Islands in the Stream. Reflections on Media Development in Belarus

Chapter 13“Islands in the Stream.”

Reflections on MediaDevelopmentin Belarus

Oleg Manaev, Natalie Manayeva, andDmitry Yuran

Theoretical Framework

Our reflections on the evolution of Belarus mass mediain the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolutiontakes into consideration the multi—dimensional, multi—layered character of both the transition and

195

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transformation periods. Belarus’ socio—politicalstruggles and those of its mass media and theirjournalists are related, and different from those ofother post—communist nations. We call our concept ofBelarusian media “Islands in the Stream.”

We will address a fundamental question that willallow us to explain the evolution of Belarus media andto forecast their future: how will the varioussocietal institutions—politics, the economy, law andthe judiciary, culture, and so forth—grow indirections consonant with democratic development orremain entrenched in an authoritarian environment. Inorder to answer these questions, we first need toaddress two others:

What conditions determine these different prospects?First and foremost, in the prescription outlined byGross and Jakubowicz (2012) in the “Introduction,” the“creation of a new media system, whatever in nature.”In this regard, we need to reconsider the separationbetween “genuine transitions and copycat transitions”,and “late development and late democratization.”

Why different countries have reached differentresults in their transition and transformation? Thechoices made by Belarus’s elites and by society as awhole, as well as “path dependency,” are insufficientgauges for our explanations and forecasting. Webelieve that Hallin and Mancini’ (2012) emphasis onvarious elements of the legacy inherited by post—Communist societies and their media systems should bea starting point.

Peculiarities of Belarusian Media

According to the State Media Register, as of November 1,2011, 1.394 periodicals (including 406 state—run and

“ISLANDS IN THE STREAM”:REFLECTIONS ON MEDIA DEVELOPMENT IN BELARUS197

988 non state—run), 243 radio and TV programs (170state and 73 non state), and 9 information agencies (2state and 7 non state) were registered in Belarus.1

The Belarusian Association of Journalists(professional organization uniting more than 1,000journalists primarily from non—state media) noted thatless than 30 of the registered non state—runperiodicals are focused on covering public or socio—political issues, the rest are focused on business,entertainment, sport, cultural, ads, etc. Almost halfof them were expelled from the state—owneddistribution networks before the previous Presidentialelection in 2005. These newspapers were onlyrecentlyreturned to the distribution networks. Keepingin mind periodicity, circulation and volume (air—time), there are approximately ten state—run media forevery one non—state media outlet in the country(Manaev, Manaeva, and Yuran, 2010).

In short, state—run media outlets dominate themedia landscape—the ratio between the state run andindependent media isapproximately 9 to 1. The editorsof state—run media are appointed by the President orby local authorities. As we shall see, this has anenormous influence on editorial policy and presents aripe environment for editorial bias.

Broadcasting in Belarus remains under strictgovernmental control; TV channels are either state—owned, or Russian—owned. According to the FreedomHouse’ Freedom of the Press 2010 report, “the statemaintains a virtual monopoly on domestic broadcastmedia, which consistently glorify Lukashenko andvilify the opposition. Only state media broadcastnationwide, and the content of smaller television andradio stations is tightly restricted” (Freedom House,2011).

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As a result of economic, political, and legaldiscrimination against independent media, theirnumbers have decreased two—fold during the lastdecade. Consequently, no officially registeredindependent newspapers can be found in some Belarusianregions (e.g., in Gomel region) and the Ministry ofInformation refuses to register new independent mediaoutlets.

The state—owned media, on the other hand, as theInternational Fact—Finding Mission to the Republic ofBelarus report, For Free and Fair Media in Belarus, indicates,state—run media outlets are in a beneficial positioncompared to the independent media: they enjoysubsidized rent, salaries, distribution, printing, taxexempts and direct funding by the government. In 2010,the Council of Ministers approved special resolutionNo. 855, which includes a list of print media whoseeditorial boards are entitled to subsidies from thestate budget in 2010. The list of state subsidizedmedia outlets includes twenty—four publications. Notso ironically, “Soviet Belarussia/SovietskajaBielorussija”,the Belarusian newspaper with thelargest circulation (2.5 million copies weekly)founded by the Administration of the President, isamong them (Belarusian Association of Journalists,2010). Support for the state—run media outlets israpidly growing. From 2002 to 2009 financial supportfor the state media from the state budget grew almostfour fold, from $24 million to over $90 million2.

The majority of TV and radio stations belong to thestate, i.e. 170 out of 243. The remaining 73 non—stateelectronic outlets are fully controlled by the localand national governmental authorities, given to theexisting system of broadcast licensing in Belarus. Aparticularly egregious example of state repression vialicensing control is that the popular “Autoradio” FM—


radio station was deprived of its right to broadcastat the beginning of 2011 after it disseminated theelection addresses of opposition candidates AndreiSannikau and Uladzimir Niaklayeu on the eve of the2010 Presidential election.3

The Internet remains the most liberalized sector inthe information space of Belarus. The number of Web—users exceeds 4 million people, although the number ofregular Internet users is smaller. However, thispopulation is gradually increasing over time.Authorities have reacted to the growing influence ofthe Internet on Belarusians by attempting to takecontrol of the Web. Thus, Presidential Ordinance No.60 of February 1, 2010, “On the Measures to Improve the Use ofthe National Segment of the Internet Network” (The NationalRegistry of Legal Acts of Belarus, 2010, No.29,1/11368) came into effect on July 1, 2010. Several by—laws regulating the Internet were adopted within thecourse of a year: All Web services in Belarus are obliged to transferto Belarusian servers and officially register in thecountry; Personal identification of Wi—Fi users and cybercafes visitors is obligatory; The modems of individual Web—users are to beidentified; The Web—providers and mobile operators are obligedto install the CORM software for the spying purposesof the Belarus KGB and police authorities; Belarusian authorities were to complete “blacklists” of Web sites. Opening these websites isprohibited for Internet users on computers of state—run institutions and organizations, as well as oncomputers of the educational and culturalestablishments, such as libraries, schools,

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universities etc. The Internet users’ access to the majority of

independent Web—resources, that is, at least a dozenof them that covered the Presidential election wasdisabled on Election Day, December 19, 2010. Moreover,Web users couldn’t access their Google, Facebook, andLiveJournal accounts (Belarussian Association ofJournalists, 2010).

According to Reporters without Borders’ World PressFreedom Index 2010, Belarus is among the lowest rankedcountries in terms of freedom of the press, 154th of178. The report states, “the [Belarusian] regime makesno concession to civil society and continues… to putpressure on the country’s few remaining independentmedia outlets.”4 The reason for Belarus’ low mediafreedom ratings is the strict control that Belarusianauthorities gained over mass media system sincePresident Alexander Lukashenko’s election in 1994.Lukashenko has clearly stated his position on themedia and journalism in various public statements(Podgol, 2007): “Journalism is probably a state profession, andjournalists are the state’s men” (1999) “Freedom of press does not constitute totalpermissibility but is an “inside editor.” And weshould not intend to avoid such an editor, let himserve society” (1999). (About Western media projects for Belarus) “Ourcountry falls into a disinformation circle” (2005). “Mass media today is a weapon of mass destruction.The most powerful one. This is a war that never ends”(2006, two months before the Presidential election of2006). “On the eve of the Presidential election Belaruswas exposed to a massive information pressure from the


outside, which is still growing” (2006, two monthsafter the Presidential election of 2006). (Addressing journalists) “You are the most powerfulweapon of the President for the purpose of stategoverning” (2008).

According to IREX’s Media Sustainability Index, theBelarusian government restricts the work of media byapplying restrictions on printing, distribution,advertising, taxation and through editorial policy,laws suits for “false—information,” and libel,restricts access to information. According to theInternational Fact—Finding Mission to the Republic ofBelarus (Reporters Without Borders, 2010),

Economic conditions for media are not equal,subscription and distribution systems are monopolizedor controlled by the state on a large scale and limitaccess for non—state media, allocation of broadcastlicenses and frequencies is neither transparent norequal, access to information is restricted,accreditation of journalists (working for foreignmedia) is restricted, legislation on defamation andextremism creates an environment of self—censorshipand thus lack of publicly available information onimportant issues.”

A new media law in Belarus was approved in 2008 andtook effect in 2009, and it set up a number ofobstacles for independent journalists and mediaoutlets, shortening the list of journalistic rights.Some of control measures include: having journalistsgo through a three—step accreditation process and thatcould be denied accreditation without any explanation;increasing the authority to penalize journalists andmass media outlets for vague reasons like“dissemination of inaccurate information that might

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cause harm to state and public interests” journalistcould be fined, operations of media outlets couldbesuspended or terminated; requiring all print andbroadcast media outlets to re—register with theMinistry of Information (at least half a dozenindependent media outlets were denied registration);sanctions when media materials are found to violaterequirements for “compliance with reality;” andforeign ownership of media being restricted to 30percent.10 Other laws detrimental to freedom ofspeech/press include: The Law on Public Service, which restricts publicand media access to information: all stateorganizations are obliged to have spokespeople whopresent official information; these people are linkeddirectly to the Presidential administration and haveto follow the official ideological doctrine.Furthermore, state official often refuse to provideinformation to independent mass media. The Law on Counteraction to Extremism, which iscommonly used to impede press freedom: publishingmaterials that are considered an “extreme and presentdanger to the state or the people” could result infines or closure of the news outlet. The Criminal Code: Articles 367, 368, 369, 369—1and 193—1. Several articles provide for criminaldefamation for “Calumny in relation to the Presidentof the Republic of Belarus, Insult of the President ofthe Republic of Belarus, Insult of the representativeof the authorities, and Discredit of the Republic ofBelarus”. These articles are widely used by Belarusiangovernment to prosecute independent media outlets.

Thus, as noted by Manayeva, Aniskevich, Dinerstein(2011), according to Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm’sclassification (1956), the Belarusian media modelcould be identified as an authoritarian model: the


function of the state—run media is to support thepolicies of the authorities; state—run media fosterssupport for the president, social and national unity;the state has a right to control mass media by theenforcing repressive media law and other means.According to Jakubowicz’s classification (2007),Belarus falls into the category of non—competitiveregimes and its media system is very different frommedia systems in Western Europe, or even from ones ofthe Baltic States, the Ukraine or Poland, Belarus’closest neighbors.

Belarusian political system, however, has notfailed for almost two decades and the Belarusianauthorities do not face massive public protests.Several attempts to introduce “colored revolutions”during last decade failed, not only due to brutalrepressions but mostly because of lack of massivepublic support. According to IISEPS public opinionpoll conducted in June 2011, 53.3 percent ofrespondents think that mass media in the country aredependent (31.2 percent answered “some media areindependent, and some not”, 10.3 percent said “mediaare independent”). And most of them have no doubtswhom the media depend on: three quarters named thePresident and other authorities, while only 13.2percent named the audience, 7.1 percent—politicalparties and NGOs, and only 1.7 percent—privatebusiness. Responding to the question if they haveenough access to information about ongoing life inBelarus, 52.9 percent of respondent said “no”, while46.7 percent said “yes”, and to the question “to whatextend does information that you get from officialsources correspond to your real life?” 48.3 percentsaid “does not correspond completely/to some extend”,while 51.2 percent—“corresponds completely/to some

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extend”. It means that many people who consider themedia to be dependent on the state see nothing wrongwith this (Results of the national opinion poll onJune 2012 and June 2011).

Peculiarities of Belarusian Society

Several peculiarities deeply rooted in Belarushistory, culture and geography explain Belarusianauthoritarianism and it vitality (Manaev, Manaeva, andYuran, 2011): (1) the gradual separation from the USSRand its heritage, (2) the growing breakdown ofpolitical and social values in society, (3) theredrawing of its social landscape, (4) theBelarusians’ unformed national identity and theirconsequent ambivalence about the country’sgeopolitical orientation.

Hallin and Mancini (2012) stressed, “The free mediathat evolved in Eastern Europe in the 1990s were notborn out of nothing” and speak about “the legacy ofthe Communist system.” This is true, of course, but“Belarusian peculiarities” can’t be reduced simply andsolely to this legacy. The Soviet heritage is gradually butsteadily overcome by Belarusians:

Figure 1. Dynamics of public attitudes towards restoration of theU.S.S.R.5


As one can see, the number of respondents in favorof restoring the U.S.S.R. in 18 years decreased twice,while opposition to its restoration increased 2.7times. The number of respondents uncertain about sucha restoration decreased 1.5 times. This is evidencethat the nature of Belarusian authoritarianism differsfrom that of its Soviet past.

Another important feature of Belarusianauthoritarianism is a very significant split insociety. “Winners get everything and losers nothing”—this old saying fits this country: it means not justsubstitution of one ruling elite by another, butsubstitution of one value system with another. New values ofnational independence, political democracy, rule oflaw, market economy and the “return to Europeanfamily” inspired Belarusian democrats of the“perestroika wave” and led to emerging independenceand democracy in the early 1990s, but then wereovercome by the patriarchal values of rule by the“father of the people,” “fair distribution ofprosperity,” and “restoration of the historic and

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cultural Union/friendship with Russia”. Moreover, thelatter values shared by a majority were consolidated;whereas the former ones shared by a minority weremarginalized via various political, legal, economic,information, educational and other means. Instead of asystem of checks and balances, Belarus adopted asystem in which one single political power dominates.This consolidation gave to the first BelarusianPresident great support from the majority butstrengthened rather than eased social—culturaltensions and conflicts in the society.

Strengthening the societal split with a “stick andcarrot” policy had much more fundamental consequencesfor the country than simple promotion of one setvalues and marginalization of the other ones.Lukashenko’s policy affects the very social structure of the society.During the first decade of Lukashenko’s rule, thesocial position of several socio—professional groupshave been downgraded (those groups includebusinessmen, directors of state enterprises andjournalists), while the status and position of othergroups, such as Presidential executives and lawenforcement officers, has increased.

These processes have very serious consequences forBelarusian society and state, because they implysignificant redistribution of power, re—allocation ofproperty, access to social resources like healthcare,education, and a new culture that stands behindredistribution of social statuses. Another inevitableresult of Lukashenko’s actions is the significantreduction of public participation in the decision—making process. Thus, responding to the question:“What is your influence on the ongoing processes?” atthe family level 5 percent said “no influence at all,”at the level of enterprises—33.3 percent, at district


level—51.8 percent, at the village/town level—62.7percent; and nationally—72.7 percent.6

Finally, Lukashenko turned from a President of “thecommon people” marginalized by elites to the Presidentof his own elites, a group of about a million people(inclusive of family members), led by their leader andready to ensure their interests by any means (Manaev,Manaeva, and Yuran, 2011). While some politicians andexperts consider this tendency to be a treat toLukashenko’s power, we disagree. Instead of the ficklelove of the common people, the President enjoysreliable support from the new elite that depends onhis power more than the “common majority” does.

One additional important feature of the Belarusian society is itsincomplete national identity. We define national identity asa system of institutional and cultural features thatclearly sets the Belarusian nation, state and societyapart from others. After a three centuries brake inits nation and state building, Belarusians faced avery serious challenge of self—identification: Who arewe? To what culture, or broadly speaking civilization,do we belong? These questions might sound strange foralmost all of our neighbors—the Poles, Baltic people,Russians, Ukrainians, but not for many Belarusians. In1960s, during a visit to Minsk, U.S.S.R. leader NikitaKhrushchev noted that Belarusians would be the firstnation to enter Communism, because they havecompletely transformed from being Belarusian people tobeing Soviet people. Twenty years after Belarus becameindependent in 1991, many experts stress thatBelarusian independence “appeared from nowhere,”because there was neither a real fight for it nor evenpublic willingness and desire for independence.Weakness of the national identity makes Belarusiansociety unstable, and creates a need for some

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“unifying basis.” Lukashenko used this situation veryeffectively, introducing himself as the essence of the“unifying” base. In fact, he limited the nationalidentification and consolidation process to only onedimension: state building and role of the President asits only guarantor.

There are various reasons, mostly historical andcultural in nature (such as disappearance of thenational memory about state independence since the17th century, massive Russification during 19th—20thcenturies, similarities between Belarusian and Russiancultures, etc.), that explains the incompletecharacter of the Belarusian national identity. Theweakness of national identity is becoming more andmore clear not only for experts, but for politiciansas well. Lukashenko defined Belarusians as “Russians,but of better quality” and confessed, “we have not yetfound that national idea which would lead the peopleto battle” (Podgol, 2007).

According to Samuel Huntington theory, Belarusianhistory, as well as that of the Ukraine and Moldova,can be viewed as being on the “civilizations' clashline” between the Western European Catholic/Protestantand the Eurasian Orthodox civilizations. Due todifferent outside influences, Belarusian geopoliticaland national identities are still in the process ofdevelopment. After the collapse of the U.S.S.R. andthe end of the Cold War, this region, according toTimothy Ash, “became a battle ground between twoempires—Russian and European” (Manaev, 2009). Underthese circumstances Belarus’ incomplete national identity turned into theambivalence of its geopolitical choice: while the more “advancedminority” looks up to Europe, the “common majority” looks up to Russia.Pragmatic interests enlarge this geo—political schism:Who offers more? Where could we get more with lesseffort? Throughout his career, Lukashenko masterfully


used these internal and external contradictions. Onthe one hand, during fifteen years he demonstratedstrong pro—Russian political orientation domestically,thus getting support from the majority. On the otherhand, he played a game with both Russia and the West,and managed to get support from both sides (mostlyfrom Russia but sometimes from the West as well). Themixed and incomplete nature of Belarusian nationalidentity is reflected in mass consciousness: accordingto IISEPS poll conducted in March 2010, people who areproud to be Belarusian and want to live in Belarusconsider themselves closer to Russians than Europeans.

Trust as a “Lubricant for Cooperation”

The coexistence of state—run and non—state media thatbecame a key feature of the post—Communist Belarusianmedia system is deeply rooted in the country’s historyand culture, both at the structural and culturallevels. The state—run “media sub—system” followspolitical, legal, economic, cultural and professionalstandards supported by the “common majority” and thestate, while the independent media follow the“advanced minority” and to some extent the West. At first glance, the Belarusian media system lookslike to be at the intermediate stage of transformationin CEE post—Communist countries, where non—state mediagradually substitute the state—run ones. But thissimilarity is deceptive. In Belarus both media sub—systems came into being at the beginning of the 1990sand during two following decades continued toreproduce themselves with some minor deviations.

Due to the state “stick and carrot policy,” thestate—run media sector dominates the Belarusian media

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landscape. The ratio between state run media andindependent media in Belarus is approximately 9 to 1,and it does not reflect the ratio of social groupsupon which they rely and represent (defining them byvalue split or voting in favor or against Lukashenko,approx. 2 to 1 — Manaev, Manaeva, and Yuran, 2011).The state—run segment of the Belarusian media becamemore visible and prominent, while the independentmedia appear less visible. This discrepancy leads to aproblem of assessing their real role in society. Which“media sub—system” is more influential and effective?

We will focus our analysis on one very important“cumulative” indicator that has broad theoretical andother implications: public trust in the media. One ofthe basic reasons why trust is essential for societyis its complex relationship with cooperation. On onehand, trust is a necessary precondition forcooperation; on the other hand, trust is a product ofsuccessful cooperation. According to Putnam (1993),“trust is an essential component of social capital… itlubricants cooperation” (Putnam, 1993). At the sametime, Gambetta (1988) stressed that distrust destroyscooperation: “If distrust is complete, cooperationwill fail among free agents.”

Polish sociologist P. Sztompka (1999) asserted thatafter the collapse of the Soviet system many post—communist societies experienced “cultural trauma,”which includes crises of trust and confidence ininstitutions. As a result society transforms into an“atomized society” in which trust is confined to smalllocal pockets of inter—personal interaction. One ofthe greatest problems with transformations into anatomized society is the emerging of corruption onevery possible level. With the erosion of confidencein social institutions people prefer to solve problemsusing personal connections. In addition, psychologists


stress the complex character of trust (Putnam, 1993).For all these reasons, trust could be used as the mostrelevant indicator for studying influence.

According to IISEPS public opinion polls, thoseBelarusians who trust the state—run and those whotrust non—state (independent) media significantlydiffer in their attitudes towards basic socialinstitutions in the country, according to the IISEPSDecember 2010 poll:

Table 1.Trust for Mass Media and Confidence in Selected SocialInstitutions (Yuran, 2011)

Of those who trustindependent media

labor unions and 32.6% do not

Of those who trust state—run media

The PresidentThe President48.8% have confidence in thePresidentand 42.2% do not.

The Military50.4% have confidence inBelarusianMilitary and 36.9% do not.

Opposition Political Parties22.9% have confidence inoppositionpolitical parties and 59.4%do not.

Independent Labor Unions47.3% have confidence in theindependent

89.3% have confidence inthe Presidentand 7.1% do not.

The Military76% have confidence inBelarusianMilitary and 15.5% do not.

Opposition Political Parties15% have confidence inoppositionpolitical parties and 72%do not.

Independent Labor Unions42.3% have confidence inthe independent laborunions and 35.4% do not

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These two groups significantly differ in theirattitudes towards geo—political issues:


Table 2. Public attitudes towards the US in different media audiences (%) (Manaeva, 2010) *

Public attitudestowards the US

Trust instate—runmedia(34.5)

Trust innon—statemedia(30.3)

RegularInternet use(32.4)**

After the diplomatic conflict between Belarus and the United States, which brokeout in the spring of 2008, relations between the two countries remain tense

(i.e.the staff of the U.S. embassy in Minsk decreased five times, and theBelarusians have to go for U.S. visas to other countries). Do you think it necessary

to restore normal relations with the U.S. or not?

It is necessary to restore normalrelations with the United States

This is not necessarily

I do not care

35.2

28.1

31.9

51.4

17.8

29.1

64.3

13.4

20.5

Who threatens Belarus?

USA 33.7 19.7 12.6

What society is fairer?

American society 4.0 16.9 21.7

*According to IISEPS March 2010 poll. **Use Internet every day or some times a week.

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The data supports our conclusion that in Belarusdifferent media sub—systems are based on differentsocio—political sub—systems. Now let’s take a look atpublic trust for different media sub—systems and itsdynamics:


Table 3. Dynamics of public trust to different media sub—systems (%)

Years State media Non—state media

09’201109’201009’200906’200805’200706’200603’200503’200403’200304’200204’200104’200003’199909’199811’1997X

Trust25.735.944.747.751.057.053.947.645.038.733.138.539.141.843.7

42.9

Distrust62.248.742.146.939.735.033.237.037.343.135.431.631.026.021.0

38.0

Trust32.830.445.349.650.637.040.035.743.832.225.325.721.819.625.4

34.3

Distrust52.249.435.548.535.547.340.242.133.843.531.831.932.632.624.1

38.7

Based on public opinion polls, we conclude that inthe past 15 years: Total average level of trust (i.e. ratio betweentrust and distrust) for the state media is higher thanfor the non—state media; Total average level of distrust (i.e. rationbetween distrust and trust) for both state and non—state media has significantly grown; Distrust for the state media has grown more rapidlythan for the non—state media.

However, when we evaluate these indicators weshould also take into consideration the fact that inBelarus the people’s trust in each other is low. Thus,responding to a question in the May 2011 IISEPS

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survey, “Could you trust most of people or better bevery careful in relations with them?” only 26.8percent of respondents have chosen the first optionwhile two thirds preferred the latter. This datasupports Sztompka’s (1995) conclusion about the crisisof trust in post—Soviet societies that transformedinto “atomized society” in which trust is confined tosmall local pockets of inter—personal interaction.” Inthis context, the mass media remain one of the fewinstitutions that provide many people sort of a“social ground”, i.e. values (for example, pro orcontra Lukashenko, pro Russia or the EU) shared bydifferent parts of the society, regardless of itsnature.

Surprisingly, despite the fact that the actualratio of state—run to independent media in Belarus isheavily tilted to the former, the ratio between theirinfluences is quite comparable, and even exceeds theratio of the constituent groups they rely on andrepresent. This data might indicate a chance for agradual substitution of the state—run media sub—systemwith the non—state one under favorable circumstances,i.e. real democratization of the existing regime. There are various factors at play, some of them areinternal to the media system (journalism education andtraining, professional standards, etc.) while othersare external. We will analyze at least two of them—oneinternal and the other external—to demonstrate howthey affect trust for media.

The first one is interaction between the media and its audiences.For decades, Soviet media used audience feedback, suchas letters and phone calls from readers, listeners andviewers, meetings with the audience, etc., not so muchfor widening the public space but to strengtheningeditorial or the authorities’ discourse. After thecollapse of Soviet Union, independent media began


restoring long forgotten freedom of expression andforming a genuine public discourse. Today a number ofBelarusians express their opinions to the mass media(Tables 5—8 according IISEPS September 2002 poll):

Table 4. Have you ever communicated with mass media (i.e. sent letters,articles, and answers to various competitions or cross words, came toeditorial meetings or called them by phone, etc.)?*

Option

Yes, several timesYes, one timeNo, never DA/NA

%

9.511.078.51.0

* Tables 5—8 according IISEPS September 2002 poll.

However, not all of them were published, and approximately a third did not get any response at all:

Table 6. If you communicated with mass media, what was their reaction?

Option

My letter (or article) was publishedI received written reply from editorialsMy letter (article) was passed to the appropriate authorities for their reactionMy letter (article) received no response from editorialsDA/NA

%

7.05.2

2.06.279.6

Next table shows how media train the audience to address “in the right course”:

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Table 7. Editorial reaction on feedback depending on its frequency (%)Frequencyof feedback

Several timesOne time

Letter waspublished

46.221.0

Receivedthe

writtenreply

9.110.2

Letter waspassed to theappropriateauthorities

16.128.7

Lettergot noreactio

n

23.134.1

The more you follow “the right course” (i.e. cover“the right” issues and to make “right comments”), themore you are published and the less your opinion gets“passed to the appropriate authorities” or receives noreaction at all. Comparative correlation analysis ofthe public trust for media and the feedback experiencereveals a different reality for the state—run and non—state media:

Table 8. Trust in Belarusian media depending on a feedback experience(%)

Type of media Sentinformation tomedia (20.5)

Sent nothing tomedia (79.5)

State—run media

Trust Distrust Na/DA

30.952.117.0

35.643.421.0

Non—state media

Trust Distrust Na/DA

39.039.321.7

30.541.228.3

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This table reveals the different mechanisms ofresponse to audience’s feedback by different media sub—systems. Those readers, listeners, and viewers whocommunicated with state—run media trust them less thanbefore this experience, while those readers whocommunicated with the non—state media trust them moreafter communicating with them. This data supports theconclusion that different media sub—systems operateunder different principles of interaction with theiraudiences. The state—run media, despite variousadvantages, tend to use public opinion in their ownfavor, reproducing the old social system. In contrast,non—state media, despite various disadvantages, tendto openly express public opinion, thus producing a newsocial system.

Another external factor that affects trust for media is foreigninfluence. As Hallin and Mancini (2012) noted, “foreigninfluence seems much more central to the process ofdevelopment of Eastern European media systems than tothose of Western Europe. In the media sphere, bothforeign ownership and the importation of professionalmodels from outside the region clearly are clearlymajor factors affecting the development of mediasystems.” However, they stressed the unclear or evenambivalent character of this influence:

But the most important questions for study have to dowith the affect of foreign ownership on the relationof media to politics, the evolution of professionalnorms, and similar issues. One can imagine a numberof possible hypotheses about the effect of foreignownership on the ties between media and politics. Itmight increase media autonomy by giving media aneconomic base separate from the politicized businessclass within a particular country. It might beintegrated into patterns of partisan alliance. Or it


might be that foreign—owned companies would tend toally with whichever party was in power, and perhapstend to limit political coverage that might lead toconflict with local politicians. Another set ofquestions has to do with the way foreign ownershipaffects professional culture. Does it enhanceprofessionalization, as strong professional culturesare imported from other regions? Or does it undercutit, as foreign owners see media properties in EasternEurope purely as commercial enterprises, and resistthe countervailing power that would result fromprofessionalization of journalism?”

In the case of Belarus, the foreign factor in themedia system’s development and earning its public’strust is very specific. Due to various restrictions,legal, political, and economic, mentioned above,foreign ownership is limited. For this reason, foreignownership does not affect the media systemsignificantly, like it does in other CEE post—Communist countries. Their influence is of anotherkind—not through ownership but rather direct influenceof their discourse (i.e. principles of coverage, likeseparation of facts and opinions, presentation ofconflict opinions, issues selection etc.) and economic(funding, technological up—grade, educational andtraining programs etc.) and moral—political support(awarding, making political statements, inviting forvarious visits abroad) from abroad (Manaev, 2008).

Foreign print media, i.e. meaning socio—politicalperiodicals, are not too popular and don’t have asignificant influence. The total audience of a dozenWestern radio stations that broadcast to Belarusduring last five years has decreased from 15 percentto just 5 percent. Television has much moresignificant audience share:

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Table 9. TV audiences in Belarus (“What TV channels do you watch?) *TV channels

Russian TV Belarusian TV Local TVCable TVSatellite TVRussian Service of Euro News (Lion)Polish TVSpecial RTVi program for Belarus (NewYork—Moscow)Independent TV Channel for BelarusBelSat (Warsaw)

%

91.289.657.251.328.122.110.012.09.8

* IISEPS March 2011 poll.

Internet users constituted the fastest growingmedia audience, growing almost fifteen times in thelast fifteen years. Today, half of the population usesthe Internet daily or several times a month, and over40 percent use different social networks. According toan IISEPS June 2011 poll, the majority of Internetusers choose foreign sources: 35 percent Russian, 13.3percent European, 2.2 percent American; 33.3 percentchoose Belarusian sources.

Evaluating the role of foreign mass media we shouldalso keep in mind that during the last year only about20 percent of Belarusian traveled abroad; a decade ago15 percent did so. This means that for the majority ofBelarusians, the media is a major source ofinformation about life abroad.

Economic support for the independent media fromabroad is another complicated issue. Some expertsinterpret foreign financial support as “an import offoreign media models.” There is rationale in thisapproach, since the foreign support includes various

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educational and training programs (i.e. “importingprofessional media standards”), as well as financialand technological support. It is also true thatvarious independent media projects survived duringlast two decades mostly due to foreign support. It wasnot the Western donors and professionals that offeredsupport to independent media in Belarus, but ratherthe Belarusian journalists and other actors who soughthelp in order to implement their own goals and ideas.

Besides, the political force that seized power soonafter the collapse of the Soviet Union used the“common majority” to marginalize the “disagreeingminority” and by this way deprived non—stateindependent media of the internal resources. In thiscircumstance, independent media have to rely onexternal resources. Of course, there are cases whennon—state media follow the Western standards becausethis is “a part of a deal” with their donors (i.e.condition of getting funding). But in most cases,independent Belarusian journalists and mediaorganizations follow these standards because they areeager to do this. That’s why interpretation of the useby independent media (as well as by other actors ofcivil society) of the Western resources as an “importof the Western model”—in countries like Belarus—is, onour opinion, incorrect: these changes are initiatedfrom inside the country and not from outside, andWestern resources are used by national actors fortheir own purposes.

Thus, as we noted before, while the state—run mediasub—system gains support from the state and is trustedmostly by the “common majority,” the independent mediagain support from abroad and is trusted mostly by the“disagreeing or advanced minority.” The mediastrengthen “social capital” and “lubricantcooperation” in two different parts of the Belarusian


society, contributing to their further co—existence.Moreover, the role of the media is not limited bysimple contributing. As Gross (2002) argues “thehighly politicized, pluralistic, opinionated andjudgmental journalism with neither shared standardsnor a professional, democratic—minded culture thatprevails in Eastern Europe not only represents civil society, butis civil society.” Both media sub—systems in Belarus not onlyreflect or represent their constituencies (mentioned above different partsof the society), but actually produce them.

Conceptualizing a Case of Belarus

The discussion above leads us to very importanttheoretical and practical questions. Could one definethe co—existence of the different media sub—system (aswell as social sub—systems that provide their support)as separate? Could one define this co—existence ofdifferent media sub—system (as well as social sub—systems as their backers/supporters) as an “Islands in theStream” model with its own nature or just as atemporary period of transformation from one well knownmodel to another? What is the criterion for itsdefinition? Is it time for a “rapid and dramaticchange,” as per Hallin and Mancini (2012)? However,there are historical examples when suchtransformations were going on for decades, withoutchanging the very foundations of societies. On theother hand, history provides us with examples whenreal transformation took several years if not months.

According to the theoretical framework provided byGross and Jakubowicz (2012), Belarusian media’stransition has passed “the point of no return,”because it conforms to both “quality change and its

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reversibility.” As for the transformation, it does notmeet either criteria of “achievement of the objectivesoriginally set for the process by its leaders” or“conformity with “Western” standards”, neitherdefinition of “post—communist countries withautocratic political regimes do not even enter thepicture in this context.” Their criteria of “creationof a stable new media system, whatever its nature” orHallin and Mancini’s (2012) concept of “media systemicparallelism” fits the case of Belarus much better.However, it is not enough, because it does not explainthe character of this “nature” or “parallelism” andits origins.

We believe that the media system, as well as socialand political development in Belarus, is not just“atypical case” or a “deviation from the mainstream.”Unexpected developments take place in differentcountries. Thus, in a recent George Friedman article,a leader of an internationally recognized intelligenceservice, Stratfor, recently stressed (Friedman, 2011):

The case of Egypt raises an interesting and obviousquestion regardless of how it all turns out. What ifthere are democratic elections and the people choosea regime that violates the principles of Westernhuman rights? What happens if, after tremendousWestern effort to force democratic elections, theelectorate chooses to reject Western values andpursue a very different direction — for example, onethat regards Western values as morally reprehensibleand aims to make war against them? One obviousexample of this is Adolph Hitler, whose ascent topower was fully in keeping with the processes of theWeimar Republic — a democratic regime — and whoseclearly stated intention was to supersede that regimewith one that was popular, opposed toconstitutionalism in the democratic sense and hostileto constitutional democracy in other countries.


Just some weeks after Stratfor’s article, U.S.media published the results of the public opinion pollconducted by Zogby International in Iraq. According tothis poll, 42 percent of respondents believe thatunder Saddam Hussein, before Western invasion, thecountry lived better, and only 30 percent gave theopposite answer (Schiermeyer, 2011).

The practical question in this regard that isfrequently asked by the West is this: When will theindependent media in Belarus become sustainable andwill be able to continue activities without supportfrom abroad?

Unfortunately, we have no definite answer, we canjust guess. And our guess is that because of adifferent, and sometimes contradicting social—political and cultural sub—systems that co—exist inBelarus due to its history, culture, and evengeography, different media sub—systems could co—existhere for quite some time, not exactly “substitutingone another or converging at the end,” but remainingnatural for this nation and society. This social andmedia “parallelism” could be broken in favor of any ofthe sides due to various internal and externalfactors. But one conclusion is clear: those who arereally eager to develop a new, democratic model forBelarus, including its media system, inside or outsidethe country, have natural base or constituency to relyon.

Notes

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1. See Ministry of Information of the Republic ofBelarus. (2011). Data on registered mass media. Retrievedfrom http://www.mininform.gov.by/rus/smi/

2. Media in Belarus 2008. Annual Report by theBelarusian Association of Journalists. Minsk, 2009, p. 4.

3. Broadcasting of election addresses is allowed byBelarusian legislation.

4. Reporters without Borders. (2010). World PressFreedom Index 2010. Retrieved fromhttp://www.rsf.org/IMG/CLASSEMENT_2011/GB/C_GENERAL_GB.pdf

5. Here and after according to nationwide public opinionpolls conducted by the Independent Institute of Socio—Economic and Political Studies (1.500 respondents age 18+interviewed face—to—face, a sample error did not exceed0.03). Dots on the graph represent dates of public opinionpolls.

6. Ibid.

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Friedman, G. (2011). Egypt and the idealist—realist debatein U.S. Foreign Policy. Retrieved fromhttp://www.stratfor.com/print/205497.

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http://www.rsf.org/IMG/CLASSEMENT_2011/GB/C_GENERAL_GB.pdf“Results of the national opinion poll on June 2012, 2011,”IISEPS. http//www.iiseps.org/edata11—6—1.html.

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Islands in the Stream. Reflections on Media Development in Belarus

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