Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Responsible Negotiation Final Paper

Bridging Conflict and Development: ResponsibleNegotiation in Afghanistan

Centuries of intertribal and international warfare combined

with unforgiving mountainous desert terrain, extreme poverty, and

a culture of isolationism have kept Afghanistan from achieving

any meaningful level of development, stability, or social

cohesion. Since 2001, the international community has been

fighting terrorism and extremists throughout Afghanistan, and we

are still in the process of refining best practices in the unique

cultural and security environment it provides. While promises

and exchanges of cash or good have been ongoing, the original

practice of large and nebulous deals with warlords-come-

community-leaders, referred to by one researcher as Hobbesian-

fatalistic1, has proven unsuccessful in balancing the needs of

development and security. Only through responsible negotiation with

local power brokers and stakeholders can effective progress be

made on the dual fronts of conflict management and sustainable

development in rural Afghanistan.

1 Giustozzi, A. (2011)

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Afghanistan is a landlocked country in South Asia, lying to

the west of Pakistan and to the east of Iran; to the north it

shares a border with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and

China. It is one of the oldest and most continually conflicted

areas of civilization known, as it occupies a strategic territory

just slightly smaller than the state of Texas at the crossroads

between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The major ethnic

groups and their relative representation nationally are Pashtun

(42%), Tajik (27%), Hazara (9%), Uzbek (9%), Turkmen (3%), Baloch

(2%) and others (8%). Official national languages spoken are

Dari/Afghan Persian (50%) and Pashto (35%) while 30+ other minor

languages are spoken by 15% of the population; bilingualism is

very common across Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s ethnic makeup is a

mosaic of dozens if not hundreds of subdivisions of tribes, each

fiercely loyal to their clan or village, and each suspicious of

its neighbors. The political sphere of post-2001 Afghanistan is

large and complicated, with many former warlords starting their

own political parties and attempting something resembling

legitimacy, though violence within and between communities is

still rife. Centuries of warfare combined with unforgiving

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mountainous or desert terrain and a culture of tribal

isolationism have kept Afghanistan from achieving any meaningful

level discussion about sustainable rural development.

In fact, based on minimum standards set forth by the Sphere

project2, Afghanistan has been and remains in a near-perpetual

state of humanitarian crisis despite a decade of investment and

focused international attention. The majority Muslim (99%)

population of Afghanistan numbers just under 30 million as of

July 2011, up from 18.4 million in 1995. Nearly 43% of the

population is under the age of 14, and life expectancy hovers

around 45 years for both males and females, ranking Afghanistan

at a reflection of just how severely underdeveloped Afghanistan

is. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) number over 350,000 and

over 3 million Afghan refugees currently reside in Iran and

Pakistan; resettlement is feasible with the physical and economic

resources within Afghanistan, however made difficult by

negotiable logistical and cultural factors.

An influx of aid and reconstruction dollars since 2001 has

boosted the economy and provided some work, however unemployment

2 Sphere Project. (2011).

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has only dropped from 40% in 2005 to 35% in 2008, and 36% of

Afghans live below the poverty line today, indicating that these

cash influxes are not reaching the average Afghan.3 Expansion of

the economy beyond industries of labor such as agriculture is

further hampered by widespread illiteracy and a corresponding

oral tradition. In 2008, male literacy rates by province ranged

from 14-64% and female from 1-17% and 31% in Kabul4. The

staggering lack of human and physical development creates a

situation rife with conflict as the leaders of each ethnicity,

tribe, and clan scramble to divide limited resources and limited

power merely to survive, rather than cooperating to discuss and

potentially implement more effective solutions.

Governance in Afghanistan is a mixture of the post-Bonn5

Agreement constitutional democracy, which was modeled on Western

democracies and a revision of the old Afghan constitution from

their quasi-secular era of the 1960’s and 1970’s, and the tribal

systems of governance, with its shuras, jirgas, mullah, maliks, 3 These first paragraphs synthesized with material from Blood (1994), the CIA World Factbook (2010), Library of Congress (2005), the National Vulnerability and Risk Assessment or NVRA (2008), the Afghanistan National Development Strategy or ANDS (2010), and UNHCR (2011). 4 Afghanistan National Surveillance System and ICON Institute. (2008). See Appendix III5 Government of Afghanistan. (2001).

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and other roles and structures both unique to Afghan culture and

present in some form across Islamic states. Ongoing attempts to

reshape the culture of Afghanistan from tribal isolationism to

active and meaningful parliamentary democracy in the style of the

West disregards the highly insular, highly decentralized system

of tribal elders and tribal councils that has been the way of

life for centuries. Learning how to work within the Afghan

negotiating culture rather than modifying it westward, and doing

so without losing sight of the concrete goals and needs being

brokered on behalf of Afghans and the international community,

will be the key to effective community-based, NATO-supported,

negotiated interventions.

A modern democracy is suited to a modern or modernizing

country with the physical and communications infrastructure to

support the free exchange of ideas, information, and people to

every corner of a nation. Having acted as the trans-continental

crossroad since the times of Hannibal and Ghengis Khan, Afghans

have historically been caught in a cycle of invasion and

rebellion. In a harsh and isolated physical environment, tribal

people have learned to close ranks around kin in the interest of 28 October 2011 Page 5

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self-protection, and to shut out or fight off invaders and

interlopers both foreign and domestic. To the villager, all the

outside world has brought is all it has ever brought: continued

violence, instability, and death. This paper seeks to better

understand the potential for negotiation to increase coexistence

and development efficacy in Afghanistan, and to propose

intensely-negotiated and detailed solutions which might

positively influence capacity building and state building

activities nationwide

International “interference” is a source of much regional

discontent and global controversy about the approaches used by

the ISAF in assisting the Afghan people. While an international

military force adds another layer of complexity to the social

mix, Afghanistan’s problems of stateness and social cohesion are

not a construct of the West, but rather a reflection of

ineffective, non-integrative, non-negotiated approaches in

operation.

Afghanistan is a fragmented country, with its people dividedalong carious tribal, ethnic, linguistic and religious lines. The diverse and complex ethnic and linguistic structures of Afghan society have created many points of

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friction and flashpoints for violence… Only in times of crisis or when faced with a threat from the outside has a sense of national unity existed… These attempts [at a central authority] have failed, largely due to the resistance of and loyalty to local tribes and religious structures already in place. The vast diversity found in Afghanistan has produced many obstacles to building a liberal democracy and a strong and integrated nation6.

This is not to say that a cooperative and stable state cannot be

formed uniting the people of Central Asia; in the past Afghans

have embraced a monarchy and for a time succeeded in building a

communal Afghan identity. The problem in Afghanistan at the

moment is the lack of a collective opinion about who the “bad

guys” are, and until the ISAF and its civilian counterparts can

demonstrate any kind of progress – towards stability, improved

livelihoods, security from violence, towards Afghan independence

– “the West” will continue to be just another interloping force

to contend with. Progress in sincerely negotiated, community-

driven approaches will allow recategorization of NATO as friend,

and of the Taliban as foe, to the population.

Since contact with the West, Antonio Giustozzi argues the

tribal way of life has been threatened in Afghanistan, for better

6 Young, D.O. (2007).

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or for worse. Tribalism finds its roots in geographic isolation

and scarcity of resources around which kin can gather to share

and protect. The influx of education, healthcare, new government

institutions, travel, media, and international military action

has exposed Afghans to ideas and opportunities previously unknown

to them. Giustozzi poses that in the case of Afghanistan, “…the

only realistic option for the evolution of a strong Afghan state

is the self-interest of Afghan political elites, either the

current or future ones. When they will see that institution

building enhances the survivability of the political regime, they

will start investing in it seriously.7” In order to achieve

robust institutions, international actors must engage the

population in open and honest discussions about individual,

tribal, regional and national goals.

The proposed strategy for improved intergroup relations via

increased frequency and intensity of negotiations in Afghanistan

indicates a refocusing on grassroots development. Rural Afghans

have been oppressed and war weary for decades now. A fiercely

self-reliant and independent people have seen their autonomy

7 Giustozzi, A. (2011)

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eroded by more than two decades of fundamentalist, totalitarian

Taliban rule. What the outside world sees as Afghan culture is a

mere shadow of the pride of the Afghan people; true Afghans are a

people who repelled and expelled countless conquering armies, a

network of tribal militias who outlasted the Soviets at the

height of communist power. The fabric of Afghan culture has

unraveled to the point that the youth of today have no memory of

Afghanistan’s good times; individual power must be restored in

the community elders and leaders at the village level, and it

must be instilled in the new generations before another 30 years

are lost to misguided follower fundamentalism. Bringing the

disenfranchised to the table and offering them a voice is a

logical and feasible way for outsiders to support a

revitalization of Afghan culture.

Before the NATO-ISAF8 era in Afghanistan is over, peace and

development practitioners must take advantage of the wealth of

resources gathered at the Provincial Reconstruction Team secure

bases before international pressure forces military-humanitarian

withdrawal. The allied nations of NATO have brought together

8 See Appendix with NATO-ISAF PRT Placemat

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experts from around the world, with experience resolving

conflicts around the world, in the interest of rebuilding the

country and polity of Afghanistan. Japan9 has contributed

Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration experts who work

with local communities to bring former Talib fighters back into

the fold. Canada and Europe have focused on applying the 3D

Approach10 (Diplomacy, Defense, and Development aka the Whole of

Government Approach) within their respective Regional Commands.

Norway11 operates a Sub National Governance Project to strengthen

the offices of provincial governors and councils as well as

administration of individual municipality. New Zealand12 has a

series of projects in Bamyan province; most involve improving or

repairing schools, orphanages, and local bridges so that life can

resume and progress in rural Afghanistan.

With so many resources on the ground, what is missing and

why has the global community not found success in freeing and

supporting the Afghan people? It is not our resources, our 9 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/aid0403-3.html and http://www.ngo-jvc.net/jann/Documents/DDR.pdf 10 http://cicam.ruhosting.nl/teksten/act.07.grotenhuis.owen%20paper.pdf and http://www.3dsecurity.org/ 11 http://www.norway.org.af/News_and_events/prt/faryab1/ 12 http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/afghanistan/nz-prt/projects.htm

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resilience, or our resolve. The problem lies in our top-down,

patrimonial approach. With a renewed commitment to engage any

and all parties in a negotiating process, the next era in

Afghanistan should see greater potential, coexistence, and

standards of living.

Reference List

Afghanistan National Surveillance System and ICON Institute. (2008). NationalVulnerability and Risk Assessment 2007/8: A Profile of Afghanistan. Retrievedon 12 September 2011 from http://nrva.cso.gov.af/

Afghanistan National Surveillance System , UNIFEM and WFP. (2004). 2003 National Vulnerability and Risk Assessment. Retrieved on 12 September 2011 from http://www.unifem.org/afghanistan/docs/pubs/04/NRVA_04.pdf

Blood, P. (1994). Afghanistan: A Country Study (GPO for Library of Congress).Retrieved on 10 September 2011 from http://countrystudies.us/afghanistan/

Church C. and M. Rogers. (2006). Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoringand Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs. Retrieved on 12 September2011 from http://www.sfcg.org/Documents/manualpart1.pdf

Giustozzi, A. (2011). Kant, Hobbes or… Machiavelli? Facing the grim choices of state-building in Afghanistan. Anthony Hyman Memorial Lecture Series. Retrieved on 10 June 2011 from http://www.soas.ac.uk/cccac/events/anthonyhyman/file67135.pdf

Government of Afghanistan. (2010). Afghanistan National Development Strategy.Retrieved on 12 September 2011 from http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/documents/Afghanistan_National_Development_Strategy_eng.pdf

Government of Afghanistan. (2001). Bonn Agreement. Retrieved on 25 September 2011 from http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm

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Government of Afghanistan. (2004). Constitution of Afghanistan. Retrieved on 12 September 2011 from http://www.supremecourt.gov.af/PDFiles/constitution2004_english.pdf

Lederach, J. P., Neufeldt, R., and Culbertson, H, (2007). Reflective Peacebuilding: A Planning, Monitoring, and Learning Toolkit. Retrieved on 12 September 2011 from http://www.sais-jhu.edu/bin/y/j/reflective-peacebuilding-toolkit.pdf

Sphere Project. (2004). The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. Retrieved on 3 September 2011 from http://www.sphereproject.org/content/view/14/33/lang,english/

Sphere Project. (2011). The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. Retrieved on 4 September 2011 from http://www.sphereproject.org/content/view/720/200/lang,english/

UNHCR. (2011). UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Afghanistan. Retrieved on16 September 2011 from http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486eb6

USAID. (2010) Theories of Change and Indicator Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation. Retrieved on 12 September 2011 from http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADS460.pdf

US Library of Congress. (2008). Country Profile: Afghanistan, August 2008. Retrieved on 15 September 2011 from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Afghanistan.pdf

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Appendix I: GIS Map of Tribal Mosaic by Jill Kornetsky

Data from Anonymous at the Naval Postgraduate School: OverlaidTribal Subdivisions

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Appendix II: Afghanistan COIN Dynamics Chart from Joint Chiefs ofStaff PPT13

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Appendix III: Human Development Index (HDI) and Components of HDI

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Appendix IV14: ISAF Regional Commands and ProvincialReconstruction Teams

14 Taken from http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/graphics/afganistan_prt_rc.jpg on 24 March 2011

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