Infantry - Fort Benning - U.S. Army

Infantry

••••• INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S.Army Infantry School at Building 4, Fort Benning, Georgia. • Although it contains professional information for theinfantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any informationpresented in other official Army publications. • Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authorsand not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. • Official distribution is to infantry andinfantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. • Direct communication concerningeditorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA31995-2005. • Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951; [email protected]. • Bulk rate postage paid at Columbus, Georgia, and other mailing offices. •POSTMASTER: Send address changes to INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. •USPS Publication No. 370630.

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2004 Volume 93, Number 5

PB 7-04-5

BG BENJAMIN C. FREAKLEYCommandant, The Infantry School

RUSSELL A. ENOEditor

MICHELLE J. ROWANDeputy Editor

BETTY J. BYRDEditorial Assistant

Soldiers with the 2nd BrigadeReconnaissance Troop wait forextraction by a UH-60 BlackHawk after receiving mortar andsmall arms fire during a QuickReaction Force weaponsinterdiction mission in Iraq.(Photo by Tech Sergeant ScottReed, USAF)

This medium is approved for official dissemina-tion of material designed to keep individualswithin the Army knowledgeable of current andemerging developments within their areas ofexpertise for the purpose of enhancing theirprofessional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Peter J. Schoomaker

General, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Distribution: Special

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSONAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 0423301

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FRONT COVER:

BACK COVER:Specialist Christopher Poe, anM203 gunner for Task Force 1-21 Infantry, provides securitywhile displaced Kurds chalk outa l ine representing campboundaries in Kirkuk, Iraq,August 20. (Photo by SpecialistSean Kimmons.)

FEATURES23 SO, YOU’RE GOING TO IRAQ? COMPANY COMMANDER SHARES

SUCCESSFUL TACTICS, TECHNIQUESCaptain Christopher L. Budihas

29 SHOULDER PATCHES: IDENTIFICATION FOR THE FUTUREBRIGADESRobert L. Gosciewski

32 HAMMERING THE WAY INTO BAGHDAD: A MECHANIZEDINFANTRY BRIGADE IN URBAN COMBAT Arthur A. Durante

DEPARTMENTS1 COMMANDANT’S NOTE3 INFANTRY NEWS8 RANGER NOTES10 TSM STRYKER/BRADLEY CORNER13 PROFESSIONAL FORUM

13 SOLDIER AS A SYSTEM: PROGRAM ENSURES SOLDIERMODERNIZATIONDavid J. Libersat

16 REFLECTIONS OF A RIFLE PLATOON LEADERFirst Lieutenant Renato E. Angeles

19 PROJECT TOUCHDOWN: HOW WE PAID THE PRICE FOR LACK OFCOMSEC IN VIETNAM David Fiedler

41 TRAINING NOTES41 MOUNTAIN LEADER ADVANCE RIFLE MARKSMANSHIP COURSE:

HELPING THE ARMY, 10TH MOUNTAIN DIV MEET THE DEMANDS OFTRANSFORMATIONLieutenant Colonel Michael CossCaptain Adam Sawyer First Sergeant Scott Baugn

44 DEPLOYING THE FORCECaptain Joseph Claburn

51 BOOK REVIEWS53 SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

BRIGADIER GENERAL BENJAMIN C. FREAKLEY

INFORMATION WARFARE

Commandant’s

Note

Information warfare has existed as long as man has waged war. The information war burgeoned during World War II, when the

keepers of the information key were thecryptographers, for it was they who both encodedour own operational documents and decoded thoseof the enemy. Captured German and Japanese navalcodes enabled America and the Allies to read ouradversaries’ mail, as it were, for a long time, andthe information gained led to victories on theground, in the air, and at sea. The massive Britisheffort on the Ultra Project laid bare the Germans’main cryptographic system, saved countless livesfrom D-Day forward, and set the stage for major defeats of Germanforces. Conversely, denial of intercept traffic caused us to be caughtoff guard. As U. S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald R.Fogleman pointed out in an address called InformationOperations: The Fifth Dimension of War, “…the Germans gainedtactical surprise at the Battle of the Bulge by shutting down thecommunications lines we had tapped. They had gone to othertactical comm[unication] systems to send messages. And our lackof information played a role in the Germans’ success.”

The importance of a synchronized, executable informationoperation is as critical today as it was during World War II. Infact, a common theme in our lessons learned conferences, workgroups, panels, and visits is that we are continuing to strugglewith the definition, planning, and execution of information warfarein current operations. In Iraq, the impact of the 11 critical variablesof the contemporary operating environment on the population hasbeen particularly illustrative and has been magnified byinformation efforts that support the disparate agendas of themultiple enemies of stability. Both the noncompliant forces andthe Coalition depend on the host nation’s population for labor,security, intelligence, and — most importantly — legitimacy.Failures in information operations can have a devastating effecton these efforts.

Our adversary plans and fights asymmetrically.In order to stem the tide of insurgent attacks andwin the support of the population, we must becomeequally asymmetric. We must communicate ourintentions and counter the enemy’s propagandamachine to further stability efforts, gatherintelligence, and deny the enemy the means ofwaging war. One initiative might be to positionforward operating bases away from host nationpopulation centers to reduce the perception thatwe are an occupying power. Such a movediminishes perceptions of a disparity between ourlifestyle and that of the host population. Likewise,

it will reduce the vulnerability our forward operating bases haveexperienced with mortar attacks, vehicle-borne explosive devices,OPSEC, and disinformation. This initiative, and the many otherslike it, developed by agile thinking and adaptive commandershelps us isolate this parasite-like enemy that terrorizes andmisleads the population in order to gain support for his agenda.

Let there be no doubt that we are fighting an adaptable andcunning enemy. He has transitioned from cell phones to sermonsto graffiti as a means to communicate with his followers. InIraq, we have undertaken civic action projects and erected signsto show U.S. and Iraqi government efforts to improve citizens’quality of life. The insurgents, in turn, have resorted to the simpleexpedient of painting over these signs and claiming credit for thework themselves. We must quickly identify the information effortsof the enemy in order to alter their effect and exploit them in ourfavor if possible. Commanders must synchronize their civil affairs,security, public affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPS),intelligence and cultural support assets available to gain the effectdesired in our battlespace. Too often we’re finding efforts to useinformational power uncoordinated. For instance, duringOperation Iraqi Freedom we had an incident of an airborne radiobroadcasting platform enticing Iraqi citizens to come out of theirhomes to celebrate their freedom, while the ground maneuver

September-October 2004 INFANTRY 1

The Next Dimension

commander was using his PSYOPS detachment to tellnoncombatants to stay indoors to avoid being mistaken for enemycombatants. We must also recognize and mitigate the unintendedsecond and third-order effects of all our kinetic and non-kineticactions directed against the enemies of democracy inside andoutside of Afghanistan and Iraq. Two examples of how we canachieve this are providing commanders with nonlethal technologiesand more precision munition options to minimize collateralpersonnel or material damage. These efforts give commanderson the ground options to shape public opinion derived by some ofour necessary kinetic actions. Specifically, we must avoid informationfratricide by working with our sister services, allies, and other agenciesto provide the commanders both material and nonmaterial solutionsto our information management dilemmas. At a minimum, we mustidentify the informational fratricide risks in our actions and mitigatetheir adverse impacts. In addition to synchronizing our internalPSYOPS, PAO, and Intelligence efforts in our own formations,we must coordinate and synchronize the efforts of everyone in ourAO. This includes our sister services, governmental and non-governmental agencies, international agencies, and host nationforces. Unity of command and unity of effort within eachcommander’s battlespace is the objective.

The Iraqi insurgents’ ability to capitalize on our informationmiscues — albeit somewhat unsophisticated — can be effective.Recently, U.S. units raided and seized an enemy facility disguisedas an Islamic school, or Madrassa, capturing weapons, documents,and enemy personnel. Seizure of the structure required force entrytechniques, which damaged the door. When U.S. forces laterreturned to the site, the door had been repaired and insurgentswere undoubtedly propagating the belief that the U.S. destroysschools, while they care enough to repair them. To be sure, suchincidents are only skirmishes in the information war, but we mustdeny the enemy every opportunity to present America and her

armed forces in a negative context. We employ footage of largescale operations to illustrate our commitment and preponderanceof force, while he claims it to be arbitrary violence of an occupyingforce. The enemy violates generally accepted rules of war bymilitarizing religious facilities and storing weapons, ammunition,and explosives in them, but local media assail us for returningfire against such facilities or discovering and publicizing suchviolations. Quickly acting and reacting to these allegations isessential, but our information operations must not be limited tominimizing the effects of enemy attacks; we are doing far toomany positive things in the nations where we are deployed to letthem go unreported. We have to tell our story. The Army andMarine Corps work with imbedded reporting is one example ofhow to show our point of view where previously our media wassteered by the agenda of others. While it is important for ouraudience here at home to see the positive, progressive aspect ofoperations overseas, it is equally important that the people of Iraqand Afghanistan and those of the region understand the magnitudeof our commitment. Similarly, we must demonstrate our resolvethrough every informational means available to show ouradversaries that we are in the fight for the long haul and that it iscostly if he persists in pursuing his illegitimate agenda.

Information operations are a combat multiplier that we mustemploy if we are to engage and defeat an enemy whose ability tofight asymmetrically may well be his greatest — and perhaps only— advantage. We must integrate all of our assets into ouroperations, consider their consequences, and synchronize ourefforts. We are fast learners, and our success in seizing andretaining the initiative in this dimension of combat is limited onlyby our own imagination. Learn from an imaginative andresourceful enemy; study what he has done up to now, but look aswell for the things he has not yet tried.

Follow me!

Sergeant Jeremiah Johnson

2 INFANTRY September-October 2004

A PYSOPS Soldier hands out newspapers during a patrol inMosul, Iraq.

All infantrymen have a vested interestin the final product as a book byinfantrymen, for infantrymen.

The intent is to fill out thechapters with the mostconcise, yet hard-hitting,personal accounts ofbattlefield situations todrive home the themes ofthe book. We are equallyinterested in both successesand failures: historically, wehave learned as much or morefrom failure as from success. The20 chapter titles listed below, withdescriptions, are the themesselected to best describeinfantrymen and infantry teams. We arelooking for written vignettes andmonographs by individual Soldiers detailingpersonal actions or observations occurringin operations that clearly illustrate one ormore of these themes.� Discipline: The basic quality that

guides a Soldier’s actions through the stressof combat and, particularly in the face ofoverwhelming odds, causes the Soldier tofight as he is trained to fight. A lack ofdiscipline leads to a compromise ofstandards and values.� Fitness: Those aspects of a

Soldier’s mental and physical fitness thatharden him, keep him alive and in the fight,and allow him to focus his energy on missionaccomplishment. An inadequate level offitness distracts a Soldier from his mission,and limits his contribution to the team.� Marksmanship: The critical

advantage of having individual Soldiers thatcan provide accurate long-range or reflexiveshort-range fire, and teams/crews that

‘Infantry In Battle’Infantry in Action From Somalia to Iraq

The Infantry School at FortBenning is working on amodern-day version of the 1934,

post-WWI “Infantry in Battle”. The goalis for Soldiers to learn from the actions ofinfantrymen and infantry units, over the fullspectrum of combat operations, from theconflict in Somalia to present day. A criticalcomponent of the project is the“infantryman’s point of view” about hisactions, without which the book would lackperspective. The challenge is to capture thefinest accounts of infantry actions resultingfrom recent operations. We are thereforeenlisting the help of commanders in thefield to aid us in gathering the best stories,interviews, and personal monographs of theleaders and Soldiers who do the fighting.


Friends of the Infantry, we are work-ing on an effort to produce an updated“George Marshall” type Infantry inBattle, focused on today’s actions. Thereaders will be tomorrow’s NCO andofficer leadership, discovering some ofthe “truths” relating to fighting andleading America’s Soldiers. We needyour help!! Please see the topical areaslisted below and have your leaders sendus their experiences grouped under thetopics. If you have other ideas, let usknow as well. We look forward to yourengaging in this exciting endeavor.

For more information, please contactMr. Dave Stieghan; e-mail isStieghand@ benning.army.mil, phone(706)-545-4290/DSN 835-4290.

All the best and thank you for yourleadership! Follow Me!

— BG Benjamin C. FreakleyChief of Infantry

employ disciplined, controlled firesagainst an enemy force.� Mutual Support Teamwork:The support which units rendereach other against an enemy

because of their assigned tasks,their position relative to eachother and to the enemy, andtheir inherent capabilities.� Why Men Fight: The

forces that draw men togetheras teams, and impel them

through the rigors of combat, notonly because of duty or discipline,but because of much closer andmore basic bonds of trust in the

unit, the leaders, and each other.� Adaptability: The ability of

Soldiers to display mental agility in orderto adjust to new challenges arising on thedynamic modern battlefield.� Ingenuity: The development of

new and varied tactics and techniques, orthe innovative use of existing assets tofacilitate mission accomplishment.� Patrolling: Tactics, techniques,

and procedures for conducting mounted anddismounted patrols in varying environmentsfacing an adaptable and resourceful enemy.� Use of Terrain: The use of terrain,

effectively or ineffectively, that has a markedimpact on the outcome of a mission orengagement.� Reporting: The passing of

reliable, actionable information to allowcommanders and staffs to see andunderstand situations first and realize thenegative results of inaccurate reporting.� Security: The importance of strict

measures taken to protect the force from


INFANTRY NEWS

surprise hostile actions, and situations when a breakdown in security, at any level, negatively impactsthe unit.� Civilian Considerations: Ability of

Soldiers to gauge the feelings and intent of a localpopulace and capitalize on a particular area orethnic group’s beliefs and feelings.� Embedded Personnel: Journalists,

Department of the Army civilians, other governmentagencies, non-government organizations,attachments or any person (nonmilitary) that is placedinto a unit, especially while on combat operations.� Reconnaissance: A mission undertaken

to obtain, by visual observation or other detectionmethods, information about the activities andresources of an enemy or potential enemy or to securedata concerning the meteorological, hydrographic,or geographic characteristics of a particular area orenemy.� Dealing with Indigenous Forces: Any

action dealing with native military forces in a joint/symbiotic (cooperative) manner.� Dealing with casualties: The timely

evacuation and treatment of combatants andnoncombatants, friendly, enemy and indigenous.� Rules of Engagement: Directives issued

by competent military authority which delineatesthe circumstances and limitations under whichUnited States forces will initiate and/or continuecombat engagement with other forces encountered.� Initiative: The ability to set or change

the terms of battle; implies an offensive spirit.� Combined Arms: The synchronized or

simultaneous application of several arms, such asInfantry, Armor, and Field Artillery, to achieve aneffect on the enemy that is greater than if each armwas used on the enemy in sequence.� U. S. Army Values: Loyalty, Duty, Respect,

Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and PersonalCourage.

We are looking for “ground truth” accounts andobservations as seen and told by infantrymen. Thereis no specific format for these, but we request thatany written products submitted include some briefbackground on the situation, the identity of the author/s, and the unit at the time of the action. In additionto printed accounts it may be necessary for us todirectly contact individuals submitting material forconsideration, in order to clarify facts or gain furtherinformation. Materials currently under considerationvary in length from one to several pages, and describea variety of actions ranging from individual actions,to battalion and brigade level engagements.

For more information, contact David S. Stieghanat (706)545-4290/6278, DSN 835-4290/6278 or viae-mail at [email protected].

Technology that has beenavailable on Soldiers’ vehicles sincethe early ’90s is now being designedinto a portable device.

The Force XXI Battle CommandBrigade and Below Commander’sDigital Assistant, known as theFBCB2-CDA, can be used all over thebattlefield to track Soldiers, map thebattlefield, and send digital messages.

“A unit with the XVIII AirborneCorps is currently training with thelatest generation of the device,” saidLieutenant Colonel David Gallop,product manager for Land Warrior.“They will deploy in the fall withabout 1,000 devices to gatherinformation on insurgents.”

User evaluations from this use inthe field will be used to makeadjustments and develop the nextgeneration of the device, which willbecome common software for all landforces within the Department ofDefense.

“Until recently there was nopowerful, affordable and portableprocessing abilities available,” saidGallop. “This new technology puts battlecommand in the Soldier’s hand.”

The device is a portable, ruggedizeddigital information system designed togive commanders, leaders, and Soldiersacross the battlefield improvedcommand and control capabilities, datasharing, and enhanced situationalawareness.

The lightweight, handheld deviceoperates on an Intel X-scale 500+ MHzprocessor and uses satellites that enableover-the-horizon communications, anintegrated global positioning system andBlue Force Tracking to map thebattlefield. Each device is networked sothat all Soldiers are working off the sameinformation.

Soldiers use drop-down menus on acolor, LCD touch screen operating on aMicrosoft Windows system for compactdevices to use the many features of the

device. These features include sendingdigital and voice messages and reports,requesting support at specific locations,mapping the area with locations offriendly forces, and using informationprovided by other Soldiers in thesystem to plan movements andoperations.

The device also has the capabilityto be cleared quickly by the Soldier orremotely to protect operational securityin case it falls into enemy hands.

“The device allows Soldiers to getmessages across with speed andprecision. It helps cut through the fogof war,” said Gallop.

The FBCB2-CDA enables Soldiersall over the battlefield to share and viewinformation that is linked to showrelationships without filtering anythingout, constructing an overall picture ofthe battlefield. For example, a Soldierspots a sniper in his area. The locationof the enemy can be entered into theCDA where it is immediately accessibleto all Soldiers with the device. OtherSoldiers now know to be aware of theenemy in that location and can plan toavoid the area, or eliminate the threat.

JENNIFER SOWELL, ARMY NEWS SERVICE

Handheld Digital AssistantsHit Battlefield

Jennifer Sowell

The FBCB2-CDA can be used all over thebattlefield to track Soldiers, map the battlefield,and send digital messages.

2-29 Infantry CreatesCombat Leader’s Course

On March 23, 2003, Iraqi forces killed or captured 17 membersof the 507th Maintenance Company in a hasty ambush after partof the company was separated from the main body of the air defenseartillery battalion they were tasked to support. The results of theensuing investigation led Army leaders to the conclusion that weneed to improve on training all Soldiers in basic infantry skillsthrough a focus on the new 40 Warrior Tasks and nine WarriorDrills, thus inculcating the Warrior Ethos across the force,regardless of military occupational speciality (MOS).

It was determined that the best way to indoctrinate youngSoldiers with the Warrior Ethos and train them on infantryskills was to incorporate the “40 and 9” into Initial EntryTraining for combat support (CS) and combat service support(CSS) MOSs. In order to do this, the drill sergeants chargedwith training our new Soldiers must first be proficient at thesetasks. With that in mind, the 2nd Battalion, 29th InfantryRegiment at Fort Benning was charged with developing a courseto train CS and CSS drill instructors on infantry skills usingthese new tasks and drills as the vehicle. The result was theformulation of the Combat Leader’s Course (CLC). The firstthree-week long pilot course was run in March 2004, withmixed results. All agreed that the “40 and 9” were to remainthe pillar of the course. During this first pilot, there were 62students consisting of NCOs from Fort Jackson, Fort Sill, FortLeonard Wood, Fort Knox, Fort Benning, and ROTC CadetCommand. The course concluded with a culminating exercisethat included a convoy reacting to improvised explosive devices.This first pilot identified that students needed more training insmall unit tactics, individual tasks, field craft, and land navigation.We also determined that the course should include more field time

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARK L. EDMONDS

and all pertinent tasks could be accomplished in 13 days ofcontinuous training.

After incorporating lessons learned from the first pilot, a secondpilot was conducted, again using predominantly CS and CSS drillinstructors. During this pilot, the cadre incorporated squadintegrity with rotating leadership responsibilities. This servedto build esprit de corps and facilitated the development andrehearsal of squad SOPs. The significant change was that thestudents spent more than 85 percent of their time in the fieldwhich enhanced the training in both tasks and field craft.Additionally, a day and night battle march and shoot utilizinga majority of Advanced Infantry Marksmanship Strategies andStandards (AIMSS) equipment was incorporated. As in thefirst pilot, the culminating event was a convoy live-fire exercisewhich enabled the students to utilize the SOPs and WarriorDrills they had been taught.

As we move forward to validate the program of instruction(POI) developed by the Infantry School, we’re incorporating alllessons learned and field feedback as we execute the third andfinal CLC pilot 12-24 September 04. The terminal learningobjective of which is “to provide NCO’s serving in a BCTassignment the requisite skills to implement the warrior ETHOSinto their IET Platoons.” The first of 10 scheduled courses is inNovember, and will serve to meet the Army Chief of Staff’s intentthat every Soldier is a Warrior; and that begins in Initial EntryTraining.

By first training the trainers (BCT drill instructors), who thentrain the BCT Soldiers, the result will be Soldiers arriving totheir first assignment with the requisite training and skills of the40 Warrior Tasks and nine Warrior Drills.

The U.S. Army is looking forhighly motivated Soldiers,

Marines, Sailors, and Airmento fill its warrant officerranks. Positions are open in all 45

specialties if you qualify. Applicants withless than 12 years active federal service

(AFS) are encouraged to apply.For more information and all forms/

documents required, visitwww.usarec.army.mil/warrant

or call (DSN) 536-0328/0466/0271.

WARRANT OFFICERS

NEEDED

Donovan Research Library PlacesStudent Papers on Web

During your assignments at FortBenning, do you remember readingAARs, command diaries, and firsthandbattle accounts at the Donovan ResearchLibrary? The library, which is locatedin Infantry Hall, is currently in the midstof transitioning its massive 10,000-pluscollection of student papers to digitalformat.

This collection includes after actionreports, command diaries, case studies,battle accounts, and first handexperiences from U.S. Army personnel

during World War I, World War II, theKorean War, the Vietnam War and otherconflicts following 1980.

It represents the intellectual talent ofresearch and education that Soldiersreceive from the faculty and staff at theU.S. Army Infantry School and itsdivisions. Prior to this effort, thesematerials were only accessible throughon-site visits.

The collection is available online atwww.infantry.army.mil/donovan/content/monograph.htm.



Sublist 1 — For Cadets, Soldiers,and Junior NCOs

� The Constitution of the United States— Available at www.house.gov/Constitution/Constitution.html� Centuries of Service: The U.S. Army

1775–2004 — David W. Hogan, Jr.(CMH Pub. 70–71–1) Available at

www.army.mil/cmh/books/COS/index.htm� The Face of Battle — John Keegan� For the Common Defense: A

Military History of the United States ofAmerica — Allan R. Millett and PeterMaslowski� Band of Brothers: E Company,

506th Regiment, 101st Airborne fromNormandy to Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest —Stephen E. Ambrose� We Were Soldiers Once … and

Young: Ia Drang — The Battle ThatChanged the War in Vietnam — LTG(Retired) Harold G. Moore and Joseph L.Galloway� If You Survive: From Normandy to

the Battle of the Bulge to the End of WorldWar II, One American Officer’s RivetingTrue Story — George Wilson� Touched with Fire: The Land War

in the South Pacific — Eric M.Bergerud� Closing with the Enemy: How GIs

Fought the War in Europe, 1944–1945 —Michael D. Doubler� Patton: A Genius for War — Carlo

D’Este� In the Company of Heroes —

Michael J. Durant

Sublist 2 — For Company-GradeOfficers, WO1-CW3, and CompanyCadre NCOs

� America’s First Battles: 1776–1965— Edited by Charles E. Heller and WilliamA. Stofft� Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant

— Ulysses S. Grant� The Philippine War, 1899–1902 —

Brian McAllister Linn� The War To End All Wars: The

American Military Experience in World WarI — Edward M.Coffman� An Army at Dawn: The War in Africa,

1942–1943, Volume One of the LiberationTrilogy — Rick Atkinson� Company Commander — Charles B.

MacDonald� East of Chosin: Entrapment and

Breakout in Korea, 1950 — Roy E. Appleman� Leadership: The Warrior’s Art —

Christopher Kolenda� American Soldiers: Ground Combat

in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam —Peter S. Kindsvatter� The Challenge of Command: Reading

for Military Excellence, Art of CommandSeries — Roger Nye� The New Face of War: How War Will

Be Fought in the 21st Century — BruceBerkowitz

Sublist 3— For Field-Grade Officers,CW4-CW5, and Senior NCOs

� National Security Strategy of the UnitedStates of America — Available atwww.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf� National Strategy for Combating

Terrorism — Available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/strategy� Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of

Terror — Rohan Gunaratna� Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War

Era — James McPherson� Supplying War: Logistics from

Wallenstein to Patton — Martin Van Creveld� George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman

of the American Century — Mark A. Stoler� The General’s War: The Inside Story

of the Conflict in the Gulf — Michael R.Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor� On Becoming a Leader — Warren

Bennis� On War — Carl von Clausewitz, Edited

and Translated by Michael Howard and PeterParet

� The Art of War — Sun Tzu,Translated by Samuel Griffith� Masters of War: Classical Strategic

Thought, 3rd Edition — Michael I. Handel� The Soldier and the State: The

Theory and Politics of Civil-MilitaryRelations — Samuel Huntington� The Future of the Army Profession

— Don Snider and Gayle Watkins, ProjectDirectors

Sublist 4 — For Senior Leadersabove Brigade Level

� Thinking in Time — Richard E.Neustadt and Ernest May� The Clash of Civilizations and the

Remaking of World Order — SamuelHuntington� The Lexus and the Olive Tree:

Understanding Globalization — ThomasFriedman� War in European History —

Michael Howard� Makers of Modern Strategy: From

Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age — Editedby Peter Paret� The Making of Strategy: Rulers,

States, and War — Edited by WilliamsonMurray, MacGregor Knox, and AlvinBerstein� The Peloponnesian War — Donald

Kagan� Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon

Johnson, Robert McNamara, the JointChiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led toVietnam — H. R. McMaster� Victory on the Potomac — James

R. Locher III� The Dynamics of Military

Revolution, 1300–2050 — Edited byMacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray� The Challenge of Change: Military

Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941— Edited by Harold R. Winton and DavidR. Mets� Transformation under Fire:

Revolutionizing How America Fights —Douglas A. Macgregor

CSA REVEALS UPDATED

PROFESSIONAL READING LIST“The Professional Reading List is a way for leaders at all levels to increase their understanding of our Army’s history, the

global strategic context, and the enduring lessons of war. The topics and time periods included in the books on this list areexpansive and are intended to broaden each leader’s knowledge and confidence. I challenge all leaders to make a focused,personal commitment to read, reflect, and learn about our profession and our world. Through the exercise of our minds, ourArmy will grow stronger.”

— General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army

29TH INFANTRY REGIMENT PAGE


Infantry Company Grade LeaderSuggested Reading List

LieutenantsBlack Hawk Down; A Story of Modern

War — Mark Bowden (1999)Infantry in Battle — Infantry Journal

Inc. Staff (1982 [1934])American Soldiers: Ground Combat in

the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam —Peter Kindsvatter (2003)

Once an Eagle — Anton Myrer (1997)Forgotten Soldier — Guy Sajer (1986)Fields of Fire — James Webb (1985)If You Survive — George Wilson (1987)Mud Soldiers: Life Inside the New

American Army — George C. Wilson (1989)CaptainsToward the Flame: A Memoir of World

War I — Hervey Allen (2003)This Kind of War: A Study in

Unpreparedness — T.R. Fehrenbach (1994).The Mask of Command — John Keegan

(1987)Company Commander — Charles B.

MacDonald (1947)Men Against Fire; The Problem of

Battle Command in Future War — S.L.A.Marshall (1947)

The Defense of Hill 781: An Allegoryof Modern Mechanized Combat — JamesR. McDonough (1988)

We Were Soldiers Once…and Young —Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway(1992)

Attacks — Erwin Rommel (1979)AlternatesOn the Banks of the Suez: An Israeli

General’s Personal Account of the YomKippur War — Avraham Adan (1991)

Citizen Soldiers; The U.S. Army fromthe Normandy Beaches to the Bulge andthe Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944-May 7, 1945 — Stephen Ambrose (1997)

Red Badge of Courage — Stephen Crane(1990). [Available free as an e-book at: http://www.usmchq.com/ebookcategories/fiction2.htm]

Firepower in Limited War — Robert H.Scales (1995)

The Killer Angels — Michael Shaara(1974)

U.S. ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL

RECOMMENDED READINGCommand Sergeant Major’s Infantry

NCO Suggested Reading List

BNCOC Reading ListBand of Brothers: E Company, 506th

Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandyto Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest — Stephen E.Ambrose (1992)

A Short History of the NCO — L. R.Arms (1989)

Black Hawk Down: A Story of ModernWar — Mark Bowden (1999)

To Hell and Back — Audie Murphy(1983)

ANCOC Reading ListCitizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from

the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge tothe Surrender of Germany June 7, 1944-May 7, 1945 — Stephen E. Ambrose (1997)

G Company’s War; Two PersonalAccounts of the Campaigns in Europe, 1944-1945 — Bruce E. Egger and Lee MacMillanOtts. Edited and with commentary by PaulRoley (1992)

Guardians of the Republic: A Historyof the Noncommissioned Officer Corpsof the U.S. Army — Ernest F. Fisher, Jr.(1994)

We Were Soldiers Once … and Young— Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway(1992)

Forgotten Soldier — Guy Sajer (1986)AlternatesThrough the Wheat; A Novel of the

World War I Marines — Thomas Boyd(2000)

Soldiering: The Civil War Diary of RiceC. Bull, 123rd New York Volunteer Infantry— Rice C. Bull (1977)

A Doughboy with the Fighting Sixty-Ninth: A Remembrance of World War I— Albert Ettinger (1992)

The GI’s War: The Story of AmericanSoldiers in Europe in World War II —Edwin P. Hoyt (1988)

The G.I.: The American Soldier in WorldWar II — Lee B. Kennett (1987)

The Diary of Alvin York — Alvin C.York. Online version of York’s World War Idiary with official reports and affidavits isavailable at www.acacia.pair.com/Acacia.Vignettes/the.Diary.of.Alvin.York.html

eArmyU GoesArmywide

Beginning October 1, access to theArmy Continuing Education System’seArmyU program will be available tomost active-duty enlisted Soldiers.

The Army launched eArmyU in2001, to offer eligible enlisted Soldiersthe opportunity to work toward acollege degree or certificate online.The program began with selectedinstallations and so far, more than46,000 Soldiers have taken coursesfrom 29 institutions.

With the program’s expansion tothe entire Army, the eArmyU“Technology Pack” or “laptop” optionwill be offered solely as a retention andreadiness tool in support of ArmyTransformation and the ArmyCampaign Plan, officials said, byencouraging reenlistment into combatforces/operational units.

The eArmyU “no laptop”enrollment, now called “eCourseenrollment,” will be offered to themajority of other active-duty Soldiers,officials said.

With eCourse enrollment, Soldiersuse their personal computers toparticipate in the program on a course-by-course basis. There is no longer aservice-remaining requirement withthe eCourse option, officials said.However, they said Soldiers must havesufficient remaining time in service tocomplete the eArmyU course in whichthey are enrolling.

The Army-wide expansion of theprogram comes with some criticalchanges in Soldier enrollmenteligibility, officials said.

Enrollment in eArmyU’s “laptop”option (referred to as TechnologyPackage) will be limited only toSoldiers who reenlist for assignmentin a combat forces/operational unit.

To find out more about the Army-wide expansion, visit any installation’sEducation Center.

General information can also befound at www.earmyu.com or bycalling the eArmyU Help Desk at 1-800-817-9990.

“Not for the Weak or Fainthearted”These words that are emblazoned on the

front sign of Camp Rogers are one of thefirst things newly arrived students see asthey enter the gates. Ranger School can’tbe fully recognized until it is experienced.

Ask any qualified Ranger and they willprobably tell you many underestimate whatis needed to get through just the first week.More than 60 percent of all Rangers thatfail Ranger School fail in the first week.We have a maximum student load of 250students, but we take up to 330 because weknow statistically that we will lose almostone-third of the class in the “RangerAssessment Phase” (RAP week).

RAP week events are not too difficultby themselves, but when you put them alltogether it is like a mini-Best Rangercompetition.

RAP week events that must be passedare:� PT test * (70 percent standards

plus 6 chin-ups)

� Swim test* (15m swim, 15m blinddrop, equipment removal)� 5-mile run (8 min per mile / 40

min total)� Land navigation* (5 out of 6

points needed)� 2.5-mile buddy run (with boots /

equip)� Ranger Stakes*

� 14.5-mile road march (with 65 to75 pounds total equip)

*Retests provided. (You don’t want reteston any of these events because that is energyyou may not have for other events.)

Other events conducted during this weekinclude: water confidence training, Malvestiobstacle course, 17 hours of hand-to-handand rifle bayonet training, pugil stickfighting, airborne refresher training andjump, prepping of gear, initial leadershipclasses, patrolling classes, and a lot ofrunning and retesting.

Perhaps the most shocking thing for

RANGER NOTES

Highest Attrition Occurs in First Week of Ranger SchoolCOMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DOUGLAS M. GREENWAY

most new Rangers is working 20-hour daysnonstop for 61 days — the full length ofthe course without recycle. (The exceptionis an 8-hour break every three weeks ifdeserved. It has to be earned.) Getting norest that first week makes many give in.

Food is the other condition that canbreak a Soldier’s spirit. Rangers get threesquare meals a day and only two out in thefield, but the average “Joe” before RangerSchool isn’t used to working 20-hour days.Many Rangers may also be used to eatingjunk food and other snacks in betweenmeals before they began this course. Theyaren’t going to get snacks for a long time.You can bet they are burning up everythingthey are eating and more. The fact is RangerSchool is a great weight loss program. Ifyou take a look at a graduating class, allyou will see are fit, focused machines thatwould kill for a slice of pizza.

Attrition has always been an issue atRanger School. Since its inception in 1950,each class typically loses about 50 percentof the students for one reason or another.



The figures above show where mostRangers fall out of the Ranger course.Figure 1 shows where most students failedduring classes from June 2002 to June2004. RAP causes the most attrition, andthen the rest is split up somewhat evenlyby medical, other, and administrative oracademic (patrols /peers) reasons.

Figure 2 is a breakdown of what eventscaused the most failures during RAP week.Usually 60 percent or more of each classwill fail in one or more of these events.

The best source for success in the Rangercourse is to put all future Rangercandidates through a “Pre-Ranger”course. Those courses tend to put muchof the same vigor into a three-weekpackage that Ranger School has andsometimes more. By attending a pre-Ranger course, students have a muchhigher chance of success. The pre-Ranger course may not only save theindividual from recycle, it will alsodetermine if the Soldier has the desire and

attitude to endure the course. This not onlysaves slots but also money.

The Ranger course tests the mettle andsoul of a man’s character. When you thinkyou are finished and can’t go on any further,you will have to find the will to go on. Youwill find that “can’t” or “quit” will not bepart of your vocabulary. The Ranger coursesets you apart from those that “could not.”So don’t waste your time if you are weakor fainthearted.

Rangers are men that “Can!”

Figure 1 Figure 2

Items of InterestNomad Helmet Mounted DisplayGiving leaders “out the hatch” situational

awareness, the Nomad Helmet MountedDisplay (HMD) by Microvision allows tank/vehicle commanders and other leaders accessto the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade andBelow (FBCB2) system and other vehicledisplays without having to leave their hatchposition to move inside the vehicle in order to view the displays.

The device provides electronic information that is visible underall lighting conditions while also being see-through.

About 100 Nomad HMD units were used by the 3rd Brigade,2nd Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team) in Iraq. Overthe past two years, the display has also undergone field trials at theNational Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and Joint ReadinessTraining Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, with the 3-2 SBCT as wellas the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (SBCT).

The systems used by the 3-2 (SBCT) consist of a display moduleattached to the helmet and a video control module mounted to thevehicle with a cable connected to the FBCB2 system. The systemsin use by the 1-25 (SBCT) have been upgraded to provide theability to switch between the FBCB2, thermal weapon display,

and thermal driver’s display. Additional developments andimprovements to the HMD display systems are forthcoming.

CamelBak CBR 4.0 Chem-Bio ReservoirCamelBak® Products, LLC., recently announced the availability

of its CBR 4.0, Chem-Bio Reservoir system to supply constantaccess to safe, clean water to personnel operating in hazardouschemical and biological environments.

The CBR 4.0, already operational in combat situations withU.S. Special Forces, was thoroughly field-tested at Fort Polk’sJoint Readiness Training Center. CamelBak’s CBR 4.0 representsmore than five years of research and development that anticipated

an increasing demand for hydration systems strongenough to survive the rigorous demands of combat

use in chem-bio environments.The CBR 4.0 fits into most CamelBak

Maximum Gear hydration systems and iscompatible with standard protective maskfittings used by military, first responders, and

security personnel. The CBR 4.0 is proven towithstand exposure to hazardous toxins such as sarinnerve and mustard blister agents as well as Anthrax.

“See First” means answering information requirements. Thecentral element of the SBCT (as well as all of our newly designedbrigades) is the change in how we make contact with our enemy.Although we have conceptualized for years about the potential ofseeing the enemy from a distance and therefore turning old stylemovement to contact missions into deliberate attacks with nowasted organizational energy, we may now be on the verge ofhaving that capability.

In the past, our doctrine focused on the step-wise process offirst making contact, developing the situation, and thenmaneuvering our forces. The SBCT, however, is based ondeveloping the situation out of contact and building an earlyunderstanding of that situation, moving the forces necessary, thenmaking contact on our terms and finishing decisively. In effect,we are attempting to turn all attacks into deliberate attacks wherewe know the enemy’s strengths, disposition and composition, andmost importantly his weaknesses prior to our main body crossingthe line of departure.

The key SBCT task is to acquire information, transform theinformation into intelligence, and finally to transform theintelligence into situation understanding before we beginmovement and/or maneuver of the main body. This is a toughtask requiring a highly trained and skilled Intelligence,Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) planning staff. Theinternal ISR, based primarily on input from the reconnaissancesquadron, organic scout platoons, and the external ISR, based onintelligence feeds from higher directly to the organic militaryintelligence (MI) company, contribute to the commander’s abilityto visualize, describe, and direct forces as required. In essence,SBCTs have the organic resources available (as well as the organicability to pull external information) to see and shape the enemyprior to the execution of decisive operations and in effectattempting to turn all attacks into deliberate attacks.

In the past, a common “baseline” used to determine thedifference between a deliberate attack and a movement to contactwas knowledge of 70 percent of the enemy disposition and

composition. If we had 70 percent or greater knowledge, wepresumed ourselves to be planning for and conducting a deliberateattack. Conversely, if we had less than 70 percent we consideredourselves conducting a movement to contact and plannedaccordingly. Our reconnaissance success or failure thendetermined what our movement rates, formations, and movementtechniques were going to be as well as our probable line of contactand when we would transition from movement to maneuver. Withan entire squadron devoted to seeing the enemy and pulling themain force into decisive maneuver, coupled with the ability topull critical information from higher on an as needed basis, wemay be closer than ever to realizing this concept.

The creation of the SBCT reconnaissance squadron solves manyexisting intelligence collection challenges. The enhanced abilityto focus collection efforts and rapidly share intelligence supportsthe commander’s ability to plan, prepare, and execute withoutlosing energy and momentum during operations. Informationtechnology enables commanders and their staffs to obtainunprecedented common operational pictures and to plan andexecute follow-on missions in the midst of a current operation.

Perhaps the most significant change in the SBCT formation isthe preponderance of intelligence and surveillance assets.Commanders have long recognized the need for organicreconnaissance capabilities at the brigade level. Doctrine continuesto task brigades with planning and conducting ISR operations togain information about the enemy. The creation of the SBCTorganization with a reconnaissance squadron and militaryintelligence company gives SBCT commanders unprecedentedsituational awareness and situational understanding — hallmarksof SBCT operations.

One of the challenges for the SBCT commanders and staff isdeveloping standard procedures as part of the military decision-making process (MDMP). A recommended part of the process isthe ISR huddle. The SBCT receives warning orders and beginsinitial movement of reconnaissance forces in preparation ofupcoming operations. Knowing what the ISR huddle is, its intent,the format and who should be in the huddle is important for officersand NCOs bound for SBCTs. The huddle is a meeting with all ofthe key players physically co-located.

The Pre-operation ISR HuddleThe ISR huddle is a proven technique for quickly beginning

ISR synchronization. It can occur as early as receipt of the missionfrom higher headquarters, or as late as the conclusion of the formal


Huddle Begins ISR SynchronizationLIEUTENANT COLONEL J.R. SANDERSON

MAJOR JEROME T. SIBAYAN

TSM STRYKER/BRADLEYCORNER

Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Sanderson, chief of the StrykerBrigade Combat Team (SBCT) Transformation Team, leads ateam of seven officers at Fort Benning and eight officers andNCOs located at four TRADOC Forward Cells focused oncoordinating, synchronizing and supervising doctrinal, training,organizational and leader development events associated withthe transformation of all SBCTs.


mission analysis brief. It is variable andMETT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troopsand time available, civilians) dependant.In a time constrained or fast developingsituation, the huddle will go as early as thecommander has enough information to giveadequate guidance. The key determinantin deciding when to execute the huddle isthe type and amount of intelligencepreparation of the battlefield (IPB) productsdeveloped by the staff from division orhigher level warning orders. A trained staffwill know what products the commanderneeds and when he needs them in theprocess. Most commanders will need as aminimum some key IPB products prior toinitiation of the huddle. An example of thisis the event template that will includepotential movement times as well as initialnamed areas of interest (NAI) and otherNAIs (or other recon objectives) tasked byhigher headquarters. During the huddle,the SBCT commander can also begin todetermine his initial commander’s criticalinformation requirements (CCIR).Although this will be thoroughly staffedthroughout the decision-making process, aninitial cut on CCIR based upon hisexperience will greatly enhance the planningprocess and focus the staff planning.

The commander’s initial integrationconcern will be priority intelligencerequirements (PIR). He must have a clearunderstanding of what he knows andconversely does not know about the enemy.By prioritizing those things he does notknow, he has provided focus for not onlyhis staff but also for his recon squadron andMI company. By conducting this huddlewith key leaders including the reconsquadron commander and possibly the MIcompany commander, the SBCTcommander begins immediate integrationof his key ISR players and his staff.

Additional benefits of this “huddle”include:� An immediate assessment of the

mission by the two most experienced ISRcommanders,� An immediate assessment of the

limitations and constraints of the upcomingmission with regards to reconnaissance aswell as an assessment on the prioritiesplaced upon known NAIs based upon theinitial IPB products, and� An initial synchronization of joint

and organic fires available to the SBCT and

the recon squadron.Getting the proper “stance” in terms of

terrain management as well as movementsequence out of the area prior to continuingthe mission. This is especially significantfor the initial positioning of organic firesassets in order to provide immediatesupport for all elements within the SBCT.

The huddle also serves as the initiationof movement of the reconnaissance forces.This provides an additional measure offorce protection to the SBCT by expandingthe SBCT battlespace. It also begins toprovide the SBCT main body withtrafficability analysis data before the mainbody begins movement. This allows forparallel and collaborative planning at boththe SBCT and recon squadron level.

In order for the ISR planning staff aswell as the recon squadron and MI companyto successfully meet the brigadecommander’s intent, the commanders andstaff must first have an understanding ofhow the collected intelligence informationwill be used to develop the brigade’s planand to facilitate execution. Both the SBCTISR planning staff and the recon squadronleadership must understand the threedoctrinal concepts of employing thesquadron. As with all terms used in ourdoctrinal language, these conceptual termshave precise meanings and all involvedmust have a thorough and comprehensiveunderstanding of the terms in order tofacilitate execution. Although we have usedthese conceptual terms in the past, this is

the first time they are formally written inour doctrine. ISR planners and executorsmust all have a common understanding ofthe terms and their meanings in order tomeet the SBCT commander’s intent.According to FM 3-20.96, a cavalrysquadron (reconnaissance, surveillance,and target acquisition) identifies thereconnaissance purposes for employmentas — Reconnaissance Push, CommandPush, and Reconnaissance Pull.

Reconnaissance Push — The reconsquadron is deployed early in the planningprocess. The brigade staff uses theintelligence information collected todevelop the plan. This purpose requires thebrigade staff to develop facts andassumptions on the threat early enough tofocus the squadron’s effort. These facts andassumptions are generally based on threattemplates, predictive analysis, and athorough IPB. As the squadron confirmsor denies these facts and assumptions, theinformation is reported back to thesquadron staff, analyzed, and disseminatedthroughout the brigade and to the brigadestaff in order to complete the plan.Reconnaissance push requires the brigadeto develop a detailed ISR plan prior to theplanning of the brigade’s (main body)mission. The information must be gathered,analyzed, and reported in a timely mannerin order to influence the brigade’s planningprocess. The result of reconnaissance pushoperations is a detailed plan, based onreliable intelligence, for the employment

U.S. Army photo

The creation of the SBCT organization with a reconnaissance squadron and militaryintelligence company gives SBCT commanders unprecedented situational awareness andsituational understanding — hallmarks of SBCT operations.


of the brigade. To be successful in a time-constrained environment,the staffs must dedicate enough time on ISR planning, and thenuse the intelligence information collected to develop or adjusttheir initial plan.

Command Push — This purpose is similar to reconnaissancepush in that collected information is used to develop the brigade’splan. The difference is that the brigade staff develops several detailedcourses of action (COAs) before the squadron deploys. The SBCTstaff must also develop a detailed ISR plan, but the ISR plan is moredirective in nature with associated recon NAIs and objectives thatdirectly support the SBCT maneuver COAs. The recon squadron isdeployed to gather detailed information based on the brigadecommander’s PIR. The brigade commander uses the information toselect the appropriate COA — massing the brigade’s strengths againstthe threat’s weaknesses. This method also results in a detailed plan,based on reliable intelligence, for the employment of brigade.

Reconnaissance Pull — The brigade staff develops a flexibleplan, based on several possible COAs, driven by the brigadecommander’s intent. In order to execute reconnaissance pull, thecommander must ensure that all subordinates truly understandhis intent for the operation as this type of operation calls fordecentralized, but synchronized and integrated execution. The planmust allow for maximum flexibility as the squadron conductsreconnaissance and continually “pulls” the brigade’s main bodyto a position of advantage against identified threat weaknesses.The brigade commander uses a series of decision points, based onthe level of SU, to maneuver the brigade. This method does notalleviate the squadron commander and staff from planningreconnaissance operations. They must still focus thereconnaissance effort by providing the troops with reconnaissanceobjectives. The result of the planning process is a flexible plan,based on decision points, that allows the brigade commander tomaneuver the brigade based on information/intelligence collectedby the squadron and ISR assets in the brigade.

The objective of reconnaissance pull is to find weaknesses inthreat dispositions that can be exploited by the main body. Therecon squadron and other ISR assets are deployed over a broadarea of operations (AO), which allows them to identify threatweaknesses to exploit and threat strengths to avoid.Reconnaissance determines which routes are suitable formaneuver, where the threat is strong and weak, and where gapsexist. Thus, reconnaissance should pull the main body towardand along the path of least resistance. Once these have beenidentified, the SBCT commander exploits the situation by choosinga COA that allows his decisive operation to attack the threat’sweaknesses and penetrate gaps in the threat’s defense. He thencommits forces to widen the gap and envelop the threat. The reconsquadron and other ISR assets continue to move, avoiding threatstrengths and “pulling” the SBCT deep into the threat’s AO.

Reconnaissance pull is also valid in defensive operations.Reconnaissance determines which routes the threat is using, wherethe threat is weak, and where gaps exist. Thus, reconnaissanceenhances agility by identifying opportunities and pulling the SBCTalong the path of least resistance to mass SBCT effects at thecritical time and place.

It is easy to see that assumptions made early during an operationwill have significant second and third order effects on thecommitment of the main body of the SBCT and the outcome of

the operation. Having the right leaders in the ISR huddle isimportant to leveraging the full capabilities of the SBCT. Thebrigade commander will designate an ISR planning team, led bythe brigade XO, which includes (at a minimum) representativesfrom the S2, S3, S4, S5 (civil affairs [when assigned]), and S6(signal) sections; fire/effects coordination cell (FECC); Armyairspace command and control (A2C2) cell; the reconnaissancesquadron commander, XO, S3, or designated representatives; andthe supporting MI company commander or XO. A key contributionof the recon squadron commander and staff to the brigade ISRplanning is knowledge of what squadron intelligence assets (i.e.,sensors) are available as well as their capabilities/limitations inacquiring needed intelligence.

ISR planning and execution are tough, challenging events. ISRis not a “come as you are” party. It must be trained and retrainedwith commanders and staff gaining an appreciation for theimportance of the art and science of conducting the huddle. Thehuddle must become a team drill with subordinate commandersand staff efficiently and accurately understanding the SBCTcommander’s intent and quickly turn that intent into an executablereconnaissance operation. The end of the huddle (regardless ofwhether we conduct it prior to or after the mission analysis brief)signals the start of the ISR operation and platforms such as FBCB2will allow the commanders and staff to continue to synchronizeand coordinate the fight for information.

The goal of “See First” is to set the conditions for deliberateattacks. It is easy to argue that once either visual contact or directfire contact is initiated, the enemy (who always has a vote) willreposition, thus placing the entire operation back into themovement to contact venue vice a deliberate attack. As with allcombat operations, a thorough rehearsal coupled with adequatebranch plans that are deep enough to cover the BLUFOR basicscheme of maneuver and fire distribution and control schematicwill, as a minimum, allow BLUFOR to retain the tacticaladvantage.

ISR planning and execution are tough. ISR consistentlychallenges staff planning, coordination, and execution abilities.More often than not, when we fail in combat training center (CTC)rotational missions, there is a direct correlation to our lack ofreconnaissance. The additional burden on staffs is that ISR isnever ending; it is a continuous process requiring our fullestcollective attention. Many staffs enjoy the thought of going tosleep once they have completed the orders process. This usuallyresults in the opposing force (OPFOR) or enemy commanderfighting your chemical officer who is the night battle captain inthe tactical operations center (TOC); therefore it is imperativethat we not stop the process after we produce the order but continueto monitor, supervise, and execute ISR operations. ISR planningand execution requires significant training and we only get out ofit what we put in … train recon as it will provide a significantpayoff in combat operations. Good luck in your recon.

TSM STRYKER/BRADLEY CORNER

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey R. Sanderson is currently serving as chiefof the SBCT Transformation Team at Fort Benning, Georgia. His lastassignment was commander of the 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment ofthe 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized).

Major Jerome T. Sibayan is currently serving as the doctrine officer ofthe SBCT Transformation Team. His previous assignments include servingwith the 3rd Armored Division and 1st Cavalry Division.

Soldiers continue to be our most deployed systemduring this Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).As such, we must ensure Soldiers deploying into

harm’s way are properly equipped and trained for themissions they must execute. To accomplish this, theArmy has embraced the Soldier as a System (SaaS)integration concept and management strategy to ensureSoldier modernization. SaaS includes everything worn,carried, or consumed by the Soldier to include man-portable crew-served weapons and unit radios. TheSoldier as a System program is recognized as the mostimportant Soldier modernization effort in the U.S. Army’sTraining and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

Today, more than 300 separate requirement documentsdrive the acquisition process for Soldier equipment. Thisis a sharp contrast to the current acquisition of majorweapons systems. In July 2003, General Kevin P. Byrnes,the commanding general of TRADOC, directed a seriesof briefings to get his arms around Soldierrequirements. The SaaS Integrated Concept Team(ICT) is depicted in Figure 1 and is comprised of representativesfrom Army organizations and sister services. The SaaS ICTprepared a series of briefings to the TRADOC commander resultingin the consolidation of Soldier requirements into six Soldier

capability development documents (CDDs) named: Core Soldier,Ground Soldier, Air Soldier, Mounted Soldier, ManeuverSupport Soldier, and Maneuver Sustainment Soldier.

This new process is a paradigm shift from the oldrequirements development process for Soldiermodernization. The Core Soldier CDD captures therequirements for all Soldiers all of the time andestablishes a foundation from which to add uniquespecific requirements for Ground, Air, Mounted,Maneuver Support or Maneuver Sustainment Soldiers.The ICT works through three levels of teams fromaction officer to general officer. Figure 2 depicts therole of the ICT and relationship to the Soldier CDDs.

The SaaS ICT began work to consolidate and alignall current Soldier programs into each of the six CDDs.There are several efficiencies gained by thisconsolidation. First, it ensures that all Soldierrequirements are aligned and integrated. The SaaSICT developed three detailed matrices that achievedthe following efficiencies:

SOLDIER AS A SYSTEMProgram Ensures Soldier Modernization

DAVID J. LIBERSAT

SaaS Management StructureSaaS ICT manages and integrates all Soldier system

capability requirements across DOTMLPFSaaS Tier 1 ICT Chair, CG, USAIC, Fort Benning

TRADOC Futures CenterCG, CAC, Fort LeavenworthCG, USASC, Fort GordonCG, USATC, Fort EustisCG, USATC, Fort JacksonCG, USAIC, Fort HuachucaCG, USAFAC, Fort SillCG, USACASCOM, Fort LeeCG, USAAVNC, Fort RuckerCG, AMEDD, Fort Sam HoustonCG, USAARMC, Fort KnoxCG, USAADAC, Fort BlissCG, MANCEN, Fort Leonard WoodCG, QMS&C, Fort LeeCG, OC&S, APGCG, USASOC, Fort Bragg

Army ReservesNational Guard

Director, IMACG, RDECOM

NatickATEC

PEO SoldierARSTAFFG3/G8/G4

Air ForceUSMC Navy

QuanticoMarine CorpsDevelopment

Center

Level 1 = General Officer Level

Level 2 = COL Level

Level 3 = Key Personnel/Action Officers

Figure 2

Figure 1

SaaS Capability Development Strategy

Core SoldierCDD

GroundSoldier CDD

MountedSoldier CDD

Air SoldierCDD

ManueverSupport

Soldier CDD

ManeuverSustainmentSoldier CDD

Air WarriorORD

MountedWarrior ORD

Land WarriorORD

Unique and/or Specific Capabilities(Must be checked against Core Soldier CDD prior to incorporation into variant CDD

SaaS ICTMetric Functional Areas

(ILITIES)DOTMLPF


� Cross-walked militaryoccupational specialties (MOSs) to keyperformance parameters (KPPs) andattributes across each CDD;� Alignment of Soldier equipment

to KPPs and attributes within each CDD andthereby establishing a proponent lead andconsolidation of Soldier equipment; and� Cross-walked the CDDs against

each other to prevent duplication of effort andto identify capability gaps not yet captured.

A secondary benefit of this approach isthe consolidation of all Soldier equipmentfunding lines. Historically, Soldierprograms competed with each other forfunding in addition to competing with otherweapon systems. This resulted in under-funded Soldier programs and equipment.This new approach makes it more difficultto use Soldier programs as bill payers forother weapon systems or programs. Thegoal of the Soldier as a System approach isto consolidate program management andfunding of the entire system, similar to theacquisition strategies used for the FutureCombat Systems (FCS) and Stryker.

The SaaS ICT is committed to remainconnected to the Operational Army in orderto identify Soldier requirements. Soldierfeedback comes through several mediumsto include direct e-mail from Soldiersdeployed in the area of operation (AO),feedback from Soldier after action reports(AARs), and post-combat surveys fromunits returning from the AO, to name a few.The SaaS ICT validates these requirementsand they are incorporated into one of thesix Soldier CDDs. These requirements andcapabilities are organized in the followingsix domains:

Lethality — The capability to detect,identify, counter, kill — or achieve desiredeffects against selected targets throughoutthe full spectrum of military operations,under all climatic conditions and in alloperational environments.

Survivability — Provision of effectiveprotection, countermeasures andsurvivability in the full spectrum of militaryoperations under all climatic conditions inall operational environments. All Soldiersmust be capable of defending themselveswhile doing their jobs, even if their jobs donot involve direct combat.

Mobility — Enhancement ofmovement, both mounted and dismounted,

maneuvers and performance of individualtasks across the full spectrum of militaryoperations under all climatic conditions inall operational environments. This includesefforts to reduce the Soldier’s load to themaximum extent possible.

Sustainability — The maintenance ofhealthy Soldiers, both physically andmentally, and the provision of equipment thatis reliable and durable, enhances theautonomous ability to sustain effectivenessacross the full spectrum and duration ofmilitary operations. When required,Soldiers must be resupplied under allclimatic conditions and in all environments.This includes all the supplies, services, andmaintenance required for Soldier care, use,or consumption.

Battle Command — An increased abilityto receive, understand, and use informationprovided by the full spectrum of BattleCommand tools and project possibleoutcomes or solutions is required.Improved Battle Command will provide anenhanced knowledge of individual tasksand missions, a more complete picture ofthe battlefield, and the ability for rapidexchange of pertinent information acrossthe full spectrum of military operationsunder all climatic conditions and allenvironments.

Training — Soldier systems mustincorporate an individual and collectivetraining capability that supports live,virtual, and constructive trainingenvironments in the threshold and anembedded individual and collectivetraining capability that supports live,virtual, and constructive trainingenvironments in the future force.

Rapid Fielding InitiativeThe Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)

created another paradigm shift in themanner in which we equip Soldiers.Historically, a Department of the ArmyMaster Prioritization List (DAMPL)prioritized units for fielding of newequipment based on available funding.This created a cascading effect of equippingSoldiers. Soldiers who were the “firstresponders” were equipped first. Overtime, this resulted in a huge gap betweenthe “haves” and “have nots.” This becamea critical issue with the call up of ArmyReserve and National Guard forces insupport of the GWOT. As a result, senior

FY04 TF Soldier ListSoldier Mission Essential Equipment• Black Fleece Bibs• USSOCOM Silk Weight Underwear• Hydration System• Wiley-X Goggles• Glove System• Cold Weather Cap• MOLLE and accessories• AF Desert Flyers Boot• Standard Army Desert Boot• Individual Combat Shelter• Multipurpose Tool• COTS Socks (4 per)• Coolmax/Polormax t-shirts• Combat Belt

Force Protection/Mobility• Advanced Combat Helmet (ACH) andAccessories• MICH Comms Systems and Accessories• ICOM Repair Parts Kits• Knee and Elbow Pads• Haligan Tool• Grappling Hooks• Door Ram• Battle Axe• Fiber Optic Viewer• Quickie Saw and Replacement Blades• Modular Entry Tools• Double Key - Cuff

Lethality• Weapon Light• 249 Rails• 240 Rails• M122/A1 Tripods• Small Binoculars• Viper (VECTOR 21/ Mark Vii)• Shotgun (Lightweight Shotgun System)• Assault Ladder• MBITR• Light Weight GPS• M4/M16 Magazines• M249 Ammo Soft Pack• M240 Combat Ammo Pack

Individual Weapons Optics• Close Combat Optic (M68)• ACOG (TA31F 4X)• Machine Gun Optic (M145)

Figure 3


Army leadership sought ways to expeditethe fielding of Soldier equipment.

The SaaS ICT, in coordination withProgram Executive Office – Soldier (PEO-Soldier) validated Soldier requirementsbased on lessons learned in the AOR.Congressional support in the form ofsupplemental dollars provided the fundingto procure and expedite fielding of Soldierequipment. This process is known as theRapid Fielding Initiative or “RFI.” TheSaaS ICT continues to validate new

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

Basis of Issue FY 05-07Figure 4

Core Soldier recommended issue

requirements and make adjustments to the RFI list as capabilitygaps or new requirements are identified. PEO Soldier coordinatesthe funding, production, and fielding of equipment to our unitsand Soldiers. In total, PEO Soldier will field 840,000 sets ofequipment to the operational Army by the end of FY 07.

There are currently two RFI lists approved. The FY 04 listwill continue to be fielded until the second quarter of FY05 and isdepicted Figure 3. During the second quarter of FY 05, PEOSoldier will begin fielding the RFI list recently approved by theArmy Requirements Oversight Council (AROC). We call this theBasis of Issue FY 05-07 List and this list is described in Figure 4.

Units that have already been fielded RFI will only receive thatwhich was not originally fielded should they be called upon toredeploy. RFI does not field a system. It fields equipment basedon production capability and availability. RFI is an interim solutionto fielding the Soldier as a System. It is the intent of Soldier as aSystem to institutionalize RFI through the approval and fundingof the six Soldier CDDs.

As leaders, we must set expectations for our Soldiers. Properlyequipping Soldiers is a delicate balance between needs and wants.No one wants to tell an operational commander “no.” However,we must acknowledge the second and third order effects causedby the purchase of commercial off-the-shelf technologies to meeta perceived need. The SaaS ICT process, shown in Figure 5,ensures we capture and validate Soldier requirements throughDoctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership andEducation, Personnel, and Facility (DOTMLPF) analysis. Thisprocess helps to distinguish between the need and want.

Soldier requirements are captured through the mediumsidentified on the left of the chart. They are then categorized intocapabilities we call “ilities” found in the left cylinder. The ICTthen evaluates the requirement against the “metric” in the centercylinder. Finally, the capability requirement is aligned with oneof the six Soldier CDDs in the right cylinder. The end result is anintegrated Soldier System.

In closing, the SaaS ICT continues to identify and validateSoldier requirements. Currently, the Core Soldier CDD is atTRADOC for staffing and approval. The Ground Soldier is atHQDA in preparation for Joint Requirements Oversight Council(JROC) approval. The Mounted Soldier ORD was approved bythe Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) and is currentlypending JROC approval. The Air Soldier ORD is JROC approvedand is currently in fielding. The Maneuver Support and SustainmentCDDs are in development. The SaaS ICT anticipates forwardingthese CDDs to TRADOC by first quarter FY 05.

Soldiers are the center piece of our formations and are the mostdeployed system in the Army. We must continue to upgrade andmodernize our Soldiers as we do major weapon systems andplatforms. The Soldier as a System integration concept andmanagement process will ensure that no Soldier goes into harm’sway without the proper equipment.

• Advanced Combat Helmet w/accessories (ACH)• Knee and Elbow Pads• MOLLE Accessories• Ballistic Protection Goggles• Hydration System• Glove System• Cold Weather Cap• Army Combat Boot TemperateWeather (OEF)• Army Combat Boot Hot Weather(OIF)

• COTS Socks (4 Per)• Moisture Wicking t-shirts (4 Per)• Combat Belt• Moisture Wicking Sports Bra (4Per Female)• Emergency Bandage (IsraeliPressure Bandage to replacecurrent bandage)• Interceptor Body Armor*• SAPI Plates*

* Fielded in addition to RFI

Unit recommended issue• MBITR• MICH Communication System• Weapon Light• IR Strobe/Glint Tape• Viper (Vector 21)/Mark VII• One-Handed Tourniquet• Flex Cuffs• Modular Weapon System Kit• Small Binoculars (M24)• Chitosan Dressing (Medics/CLS)• Back-up Iron Sight

• 3-point Sling• Helmet Repair Kit• Improved Cleaning Kit• Modular Accessory ShotgunSystem• Haligan Tool• Grappling Hook• Door Ram• Fiber Optic Viewer• Tactical Assault Ladder• Modular Entry Tool Kit

Selected Soldier recommended issue

• MOLLE Accessories (Grenadier,Medic, Pistol, SAW Gunner)• Close Combat Optic, M68• TA 31F ACOG• Machine Gun Optic, M145• M249 Ammo Soft Pack• M240B Combat Ammo Pack• M249 Rail• M249 Short Barrel• M249 Collapsible Butt Stock• M249 Spare Barrel Bag• M240B Spare Barrel Bag

David J. Libersat is currently employed by SYColeman as the projectofficer for the Soldier as a System program with the U.S. Army InfantrySchool’s Directorate of Combat Developments, Fort Benning, Georgia.Libersat retired from active duty as a command sergeant major in September2000. His last assignment was as the top enlisted Soldier of the U.S. ArmyInfantry School.

• M122A1 Lightweight Tripod• M240B Rail• M203 Day/Night Sight• Night Vision Mono Lock (PVS14)• Improved Spotting Scope w/ Tripod• Improved Butt Stock (M4)• Modular M9 Holster• Forward Grip Bipod• USSOCOM Silk Weight Underwear• Black Fleece Bibs• Black Fleece Jacket

Figure 5


REFLECTIONS OF A

RIFLE PLATOON LEADERFIRST LIEUTENANT RENATO E. ANGELES

The intended purpose of this article is to reflect on mytime as a platoon leader and share some things I wish Ihad known before becoming platoon leader and some of

the things I learned while serving in the position. My intent is toconvey my experience and the lessons I learned that may be ofsome use to others.

There is not a whole lot of literature written about being aplatoon leader. Before taking over the platoon, I hoped to readsome of the experiences of past platoon leaders to provide me aglimpse of some of the challenges and experiences they had, butthere was not a whole lot out there to read. I thought it wasimportant to write about my experience so as to provide someinsight on the personal and professional challenges I had as aplatoon leader. I wanted it to be written in a form that conveyedideas and not a series of one-line catch phrases that were open togeneral interpretation.

TAKING OVER THE PLATOONI was excited to assume duties as a platoon leader (this after all

was my lifelong dream). My excitement was tempered by therealization that I was now in charge of 40 Soldiers. It’s a dauntingtask if you put it into perspective, but that did not diminish myenthusiasm. Leading men into harm’s way to defend and upholdour nation’s will was a challenge I was really looking forward to.

Meeting the platoon for the first time was a thrill (looking at theirfaces and wondering what each man was thinking about me); itgave me the opportunity to let the men know where I came fromand my initial expectations of them. I did not talk too much; itwas a simple meet and greet. I never liked the idea of talking tothe platoon at the onset because it was merely stating the obvious,but I have changed my view on the matter. I now believe that thisis important to do because it is an opportunity to let your Soldiersknow about you, your expectations, and the direction you want totake the platoon. It sets you up for a good transition.

Taking over the platoon initially has its challenges; the bestway to begin is to make an assessment and get to know yourSoldiers. Your commander can provide you some guidance on whatis ahead and from that you can plan for your transition. It mayfeel overwhelming at first, especially if you get in there in themiddle of training that is already in progress and you don’t havetime to transition. The only thing you can do is to observe andapply what you have learned. You will be surprised with what youknow. The Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) and RangerSchool will equip you with the basics — if you paid attention. Donot feel overwhelmed, most of it is just perceived because you arenew. Once you are grounded, you will get the feel for how thingswork.

IMPRESSING THE BOSSI don’t know if I ever truly impressed my company and battalion

commanders. I might not have succeeded at each mission, but I


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

always tried to do my best in every task Iwas given and learned from my successesas well as my failures. I would be ahypocrite if I said I did not want to impressthem, but I thought it was more importantto learn and gain experience than worryabout impressing them constantly. Earningtheir trust was more of my concern thantrying to look good. Impressing the bosswith flattery can only go so far; after a whileyou have to perform.

Doing your best is not enoughsometimes, but it’s a good start. You can’tpossibly know everything, and proficiencycomes with time. Knowledge is learned andgained by experience. As long as you makea conscious effort to learn and get better,your mistakes will be underwritten aslearning curves. I made many mistakes andin the process I learned a great deal. I amfar from perfect, but I am far better than Iwas. Impressing the boss should probablybe the least of your worries. In the end, theonly people you truly have to impress areyour Soldiers. You need to gain theirrespect, which only comes from being ableto lead them.

OBSERVE AND LEARNAny good leader or book on leadership

will tell you to not make any changes untilyou fully understand the situation. Thesame thing applies when you get to a newplatoon. The best thing to do initially is toobserve, absorb, and analyze. Makingsudden changes after beginning your tenureis not a good start. You have not been therelong enough to make any judgment callsyet. Make an assessment of your platoonand its status; on average it takes monthsto get a grip on things.

Observe around you; watch the otherplatoon leaders in the company and learnfrom them. It is great when you establishrapport with the other PLs and pick theirbrains on some of the issues you havequestions on. It also helps if one of themtakes an active interest in getting yougrounded. Sometimes you take over aplatoon with really no transition time withthe outgoing PL. Absorb everything —your time is very limited so try not to wasteit on nonessential things. You have to hitthe ground running. Learn quickly anddigest information that is relevant. Don’twaste time on trying to know every little

thing. Concentrate on what is importantand relevant now.

BE A LEADERA lot is expected out of you. You might

not think so but this is the case. There aresome expectations you have to live up to.You have to lead from the front andestablish your credibility as a leader by youractions. You must conduct yourself with classon and off duty. You don’t have to be a saint,but there is an expectation of you. Like it ornot, you are held to a higher standard.Establish a good working relationship withyour platoon sergeant. Also, get to know yoursquad leaders — some of them have moreyears of experience than you can count onboth hands. As a PL you are expected to lead— remember that. You might meet someresistance initially, but you have to exert yourauthority; it is your platoon. Your platoonsergeant can help you with this if he is atrue professional. I was fortunate enoughto have such.

The platoon takes on the personality ofits leader. If you want to know whichpersonality, just observe your Soldiers —it will become clear to you. Soldiers arelooking at you for leadership; you mustknow and understand that.

DON’T BE AFRAID TO MAKEMISTAKES

It will happen and you are not the first

or last to make one. My experience is thathonest mistakes are pardonable. The bestway to learn is by making mistakes andlearning from them. Don’t allow mistakesto cripple you from making decisions.Remember, it is training until real bulletsstart flying. Training is as much for you asit is for your Soldiers. I have been calledoverly decisive (if there is such a thing),overly excited on the radio when makingreports and just plain John Wayne at times,but that has not stopped me from learningand making hard decisions. It is better tomake mistakes now and learn from themthan make them later when lives are on theline. However, make no mistake aboutsafety. Safety is always paramount; nothingyou do in training is worth loosing life,limb, or sight. Not knowing is not an excuseas a leader. Remember that your jobencompasses all that the platoon does orfails to do. Always do your best and learnfrom your experiences.

LIVE A LITTLEDon’t take yourself too seriously; humor

can make life more bearable. Spend sometime getting to know each and every Soldierin the platoon. You will have somecharacters. Humor will defuse any tensesituation and make light of any perceiveddifficulty. Just have a smile or a joke readilyavailable to lighten the mood. Sometimesyou just have to laugh about things that you


Tech Sergeant Scott Reed, USAF

A platoon leader briefs his Soldiers on an upcoming mission in Iraq.

cannot control. I don’t think I ever had a bad day the whole timeI was a PL (maybe I did, but I just can’t recall it). It was a joybeing with the NCOs and Soldiers in the platoon. Many of mySoldiers are some of the finest young men our country has to offer.Their discipline and dedication to duty was truly inspirational tosee day in and day out. You can’t take everything seriously; try tolighten the load with some humor and fun. Do physical training(PT) and nonstandard PT with your platoon; it will strengthenyour bond.

TAKE CARE OF SOLDIERSFirst and foremost, this is your job — nothing could be more

important than this. Always keep your Soldiers informed. Avoidpropagating rumors and confront every rumor with facts. If youdo not know, tell them you don’t know.

Taking care of Soldiers is more than asking about them andtheir families. It is a conscious effort to help them improve andbetter themselves. There is no such thing as NCO business whenit comes to taking care of Soldiers. This is your job, too. There aremany different reasons why each Soldier joined the Army, but thebottom line is he volunteered to serve and defend our nation andway of life. Nothing short of absolute dedication to their care mustbe afforded them for what they volunteered to do (realized or not).

The best way you can take care of Soldiers is to prepare themto be ready for anything. You have to make an assessment of whatyour platoon is weak on and try to improve it. I found that gettingfeedback from the SLs works well. You have to trust your juniorleaders and encourage their initiative.

KEY TO SUCCESSPre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections and rehearsals are

the key to success. This is a critical leader’s task to any missiontactical or otherwise. Preparation and training is the key toaccomplishing anything. Rehearse every mission and let everybodyknow what each element is doing. Make sure they know their taskand purpose and the commander’s intent. Nothing will get youmore ready than having everyone know what each element is doingin the overall scheme of maneuver. There is much more to thisthan merely stating the obvious. Establish a checklist (copy onepreferably) that you go through prior to each mission and life willbe much easier.

There is no secret formula to accomplishing a tactical mission.Preparation and decisive action are the only sure methods youcan employ that will allow you to succeed. Know and understandyour junior leaders’ capabilities and weaknesses. With this inmind, you have a grasp of how to best employ and fight yourplatoon in a tactical setting. It is an amazing thing to see a platoonoperating at peak performance. To get there requires much timeand training. You have to prioritize and delegate — you can’t doeverything. It is a lot easier when you have great NCOs. There isno substitute for being prepared. The only sure way to succeed isto be ready.

LIST YOUR PLATOONS ACCOMPLISHMENTI made a “List of Excellence” that I posted inside the platoon’s

command post (CP) of all the platoon members’ accomplishments.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM


First Lieutenant Renato E. Angeles currently serves with the 1stBattalion, 24th Infantry, 1st Brigade (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), 25thInfantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington. He was a platoon leader with 1stPlatoon, A Company of the 1-24 Infantry.

I am not sure if it made any impact on my Soldiers’ performance,but they saw that I was keeping track of their accomplishments.This can include Soldier and NCO of the Month and Quartercompetitions, Audie Murphy Club inductions, times assigned asthe main effort during tactical missions, and reenlistments in theplatoon. I am not sure if this makes any difference, but I like tothink it does. Reward Soldiers that excel and appreciate theirhard work. Nothing is more satisfying to a Soldier than beingrecognized for a job well done by his leaders among his peers.Always appreciate hard work with a kind word or thanks.

BE YOUR OWN MANIn the end, you are your own best critic if you are honest with

yourself. There is always something bad that can be said aboutyou and your performance. You can almost always find a flaw inanybody if you look hard enough. Your commander cannot seeand know everything you do. He bases your performance on whathe knows and sees. The only thing you can be sure about is theknowledge that you have done your best and will continue to learnand grow. Never forget to be a team player. This does not meanparticipating on silly things or hanging out just to belong, rathercontributing to better the unit whether not recognized or seen.You don’t have to prove yourself to anybody but yourself. Takecomfort in knowing your capabilities when they are not dulyrecognized. Personal satisfaction comes from knowing what youare capable of doing.

There is really not much you can do about other people’sperceptions. You can only count on what you know to be trueabout you in your heart.

IN CONCLUSIONMy time as a platoon leader was far too short, spanning only

12 months. There were things I wish I could have donedifferently, but that is the pain of regret. I wish I could havestayed in the position longer so I could have done and learnedmore. My time as a PL was definitely one of the highlights ofmy career thus far. It was truly a very satisfying timeprofessionally. The bond shared under conditions of discomfortand pain, and the fond memories made on many training eventswill always be dear to my heart.

The Soldiers and NCOs in my platoon are some of the best ournation has to offer. I will always treasure the time I spent withthem. The experience for me was both physically and mentallysatisfying. The challenges were many, but the knowledge andexperience I gained are significant in my growth as a leader,Soldier, and individual.

There was definitely a lot to learn and much more to learnstill, but knowing the basics and applying what you learned willgive you a good head start. There is probably more we can do toimprove junior leaders’ education before and after they leave theinstitution of learning, but that is a different discussion altogether.

Editor’s Note: This article was previously published in ArmyCommunicator magazine. The article details a glaring exampleof how non-secure radio communications can lead to the death ofU.S. combat troops. In today’s theaters of operations, the use ofcommercial radios without communications security (COMSEC)is still very dangerous.

In late 1969, I and every other member of 1st Signal Brigadeand 160th Signal Group’s 44th Signal Battalion were searching for Viet Cong (VC) or North Vietnamese Army

(NVA) spies within our local-hire signal workforce. (TheVietnamese locals were mostly base-camp telephone switchboardoperators, installers, and repair personnel that 1st Signal Brigadeemployed in its base-camp facilities.) At that time, the G-2, U.S.Army Vietnam (USARV) – our command headquarters – wasconvinced that, because so much of our operational informationwas apparently in the enemy’s hands and we were taking suchhigh casualties, espionage on a large scale was the only possibleexplanation.

G-2 also felt that the most likely location for espionage was atmajor signal locations where operational information wasconcentrated and there was also a large local civilian workforce.In fact, in 44th Signal Battalion, we caught one of our cleaningwomen with a stolen manual for the AN/FRC-93 high frequencyradio (also known commercially as the Collins KWM-2A) at agate search. She was turned over to the Vietnamese National Police,which was probably determined to sentence the woman to death,and that bothers me even today because she was probablyinnocent. She probably wanted the manual for toilet paper,since such a use for publications was common among theVietnamese.

Almost everyone was quite happy with this “spycapture” except myself and a few others. We failed tosee how obtaining a manual that could be bought inany amateur radio store in America would be ofmuch value as technical intelligence to the enemy.In addition, we thought our losses were clearlythe result of operational, not technical,communications intelligence.

No spy ring, just arroganceThanks to our battalion S-2, 44th Signal

Battalion Soldiers were aware as early as1965 that the enemy was probablymonitoring USARV tactical-radio nets.The Army Security Agency (ASA) triedto make everyone else a believer in this,

PROJECT TOUCHDOWN:

HOW WE PAID THE PRICE FOR LACK OF COMSEC IN VIETNAMDAVID FIEDLER

too. However, despite ASA’s many warnings, it was USARV’sofficial opinion that the NVA/VC had no equipment capable ofmonitoring U.S. tactical-radio nets, nor could they understandEnglish well enough to use the information if they had theequipment. Most importantly, they believed our tactical forcesmoved so fast and our actions on the battlefield were so quick thateven if the enemy managed to acquire some information from ourtactical-radio nets, it would do them no good and us no harm.That arrogance was to cost us dearly.

At this point, it’s important to know that by 1965 frequencymodulation voice radio had been deployed to every level ofcommand from squad to corps (and higher). It’s also important toknow that this radio equipment, AN/PRT-4 and AN/PRR-9 (handheldradios for squads or platoons), AN/PRC-25 (manpack and vehicularfor platoon, company or battalion) and AN/VRC-46 (vehicular,platoon through corps and higher) did not have any communicationssecurity provisions at the Vietnam War’s outset.

Since there was no COMSEC device, either internal or external,provided to this equipment until late in the conflict, the onlysolution was to constantly stress the vulnerability of FM voiceradio intercept and analysis and to carefully use signal operatinginstructions, off-line (paper) operations codes and authenticationtables (challenge and reply) to provide net security. As I said,

however, before late 1969, the USARV and MilitaryAssistance Command Vietnam (MACV) commanders

steadfastly refused to believe there was a realcommunication intelligence (COMINT) threat.

This attitude was reflected across the entire forceat every level.

Accordingly, since existing operations codes andauthentication tables were cumbersome for the typical

poorly trained FM voice radio operators (most of whomwere officers and senior NCOs) to use, they were rarelyemployed. Field commanders clearly believed that time

was more important than security. This view wasreinforced in the combat-arms training base, where verylittle time was devoted to communications subjects, eventhough the Signal Corps had declared combat-net radioequipment to be “user-owned and operated.”

Unit signal officers (S-6/G-6) magnified thehemorrhage of vital tactical information over

the radio because many of these officers werecowed by higher headquarters and tactical

commanders into also believingthere was no COMINT threat. Bydirection, signal officers rarely, ifever, took even the minimal action


PROFESSIONAL FORUM


of just simply changing net call signs andfrequencies.

Taken together, our COMSEC laxness –created by our arrogant assessment of theenemy’s capabilities and intelligence – ledto a massive opportunity to intercept andexploit our tactical FM communications nets,which our astute enemy used to an extremeadvantage.

While we in the Signal Corps tout goodcommunications as a combat multiplier, werarely mention that Vietnam proved enemyexploitation of our communications is deadly.No one to my knowledge has ever been able to calculate the numberof names on the Vietnam Wall due to poor COMSEC, but allindications are that the number is considerable. The number ofAmericans killed and wounded in action due to lack of radiosecurity certainly must, in my opinion, far exceed the much-publicized losses due to friendly fire or noncombat related deathsdue to accidents, for example.

The blame for this unfortunately lies squarely with the majorU.S. field commands (MACV and USARV), the Signal Corpsleadership, and the Signal Corps’ schools at Fort Gordon, Georgia,and Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Compounding the “user-ownedand operated” COMSEC disaster was the concept that tactical-unit signal officers (S-6s) could be trained in nine weeks at FortGordon in the Signal Officer Basic Course. These basic signalofficers were then assigned to tactical units in the United Statesor Europe for periods as short as eight months where, accordingto the Signal Corps, they would learn their job on the job, bepromoted to first lieutenant and then deployed to Vietnam.

The result of this concept speaks for itself, since most signalofficers when assigned to tactical units did very little signal work,had no formal training while in these assignments and no signalstandards to meet while in these assignments.

Embarrassed by Alpha-3Fortunately, in late December 1969 – almost four years after

the U.S. Army deployed major units to Vietnam and after fouryears of exposing our combat radio nets to exploitation – thesituation changed dramatically. On the morning of December 20,1969, a scout from 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, discovereda long wire antenna on the ground at the old Michelin rubberplantation in the area northwest of Saigon. The antenna wire ledto a carefully concealed underground bunker complex that waspacked with enemy radio-communications intercept equipment.This complex was the operations center for an NVA/VC platoon-sized radio “technical reconnaissance unit” known as Alpha-3that was part of the NVA’s 47th Technical ReconnaissanceBattalion.

After a short fight, 12 members of Alpha-3 were taken prisoner.Even more significant, however, was the fact that U.S. infantryalso captured all of Alpha-3’s equipment and its logbooks. Theselogbooks proved without doubt that the enemy had beenintercepting U.S. voice radio traffic over an extended period oftime, understood the exact meaning of the traffic and were able toeasily decrypt and understand traffic covered by unauthorized

(locally made) codes and infrequent SOIchanges.

Alpha-3’s actual intercept equipmentwasn’t the product of some super-secretSoviet or Chinese version of FortMonmouth or the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology labs. Alpha-3’s stuffconsisted mostly of captured AN/PRC-25or AN/PRC-77 radios and others boughtfrom our South Vietnam allies or throughthird parties.

Obviously, this equipment was 100-percent interoperable with the radios in our

units since it was identical to our equipment. Supplementing thecaptured or acquired U.S. standard very-high-frequency equipment,Alpha-3 had several Chinese R-139 HF receivers and a goodnumber of Sony and Panasonic commercial radios they had simplymodified to work in the U.S. tactical-frequency bands.

Alpha-3’s hardware engineering wasn’t without someimagination, though. At the time, all U.S. units were sufferingfrom a critical shortage of BA-4386 magnesium batteries. Alpha-3 soldiers discovered they could solder together eight BA-30 D-cell flashlight batteries (no shortage of these) and produce the 12volts of direct-current power the AN/PRC-25 needed to receivesignals.

In addition, unlike U.S. forces, the NVA signal establishmentwas able to impart to Alpha-3 an appreciation of the critical roleantenna engineering plays in any radio system. Compared to FortGordon graduates of both then and now, Alpha-3 personnel wereantenna geniuses. With this knowledge, Alpha-3 was able toproduce antennas that extended the normal operating distances oftheir radio intercept receivers far beyond their expected range.

This lesson needs to be remembered today as the Army adoptsmore non-COMSEC-protected radios, radio/intercoms and wirelesslocal-area network equipment with the expectation that their lowradiated-signal levels will protect them from enemy interceptionand exploitation. The Alpha-3 experience teaches us that nothingcould be further from the truth. Supposedly ignorant third worldAlpha-3 soldiers were expert enough to actually build radioreceivers in the field from new and used parts obtained ormanufactured locally. Very few U.S. Army Signal Corps personneleither then or now could duplicate this capability.

The most shocking thing about Alpha-3 platoon’s capture byfar, however, wasn’t its intercept equipment or its ability as antennaengineers, but rather its station logbooks, training materials andknowledge of U.S. operational combat net radio (CNR) doctrineand procedures. In short, Alpha-3 was reading our mail and knewexactly what it meant and what to do about it. U.S. infantrymenfound handwritten logs containing the texts of American voiceconversations transcribed verbatim in English and then analyzedby excellent English linguists.

The 47th Technical Reconnaissance Battalion was primarilyinterested in plain-language and brevity-coded voicecommunications its intercept operators had no problemunderstanding. Of particular interest were forward air controller,forward observer, command and control, and civilian presscommunications. The civilian press, in fact, proved to be a great

The most shocking thingabout Alpha-3 platoon’scapture by far, however,

wasn’t its intercept equipmentor its ability as antennaengineers, but rather its

station log books, trainingmaterials and knowledge of

U.S. operational CNR doctrineand procedures.


source of immediate operationalinformation throughout the war. Presentday commanders should take a lesson fromthis when considering allowing the civilianpress and its normally uncoveredcommunications (satellite phone, cellphone, etc.) into their operations area. Abetter approach may be to let the press useCOMSEC-protected military com-munications to avoid immediate disclosureof critical operational information.

The Alpha-3 logs showed us that backin 1965 we were passing this operations-security information over the air in the clearbecause we underestimated the enemy’sCOMINT capabilities:

• Artillery target information (in timefor the enemy to take cover);

• Artillery harassment and interdictionfire schedules (in time for the enemy to stayclear of targeted locations);

• Ambush site locations (bringing up thequestion of who ambushed who);

• Casualty reports;• Air strike (B-52) warnings;• Friendly troop positions;• Radio-net call sign and frequency

changes;• Unit status reports;• Plans and orders; and• Idle operator chitchat containing all

sorts of operational information.More examination of captured enemy

material also revealed the enemy had deducedfrom their COMINT operations the followinggeneral characteristics about our CNRoperations and could exploit them:� U.S. units made extensive use of

locally produced unauthorized codes, manyof the “point of origin” or Sardot type,which the NVA/VC had no difficultycracking. Alpha-3’s logs clearly show manylocally invented coded transmissionstranscribed verbatim and then the plainEnglish meaning of the transmissionwritten next to it. The seriousness of thisaction was magnified many times becauseU.S. operators were convinced theirtransmissions sounded great over the radio,were fully secure, and could only beunderstood by friendly forces. The amountof tactical advantage given to the enemybecause of this false sense of security canonly be imagined.� Captured 47th Technical

Reconnaissance Battalion training materialstated that U.S. units didn’t change call

signs or frequencies very often, but whenthey did, some frequencies or othercomponents were often retained from theprevious net structure. The material went onto explain how to recover unit identity afteran SOI change. An example was shown ofoperator chitchat where one operator toldanother the details of an SOI change (oldcall sign to new call sign, old frequency tonew frequency) many hours before the actualchange. In this case, 47th TechnicalReconnaissance Battalion made the changefaster than the U.S. unit, who hadcoordination problems. The 47th TechnicalReconnaissance Battalion’s interceptorshad already been waiting for several hourson the new frequencies by the time the U.S.unit got its problems sorted out.� U.S. units often failed to use

authentication procedures in a deceptionenvironment. This was particularly evidentunder a higher stress situation such asmedical evacuation, search-and-rescue,quick-fire artillery targets and units incontact with the enemy. The NVA’simitative communications deception couldexploit this U.S. characteristic to lureevacuation and SAR aircraft into preplanned“kill boxes,” misdirect artillery fire toharmless locations or on to U.S. forces anddisrupt, confuse and expose maneuveringU.S. troops. I personally saw this at work in1969, when an unauthenticated transmissioncaused 69th Signal Battalion’s base camp atBen Hua to be shelled, producing producedseveral casualties.� U.S. radio operators, many of whom

were field grade commissioned officers andsenior NCOs, lacked proper circuitdiscipline. These operators were prone tolong chats over the air that invariably ledto the disclosure of important operationalinformation.� Prior to major operations,

COMSEC levels didn’t increase. This ledto disclosure of some useful informationbefore almost every U.S. operation.� Secure communications

equipment, if available, was almost neverused between 1965 and 1969, since theequipment (Nestor) was bulky and the S-6staff had problems structuring mixedCOMSEC and non-COMSEC radio nets.This changed after the capture of Alpha-3, when a crash program beganimmediately to install COMSECequipment in vehicles and aircraft.

Equipment bulk was not a problem onthese platforms but was for manpackoperations, so equipping the light infantrylagged. Unfortunately, the bulk of U.S.combat forces were light infantry.� Radio operators in tactical units

generally failed to acknowledge radiocommunications’ vulnerability to COMINT.After Alpha-3’s capture, great pressure wasbrought upon the Signal Corps to improveoperator training. This was done in manymaneuver units, but since most equipment was“user-owned and operated,” operator trainingwas considered out of Signal’s control and thusimprovements were difficult, spotty anddepended on the unit’s S-6 and staff’s qualityand training. Mindsets were also very hard tochange in maneuver units, where signalofficers weren’t particularly well regarded ascommunications experts, sometimes withgood reason.

If these revelations weren’t shockingenough, the Alpha-3 treasure trove oftraining documents also showed howextracted information from radiotransmissions was used against specificunits such as 11th Armored CavalryRegiment, 1st Infantry Division, 25thInfantry Division, and 1st Cavalry Division.

The 47th Technical ReconnaissanceBattalion actually profiled these major U.S.units based on CNR intercepts. Some typicalexamples of unit profiling were:

• Normal modes of transportation, downto identifying vehicle types andcharacteristics. The VC/ NVA, according toAlpha-3, had a healthy respect for the M-113 family of armored personnel carriersand the UH-1 helicopter. The M-151 jeepdidn’t particularly impress them, neither didthe Stryker-like V-100 armored car U.S.military policemen used.

• Unit areas of operation. The enemyusually knew which U.S. unit was opposingthem and within what areas the unit operated.

• Methods of navigation. The enemy knewwhich units were using landmarks todetermine position and what the landmarkswere.

• Unit message formats and radioprocedures.

• Unit composition, weapons andcapabilities.

• Radio-net traffic volume and what itmeant.

Also, 47th Technical Reconnaissance

COMINT and other forms of communications and automationexploitation. Assignment of junior, inexperienced, minimallytrained officers to S-6 positions in maneuver units leads directlyto defeat on the battlefield, as the Vietnam experience proved.

• COMSEC and OPSEC procedures properly applied inVietnam would have kept many names off that famous wall inWashington. In the most glaring cases of Tet 1968 and 7th Cavalry/1st Calvary Division at Ia Drang 1969, we’ll never know howmany lives could have been saved by a few well-trained signalofficers aggressively doing their jobs in spite of what others mayhave thought. In my opinion, the number would have beenconsiderable.

Over the years since Vietnam, the temptation to relax COMSECand OPSEC requirements for the sake of convenience, ease ofoperation, cost, time, or just plain laziness continues to rear itsugly head.

While all CNRs in tactical units now have either embedded orexternal COMSEC devices, the temptation not to use them or notto change the COMSEC keys, for instance, has triumphed toooften. The devices and proper net-operations procedures do nogood if you don’t use them.

Also, to satisfy their commander’s perceived need for morecommunications, some S-6s have sanctioned the use of unprotectedradio equipment to supplement organic protected CNRs.

Initially, modified amateur (ham) radios were used, followedby citizen-band radios (particularly during the CB craze of the1970s) and, most recently, by Family Radio Service radios – whichcan be easily obtained, don’t even require a FederalCommunications Commission license and have been seen in someunits, even outside the continental United States. Sometimes thisequipment is disguised with names like wireless LAN, soldierintercom, brand-name brick, wireless orderwire, cellular telephoneand cellular telephone walkie-talkie – and now even voice-over-Internet protocol and others.

Users invariably treat these devices as if they were secure U.S.Type I COMSEC protected CNRs. If you don’t believe me, thenext time you’re in an operational situation, see if anyone on acell phone is authenticating the station on the other end, usingoperations codes or encrypting location coordinates.

If we learned nothing else from Vietnam and Alpha-3, it’s thatthis sort of thing gets people killed and must be stopped. Only thecompetent, well-trained and aggressive S- 6/G-6 is able to do this,so let’s get on with it!

Battalion was sophisticated enough to actually analyze the toneand content of unit radio traffic and used the analysis to predictunit actions. There is considerable information that 47th knewmuch of this type of data before the Tet 1968 enemy offensive andused it against us extensively during that action.

After Alpha-3 was captured in 1969, a new emphasis was placedon COMSEC in U.S. combat units.

Long-dormant signal staff officers began to enforce long-disregarded COMSEC directives, such as station authenticationand encryption of coordinates, due to pressure from their combat-arms commanders.

Project TouchdownThe information that Alpha-3’s logs contained astounded the

USARV commander, General Creighton Abrams. A survivingaudio record of Abrams’ reaction to this (I’ve personally listenedto it) reveals an obviously shaken commander completely flooredby proof that our enemy had been intercepting and exploiting ourtactical voice radio communications on a grand scale and thatthere was no spy organization to be busted.

After this, Abrams’ hostility to Signal Corps officers, ourtraining, doctrine and tactics as taught and conceived at FortGordon – and particularly Signal officers in S-6/G-6 assignmentsbattalion through corps – is legendary. Led by the MACV highcommand, the Signal Corps quickly became the target for anunmerciful attack by our combat arms brethren, who at the timeneeded a blood sacrifice and something to blame for why theground war was not going particularly well.

Unfortunately, much of the attack was well deserved. The Armygot so serious about placing the blame mostly on the Signal Corpsthat the National Security Agency – the folks responsible forproducing codes, ciphers and COMSEC equipment, not the SignalCorps (whom Army headquarters assumed would lack objectivity)– was directed to produce detailed briefings, training materialsand movies exposing how Army combat communications werebeing exploited in Vietnam. In their effort to expunge themselvesfrom blame, top commanders declassified this information andused it to justify procuring new, less vulnerable CNR equipment(Nestor, Vinson, the Single-Channel Ground and Airborne RadioSystem) as well as establishing larger field COMSEC organizationscontrolled by G-2, not the Signal Corps. The name for this exposureeffort was Project Touchdown, and the Army distributed its highlyembarrassing training materials under that name for many years.

Relevance for todayMany today will ask what relevance this almost 40-year-old

information is to today’s Army? I say:• Never underestimate the capabilities of your “electronic

enemy.” Technology needs to be applied with a good dose ofcommon military sense today more than ever. Even atechnologically unsophisticated enemy like 47th TechnicalReconnaissance Battalion can find a flaw in something we do andexploit it. Command, control, communications, computers,intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems are oftenthe most vulnerable to exploitation – the Signal Corps is the heartof C4ISR, so be alert.

• The trained S-6 is key to protecting combat units from

David Fiedler, a retired Signal Corps lieutenant colonel, is an engineerand project director at the Project Manager for Tactical-Radio CommunicationsSystems, Fort Monmouth. Past assignments include service with Armyavionics, electronic warfare, combat surveillance and target-acquisitionlaboratories, Army Communications Systems Agency, PM for mobile-subscriber equipment, PM-SINCGARS and PM for All-Source AnalysisSystem. He’s also served as assistant PM, field-office chief and director ofintegration for the Joint Tactical Fusion Program, a field-operating agency ofthe deputy chief of staff for operations.

Fiedler has served in Army, Army Reserve and Army National Guard signal,infantry, and armor units and as a DA civilian engineer since 1971. He holdsdegrees in both physics and engineering and a master’s degree in industrialmanagement. He is the author of many articles in the fields of combatcommunications and electronic warfare.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM


SO, YOU’RE GOING TO IRAQ?Company Commander Shares Successful Tactics, Techniques

CAPTAIN CHRISTOPHER L. BUDIHAS

In the Army training model, you“train as you fight,” however, whatends up happening when you get

into combat is that you will inversely “fightas you had trained.” Now that sounds likecommon sense to most, but as Soldiers havefound out during their tours in Iraq andAfghanistan, the effects of finger-drilledtraining rises to the top. Leaders must takeevery opportunity, while at home stationand once deployed, to train their units andrefine their SOPs. Training does not stoponce you are deployed — complacencymust be fought. In this article, I do notintend to tell you how a rifle company andits commander should operate in combat,but to present some of what we did whichmade us successful in our little piece ofIraq.

BackgroundThe 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

(Light) was scheduled to go to the JointReadiness Training Center (JRTC) inJanuary 2004. However, in July 2003 wewere notified that the Warrior Brigade

would deploy as part of Operation EnduringFreedom V. Because of our battalion’sintense preparation for JRTC, it was easyfor the company to transition tactically forthe deployment to Afghanistan. We hadconducted a number of field exercises whichincluded company and platoon search andattack lanes, combined arms live-fireexercises (CALFEXs), and air assaultoperations. We had prepared for the fightin Afghanistan. Then in late October, wewere notified that the unit would deploy toIraq to replace the 173rd Airborne Brigadein the Kirkuk region in support of OperationIraqi Freedom II.

To give you an appreciation of ouroperations in Iraq, this article will attackmany of the areas surrounding our companyoperations by subject. I’ll take you fromlanding in Kuwait to company combatoperations in theater to sustainmenttraining.

RSOI in KuwaitWhen we landed in Kuwait, we

immediately closed on Camp Virginia tostage the brigade for the follow-onmovement into Iraq. Being a light infantrycompany, we never had more than twoHMMWVs to support us during any pre-deployment training. The companyimmediately took advantage of our time.Once we receive our allotment of vehicles(10 x M-998 cargo HMMWV), leadersdeveloped and tested SOPs for convoymovements and mounted combat patrols.The Udarai Range in Kuwait allowed usthe opportunity to test those SOPs underlive-fire conditions, during both day andnight. Our time in Kuwait was a greatopportunity to rehearse, reconfirm weaponszero, conduct PT, and mentally prepare theSoldiers for the push into Iraq. Other unitstook this time to rest prior to the movement

Staff Sergeant Daniel Davenport

north. This final period priorto combat is too important for



rest. Use all available time to get thosefinal touches done prior to moving north.

The Five Pillars to SuccessfulOperations

Our company was very proficient atexecuting troop leading procedures priorto deploying. We realized how fluid theenvironment we were operating in was withthe various dynamics brought on by theenemy, civilian population, religion,customs, politics, and former regime ways.In this environment, it was apparent to usthat we needed to further reduce the troopleading procedures sequence because of thetime compressed operations we wererequired to execute to retain the initiativeover the enemy and stay in his decision-making cycle. For instance, we would haveinformants come to the forward operatingbase (FOB) to report on an individual(s)resulting in the need to assemble a force,brief a plan, and execute it, in most casesin less than three hours. If we didn’t, thetarget would be gone by the time we arrived.Solid SOPs, rehearsals, and experiencewould give us the agility to turn intelligenceinto action within a small amount of time.To ensure “we answered all the mail” priorto executing an operation in a reducedtimeline, I developed what I called the “5Pillars.” These pillars would facilitate anyforce’s ability to achieve its end state inrelation to the enemy, terrain, and friendlyforce. Plus, it would allow subordinates tooperate within the intent of their leaders.The 5 Pillars were:

Concept of the Operations – What arewe going after? What is going to happen?How it is going to happen? Where iseveryone at? What will the end look like?

Fire Plan – What are artillery andmortars doing? What type of support isaviation providing? Who and how are theybeing controlled?

Tactical and Fire Control Measures –What routes, checkpoints, release points,phase lines, etc., are going to keep us withinthe plan? What fire control measures aregoing to allow us to maximize our firepower on the enemy and not ourselves?

Medevac Plan – Where are the medicsand CLS aidmen? Where are the CLS bagsand litters? Where do casualties go? Howdo they get evacuated by air and ground?

Signal Plan – What type of radios andnets are we going to communicate on? What

are the primary and alternate signals tocommence, shift, and cease fire?

As we found, if you can address the “5Pillars” prior to the execution of anymission, regardless of the amount of timeavailable, you can beat the enemy force andpreserve your force.

The Big 5 You Must Know

When operating in Iraq, there are acouple of operations you need to train yourcompany on prior to deployment. Theseoperations are raid, cordon and search,patrolling (mounted and dismounted), trafficcontrol points, and route clearance. Raidsare fairly self explanatory. Actionableintelligence on an individual(s) and/orequipment at a certain location drives youto execute this operation. Cordon andsearches are done in most cases where thereis “reasonable” information collected that atargeted individual(s) and/ or equipment arepresent in a certain place. In many cases,cordon and searches end up being “knock”and searches. This is where the terrain andpopulation is under control andnonthreatening to our force, so we cansimply knock rather than breach the housein a dynamic manner.

We’ve found that 80 percent of thecompany’s time will be spent in somemanner patrolling, both mounted anddismounted. So, it is extremely importantfor the unit, prior to deployment, to developand exercise some solid patrolling SOPs.When patrolling, the Soldiers mustremember the fundamentals of patrollingand always know their actions on contact. Imust reiterate that leaders must enforce andsupervise security when patrolling — neverlet your guard down! Also, all units willoperate in some type of urban environment

most of the time they are in theater, sothey will need to remember that it’s athree-dimensional fight and to alwayssearch and scan the battlefield in depth.

Traffic control points (TCPs) are a taskthat the force will find itself doingperiodically. TCPs give us the ability toget a feel for what contraband may bemoving in or through our battle space. Wefrequently used “snap” TCPs to interdictenemy movement within the AO. “Snap”TCPs are improvised TCPs, set up for ashort duration, to keep terrorist andcriminal elements off balance and to seizecontraband moving along the roads in oursector. On average, we would only operatethese TCPs from a specific location for nolonger than an hour. Once a TCP wasestablished, the word gets out among thepopulation quickly and they becomeineffective after three hours.

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)have become to Soldiers in Iraq, whatbooby traps were to Soldiers in Vietnam.The terrorists adapted this TTP for anumber of reasons. First, the Iraqiinsurgent or foreign terrorist is generallya coward, who does not want to fight ourSoldiers in a direct contact fight. Second,it is easy for the enemy to plant thesedevices and blow them up from a distancein order to evade capture. Third, there isordnance all over the country from the fallof the former regime, and IEDs arerelatively easy to construct. With a simpleradio or electronic controlled device(garage door openers, car alarms, cellphones, etc…) as an initiator, a blastingcap and/ or fuse and an explosive (artilleryor mortar shells, rockets, aircraft bombs,plastic explosives, etc…), you have anIED. Lastly, our Army is bound by thehighways and roads that move oursupplies, personnel, and equipment. So,we are often predictable targets on themain supply routes (MSR) and alternatesupply routes (ASR).

The key of preventing or reducing theseIEDs from being employed in your areaof operations (AO) is through routeclearance. What do I mean by routeclearance? Generally, it would looksomething like this: simply driving at aslow rate of speed (10 to 20 mph) scanningfor suspicious items along the route, thendismounting to clear those suspiciousitems or areas. It would also involvedismounting to clear all bridges (to include

We’ve found that 80percent of the company’stime will be spent in some

manner patrolling, bothmounted and dismounted.

So, it is extremely importantfor the unit, prior to

deployment, to develop andexercise some solid

patrolling SOPs.


under), overpasses, signs, culverts,and guard rails. It is important thatwhen you dismount, the force clearsthe area where an ambusher couldhide prior to clearing the suspiciousitem, bridge, overpass, or sign.Always clear far to near. KeepSoldiers in overwatch to cover theelement that is clearing. If theclearing element is engaged, theycan quickly react, usually killing orpreventing the escape of the attacker.Additionally, a 152mm artillery shellhas an effective casualty radius of upto 50 meters, so it’s important foryour vehicles to stay at least 150meters or further from the area youare attempting to clear. Thecompany did route clearance on allmajor MSRs and ASRs in our sectora minimum of once a day. We hadthe Iraqi National Guard (ING)execute route clearance operations at sunrise, mid-morning, twohours prior of sunset, and in the evening to supplement theoverall coverage of the main roads to prevent IED attacks onCoalition forces and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

The unit we relieved would only execute route clearance twoor three times a week. On average, they would find or be attackedby IEDs two or more times a week. Because of the frequencyand the thoroughness at which we cleared the roads, we wereattacked zero times in five months and found less than 10 IEDsin our sector. The police, ING, and locals attributed the lack ofattacks due to the fact that we (U.S. and ISF) cleared the roadsso often that terrorists would not want to risk being caught.Terrorists could simply go in another unit’s area to plant anIED with no risk of being captured. If you come to Iraq, dodeliberate route clearance; it’ll save your Soldiers’ lives.

Urban Patrolling, Our Way

The company’s model for urban patrolling was based onlessons learned by British forces in Northern Ireland. Some ofthese tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and lessonslearned included engaging the population through nonlethaltactics. We recognized that this is a counterinsurgent war, andthe way to win is to influence the population in order to preventthe support of “anti-Iraqi forces” (AIF). All Iraqis had beenimmersed in anti-American rhetoric/propaganda thru Saddam’sstate-run television and radio for more than 30 years. So, thebest way to break down that barrier was to show the people thatwe weren’t those wicked people that Saddam and other anti-American organizations claimed we were. Quickly, 75 percentof the population realized that even though we were different,we were still the same in many respects and held many of thesame basic human values. Because of this, the Iraqi populationand the American Soldiers found a mutual respect for oneanother. It’s important for your Soldiers to have a healthy respect(don’t have to love them) for the population, their religion,

culture, and customs if you are going to be successful in Iraq. Ifyou become arrogant, pompous, and disrespectful to the locals,you will only empower the insurgents.

What I would like to offer you is our company’s perspectiveand a couple of TTPs for conducting urban patrolling operations.

1) “Boots on the Ground” — In order to know the populationand to gain their trust, you have to get out on the streets andpatrol. The leaders need to talk to the population. The more youare out there, the more information you will pick up and the morethe people may trust or at least tolerate you. Obviously not everyonewill embrace you, but the majority of the population sees a futurebuilt upon the freedom the Coalition has given them and thesecurity we provide their society during this important time intheir history.

2) “Waves, Smiles, and Handshakes” — Waves and smilesbreak down a lot of barriers. It shows a sense of friendship andbreaks tension. Smiling will show you as nonthreatening, andshaking hands demonstrates that you have a general respect forthem. On patrols, both mounted and dismounted, the companyhad a “waving campaign.” This is where we would wave toeveryone, regardless if they liked us or not. It was also a good testto see who was friendly or not. In a couple of towns in our area ofoperations, we had Arab and Turkomen mothers slapping andscolding their children for waving at the Coalition Soldiers.However, those incidents would not deter us from executing thiscampaign. Over a couple of months, in a number of villages whichwere initially either anti-Coalition or indifferent, they becamefriendlier to the company.

3) “Hard Targeting” — The one thing about patrols operatingin an area over time is that your routes and speed can becomesomewhat routine. We adopted a technique called “hard targeting.”What this simply entailed was the patrol, at any given time, wouldpick up a double time for a short duration and, at times, changethe direction of the patrol’s movement to prevent being targeted,trailed, or predictable.

4) “Carman, Spotter, Recorder, and Cameraman” — These


In order to know the population and gain their trust, you have to get out on the streets and patrol. Leadersneed to talk to the population. The more you are out there, the more information you will pick up.


are simply tasks assigned to patrol membersto enhance the effectiveness of the combatpatrol.

Carman: Responsible foridentifying vehicles reported by the S-2 asanti-Coalition (i.e., possible VBIED,known terrorist vehicle, used in a crime,etc…). He would have the vehicle “blacklist” and check it throughout the patrol.Additionally, he would look for vehiclesthat may have some type of suspicious battledamage (bullet holes) or foreign licenseplates.

Spotter: Responsible foridentifying suspected or known anti-Coalition personnel or criminals. He wouldhave the personnel “black and gray list”from the battalion S-2 section. Whentalking with the police, governmentofficials, and Iraqi National Guard (ING)and they mention names, you could easilyreference these lists.

Recorder: Responsible forrecording everything that occurs during thepatrol, to include times, events, andpersonnel engaged (talked to) during thepatrol. His notes became crucial duringdebriefs and filling out patrol reports.These reports could also be referenced laterin building targeting packets.

Cameraman: Responsible fortaking digital pictures during the patrol. Hewould take pictures of suspicious personneland activities. Additionally, he would takepictures of personnel who were engaged bythe patrol leader. This was an excellenttool where you could superimpose thepictures on patrol reports and target folders.Lastly, during raids, he would take picturesof captured personnel with confiscatedequipment and contraband.

Endless Meetings

As a company commander, I spent mostof my time engaging key Iraqi personnelthrough meetings in my area of operations.These people ranged from chiefs of policeand city counsels to medical professionalsand Iraqi National Guard commanders. Myultimate goal as a company commander inOperation Iraqi Freedom II was to get thelocal leadership in the government andsecurity forces operating on their own withCoalition oversight. Basically, I wanted tocoach, teach, and mentor them to the pointthat they were effectively operating on theirown.

In February 2004, the unit I relieved hadbasically run the government and gave allorders to the security forces. At that time,the appointed local government had nograsp of public service, building a bettercommunity, or how to work well with theirfellow council members. Prior to liberation,the Iraqi people generally existed to servethe government and Baath Party, with thepoliticians attempting to gain as muchpower and wealth as they could. Thechallenge for us was that we had to get themover this sickness and teach them thegeneral principles of a democracy. Iinvested a lot of my time teachingGovernment 101, Economics 101, PoliticalScience 101, and many other classes onwhat I thought was fundamental to get theirlocal governments operating. However, itwas difficult for them to practice theseprinciples until they broke away from theirold bad habits. After months of coaching,we saw progress in the city governmentsand on the streets. To date, this is still awork in progress and will be for many yearsto come.

Overall, I would spend about a third ofmy time working with the localgovernments and municipalities, a thirdworking with the police and new IraqiNational Guard, and the other third outpatrolling and meeting the local people.Meeting people is very important. It givesyou a true appreciation and “gut” feelingfor the atmosphere of the towns andvillages. You personally get anunderstanding of what projects they need,

the security in the area, and who is doingwhat. The majority of my actionableintelligence was collected from the Soldiersor me talking to the population and its localleaders. Units have to get out of the FOBdaily and hit the streets in order to haveany effect in their area of operations.

Exit Strategy = Iraqi Security Forces

The week that our company assumed ourarea of operations, we inherited two newlyformed and graduated Iraqi Civil DefenseCorps (ICDC) companies, the precursor toIraqi National Guard (ING). Early in theoperation, it was readily apparent that thestrategy for the United States to get out ofIraq was to get the Iraqi security forcestrained and in charge of their own country.Right off the bat, I aligned a rifle platoonto each ING company in a partnership fortraining and operating together. Daily, theplatoons embedded a rifle squad in the INGcompanies. The initial five weeks oftraining was devoted to team and squadtactics. Even though we were extremelybusy in the AO, having Coalition Soldiersembedded with these newly formedorganizations paid huge dividends laterwhen the ING was operating independentlyand jointly with us. The intangible resultof having a U.S. Army squad daily workingwith the ISF was remarkable! Throughtheir sheer daily example, the squadsdemonstrated to the Iraqis not only how tooperate tactically, but how to act as Soldiers,receive orders, and execute missions. It


Progress through cooperation — The company commander attends a weekly Daquq city counselmeeting. About a third of his time is spent working with the local governments and municipalities.


showed the Iraqi officers and NCOs how to lead by example, makedecisions, and issue instructions. The platoon leaders and platoonsergeants worked with the platoon and Iraqi company leadershipon how to plan and operate in both tactical and garrisonenvironments.

By late March, we had ING platoons and companies conductingraids and cordon and searches jointly with us. They not only gavethe company more combat power, but their knowledge of the areaand population allowed us to be successful. I contribute our successwith these ING companies to a couple factors:

1) Embedding U.S. forces gave us a legitimate bond as mutualpartners in this counterinsurgency to fight against terrorists, and

2) We selected and promoted Soldiers and officers based onmerit and not who they were or who they knew.

When operating in Iraq, it is very important to conduct jointsecurity patrols with police and ING forces. I say “security” patrolsrather than “presence” for a specific reason. The term “presence”patrol was born out of operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. In Iraq,however, we were doing much more than being seen. Throughthese patrols, we were providing security to the town or village bylooking for terrorist activity, denying the enemy a safe haven,keeping him off balance by operating in his battle space, andcollecting information from the population. Additionally, the useof joint patrols with the local security forces achieved a number ofother effects. First, it trained them on how to properly patrol andtreat the population. During the former regime, having a weaponand a badge gave you the right to mistreat the populace. Second,it got them out of their headquarters and out in the public doingtheir jobs. The police had a bad habit of sitting around theirpolice stations “hanging out” waiting for something to happen,rather than out “walking a beat” preventing crime or incidentsfrom occurring. Third, it gave them legitimacy. Because of thepoor history of the police during Saddam’s period, the people wouldsee the police as an enemy and not as a protector. So, by beingseen with Coalition forces, it would give the police legitimacy.

Training Never Stops!

It is evitable, but if you do not train in combat your skills willdiminish. If you allow your Soldiers to develop a “we are incombat” or “I’m a veteran” attitude, it’ll directly affect thereadiness of the unit. It is true that during one year of operationsyou can get really proficient in some tasks, but in a year they arenot going to execute many tasks associated with their MOS untilthey get back to home station. For this reason, it’s important thatofficers provide training guidance and NCOs drive training. Neverexcept finger-drilled, half-step training from your leaders. Theymust plan, resource, rehearse, and execute training to standard.Here are some of the ways we conducted training:

Physical Fitness: Operations in the company were generallyrun at the platoon and squad levels. With a high operational tempoand living in a very small FOB (255 feet by 466 feet), it was achallenge to keep Soldiers fit. This was a squad leader’s fight,which needed monitoring by the platoon leaders and sergeants.The company’s goal was that Soldiers would run at a minimum offour times a week and/or a total of 100 minutes. Also, squadleaders established routines with weight training and calisthenics.Additionally, to break up the patrolling routine, achieve a good

workout, and keep the locals wondering about us, platoons wouldconduct foot marches within the town. We would get strangelooks at 0700 when we were roadmarching through the Daquqcity market with 70 pound rucksacks on our backs. Anothermethod to monitor Soldiers’ fitness was to conduct monthly platooninventory APFTs and execute supervised height and weight tests.

Marksmanship: An infantryman who cannot hit what he isaiming at is useless. Since we were living in a small FOB in atown, marksmanship was a challenge. However, our battalionhad two multiple-purpose ranges to our south that we often used.The goal was to reconfirm zero on all weapons, do a sequence ofclose quarter marksmanship drills and long-range shooting (300meter +) a minimum of once a month. We obviously wanted toshoot more, but our operational commitments limited our time.This at least gave the Soldiers the confidence needed that theirweapons were zeroed and they could hit what they were aimingat. Fortunately, when our battalion went on missions outside oursector in both Mosul and Najaf, we had the opportunity to doplatoon convoy live-fire ranges to revalidate our SOPs andmaintain our lethality.

Medical Training: The company goal was to bimonthly trainon six separate medical tasks. Having the battalion’s AdvanceTrauma Life Support (ATLS) Team, consisting of the battalionphysician assistant and two senior medical NCOs, attached greatlyenhanced the company’s advanced medical training beyond whatthe Combat Lifesaver (CLS) Course taught. We had a surplus ofbasic Class VIII supplies at the FOB, so we could incorporatemedical aid training during FOB Quick Reaction Force (QRF)drills. These drills gave the squad CLS Soldiers and medics agreat opportunity to train.

Officer and Leader Development Program (OPD and LPD):Once a week, the leaders (if not on mission) would assemble to doformal and informal classes in order to hone our war-fightingability and professionally development. On several occasions, wewould do a tactical decision-making game (TDG) based on asituation built on the terrain (towns and villages) we operated indaily. These TDGs gave us the opportunity to discuss a variety ofissues, from troop leading procedures and the effects of terrain toactions on the objective and information operations. Theimportance of doing these exercises was not so much the mechanicsof the solution, but getting to the decision that was made and the“why.” This helped us bond as a leadership team, so in futurecombat operations we knew how the man our left and right wasthinking. Also, the company first sergeant on many occasionstaught classes to professionally develop the officers and NCOs insubjects such as: OERs and NCOERs, counseling, force protectionmeasures, and promotion board procedures.

The Other Important Stuff

Sometimes inexperienced company commanders can forgetabout the importance of their mortar sections during thiscounterinsurgent fight. On all raids and cordon and searches, Itook a minimum of one 60mm tube with 24 rounds of highexplosive, 12 rounds of illumination, and six white phosphorusrounds. When needed, they suppressed enemy personnel in theobjective area, suppressed personnel attempting to escape,illuminated the battlefield, and marked targets for rotary-wing

air support. Due to the FOB being locatedon the edge of a town, I would periodically(on average four times a week) use mortarillumination rounds as pseudo H&I fires.My intent was to not cause any unnecessarylocal national casualties, but I wanted themto know that we were still there and alert.Additionally, these fire missions wereexecuted in conjunction with QRF drills. Themortar section would be graded and timed inaccordance with ARTEP standards. Thecompany mortar section is an invaluableasset, and they proved themselves during afive-hour battle against the Sadr Militia inNajaf.

Commanders these days usually have apersonal security detachment (PSD). MyPSD was made up of my Javelin section,periodically augmented by my mortarsection. I stood up the company’s Javelinsection 14 months earlier to serve as boththe company’s anti-armor element andscouts. The Soldiers were hand-selectedfor this section and were very well-trainedby their former scout section leader. Acouple of good reasons for using this sectionto serve as the commander’s PSD included:

1) I was not taking combat power awayfrom the rifle platoons;

2) The section’s maintenance and restcycle corresponded with mine;

3) They had a habitual understandingof the commander’s weekly battle rhythm.

The PSD was responsible for ensuringthe commander’s security; whether is wasa mounted or dismounted patrol, a meetingat a government institution, a meeting withreligious leaders, or doing villageassessments.

The company ran a three squad guardrotation for a three-day cycle. What thiscycle would do to the rifle platoons is leavethe platoon leadership with two squads tooperate with at any given time. Prior toassuming guard, the oncoming squadswould assemble in the company ready room(small theater in the FOB) to receive “TheFirst Sergeant’s Guard Mount Brief.” Thisbrief was extremely important because itgot the Soldiers refocused on theirresponsibility of guarding the company.The guard mount would cover the currentenemy threat, rules of engagement andcompany guard SOPs, that included:actions during various types of scenarios,QRF standards, and emergency procedures.

As part of that guard rotation, the squadcoming off would assume the company

QRF. The QRF was augmented with amedic and the ATLS Team (with anambulance) prepared to join them in lessthan five minutes after notification. Thecompany had a QRF staging area where thesquads would stage all their personal andspecial equipment. The QRF squad leaderhad to monitor company operations by oftendropping by the company tacticaloperations center (TOC) to see what wasoccurring in the company’s battle space toincrease his situational awareness. Twicedaily (day and night), the first sergeant,executive officer, or I would conduct a QRFdrill. These drills would incorporate likelytactical scenarios, such as to reinforce apolice traffic control point, friendly unit incontact, high value target (HVT) sighting,friendly vehicle accident, and mass casualtysituation. The drills allowed us to work ondecision-making, battle tracking, casualtyevacuation, indirect fire support, workingwith the police and ING.

The “exploitation team” in a raid iscritical to the ultimate success of theoperation. Their job is to preserve capturedequipment and documents seized duringand after actions on the objective. Anexploitation team was used to maximize theamount of “correct evidence” to take intocustody. This team would consist of a fireteam that would have two digital cameras,a large heavy duty 50-gallon waterproof kitbag filled with large zip lock bags, labels,


Captain Christopher Budihas is currentlyserving as the brigade assistant S-3 for the 2ndBrigade, 25th Infantry Division. He served ascompany commander of A Company, 1st Battalion,14th Infantry from June 2002 to June 2004.

CPT Budihas received his commission thru theMarine Corps’ commissioning program as adistinguished graduate in 1994. He has seven yearsof infantry enlisted service and nine years ofcommissioned infantry service with experience insix combat operations/campaigns during his career.

The company mortar section is an invaluable asset. During a five-hour battle with Sadr militiain Najaf, the company mortar section played a critical role in the engagement.


and black markers. It is critical to properpreserve and record evidence. Thisdetainee will eventually go to a criminalhearing where they will be tried in an Iraqicivilian court of law. Evidence preservationcould be the difference between a terroristgoing to jail for years or getting released.When taking pictures of captured equipment,it’s important to have the terrorist in thepicture with it. It sounds ridiculous, but itwill unquestionably show that the terroristwas present during the capture and the toolsof his trade.

The areas I focused on in this articlewere tested, refined, or discovered in thecombat operations and sacrifices made bythe brave men of Alpha Company. The sixmonths I commanded this company in Iraqwere the most memorable of my militarycareer. I saw the best and worst of warfarein this period, from establishing a well ina village for 73 families to fighting SadrMilitia in Najaf.

SHOULDER PATCHES:IDENTIFICATION FOR THE FUTURE BRIGADES

ROBERT L. GOSCIEWSKI

After World War II, the 92ndInfantry Division saw itscolors retired and its

members move on to other units.Despite its heroic accomplishments inthe Po Valley, the 92nd ID joinedmany other honorable units in theannals of military history. Now, thecolors of the 92nd may fly once more,as the Army of this new century takesthe field.

Most Soldiers are well aware ofthe many transformation initiatives.Begun under Chief of Staff of theArmy General Eric Shinseki andcontinued by CSA General PeterSchoomaker, the “leap ahead” in ourtools of warfare is being realized.The Land Warrior program is bringing21st century technology to the Soldier’sfingertips. The Future Combat System willrevolutionize our equipment and groundtransportation in all dimensions and acrossall five senses. The Warfighter InformationNetwork - Terrestrial will connect everySoldier to enable instant communicationsand information availability. Move. Shoot.Communicate. That’s what it’s all about.

Still, these three programs are simplythe flagship initiatives of ArmyTransformation. There are many otherprojects, each in varying stages fromexperiments to development, toprocurement and fielding. Combined, theywill all work together to produce the FutureForce.

We know that is easier said than done.After a Soldier’s been around for awhile,he will know, or know someone whoknows, the joy of being in a unit thatreceived a new piece of equipment, orundergoes a “modernization” of one of theunits systems, or simply decides to try outa new idea. There’s always some degree ofpain in making it fit. So it’s easy to imaginethe training, education, and reorganization

that will be required when we begin to seeall of these initiatives arriving in our units.

The process of tracking the manyimpacts a new program will have on anArmy unit has been around for awhile. Infact every new program has to documentand plan for the impacts before the systemcan be approved for fielding. This is toensure the new program will be compatiblewith everything it will find out in the “realArmy.” This impact process is known bythe acronym DTLOMPF, after the sevendomains of impacts to be measured —Doctrine, Training, Leadership,Organization, Materiel, People, andFacilities. Like an integrated system, anychange in one of these domains impacts onone or more of the others.

We are seeing this now. Over the lastfew years we introduced new technologiesto make the 4th Infantry Division the

Army’s digitized division. We took thegood ideas that have proven valuable andput them into the mix for Operation IraqiFreedom. One example is theinformation exchange capability of theForce XXI Battle Command Brigade

and Below (FBCB2). We used thenew capabilities and the resultingnew tactics to empower ourleadership and our people forspeed and flexibility.

DISCRETE MODULESFOR THE FUTURE

Now we are beginning toreorganize our units to leveragethe new doctrine and personnel

capabilities as well as the new materiel.At the direction of CSA Schoomaker,the 3rd ID is reforming its threebrigades into five brigades. They willno longer have a division supportcommand (DISCOM). This

reorganization is the first attempt atcreating what the Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC) calls the FutureForce’s Unit of Action (UA). As the Strykerbrigades are the interim solution of theArmy’s transformation, the UA is beingorganized in a modular fashion whose focusis the core competency of the land force

The future Army will be modular, andthe UA is the Army’s brigade-size “buildingblock” for task organizing a force to meetany mission. This model for organizationof the future force can be considered amodular approach to force structure basedon the capabilities requirements necessaryto meet a given operation. This approachprovides the much needed flexibility for thefuture Army. Flexibility is particularlynecessary to meet the many non-core, oftensmall-scale, or humanitarian contingenciesand nation building operations that it isincreasingly called upon to perform. EachUA will be autonomous. Able to operate


independently on the battlefield, it will still workas part of a team with the other UA units undera Unit of Employment (UE).

Both the UE and the UA can be configuredand scaled based on the capabilities needed. AUE is analogous to Joint Task Force headquartersand a Land Force headquarters, depending onthe configuration. The smaller, army-centric UEis currently called a UEx, and the larger, multi-service, theater-wide UE is currently designateda UEy. Either of these headquarters units maywork for a joint task force or may be organizedto work directly for a unified combatantcommander.

In the same way, a UA design is not restricted to a direct combatunit. There will be UA designs for Engineer capabilities,communications or security support capabilities, and forsustainment.

The brigade-sized Units of Action and the Land ForceHeadquarters Units of Employment are being designed to executethe Army’s core competencies. Through these two basic buildingblocks, the Army will construct a versatile force structure toguarantee the American people it will succeed in the two essentialservices: protection of the United States and its interests, and thewaging of land warfare.

Certainly, however, these future units will not be called UA,UEx, and UEy. These terms work well for discussing conceptsand avoiding confusion with the current understanding of brigadeand division capabilities. They do nothing, however, to evoke thecontinuity of spirit from its participants. Undoubtedly, the brigadesof the future force will be called brigades. The division and corpswill disappear in favor of their joint descendants. At these levels,the operational necessities of joint and interagency cooperationwill flatten the organizational structure to produce the headquarterselement, which is focused on coordination and support ofautonomous action entities.

A MODULAR EXAMPLEThe future brigades will come in many flavors. Each will be

tailored and focused toward completion of its part of a jointlyintegrated operation. In addition to the maneuver, aviation andreconnaissance brigades, there will also be sustainment,medical, distribution, and fires brigades. Each will be essentialto the joint land operation, yet their autonomous nature willpermit them to join the force as needed based on the specificrequirement.

Unit sustainment of combat power is a good example toillustrate the new structure. The organic force structurededicated to sustain these future brigade maneuver units islimited roughly to the equivalent of a present day forwardsupport company. This minimal logistics footprint will beadequate to provide all combat support and combat servicesupport functions. These Soldiers will be able to leverage thenetwork centric capabilities afforded by the future logisticsnetworks. The global combat service support informationnetwork will not only provide the right situational awarenessand situational understanding, the information will be packagedto provide the maneuver brigade’s logisticians with actionable

logistics intelligence as needed toaccomplish the mission.

The sustainment UA will be configuredto provide for all of the support service tothe other units on the battlefield based ontheir inherent capabilities. There could bedifferent sustainment UA for the differentphases of the operation. Yet even thisfuturistic construct will be insufficient toprovide all of the needed support from itsown resources. The capability must comefrom the utilization of the supply chain. Theprimary role of the logisticians on the

battlefield will be to control and manage the many service providerswho will be essential for the building and sustainment of combatpower.

A strong logistics support relationship between the customerand the service providers, then, is critical to the sustainment ofthe UA. The logistics support provider will continue to be judgedby timely performance. The future provider, however, will be inthe form of contract suppliers of goods and services. Theeffectiveness of this contractor performance will become theprimary role of the sustainment UA, and the future Armylogistician.

To maintain an adequate logistics infrastructure on thebattlefield, and simultaneously maintain a minimal logisticsfootprint, a shadow force of contractors will provide the logisticsfunctions and services. Contractors are not visible to military forcestructure managers. The combination of private contractor-basedsuppliers on the battlefield and the military sustainment UA willmake up the supply chain from America’s industrial base to theland force customer.

MANY MODULES FOR MULTIPLE CAPABILITIESJust as this simple example for the sustainment brigade quickly

expands, so to will the capabilities-based future brigades connecttogether in a mutually supportive manner to operate under thejoint UE headquarters. This year we are witnessing thetransformation of the 3rd 10 brigades to the UA construct of thefuture. Next will be the 101st Air Assault brigades. Then we’ll seethe conversion of the 10th Mountain units, the 173rd AirborneBrigade, and the 4th 10 brigades. The process will continue untilthe future Army will have 48 maneuver UA brigades.

Each of these future brigades will be separate, independentorganization capable of deploying and operating independentlyfrom the support structure of the old division support organizations.In fact, we expect that each of these 48 new brigades will becomecapable of working with any UE (formerly division) to meet thedemands of the mission of the land force. Each future brigadewill maintain its relative capabilities. The five brigades from the101st will maintain its airmobile capabilities, the five from the10th will still be light mountain brigades, the 173rd will beairborne, and the five brigades from the 4th will possess all of thepower of its mechanized heritage.

It becomes easy to imagine an operation that is headed by aJTF UEx formerly the 3rd 10 leading future UA brigades fromeach of the maneuver divisions discussed. More confusing, thevarious support U.S. brigades could come from this mix of division


The brigade-sized Unitsof Action and the Land

Force HeadquartersUnits of Employmentare being designed to

execute the Army’s corecompetencies.

pool of capabilities, or even from differentorganizations altogether. Thecommunications UA may be from the 1stID, the security UA from the 25th, and theEngineers from the 1st AD.

Consider that there will be at least fivedifferent types of support UA brigades. Ifwe believe the future maneuver UA brigadeswill number 48, and there will beapproximately 12 UEx and four UEyorganizations, there will certainly be a needfor 12 to 15 of each of the five differentsupport brigades. We will soon be facedwith the prospect of 120 brigade-sized UAunits.

UNIT DESIGNATIONSManaging 120 brigades created out of

the current 10 division force structurecreates an interesting problem. Currentlyall brigades in the 82nd AirborneDivision wear the “All American” Soldierpatch. Irrespective of the type of unit,whether Infantry or Artillery, Intelligenceor Signal, Ordnance or Quartermaster,each unit is identified by its basic unit ofdeployment — that is the division. As wemove to separate, autonomous, andindependent brigades as the unit ofdeployment, our brigades will lose theirdivision affinity. Strikingly, thesupporting brigades of communicators,distributors, engineers, security and fireswill more often than not be deployedseparate from their parent UE. This newconstruct threatens to dissipate Soldiers’affinity for their unit.

To rectify the situation, the naturaldecision is to move the focus from thedivision to the brigade. The future moduleproperly looks to the brigade for a specificcapability. The future brigade as the unitof deployment will become an autonomousentity on the battlefield. Even as they workas part of a UE team, their duties andmission will be temporary. Soldiers willidentify with their UA brigade just as todaythey identify with their division.

We run the risk of the division fadinginto the role of quaint heraldry the way theregiment has retreated in importance. Westill have a sense of affinity with ourregiment, and we will probably keep afeeling of pride in our division. Yet, theimmediate camaraderie will be tainted astime and operations separate one soldier’sexperience and perceptions. Unit esprit decorps does bridge generations. Sky Soldiers

who served in the jungle do bond with theirlater counterparts who served in the desert.Still, how many members of the 9thInfantry Regiment (Manchu) share thesame bond with a fellow Manchu even afterdiscovering that one served in Korea whilethe other was in Alaska?

It will streamline unit differentiationwell as task organization to identify UAbrigades. By naming them and providingthem a visible symbol, these brigades willtake on their separate identity. We willavoid confusion when two air assaultmaneuver brigades, a mountain engineerbrigade, a mechanized reconnaissancebrigade and an air assault security brigadejoin a mountain UE for an operation.Which brigade becomesdesignated 1st Brigade? Howdo we designate the two airassault brigades differently?Does the mountain brigadehave special “precedence”because the UE is a mountainUE? Command and controlbecomes much easier if wename each UA brigadeseparately with a capabilitiesrelated unit identity.

RESURRECTING THE 92NDSince the future UA brigade will

perform with the autonomy and freedomof action of our current divisions, and thedivision structure will dissolve in favor ofthe joint UE force, it makes sense todesignate the UA brigades with the nameswe now use for divisions. By leveragingthe division colors and flourishes, the Armywill sustain its sense of history andcontinuity. Also valuable is the comfortderived from leveraging the present senseof affiliation to the currently active units.

There are more than sufficientdivision units to cover the requirement.Coincidentally, there were 48 Americaninfantry divisions in the EuropeanTheater in 1945. That’s not counting thearmored or artillery divisions in theater,or the 21 Army divisions in the PacificTheater. The supporting UA brigadeswould also be designated according to thecapability they brought to the battlefield.The 95th Military Police Brigade and the2nd Signal Brigade could support the92nd Airborne Infantry Brigade. Specialunits, sustainment and RSTA units willpick up their current affiliation or be

Robert Gosciewski is a Department of theArmy civilian who attended the U.S. Army WarCollege while assigned as a logistician for theSouthern European Task Force located in Vicenza,Italy. A former paratrooper, Gosciewski served withthe 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade as well as the559th USAAG. He was a distinguished militarygraduate at the University of Pennsylvania. He alsoholds a Master of Science degree from BostonUniversity, and a Master of Strategic Studies fromthe U.S. Army War College.

Mr. Gosciewski’s two decades of federal serviceinclude various technical and managerial positionsin Alaska, California, Germany, Italy, and Virginia.Additionally, his experiences in the private sectorinclude international operations and informationservices. A Certified Professional Logistician, Mr.Gosciewski is particularly interested in thesustainment of combat power for the future forceon the battlefield. He became interested in brigadeidentification while researching the use of separatebrigades and specialized units.


supplied with resurrected unit designationsthrough the U.S. Army’s Institute ofHeraldry. Even smaller units could bedesignated to meet particular tasks. After60 years, the return of the 766th TankBattalion would surely be welcome.

So the most difficult upgrade to our unitsmay not be a new system or a new tactic forconducting a procedure. To become thefuture UA brigade, our current brigades willbe expected to undergo the stress of changeand detachment from their division. Theresulting impact will cross all of theDTLOMPF domains to become anautonomous force provider of significantcapability. Forty-eight modular maneuver

combat brigades and an undefinednumber of unspecified support

brigades will provide the landpower of tomorrow.

This organizationalchange is happening. Ouracceptance of the newconcepts and the riskassociated with this changebecomes a valuable goal.One way to gain thatacceptance is to reach backto our colorful past to solvean identification problem.

By making our units of deploymentsport the patches of the distinguished unitsof our past, we perpetuate the tradition ofexcellence and ease the tension of progressinto the future.

As the first week in April 2003 drew to a close, theU.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) had completed its wearying drive north from Kuwait and

was poised to attack Baghdad and bring an end to Saddam’s brutalregime. In less than three weeks, it had driven hundreds of miles,fought off hoards of fanatic Fedayeen outside the cities of southernIraq, endured three days of choking sand and dust storms, foughtits way up and over the Najaf escarpment, bulled through theKarbala Gap, and forced a crossing of the Euphrates River. Now,it controlled three major blocking positions to the south, west,and northwest of Baghdad.

On the 5th of April, the division’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team(BCT) had sent a powerful armored force on a slashing, explosive,highly publicized drive north that burst through the heart of thecity and then out again to the airport in the west, in what thetroops later came to call a “Thunder Run.” The audacity of thisbold reconnaissance-in-force surprised the Iraqis and gave the U.S.commander a much better idea of what he would face in the city.Despite the American success, however, the Iraqi propaganda fromits official spokesman, known to the Americans as “Baghdad Bob,”depicted the Thunder Run as a defeat for the Americans andtrumpeted to the world that the defenders of the city had repulsedan attack.

To the west, the 3rd Infantry Division’s 1st BCT under ColonelWill Grimsley was consolidating its positions around the BaghdadInternational Airport (also known as Objective LIONS). The 1stBCT had seized the airport in a daring night attack on 3 Apriland then, reinforced by elements of the 101st Airborne Division(Air Assault), held it against furious Iraqi counterattacks. TaskForce 2-7 Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel ScottRutter, was expanding the 1st BCT’s control eastward along

the main highway heading into the heart of the city but the fightingwas fierce and the progress slow.

To the south, the powerful 2nd BCT, reinforced by TF 1-15Infantry from the 3rd BCT and under the command of ColonelDave Perkins, was sitting firmly in Objective SAINTS, which ithad seized on 4 April. Objective SAINTS was an industrialcomplex along Highway 8 that dominated the road net headingnorthward into the city. On 2 April, Task Force 1-15 Infantry hadled the 3rd Infantry Division attack across the Euphrates River toseize this decisive terrain for V Corps. It was the intersection ofevery key highway leading into the south and west areas ofBaghdad. Every subsequent attack into Baghdad and against theBaghdad Airport would first pass through Objective SAINTS.

Although the U.S. 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF)was fast approaching Baghdad from the southeast and wouldeventually seal off the city east of the Tigris River, V Corps stillhad to isolate the city from the north in order to set the conditionsfor the final attack against Saddam’s capital and the heart of theregime. The 3rd Infantry Division’s commander, Major GeneralBuford Blount, identified a key area north of the city center as thenext objective to complete the isolation in the V Corps zone. Hedesignated this area as Objective TITANS. (The Army gave manyof the major Army objectives around Baghdad the names ofprofessional football teams.)

The 3rd BCT commander, Colonel Dan Allyn, knew that soonhe would be called on to complete the ring of tanks and fightingvehicles around Baghdad.

The 3rd Infantry Division’s 3rd BCT is known around the Armyby its nickname, “the Sledgehammer Brigade.” It had been heavilyengaged around the city of Karbala since the first of April. Twoof its combat elements, TF 1-30 Infantry and TF 2-69 Armor, had

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A Mechanized Infantry Brigade in Urban CombatARTHUR A. DURANTE



been fighting a frustrating and wearyingbattle to contain Iraqi irregulars in the citywhile the rest of the brigade combat teamprotected the division and corps unitspassing through the Karbala Gap.

By 2 April, TF 2-69 Armor, commandedby Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Sanderson, hadfought its way to a desolate stretch ofhighway about 10 kilometers southeast ofKarbala. It was here that his sister battalionin the 3rd BCT, TF 1-15 Infantry, hadfought a fierce battle against fanatical IraqiInfantry in trenches and bunkers astride thehighway two days earlier while under COLPerkins’ command. Even this punishmenthad not diminished the Iraqi desire to makeheadlong and often seemingly suicidalattacks against the long convoys of the 3rdInfantry Division streaming towards thegap between the city of Karbala and thelarge freshwater lake further to the west.

Late that afternoon, LTC Sanderson wasordered to attack with his task force upalong the eastern side of the city, to containthe Iraqi forces and to cut off theirreinforcements from the north. The nightwas exceptionally black, with no moon.Low, dark clouds blocked even the dim lightof the desert stars. The task forcecommander made the comment that it wasso dark that he was actually under “negativeillumination.”

Despite this handicap, TF 2-69 Armorground its way inexorably northward toisolate the eastern side of the city. Duringthis advance, it came under fire fromsophisticated RPG ambushes from well-prepared fighting positions as well as by

suicide bombers, leading the commanderto fear that he was facing “professionalterrorists.” The roads on which the tankswere moving turned to dirt and becamenarrower as they entered the irrigatedfarmlands close to the city. The lushvegetation reminded many Soldiers ofscenes they had watched on TV showingthe jungle fighting in Vietnam. Thefighting was so close that tank commanderswere using their 9mm pistols to shoot atIraqi RPG gunners who would rise up fromthe roadside and fire rockets at point-blankrange.

Task Force 1-30 Infantry, commandedby Lieutenant Colonel Wes Gillman, movednorth also and tightened the ring aroundKarbala, hooking south and fighting fiercebut small-scale local counterattacks astogether they compressed the enemy forcesinto smaller and smaller areas of the city.

Even while it was coordinating theseefforts to isolate Karbala with tank andmechanized Infantry forces, the 3rd BCTstaff was busy coordinating with the 2ndBCT of the 101st Airborne Division as itmoved to assume the mission. Transferringresponsibility for clearing the enemy outof Karbala to the 101st Airborne Divisionwould free the 3rd BCT for its next task.The 101st Airborne Division assumedresponsibility for the Karbala area on 5April, and the 3rd BCT immediately beganto reposition and move north to prepare forthe upcoming combat operations inBaghdad.

With the next fight looming, the 3rdBCT went through several changes in its

task organization. Earlier, the 1-10th FieldArtillery Battalion, commanded byLieutenant Colonel John Harding, and TF1-15 Infantry, under the command ofLieutenant Colonel John Charlton, hadbeen sent to reinforce the 2nd BCT as itseized Objective SAINTS. LTC Hardingarrayed the 1-10th FA’s massive 155mmhowitzers in firing positions in the southernsection of Objective SAINTS, helping toisolate Baghdad from any remaining Iraqiforces that might move along Highway 8.

The Infantrymen and tankers of TF 1-15Infantry, which had borne the bulk of thecombat during the initial seizure ofObjective SAINTS were still in place there,helping to secure the ground and to fendoff the groups of Iraqis making scatteredbut deadly attacks with small arms,machine guns, and rocket-propelledgrenades (RPGs).

Late in the afternoon on 5 April, the 3rdBCT received an order that was to bringboth the 1-10th Field Artillery and TF 1-15Infantry back to their habitual organization.For the first time since the early fightingaround the southern town of An Nasyria,the 3rd BCT would be back together again,this time for its attack into Baghdad.

Just after dawn on the morning of 6April, LTC Harding and LTC Charlton metwith COL Allyn at a road junction onHighway 1 in Objective SAINTS. Theywere there to get the final order for theattack to seize Objective TITANS andcomplete the isolation of Baghdad.Standing in a small group next to the road,the officers quickly copied the maneuvergraphics onto their maps and completedtheir final coordination.

There was electricity in the air whenCOL Allyn met with his commandersbeside the road in Objective SAINTS. AsLTC Harding put it, “It was a great feelingfor us to be together again. We were aspumped up as we could be! There was noapprehension at all about attackingBaghdad. It was all clicking like clockworkby then.”

In normal times, the 3rd BCT isn’tstationed at Fort Stewart with the rest ofthe 3rd Infantry Division. Its home is 200miles away at Fort Benning, Georgia, whereit’s the only mechanized Infantry and armorforce on post. The organization wasexceptionally close-knit, not just becauseof its geographic isolation from theremainder of the 3rd Infantry Division, but

Major John Seagars, the executive officer for Task Force 2-69 Armor, walks down a Baghdadstreet while an Abrams tank patrols to his right in April 2003.

Specialist Adam Nuelken

also because of what its Soldiers had gone through together overthe past year.

In 2002, the 3rd BCT had completed a grueling train-up andthen a six-month deployment to Kuwait. It had come home forless than three months and then, in January 2003, deployed againto confront Iraq in this war. The men had trained at the NationalTraining Center together, deployed together, trained in Kuwaitfor six months, come home for a while, and then returned foranother round of rigorous training in the desert of Kuwait. Thebrigade was emotionally taunt, desert-hardened, and cohesive toa degree unknown since World War II.

Unit cohesion notwithstanding, since crossing the border andseizing Tallil Airbase in the opening days of the war, the fullbrigade had not fought as a single integrated unit. One or moreof the maneuver task forces had always been detached and fightingunder the command of other brigade combat teams.

LTC Sanderson’s TF 2-69 Armor had been detached from the3rd BCT immediately after the fight at Tallil Air Base and sent tothe 1st BCT. It was with the “Raiders” of 1st BCT that TF 2-69Armor fought a ferocious battle at Al Kifl.

LTC Charlton’s TF 1-15 Infantry had been passed to the controlof the 2nd BCT as it fought northwestward along Highway 9through the town of As Samawa and towards Karbala. This unithad fought a long, wearying, and confused battle againstdetermined but uncoordinated Iraqi resistance along Highway 9and in a large expanse of bunkers and trench lines severalkilometers outside Karbala. Earlier, one of its mechanized Infantryand tank company teams (B Company, under Captain DoughPhilippone) had even been sent on an independent mission almost75 kilometers west of the main body, where it seized and held amajor bridge over the Euphrates for several days, preventing anyIraqi counterattacks.

Even the 3rd BCT’s direct support artillery battalion had been

sent to support other unitsseveral times, eventually firingin support of all of the maneuverbrigades of the 3rd Division atone time or another. For now,however, for this vital mission,the men and women of the 3rdBCT would be together again …and they were elated with theprospect. It was their turn tostep up to the plate.

Moving OutAt 0508 hours on 6 April, the

lead element of COL Allyn’s 3rdBCT, TF 2-69 Armor, crossedthe line of departure atObjective PEACH, the maincrossing of the Euphrates River,and began a 110-kilometerattack to the northwest andnorth. More than 60 kilometersof that attack would beconducted under heavy firefrom defending Iraqi forces.

The 3rd BCT moved from its assembly areas west of theEuphrates and crossed the river using the recently capturedhighway bridge and the auxiliary floating bridge put in by thecombat engineers. It then continued northeasterly along RouteCUB into Objective SAINTS where TF 1-15 Infantry and 1-10Field Artillery had been fighting as part of the 2nd BCT. TaskForce 1-15 Infantry joined the massive column there, and nowtogether again, these units made the turn to the northwest towardsObjective MONTGOMERY.

Objective MONTGOMERY was a blocking position at theintersection of Highways 1 and 10, almost due west of the BaghdadInternational Airport being held by COL Grimsley’s 1st BCT.Alpha Troop, 3-7 Cavalry held Objective MONTGOMERY,guarding the western flank of the 3rd BCT moving north towardsObjective TITANS and providing advance warning of any majorIraqi counterattack from the northwest. Manning such an isolatedblocking position was a classic cavalry mission, and the trooperson Objective MONTGOMERY were executing it with all the styleand panache the Army has come to expect of them.

Delta Troop, 10th Cavalry, the 3rd BCT’s organicreconnaissance troop, led the brigade’s powerful main effort, theM1 tanks and the Bradley fighting vehicles of TF 2-69 Armor,northwest along the major highway towards ObjectiveMONTGOMERY. There, it linked up with the battle-hardenedtroopers of the 3-7 Cavalry. This position marked the northernand western extent of the ground secured by the 3rd InfantryDivision. As LTC Harding described it, “Past that point, it wasall Indian country.” The 3rd BCT columns made the turn at thecavalry outpost, heading back northeast now, towards the TigrisRiver, but now north of the center of Baghdad.

After the light-skinned reconnaissance vehicles of Delta Troop,the 3rd BCT’s order of march had a tank and mechanized Infantryteam, known as Team Assassin (A Company, 2-69 Armor,

Figure 1 - 3rd BCT Scheme of Maneuver



commanded by CPT Stu James) leading.The next combined arms team, known asTeam Hard Rock, built around C Company,1-15 Infantry, followed Team Assassin. TheTF 2-69 Armor combat trains were next,nestled close behind the combat vehiclesfor protection. Then came COL Allyn’stactical command post in two trackedvehicles, followed by elements of BCompany, 317th Engineers, then the tank-pure C Company, 2-69 Armor. FollowingTF 2-69 Armor were the howitzers of 1-10th Field Artillery, which were themselvesfollowed by TF 1-30 Infantry. The combat-scarred vehicles of TF 1-15 Infantrybrought up the rear. The powerful columnstretched for miles along the narrowhighway route.

COL Allyn was riding in his HMMWVand not the armored vehicle he normallyused. His M113 had broken down andcould not be fixed because of a lack of repairparts. Rather than take a replacementvehicle from one of his subordinates, theBCT commander chose to risk the ride inthe light unarmored HMMWV, a move thatcame close to costing him his life later.

First ContactAs TF 2-69 Armor passed through the

checkpoint manned by A Troop, 3-7Cavalry at Objective MONTGOMERY, theyoung Cavalry troop commander advised

COL Allyn and LTC Sanderson that therehad been firefights around his position allnight and that they should expect imminentenemy contact as soon as they cleared thecheckpoint. Several officers rememberedthe A Troop commander saying, “Once youget 300 meters up that road, you’re goingto make contact.”

The weary cavalryman knew what hewas talking about. By that time in the war,they almost always did. The reconnaissanceHMMWVs of D Troop pulled over and letthe heavy tanks of TF 2-69 Armor take thelead. The tanks and Bradley fightingvehicles of Team Assassin immediatelymoved into a combat formation as theycleared the cavalry positions. (See Figure1- 3rd BCT Scheme of Maneuver)

Objective SMITH, the first of many roadjunctions 3rd BCT planned to seize, waslocated in a small cluster of buildings andhomes where the highway made an “S”turn to the east and then back north. At0850 hours, TF 2-69 Armor ’s leadelements entering Objective SMITH cameunder small arms and RPG fire. Theyreturned fire and the engagement rapidlyescalated, with the Iraqis opening up withmortars and artillery fire. The task forceengaged and destroyed at least one T-72tank and there were several other Iraqiarmored vehicles firing from revetedpositions within the urban area.

The battle began to settle into whatbecame a familiar pattern. As eachcompany team approached the vicinity ofthe objective, it would come under heavysmall arms and RPG fire from multipledirections. This was the beginning of a 10-hour, nonstop running battle to defeat theenemy in Objective TITANS, a huge areawith hundreds of buildings, severalsignificant canals, and two major bridges.Its seizure by 3rd BCT would complete theisolation of the city on the west of the TigrisRiver. (See Figure 2 - 3rd BCT Objectivesin TITANS)

COL Allyn, traveling close behind TF2-69 Armor, continually called for artilleryfires from the 1-10th Field Artillery. Atthe same time, he targeted the Iraqi armorand bunkers with close air support from AirForce A-10 Warthogs. Although they neverslacked the fires they were delivering insupport of TF 2-69 Armor, LTC Harding’sartillerymen came under heavy attackthemselves at this time. They were forcedto defend their position while still feedingthe heavy shells into the howitzers andpounding the enemy with deadly volleys.

Almost as soon as the howitzer crewshad fired the first rounds in support of TF2-69 Armor at Objective SMITH, theybegan to receive heavy indirect fire as wellas direct fires from groups of Iraqis usingsmall arms and RPGs. Some of the Iraqigunners even launched their rockets frombehind buildings, aiming them high in theair so as to arc up and over before comingdown in the artillery firing positions.Despite the incoming fire, the howitzerscontinued to pound away at the enemy inObjective SMITH.

3rd BCT fought through ObjectiveSMITH, receiving continuous fire as theentire brigade formation passed. As eachunit passed through, there was intermittentcontact with individual Iraqi militaryvehicles, civilian trucks mountingautomatic weapons, and small groups ofIraqis fighting on foot with small arms andthe ubiquitous RPG. Objective SMITH wastroublesome for a long time. The fire fromthe area around the overpass waxed andwaned, but it didn’t cease completely untilthe Soldiers of TF 1-30 Infantry deployedand pushed the Iraqis out of the adjacentarea later.

As called for in the 3rd BCT plan, TaskForce 1-15 Infantry turned 90 degreeseastward near Objective SMITH and began

Figure 2 - 3rd BCT Objectives in TITANS


to clear enemy positions in its zone. Itattacked and secured a large maintenancefacility that COL Allyn would later use forthe Brigade Support Area. The task forcemade significant enemy contact from thebeginning. During one of the nearlycontinuous firefights, an RPG wounded thecommander of B Company, 1-64 Armor buthe was able to return to his unit the nextday.

As the task force’s lead element, TeamBaker (built around Bravo Company 1-15 Infantry, commandedby Captain Doug Philippone) rolled under an overpass, the numberone tank spotted an enemy T-72 with his cannon oriented directlyon the company column. The American tank fired first and the T-72 erupted into flames. As the column bypassed the burningwreckage on the narrow road, the commander of the probingAbrams spotted another Iraqi tank and destroyed it as well.

The fighting was so confused, and at such confined quarters,that one of the B Company Bradley fighting vehicles smashedinto one of the burning Iraqi tanks during the melee and the vehiclecommander suffered a severe concussion. The company destroyedmore than 20 military vehicles and 10 Iraqi artillery pieces duringthis fight.

As TF 1-15 Infantry battled the Iraqis in the urban area east ofthe main route, TF 2-69 Armor continued north to ObjectiveCUSTER, a sharp right turn at a canal that marked the brigade’snorthern boundary. LTC Sanderson described the 40-kilometerroute from Objective SMITH to Objective CUSTER as “a constantgauntlet of fire.”

It was along this route that an M113 armored personnel carrierof the 317th Engineers was hit with an RPG that killed PrivateGregory P. Huxley, the first fatal casualty of the day. Later, PVTHuxley’s comrades would create an informal memorial to theirfallen friend on the side of the APC, and an unknown photographerwould make it famous, but for now, the attack continued withoutpause.

At 1136 hours, Team Assassin (TF 2-69 Armor) destroyed acompany-sized element of Iraqi mechanized vehicles along thecanal. At Objective CUSTER, the sharp turn to the east along thecanal road, TF 2-69 Armor engaged and destroyed several BMPsand T-62 tanks along with at least 18 BM-21 rocket launchers.

A bizarre sight greeted Team Assassin as it made the turn tothe east on the canal road. Standing almost in the middle of thehighway were several Iraqi officers busy stripping off theiruniforms to reveal the civilian clothes they were wearing beneath.In full uniform or not, they were armed combatants who weremaking no offer of surrender. They were shot and killed beforethey could complete their change of clothing.

LTC Sanderson was determined that he would not allow hisattack to become bogged down fighting every single Iraqi elementhe ran into. His mission was to move rapidly to the north of thecity and to seal it off, not to have a long, drawn-out fight in thebuilt-up area. He pushed the task force to keep moving. If hereceived fire from a sniper on a roof, he used artillery, tank fire,or CAS to bring the building down and then move on.

The commander of TF 2-69 Armor moved far to the front ofthe lengthy column. His tank was just behind the commander of

Team Assassin who was following his leadtank platoon. LTC Sanderson, along with thebattalion fire support officer, Captain AndyMcLean, and the USAF air liaison officer inhis M113, were all grouped close togetherright behind CPT James, the teamcommander.

As they moved along the canal road,artillery support from 1-10th Field Artillerywas falling to the left of the road while low-flying CAS aircraft were engaging any Iraqi

force directly to the front. The pilot reports from these CASaircraft, A-10s, F-15s and F-16s were keeping the task forceinformed on what to expect as it advanced. LTC Sanderson said,“It was always comforting to see the A-10s coming in. The fieldartillery support was spot-on. You couldn’t have asked for a betterartillery barrage.”

As the 3rd BCT was fighting Iraqi forces in Objective TITANS,the 3-7 Cavalry was still maintaining the guard on the westernflank at Objective MONTGOMERY. At 1232 hours, the cavalrydestroyed eight T-72s along with a BMP as they attacked theoutnumbered but not out-gunned troop. Five of the T-72s werereported as having reactive armor and that drew considerableattention from everyone who heard the report. If it were accurate,it might mean that the most modern and well-equipped elementsof the Iraqi Republican Guards were attacking. Throughout theday there were reports from various sources of Iraqi convoysattempting to escape from the city to the north and west.

At 1308 hours, the 3rd Infantry Division’s assistant divisioncommander discussed the combat team’s progress with COL Allyn.Everyone was beginning to realize that Baghdad was literally an“armed camp.” There were heavy anti-aircraft weapons, artillery,tanks, BMPs and other military equipment everywhere the unitturned.

There were so many huge secondary explosions from thedestroyed Iraqi vehicles, and they were so close to the road TF 2-69 Armor was using, that LTC Sanderson was thinking about hiscombat and field trains, worried that the wheeled vehicles mightnot be able to make it through to him. Large chunks of debrisfrom exploding Iraqi tanks and BMPs often blocked the road.Many HMMWVs were driving with flat tires because of all thesharp metal fragments.

By 1530 hours, the 3rd BCT had seized Objective PATTON,the north/south intersection of Highway 1 where it crossed overthe canal. LTC Sanderson assigned responsibility for ObjectivePATTON to Captain Carter Price, commander of C Company, 2-69 Armor. Most elements of the task force field trains stoppedthere within CPT Price’s protective perimeter until they were calledto come out and conduct refuel and resupply later in the day.

After C Company was established on Objective PATTON, TF2-69 Armor moved far to the south, seized Objective MONTY,and began to clear the areas around it. This was the most criticalof the task force’s objectives, the main highway bridge over theTigris River in Objective TITANS. Captain Stu James and hisTeam Assassin secured the bridge and several buildings aroundthe approaches.

Soon afterwards the tank and mechanized infantry forces ofTeam Hard Rock attacked the bridge at Objective ROMMEL,

“It was always comfortingto see the A-10s coming

in. The field artillerysupport was spot-on. Youcouldn’t have asked for abetter artillery barrage.”

— LTC J.R. SandersonTF 2-69 commander

where the canal intersected the Tigris River.This movement was made from south tonorth and for the moment it completed theTF 2-69 Armor plan for seizing crossingsites on the Tigris.

Things were fairly quiet until about 1830hours when dismounted Iraqi infantryattacked the TF 2-69 Armor combat trainsnear Objective MONTY. COL Allyn, stilltraveling in his HMMWV close behind TF2-69 Armor, had pulled into the grounds ofthe Iraqi Petroleum Institute and stoppednear some 2,500-gallon fuel tankers and aheavily loaded ammunition truck. Theattackers poured a surprise burst of fire intothese tempting targets and at thecommander’s vulnerable HMMWV. Quickreturn fire from LTC Harding’s Bradley andfrom elements of TF 2-69 Armor eliminatedthe threat to the brigade commander, butnot before the ammunition truck had beenhit.

The ammunition carried in the truck caught fire and began tocook off. Despite the best efforts of the drivers and other Soldiersof the combat trains, the fire quickly spread from the ammunitiontruck to one of the fuel tankers. Both vehicles were completelydestroyed and several Soldiers were wounded. Sadly, Private KellyPrewitt, a member of the Support Platoon, received mortal injurieswhile defending his vehicle in this brief but deadly fight. Despitethe best efforts of the battalion medics, PVT Prewitt died whilebeing evacuated.

At about this time, CPT Price on Objective PATTON cameunder attack by dismounted Iraqi forces moving through somebuildings near the crossing site on the canal. Knowing that thetank-pure C Company lacked supporting infantry, LTC Sandersongathered a small scratch force made up of the men and vehiclesaround his command post. This ad hoc group, including LTCSanderson in his Bradley fighting vehicle, CPT Rappaport, thecommander of Team Hard Rock in his, an artillery fire supportteam vehicle and one other Bradley moved to the north quickly toassist the tankers.

Just after the threat to Objective PATTON was repulsed, theIraqis counterattacked against both the northern and southern endsof the U.S, positions at the bridge over the Tigris near ObjectiveMONTY. The attacking force initially consisted of dismountedinfantry, but several T-72 tanks and BMPs soon joined in. Therewas significant fighting there, the start of what turned out to bemore than 60 hours of combat for Objective MONTY. The fightingswirled around the objective, and the situation was often unclear,but COL Allyn thought the Iraqis were attempting to breakout ofBaghdad or at least to open Highway 1 as an escape route forother forces still within the city.

One Iraqi T-72 made it within 300 meters of the bridge beforeit was destroyed. Task Force 2-69 Armor defeated this initialcounterattack and at 1912 hours, the 3rd BCT reported to 3rdInfantry Division headquarters that the situation was under controlat all locations, at least for now. LTC Sanderson conferred withCOL Allyn and requested that he attach another maneuver

company to the task force in order to secure the most southernarea of Objective TITANS, a site designated as ObjectiveBRADLEY. COL Allyn agreed and attached A Company 1-15Infantry to TF 2-69 Armor.

As the sun began to set on April 6th, the combat team hadforces arrayed across the breadth of Objective TITANS. Task Force1-15 Infantry, having detached its Alpha Company, was orientedto the south, controlling the routes into the objective area. Allwas not quiet there, however, and the unit engaged and destroyedthree tanks late in the afternoon. Task Force 1-30 Infantry wasclearing the last Iraqi die-hards out of the urban area aroundObjective SMITH while D Troop 10th Cavalry occupied ObjectiveCUSTER in the northwest. Task Force 2-69 Armor had company-sized forces on Objectives PATTON, ROMMEL, MONTY andBRADLEY.

The first day’s fight to isolate the city in the 3rd InfantryDivision’s zone was nearly complete. The 3rd BCT had foughtthrough elements of the Special Republican Guard, theHAMMURABI Republican Guards Division, and possibly the Iraqiforce’s Corps Artillery. The stage was now set for further attacksinto the city, but the Iraqis had not given up. The quiet of earlyevening was soon to be shattered.

The Fight Renews – Objective MONTYAlthough the 3rd BCT’s area of operations was calm in the

early evening, the Iraqis attacked fiercely just after it became fullydark. A significant amount of indirect fire fell on ObjectivesROMMEL and MONTY. Counterfire from 1-10th Field Artillerylashed out and the competing explosions reverberated back andforth across the river. The objectives were close enough to eachother that Soldiers on one could see and hear the rounds landingon the others.

The Iraqis followed up their artillery and mortar fire with apowerful combined arms attack against Objective MONTY usingtanks, BMPs and dismounted Infantry. Unfortunately for them,Team Hard Rock, holding Objective ROMMEL, had observed them

U.S. Army photo

A 3rd Infantry Division Soldier sits atop his Bradley in Baghdad, Iraq, in April 2003.



as they moved southeastward along theriverbank. Although the Iraqis were out ofdirect fire range, the fire support team withthe company engaged with indirect fire andsent reports that alerted the men of ACompany, 2-69 Armor on the bridge atObjective MONTY to the impending attack.

According to LTC Sanderson, bothartillery and CAS were extremely effectivedue in large measure to the Army’s fieldingof the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle(BFIST). This vehicle has an integratedlaser that allows precision targeting andsubsequent increased lethality fromsupporting fires.

The Iraqis made a concerted effort toseize the bridge at MONTY. The fightinglasted all night and into the early morningof April 7th. COL Allyn called multipleair strikes against the enemy armoredvehicles firing on the friendly positionsfrom across the Tigris. As the pressureagainst the bridge mounted, 3rd BCTbrought concentrated fires from USAFCAS, field artillery, and TF 2-69 Armor’spowerful 120mm mortars to bear. This,combined with the direct fire of the 120mmtank guns and the deadly 25mm cannonsof the Bradley fighting vehicles, destroyedmany Iraqi armored vehicles. Despite thelosses they took, the Iraqis pressed theirattacks closer and closer to the bridge.

At one point in the battle, the Iraqis evenmoved a heavy construction crane into

position, apparently in an attempt toremove some of the destroyed vehicles thatwere by now blocking the bridgeapproaches. This crane was detected as itslowly crawled its way past the alertinfantrymen on Objective ROMMEL. Thefire support team from the 1-10th FieldArtillery called in the artillery fires thatdestroyed it.

At approximately 0600 hours on April7th, the Iraqi attack reached its peak.According to observers, the enemy had“tons of stuff on the other side of the river.”There was an entire Engineer bridgecompany with all its vehicles andequipment in addition to the large IraqiInfantry force armed with RPGs, heavymachine guns, and mortars.

As a company-sized enemy force closedin on his position, the commander of ACompany, 2-69 Armor sent a radio messagethat had not been heard in this war untilthen. He called for the supporting artilleryto fire his final protective fires (FPF).

Commanders in a defense designate aline just outside of their positions where, ifthe defense gets desperate, all guns andother weapons systems available fire alongthis line, theoretically creating a protectivewall of fire. Calling for an FPF is, inunderstated Army parlance, “a significantemotional event.” It meant that thesituation, while perhaps not critical, wascertainly serious. It was getting “really

serious” on Objective MONTY.Fortunately, the company’s fire support

team was well prepared. It had not onlyplotted the FPF earlier in the day during alull in contact, it had actually been able toadjust the impact of live rounds until theywere hitting precisely where they wereneeded. The gunners of the 1-10th FieldArtillery entered the firing data into thecomputerized systems of their Paladinhowitzers. The battalion heavy mortarplatoon did the same with their simplermortar ballistic computers, and waited forthe call.

When the order came to fire the FPF, 1-10th Field Artillery unleashed 30 minutesof continuous rapid fire, pounding theattacking Iraqis and placing a protectivewall in front of the hard-pressed Americanforces. In addition to the artillery andmortar FPF, the 3rd BCT also called inmore Air Force close air support, smashingthe final Iraqi assault just short of thebridge. As LTC Sanderson said, “Theenemy was in a caldron there. The A-10swere at treetop level doing strafing runsagainst enemy columns.”

But the infantrymen and tankers werenot the only Soldiers in close combat withthe Iraqis. As it was repositioning to bettersupport the brigade, A Battery, 1-10th FieldArtillery did something few artillerymenhave ever done. It engaged and destroyedtwo T-72 tanks using direct fire. The Iraqitanks were hidden under the trees across acanal from the howitzer battery. The huge155mm explosive projectiles smashed theenemy tanks and the battery continued itsmovement.

The Iraqis continued their efforts torecapture the bridges over the Tigris,making at least two significant efforts tocross the bridges at Objective MONTY.COL Allyn was short of combat forces todefend them all. He requested permissionto blow up both the bridges and deny themto the Iraqis. This would free his forcesfrom static defensive positions and allowthem to continue to clear the remainingportions of Objective TITANS on the westside of the river.

Initially this request was denied, but astrange situation developed at ObjectiveMONTY concerning the bridge there. Atthe same time that COL Allyn wasrequesting permission to destroy it, Iraqiinfiltrators were working to do the verysame thing themselves. It is a clear

Army Public Affairs officials and other media representatives interview Captain Stew James ofTask Force 2-69 Armor regarding the fighting at Objective MONTY April 6, 2003.

Specialist Daniel T. Dark

measure of the intensity and confusion of the fighting when oneconsiders that both sides felt it would be to their tactical advantageto destroy the same bridge at the same time.

Working undetected, Iraqi sappers managed to put explosiveson the eastern abutment of the bridge and actually dropped part ofit. The destruction was not complete, however, and the bridgeremained useable. Later, permission came down for COL Allynto destroy the bridge at Objective ROMMEL. The Air Forcedropped the span neatly on the second try with a pair of precision-guided bombs.

Intense fighting raged around the perimeter of ObjectiveTITANS for the next two days. COL Allyn had been told thatMarines from I MEF would link up with his forces from the otherside of the Tigris within 12 to 15 hours, but the Marine attack wasstalled and did not arrive until more than two days later, on the9th of April. This delay allowed the Iraqis east of the Tigris Riverto concentrate their attacks against the HAMMER Brigade inObjective TITANS.

On April 8th, the third day of the fight in TITANS, the 3rdBCT sent TF 1-15 Infantry attacking south towards ObjectiveLIONS (the Baghdad Airport), which was still held by 1st BCT.The Iraqis were far from beaten. They still had significant forcesand they knew how to use their weapons. During this attack, asupporting A-10 Warthog was hit by Iraqi anti-aircraft fire andseverely damaged. The pilot managed to guide his craft towardsfriendly forces and ejected near Objective PEACH where he wasrecovered.

Task Force 1-15 Infantry attacked along the Abu GhuraybHighway to seize an electrical substation, Objective ORACLE,and two key highway intersections, Objective TRINITY andObjective NEO. LTC Charlton began his attack with B Company,1-64 Armor in the lead followed by B and then A Companies, 1-15 Infantry. Heavy artillery, mortar, and close air support firesalong the highway and on top of both objectives preceded theattack. At Objective TRINITY, B Company, 1-64 Armor receivedfire from enemy forces under the overpass and engaged with directand indirect fire, killing approximately 20 enemies and destroyingseveral trucks.

The tank company continued to attack through to ObjectiveNEO, destroying many enemy Infantry enroute and destroying ordisabling 20 artillery pieces. It established blocking positions inthe vicinity of the grid line at 37 Easting, and there it withstoodheavy enemy anti-armor and small arms fire. An enemy anti-tank weapon penetrated the turret armor of one of the tanks andwounded the crew but the company continued fighting until allenemies at that position were destroyed.

Team Baker (B Company, 1-15 Infantry) secured ObjectiveTRINITY when B Company, 1-64 AR moved into position aroundObjective NEO. Both companies continued to engage and destroyenemy counterattacks throughout the day. The TF 1-15 Infantrycommander was positioned with his Bradley fighting vehicle onthe road between the two objectives and from there he engagedand destroyed three enemy trucks that were counterattacking intothe task force.

That afternoon (8 April 03) the LTC Charlton ordered BCompany, 1-15 Infantry and B Company, 1-64 Armor to seizeObjective ORACLE and ordered A Company, 1-15 INF, recentlyreturned from assisting TF 2-69 Armor, to move to and assume

responsibility for Objectives NEO and TRINITY. Not long afterA Company established its initial blocking positions on ObjectivesNEO and TRINITY, it began to receive heavy small arms andRPG fire.

The A Company commander used indirect fire on all thesuspected Iraqi locations. This temporarily stopped the enemyfire. After about two hours of fighting, an RPG hit one of theunit’s Bradley fighting vehicles while it was repositioning on thesouth side of the intersection. The vehicle was severely damaged,but the crew was not injured. In 24 hours, Team Able (A Company,1-15 Infantry) destroyed 15 enemy vehicles and an unknownnumber of RPG teams. Throughout the night the positionscontinued to take random RPG rounds.

For the next two days, Task Force 1-15 Infantry continued toattack along the Abu Ghurayb Highway and cleared enemy forcesin its zone. On 11 April, CPT Philippone, Commander of BCompany 1-15 Infantry, received reports that there were 50 Syrianand Palestinian fighters occupying a road intersection in acommercial district in Baghdad ten kilometers southeast of theTask Force, in the 2nd BCT zone. Seizing this opportunity, LTCCharlton proposed to COL Allyn and COL Perkins that heimmediately launch an attack against that force. The missionwas approved and LTC Charlton ordered CPT Philippone and hisB Company, 1-15 Infantry to conduct the attack.

The source of the information CPT Philippone received reportedthat the enemy was waiting for U.S. forces to move through anintersection so they could ambush them. The B Companycommander organized his force into two elements, each with atank section supporting a Bradley platoon.

The first element attacked the western portion of the intersectionand the second attacked the eastern. Both attacked rapidly and asthe combat vehicles established attack-by-fire positions aroundthe intersection, the Infantry dismounted and began to clear thearea.

CPT Philippone’s attack achieved total surprise and quicklykilled a large number of enemy personnel. The western elementreceived heavy RPG and small arms fire from three directions.The company executive officer identified the enemy fires as comingfrom a building and began to suppress the building with tank and


Staff Sergeant Kevin P. Bell

3rd Infantry Division Soldiers apprehend a civilian walking in an off-limits area of Baghdad April 15, 2003.

Bradley fire. The combat vehiclescontinued to fire on the buildings and bunkerswhile the infantry cleared buildings and alleysaround the intersection. Many of the enemyforces pretended to be dead only to engagethe Americans when they came to searchthem. All of the enemy bunkers were riggedwith booby traps.

B Company, 1-64 Armor also conductedan urban raid on 11 April based on anotherhuman intelligence (HUMINT) report. Itmoved east on the Abu Ghurayb Highwayto the 37 Easting grid line where enemyforces attacked it with RPGs, recoillessrifles, and small arms. The companyreacted immediately to the contact andkilled about 20 enemy personnel. One ofthe company’s tanks was hit and penetratedby a recoilless rifle. Even though wounded,the crew continued to fight until it was laterevacuated to the battalion aid station.

Task Force 1-15 retained control ofObjectives TRINITY and NEO and clearedthe Abu Ghurayb Highway and surroundingurban areas. The damage this fight did tothe Iraqis was immense. The task forcedestroyed eight tanks, 58 BMPs, and 44light armed trucks. It killed more than 150Iraqi infantry and took 15 prisoners of war.

Early in the morning of April 10th, afterclearing the remainder of ObjectiveTITANS, 3rd BCT made its last majorattack of the war. Task Force 2-69 Armorattacked south down the west side of theTigris River along Highway 1 all the wayto downtown Baghdad. There, it linked upwith elements of the 2nd BCT that hadstayed downtown after a second ThunderRun on April 7th.

This final attack by the 3rd BCT,supported by an elaborate program ofpreparatory fires, overwhelmed the weakand disorganized resistance put up by theIraqis. Task Force 1-30 Infantry followedin support of TF 2-69 Armor and clearedout the last pockets of resistance. WhenCOL Allyn’s 3rd BCT completed the linkupwith 2nd BCT in the heart of the city, itsignaled that V Corps had completed itsattack to seize and control Baghdad.

As resistance melted away, 3rd BCTforces occupied the area around the“Mother of All Mosques,” a massivemosque complex in the center of Baghdad.The Soldiers discovered that the apartmentsacross the street from the mosque were, inreality, an elaborate deception. Instead ofreal buildings, it was a false front that hid

Arthur A. Durante is currently serving asdeputy chief of Doctrine, Doctrine and CollectiveTraining Division, Combined Arms and TacticsDirectorate, U.S. Army Infantry School, FortBenning, Georgia.

Sergeant Igor Paustovski

Soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Division’s TF 3-7 Cavalry guard a bridge in Baghdad on April 10, 2003.


a large Iraqi ammunition dump.Apparently this was an attempt by the Iraqisto use the Americans’ reluctance to attacknear a mosque as a way to protect theirmilitary supplies. It was not the only timethe Americans discovered such ruses, but itwas one of the most elaborate of them all.

As the fighting died down, the 3rd BCTconsolidated its positions, reorganized itsunits, and moved into temporary locationsas it made the sometimes difficult, oftenconfusing transition from high intensitycombat to urban stability operations. Itwould not return to the U.S. for severalmonths but when it did, the troops werewelcomed back to Fort Benning as heroesfor what they had accomplished in the war.

This modern tank and mechanizedinfantry force had proven itself to be apowerful and lethal combat team, even inthe concrete canyons of a major urban area.The Battle of Baghdad was over, but theinsurgency in Iraq was just beginning.

Sergeant Jose Castro, a squad leaderin C Company, 2nd Battalion, 87thInfantry, prepared to assault a building inAfghanistan housing three suspectedTaliban leaders. During his platoon’searlier rehearsal, he ensured that hisSoldiers used the marksmanship and shortrange battle tactics, techniques, andprocedures that his instructors taught himduring the Mountain Leader AdvancedRifle Marksmanship (MLARM) course atFort Drum, New York. His squad alsorehearsed the proper techniques to subdue,restrain, and search prisoners that mightbe captured during the mission –additional skills taught to SGT Castro inthe MLARM course. As his squadconducted the assault, SGT Castroobserved with great satisfaction howaccurate his Soldiers shot and howaggressively they applied the combativestechniques he taught them. Their skillsresulted in the safe capture of the threesuspected Taliban leaders. SGT Castro,like many other 10th Mountain Division(Light) NCOs, attributes their success tothe advanced marksmanship and SRBtechniques taught at Fort Drum’s MLARMcourse.

In America’s Army, the Soldier’sability to hit what he shoots atremains one of the most significant

factors that make our Army the most lethal

force in the world. This is especially truein urban environments where short rangemarksmanship is essential. In thisenvironment, most battlefield actions beginto culminate when there are effective fireson critical targets. For the individualSoldier and fire team, their marksmanshipoften determines if they survive and win.Our nation depends on them to win, and inthe 10th Mountain Division (LI) we aretraining them to win by developing mastertrainers using our Light Fighter School.

The Chief of Staff of the Army has statedthat “every Soldier is a Warrior.” In the10th Mountain Division, every Warrior isalso a rifleman, but success on today’sbattlefield requires more than justmarksmanship skills. Our experiences inAfghanistan and Iraq show that in orderfor our Soldiers to survive, succeed, anddominate in urban environments theyrequire a mastery of short range battle(SRB) skills that include combatives,breaching, and short range marksmanship.

Helping the Army, 10th Mountain DivMeet the Demands of Transformation

MOUNTAIN LEADER ADVANCED RIFLE MARKSMANSHIP COURSE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL COSSCAPTAIN ADAM SAWYER

FIRST SERGEANT SCOTT BAUGHN

Specialist C. Elijah Spencer

An MLARM instructor coaches a student during an MTT in Afghanistan.


TRAINING NOTES

The 10th Mountain Division Light FighterSchool teaches all of these vital skills usinga three-week program of instructionconducted by top quality instructors underrealistic conditions – the Mountain LeaderAdvanced Rifle Marksmanship (MLARM)course.

The 10th Mountain Division capturedthis new requirement for advanced, multi-unit marksmanship and SRB training in“The Way Ahead,” its vision for thedivision’s transformation. “The WayAhead” establishes six goals, each with aset of supporting objectives that ensure the10th Mountain Division’s successfultransformation into modular, capabilities-based formations capable of executing fullspectrum operations as part of an integratedjoint force. Two of the supportingobjectives in this document are directly tiedto meeting the marksmanship and SRBdemands placed on every Soldier in thedivision: “Train all Soldiers to employsmall arms with a high level of precision,lethality, and confidence” and also to “serveas the Army’s proponent for advancedmarksmanship and conventional urbanoperations, develop associated equipmentrequirements, and promulgate the TTPs

across the Army” in these areas.Our MLARM course is the primary

means for achieving these twotransformation objectives. The courseprovides 10th Mountain Soldiers andleaders the skill sets necessary for successon today’s battlefield, and similar trainingneeds to be available to all units across theArmy to fully prepare them to defeat theadaptive enemy we face in the war onterrorism. The current course evolved fromthe Mountain Leaders Close CombatCourse, which had existed since 1999, tomeet the demands of the evolving war onterrorism. In March 2003, the LightFighter School implemented the MLARMcourse that provides additional focus ontraining leaders and developing mastertrainers in the areas of advancedmarksmanship and SRB, whileincorporating the conditions our Soldiersand leaders face in the war on terrorism.

The result is a 21-day, live-fire intensive,train-the-trainer course designed for squadleaders through platoon leaders.Specifically, the course focuses on TTPs foradvanced rifle marksmanship (ARM) andUrban Operations. The ultimate goal ofthe course is for the graduates to return to

their units and perform duties as subjectmatter experts for team, squad, and platoonlevel training in these areas. Each platoonin the 10th Mountain Division is requiredto have a MLARM certified NCO who isresponsible for teaching the TTPs to theother Soldiers in his platoon. This hasrapidly increased the lethality andsurvivability of all our formations in everytype of 10th Mountain Division unit.

The instructors of the Light FighterSchool teach the MLARM course in threesuccessive phases that build upon eachother. The course starts with a five-dayARM phase. The skills learned in the firstphase establish the most importantfundamentals of advanced marksmanshipand incorporate the latest advances inequipment, technology, and techniques. Itbegins with the principles of shooting andcovers everything from ballistics to targetanalysis to the M-68 Close Combat Optic.This phase also includes employing limitedvisibility aiming systems such as the AN/PEQ 2A Target Pointer Illuminator/AimingLight and the AN/ PAC-4C Laser AimingModule. Emphasis is placed on shooting,grouping, zeroing, and known distancefield fire. On the final day of this phase,the course requires the students to qualifyon the known distance qualification courseand to take a written exam on all of theARM material.

The second phase of MLARM focuseson short range marksmanship. Instructorsteach students the various quick andreflexive fire techniques that includestationary, moving, and alternate positions.During this phase the student to instructorratio is one-to-one, helping to reinforceproper technique and develop propermuscle memory. Another importantsegment of this phase is the 14 hours ofMOUT-related combatives. Thesecombatives are different from the basiccombatives found in FM 21-150. Thecombatives taught at MLARM focus onproper ways to subdue enemy combatantswhile operating with full body gear andorganic equipment. The students quicklylearn during their force-on-force exercisesthe repercussions of not using the propercombative techniques they were taught.Furthermore, these combatives aretechniques that are relevant to 10thMountain Soldiers in an urban environment


Photo courtesy of the Light Fighter School, Fort Drum, NY

The combatives taught during the MLARM course focus on proper ways to subdue enemycombatants while operating with full body gear and organic equipment.


when deployed in support of the war onterrorism. The second phase ends with aSRM qualification and hands-onperformance evaluation.

The final phase of MLARM is the shortrange battle phase – the most realistic anddemanding of all three phases. During thisthird phase of training, students learn toproperly conduct mechanical, shotgun, anddemolition breaches. The cadre then formthe students into fire teams and beginMOUT offensive operations that includeextensive live firing in a single team, multi-room environment as well as a multi-team,multi-room environment. Starting with thebasics, instructors teach room clearing,hallways, stairs, and use of verbal andnonverbal commands. Students build on thetraining at the squad level and on Day 19they conduct a squad assault with live demolitions and simunitionswhere the instructors evaluate them in various leadership positions.This phase concludes with a written and hands-on examination.

MLARM’s program of instruction is driven by the TTPs ofproponent agencies such as the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unitand 75th Ranger Regiment. The MLARM instructors receivetraining on a yearly basis on the most current TTPs theseorganizations employ to aid them in refining our course. Theinstructors further refine the POI based on the combat experiencethe 10th Mountain Division (LI) has from our operations in bothAfghanistan and Iraq, and from their mobile training team

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Coss is currently the G3, 10th Mountain Division(Light) and supervises the Light Fighter School. He formerly commanded the1st Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii.

Captain Adam Sawyer is an assistant G3, Training Officer, 10th MountainDivision and coordinates Light Fighter School scheduling and resources. Heformerly served as an infantry platoon leader and company executive officerwith the 172nd Infantry Brigade in Alaska.

First Sergeant Scott Baughn is currently the first sergeant of the 10thMountain Division Light Fighter School. He formerly served as a platoonsergeant in A Company, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 10th MountainDivision.

experiences in theater. For example, duringan MTT to Afghanistan in February 2004,the instructors incorporated the effects ofaltitude on ballistics. They have since addedthis impact to the course instruction.

All MLARM instructors are graduates ofthe MLARM course. They range in gradefrom E6 to E7 and were successful squadleaders and/or platoon sergeants. Thestudent to instructor ratio further strengthensthis course as each class size is no more than24 Soldiers with nine instructors. Thisprovides students the opportunity to receivedetailed attention not readily available inother training venues in the Army. However,the student to instructor ratio does not ensurethat all students graduate. In fact, roughly30 percent of each class fails to graduate —most fail the known distance qualification,

which further highlights the importance of meeting themarksmanship standard.

The 10th Mountain Division’s MLARM course directlyimproves the marksmanship and SRB capabilities of the divisionas it transforms to meet our responsibilities in the war on terrorism.The 10th Mountain Division understands the importance ofproperly training Soldiers and leaders to succeed on today’sbattlefield – and MLARM is meeting those requirements.MLARM is providing advanced rifle marksmanship and SRBinstruction to leaders using the most current equipment and aimingdevices, and at the same time it reminds Soldiers of the importanceof the marksmanship fundamentals in and urban environmentwhile fighting an adaptive and versatile enemy. Most importantly,the course is providing this training to leaders from all of ourunits, not just our infantry units. Although it will take time, theend result will be that every Soldier in the division becomes amore lethal individual and fire team member equipped with theadvanced marksmanship and SRB skills necessary to succeed andsurvive on the battlefield.

Additional information on MLARM and the 10th MountainDivision’s Light Fighter School can be found atwww.drum.army.mil/lightfitr/LFS-home.htm

The 10th MountainDivision’s MLARM course

directly improves themarksmanship and SRB

capabilities of the division asit transforms to meet our

responsibilities in the war onterrorism. The end result

will be that every Soldier inthe division becomes a more

lethal individual and fireteam member equipped with

the skills necessary tosucceed and survive on the

battlefield.

A 10th Mountain Division Soldier subdues another Soldier during trainingas part of the Light Fighter School’s MLARM course.

Photo courtesy of the Light Fighter School, Fort Drum, NY

DEPLOYING THE FORCE

TRAINING NOTES

The Global War on Terrorism requires that we sustain aforce in several different areas of responsibility (AORs)around the world. Preparing units for deployment is the

first and most essential task that must be completed before theycan begin their missions. Since September 11, 2001, the Armyand its sister branches have been on a continuous rotation ofpersonnel, equipment, logistics, and sustainment packages. Beforethese forces are able to operate in their theater and as long as theArmy continues to increase the rate of deployments, a constantpreparation for deployment must be established for every unit.The baseline for success should result in a deployment shell thatexhibits every mode of transportation available for a unit to traveloutside of the continental U.S.

Concept and Execution

As the unit movement officer (UMO) for an infantry battalionwith the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) for two years whichincluded deployments as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom andOperation Enduring Freedom, I had the opportunity to plan andexecute every means of transportation that exists, and in thefollowing paragraphs I will discuss the lessons learned along theway.

Before September 11th, specifically in the 101st AirborneDivision, we used terms such as Rapid Deployment Force, DivisionReadiness Brigade, and N-hour sequence for deploymentnotification. But post-September 11th, there are now different waysto deploy the force. For the most part, units are being givennotification of deployment months in advance, which hasdrastically changed the sequence to which units prepare to deploy.

Warning orders for a possible deployment are all apart of thedivision X-hour sequence which precedes the brigade andbattalion-level N-hour sequences. The constraint of a 36 or 18-hour deployment cycle with a detailed and systematic N-hoursequence is now replaced with warning orders months in advance.These sequences help leaders to initiate certain decisions, enablestaff officers to develop actions in the military decision-makingprocess, and begin troop leading procedures. These steps can helpto identify certain needs such as obtaining maps of the potentialarea of operation or requesting important deployment equipment.Upon notification of the initial warning order, units should startthis sequence, even six months out from deploying. If unitscontinue to use the N-hour sequence, staff and companycommanders must understand the sequence in order to assign tasksand identify responsibilities.

Even at the beginning of U.S. deployments to Afghanistan inlate 2001, conventional forces were given notice of a possibledeployment weeks before receiving deployment orders. Units hadtime to deeply prepare and revise the very documents, personnelissues, and loads that should have already been done prior to thealert notification. From that point on, the force that was designatedas the “readiness unit” truly had to be ready. There couldn’t beanymore magic hand waves or units just “checking the block” tomake it appear that they were ready.

Documents and Systems

Prior to any deployment, regardless if it is just to the NationalTraining Center or as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, every unitmust have an accurate automated unit equipment list (AUEL)

CAPTAIN JOSEPH CLABURN


entered into the TransportationCoordinator’s Automated Command andControl Information System (TC-ACCIS)computer system. This list is supposed tobe a representation of what the unit hasavailable on the property books and helpsthe unit determine what equipment isneeded for the deployment. Specifically,units must concentrate their efforts intotransitioning the AUEL into a very accurateand detailed deployment equipment list(DEL) where they input data about thevehicles and equipment. This list has to becompleted prior to any unit assuming oracknowledging deployment readiness. Tosave time and make the deployment datacorrect, unit movement officers must focustheir attentions on the dimensional andweight data for every piece of equipmentbeing transported. Without thisinformation, or by inputting inaccurate datainto the system, a unit could misrepresentthe allocated lift or movement requirementsto move the equipment.

Once a unit has been verified fordeployment and the U.S. TransportationCommand and Division TransportationOffice begin to allocate the appropriatemovement requirements for the unit, theDEL data is entered into the Time-PhasedForce Deployment Document (TPFDD) toassign the deploying force with a unitidentification code (UIC). The problemwith this system is that it is not compatiblewith the TC-ACCIS system; therefore, thedata must be produced in a different formatand takes time away from the unitmovement officer. Depending on the sizeand type of deployment, it could take a unitmovement officer several hours to completeand compile the data to submit. At thispoint, JOPES (Joint Operations Planningand Execution System) operators at thehigher level confirm the data in the systemand begin to resource the transportationrequirements.

The lack of a centralized computersystem to do this job created problems inhaving true visibility of the units’ allocatedmovement requirements. This problemcould be solved if there was one universaltracking code instead of the Army usingtransportation control numbers and theU.S. Air Force using UICs. Additionally,if the data is not entered into the computersystems accurately from the very

beginning, it is easy for this process tobecome inaccurate and inevitably createsproblems from the lowest level to thehighest level.

Heights, weights, dimensions, andspecific data about the loads have to beaccurate for these systems to produce thetrue picture for what the deploying forceneeds to meet its requirement. Because ofthe different data formats of each of thesystems listed above, it can be very easy to“lose” equipment in the system or reportinaccurate data. The incompatibility ofcomputer systems and the inability totransfer data from one system to the othercontinues to create problems in this systemand many others of the deployment systems.

Containers

Depending on the mode oftransportation, the military van (MILVAN),ISU-90 and ISU-60 shipping containers,and the quadruple container (quadcon) arethe primary containers used for bothcontinental U.S. (CONUS) and outside thecontinental U.S. (OCONUS) deployments.The quadcons can be shipped individuallyor linked with three others to make one unit,

and are now becoming the most widely usedcontainers that the Army uses. The USAF463-L pallet was used primarily for unit tuftboxes and baggage. Wood sideboards wereconstructed for pallets that were pre-packedfor A and B-bags which drasticallyincreased the number of bags that werestacked to the maximum height limit. Thereis no reason that the pallet with thisbaggage cannot be packed prior to a unitbecoming active in the deployment order.

Designed primarily for sea movementand to replace the very old MILVANcontainer, the quadcon can be packed withspecific items, grouped together up to a 20-foot length, shipped to its destination, andthen easily broken apart and transportedby truck to the receiving unit. However, theproblems with this container were visibleduring the initial deployment of units fromthe 101st Airborne for Operation EnduringFreedom in Afghanistan. Although thecontainer works great to group hazardouscargo together without having to jeopardizenonhazardous cargo being shipped in thesame container, early use of this containershowed that it is very manpower heavywhen it comes time to group the fourcontainers into one by using the couplings.

Additionally, the single quadconis easily shipped in the back ofa truck using tie-downs, orgrouped together it travelsperfectly by commercial linehaul, rail car, and sea lift. Unitsmust ensure that the properequipment to move the quadcontrains is available at the finaldestination such as theequivalent to a 10,000-poundforklift.

The majority of the air loadpersonnel from the USAF didnot have experience with thecontainers, so there was someconfusion about how to tie the20-foot configuration down tothe USAF pallets. Everyloadmaster for the aircraft hada different standard for the tie-down of the quadcons to thepallets. The quadcons required

at least 24 10,000 pound chainsto tie down to the pallet whichhad to be provided by thedeploying unit. I do not

Sergeant Tami Lambert

Soldiers hook up an ISU-90 shipping container to UH-60Blackhawk during a training exercise. The ISU-90 is oneof the primary shipping containers used for deployments.


recommend this container for use during air mobility movementsbecause it took up too much room in the aircraft, was extremelyheavy, and often times got stuck in the roller system of the aircraft.The containers had to be placed on a pallet lift and placed ontothe aircraft, using the center roller ADS system on the C-17, whichdrastically cut down on the number of pallet positions availablefor other pieces of equipment. The actual number of containerscould be doubled if units used the more “air-friendly” ISU-90,with the built-in pallet locks on the bottom of the container.

The other area of concern came when the appropriate lift assetsweren’t available at the receiving airfield or forward operatingbase to move the 20-foot lengths. Certain lift equipment is requiredfor units to separate the containers from the couplings and transportthem individually. At one point during the 101st deployment toAfghanistan, several Air Force refueling bases identified that theydid not have the material handling equipment (MHE), such asthe k-loaders, to handle the large quadcon trains. The C-5 aircraftloaded at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, had to be downloaded atairfields in Europe and loaded onto C-17 aircraft to compensatefor the smaller airfields in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The lack ofproper MHE became an issue when multiple C-5 aircraft couldnot download the containers once they had arrived in Europe andresulted in timely delays. Due to this significant delay at severalair bases, Air Mobility Command personnel requested that thecontainers be placed on individual pallets at the aerial point ofembarkation (APOE) in order to increase the speed of the transloadprocess.

Prior to any deployment, regardless of what container is beingused, units can save time and preparation in planning to preloadall of the equipment that they plan to take into theater with them.This includes office computers, manuals, and extra BII/arms roomequipment. Load cards designating specific loads to containerscan be done in advance; further, the unit must recognize that certainhazardous cargo or sensitive items may need additional paperworkfor the movement. Specific attention should be placed on the typeof movement, MHE, and other transportation assets available atthe final destination to sufficiently allocate the proper containerto be used.

HAZMAT

For all types of movement in or out of the United States, thecertification to transport hazardous material (HAZMAT) can makeor break the unit. A unit must focus critical attention on sendingpersonnel to the two-week Department of Defense’s transportationof HAZMAT course. Personnel designated to attend this courseshould be stabilized at the unit for at least one year to provide theunit with maximum coverage of this skill. To provide continuouscoverage of this skill, certified personnel should be designated allthe way to company level so that the work load of an entire battalionis not felt by one person as the certifier.

For all the types of movement, a Shipper’s Declaration ofDangerous Goods (SDDG) and the DD 836 are required whenshipping any hazardous material. The SDDG forms can only bepurchased by the civilian company Labelmasters and can cost theunit money if preparation and experience are not emphasized.

Unit movement officers should photo copy blank SDDG’s forpractice and to simulate the hazards in certain containers or loadsand place them for future use. The DD836 is another declarationform for hazardous materials, but this form can be printed fromForm Flow and can be reproduced with little effort or cost to theunit. A hazardous material “smart book” should be kept atcompany level handy to help with quick references of the mostfrequently used hazardous material used by the unit. When theword comes for units to deploy, these practice forms will be easyenough to use to fill out on the correct and actual form with thefour carbon copy originals. Only the forms with the red-stripededges should be used for real world deployments. Units must alsobe prepared to add to their deployment package several packets ofthese forms with them into theater for their return trip and foroperational or strategic flights in the AOR. In conjunction withthe SDDG and DD836, a diplomatic clearance sheet will also haveto be completed for international travel. The diplomatic clearanceforms will be a compilation of the hazardous material on oneaircraft traveling over the international borders of another country.Some flights experienced significant delays in travel (2-8 days)due to a denial of diplomatic clearance for U.S. Air Force flightsflying to or over certain countries. A majority of the prolongeddelayed flights had some type of Class 1.1 or 1.2 explosive (suchas rockets, C4, or powder container projectiles) on the aircraft.

In addition to preparing the SDDG, units must also ensure thatthe proper shipping labels are placed on vehicles, pallets, andcontainers. The hazardous shipment labels can also be boughtthrough Labelmasters, and units must ensure that a substantialamount of labels are in stock since every mode of transportationrequires labels for shipment. Again, it is critical to ensure theproperly trained personnel are certifying these loads since theimproper labeling of loads is punishable by federal law with finesup to $10,000. Special consideration needs to be paid to such itemsas generators, Class VIII items, compressed cans (such as paintor maintenance lubricants), propane tanks (Coleman stoves), andClass IX.

Moving by line haul

Moving the unit by line haul from the home station is one ofthe easiest moving modes. The majority of the focus for unitsshould be placed on the transportation of their containers andensuring that the proper personnel (UMOs, supply reps, executiveofficers) are present during the loading and inspecting of theequipment. All of the vehicles being shipped by line haul aretraditionally stripped to the bare minimum to reduce the risk ofequipment being stolen during transportation. For this reason, allof the accompanying equipment to vehicles and loads should beplaced in containers for movement. Movement by truck doesn’thave the constraints of shipping hazardous cargo like the othermodes of transportation. Loads containing the equivalent tohazardous material “residue” do not require the SDDG forshipment. Depending on the type of hazard, shipments only haveto be certified by schooled HAZMAT personnel if the substanceexceeds a certain weight (1,000 kg or more depending on thehazardous material being shipped) or amount. For instance, empty

TRAINING NOTES



Gerry cans have to be certified if flying bymilitary aircraft, but an entire container fullof the cans does not constitute a hazardousshipment by commercial line haul. For thisreason again, it is necessary that personnelmaking the decisions for the moving unitmust be experienced and qualified to shipsuch material to avoid wasted time andplanning preparation.

For containers holding sensitive orcritical pieces of equipment, a specialrequest is submitted through thetransportation office of each departing unitfor a truck with the satellite- trackingdevice. The use of these satellite-trackingdevices is the only way that the sensitiveitems should be shipped since the truckdrivers are qualified for such movementsand the driver/company sign for thecontainers prior to departing the homestation.

Units must ensure that a companyrepresentative is on site at the line haulloading dock because vehicles are typicallyloaded by an outload team that does notpay attention to bumper number specific toeach unit. Load planners for these line haulsare only worried about the type of vehicleand not who it belongs to it, so the visibilityof each unit’s vehicles will be lost once thetrucks depart the home station. It isimportant to not overload the containerswith items that won’t be able to be movedwith the organic vehicles in the unit. Thisis the result of there not being enoughallocated MHE available at the point ofdebarkation and allows the unit to quicklydownload the containers and move forwardto an operating base or staging area.

Moving By Rail

Movement by rail car is significantlyfaster for a unit to outload because amajority of U.S. Army installations keep adesignated number of rail cars on stationand have significant rail operatingfacilities. Some of the railhead facilitieshave the ability to operate 24 hours a day,making the constant deployment of abrigade or a division much easier than anyof the other deployment modes. Regardlessof how many times U.S. Army units seemto use the rail system to deploy throughoutthe United States for the Joint ReadinessTraining Center or the National Training

Center, we somehow always run intoproblems. Consistent with all of the othermodes of transportation, the lack of trainedpersonnel seems to be the biggest majorshortfall for this system.

As easy as it is to deploy forces throughthis type of mode, it can be a very difficultprocess to go through, all the way up togetting the pieces of equipment on the railcars, if the personnel aren’t trained andconsistent standards aren’t enforced.Sensitive items on vehicles must be takenoff and stored in containers due to the lackof security during the time of travel. In myexperience, units were required to striptheir vehicles to the lowest configurationand either store the pieces in a containeror attach them to the vehicle using bandingmaterial. The vehicles were loaded up withas much equipment as possible to makeroom for other equipment in the containers,create more room on the rail cars, and toget as much equipment down to the portrapidly.

Members from civilian railwayscompany came down to help with unitsdeploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom andinsisted that certain units use a specific typeof banding material. This was the first stepof many that became issues in the 101stAirborne Division’s deployment. The typeof banding material seemed to change after

units had already spent thousands of dollarsto buy one type and spent the time to applyit to the vehicles. The result was that unitshad to request additional funding to godown to local hardware stores to buy theappropriate banding material for themovement. This resulted in several vehiclesfailing the initial inspection and thousandsof dollars wasted on the wrong material.Although military manuals specificallyoutlining rail requirements have beenpublished, the use of CSX personnel on siteas subject matter experts was something tosustain, but changing standards to how theload-out is to be conducted cannot bechanged at the last minute. Recognizingproblems early in this certain case can saveunits time and a significant amount ofmoney.

Vehicles with secondary loads were onlylimited by the height to which they couldbe put on the railcar. Units maximized theuse of secondary loads and traveled withmost of their containers on the back of theirmedium and heavy trucks. For this, the ¾inch wire rope sufficed for tying down thecontainers to the vehicles. However, it isessential for the DEL to report that the itemhas a secondary load on it as well as havingan adjusted height and weight for thevehicle. This is important for the LOGMARlabel when the vehicle gets down to the

Lori Bultman

Soldiers unload M113 armored personnel carriers from rail cars prior to an exercise at FortRiley, Kansas. The rail system is often used for deployments to the Joint Readiness Center atFort Polk, Louisiana, and the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California.


shipping yard so that both pieces of equipment are accounted forappropriately. The John Deere GATORs were also a problem sincethey are too long to put onto the back of trucks, they hang off ofthe sides, and transporting them from the port to a FOB could bea problem if it is a considerable distance away. One solution wasto load the GATORs on civilian bought trailers that could also bepulled by the Gators when they were downloaded. Another way toload the small utility vehicle was to secondary load one GATORinto the back of trucks which doesn’t maximize the load capacityof the trucks transporting them.

Moving by Sea

Since the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the Army has focusedmuch attention on the ability to deploy units using sea vesselsfrom both the U.S. Navy and from the civilian maritime fleet.During the deployment phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S.Army units were rail loading their vehicles and containers to thenearest seaport of Debarkation (SPOD) for sea load across theAtlantic Ocean. U.S. Army personnel were assigned to downloadthe vehicles from the trains at the shipyard, but at that point thevehicles became the responsibility of the shipping personnel. Tokeep accurate control of the equipment, vehicles and containerswere equipped with RF tracking tags. These tags are tracked whena receiver and transmitter are in proximity so the result was thatthe equipment could be tracked from the home station along therailroad as the pieces of equipment passed certain transmittersalong the way. The problem was that the transmitters could alsokeep track of the equipment while sitting at the port, but once thevessel got outside of the transmitting distance of the RF tag, thepiece of equipment became untraceable until the vessel reached a

port with another receiver and transmitter. This caused significantchallenges to the units on the receiving side since there was notrue visibility of equipment on multiple ships. It seemed that therewas no one from the units keeping an eye on specific pieces ofequipment and the personnel loading the vessels grabbed vehicletype’s specific to their own load plans and gave no considerationto priority of movement for each unit. A partial list of the equipmenton the ships was generated, but after further review, the lists wereonly 75-percent accurate most of the time. In addition to units notknowing what ship their equipment was on, it took a significantamount of time about 20-30 days for these ships to reach the portsin the Persian Gulf, and only limited space and resources wereavailable to receive multiple ships. After multiple ships started toarrive at the SPOD, many other vessels were required to sit off ofthe coast. Before a vessel could enter the dock area to download,it had to wait for one ship to clear the docks before it could enterand download itself. Even still, units were unsure that specific ormission critical items would be on the next vessel.

In respect to hazardous material, U.S. Coast Guard regulationshave to be enforced, and it is essential for units to understand therules and regulations for such movements since the USCG fallsunder the Department of Transportation and not the Departmentof Defense. Containers holding hazardous material must beinspected and certified to be sea worthy to protect the items inside.Vehicles must be reduced to their lowest configuration to maximizethe ships’ multiple levels, and the striped items must be stored incontainers which are readily available, so that vehicles couldimmediately travel from the port of debarkation the their respectivestaging areas. Due to the decreased need of a quick reaction forceand the increased predictability of deployments, future units inthe U.S. Army will deploy by sea vessel. Since movement by sea is

TRAINING NOTES

A Bradley fightingvehicle is loaded aboardthe USNS Gordon inKuwait. With theincreased predictabilityof deployments, moreunits may moveequipment by seavessel. Since movementby sea is significantlycheaper than airmobility and has theflexibility to travelanywhere in the world,the use of U.S. Navyand civilian maritimevessels will be greatlyincreased, while theuse of intercontinentaltravel with militaryaircraft will decrease.

Commander Randall Ramian,USN

significantly cheaper than air mobility and has the flexibility to travelanywhere in the world, the use of U.S. Navy and civilian maritimevessels will be greatly increased, while the use of intercontinentaltravel with military aircraft will decrease.

Moving by Air

Moving a unit by strategic air seems to be the biggest beast totake on upon receipt of deployment orders when the operationsorders come to conduct a deployment. Among the standardpaperwork that is required to be filled out for all the otherdeployments such as load cards, SDDG’s, DD836’s, and packinglists the challenge of working with another branch of service tomove a unit is difficult and requires even more tedious paperworkon the part of the unit movement officers.

The first hurdle is ensuring the proper personnel are trainedon the right computer systems and that they are familiar with thesequence of USAF deployments. A large majority of the “frustratedloads” and delays on the flight line, or in the process, are primarilydue to inconsistent standards by personnel not trained properlyfor their job. Like all things, interpretation of the manuals seemsto be the law of the land during exercises that do not involve thepeople who help to enforce those standards. The deploymentprocess for units moving by air must have a priority for schooling,and this training must be supported by USAF personnel whodirectly influence the movement of units during deployment. Thisensures that everyone involved in future deployments is speakingthe right terminology and enforcing the same standards.

Several installations offer Air Mobility Command LoadPlanner’s Courses to assist unit movement officers in developingstrategic lift load plans. During the time that I attended the course,the class learned how to create these load plans using cut outs,calculators, and countless formulas to determine center balanceand maximum capacity of aircraft loads. Once I arrived at myunit, I received the Automated Air Load Planning System (AALPS)computer which helps assist the UMO’s in determining liftrestrictions and easily identifying load plans for aircraft. The trialby error on this system is long and tedious since the AUEL orDEL cannot be downloaded into the computer system but insteadeach individual piece of equipment must be entered into the AALPSsystem. Once this is done, each piece of equipment must be plannedon the designated airframe and moved in conjunction with weightand squared feet restrictions. This system is easy to use once theDEL has been built into the database and is extremely acceptablefor when units have to move around a wide AOR by militaryaircraft. However, due to the computer system not being compatiblewith the U.S. Air Force’s two other load planning systems (CALMand GATES); the AALPS system is useful only to itself. A largeamount of time can be saved with the system if there was a way totake the information from the units DEL in TC-ACCIS and inputit into the AALPS system. The plus to the system is that the loadplans are accurate and can be manipulated easily in the system tohelp with last minute load changes, frustrated loads that have tobe “bumped” from one aircraft to another, and moving the pieceson the aircraft to maximize seats for passengers. Additionally, thesystem allows the user to print out a complete list of equipment inthe DEL by Unit Identification Codes, Transportation ControlNumbers, and Unit Line Numbers. But again, all this informationhas to be typed into the system prior to the use of this capability.

When units move by air, it is important for every piece ofequipment to go through a pre-inspection to verify load cards,certify hazardous material, ensure vehicle serviceability, andcomplete the proper paperwork. A large majority of mistakes canbe detected prior to the vehicle or equipment arriving at theADACG/JI line where the final inspection is done. By the timethat the items pass through the stations of the Joint Inspectionline, UMOs will only have minor adjustments to weight anddimensional data. Having to create this information on the JI lineonly delays the unit’s ability to quickly deploy by air and placesextreme constraints on time for the inspecting USAF personnel.

The key to success for a unit to quickly and efficiently movethrough the air deployment process is to have multiple personnelknowledgeable and experienced to prepare the unit. The biggestsetbacks from this process come from individuals who do notunderstand the standard and do not allow themselves the propertime to prepare for the deployment. Preparation and load outexercises are critical in ensuring accuracy in load plans for vehiclesand containers as well as ensuring that the proper paperwork hasbeen done for hazardous and nonhazardous material.

Lessons Learned

Every unit in the U.S. Army, down to company level, shouldhave a unit movement officer responsible for keeping an accurate


Kaye Richey

Airmen load a pallet onto a C130. The key to success for a unit toquickly and efficiently move through the air deployment process is tohave knowledgeable and experienced personnel to prepare the unit.

TRAINING NOTES


Captain Joseph Claburn served as thebattalion movement officer for the 1st Battalion,187th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division(Air Assault) from April 2001 until May 2003. Whilein this position, Claburn completed deploymentsas part of Operation Iraqi Freedom and OperationEnduring Freedom.

and detailed deployment book on hand.This deployment book must contain everydocument needed for every possible modeof movement that the unit could be requiredto execute. Every UMO must keep a currentcopy of the property book, a copy of theAUEL and DEL, load cards for the vehiclesand containers, and HAZMAT paperworkfor any and all possible scenarios for thetransportation of dangerous cargo. Thisbook should be constantly changed basedon the type of mission and area ofresponsibility that the unit might bedeploying. For instance, the load requiredfor a HMMWV shipped by air to the MiddleEast will be drastically different from aHMMWV shipped completely stripped ona rail car to JRTC.

Some installations offer a StrategicDeployability School and some installationseven offer the two-week DoD certifiedHAZMAT course which allows personnelto sign for shipping hazardous materialsfor all modes of transportation. The focusfor every unit should be the qualificationof several personnel to reduce the workloadof paper work and responsibility onto oneperson and enable coverage at severaldifferent locations during the deploymentprocess. These personnel should have atleast one year of retainability in the unit toallow time for experience and continuity.Because of the vast number of computersystems and paperwork that go intodeploying, a designated deploymentreadiness team should be established withthe assigned OIC (usually the S3-Air for a

battalion) so that standards and continuitythroughout the lower units is consistent. Itis recommended that a MTOE change occurin units to allow the position of a designatedAssistant S3 and a separate S-3 Air.

Before a unit departs to the theater ofoperations, UMO’s for each unit shouldrequest to have the LOGMAR labelsprinted off for the return trip to home ofstation. If the proper computer system isnot available at the POD in a different areaof the world, unit movement officers willfind themselves hand writing the labels fortheir equipment. The bar codetransportation control number will neverchange for the piece of equipment and data,such as weight and dimensional data, canbe crossed out and corrected without havingto reprint a new label. Restrictions for thisrequest will be dependent upon the numberof units deploying and the resource fundingto complete this task.

Airflow for military aircraft isunpredictable. I suggest that the chain ofcommand split up between several aircraftso that any delays experienced along theway does not affect the command andcontrol of elements that may arrive beforethem. All of the designated aircraft chalkleaders should travel with acommunications card specifically withtelephone numbers and pertinent e-mailsin order to communicate with thedeployment operations cell or the reardetachment back at home station tomaintain visibility of delayed flights.

When the data for the TPFDD is

produced, it is critical for units toemphasize the square feet required insteadof weight. It seemed that the focus for theair force USAF transportation personnelwas on how many tons a unit had to movewithout giving consideration to how big orsmall the pieces of equipment were. Thelogic for allocating aircraft was that if thedeploying unit had a specific number oftons to move, the USAF would take thatmaximum weight for each aircraft andcontinue to add aircraft until the totaltonnage was met. The problem with this isthat the larger pieces of equipment take upmore space inside the aircraft, resultingfrom the aircraft running out of room beforemeeting the maximum weight limit.Aircraft were flown completely filled basedon square foot, but only met 60 or 70percent of its total weight capacity. Thisresulted in the U.S. Air Force under-allocating the number of aircraft to movethe unit and in units having to justifyspecific load plans on aircraft in order toreceive more flights. This further slowedthe deployment process and only resultedin bitter cross-talk between branches whentimelines were not met and misallocationwas factored.

The 101st Airborne Division utilizedcivilian contractors to help facilitate themovement of units deploying from FortCampbell. These deployment support teams(DSTs) were first used during theredeployment of units returning fromAfghanistan and were again utilized duringthe deployment to Iraq. The DST’s wereassigned to each of the units to create acentralized standard for the way that unitswere deploying. Additionally, thesepersonnel were to be trained in specificareas of deployment to assist the unitmovement officers in their deploymentprocess. Based on my experience, the useof these DST personnel was not at allcritical in the deployment or redeploymentof units. The money to pay and train thesepersonnel could very easily be saved on theproper training of unit personnelthroughout the division.

Specialist Lorie Jewell

Soldiers file off a C-130 at Esler Air Field in Louisiana.

Hallowed Ground: The Last Battle forPork Chop Hill. By Bill McWilliams.Naval Institute Press, 2004. 494 Pages.$29.95, Hardcover. Reviewed by ColonelMike Davino.

The Korean War is often called the“Forgotten War.” However, in truth, the warof maneuver that made up the first year ofthe war has been the subject of manyexcellent books. The stationary, or “outpostwar,” that was fought from 1951 to 1953has received far less attention. Forexample, the U.S. Army’s official historyof the war devotes two volumes to the firstyear, but just part of a single volume to thecombat operations conducted during thefinal two years of the war. Bill McWilliams’book, On Hallowed Ground: The LastBattle for Pork Chop Hill, is a close studyof one of the most brutal battles foughtduring that period.

Pork Chop Hill may be familiar to somereaders as the subject of SLA Marshall’sbook and the subsequent movie starringGregory Peck. That book and movie dealwith the April 1953 battle for the outposton Pork Chop, so named because of itsresemblance to a pork chop when depictedon a topographic map. McWilliams, aretired Air Force colonel and 1955 graduateof West Point, reviews that earlier battle aswell as the overall strategic situation. Ofparticular note is his account of the effortsby the South Korean president, SyngmanRhee, to undermine U.S. negotiations toconclude an armistice agreement with theNorth Koreans and Chinese. Rhee orderedhis Soldiers to release thousands of NorthKorean prisoners as well as prohibitedSouth Koreans to continue to work for theUnited Nations Command. His actionsprolonged the fighting and are a vividreminder that the challenges associatedwith coalition warfare are nothing new.

McWilliams’ recounting of theorganization, training, operations and

leadership of the 7th Infantry Divisionprovides a fascinating look inside the U.S.Army of 1953. The 7th Division, with itsattached Ethiopian and Colombianbattalions along with more than 2,000attached South Korean Soldiers, was initself, a mini-coalition. He explains theheavy pressure on the division’s leadershipto keep friendly casualties to a minimumand how leaders above division levelseverely limited the freedom of action ofthe division commander and hissubordinates.

The real focus of this book is on the July1953 battle in which regiments of the U.S.7th Infantry Division fought against aChinese enemy determined to seize thecompany-sized outpost on Pork Chop.McWilliams does a great job in describingthis chaotic battle and the bravery of theSoldiers in the rifle companies and theirsupporting units that fought it. Using acombination of official records, letterswritten by Soldiers to family members, andinterviews with survivors, he recreates thedecentralized bunker-to-bunker fightingthat characterized the numerous attacks andcounterattacks. He examines in detail thedecisions made at high levels of commandthat ultimately determined the outcome ofthe battle. And finally, in his section on theaftermath of Pork Chop, he puts it in theperspective of both history and the familiesof the fallen.

This is a great addition to the history ofthe Korean War. Infantrymen assigned tothe brigade level and below should read thisbook as well as those infantrymen workingin headquarters that are responsible formultinational operations. It will also be ofinterest to both students of the Korean Warand those readers with a general interestin military history and ground combat.

Nuclear and Sri Lanka. LieutenantColonel Chandana Weerakoon, GodageInternational Publishers, No. 661,Maradana Road, Colombo 10, Sri Lanka.$10. Reviewed by Russell A. Eno.

This paperback is well worth thenominal cost. Lieutenant ColonelWeerakoon — a major at the time the bookwas written — is a graduate of the InfantryCaptains’ Career Course at Fort Benning,and has effectively discussed the issue ofnuclear proliferation from the perspectiveof a small nation in the Indian Ocean,between the Arabian Sea and the Bay ofBengal. His topic, relevant enough if onlyviewed in light of the potential secondaryeffects of a nuclear exchange between majorworld powers, has assumed greater evenurgency now that India and Pakistan nowboast their own nuclear capabilities. Giventhe implications of the global war on terrorand the threat of nuclear materials fallinginto terrorists’ hands, it requires littleimagination to understand the importanceof maintaining in that region stablegovernments whose interests and foreignpolicy goals are congruent with those of theUnited States.

LTC Weerakoon does a good job ofoutlining the backgrounds of variousnations’ nuclear capabilities, focusing onthose of India and Pakistan because anyeffects of such weapons would quickly andirrevocably be felt in his own island nation.He uses the downwind effects of the SovietUnion’s Chernobyl disaster as an exampleof what could befall Sri Lanka and nationsalong the Pacific Rim after a nuclearexchange. The author spends some timediscussing the immediate and long-termeffects of a nuclear detonation and offersextensive charts, tables, and diagrams tosupport his points.

The book is written in clear, conciseEnglish, and the occasional typographicalerror does not significantly detract from


portrayed as being problem ridden althoughthe depth of that stereotype was not as deep.Although the stereotype has beensignificantly debunked by the facts, largeportions of American society still believethat Vietnam veterans were somehow moreprofoundly damaged than veterans of otherwars.

The Vietnam War in History, Literature,and Film is billed as an interdisciplinaryapproach to the Vietnam War that clarifiesthe relationships between how that war isportrayed. Hardly. Rather than clarifyanything, the book straddles the fence onthe issue. The author skillfully outlineshow much of the journalism, history,novels, and cinema related to Vietnam ispolitically motivated and designed tomanipulate the audience into denying thetruth and accepting unsupportedconclusions that comply with the authors’preconceived ideas. The weakness of thisbook is that after all the analysis anddiscussion the author is still unable topresent a conclusion other than to say thatthere is no conclusion, and that furtherstudy is needed. Well, who did not alreadyknow that? Did we not know that nearlyevery article, book, and movie of Vietnamwas either a piece of conservativepropaganda or liberal hatchet job? Wedid, and this book just restates theobvious. A second weakness is theauthor’s granting validity to inaccurateportrayals of the war. The moraleequivalency offered to those with an ax togrind about Vietnam is aggravating in thevery least.

The real question, the importantquestion, is not what contemporary orimmediate postwar literature tells us. Wealready know that the work of that era willbe worthless to future generations ofAmericans. The question we should beasking is, what does current literature andmovies teach us about the Vietnam War 30years after? One can only trust that thosecurrently writing are not infected by thesame anti-Vietnam fever as those writing ageneration before. Hopefully someone isworking on that and we won’t have to waitanother 30 or more years to get a legitimateanswer. Additionally, we hope that asimilar group of charlatans will not gainpossession of our history in regard to ouroperations in Iraq.

either the book’s readability or its relevancein today’s highly-charged environment.The message the reader carries away is that— while major world powers have by andlarge come to grips with the need to controlthe proliferation of nuclear weapons — thesmaller and potentially less stable membersof the nuclear club will need supervisionand incentives to forestall the world-widecatastrophe that we have been trying toprevent since the end of World war II. Thenuclear genii is out of the bottle, and theissue today is not so much whether we canonce again confine him, but rather how wecan best restrict his movements until he canonce again be brought under control.

Nuclear and Sri Lanka is worth the read.Buy it.

The Vietnam War in History,Literature, and Film. By Mark Taylor.University of Alabama Press, 2003. 160Pages, $48.00 (Hardcover), $22.95(Softcover). Reviewed by CommandSergeant Major James Clifford.

The Vietnam War in History, Literature,and Film is a survey of the Vietnam Wardepiction in contemporary and immediatepostwar American films and books. Theauthor provides six short chapters thatsuccinctly divide the subject intodigestible portions. Chapter 1 explainsthe difficulty in telling war stories.Specific to Vietnam, Taylor introducesreaders to an approach to writing thatseems tailor made for those bent uponpresenting their preconceived ideas bytwisting facts to fit their political agenda.This ‘new journalism’ as practiced byjournalists and novelists gives credibilityto a definition of truth where faithfulnessto facts is less important than expressionof the authors’ perceptions and feelings.

“Heroes” is a dissection of the conceptof heroes and bravery as represented byArmy special operation forces with specialemphasis on Robin Moore’s 1965 book TheGreen Berets and John Wayne’s movie ofthe same title. Green Berets represent allthat was right, and all that was wrong, withthe Vietnam War. Depending on one’sframe of reference, the Green Beret waseither a selfless hero that risked all toprotect, guide, and nurture a helpless people

or a bloodthirsty savage that ruthlesslykilled without remorse.

A second chapter focusing on moviestakes on Oliver Stone’s JFK. This film putsforth the premise that the President wasassassinated by a conspiracy hatched toensure that America stayed in Vietnam. Inorder to begin to accept such an accusationone must believe that Kennedy was aboutto pull America out of Vietnam. MarkTaylor uses critical excerpts from themovie, Stone’s own statements, and thedocumentary record to cast serious doubton that premise. He thoroughly destroysthe credibility of JFK while at the same timelending credence to Stone’s right to presenthis mangled view of the facts.

In a chapter on battles, the author usesKhe Sanh as an example of the slantedwriting coming out of Vietnam. Severalauthors wrote books that misrepresentedwhat happened there. One novel of theperiod was written so skillfully that somehistorians have since used it as a factualreference, perhaps not realizing that muchof the book is a composite of events andparticipants.

Up to this point the book is a strongpresentation that outlines the significantdistortions in Vietnam writings. Anyonereading this book will approach anyfuture works with a jaundiced eye fromthen on thanks to this author’s insightfulanalysis. Had the author stopped at thispoint the book would have been animportant contribution to Vietnamstudies. In fact, the author includes achapter that seems to be an unfocusedsearch for a point. In “Villains” theauthor retells the story of American warcrimes in the Vietnamese hamlet of MyLai. His telling of the story lacks anysignificant reference to the history,li terature, or fi lm other than somediscussion of contemporary journalisticreporting and polling data. Most of thechapter discusses the official report andlater book on the incident authored byLieutenant General William Peers.

In the final chapter, “Veterans,” theauthor describes how America media andentertainment outlets bought into thestereotype picture of a burned out Vietnamveteran. He lightly compares and contraststhis picture with that of the World War IIveteran. Veterans of that war were also



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Specialist Martin Wicklock (left) and Sergeant James Diederich prepare to enter a house during an August 2004 mission in Iraq. The Soldiersare assigned to the New York Army National Guard’s Company C, 2nd Battalion, 108th Infantry Regiment.

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