over
Afghanistan.
31 Bing West, “Groundhog War: The Limits of counter- insurgency in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs,
September-October, 2011(http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68133/bing- west/groundhog-wa).
32 Pakistan attended a trilateral Pak-Afghan-US meeting on Afghanistan in Brussels , released some
captive “moderate” Taliban leaders from her jails to facilitate Afghan peace process, allowed them
passage for participation in peace-centric conferences/meetings on Afghanistan in foreign countries
and sent one senior official to Afghanistan under good-will gesture. President Karzai reciprocated by
visiting Pakistan in July 2013 and meeting Nawaz Sharif in London in November 2013 to invoke his
support for the furtherance of Afghan reconciliation process.
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
83
India-Pakistan relations also exhibit a sorry state of affairs since the Partition of
Indian sub-continent into modern India and Pakistan in 1947 and their continued
infighting on Indian part of Kashmir (Jammu & Kashmir or J&K). For their mutual
enmity on Kashmir, both countries fought wars, turned nuclear and enhanced their
defence capabilities to outweigh each other. 33
True, some time back in 2008, under
internal and external pressure, both countries resolved to end conflicts through
dialogue, and under several confidence building measures, they restored two
traditional road links, Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalakot, for limited trade
and traffic to begin with. Soon, however, 26/11/2008 Mumbai terror attack pushed the
whole peace process into the background as India alleges Pak hand in the attack which
Pakistan denies till date. Nawaz Sharif’s assumption of power and John Kerry’s
appointment as the new US State Secretary had signalled signs of recovery in their
impaired ties and created hope for resumption of their stalled peace process for the
settlement of their disputed issues through mutual consultation. Nonetheless, their trust
deficit remains due to Kashmir conflict and is currently heightened by their
intermittent cross-LoC border skirmishes in Kashmir and alleged militant infiltration
from Pakistan into Indian part of Kashmir (Jammu & Kashmir). Consequently, a
heavily militarized Indo-Pak borderline including Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir
divides two countries in the India states of J&K, Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat. Its
rigidity is a technical snag and a major obstruction in the way of the forthcoming new
Silk Route project over post-2014 Afghanistan.
Once strong allies, US-Pakistan relations severed over what US believes as
“Pak duplicity.” These relations mired since the death of 2 Pakistanis by a CIA
contractor in Lahore and the quiet US raid that killed Osama Bin Laden in Abbotabad
Pakistan. Further damage to it was done with the killing of 24 Pak soldiers in a US
airstrike in November, 2011 and the sequential Pak blockade of NATO supplies to
Afghanistan in retaliation. Later, however, the supplies were restored under July 2012
agreement,34
which the US appreciated as a key to reassure Pak support against the
33 India enhanced its defence expenses from US$19 billion to US$30 billion, a 70% increase, during
2005-10 and Pakistan from 142 billion rupees to 514 billion rupees or US$6.4 billion during 2001-
10. Pakistan has yet again hiked it by 15% to rupees 627 billion for the fiscal year 2013-14.
34 Quinn, Andrew and Nauman, Qasim, “U.S., Pakistan reach deal to reopen Afghan supply routes,”
Reuters, 4 July, 2012 (http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/07/03/pakistan-usa-nato-afghan-supply-
idINDEE8620H020120703).
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
84
Taliban and economise expenses on the back-home transportation of her convoys
carrying withdrawing NATO over Pakistan. Their relations improved especially after
John Kerry took over as the new US State Secretary and visited Pakistan to normalised
US-Pakistan strategic and dented ties. He frankly admitted that “we experienced a few
differences in the past,” but we won’t allow the trivial “issues to divide us and the
common interests that united us in big ways.” While he solicited Pak support to
motivate the Taliban for peace talks with Afghan government, he assured to end
forthwith US Drone attacks inside Pakistan. Pakistan’s role in arranging direct US-
Taliban peace talks at Qatar in June-July 201335
and Nawaz Sharif’s October 2013 US
visit, typically exemplify two-way optimism. Unluckily, the US-Pakistan relations
went into rough weather on recent US Drone airstrikes in North Waziristan on
November 1, 2013 killing Hakimullah Mehsud, Pakistan Tahrikh-I Taliban (TPP)
chief only a day before Pakistan was to begin peace talks with him for Pakistan’s
security. Pakistan Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan forthrightly said that
“Pakistan does not see this Drone attack as an attack on individual but as an attack on
the peace process… The bilateral ties with the US will now be reviewed…”36
Whatever the US justification, the said attack without doubt jeopardized the upcoming
US-Taliban and Pak-Taliban peace talks, which is a deterrent not only to regional
security but also to the upcoming new US Silk Route project for Afghanistan.
(3.3)Exclusive Nature of the Project
Despite the announcement of the US President that the underlying aim of the new US
project is to bring about peace, prosperity and stability to Afghanistan as well as to its
neighbourhood,37
China has been left out of it supposedly on three grounds. First, most
of the Chinese export trade is through shipment. Second, China’s National Petroleum
Company (CNPC) is foreseen to optimise all future investment and development
projects in Afghanistan to the great harm of American and western companies. Third,
35 “US commits to Afghan Taliban talks despite Kabul attack,” BBC News, June 26, 2013(
http:/m.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia23058031); “US, Pakistan to resume high-level negotiations,”
Dawn News, August 1, 2013(http://dawn.com/news/1033302/us-pakistan-to-resume-high-level-
negotiations ).
36 Dawn.Com, November2, 2013 (http://www.dawn.com/news/1053627/pakistan-to-review-us-ties-
after-attack-onpeace-says-nisar).
37 Starr S. Frederick, “Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of Nation Building: Giving Economic Strategy a
Chance,” Silk Road Paper, January 2011 (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies
Program, Washington DC),pp. 8, 11, 26.
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
85
China eyes to reorient Central and South Asian countries from the West to Beijing for
future economic cooperation.38
Like China, Iran has been dropped from the new
project obviously for her anti-Israel take, nuclear programme allegedly for deadly
weapons, and her traditional monopoly of the Central Asian energy trade. The US
dubbed Iran as the energy “rogue state” and her nuclear programme a serious threat to
the regional and global security.39
Though Russia is a partner to the new US project,
yet she reads in it a hidden US agenda to outflank Russian trade monopoly of Central
Asian energy to Europe by exploring alternate energy trade corridor to South Asia.
Even otherwise too, US-Russia clash on Central Asian energy pipelines and their
competing military bases in Kyrgyzstan (Manas), Uzbekistan (Khanabad), and
Tajikistan (Qurgonteppa) respectively. Russia equally resents the alleged US role in
anti-Putin public demonstrations in Moscow and elsewhere and the US intention to
retain 5 strong US air bases40
and 30,000 US combat troops in Afghanistan after 2014
purportedly to checkmate Al-Qaeda.41
Central Asian states (CAS) also seem to have
developed doubts about US policy in the region42
for suspected US hand in the anti-
regime revolts, growing Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) influence,
weakening US position in Afghanistan and probable Taliban resurgence after 2014.
Their vacillating foreign policies, bullying tactics to renew the lease of US military
bases regardless of anticipated post-2014 security spill over on their regimes43
and loss
of rentals, per se, US$ 2-200 million to Kyrgyzstan alone44
and their growing
proclivity for economic cooperation with European Union, China, Russia, Iran, India,
38 “The New Great Game in Central Asia,” China Analysis, European Council on Foreign relations
(ecfr.eu), (Asia Centre, September 2011, p.1.
39 Yaphe, J.S and Lutes.C.D , ‘Reassessing the Implications of Nuclear-Armed Iran, McNair Paper 69,
2005 (Washinton DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University), p.1.
40 Moscow, Interfax, in Russian, March 15, 2011, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central
Eurasia (FBIS SOV).
41 “US troops to stay in Afghanistan till 2024: envoy.” Dawn.Com, July 12, 2012
(http://dawn.com/2012/07/17/us-troops-to-stay-in-afghanistan-till-2024-envoy/).
42 Stephan Blank, “Central Asian Perspectives on Afghanistan After the US Withdrawal,” Afghanistan
Regional Forum, No. 2, November 2012, Central Asia Program, Elliott School of International
Affairs, The George Washington University, pp. 7-11.
43 Olimov Muzaffar & Olimova Saodat, The Withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan:
Consequences for Tajikistan, Policy Paper 6, March 2013, Afghanistan Regional Forum, Central
Asia Program(Elliot School of International Affairs, The George Washington University,
Washington), pp.1-6.
44 Elisabeth Bumiller, “Kyrgyzstan: Official Says U.S. Base Must Be Civilian in 2014, is Possible
Obstacle to Exit From Afghanistan,” The New York Times, Asia Pacific, March 14, 2012
(http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D05E6D6133BF937A25750C0A9649D8B63&re
f=elisabethbumiller).
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
86
Pakistan etc., are illustrative of US-Central Asia doubtful relations which, in
aggregate, is due to delay, if not defeat, the new US economic project for 2014
Afghanistan
4. Alternatives:
The new US Silk Route project is prospective provided Afghanistan is stable and
peaceful. This warrants regular therapies of love, affection, aid and assistance to its
restive people till such time they realize that conflict or war is a “bane rather than a
boon.”45
The Taliban can’t be expected to change overnight given their belligerent
past. That does not suggest that should always remain on war-path and stay away from
democratic and peace processes for a viable settlement of Afghan problem. The US
had indeed organized peace talks with former Taliban officials at Duha Qatar in
January 2012 despite strong opposition from some hard-core militant groups46
and the
US policy planners.47
But such peace initiatives foiled due to few ugly incidents of
desecration of holy Qur’an in Afghanistan and the killing of certain “innocent” Afghan
nationals.48
Though these were again scheduled at Duha Qatar in June 2013, yet could
not materialise on certain technical grounds. Pragmatically, the US has no alternative
but to tread the “troubled path”49
and re-engage Taliban in peace talks forthwith as the
timeline for withdrawing US forces is nearing close. Any political arrangement in
Afghanistan without Taliban participation is meaningless keeping more than a decade-
old bitter history in mind. Therefore, reconciliation process especially with Pakistan’s
mediation is quite inevitable. This can be gauged from the given statement of former
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on April 19 2012: “And when it
comes to our relationship with Pakistan my main point is to stress that we need a
45 Elaheh Rostami-Povey, “Outsiders Can’t Defeat the Taliban,” The New York Times, opinion Page,
April 3, 2012 (http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-
afghanistan-now/outside-intervention-cant-defeat-the-taliban).
46 Alissa J. Rubin, “Former Taliban Officials Say U.S. Talks Started,” The New York Times, January
28, 2012 (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/world/asia/taliban-have-begun-talks-with-us-
former-taliban-aides-say.html).
47 “West Willing to leave Afghanistan without settlement: report,” Kashmir Times, March 27, 2012,
Srinagar, p. 8.
48 Rod Nordland & Jawad Sukhanyar, “NATO Convoy Hit By Major Attack in Afghanistan,” The
New York Times, Asia Pacific, March 29, 2012,
(http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/world/asia/afghanistan-security.html).
49 Doucet Lyse, “Troubled path to talks with Taliban,” BBC News Asia, June 20,
2013(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-22980892).
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
87
positive engagement of Pakistan if we are to ensure long-term peace and stability not
only in Afghanistan but in the region.”50
Otherwise peace initiatives by whomsoever to
settle burning Afghan issue may hang on for another decade and naturally defeat the
new US Silk Route project, to say the least
Equally important is the friendly intra-state relations between and among
Central and South Asian countries. While Afghanistan is smoothly situated towards its
northerly Central Asian States, it is not comfortable with Pakistan to the south and so
is Pakistan unfriendly with India. In effect, the new Silk Route project shall be a
distant dream without cordial ties between and among all the countries surrounding
Afghanistan from near or far-near destinations.
Similarly, the said project warrants an inclusive approach and involvement of
all regional players as all of them have respective stakes in Afghanistan and have great
potential to contribute to its future politico-economic transformation. Central Asian
region has been and continues to be a significant partner to the ancient as well as the
new Silk Route vision. The new-born Central Asian states are wedded to a number of
existing or upcoming multi-billion trade, energy, investment and rail network projects
with or over Afghanistan, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas
pipeline project, Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan power transmission line
(CASA-1,000), Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Iran railway project, to name a few only.
These energy rich states are fortunately perched next to the energy deficient South
Asia states including Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Such a geographical proximity
can generate huge cross-border opportunities to them according to the World Bank
experts. Pakistan is no less important for her strategic location on Central-South Asia
land mass and her heterogeneous borders with Afghanistan across the Durand Line.
She offers landlocked Afghanistan the direct, shortest and cheapest land route access
to South Asia and even to the withdrawing NATO troops. In effect, Afghanistan is
“desperately dependent on roads, and the nearest [Pakistani] seaports of Gwadar or
Karachi” by a distance of only 1,000 miles.51
On the other hand, Pakistan banks upon
Afghanistan for her overland access to Central Asia for trade and is just sixteen hours’
50 “NATO asks Pakistan to open transit routes,” Kashmir Times, 21 April, 2012, p. 8.
51 Metin Gurcan, “Countering The Insurgency in Afghanistan: Wrong Diagnosis Wrong Treatment,”
Journal Central Asia & Caucasus, Vol. 6, No. 12, 2011, p.
49(http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/tc9rL7hA2zxjzUNOu9drcsfD0b1P9R.pdf).
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
88
drive from Peshawar to Central Asia over Afghanistan. India factors in the new project
despite being a near-neighbouring state of Afghanistan. Because of her fast growing
economy, she has much to offer to post-2014 Afghanistan’s economic transformation.
Her contribution of around US$ 2 billion aid to Afghanistan’s rehabilitation is on
record, and she holds a soft corner among some, if not all, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara
Afghan communities. President Karzai trusts India more than Pakistan though India
can’t take Pakistan’s place in Afghanistan for geographic, historical and ethnic
considerations.
China and Iran directly border Afghanistan. China has the value addition of
being the growing economy and stimulant to the Eurasian economic integration.
Though most of her export trade is by shipment, yet she does not lag behind in her
overland trade with her western bordering states of Pakistan, Central Asia and
Afghanistan through her volatile but strategically important Xinjiang province. Her
trade turnover with Pakistan52
is estimated to grow to US$ 15 billion in 2015 and
beyond after the US$ 18 billion tunnel construction project between Kashghar in
Xinjiang and Pakistan’s Gilgit region, is complete. China’s trade volume with Central
Asia was € 23 billion as compared to € 21 billion with Europe in 2010, and US$
715.70 million with Afghanistan in 2010.53
If China-Afghanistan bilateral trade is not
worthwhile, be it so. It is sure to grow in the post-2014 scenario because of China’s
nearly US$ 10 billion investment on Afghan railways, coalmines, coal fired power
plants, copper and steel projects, out of which Afghanistan shall be entitled to US$ 808
million for land use and US$ 60 million as annual taxes over 30 years. China’s huge
investment on Aynak copper project, refinery building and oil and gas exploration in
Sari Pul and Faryab provinces,54
provides a cogent reason for her involvement in the
new US trade and transportation project over Afghanistan. It was her long-enduring
potential that was hailed by none else than Gen. Colin Powell in the following words:
“Without China's assistance, almost nothing of sustainable consequence will happen in
South or Central Asia in Pakistan, in Afghanistan, or elsewhere,” which reminds one
52 It was worth US$ 1.07 in 1997, US$ 4.27 billion in 2005 and US$ 12 billion in 2012.
53 It was US$ 19.99 million in 2002.
54 Huasheng Zhao, China and Afghanistan: China’s interests, Stances, and Perspectives. A Report of
the CSIS, March 2012, Russia and Eurasia program (Centre for Strategic and International Studies,
NW, Washington DC), p. 6.
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
89
of the great Chinese contributions to the Afghanistan-bound ancient Silk Route.55
The
US and Iran may clash on nuclear programme. But for Afghanistan’s intra-regional
trade, Iran is as important a stakeholder as others are. Her ethnic Shiites minority
constitute 19% of 28.3 million of Afghan population. She hosts around 1 million
Afghan refugees since conflict and supports Taliban either for “regime security”56
or to
settle scores with the US. She contributes to Afghanistan’s educational and cultural
development to such an extent that made an analyst to say, “…The cultural war is
more important than war led by guns."57
6. Mutual Benefits:
(6.1) General Benefits
Lots of benefits are due to accrue from the said project subject to the condition that
aforementioned requisites are given due thought by the concerned stakeholders. In
general, it can facilitate regional and economic integration, reunite peoples and
communities of Asian Civilization, boost intra-regional trade, ensure regional resource
sharing, build mutual confidence and trust among the partner sovereign states to jointly
counter insurgency and cross-border terrorism, settle disputes through dialogue and
diplomacy, spare defence-centric expenses for works of public utility, diversify Central
Asian energy consumers and salvage acute South Asian energy crisis. For obvious
advantages, the stakeholders need to pool their efforts and extend optimum
cooperation to the US in translating the project into a reality and that too within the
specified time frame.
(6.2) Individual Benefits
The Afghans, the core stakeholders, shall experience and explore in the new US
project an assortment of advantages for their empowerment in the foreseeable future. It
can sooth their restive souls, metamorphose their mind-set from “co-annihilation” to
55 Vine, Steve Le , “Pax-Sinica : why the U.S. should hand over Afghanistan and Central Asia to
China,” FP Foreign Policy, June 30, 2012
(http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/26/pax_sinica_why_the_us_should_hand_over
_afghanistan_and_central_asia_to_china).
56 Toscano, Roberto, “Sources of Tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Iran’s role in Afghanistan: A
Regional Perspective, CIDOB Policy Research Project, Norway: Norwegian Peace Building Centre,
NOREF Norwegian Peace Building Resource Center Policy Brief, January, 2012, pp. 3-4.
57 Sharon Behn, “Afghans Worry About Iran's Growing Influence,” Voice of America, November 27,
2012 (http://www.voanews.com/content/afghan-worry-about-iran-growing-
incluence/1553651.html).
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
90
“co-existence” and assuage their unprecedentedly-grown tribulations since the
inception of the conflict. As regards the country of Afghanistan, the new project can
re-energise her ailing economy, generate her additional resources with taxes and transit
with which to meet security and other expenses after US exit, promote infrastructural
development, attract foreign investment, and boost her GDP, per-capita income58
and
other indicators of human resource development, stimulate her export potential in
mining, agriculture and industry, improve governance, reduce corruption59
and
relocate her being the “Asian Roundabout” for exchange of goods, ideas, services and
people during the heydays of the ancient Silk Route. More important, the project can
minimise her dependence on foreign aid, assistance and illegal opium trade. Presently,
opium cultivation accounts for 90% of world’s opium production simply because its
earnings are far greater than from the traditional crops. It earns an ordinary Afghan
farmer US$ 160 to US$ 200 as compared to one kilo of wheat for 41 cents. Despite
being irreligious, Taliban does not publically oppose it for being supportive to
insurgency. Its cultivation and trade is, as such, so deeply entrenched in the Afghan
society that “no military can undo it” as “there are powerful people out here, and they
will never let it happen.”60
The project can be equally useful to the US in reducing her whopping
expenditure on Overseas Contingency Operations in Afghanistan by billions and
trillions of dollars. According to a new analysis of the Pentagon’s budget, annual cost
on each US soldier in Afghanistan soared from $1.3 million to $ 2.1 million over the
past 5 years,61
which is alarming at a time when the country is experiencing
unprecedented economic meltdown. The proposed shifting of US security
responsibility to new Afghan government and the launch of a new regional and
economic integration project for post-Afghanistan can salvage ballooning of US
expenses on Afghan wars and resituate her image as the emerging “Asia’s commercial
giant.” The US and UK companies can find it easy to step in a country where Chinese,
58 Afghanistan’s GDP was US$19.3 billion and per-capita income was US$ 800 in 2011.
59 “Afghanistan Will Regional Cooperation Accelerate Peace and Development?” World Bank, July
2010, pp. 1-2.
60 Pen Alex, “Some Afghan Police are drawn to poppy trade to boost income,” Stars and Stripes,
Stripes Central, April 20, 2013( http://wwwstripes.com/news/some-afghan-police-are-drawn-to-
poppy-trade-to-boost-income-1.217205).
61 “Collateral damage: Cost of each US soldier in Afghanistan soars to $2.1 mln,” RT Question More,
USA, October 25, 2013(http://rt.com/usa/us-afghanistan-pentagon-troops-budget-721/).
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
91
Iranian and Japanese corporations have already lined up for massive investment on
multilateral projects. Further, the project can open up vistas for her to create regional
influence through the medium of economic dynamism rather than military mechanism.
As regards Central Asian States, they shall eventually find alternate energy
transportation corridors and consumers in South Asia to bargain their energy products
at better terms than offered to them by Russia, Iran, Turkey and of late China. Their
trade volume with South Asian partners shall instantly grow, and broaden the region’s
“production consumption trade prefecture.” More important, the new project can be
instrumental in restoring their direct trans-surface connections with South Asia for
economic, cultural and civilizational amalgamation.
China’s regional influence can reach out to a wider territorial space as the
project can explore her yet another trans-surface corridor to South Asia for industrial
exports and energy imports. Her Xinjiang province is already hooked with newly
constructed Pakistan Gwadar seaport in the Arabian Sea for trade and energy imports
through super tankers via Pakistan’s Gilgit region. The new Silk Route project can
enhance her trade volume with Afghanistan and other South Asian states. Russia can
retrieve her lost Soviet linkages with Afghanistan and she can, besides Europe, find
new energy buyers in South Asia. She has already shown willingness to join the TAPI,
new US Silk Route US vision and other prospective economic projects for or over
Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s relevance shall grow still further as she provides Afghanistan a
direct overland outlet to the Arabian Sea and South Asia. Her annual trade 62 and
exports in rice, wheat, vegetables, textiles, plastic and rubber, pharmaceuticals, fish,
paper, fruits, and cement to Afghanistan and her imports in wool, dried and fresh
fruits, carpets, etc from Afghanistan, can increase onwards from US$ 170 million in
2001 and US$ 2508 million in 2010-11 with considerable trade balance to her favour 63
and she can continue to be the second largest exporter of Afghanistan after United
States. Her annual exports to Central Asia, though insignificant, can also grow beyond
present trade turnover of US$ 10-15 million and her trade turnover of US$ 2,233
62 It was US$ 2 billion (official) and US$ 5 billion (unofficial) in 2013.
63 Pakistan had a trade balance of US$ 2164.7 million in US$ 2508 million trade turn over with
Afghanistan in 2010-11: Rizvi Hasan-Askari, Pak-Afghan Trade, Discussion Paper, December
2011 (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency-PILDAT,
Islamabad, Pakistan), pp. 7-8.
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
92
million with India in 2008 can correspondingly swell to estimated US$ 11 billion by
2015. Besides increase in the accruable taxes and transit fee from the upcoming intra-
regional trade project over her soil, she can join “energy production consumption trade
structure” which will instantly bail out her annual growing energy demand at 6-7% to
the great respite of her nationals. Last but not the least, she can directly go far a wide
trade with South East Asian states.
India’s strategic benefit shall be in her direct physical access to Afghanistan
and Central Asia. Subsequent to the abolition of border barriers, transit hazards and
complex trade patterns, her annual trade with Central Asia and Afghanistan at US$ 1
billion with US$ seven hundred million exports in 2012 can step up to US$ 100 billion
by 2015 “If political economy in the region improves,” and “if just 20%” of India’s
estimated trade of US$ 500 billion with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia and
Europe by 2014, is allowed through road.64
Pakistan has invariably allowed Afghan
goods up to India’s borders under the terms of the Afghan Transit Trade (ATT), and
only Indian goods await Pakistan’s nod for onward transportation to Afghanistan and
Central Asia. Given South Asian acute energy crisis, the intra-regional trade under the
new Silk Route project shall be pre-dominated by energy imports from Central Asia
thereby releasing pressure on India’s speedily growing annual energy demand. Despite
India-US nuclear deal and uranium imports from Kazakhstan, India’s severe energy
deficiency persists.
CONCLUSION:
As an alternative to end fourteen year-old US-Taliban conflict, the US has lately
thought of a viable Afghanistan-bound regional and economic integration project
between Central and South Asia. It represents a trading block of countries having
common politico-economic and security goal in the region. Being multi-dimensional in
nature and based on a sort of compatibility between diplomacy and domestic
reconstruction, the projects supports a new politico-administrative set up for
Afghanistan after Parliamentary elections and US exit in 2014.
64 The Central Asia Policy Forum, No. 2, June 2012 (USA: Central Asia Program, George Washington
University), p. 7.
New US Silk Route Project for Post-2014 Afghanistan
93
The project has, therefore, multiple advantages for Afghanistan and the
regional and global stakeholders provided they are disproportionately drawn into the
project, hold friendly ties between and among themselves and have selfless
commitment towards regional cooperation and reconciliation process in Afghanistan.
Provided further, the international community provide continued support for the
empowerment of the war-ravaged country and its conflict-ridden people. Incidentally,
the US, Germany and Japan stand committed to US$ sixteen billion aid to post-2014
Afghanistan for its reconstruction.
Indeed, the anticipated advantages of the project are numerous for the partner
sovereign states of America, Europe, Central, South and South East Asia. These can be
a catalyst to their multifaceted cooperation in the fields of polity, economy and
security within a mutually agreed trade arrangement; hence, equip them to jointly
resist forces of “fear and doom” in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
*******
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********