T oday U.S. and multinational forces mustrespond to crises around the world andacross the conflict spectrum. Such chal-lenges are often initially defined by the

media. Responding forces thus must enter infor-mation age battles with non-lethal but criticalfires against multiple targets. The outcomes canestablish the political-military context for all actions that follow.

A joint task force activated to respond to acrisis must first determine actual contingency-response requirements—whether the assignedmission is derived from an established operational

plan or a new situation in the area of responsibil-ity of a unified command. If the effort is quickand everyone in the objective area agrees on theinitial response, a lethal, protracted conflict maybe averted. Multinational military assets may notbe needed. That situation occurred during a U.S.European Command (EUCOM) contingency incentral Africa. The operation taught lessons abouttactics, techniques, and procedures related to pre-venting conflict and conserving resources.

Operation Guardian Assistance involved de-ploying joint forces from EUCOM in late 1996.They were sent initially as a humanitarian assis-tance survey team, which later formed the core ofthe Joint Task Force Guardian Assistance (JTFGA)staff. The first survey team personnel were tasked

Autumn/Winter 1998–99 / JFQ 91

Major General Edwin P. Smith, USA, is Commanding General, U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, and deployed to Rwanda and Uganda.

Joint Task Forces

and PreemptiveResponseBy E D W I N P. S M I T H

Refugees near Goma, Zaire.

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■ P R E E M P T I V E R E S P O N S E

to assess the need for participation by the ArmedForces in eastern Zaire and Rwanda.

The principal lessons dealt with understand-ing, defining, and dominating the informationenvironment. From the first assessment carriedout in the field in preparation for the U.N. steer-ing committee meeting on requirements for amultinational force, accurate and timely informa-tion was essential for resource decisions. The taskforce made a major contribution in that process.

Setting the StageEvents in September 1996 revealed a sharp

increase in violence and discrimination by theArmed Forces of Zaire (FAZ) and the FormerArmed Forces of Rwanda (EXFAR) on the easternZairian plateau, west of Lake Kivu. The major in-digenous group was Tutsi, many descended fromRwandan Tutsis who migrated there some threehundred years earlier.

In April 1994, a bomb destroyed an aircraftcarrying both Rwandan President Habyarimana (aHutu) and Burundi President Ntaryamira. While

no group was ever proven re-sponsible for this act, thedeaths sparked mass killing ofmoderate Hutus and of Tutsisby enraged Hutus. When theviolence was ended monthslater by the Tutsi-led, Ugan-dan-supported Rwandan Patri-

otic Army (RPA), half a million people had diedand over a million Hutus had fled to Zaire. Amongthe refugees were many people who had been di-rectly responsible for genocide or connected withthe former Hutu interim government.

With this tide of humanity came weapons inunprecedented numbers (from EXFAR and its

suppliers). Free access to arms coupled with con-tinuous cross-border operations into Rwandamolded EXFAR into a serious regional securitythreat, particularly to the government of Rwanda.

EXFAR operated from camps along theZairian-Rwandan border. Ease of movement fromthis area allowed the force to conduct hit-and-runraids in Rwanda and melt back into the refugeepopulation to be resupplied from stocks of hu-manitarian aid. Zairian troops were either unwill-ing or unable to stop these attacks, promptingwarnings of military action from Rwanda.

In mid-October 1996 Zairian Tutsis, the Ba-nayamulenge, began probing attacks against iso-lated FAZ units and civilian targets southwest ofBukavu. They struck Uvira in the south and Rut-shuru north of Goma in a coordinated offensive,supported by RPA and loosely by the Uganda Peo-ple’s Defense Force. FAZ resistance crumbled astheir unpaid, undisciplined troops became an un-ruly rabble looting their way north to Goma andsouth to Bukavu.

Camps in the path of the advancing conflictwere fragmented as their occupants fled. Huturefugees from Rwanda feared Tutsi retribution forthe 1994 genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda. Campsnorth of Bukavu and south of Rutshuru eventuallyemptied as the refugees converged near Goma. Anestimated 800,000 refugees crowded into a largecomplex, the biggest camp being Mugunga.

EXFAR established arms caches and com-mand hubs at Mugunga where a labyrinth oftents and refugees provided perfect cover for in-surgents. Increasingly reported in the media,moreover, was an emergency humanitarian crisisinvolving hundreds of thousands of refugees whoallegedly were being held against their will, dyingof starvation, and unable to help themselves.

After an exchange of EXFAR mortar and Ba-nayamulenge rocket fire on November 9, mostrefugees in Mugunga chose an uncertain fate atthe Rwandan border over certain death at thehands of EXFAR. Some 600,000 broke withEXFAR and streamed towards the Goma corridor.

Mission Starting PointOn November 1, 1996 the Chairman issued a

directive to develop a tactical plan to facilitate re-lief operations and voluntary repatriation ofRwandan refugees. As with all EUCOM opera-tions, Commander in Chief, U.S. European Com-mand (CINCEUR), provided clear planning guid-ance and stressed thorough staff analyses, frommission statement to rules of engagement.

After its initial analysis, the EUCOM staffprovided the following mission statement to the

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refugees had been directlyresponsible for genocide orconnected with the formerHutu interim government

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U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF)for tactical plan development:

When directed, EUCOM will conduct military opera-tions in eastern Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi in support ofU.N.-directed humanitarian assistance and disaster relief op-erations. EUCOM will provide only unique military capabili-ties to alleviate acute humanitarian crises. If required, estab-lish [a civil-military operations cell (CMOC)] totransition all support to U.N. agencies and [nongovern-mental and private voluntary organizations].

CINCEUR also provided the following intentstatement:

Rapidly assess the situation and recommend usage ofunique U.S. military capabilities; complement/supplementdesignated U.N./civilian-led agencies, minimizing the re-quirement for U.S. military forces; utilize, to the maximumextent possible, the capabilities of contractors and non-DODorganizations; establish clear and achievable objectives; co-ordinate through the National Command Authorities for theemployment of military force; transition and/or terminatesupport and redeploy; at all times, exercise the inherent obli-gation to protect U.S. forces; success is achieved when objec-tives are met or conditions requiring U.S. military assistanceno longer exist.

The SETAF commander was also assigned todevelop a mission statement and composition ofthe EUCOM survey team, which was to be readyto deploy to central Africa on order.

On receiving a second planning order fromthe Chairman on November 8, the new survey

team, led by the SETAF commander, deployed No-vember 13 to Entebbe in Uganda and met with of-ficials from the government and the country teamat the American Embassy in Kampala, Uganda.The following day it moved to Kigali, Rwanda, tomeet government and nongovernment officialsand continue assessing the crisis. Its initial forcerecommendations, forwarded within four days ofarrival, helped determine both the size and scopeof U.S. involvement. In addition, its assessmentprompted a new mission analysis to address thechanging situation on the ground.

The task force that would soon be deployedwould be significantly smaller than planned. Forexample, the first SETAF/EUCOM troop-to-taskanalysis indicated the possible need for attackhelicopters and combat ground forces. In light ofthe changed situation in eastern Zaire and the as-sessment by the survey team, the task force actu-ally deployed primarily command and control,communications, intelligence, and logistical ele-ments to support what was to become a series ofinformation age close-in battles among manycompeting interest groups, to be known as Opera-tion Guardian Assistance.

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Early PlanningInitial planning conducted at Kelley Barracks

in Germany and at Longare in Italy identifiedthree probable bases for the humanitarian assis-tance survey team and joint task force operation:an intermediate staging base located at Entebbe, aforward operating base at Kigali, and the objec-tive area—probably near Goma, Zaire.

The first mission essential tasks were:

■ conduct assessment and identify requirementsin support of the humanitarian assistance operations ofthe U.N. High Commission on Refugees, nongovern-mental organizations, and private volunteer organiza-tions in central Africa

■ deploy forces into the joint operational area■ establish and protect intermediate stage

base/forward operating base objective area forces■ establish CMOC interfaces■ execute security and facilitation tasks toward

reestablishment of humanitarian operations wholesaledistribution nodes

■ position forces to hand over security/facilita-tion tasks to the U.N. High Commission for Refugees,nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntaryorganizations.

As each task was identified, an endstate andobjective measures of effectiveness were devel-oped to gauge progress toward mission task com-pletion and handover of residual responsibilities.

Early planning called for the Air Force andmain headquarters to proceedto the intermediate stage basein Entebbe. The forwardheadquarters, CMOC, and as-sociated security forces wereto establish operations at theforward operating base in Ki-gali. And an infantry force

would prepare to secure warehouse distributioncenters near Goma and furnish local security fornongovernmental organizations, and private vol-untary organizations. However, the survey teamassessment did not indicate the need for an oper-ating base in Goma. With the November 15 exo-dus from Mugunga, the requirement to providesecurity for nongovernmental and private volun-tary organizations also had diminished.

The changed refugee situation prompted anew crisis-action planning cycle by the task forcestaff at Entebbe with updated tasks: determinemission requirements based on input from Rwan-dan government and humanitarian relief agen-cies, continue to deploy appropriate forces for ex-ecution, establish an appropriate command andcontrol (C2) architecture, continue CMOC opera-tions from the forward operating base in Kigali,inform and assist Rwanda in executing a synchro-nized information campaign, and conduct taskhandover on completing the mission.

There were two significant shifts in missionfocus from the humanitarian assistance surveyteam planning phase conducted at Kelley andLongare and an assessment conducted on theground. On completing the initial evaluation,U.S. efforts were intended to directly support thegovernment of Rwanda as lead agency in the hu-manitarian assistance and repatriation opera-tions. Also, rather than static and mobile securityfor relief agencies, the joint task force was to pro-vide information to the local government and re-lief agencies on issues such as refugee locations,size, and directions of movement in eastern Zaire.Based on this new analysis, the primary JTF effortat Kigali became advisory assistance.

Initial humanitarian assistance survey teamplanning on November 4–13 identified the needfor a JTF task organization of some 3,000 people,not including the tanker airlift control element.Within it were security forces and a forcible-entrycapability to gain access to Goma.

The original task organization was establishedwith Army, Air Force, joint psychological opera-tions, and joint special operations components.CMOC was a separate function under the JTF staffand had a support role. However, as the missionevolved the entire joint task force was sized atunder 400 personnel. Its new role became informa-tion enabler to Rwanda and relief agencies ratherthan a substitute for relief agencies.

Although the task organization remainedservice-component oriented, the internal struc-ture of the joint headquarters changed. The AirForce used a tailored air operations cell ratherthan a joint forces air component commander el-ement. The joint special operations task forceconsisted of a communications team and AC–130for reconnaissance. CMOC was provided by theArmy under the JTF headquarters. Moreover, theNavy prepositioned P–3 reconnaissance aircraft inthe operational area. It conducted operationsprior to deployment of the humanitarian assis-tance survey team and came under the opera-tional control of the joint task force upon its acti-vation on November 19.

Moreover, the headquarters structure andsubordinate commands were reduced over time,applying a lesson from Operation Support Hopein 1994: as a function ends, its resources shouldbe redeployed. The chief of staff monitored mis-sion task completion and made recommendationson redeployment. Thus task force strength withinthe area of operations was kept to a minimum. Inaddition, liaison officers from France, Britain,Canada, and Italy monitored the assessment madeby the survey team and task force operations.

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Operations around KigaliThe initial humanitarian assistance survey

team and task force center of gravity was Kigali,where the Rwandan government was based andmost relief agencies had Rwandan offices. Afterthe survey team assessment and task force activa-tion, JTFGA identified unique requirements insupport of the local government and relief agen-cies involved in humanitarian assistance andrepatriation. JTF immediately established aCMOC operation to do this.

At first, the relief agencies wanted militaryforces to separate belligerents in refugee camps,disarm criminals, and provide security for opera-tions in eastern Zaire. However, some requests be-came moot once the refugees began returning toRwanda. By November 19 it was apparent thatRwanda and the relief agencies only required ac-curate information on the size, location, and di-rection of refugee movements.

One reason there were few other military re-quirements was the aggressive humanitarian oper-ations-repatriation preparations by the local gov-ernment and relief agencies in Rwanda since the1994 crisis. In 1996 they were ready with a coordi-nated and rehearsed plan for refugee support.

The commander and his forward headquar-ters operated between November 19 and 25 in Ki-gali to consolidate analysis and provide succinctsituation briefings to the Rwandan governmentand relief agencies. This information helped theseorganizations to further preposition foodstuffs,medical assistance, and other life support alongrefugee routes. In addition, the local governmentcould focus processing and repatriation efforts on

Goma, the site of most refugee traffic, and also ex-ecute an information campaign to update return-ing refugees. Once refugee information channelswere developed through the Rwandan governmentand humanitarian relief agencies, the main focusof refugee support became collecting and analyz-ing information on refugees in eastern Zaire.

Operations around EntebbeHaving identified the information require-

ment, the task force center of gravity reverted toEntebbe. Concurrently, the Canadian portion ofthe U.N.-sponsored multinational force had in-structions from Ottawa to stand up. Canada wasto prepare to lead the force.

JTFGA created an all source information cen-ter at Entebbe airport comprised of operationsand intelligence analysts and planners, a nationalintelligence support team, and representatives ofevery on-site U.S. military reconnaissance asset.This team applied an Army doctrinal intelligencepreparation of the battlefield collection method-ology to this nonstandard mission.

Each collection asset was aligned against spe-cific intelligence requirements, and the resultswere integrated daily to portray the size, location,composition, direction of movement, and intentof refugee groups in eastern Zaire. Products of theall source information center were provided to theCanadians, Rwandan government, and availablerelief agencies. Combined with early activities ofthe multinational force CMOC, formed in Kam-pala, collection and dissemination assets becamethe primary U.S. military contribution to furtherhumanitarian assistance and repatriation efforts.

The task force maintained its headquarters atthe intermediate stage base at Entebbe airport. Col-located with it were British and Canadian contin-gents and the organizational headquarters of re-gional relief agencies. In addition, many regionaloffices of relief agencies were located at the airportand in the capital, Kampala, which allowed closecoordination through multinational force CMOC.As in 1994 the government provided a large air-field and ground security, which were indispensa-ble in operating a staging area for military air.

Dèjá VuSimilarities to Operation Support Hope al-

lowed JTFGA to apply earlier lessons, avoidingsome pitfalls while structuring itself to counterunavoidable ones. New conditions in the politicaland security environments and a different refugeesituation led to some new JTF tasks in 1996. Theunique military capabilities required were intelli-gence processing and related information sup-port, civil affairs advice and assistance, and psy-chological operations advice and assistance.Whereas these same capabilities helped in 1994,

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in 1996 they were essential to the government ofRwanda and humanitarian relief agencies.

As in 1994, task force operations were char-acterized by a rapidly changing environment, si-multaneous planning and execution, and chal-lenges posed by multinational operations andcoordination with humanitarian relief agencies(with most nations, nongovernmental organiza-tions, and private voluntary organizations havingdifferent perspectives).

Unlike 1994, opposing regional politicalagendas and Zairian army and rebel forces which

were fighting in the jointoperational area arguedagainst using U.S. groundforces. Moreover, a mas-sive return of refugees,coupled with the readi-ness and capability to re-ceive them and provide

life support through the government of Rwandaand relief agencies, precluded the need for a largemultinational force.

While JTFGA demonstrated again that theU.S. military can execute contingency responsetasks on short notice and render focused assis-tance, it did so differently than the joint taskforce in Operation Support Hope. It added a newchapter to the operational and tactical lessonslearned two years earlier.

Humanitarian assistance survey team challenge.With clear terms of reference provided byCINCEUR, the humanitarian assistance surveyteam deployed to the area to make an assessment;establish interface with U.S. country teams, thegovernment of Rwanda, and relief agencies; andprepare for follow-on forces. The real challengewas to conduct the assessment accurately andquickly to affect decisionmaking already under-way in Washington, New York, and Ottawa.

The humanitarian assistance survey team de-ployed with subject matter experts—includingsome with experience from Support Hope—andinitially sufficient automation and communica-tions support. The proposed JTF commander ledthe team to provide added focus. Prior coordina-tion and preparation by U.S. country teams inKampala and Kigali allowed the survey team toquickly establish a base of operations and interactwith government and nongovernment officials todevelop assessment media.

Rwanda was stable. The local governmentand relief agencies had made detailed preparationsfor refugee repatriation. Two days after the survey

team arrived, refugees from the Mugunga Campbegan returning in mass. The situation thus drasti-cally changed and just three days after arrival theteam was able to recommend minimum deploy-ment of select, discrete assets to address thoseidentified support requirements which onlyunique military capabilities could satisfy.

As the survey team leader, the JTF com-mander built consensus and common under-standing of the situation with the American am-bassador to Rwanda, members of the DisasterAssistance Relief Team, and other representativesin country from the Departments of State andDefense. Despite common accord that large mili-tary capabilities were not necessary, political mo-mentum at the United Nations was already mov-ing toward wider action. Thus the SecurityCouncil supported its initial resolution callingfor a large multinational military force despitethe changed situation.

Tailoring JTF. As in 1994, the U.S. joint taskforce structure was developed around enablingforces and unique military capabilities that civil-ian alternatives could not immediately supply.Three capabilities were specified: informationcollection, analysis, and dissemination, civil-military operations support, and psychologicaloperations support.

In the area of tailoring a joint force packageto mission requirements, four basic lessons wererevalidated. First the commander, working closelywith EUCOM and service components supplyingforces, had to constantly review, identify, and de-ploy forward only those elements really needed.Minimum footprint in size and duration of forcepresence was recognized as the primary way toprotect them from start to finish. Flexibility wascritical to ensure force flow in and out of thejoint operational area by service componentforces best suited for each task.

Respect for host nation wishes and ease ofdisengagement also called for continually tailor-ing JTFGA. The government of Rwanda madeknown its desire for a limited presence of foreignforces, both in size and duration, explicit fromthe start. Further, the government and the reliefagencies were soon providing life support needsto returning refugees. With the help of the taskforce, the local government and regional reliefagencies knew how many refugees could still re-turn to Rwanda. They prepositioned stocks andotherwise made preparations to repatriate them.Once it was evident there was no further valueadded in CMOC and joint psychological opera-tions task force operations in Kigali, the task forceforward was redeployed to Entebbe. This gradual

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handoff of tasks and redeployment of excess ca-pability allowed the commander to avoid de-pendency by relief agencies on JTFGA supportand better protect the force.

The second lesson was that although JTFs bynature will always be more ad hoc than desir-able, joint doctrine, training programs, and tac-tics, techniques, and procedures enable us to de-ploy packages of capability to execute mostcontingency missions effectively. This doctrine,added to training on joint operations with allies,again proved invaluable in all interface among

multinational force advanced echelon elementsin the joint operational area.

Participation in joint exercises and real worlddeployments by the SETAF core staff and aug-menters after 1996 significantly enhanced thespeed and efficiency of planning, deployment,and execution. Furthermore, CINCEUR directedand V Corps supported joint training exercises forSETAF. These took place only weeks prior to thedeployment of a humanitarian assistance surveyteam and paid great dividends.

The third lesson was the importance ofquickly deploying humanitarian assistance sur-vey teams or an advanced echelon to the objec-tive area to appraise the ground situationquickly. Team selection must be based on criticalskills and functional needs anticipated in thejoint operational area. Members of the JTF corestaff are usually the most accessible for the hu-manitarian assistance survey team and facilitatethe transition to subsequent operations. The pro-posed JTF commander should lead the team toensure that a comprehensive assessment bringsthe best force package to the mission. In contrastto 1994, the inclusion of the deputy director ofmobility on the survey team helped ensure

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smoother deployment and sufficient visibilityand control of the airlift flow.

Finally, placing JTF members and equipmentforward with other select advanced echelon assetson the survey team greatly eases transition to fulloperations, allowing quick establishment of com-mand and control and the efficient reception andintegration of follow-on forces.

Task Force RolesUnderstanding and dominating the informa-

tion environment during fast-moving, chaotic,and ill-defined contingency operations is critical.As in 1994 information proved to be the greatestchallenge. The focus of the information cam-paign was painting an accurate picture of therefugee situation (ground truth) by quantifyingelements such as size, location, composition, di-

rection of movement, andrefugee intent—the hardest toverify. JTFGA spent consider-able effort in setting up pre-cise systems to report on thedynamic situation on theground and communicate itto higher headquarters as well

as the relief agencies, local government, multina-tional force, and media.

Information gathering followed the basicdoctrinal approach. The principles of intelligencepreparation of the battlefield and targetingmethodology (decide, detect, deliver, and assess)were followed in creating the collection plan.Analysts and planners from J–2, J–3 (national in-telligence support team), and J–5, supported byintelligence officers from the air reconnaissanceplatforms, assessed collection daily and recom-mended the collection plan for the next 24-hourperiod through a formal decision brief.

Off-site information was also leveraged tosupport collection or inject further requirements.For example, CMOC provided information or re-ferred questions from humanitarian relief agen-cies while regional defense attachés furnishedinput from area governments and the nationalintelligence support team gave access to other in-formation sources. The collection platforms useda variety of aircraft (P–3s, Canberras, andAC–130s) which were the most advanced andsuitable available.

Information dissemination involved manyplayers. Some interfaced in CMOC settings andothers directly with the task force. Tailored prod-ucts were designed for specific target audiencesand graphic intelligence summaries, overhead im-agery, information briefings, and periodic trendand refugee flow analyses were all used to portrayrefugee status.

Although this daily information dissemina-tion was welcomed by most, it was contested bysome. Overhead photography, albeit difficult torefute, did not eliminate exaggerated reports ofrefugee concentrations by the United Nationsand other agencies, at least initially. Moreover,the various target audiences had differing percep-tions of military requirements. While some con-tested the data for parochial reasons, most be-lieved the military had the best means to providean objective and accurate assessment of refugeegroup sizes and locations.

Central African governments, the regionalmedia, and JTF itself agreed during the initialphase that the military could contribute signifi-cantly. As time passed, however, each party deter-mined that the unique military capabilities wereless and less necessary to the long-term humani-tarian and repatriation requirements. The majorcontribution of the task force remained providingtimely and accurate refugee information to thelocal government and relief agencies.

Another key task force role was advisory as-sistance. The object was to improve existing capa-bilities of the Rwandan government and reliefagencies. As was learned in 1994, the operativeterms were assist, facilitate, coach, teach, advise,reinforce, and leverage. These were repeatedlystressed in CINCEUR and JTF commander intentstatements. A multifunctional pool of expertiseallowed JTFGA to play this role. CMOC includedboth civil affairs and non-civil affairs officers withtechnical expertise (engineering, logistics, admin-istration, medical) and extensive experience inboth Africa and humanitarian operations. Twoplayed key roles in 1994.

Members of the Kigali CMOC also reinforcedthe information flow between the Rwandan gov-ernment and relief agencies. They ensured taskforce offerings were shared and identified coordi-nation inefficiencies. The all source informationcenter also tailored products to provide refugeeinformation in the right detail and format for thelocal government and relief agencies. Moreover,CMOCs in Kigali and later Kampala played keyroles in disseminating these analyses by both ex-plaining and interpreting them, then assessinghow well the information was understood.CMOC feedback allowed the task force to trackcrisis perception by the Rwandan governmentand relief agencies.

Civil affairs and psychological operationsmobile training teams already deployed in theaterwere another benefit. They had worked with theRwandan Patriotic Army toward the repatriationand social integration of Rwandan refugees. Theirtiming was perfect. Practical exercises by the

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teams included visits to border crossings andcommunes where refugees were arriving. Theteams in Rwanda had developed concrete pro-grams to support efforts by both the governmentand relief agencies to receive refugees.

Force protection training—the top priority ofCINCEUR—began prior to deployment and con-tinued on arrival at the intermediate stage base. Itcovered threats in the joint operational area, en-vironmental hazards, preventive measures, safety,sensitive items checks, physical and operationssecurity measures, and individual/leader disci-pline and responsibility. With the joint task force,an Air Force-led force protection working groupat Entebbe airport, supplemented by daily surveysof living and working areas, maintained constantfocus. It used training materials developed by U.S.Army Europe and tailored to the joint operationalarea. Periodic briefings, inspections, and dailycommand emphasis on caution reduced illnessand injury.

Furthermore, the top priority of the com-mander remained the identification of air defensethreats (location, capability, association, and in-tent) against JTF air reconnaissance platformsover eastern Zaire. While no specific threat wasisolated despite indications, the early establish-ment of an air operations cell to produce an airtasking order and solid air control measures re-duced risks with the coordination of minimumaltitude no-flyover of combat areas, diplomaticclearances, and monitoring of flights with thegovernment of Rwanda.

Finally, Rwanda used the lack of a status offorces agreement to deter the establishment of amultinational force in country. Despite consider-able effort by the JTF staff judge advocate and theambassador and defense attaché in Kigali, the gov-ernment avoided an agreement and failed to pro-vide administrative protection to task force mem-bers. Thus the commander redeployed forward

elements in Kigali to Entebbe as soon as their workwas complete, a vital part of force protection.

The Armed Forces are uniquely suited to un-dertake crisis assessment and response. Joint doc-trine and training prepare them for a range of op-erations on short notice. Joint exercises andoperations increasingly facilitate the full spec-trum of warfighting and peace support operationswith precisely tailored modular packages. Forceprojection capabilities allow the Nation to rapidlydeploy those packages to crisis areas.

Does this mean that a military force packageshould be the contingency response of choice?Not necessarily. A number of considerations sug-gest caution in using our forces for humanitarianassistance crisis responses (particularly where sup-port may become long-term).

Costs associated with protracted peace sup-port operations may degrade warfighting skills.Constantly employing the Armed Forces may at-rophy other instruments of national power thatare better suited to respond to certain crises.

The military may not always have a say inthis process, but they should endeavor to helpthose who do to understand trade-offs in usingU.S. forces for nonwarfighting problems. Mobiletraining teams that assist relief agencies, for ex-ample, may improve operations and reduce mili-tary involvement in future humanitarian crises.Advice in peace-support operations, through con-tinuing peacetime engagement strategies aroundthe world, should be wisely applied.

Many soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmenhave learned valuable problem-solving skills.Training has given them the ability to apply theirservice, functional, and technical expertise. Theyhave proven highly effective in responding to awide range of crises around the world. JFQ

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