2nd Infantry Division - Command Report - September 1951

Korean War

2nd Infantry Division - Command Report - September 1951

Headquarters

Korean War Project Record: USA-14

Folder: 050009a

Box: 05

File: 09a

National Archives and Records Administration

College Park, Maryland

Records: United States Army

Unit Name: Second Infantry Division

Record Group: RG407

Editor: Hal Barker

Korean War Project

P.O. Box 180190

Dallas, TX 75218-0190

http://www.koreanwar.org

Korean War Project 2ID-00100803


2nd

I SEP to 30 1951 SEC:RET

""' .. I •

SEP - ,J .. j~IU ~ fri.S f .J..09 No. ~


. I

i· :, ... DEClASSIFIED :

l :~t~~l,JoMtQJ· . e1.~ NAPA ~a.te rwJ.

HEADQU !R TE...t(S 2d Inf'a.ntry Dlvi sion

AFO 24b o/o Postmaster San Franoisao~Calirornia

C 0 M M. A N D R E P 0 R T

( CSGP0-2b)

Period

From: 1 September 1951 Tbrou.gb: 30 SepteTJaber 1951

ltft!b· : Maj Gen: USA .

Commanding

Copy Number_L


!· : ... DECLASSIFIED ·: -~t'w@r~w0dJ6tQJ . ey_~_AAR~ o~te tz:ti

T4J?LE OF CONTENTS

S~tembe" .1951

Section I. Command Report

A. Narrative S~'!liJlDarY

B. Personnel {G-1)

c. Intelligence (G-2)

·D. Operations (G-3)

E. Logistics (G-4)

F. Evaluation and Reeommenda.tions

G. staff and. RCT Comma,nd;ers

H. Maps and Overlays

Section II. SUpporting Documents

A.. Chief of Staff

1. Cb.ief of Staff's Journal

2. Briefing Notes

B. Personn.el (G•l)

1. G-1 Journal

2. PersonJ!lel Periodic Reports

3. Personnel Daily Summary Reports .,

4. Station Lists

. ,, ... ··5 .. _General Ord.ers (2d Inf Div and 8tb Army)

6. . Mi seellanaous

Ca Intelligence (G-2)

1 a. G-2 Journal and File ( 1-231) 1-3 Sept 51

b. G-2 Jou.rnal and File (232-411) 4-6 Sept fJ.

c. G-2 Journal and File (412 ... 566) 7-9 Sept

51

51

do G ... 2 Jou.rna.l a.nd File ( 567-723) 10-12 Sept

e. G--2 Journal ~and File (724 ... 894) 13-15 Sept

51

51

f. G-2 Jourt)al a.nd File {895-1054) 16-18 Sept 51

g. G-2 Journal and File (1055-1199 2000-2044) 19-21 Sept 51

b .. G-2 ·Journal and File (2045-2196) 22-24 Sept 51


i. G-2 Journal and File (2197-2350) 25-27 Sept 51

j • G-2 Journal a,nd File (2351-2514) 28-30 Sept 51

2. Feriod.ic Intelligence Reports

D. Operations (G•3)

1 .a. G•3 J~:urnal a.nd File 1-2 Sept 51

b. Q...,;"'i ' .; Journal and File 3-4 Sept 51

c. Q ... 3 Journal a.nd File 5-6 Sept 51

d. G ... 3 J.ournal and File 7-8 Sept 51

e. G-3'Journ:a.l and File 9-10 Sept 51

f. G~3.Journal a.nd File 11-12 Sept 51

g. G-3 Journal a,nd File 13-14 Sept 51

b. G-3 Journa,l a:nd File 15-16 Sept 51 ' '

i. G-3 J ourna.l and File 17-18 Sept 51 . ,··

j. G-3 Journal and File 19•20 Sept 51

k. G-3 Journal a.nd File 21-22 ·Sept 51

1. G-3 Journal a.nd File 23-24 Sept 51

m. G-3 J oul;'na.l and File 25-26 Sept 51 .,

n. G-3 Journal and File 27-28 Sept 51 '·

o. G-3 Journal a.nd File 29-30 Sept 51

2. Periodic Operations Reports

3. Operations Orders ' • -c ~

''

4. Operations Instructions

5. Letters of Instruction

6. Training Memoranda.

7. ,Administrative Order

E. Logistics (G-4)

1 a. G-4 'Journal e.nd File 1-15 Sept 51

b. G-4 J ou rn a.l and File 16-30 Sept 51

2. Periodic L9gi stic s Reports

3. A.rmor Status Reports

F. Staff Section Reports

1. Chemical ,.,


2. ADE

3. Ordnance

4. ~a.rtermaster

5. Signal

6. Surs~o~.

7. Finance

· s. Inspector Gen~ral

9• ·Public Informa:tion Officer

10. Provost Marsha:l

11. Sta:ff .Judge Advocate

12~ Sbechu services.

13. Ot)aplain :

14. Ci vi'l: Ass:httance Offi'cer

G. Mi seellaneou s (·Spebtal St'Ud.ies,. Reports and Mi scel-. .laneous Material}

1. 2d Division Official Newspaper "We.rrior11

Sect.ion III. Subordinat.e Unit Reports (4nnexes)*

A. 9th Infantry Regiment 1

F' j .. B. 23d Infantry Regiment

c·. ·38tb Inf ant±-y· ,Regiment· . .

,,. ,- .. D. He ad qu art.er e Division Artillery

E. 15th. Field A:r'tillery Battalion

F. 37th .Field Artillery :Ba.ttalion

G. 38th Field Artillery Battalion

H. 50 3d Field Artillery Batta.lion

I. 82d AAJ.. A.W Ba,ttalion ( SP)

iJ J. 72d 'rank Batt.aliQn

K. 2d .Engineer ...... (C) Battalion . .

*These reports forwa.rded under separate cover per a.utboriza.tion of Eighth ~my Circular No. 135, 12 August 1951.


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!-.:. _- ... DEC\.ASSIFIED -1 -j-~, &~l([J- ,-By~ NAP.A Date tz:77

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0579

NARRATIVE SUMMARY ·

. The combat activities of the 2d Division during the

month of August were marked by exceptionally bitter fighting

in the Hill 983-900-773 terrain eomplex. The attacks of the

36th ROK Regiment, although ini tia.lly successful, were negated

by the counteratta.cks of the North Koreans, who expended their

strength recklessly in fanatical efforts to regain control of

this terrain feature. The 2d Division had then prepared Oper

ations Order 35, which outlined an attack against the bill de

fenses, to be launched on the last day of the month by the 9th ·- - - _..,._ . ----. Infantry in conjunction with a drive by the 38th Infantry up

the ridgeline to the northe~st of Hill 1179.~

On the first day of September, Brigadier General Thomas

E deSh azo, Division Artillery Com_pander, assumed command of . -the 2d Infantry Division pending the arrival of Major General

Robert N Young from the Zone of the Interior. ;,Vhen be assumed

command, General deSbazo remarked that General Ruffner's pol

icies wo~d be followed: artillery ra.ther than Infa.ntry would • I;

be used to secure· po eitions; tbe- Division wa.e to be under no

time limit or time schedule; manpower was not to be expended

unnecessarily. He added that when the Division was stopped

it would use artillery, that it would move abea.d slowly and

steadily. He emphasized the importance of good visibility,

" pointing out tha.t improved visibility would greatly lessen

artillery requ1rements. 2

On tbe first day of the period, the 9th Infantry con

tinued lts a.tta.ck in the vicinity of the 983-900-773 terrain

1. Command- Report, Hq 2d Infantry Division, Aug 51 2. APP A-2: Briefing Notes, 1 Sept 51

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: : DEC~SSIFIEO r t AuL"'orny 1- \Q M ~ Ul, I By~ NAPA Date 12?7!

Maj Ge1'1 Clark L. ad"fn.er bids farewell to hie et.&ff.

t ~

~ ..

Srig len Thomas E \'leShaz~ shown h-::re ;uter receivin.g Legion of :erit~ assumes commanu.


complex. At 0830 on 1 September, the lst Battalion a.ttacked

Hill 900. It wa.s immediately engaged by an unknown number of

enemy firing a large number of automa.tic weapons from well

emplaced bunkers on this hill. With Company A in the advance,

the battalion pressed., it~'· attack and encountered increasingly

heavy resistance until 2100 when the enemy·broke contact.

The battalion rema.ined overnight in positions astride the path

400 meters north of Hill 773, reporting no further contact with

the enemy •1

The 2d Battalion of the 9th Infantry remained in posi

tion in the vicinity of the unnumbered bill 800 meters south-

west of Hill 773, receiving some mortar and automatic ~apons

fire from the vicinity of Hill 940. In the meanwhi~e, the 3d

Battalion had been reorganized into two rifle· companies (Com

panies I and L) a.nd one heavy weapons company. At 1400 on

1 September, Company L moved to Hill 773 from the batte.lion

position south of tbat hill, remaining in position there until

2230 when it extended due east to cover the MSR between P1a-ri

and Worun-ni. It stayed in position throughout the night of

1-2 September with no further conta.ct with the enemy. Company

I, remaining in position on the mounta.inside200 meters south

a.nd slightly ea.st of Hill 773, reported only light enemy con

tact until 2100 when all contact with hostile forces cea.sed

for the period. 2

Action was light in the 23d Infantry sector, being con

fined chiefly to small enemy probing attacks during the hours

of darkness end friendly reconnaissance during tbe daylight

hours. The 1st Ba.tta.lion (-)remained in its assembly area

1300 meters south of Hill 787 DT145286. Company C, in block-

ing positions, reported receiving several small probing attacks

1. APP D-2: POR 719, 1 Sept 51 2. Ibid

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0532

between 0005 a.nd c6oo hours when hostile forces withdrew to

the north. A fire support team from Company D left the 1st

Battalion assembly area at 1800, closing into Company C block

ing positions at 2300 po provide fire sup~ort for an attack

by the Tank Destroyer BS*talion of the 8th Regiment~ 7th ROK

Division. The 2d Ba.tta1ion rems.ined in an assembly ares in

the vicinity of Ha.ha.njon-ni. The 3d and French Battalions

each sent three squad-sized patrols 1,000 yards forward of the

~ansae Line, the French patrols departing at 0700 and return

ing a.t 1230, the 3d Battalion's patrols returning at 1250;

none of the patrols reported any enemy contac t. 1

The 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, essa.ulted Hill 1059

at 0745 1 September,,initially meeting light resistance. As

the batta.lion advanced, enemy resistance stiffened. Compa.ny . .

B secured Hill 1059 at 1100;. the battalion tben moved toward

Objective 2 (Hill 1181), repelling an enemy counterattack ...

from Hill 1181, and securing the objective at 1910. The Ba.t

talion (-) rema.ined on Hill 1181, receiving sporadic artillery ..

fire till the close of the period. ,-

The rear of the 1st Bat-I

tel ion we s covered by a pls.to on from Company A which occupfe'd

a blocking position on tbe ridgeline in the vicinity DT204363.

This platoon reported no contact with the enemy during the

period.

The 2d Batta.lion remained in the vicinity of the stream

bed some 1,000 meters southeast of Pia-ri until 2215 bours on

1 Sel)tember, when the ba.ttalion (less Company E) ·ATas relieved

a.nd ordered into an.assembly area in tbe valley just north of

Chukkae-gol. Company E extende.O west from a. posit ion on tbe

long ridgeline running southwest of Hill 1179 to the MSR between

Pia-ri and ':Vorun-ni to este.blish contact \vith Company L of tbe .

9th Infantry. The 3d Battalion bed no e.ction during the period,

1. APP D-2: POR 719, 1 Sept 51

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.~ DEClASSIFIED f

I. klt'writy 1.. .o :m.s tul By~ NAP .A Date l z:n.

Porvard obeerv~rs epot new targets on Hill 98 5· .. •

••• ano. the howitzers blaze a.va.y.


r'.···.

•

! · :: . - DECI ~SStAED r ~ ·. . . . . .. .

.Aui.'1of!iy ·60 116 \O,J· I By~ liAPAD~te 11.:7].

but Company L received some direct fire from Hill 754.1

~fuile firing in support of Infantry units on 1 September,

a single artillery ba.ttalion, the 15th Field, fired 14,000

rounds. 2

The Di vi sian continued 1 ts grinding a.dvance northward

during clear weather on 2 Septem~er a.gain st battalion- sized

enem;y units which continued stubborn dele.ying actions. 3

Having regrouped during the morning hours, the lst Bat

ta.lion of the 9th Infa.ntry atta.cked Hill 900 at 1415. By

1440, however, intense enemy fire had halted the adva.nce a.fter

the ba.ttalion bad moved only some 275 meters. Despite fire

support from the 2d Batta.lion, which remained in positions on

the unnumbered bill 800 meters southwest of Hill 773, the 1st

Battalion could adva.nce no farther; and breaking contact with

the enemy at 2145, it returned to its former area near the

path 400 meters north of Hill 773 where it closed into posi

tions for the night. The 3d Battalion consolidated positions

from DT158335 to DT169339. No enemy contact was reported by

either the 2d or 3d Batta1ions.4

The 23d Infantry sector wa.s genera.lly quiet during the

period. Company D (-) remained in position Cm the high ground

1,200 meters northeast of Kobangsan-ni to support by fire a.n

attack by the Tank Destroyer Battalion of the 8th ROK Regiment

on Hill 618. The 2d Battalion remained in its assembly area

in the vicinity of Ha.hanjon-ni and continued preparation for

1 commitment upon order. Company L relieved Company E, 38th

Infantry, on the hillside in the vicinity DT170343, a.nd the

3d end French Ba.ttelions again dispatched squad- sized patrols

900 meters north of the Kansas Line. The patrols returned by

1. APP D-2: POR 719, 1 Sept 51 2. App A-2: Briefing Notes, 2 Sept 51 3. App C-2: PIR 308, 2 Sept 51 4. App D-2: POR 720, 2 Sept 51

-4-

;.,.. ,. - .•. ~ -~ ........ t.


1400 reporting no enemy contact. The 2d Reconnaissa.nce Com-. pany, minus one pla.toon, relieved Company L, 23d Infantry,

on the Kansas"' Line at 0945, being a.t this time relieved from

attachment to the 9th Infantry and a.tta.cbed to the 23d.l

In the 38th Intartt~y sector the enemy defended Hill

1181 to the last man against an attack by the 3d Battalion

which began at 1547, lasted six hours, and ended in the oc

cupation of the hill.2 One hundred fifty-two enemy dead were

counted atop tbe hill after the battle.3

The logistical situatio·n of the 2d Division improved

considerably at this time. Q,uartermaster supplies, which bad

been coming along the Wonju axis, started coming in along the

Seoul--Chunchon axis, whicb· greatly decrea.sed tbe distance

requiring truck carry. 4

September 3d marked the sixth consecutive day in wb icb

the 9th Infe.ntry battled tenacious enemy units for possession

of the entire 983-900-773 terre.in complex. The regiment, des-

pi te numerou a assa.ults supported by artillery fires, e.ir straf-

ings, and bombings, was unable to register any appreciable

gains during the day.

The 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, with the exception of

Company B, rema.ined in an assembly area in the vicinity of

Tokkol-li providing carrying parties for tbe resupply of units

on the Kansas Line and for Company B in a blocking position

atop a bill 1,200 meters northeast of Kobangsan-ni. During

the early morning hours on 3 September, Company B repulsed an

attack by a.n unknown number of enemy. The enemy withdrew to

the north after a brief fire fight. The 2d.Battalion in the

vicinity of Hahanjon-ni conducted training which stressed

1. 2. 3. 4.

APP D-2: A.PP C-2: App A-2: APP A-2:

POR 720, 2 Sept 51 PIR 308, 2 Sept 51 Briefing Notes, 3 Sept 51 Briefing Notes, 2 Sept 51

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1 Aut'10dt'f h-oM tul • : - DECLASSIFfED r I By~NAP.A Date 12.2].

0586

A tank blaeta away a:t Hill 9C'·;. • •

• • • ~ith satisfactory reeults.


,/

..

r" ~ : ""• <;,_. U' .. ] ~

"bunker bustingtt techniques. The 3d and French Ba.tta.lions

conducted patrols wbicb ranged nortb of tbe Kansas Line some

900 meters with no enemy contact. Tbe only exception wa.s a.

petrol from Company L, 23d Infantry, whicb after going north

450 meters engaged, an estimated 15 enemy in a brief fire fight

a.nd then withdrew to friendly lines, returning at 0630.

Elements of an estimated enemy battalion fiercely re

sisted the advance of the 3d Batta.lion, 38th Infa.ntry, north 1 along the ridge1ine from Hill 1181. But the enemy, severely

punished by friendly artillery fire, was forced to give ground

as the 3d Battalion pressed forward.

·At 1640 on 3 September, in compliance with instructions

from the X Corps Commander, General deShazo informed tbe Com

manding Officer, 38tb Infantry, of a change in bis mission:

be was to allow tbe 3d Battalion to advance no 'farther than

Hill 1130, 700 meters south of Hill 1243. At 1910, however,

Colonel Mildren called General deShazo to inform him that the

3d Battalion bad already taken Hill 1130 a.nd Company L, con

tinuing the attack through Company K, had occupied the origina.l . _-;

objective at Hill 1243 by 1950. It then repulsed a small en-

emy counterattack and secured the objective. By 2130, Company

L was physicallY. tied in with el:e.ments of tbe,27tb ROK Regiment

end bad no furtber contact witb the enemy.

At 2200 on 3 September, the 38th Infantry was given the

mission of occupying Hill 1243 with a minimum of one battalion,

of continuing tbe defense of Hill 1179 with a minimum of forces,

of outposting and patrolling the ridge from Hill 1179 north

to Hill 1243, and of maintaining conte.ct with elements of the

5th ROK Division on the right in the vicinity of Hill 1243.

On 4 September the 38th we.s to attack, seize a.nd occupy Hills

1. App C-2: FIR 309, 3 Spet 51

-6-...


660 and 754. Effective 2400 the boundary between tbs 9th and

38th Regiments '.Va.s shifted west approxima.tely 450 meters,

bulging arouno the a.rea. assi&J:.ned to the 38th as an objective

(See App H, Overla.y 1). The missions of the 9th and 23d Regi

ments remained unchanged;l

During the night 3-4 September, enemy squads continued

to reconnoiter Division positions, one such unit infiltrating

south of the Ka.nsa s Line in a.n abortive effort to destroy a

friendly mortar pos1tion.2

0~ tb e 2d Division 1 s right flank, the 5th ROK Division

coYJtinue:d to secure the high ground along the ridge from the

trail fork. at Kachil-bong to a point on the ridgeline 400 meters

west-southwest of Hill 930. At 1200 the 1st and 2d Companies,

27th Regiment, occupied positions formerly beld by elements of

the 38tb Infentr~ from a point 300 meters south of Hill 1130 to

a point 200 meters north 6r tbe bill, effective at tbat bour.3

An estimated two enemy battalions counterattacked at

2230 on 3 September a.nd forced elements ·of the 8th Rsgimcnt,

7th ROK Division, to withdraw from Hill 901. At 0800 on 4

September, friendly fore e s counterattacked, regal nine; the hi 11

by 1000.4

In the 2d Division sec·tor, tb e 9th Infantry jockeyed for

position in preparstion for an atta.ck 5 September on Hill 900.5

During the period, the regiment reorganized end directed

air strikes and heavy fires on the enemy occupyin~ Hill 900.

At 1800, the regiment was reinforced by the 2d ~econna.i seance

Company 1oTh icb took up posit ions near tb e stream bed 500 meters

southwest of Pie-ri and established contact with Company Ia 6

1. AD't"' D-4: 0 I 102' 3 Sept 51 2. A9D C-2: FIR 310' 4 Sept 51 3. APD D-". '- . FOR 722, 4 Sept 51 h. Ibid . t::. App A-2: 8riefinp: Notes, t::. Sept 51 _... -6. APP D-2:- FCR 722, L!. Seut 51

-7-


. .

-· .-...,. .. ~-

'~~~~~

There was no actfon in the 23d Infantry sector. At

1915 hours, the 1st Battalion (-) proceeded in trucks to an

assembly area in the vicinity of Soya.pyong, Company B remain

ing in its blocking positions atop the unnumbered hill 1,200

meters northea.st of Kobaugsan-ni. The 2d Battalion entrucked

e.t 2015 a.nd moved from Hahanjon-ni to join the let Batta.lion

(-) at Soye.pyong. The 3d and French Battalions remained de

ployed a1ong the Kansas Line a.nd di epa.tched sma.ll security

pa.trols which reported no contact. Comps.ny B sent out a re-

connaissance patrol armed with a recoilless rifle in an effort

to help out the 9th Infantry. The pa.trol reported no enemy

contact. Company L, relieved at 1100 of its blocking mission

·on the ridge 500 meters north of Hill 582, returned to the

Ka.nsas Line at 1900 to occupy the position vacated by the 2d

Reconnai seance Company. The 23d Infantry was relieved of re

sponsibility for the area east of Hill 530 effective 1600, and

the requirement of maintaining an adva.nce patrol base ·in the

vicinity of the hill·l,200 meters northeast of Kobangsan-ni

was suspended.

The 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry, attacked Hill 660,

moving west from Hill 1179 at 0615 with Company F ~eading, and

Companies E and G following. Except for s.ome enemy fire which

came from the west shoulder of Hill 1179 (and whicb was quickly

silenced) the· battalion's move to the objective was without

incident. The 2d Battalion took Hill 660 a.t 1145, quickly

moved to secure control of Hill 754, a.nd in ·addition placed

platoon- sized roadblocks on tbe trail winding through Ya,owdong

and on the ridgeline 2,200 meters west of Hill 1179.

During the previous several days the 9th Infantry, in

almost continuous battle with the North Korean enemy, had helped

destroy more than three NK Divisions confronting it. And in

so doing it ha.d materially helped the other two regiments to

-8-


accomplish their missions. Casualties bad bean high in the

9th Regiment, but casual ties among the enemy bad been mucb

higher.. During the period from 18 August to 4 September tbe

enemy opposing tbe "Indianhead" Division bad suffered h.,600

killed~ 7,000 wounded a.M'229 captured.l

2d Division tactical pla.ns for 5 September called for ...

the 9th ~nfantry to seize Hill 900. Tbe 23d Infantry was to

support tbe attack by swinging around to the left and seizing

Objective N, a long ridgeline extending off to the northwest

of Hill 900 between Hills 983 a.nd 7'78. The 38tb Infa.ntry, in

the meanwhile, was, from its positions on Hill 558 and the

unnumbered hill to the west, to block a.nd intercept by fire

enemy attempts to escape, resupply, or reinforce its forces

confronting the 9th Infantry. The Division Artillery was to

offer ma.ximum support to the 23d Infantry a.nd establish no-

fire lines to permit coordina . .ted fire support for a.ll regiments.

The time of attack was to be announced upon approval of the

Commanding Officer, 23d Infantry.

On 5 September, the 9th Infantry Regiment attacked

Hill 900, wresting it from a desperate enemy who, in a ten

day period had employed no ·less tb.an 11 enemy battalions to

defend thi·e key ·terrain. Tb·e 1st a.nd 2d Battalions of tbe

9th Infa.ntry, supported by air, artillery, and mortars, finally

reduced the enemy's stubborn resistance to zero, and by 1405

were in possession of the hill. 2 The battered North Koreans,

threatened with envelopment by tbe 23d Infantry on the west

and the 38th Infantry on the east, withdrew to the north leav

ing Hill 900 strewn with bu~dreds of enemy dead and littered

:>~ith abandoned food and· ammunition.3

1. 2. 3.

App A~2: App D-2: App C•2:

Briefing Notes, 5 Sept 51 POR 723, 5 Sept 51 PIR 311, 5 Sept 51

... g ...


: c_ OECLASSlFlEO

I . .&JJ~iot!ti-t:»:.~J M t OJ By~ HAP .A O~te l z:zJ.

0591

MSn wearily trudged up. • •

• • • and aom the. hille, seeldllg new :··oeitions.,


·,

The 23d Infantry wa.s relieved from responsibility for

the Ka.nsas Line from Hill 500 to Hill 1148, by elements of

the 38th -·Infantry. Its left boundary changed effective 0800

f';f""92' v;J

5 September, to include Hills 618 and 582 (See App H, Overlays

2 and 3). The 1st Battalion {minus Company B) departed from

its assembly area in the vicinitq of Changpyong-ni and moved

to Hill 618 to relieve the Tank Destroyer Battalion of the 7tb

ROK Division. A.t 0845, as tbe relief was ta.king place, the

batta.lion engaged a small enemy group and did not fully secure

the hill until 1115. The batta1ion' s subsequent movement to

occupy Hill 582 was delayed by this estimated enemy battalion

which, us~ng small arms, automatic weanons, and mortar fire,

prevented tb..e 1st Battalion from securing tbe hill until 1630. ' . .

The 2d Battalion left its assembly area in the vicinity of

SOnp:hyon-ni and moved to positions on the hillside 1,000 meters

northeast of Soyapyong from which to launch an attack on Ob

jective N. As. a. result of sniper fire in the vicinity of Ton-. ·'

dul, the 1st Battali.on wa.s delayed in jumping off for the ob

jective until 1615. The batta,lion then moved out on Objective

N, a.nd meeting no resistance'· . secured completely the b igh ground

600 meters north and 500 meters southwest of Hill 983. The

3d and French Battalions sent small patrols 1,000 meters north

of the Ka.nsas Line without reporting any enemy activity.l

During this operation Companies B and C of the 72d Tank

Battalion were attached to the 23d Infantry. Company B fired

1 both direct and indirect fire support missions. It is of in-

terest to note further that the 72d Tank Battalion, during

the period 1800 4 September to 1800 5 September, supplemented

the Division Artillery in firing 186 missions in support of

Division operations a.nd inflicting an estimated 950 casualties

on the enemy.2


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--·- -··- ···-.. -···-·--~----~-1- :, :: . - OECt.ASSlFIED, ·

... ,. -~-~~~(_ Q1j6\().J· .·

. By~ NAP.A D~te 12,?]. ~~<A

C593 The 38tl.1 Infantry had no enemy contact durin~ the

period and remained in its previous positions. The 2d Bat-

talion dispatched two ·squad_:- sized patrols which patrolled up

to 2,000 meters north of the batta.lion po si ti on s a.nd returned

without contact. 1 "~

The 6th of September, in _General deShazo's opinion,

marked tbe end of the 2d Division's three week battle for the

983-900-773 Hill Mass. He added that the 2d Division had ad-

ministered just as decisive a defeat to the North Koreans in

the present sector as it h~d to the Chinese Army in May. 2 At

the Staff briefing on 6 September, General deShazo mentioned,

in part, that the next operation would take place within one

week to ten days and' that the. 9th Infantry would need at least ' .

that long to reorganize a.nd fill the vacancies resulting from '

tbe fighting of the preceding two weeks.3

On the afternoon of 6 September, the battalions a.nd

other elements of the 9th Infantry were .separately relieved

by elements of tbe 23d Infantry from their previous positions.

The regiment proceeded to a regimental assembly area in the

general vicinity of Habanjon-ni for reorganization and further

training. The 2d Reconnaissance Company was detached from tbe

9th and a.ttached to the 23d -effective upon the relief. 4

The only el91Dent of the 23d -Infantry to have contact

wi tb th~ enemy on 6 September was the 1st Battalion. At 2130,

a.n estimated enemy company attacked from the nortbwest toward

let Battalion positions on Hill 618. After a thirty minute

fire~ight, the enemy forces withdrew and there was no further

contact. Companies E a.nd F moved from thei~ positions on

Hill 983 at 0949" Company E occupied Hill 778 by 1345; com

pany F-·occupied Hill 785 by 1240.

1. 2. 3o 4.

App App App APP

D-2: A-')• ..... A-2: 1)...2:

POR 723, 5 Sept 51 Briefing Note~, 7 Sept 51 Briefing Notes, 6 Sept 51 POR 724, 6 Sept 51

-11-


cnce on 1Bloody Ridge•, men pauea to reflect. on the coat of the battle •••

. . ,or relax for a. moment with whete'fer ree.din;; .:latter is at·hsnd.


,r ?- (,1"'~-,_. v .:5 .:)

Activity in the 38th Infe.ntry sector was limited. Tb e

lst Batta.lion (less Company B) remained in its positions on

Hill 1179 and on the ridgeline 1181-1059-992. Leaving one

ple~oon to set up a defensive position on the unnumbered hill

(1100) 800 meters east o~·Hill 1179, Company B (-) a.dvanced

toward Hill 868. Although Company B h a.d no enemy contact, it

encountered so many s.nti-personnel mines that it had to stop

at a point only 180 meters south of the summit. A small patrol

from Company F engaged approximately 18 enemy in a brief en

counter at 1400 on Hill 894 and then withdrew. It reported

that the enemy were armed with automatic weapons. At 1330,

Company K departed from the 3d Battalion assembly area at Hoam

to set up a. platoon- strength outpost at eacb of tbe following - '

points: one at a point 150 meters northeast of Hill 1179,

a.nother at the trail fork on Hill 872, and a third in the

stream bed 1,100 meters south ~f Worun-ni.l

At 1930 on 6 September, the boundary between the 23d - '.: '· ! ' 1

and 38th Regiments was changed as follows: from DT135396 south - ' ' .. .. ' ~

to DT135360, east to DT151!61, then following the road (in-

clusive to the 38th Infantry) to DT163343, east to DT19'0343,

south to DT170338, and west to tbe road leading to Worun-ni.

This divided the Division zone more equally between the two

regiments .. on line. 2 -·

Plans for 7 September included e. boundary shift between

the Division and the 5th ROK Division. This change, effective

at noon, 7 September, shifted the center of the boundary almost

900 meters to the west a.nd gave the 5th ROK Division responsi

bility for much of the high ground occupied by the let Battal

ion of the 38th Infantry (See APP H, Overlay 4). The 38th In-.

fentry was to relieve the 23d Infantry of responsibility for

the Kansas Line between Worun-ni and a point 400 meters north-


-12-.,... ~ 1

-Lc "'- .._ , ,- •. ,.:_ 1-


! · :; -- DECLASStFlEO

I~ -~~~i ~() JJ>.?tQJ By~ NAP.A O~te I zn ..

east of Hill 1148 at 1630 on 6 September. Both regiments were

to occupy and defend the Hays Line from dug-in and wired-in

l/' positions; both regiments were to conduct extensive patrolling

north and northwest of their positions; both regiments were

~

to mainta~.n defensive ins~allations on the Kansas Line, using

a minimum of forces. The 9th Infantry wa.s to continue its

reorganization and training.l

There was little activity in the Division zone on 7

September as elements of the V NK Corps fled north.2 The 23d

Infantry continued its mission of occupying and improving po

sitions on the ~ays Line and of dispatching pa,trols to its

front and to contact adjacent units. No enemy contact was re

ported. In the 38th sector Company B (-) went to occupy the

southern slope of Hill 868 about 600 meters from the crest.

Instead of encountering anti-personnel minas as it had the day

before when near the crest, Company B got into e firefight with

a.n estimated 15 enemy armed with small arms and throwing gre-. .

na.de s. The fight lasted from 0800 till 1500, at wb ich time

Company B disengaged and returned to Hill 1179. A squad- sized

petrol from Company E encountered from 15 to 20 enemy in the

vicinity o-f Hill 702. After e.n hours engagement, which started

at 1105, the ene-my withdrew and the patrol returned at 1830

without further incide.nt.3

On 8 September, the 2d· Division Comma.nd Post. displaced

from Kwa.ndae-ri, Korea, to Chukkong-ni~ Korea, closing at 0905.

Tb e Fire Support Coordination Center was transferred from the

Division Comma.nd Post to the Division Artillery Command Post

effective at the same time.4

1. 2. 3. 4.

There wa.s no contact ~·ritb the ene!Ty on 8 September.

App D-4: AP'P C-2: APP D-2: App D-2:

o ·r 105, 6 Sept 51 PIR 313, 7 Sept 51 POR 725. 7 Sept 51 POR 726~ 8 Sept 51

-13-


·,

r ... " ·r~ "'"' ... ~

··~· ..' )

Aggressive Division patrols, however, continued to probe the

for,tls.rd a.reas and directed e~fective fires on observed enemy

groups. The 9th Infantry remained in its assembly area re

organizing a.nd training replacements. The 23d and 38th Re

giments. rema.ined in tb.efr 'posi tiona and continued to prepare

defensive positions. 1

During the first week in September the 2d Division ex

perimented further with psychologica.l warfa.re techniques. A

loudspeaker team assigned to the 9th Infantry Regiment broad

a ast a.nti-mora.le themes and surrender appeals, specific ally

to the 15th Regiment, 6th NK Division. On 4 September, a

broadcas-t was made which influenced nine enemy to surrender

to the UN Forces. Otber methods used during this week were:

{1) air loudspeaker operations; (2) the dropping of leaflets

from aircraft--organic and loud speaker aircraft; ( 3) the fir

ing of leaflet ammunition from artillery pieces. Of the 126

North Koreans ca.ptured during the week, 80% stat_ed that they

were influenced by the psychological warfa..re program. Prisoners

of war stated positively tha.t the UN psychological warfare

leaflets, used in conjunction with UN Artillery fire, had con-

tributed grea.tly in brea.king the fiEhting spirit of mos! of

tbe North Korean soldiers.· .In the 2d Division sector, due to

the tremendous casualties suffered by the enemy, it was recom-

mended that appeals to the enemy--many of whom are ex-ROKs and

ne,·dy conscripted soldiers--~hould stress: {1) Return to Sou.th "

. Korea; (2) families and loved ones; (3) dislike of communism }

and Red Army; (4) effect of tJN firepower. 2

The first week in Sentember also se.w the implementation

. vof a new policy vvi tb rega.rd to colored personnel; In accord-

once with instructions from higher headquarters, incorr.ing

l. 2.

APP D-2: APP D-2:

POR 726, 8 Sept 51 Annex 2, POR 725, 7 Sept 51

-14o..


. : UtL~~IrltU

I .AJJtt".oritt k_ .o M t OJ f ~By~ HAP .A Date 12 :z:J I

Planas dropped leatlete over enemJ lines. • •

. . • induc::ingwear:r sobiere to EJurreoo.er.


~-,.----

"' ..

hostile patrol was quickly reported by the 2d Bat tali on, 38th

Infantry, and the 23d, Infantry and 72d Tank Battalion were

a.lerted. By 0530, the 38th Infa.ntry ha.d screened the area

carefully using illumina.ting shells to light it up. There

w·ere no further devel~pments reported. 1

Major a.ctivity in the Di~sion for the period was re

stricted to the 38th Infantry. In the 1st Battalion area.,

Company A, coordinating with Company G, moved out at 1000 to

secure the east portion of the ridge in the vicinity DT183383,

securing this initial objective at 1330 without enemy resist

ance. Company A, with Company C following a, thou sand meters

behind, then proceed.ed along the ridgeline in a southwesterly

direction, in an endeavor to link up with Compa.ny G, which was

attempting to secure the west portion of the same ridge in the

'vicinity of Hill 868. Neither Companies A nor G were success-

ful: Company A was halted at 1630, after advancing an additiona.l

350 meters, by enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire in

the vicinity DT1803~. Compa.ny G was halted about 300 meters

si-Jort of its objective by some 15 to 20 enemy who were using

smell arms, a.utomatic weanons, and grenades. All companies

broke conta .. ct after dark and went into positions nee.r their

objectives for tbe night. Els-ewhere in the 38th Regimental

zone two tanks belonging to a platoon from the Regimental Tank

Company were disabled by mines in the Pia-ri valley as they

moved north on the Worun-ni--Pia-ri main supply route.2

In the preparation for an anticipated visit from the

French Ambassador, the French Battalion (minus one platoon

from each compa.ny) moved from the Ka.nsas Line to an assembly

area in the vicinity of Ya.chon-ni, closing at 1000. There-

meining platoons continued their surveillance on the Kansas

1 ..... 2.

App D-le: _ J 13, G- 3 Jour"Qal, 9 Sept 51 App D-2: POR 727, 9 Sept 51

-17-

,


r---... ···-·-···-·-·-·-·--·-- ! · :. . ~ DECLASSifiED

I ~~~~~( .0;116\Ql By~ NAPA D~te I z:t1.

.

·,;

Line in the 23d Infantry zone. 1

Two platoons from the 72d Tenk Battelion took up po-

s5 tions on 9 September from 'Nh ich to support the 7th ROI-C

Divisio~'s attack on Hill 883. Both platoons together fired

a tota.l of more tb an 800 rounds of 76mm ammunition ~ n support

of thi~ operation.2

At the Sta.ff briefing on 10 September, Gener,aJ deSha.zo

re!!l er1{ed tb at tb e Dlenned "Operation Ap gc\1 e" had bEen called

off, but tbet the Division 1.,rould still carry out 2dme of the I

objectives, and th&t he believ~d the Division would achieve

the objectives envisioned in the plans before the end of Sep-;r;

terr.ber ..... I

On 10 September the 2d Division started a new tr'8ining

progra.m designed to give each repla.cement a seven day period

of intensive training at regiment a.l level-- 11 to better equip

him to meet the situation be is to be confronted with in com

bat."4 The implementation of tbe program was the r_esponsi

bility of tbe respective regiments. Two of the regiments or-

~anized a "R.egimenta.l Training Center at the Service Companies,

tte renlace~ents remaining at r~gimental level for a minimum

of !'our days and then_be~ng.a.s~igned at tbe completion of

their training to a company. _ The other regiment broke dmm

tbe training into two phase-s: Pha.se one (three days), at

regimenta.l level, covered e.ll subjects except crew served

wea.pons and field problems; phase two (four de.ys), at battal

ion level, stressed field problems and firing crew served

weapons. The use of a.ble 6.fficers end non-cqmmi ssioned of-

ficers from front line compenies injected tbe realism end

enthusiasm needed to make the program a succ~ss. At the end

1. Apn D-2: 2. Ibid. 3. APP A-?: 4. APP D-6:

FOR 727, 9 Sept 51__ , ._

Briefing Notes, 10 Sept 51 T M-28, 7 Sept 51

-18-


• OECU\SSlFIEO t

; .~Jrt,~rttyb . . o1lbhY1 I t

~ I

By~ NAP.A Date l L 71!

An evacuation helicopter lantla •••


! · :. DECLASSIFIED

I. Au~'lo~ .b. 0 116 t<Jl B)'~NAP.Ao~te tz;zl,

o f' t ~ e f' i r P t ten d ay cr o f one r 8 t ion , t b e regiment al t r a i n i n g

ce~tere bgd nrocessed 1,058 replacements. It was the opinion

of ell concerned--commanders, instructors, and replecements-

thet the progrem was a very valuable one indeed. 1

A struggle for the possession of Hill 868 raged tbroush

out the period 10-12 Seotember ss.an estimated enemy battalion,

believed to be a component of the 13th Regiment, 6th NK Divi-

sion, stubbornly reeisted from bunkered positions a three

~ronged attack by elements of the 38th Infantry. 2

At 0650' on 10 September, Companies A end G, from po

sitions on opposite ridges of'Hill 868, jumped off in an ef-

fort to meet each ot.h er o':1 the ere st a.nd di sledge the E:'nemyo

At 0700, Comneny G contacted the enemy a.bout 150 meters south

of' Hill 868, withdrew to the southwest about 450 meters, and

called for artillery fireo At 1420, it continued its advance-

although under automatic r . ..,eanons fire from Hills 841 and 702.

At 2100, Company G went into position on the ridgeline 400

meters southwest of Hill 868. Company A adva.nced alo:Jg the

ee.st fa.ce of the ridgeline toward Company G but halted on the

esst slope of the ridgeline 750 meters northeast of the st;Jme

bilL Enemy contact ceasing ·efter nightfall, both units went

into positions for the night.3

On the fol1ovrin9' morninf!, 11 September, the efforts of

the 38th Infantry to teke Hill 868 conti~ued--with some suc

cess. Companies A and C departed at 0800 from their positions

of the previous eveninP: end resumed the attack on the hill from

the northeast--this time in conjunction with Comnany ~' which

edvanced from the southwest. A short time after decarture,

while only 200 meters northeast of Hill 868, Cornc~nies A and C

1. App D-2: 2. App C-<: 3. App D-2:

Annex 2, FOR 7h4, 26 Sept 51 FIRs 316-318, 10-12 Sept 51 FOR 728, 10 Sept 51

-19-


came under hesvy eutomatic weepo~s ~ire end ~re~ades from ~n

estimated enemy company on the objective. This sJo,.ved d01trn

t~eir advance considerably. Company E, advancing up the south

west face of Hill 868, got to within 200 meters of the top by

0900. But then it, too, started receiving automatic weapons

and grenade fire. By 1830, Company E was within 50 meters of

the billtou. Further atte111pts, hoi.vever, to obtaJn the objec-

tive were fruitless; and by the end of tbe day its position

remeined unchanged, and it was still encountering heavy enemy

resistance. Companies A and C managed, by 2000, to push their

leedin~ elements to within e few feet of tbe top of the hill,

but failed to take it. At 2120, CompAny A broke contact,

witbdrawirig 600 meters up the ridgeline to the northeast.

Comuanies A, C, and E of the 38th Infantry were still

locked in battle with enemy forces holding Hill 868 in the

early morning hours of 12 Sentember. By 0220, Company E bad

approached to ~·.rltbin 50 meters o: the objective. Seven 1_\Torth

Koreans attempting to withdraw from the hill were· cut down by

mach 1 ne gun fire a.nd sma.ll arms fire a.t 0330. At 0930, e pa-

trol from Company A contacted a petrol from Company F on the

east slope of the bill. By 1300, Companies C and E bed linked

up on Hill 868 and; though hampered by e. very heavy enemy mor-

tar barrep:e, ba.d started mopping up enemy remaining in the

bunkers. The bill was finaJ.ly. secured at 1500 hours on 12

September. 1

During the initial phase of the 38th Infentry battle

for Hill 868, the 9th Infantry hP.d remeined in its aesembly

area devoting itself to reor~anization end the trAining of

repleceme·:1ts.2

On 10 September, tbe 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry

1. App D-2: FOR 730, 12 Sept 51 2. AP"? D-2: POR 727, 9 Sept 51

-20-


i ·. · . . Ut\,~\lltltU

l .AJt~:itJ( irMH~l By~NAPAO~te 12:2]~

06,~6

~oved from its assembly area in a small valley 650 m~ters

southwest of Hill 399 to relieve the lst Battalion, 23d In-

fantry, in nosition, at 1350. 3y 1900, Companies B, C, end D

of the 9th Infantry ha.d relieved their counterparts in tbe 23d

Infantry. The remainder of the regiment (witb the exception

of tbe I & R Platoon, which ma.de a motor-foot patrol to Hill

728 and returned 11'lithout incident) continued its training.l

On 11 September the 9tb Infantry proceeded to complete

the relief of the 23d Infantry, begun the previous day. Tbe

regiment assumed responsibility for its newly assigned sector

by 2010. Cowpany B, 72d Ta.nk Battalion, was detached from tbe

23d and attached to the 9th as of 1920. There was no enemy

contact on 11 September; but at 0405, during the relief of

Company A of the 23d, by Company A of the 9th, both Companies

A and C of tb e 9th rec e 1 ved spored ic mortar and 76mm e.rti llery

fire in the vicinity of Hille 582 and 618.

The 23d Infantry, in its turn, commenced relief of

those elements of the 38th Infantry not engaged in the battle

for Hill 868. The relief of the 38tb Infantry (minus the lst

Battalion) by the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 23d Inf;;;ntry

~as completed early in the evening of ll September, tbe regi-

ment assuming responsibility for its new sector a.t 2010. Due

to the battle for Hill 868, 1 t wa.s 1200, 13 September, before

t~e 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, relieved the lst Battalion,

38th Infantry, in position.

Enemy units continued their probing ehd infiltrating

e.ctivities during the period. On the evening 10-11 September,

smell groups of enemy infiltrators plying friendly rear a.reas

i<rere eng8~ed end di suer sed 1.ri tb one-- such enemy group recon-

noiterin~ tbe areas near the bridge nortb of Pie-ri for tbe

1. App D-2: POR 72E, 10 Sept 51

-?1-


0607

• •


1 third time in a.lmost as many days. On the following two

evenings squad-sized enemy units probed friendly blockin~ po

sitions .elonp: the Mundung-ni--Kobangsan-ni road in the vicin-

i ty of the south side of Kong-dong and the sma.ll knob 500

meters north of Hill 582 respectively.2

As a. commentary on the effecti venes2 of the 2d Divisions'

dug-1'1 and 1~rired-in emplacemen·ts, it is of interest to note

that for three successive nights durin~ the second week in

September tb e 1st Regiment· of the 6th NK Di vi sian launc bed

corrpeny- sized attacks on 38th Infantry po si tiona which were

stopped with staggering losse-s by ma.cbine gun fire a.long final

protective 1ines.3

Pla.ns for 13 September ca,lled for the 2d Division to

press northward, seize and occupy the high ground in the vicin

ity DT1336-DT1438-DT1440, e.nd prepare to continue the attack

to the north and northwest on order.4

The capture of' this general area. would place the Divi

sion dr::ngerously close, from the enemy point of of '~iew, to

ltnown enemy supply centers such as th'e 11 gold-mine a.rea", Mun-

dung-ni, and Satae-ri. It would also give the 2d Division

control of the t~-ro north- south MSRs on either side of the ob-

jective.

Recent aerial photos of the objective bad failed to re

veal any such elaborate d~fensive fortifications as bad been

encountered in the Taeu-san and Hill 983 terrain complexes.

Nevertheless, AOP reports a.nd a compilation of a.erial photo

interpretation reports from mid-July to the end of August

indicated that the enemy bed conce~trated the bulk of his ar-

tillery, mortar, an~ automatic weapons in the Mundung-ni and

Sa.tae-ri erees and, furthermore 1'les busily fortifying tbe

1. APD ~-2: PIR 317, 11 Sent 51 2. App C-2: PIRs 318' 319' 12, 13 Sent 51 3. Apn A-2: Briefin,-r Notes, 11 Sept 51 h.. ADP D-3: Op 0 36' 9 Sept 51

-22-


! ~ :, OE--GlASSlftED

I .M~~~~,".o116tQJ Sy~NAP~ D:~te tZ.ZJ -,

critical bigh ground in the objective areas.l

'T'hree NK divisions were accepted as occupying the ob

jective area: the 32d Nk Division wa.s situated on the ex

treme west flank, while the 6th and_ 12th NK Divisions occupied

positions directly confrbtting 2d Infantry Division units.

It was believed that despite recent high losses in personnel ...

and materiel, these divisions could and would put up a. deter

mined and vigorous defense of the desired terrain masso2

Enemy-contact was negligible in the 9th Infantry sector

12 September. Action was limited; two -small probing attacks

1N"ere repulsed and two squa.d-sized patrols were dispatched

which fa.iled to contact the enemy. '

At 0700, 12 September, Company B, 23d Infantry, m·oved

out of its posi tiona in the vicinity of Hill 558 and advanced

toward Hill 702. The company took Hill 702 at 1530, its ad-

vance slowed for the greater part of the morning by hostile

machine gun fire from the vicinity of Hill 841. Company c,

23d Infantry, tied in. with Company E, 38th Infantry, in the

vicinity DT172374 a.nd with Company B, 23d Infantry in the vi

cinity DT164374 by 1630. At the same time Companies A and C

tied in with each other in the vicinity DT165370. The 2d Bat

talion_rema1ned in its assembly area in the vicinity DT1526,

while the 3d Battalion moved ·rrom an assembly area in the vi

cinity DTltS31 to its new assembly area in tbe vicinity of Tok

kol-li, closing at 2015. The French Battalion (minus one pla-

.. toon) ·rema.ined 1n ita previous assembly area.·3

Effective 2010 11 September and 1200 12 September, there

were extensive bo~ndary changes in the 2d Division zone between

the 9th and 23d Infantry Regiments a.nd between the 7th ROK and

2d Infantry Divisions respectively (See App H, Overlay 6).

1. App D-3: Annex 1, Op 0 36, 9 Sept 51 2. Ibid 3. App D-2: POR 730, 12 Sept 51

-23-


·,

On 13 September, the 9th Infantry readjusted its po

si tiona along the Hays Line and prepa.red to attack Hill 728

on order. 1 ' Two platoons from Company L, 9th Infantry, sta-

t1oned themselves on the OPLR in the vicinities of Hills 785 ·<.;' J· -!~

and 778, and a secttom f~om Company F took up firing positions

along the OPLR in the vicinity m'l46357 for the sa,me purpose:

to support by fire an attack by elements of the 23d Infantry.

This a.ttack, an effort to seize Objective S (Hill 931), was

made during the daylight hours of 13 September by Companies

0610

I and L of the 23d Infantry, and was repulsed. Both companies

retired for the night to positions some 1,000 meters to ~be

northwest of Hill 931, preparing to resume the attack on the

following ·morning.2~

The French Battalion, 23d Infantry, relieved elements

of the 38th Infantry, the 23d assuming responsibility for the

38th sector upon moving into an assembly area in the vicinity

of Sol-kogae. The 38tb Infa.ntry, utilizing Company G, con

tinued, however, to maintain surveilla.nce of the Kansas Line.3

The fighting became more widespreaQ on 14 September as

the enemy stiffened his resistance against efforts of the 2d

Division t.o secure. Objective· D--:t.he hi.gh ground west of Samtae

aong.4

On tha.t morning, the 2d Battalion (less Compa.ny F) of

the 9th· Infantry moved .out in -8n attack on Objective B (Hill

728) supported by the fire of 4.2 inch mortars and attached

tanks of Compa.ny B, 72d Tank Battalion. Despite moderately

long range fire from enemy on Hill 894 the battalion had made

fair progress, reaching a point on the south~ast slope of the

894 Hill Mass about 1,300 meters southwest of Samtae-dong by

1. 2. 3. 4.

App D-lg: App D-2: App n-;.lg: App C-2:· ·

J 94, G-3 Journal, 13 Sept 51 POR 731, 13 Sept 51 J-94, Q-;3 Journal, 13 Sept 51

PIR 320, 14 Sept 51

-24-


! · ,, · . UttiUl~lfffD

l .~~~~t' j1j6tQJ ay~ NAP.A o~te t 2.?j.

1 . •

.....

1200. At 1345, however, the battalion (-), which ha.d then

reached the top of tbe ridgeline running south from Hill 894,

was ordered to atta.ck that bill from the south to assist a.n

attack by the 23d Infantry on Objective D (851-931-894 terrain

complex). By 1700, tbe hh.ttalion, constantly under hostile

small arms fire, had a.dvanced north and northeast to a point·

approxima.tely 650 meters south-southwest of the crest of Hill

894. The battalion (-) halted its advance for the night, Com

pany E remaining in place, Company G going into a perimeter

about 450 meters down the hill. slightly to the southwest.

At 1100 on 14 September, elements of the 23d resumed

their advance on Objective D. Companies I and L secured the

ridgeline betw~en Hill 931 a.nd Hill 851 by 1900. These un1 t s

had been assisted in their attack not only by fire from the

other two batta.lions of the regimemt, but also by a.n a.ir strike

on the objective prior to the atta.ck a.nd by 155mm artillery

fire which helped reduce enemy bunkers delaying the adva.nce. 1

Psychological warfare activities were continued during

the period with every indication of increasing effectiveness.

As in previous interrogations, at least SO% of the enemy sol

diers wb o .surrendered admit ted tb et tb ey had been i nflu enc ed

by propaganda broadc.asts or surrender lea.flets. They were

also influenced by the superior UN firepower and the dire food

shortages caused by UN bombings. The unwillingness of new con

scripts in the NKPA to fight for the regime ~as another factor

in the declining morale of the 1~ forces. 2

Elements of the 1st Regiment, 6th Division, V ~~ Corps,

defending the bigb ground between Hill 931 (Objective S) and

Hill 851, probed 2d Division positions intermittently during

the early morning· hours of 15 September.3

1. 2. 3.

APP D-2: APP D-2: APP C-2:

POR 732, 14 Sept 51 Annex 2, -POR 732, 14 Sept 51 PIR 321, 15 Sept 51

-25-

\,.- : • i -- ~ .... ..i;) ..... .l


t • ., . UttilA~~ItltiJ

··r~~~ .•

colored personnel were henceforth to be inte~reted into nll . - --units of the Division a.nd were not to be beld in groups--not

even tn groups as small as .a squad.l

0599

Division pla.ns for 9 September called for the continu-. . .

at ion of tbe Division:~ s mission of orga.nization, occupation

e.nd defense of the Hays Line from dug-in and wired-in empla.ce-

ment s.

The 23d Infantry was, in addition, to establish a well

organized and prepared advance be.se of at least platoon-size

a.nd to conduct da.ily patrols north of its present po si tiona.

The 38th Infantry not only had the same mission, but also was

to seize a:nd occupy tbe long ridge running northeast of Hill

868 to a point about 500 meters east of Hill 1052. Division

Artillery was to provide preparation and on call fires to tbe

5th ROK D1 vision. The 72d Tank Ba.tta.lion was to provide sup

porting fires to the 7th ROK Division. Both the 23d a.nd 38th

Infantry Regiments were to establish ambu.sh points in fro·nt

of their present po~itions.2

September 9 was overcast with mild temperatures. In

the 5th ROK Division sector two companies of the 27th Regiment

took Hill 12ll by 1630 ,· despite moderate opposition by an un-

known number of enemy.. At· 2051;: however, an enemy counter-

e.tta.ck forced the companies off tbe bill. They returned after

dark to their ba.tta.lion on the Hays Line. There was no further

enemy contact reported by tbe Division for the period. Ele-

'! mente of the 7th ROK Division staged an a.ttack upon an esti

mated enemy battalion on Hill 883, but due to heavy enemy op

position were unsuccessful in their attempt and returned to

their unit assembly area.s withou~ further incident.3

1. APP .. ~-1: 2. APP D-4: 3. App D-2:

C/S Journe.l, 6 Sept 51 0 I 106 , 8 Sept 51 POR 727, 9 Sept 51

-15-


By 9 September, it apneared that the 2d Division would

establish a defense on tbe Ha.ys Line and rema.in there for a

while. Both NK divisions .in tbe Division sector--the 12th Di

vision opposing the 38tb Infantry, end the 6th Division oppos

ing the 23d Infantry---a.pparently retained the potentiality to

a.ttack, despite their heavy loss~s of the previou~ weeks. It

was entirely possible, according to General deShazo, that the

Divis ion might be figbti ng a de fen si ve battle in e. fevr weeks

or less. In the meantime, be told his staff to plan on ha.ving

the 9th Infe.ntry take the 23d Infantry sector on the 13th o

The 23d Infa.ntry wa.s to take the 38th Infantry sector and the

38th Infantry was to go into reserve.l

In the 2d Division sector there were extensive boundary

cha.nges effective a.t 0800 hours on 9 September (See APP H, Over

lays 4 and 5). Although th_e right anchor of the Hays Line in

the sector remained static, the center portion was moved back

an average of 1,800 meters to conform to recently acquired

territory in the Hill 983-900-773 terra.in complex and to em

brace Hill 754 on the right. The left end of the Ha.ys Line

was advanced approximately 450 meters. The upper half of the

boundar-y b-etween the 23d e.nd 38t)J Infa.ntry Regiments became

a line run':'ling ··in a. northwesterly direction from a point. in

the vicinity DT163360. The portion south of DT163360 remained

uncbanged. 2

During the early morning hours of 9 September, a pla

toon- sized reconna.issance patrol from the 1st Regiment," 6th

~~ Division, infiltrating friendly lines to the vicinity of

the bridge 700 meters north of Pia-ri, wa.s surprised a.nd ·dis

persed by a friendly carrying party.3 The presence of the

1. 2. 3.

App A-2: App D-4: App C-2:

Briefing Notes, 9 Sept 51 0 I 106, 8 Sept 51 PIR 315, 9 ·sept 51

-16-


~" ,,. ,___ ······- -

.•

At 0700, the 2d Battalion (lese Company F), 9th Infan

try, jumped off in an attack on Hill 894. By 1445, despite

heavy automatic weapons fire, it ba.d taken the bill and was

tben rejoined by Company F, wbicb bad been 1,500 meters south '"•·· •l

wben the atta.ck starte_d;· · By 1645, the battalion occupied po-

sitions a.ll along the ridgeline from a. point 600 meters east

of Tutayon nortbea.st to a point 400 meters north of Hill 894.

A reinforced platoon from Company L departed from Hill 773 at

1030 wi tb orders to secure the high ground of Hill 485. An

e stima.ted enemy company burled such a.n intense volume of small

arms a.nd a.utomatic weapons fire at the platoon at 8 point a.p

proximately 200 meters from 1 t s objective tb at it was forced

to i-r1tbdraw. It rejoined Com"9a.ny L .in the vicinity of Hill

778. Patrols ~rom tbe_ 1st Battalion of the 9th Regiment made

conte.ct with elements of the 7th ROK Division a.bout 1,000

~eters southeast of Hill 901 at intervals during during the . Clay. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 23d Infantry were un-

successful in a coordinated attack against Hills 931 and 851

(Objectives S and T·, respecti vely)•. Tbe French Battalion was

equally unsuccessful in its ·e~f~r~ to take Hill 841. 1

The next few.days we!'e a continuation of the bitter

struggle which raged between elements of the 2d Infantry Di vi

sion and North Korean forces def_ending the high ground in the

area Mundung-n1--Sa.tae-ri and running along the 894-931 Hill

Ma.ss.

The greatly increased enemy use of mortars and artil

lery was, a.ccordi ng to Gener13l deSb azo, a measure, of b is de-

termination to hold his present positions •. He added tha.t the

Commending General, Eighth Army, bad informed him that the Di

vision could shoot all the ammunition thought necessary to

take the posi ttons. 2

1. App D-2 i FOR 734, 16 Sept 51 2. App A-2: Briefing Notes, 17 Sept 51

-26-I. Wt...c.'·;

1'-


!· :: .. ~ OECl.ASSffffD ~ ·' . . . . . . . ..

j~illtl.~= . .

..

0613

On 17 September, the enemy stiffened his defenses of

the objective area, re~cting sharply to 2d Division aggres-- -.

siveness with counterattacks, night probes, a.nd increased

mortar a.nd artillery fire. During the afternoon, a.ll units ' I

~. t of the 1st Batta.lion, 9t:tr Infe,ntry, received sporadic mortar

and artillery fire in positions running astride the valley

approximately six miles south of Mundung-ni. The 2d Battalion

had received· squad end platoon-sized probes in the ea.rly morn-

ing hours. At 1510, an estimated 100 enemy struck 2d Battalion

positions along the ridge line south of Hill 894, using sma.ll I

arms, automatic- weapons, and mortars. Extremely heavy friendly

artillery e.nd :mortar fire broke up the atta.ck and the enemy

withdrew. .. In the 23d In:t'a:ntry area, the enemy made an attempt to

oust elements of the 1st Batta.lion from their bard-won posit·ions

atop· the sa.ddle between Hills 894 a.nd 931. Presaged· by a ligbt

probing atta.ck. at 0130, the enemy two hours later hit Coftlpany

C with a company, later reinforced by a batta.lian, and succeeded

in penetra:tin&:!' Company C' s positions. Containing the attack.

by 0730, the bard-pressed 1st Battalion bad managed to push

Compeny A up through Company C' s old positions by 1300 when

the enemy, utilizing an estimated battalion, struck again.

The let Battalion called in devastatingly accurate artillery

fire to sma.sb tb is a.ttaC'k and immedia.tely thereafter thrust

C~any A.northward toward Hill 931. Company A's determined

push succeeded in-regaining the ground lost to the enemy

counteratta.ck, and at dark it took up positions for the nigbt I

300 meters down the ea.stern slope. of tbe ridgeline to the east

of Compeny C, whicb occupied the same general area of the

previous eventng~

On 17 September, Hill 931 also occupied the attention

of the 23d Infantry's 2d Battalion. In conjunction with the

-27-


0614


...

.. r .......... ., "'

3d Battalion's attack on Hill 851, Companies E and F, with

Company G providing a base of fire, jumped off at 1345. In-

1 tially they came under a bea.vy mortar be.rrage which decreased

in intensity as they pressed on. By around 1700, each bad

gotten within some 300 meters of the top of the hill--Company

E to the east, Company F to the northeast--but so intense was

the fire from the. enemy on the hill that neither could press

forward a.ny f'arther. The battalion 'retired to positions some

1,000 meters northeast of the objective for the night. In

the meantime, the 3d Ba.tta.lion, with Company I leading, resumed

its attack at 1345 on Hill 851. Enemy fire was exceedingly

hea.vy from the objective. Compe.nies I and L, supported by

fire fr.om Company K, managed to secure the east-west ridgeline

running 1;200 meters south of Hill 851 a.nd went into a, perim-

eter for ~he night.

1iith tbe exception of a.n early morning squad-sized

.Probe in tb e area of Compa.ny C, .tb e 9th Infantry had no even

ing activity on 18 September. But there was very bitter fight-

ing in the 23d Infa.ntry sector. Elements of the 1st Ba.ttalion

took the high ground 500 meters south of Hill 931 and then

employed a.rtillery to break up a threatened enemy countera.ttack.

At 2030, the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry, left its assem

bly area 1,000 meters west-southwest of Satae-ri and moved out

behind the 3d Battalion to support its attack on Hill 851.

The 3d Battalion, f~om its defensive positions on the high

. ground to the south of th a.t hill, had been engaged in a day~

long duel with the enemy using small arms, automatic ~..reapons

and artillery. No a.ir support bad been available due to the

bad weather ".vbich prevailed durinp- the day. The 3d Battalion

started its night attack at 2030. Using flame thro•N"ers to

rout the enemy from his bunkers and proceeding behind a rolling

-28-

•'--

•


• • .-. dl"'pped aaami tion.


.. ·~

ba.rra,ge of artillery, ttie battalion finally took its objective,

Hill 851; by m1dntght. 1

On 19 September,· the- skies were clear enough to permit

tbe resum,Ption of air operations. FI:"iendly air went back to

work--no less than' 37 fighter bombers ra.nging over the Divisi-on

sector f'irtng'close support missions during tbe da,y.2

Plans fo:t- 19 September called for the 9th Infantry to

continue its attack on Obj~etive G and H (DT1237 a.nd DT1236).

It was to· c·oordinate its attack on Objective H with the 23d

Infantry, by supporting tb e attack· with tank·s firing from tb e t ~ ., ~

road between Kong-dong· and Saegonbae. Movement by tbe 9th . '

Infantry tbro\Jgh tbe area of the 23d Infantry wa.s a.uthorized ' ' . ' :. : J: ;,. • i ~

I

and the time of the attack on Objective G was to be at· the

discretion of· the CORe,nding,off'1eer, 9tn Infantry. The 23d

Infan.try was to. c~~~~nu~ 1~·~--a~:~~c~· ~~-·Hiil 931.3

On 19 September, the 1st Bat.talion, 9tb Infantry, dis

patched a reinforced patrol to Hill 1024. !be patrol found . .

the blll to be oce·upied by an undetermined number of enemy : "·-

who fired at them w1 tb automatic weapons and burled grenades. ,·J , .r

The patrol maneuvered around them brief'ly in an ef'fort ·to

ascertain their status and location, and then witb.drew. Call-,

ing artillery fire in on the· hill, the pat~ol· returned to the ·7-• - .

battalion.

In its attempt to. take Objft'tive G, tbit 3d Battalion -·

was stopped by an enelQ' minefield just. north of tb.e objective

area·, a minefield covered. by hostile fire t:rom the vicinity·

of Hill 485. It w1 thdrew slightly to the east to take up po-

s1tions for the night- •. ·

Nor wa.s the 23d Infantry any more sueeesstul 1n 1 t s '

efforts for Hill 931. The 1st Battalion, in .a dogged, day-long

1. 2. 3.

App D-2: APP D-2: App D-4:

POR 7-36, 18 Sept 51 POR 737, 19 Sept 51 0 I 112, 18 Sept 51

-29-,... -·· ,~~'>i, ._..._ .. ~-: ...

~~~l{tJ


~· ·· . ~1:':'~\J~Ir.tt:U

l .~t'lor!tfl -_.q_?J>O\t!l By~NAP.AO~te t22J.

.•

battle up the ridgeline south of Hill 931, managed to get to

within 300 meters of the hilltop but was unable to .go farther

in the face of such heavy enemy resistance. A.t dark it with-

drew along the ridge:line 1,000 meters south of the objective, -.~ ·, ·'~"

tying in for the nigh~· with elements of the 2d Battalion of

the 9th Infsntry. 1

About 0110 on 19 September, an enemy company believed

to be from the 15th Regiment, 6th NK Division, enga.ged Company

L, ?3d Infantry, on Hill 851 i:n a. brisk exchange of fire. An

hour la.ter a.n entire battalion launched e. determined asse.ult

on Company L' s positions, increa.sing its pressure enough to

force the displacement o:' Company L from the hilltop by da.y

break.2 It ·pulled bacJf at 0830 under the covering fires of

Compa.nies I and. K. '!'We 3d Battalion then wi tbdrew some 800

meters south of the objective a.nd, a.t 1230, proceeded to re ...

organize while Companies E and. F pa.ssed through and counter

attacked the enemy. This counterattack took the pressure off

the 3d Ba.ttalion. Around 2100, both battalions were counter-

atta.cked, but they managed to repel the atte.ck and then closed . . . - .. ,

into adjoining positions for the night.3

On 2q Septe!nbfir, .Ma.Jb~ Genere.l Robert N Young a.ssumed

command of the 2d In~a!')_try Division, repla.cing Brigadier Gen

eral Thomas E deShazo, who was scheduled to retu~n to the :-. .. United Sta.tes on rotation. 4

The 2d Division made little progress on 20 September.

7 The fierce struggle for possession of the 851-931 Hill Mass

raged una.bated throughout tbe day a.s elements of the 13th NK

t{egiment on Hill 931 and the 15th NK Regiment on Hill 231 sav

egely resisted all attempts by the 23d Infantry to dislodge tbem.5

1. App D-2: POR 737, 19 Sept 51 2. APP C-?• -· PIR 325, 19 Sept 51 3. App D-2: POR. 737, 19 Sept 51 4. App B-1:,• -. G 0 531; 20 Sept 51 5. APP C-2: PIR 326, 20 Sept 51

-30-

~~ ~' "'"" ' ' : ...:.. i


: lJt\i~\)~ltH:U I i Autt'loritf 1 o ::Ji6 t<Jll J By~ HAP.A Date l 1XJ!

Brig l1eD. frlo-.. &4..._o, t.-.,.ruy D1'fbtoa ~er, laavee fot' t.l\e zoa.~ot !llt.6J"ior lrA4 ia repl&oed by •••

• • .A.aj xen Robert N Young, t~oown meeting Lt Col Frank ·~ :·lilaren. C.:)mme.ndlng Oi'f'ieer of the "oth RCt'T.


..

At 1000 -on 20 September, Company A, 9th Infantry, sent

e. platoon-sized patrol to Hill 867. The patrol moved to the

hill, twice coming under enemy fire while enroute. Just south

of the objective the patrol ra.n into enemy who fired small arms,

a.utomatic weapons, grena:tfes a.nd mortars to defend the hilltop.

After bringing in 4.2 inch mortar fire on the enemy with tell

ing effect, the patrol returned to the company, arriving after

dark. The 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, continued to dig in and

to improve its positions~-at times during tbe day being subjected

to heavy artillery and mortar fire. Compeny L sent a patrol

to Hill 728. When the patrol had come within approximately

900 meters southwest of the hill it started receiving mortar

fire. The patrol returned without further incident. The 9th

Infe.ntry moved 350 replacements from tbe Regimenta.l Replacement

Training Center to blocking positions on the ridgeline between

Hills 940 and 983. 1 Here in a. relatively quiet sector these

young soldiers would have a ch~nce to accustom themselves to

the grim work ah~ad.2

During the past week the 2d Division Artillery units

had fired so much artillery ammunition in support of Division

operations· that reserve.s bad 'becom·e depleted, and it had become

necessary to start moving ammuntti_on ·up from the rear in organic

transportation. 3: To ease- the demands upon the artillery some

wba.t, the Division employed tanks which fired indirect har

assing and interdicting fires.4

Enemy defensive operations decreased somewhat on 21

September--being confined for the most part to passive resist

enc e to 2d Division pe.trols probing forwa.rd areas e.nd to in

crea.sed hara.selng a.nd interdicting artillery and mortar firee.5

1. App D-lj: J 148' G-3 Journal, 20 Sept 51 2. App D-6: T M 28, 7 Sept 51 3. App A-2: Briefing Notes, 17 Sept 51 4. APP A-2: Briefing Notes, 18 Sept 51 5. App 0-2: PIR 327, 21 Sept 51

-31-~·

... --""' -.~ ·v i 1 :_::. i


! · ... , .. Utt;L.A~tHtU

~~-:l ~··.01\6\Ql l eysi.QL HAM o!tl tz :ti · .•

It was revealed tbet tbe'bunkers now being used by the enemy

;vere elmo2t impervious to our tJEdium erti11ery. 1 Despite these

super bunkers it was obvious that the 2d' Di vi sian art il1ery

fire--both light end medium--H·a.s causing the enemy mucb dis-

comfort: the· enemy suffered a.n estimated 1,075 casualties

during the 24 hour peMod ending 1eoo, 21 September, from ar

tillery a1one.2

The remainder of the month of September was marked by

the conti~ued efforts of the 2d Division to seize key terrain

features along its front. The enemy, firmly dug-in, e.nd fan-

atica1ly determined to keep control of'Hi1ls 851 end 931, re

sisted all a.ttempt.s by the 23d Infantry to take these hil1t~

Moreover, the enemy,_ despite punishinE artillery fire, was

attempting to r~inforce his forces. This mat~rially increased

the possibility of an enemy counterattack down the Sa.tae-ri

-Fia-ri roed.3 So bitter had the struggle become that press

correenondents began referrina to Hill 931 a.s 11 Heartbreak Ridge 11 .4

On the morning of 22 September, the 1st and 2d Battal-

io'1s of' the 23d Infa.ntry launched a coordine.ted attack on· Hill

931.5 Dur-tng the c·ourse of- thE:;day,. elem.ents of the regiment ' "·

eucceeded several ttm~s in ~aining the crest of Hill 931, only

to be driven :off by the heaviest v.olume of mortar fire ever

received by. any 2d.Division unit in the Korean wa.r.6 Both

battalions returned to their previous positions for the night.

On 22 September, the 9th Infantry, preparing for an at

ta.ck to be made on Hills 1024 a.nd 867 on 23 _September, ~'!as to

1 dispatch e patrol to reconnoiter for enemy in the vicinity

o7' Saegonba,e e.nd to report t\1 e condition of the road betv.reen

1. Anp A-2: Brief in~ Notes, 21 Sept 51 2. APD D-2: POR 739, 21 eept 51 3. Anp A-2: Briefing Notes, 22 Sept 51 4. Aop A-2: Briefinp- Notes, 2C::, Sept 51 _.

5. Apn n..:lk: •J 127' G-3 Journal, 22 Sept 51 6. Anp A.-2: 3r.iefin~ Notes, 23 Sept 51

-32-

c

"--"-'i~-.4


. .

- DEtlA'SSIREU f

t Aut,1orit'fLH \Q"'J'bS\0] J Sy~NA?.A D~te 12,;2],

.·»;

.su!'porte4 by native carriers who help move the hea:vy weapons- into new poe1 tiona.


, .. _ ...

¥

' ..

•·

Kong-dong and Saeg~nbae.l

The patrol, a. pla.toon-sized patrol from Company B,

left at 0900, reached its objective at 1200, and immediately

sent o·ut small patrols to scout the area around Sa.egonbae.

Although tb.e patrol bad ·no enemy contact in the vicinity of

tb at village, it received a.n enemy mortar barrage ·~rh ile return

ing to Company B' s positions located on the hill immediately

south of Kon~-don~. The 1st Ba.ttalion area, too, wa.s subjected

to mortar fire tb a.t a.ft ernoon. 2

The 2d Ba.ttalion moved out at 1730 on an a.tta.ck on

Objective H (vicinity of Hill 728). Because of the exceedingly

rough terrain the ba.ttalion had to take a circuitous route to

its objective through the positions of the 1st Battalion, 23d

Infa.ntry, which was then in combat with the enemy just north

of Hill 931. Becoming engaged with the same enemy, the 2d Bat

ta.lion took up blocking positions some 400 meters south of Hill

931. The enemy broke contact a.t 1900 a.nd the battalion remained •

in these blocking positions on the ridgeline overnight.3 '·

Durin~ the night 22;..23 September, elements of the 15.th .- " .--- '~

NK Regiment, supported by a heavy mortar barrage, la.unched a

strong counterattack· against -23d·Infantry defensive positions

alonP: the ridgeli ne north of Hill 931. But shortly a.fter mid-

' niaht the 23d Infa.ntry repulsed their attack, and the enemy

withdrew to the north, still under the cover of heavy mortar

fire. Until da.ylight small enemy reconnaissance and infiltrator

· parties probed friendly positions.4 ~

On 23 September the 1st Battalion {-),9th Infantry,

succeeded in getting within 100 meters of the top of Hill 1024,

but the volume of ba.nd grenades used by ·the North Koreans pre-

1. 2. 3. 4.

APP D-4: APP D-2: Ibid App C-2:

0 I 114, 21 Sept 51 POR 740 , 22 Sap t 51

PIR 329, 23 Sept 51

-33-


·,

vented the battalion from makin~ further gains. After e day

lonp: ba.ttle the battalion (-) regrouped and went into a per

imeter about 300 meters nortbeast of the objective.l

1Nh ile the 9th Infantry's let Batta.lion (-) was engaged in

its attempt to take H1111024, the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry,

tried, without success, to tie in with elements of the lst

Batt8tlion, 23d Infa.ntry. Despite the fact that the la.tter

unit was located on the southern slope of Hill 931, the pres

ence of groups of enemy infiltrators and the fire of hostile

elements to the northwest prevented the two ba.ttalions from - 2

tying in with each other.

The' Netherlands' Detach·ment returned to the Division

on 23 Se-ptember from 1 ts a.asembly area 1 n Chung- ju. At 1500

on that date, it was attached· to the 2d Division and further at

tached to the 38th Infantry upon its arrival in an assembly area

near the 38th Regimenta.l CP at Mu sumak.

The 38th Infantry had gone to the rear on 13 September

and had assembled in the general area of Cbisong-ni.3 Leav-

ing one batta1..ion in constant surveillance of the Kansa.s Line,

the regiment had -devo~ed a. ma~,imum effort to reorga:nization, re

supply and continued training.:4 It was still conducting a tra.in

ing program wbf!.n the Netherl~ands' Deta.chment returned on 23

September. The Netherla.nds' Detachment was scheduled to begin

a week of training itself.5

At 1200 on 23 September, the let Battalion, 23d Infantry,

1 me.de another atta.ck on Hill 931. By 1400, with Compa.ny A lead

ing, the battalion had ·dr1.ven to within 50 meters of the top

of the hill. This.attack wa.s repulsed. Four more times the

1. App D-2: POR 7Ll, 23 Sept 51 2. Ibid 3. App D-Ll: 0 I 108, 13 Sept 51 4. ,App D-4: 0 I 110' 15 .Sept 51 h APP A-2: Brieftna- Notes, 24 Sept 51 ...;o

-34-


SFt"'R r-r I • _t, t •

• • .under enem, fire.


ba.tta.lion atta.cked. On the fifth a.ssault, at 1750, tbe bat

talion took the bill--immediately thereaft-er. repelling a.n en

emy cotlnterassa.ult.l

On ·24 September., tbe 9th Infantry a~u~ted its positions

to form a new line from Hill 894 to Hill 582. The 1st Battal

ion 1 s plans for attacking I;ill 1024 w"Sre curtailed by a short-.. ~

age of a.mmunition and supplies, a. shortage caused by en~my

attacks on carrying parties during the early morning hours.

At· 1755, the battalion adjusted an air strike on Hill 1024,

but it was unable to attack after the strike because of the

intense artillery and mortar fire falling on its lead elements.2 _, J :: ~ ':- ~, !"' , ....

An attempt by elements of the 2d Battalion, 9th Infe.ntry, : -~,1 . ~ •

• • ~ •• J

to by-pass Hill ~31 and conttnue the attack on Hill 728 ended

unsuccessfully also. These maneuvering elements were forced.

to withdraw under intense enemy. automs.tic weapons and. mortar

fire.3

In the 23d Infantry sector on 24 September, the enemy

launched a counter~tta.ck a.t 0220 on eleme!lt s of the 1st Bat-

talion which bad. suc;ceedEtd in gaining the crest of Hill 931 ~ 1 .. _ (=··~:~ :- -~ ,· .. )~ -, :-~ .':" .

o~ the preceding evening. Using .mostly band grenades, the

attack1ng·-enemy-:·:r1nii.lly ·.·drove: the embattled batt·alion off the . . .

hill at abdut 0330·.: · At o44s, ··co~pany A counterattacked to re-

gain the b-111 but was unable to do so. And, at 0610, Companies

B a.nd C were engaged by an enemy group of 200 wbich approached

Hill 931 from the northwest~ . This group, using smal~ arms

and automatie weapons, was supported by a.n extremely heavy

and accurate mortar· barrage· wbicb lasted until a 2d D1 vision

liason plane appeared in the air. Sporadic small arms fight ...

j ng continued for tb e remainder of the day. Tb e 1st Batt ali on

L APp D-2: 2. App D-2: 3. APP _D-11:

POR'741, 23 Sept 51 FOR 742, 24 Sept 51

J 145, G- 3 Journal, 24 Sept 51

-35-. ~ --.. ~"f ~-~,..\ - ·--~

t '"' .


·,. __

withdrew to more advantageous oositions some 500 meterR south

o~ Hill 931 shortly before dark. The 2d Battalion, in attempt

ing to move south on the nort6-eouth ridge between Hills 851

and 931 was a.ble to move but slo•,rly--being continually under

heavy enemy small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire.

The battalion was unable to secure its objective and returned,

still under fire, to its positio~s of the previoue night, ap

proximat~ly 800 meters south of Hill 851. 1

Company A, 38th· Infantry, moved to blo~-ki ng 90 sit ions

~ormerly occupied by Comuan~ A, 9th Infantry, in the vicinity

o~ Hill 582, arrivin~ at 1900 on 24 September and bein~ at

te~hed to the 9th Inf~~try bn arrival. The 3d Battalion, 38th ,"-.- .. ;.., .. . --·

Infantry, continued··surveillance·of the Kansas Line and the

rem8inder o~ the regiment continued to tra1n.2

Plans were being prepared, howev~r, for an operation

in which the 38th Infantry would be the striking force. More-

over, it was decided that henceforth· the Kansas Line wes to - ... ·-. " .

~ ... . be secured by pa.trols only--thus releasing an entire Infantry

batt all on for ;~r~ .• ~~e~~i n~~ t~~~~.3 :· . ' '. ·r •. ~ • • i •.) • . "- "' 'l"" , • ., ' ·,• '

North Kor~~n platoon-sized patrols probed perimeter

posit ions of ei.e.ment s. of the-,9th ~end 23d Infantry Regiments

durinp: the nip:ht df~24-2,5· S~ptember. But the enemy made no ·'-,, o ',M"-'o ~

attacks o~ the latter during daylight hours, being content to

harass friendly forces with ·heavy artillery and mortar fires

interspersed· with. occasional bursts from long-range machine

.guns and eutomat ic weapons. 4 l

At 0·300, Company A, 9tb Infantry, moved from 1 ts former

positions in the-vicinity of Hill 582 to a position on a.

shoulder of Hill 1024 some 800 meters southeast of the hilltop

-1. APP D-2: POR 742, 24 Sept 51 2. Ibid 3. Apu A-2: Briefing Notes, 24 Sept 51 4. App C-2: PIR-331, ?t:; - _, Sept 51

•

-36-


0628


..

in preparation for a.n atta.ck on tha.t hill. Arriving a.t this,

new·location by 0900, the company started to receive moderate

small arms and automatic weapons fire. But as the company

climbed upwards it found that enemy resistance was only moder

ate, and by 1145 lead1ng'elements were on the objective. Heavy

volumes of h:arassing mortar fire coming in at that time de

layed tbe arrival of the entire company upon tbe obJective

until 1300. Companies B and 0 moved up to join Company A,

the entire 1st Battalion securing the objective by 1500. Ele

ments of the battalion in the immediate· vicinity physically

tied in at 1930 with elements of the 3d Regiment, 7th ROK Di-

vision. • '!. -~ '1

i

The· ?d Ba,tt_alion, 9th In~antry, made some adjustments . - ·. ';

in /i te positions during the afternoon and at the same time was I

the recipient of soprad1c harass-ing mortar, artillery and

small arms fires .•

All units of the 23d Infantry received moderate to heavy

mortar a.nd artillery fire and moderate to light small arms· and . . ' ... !"'~ ~ ~, ·-: ·~ . ....._ .

automatic weapons fire during t~e 25th. The French Battalion : ... : .

relieved the 2d. Battalion in positions, completing the relief -

by 1700, the 2d. Battalion moving to an assembly area in the

vicinity of Imdang.,.n1. and closing at 2100·. 1

The French Battalion. having relieved the 2d Battalion,

23d Infantry, 1 ts positions on the H~y s Line ·w•re taken by the

1st Battalion,. 38th Infantry, wb ich assumed re~onsib1li ty for

a: new sector approximately 2,000 meters wide along the right

portion of the Division sector. The 38th Infantry' was relieved

from responsibility of surveillance of the Kansas Line by the

Iva.nhoe Security Force •. The major boundary changes, effective

1200, 25 September, were such that the 23d Infantry's sector

1. App D- 2 : POR 7 4 3 , 2 5 Sept 51

-37-

.< ,

\.,. .·. , .•... ·- l


-,· ..

was reduced and the 9th Infantry's sector was increased (See _} 1

App H, Overlay 10) •

Air activities on 25 Se-ot·ember were restricted by poor . -

visibility and low ceiling during the morning hours. The

weather improved in tlile afternoon, however, permitting eight

fight.er bombers to napalm, rocket, and strafe enemy mortar \ ·-f-

positions and mortars on the reverse slope of Hill 867. Dur

ing tbepreviou~ evening one radar-controlled B-29 bomber and

three radar-controlled B-26 bombers h·ad dropped a total of 56

500 pound· general purpose bombs; six 200 pound fragmentary

bombs, and six 500 pound fire bombs en various enemy _positions

across the Division front with unknown re.sults.2

. On ~6 ·september·, the .. let Battal ton, 9th Infantry, con

solidated and imp~oved its J}Ositions on Hill 1024. Th.at morn

.ing Company A et:mt a platoon-sized patrol to a. group o~ enemy

bunkers a.bout 300 meters north of Hill 1024. Using flame

throwers, small arms, and automatic weapons, tbe platoon killed . ; .· ' . ..

45 enemy emplaced in t?:ese bunkers.· 'l'he patrol returned to ··:-..... ·.··~.· ;,<-~:-~.::.~-,.-c'·, ·.~ '··-··'

the comp.any area when it started to receive lDOrtar fire.3 . . . ~ .... ;: ·~:!;·~ ·_:;, . - . ' .

· Twelve PWa, captured on this date, identified the 18tb

Division·,-·Vl-·NK;:•Co.~,$~ :.in tne.2·d ·nivisio·n sector. This was a .-. -: ·~."'-/! ,l •.· ., .j:

new ident·:tffcation·,·,.arid-it .pointed td the possibility that the

18th NK Di vi sian may be.ve been c qmmi tted bee au se of the b ea.vy I . . - . .

. . 4 losses sustained by the V NK Oorps.

On 26 September, the French Battalion launched an un-

. successful a.trtack on Hill 931. It then returned. to its forme.r

po si tion·s; The let and 3d Bat'ta:lion~, 23d Infantry, remained

in their p~·sitions: for the day•-subjec'te'd to heavy artillery

and mortar, sma.ll arm.s and automatic weapons fire. The 2d

1. App· D-lm: J''l33, G-3 Journal, 25 Sept 51 2 .• App D--2: POR 743, 25 Sept 51 3. App D-2: POR 744, 26 Sept 51 4~ App A-2: - Brtefing·:Notes, 27 Sept 51

-38-(':- ;- :" . -\)L._\;.; ~ s


. OECLASSlftfO t i Aut.'1onty b_.AO J16 \ UJ\ ~ By~ NAP.A Date l bZ?j

<i- ;.-

~v~-·

'· , .

• • • that wreaks destruction on ena.r buakere •

..-~ -~·~· L ._,~ :.'


" - ~ .: . .. ; ,_ 1-

""· 0; \"). v .i~

Battalion remained in the vicinity of Imdong-ni, reorganizing

and resupplying.

Except for small patrols wh tcb encountered enemy in

tbe vicinity of Hills 1052 and 851, the 38th Infantry bad no

activity on 26 Septemeer.-~ Company A (attached to the 9th In

fantry) sent a patrol to acc·ompany a two officer tank-engi near

reconnaissance team making a study of the road b.etween Kong

dong and Saegonba.e to ·determine the construction necessary to

make. the road usab-le' for tanks. 1

. During tbe evening 26~27 September, small enemy groups, : ': -~.

generally of platoon strength and less, ranged the front mak-- .

1 ng vain atteJT:pts_ to ·probe· and infiltrate 2d Division po si tiona. 2 • I - ~

~ ~ ' '

One sucb force counterattacked tbe let Ba.~talion, 9tb Infantry, ' , .. ·,_:

in the vicinity of Hill 1024 in tbe very early morn1.ng, but

it was repelled by 0600.3 Anotb er group count&ratta~ked the

2d Ba.ttalion, 9th Infantry, on Hill 582 but at 0230 it, too,

wa.s beaten off. 4 •.;. .·

During daylight hours on 27 September, tbe enemy contin-

ued to plae.e a.r~illery and mortar fire on frontline elements

· of tbe·· 2d· D11'\fia1'on.._.:c;rspec-1a'ilt otlLtho·se, units of the 23d Infan-- .

try wbicb -were located. 'ilf tb<e· ~iclnity of Hill 931 and adj aoent I -- "' ·: •. ~ '· ; ~~-::1 :-. • -

ridge lines-. • However~:. so ·excel·lent was ~be air coverage given

to tbe 2d Division on that dat~ tha~ the volume of ho~tile fir,e

was materially less tb~n that received du.ring.previous periods.

Fifty-six fighter bombers ranged the skies· qver the Division

sector on 27 September, atta.cking mortar positions, supply in

stallations, artillery pieces, end troop concentrations wi tb

excellent resu1t·e·.5

1. App D-2: . FOR 744:;, 26· Sept 51. 2. App C-2: FIR 333 ,· 27 Sept 51 3. App D-2: l?OR 745, 27 Sept 51

• 4. App A-2! Briefing No.tes, 27 Sept 51 5. App D-2: POR 745, 27 Sept 51

-39-


...

"'.,.. .. ,. ' ..

The 1st Battalion, 23d · Infaptry, was relieved in po si

tion by the 2d Battalion at 1500 on 27 September, in the vi

cinity of 1t{orun-n1 for the purposes of resupply, reb a.bili tation,

end the integration of replacements.

In the -38t-h Infaatry sector, a :J_st Battalion patrol - '

encountered arl unknown number of enemy in bunkered positions . ' - . .

-~·"

on the forward slope of Hill 1052. The 2d Battalion moved tp

the vicinity of Hill 1179 in'preparation for an attack on Hill

1052·. The 3d Battalion and the Netherla.nds' Detachment pur-

sued their respective tre.ining_ missions. The regiment sent

three 75111ll recoille-ss rifles teams to the 5tb ROK Division

CP to be used. 1n- support of the 5th ROK Division attack on . -

Hill 1211 on 28 September.

The main activity in the 2d Division sector on 28 Sep

tember consisted of a battle between ·el~e'nts of the Division

a.nd an estimated/enemy batta.lion in an effort to free a platoon

of ·aompa.ny M, 38th Infantry, which ha.d be-en ambushed by the . . . . '

enemy .. near a. ·_fo_otbl"idge aeou~, ·8oo ·meters wes~ of Satae-ri. - .

The platoon fha.d left the company at 0500 with a. mission of

gping to- Hi~-1- 868· to':·fur-n~iit~~-fi~~ suppQrt to tbe 2d Battalion,

38th ~nfantry, for its p-roposed attack on Hill 1052. The pla

toon mistakenly ·follo-~ed·:a wrong trail and a:t 0900 became en

gaged with a.n enemy fore·e- deployed in bunkers_ on Hill 656.

A rescue force composed of one platoon from Company X of ·the

French Battalion; one platoon: of ta.nks from the 23d Infantry;

two squads from Company C, 38th Infantry; and a platoon fro,n

Tank Company, 38th Infantry, II!OV:ed UJ' tbe MSR to tbe rescue.

After several hours of bard fighting, the rescue force suceeded

in extric e.ti ng tb e embe.ttled platoon, enq 1 t returned to its

compe.ny at about 1300.· l

1. A:pp D-2: POR 746, 28.· Sept 51

-40-

"'. r f~· P_·. ; ~-,. . .~·· ·--~ -··~J ~ ~ 1-


~-·

~

.-,\ ..

~ ~ '" ._ ....

<JbJ;J

During.the early morning hours of the 28th, the 1st

,Battalion, 9th Infantry, repulsed 13 minor probing attacks

on Hill 1024. 1 Effective 0600, a modifi&-ation of the 2d us

Division--7th ROK Division boundary placed Hill 1024 in the

ROK zone. 2 At 1310, el8.'mtnts of tbe lOtb Regiment, 8th ROK

Division, relieved the let ·Batta.lion, end it moved into an

assembly a.rea. in the vicinity -of. Tondul. The 9th Infantry

Regimental Forward· CP moved to a. new lo.cation about 500 meters

southwest of Koba.ngsan-ni.3

Despite t-he relative lack of ground activity on 28 Sep

. tember, that d'ay was notable for its aerial activity. A

tota.l of 128 close support mi~sion·s were flown in the Division I

• - ·-~ ! ~ ' 1

fantry wee to plan on relieving the 38tb Inf"antry .in the zone , I- •- ""!- ' · ·• ~- • ·:.'" ·,·~-t . , . '.

of tbe la.tter.5 . ·, -, '?: ~·. . ·,. i ~ .

At 0410, 29 s:eptemb~r~ the 1st Battalion, 9th Infa.ntry, i:· - :; -~. -" j • •• :· "~·. ~ , .. , '

moved out to attack Fi111 867.. The 1st enemy· contact was light, ~ • -~;- L

and the batta.liol;l pressed ror.ward until at 1500 it was within ' . . ... '. . .,

150 meters of the objective. SUpported by artillery and tank

fires; the/battali-on tiad started ·its assault wben it was pinned

down .by an exceptionally heayy mort:ar_ and artillery barrage.

At 1725, tbe barrage ceased,: and the enemy counterattacked.

At 1800, followingafierc·.e< .. engagement, the batta1ion.was

ordered to withdraw. -It ret-urned tbat night to an assembly

area· near Kong-dong •. TNbile. thi£ battle was going on Company

K moved to teke·up new posit!ons near Kung-dong, the rest of

1. App D-2: POR 746, 28 Sept 51 2. App D-4: 0 I 118,. 27 Sept 51 3. App D-2: POR 746, 28 Sept 51 4. Ibid 1::: App D-4: 0 I 118, 27 Sept 51 ...;o

-41~

r . ~;;I'! .

UL..""'. ~

•


rS37

the 9th Infantry rem~ning in their previous positionse ' .-

In. ~be 23d. Infantry sector the 1st Batta.lion relieved

the 3d Battalion on position, the 3d Battalion moving into

an assembly area near Worun-nt. · Tbi s relief' was made dif-

ficult by enemy mort&r' aiR!· small arms fire falling into the

positions as it took place. Other units of tbe regiment bad -~

only light contact, as did the '38th Infantry. The 1st Ba.t-

talion of' the 38th Infantry remained in its blocking positions

along the Ha.ys Line and' conducted a patrol which went to a

point some 400 meters east of H1ll~841 and returned without

enemy contact.- The 2d ·Battalion, Which bad been r~lieved of

its propos~d · 'QI1 asian of attaoki'ng Hill. 1042, moved- i nt.o a new , .....

assembly area. astrid.e. the ·ridgeline some 300 meters south of ;.· : . , . . , :': ;--:· ···~ r ~ : ·_: .. . .

Hill. 1243.1 Tbe re~ainder of the 38th Regiment, .including the . ~, ~ .

Netber·lands' Detachment, continued with scheduled· training. ' .. '

', '

On 30 September, the 9th Infantry mafntained 1 ts posi-1 : • . ~- ·-·

tiona with ~nemy action relatively light .in its sector •. The . .._ .. \ ,.... . .. '.1 :; .~ '} .,·· . ... .

let Bat·talioti experienced. little difficulty in reorganizing. ·; ' r .· "''' :; .... ·,- , ··•

.once it had reach~d i.ts assemb~y area.· The 2d Battalion, 9tb ··. .; ·;. ~-;~ .. ~ ~'~-~- ~~r~ 1 •• w

Infantry; ha.d no trou~le while-moving from its frontline po-···. . .. ·. ~ > .~ ::: . . -~:.. '. L ?· :;~ ... :·:, ;·-:; _i _ __.: .

si.tions to an asseml:>ly:. area·.ln the rear. The 23d Infantry re-'_., •'

. cei ved ligR.t. probing -.attack's at tbe early morning hours and

late at n'i·ght. All't·be 'b&t~talions of the 23d Infantry received

harassing l20mm mortar fire which bothered tbem ·somewhat, but

~

none of this fire waa very heavy. In tbe 38tb Infantry sector,

two patrols from the let Battalion--one to Hill 841 and one

to Hill 1052--encouutered enemy forces on their objectives.

The patrols. were a.ble to reoonnoi ter th eft• assigned obj ec-t;.i vee,

however, and return witb. minimu~ loases. The 2d Battalion,

38th Infantry, moved from its ·positions on line to an assembly

area in the vicinity of Kwangchi-dong, and the 3d Battalion

1. APP D-4: . 0 I 119, 30 Sept 51


r . . _ .... , .,..,. 1""'

"' . t "? . .....- -~ •\. ~ . .,.,.."" -~ ..

and Netherlands' Deta.c.hment continued -their training.l

The close of the period found the 2d Division dogg·edly

fighting an ~qually determined enemy for possession of the key

terrain features to the D:tvtsion front. That the enemy wa.s

weakening, however, ooul•·be discerned from his increasing

susceptibility .. to inducements to surrendero2

1. App D-lo: J 117~ G-3 Journal, 30 Sept 51 2. APP D-2: Annex 2, POR 746, 28 Sept 51

-43~

Rcrr~-: :;r - .v. ::....


.::"'·""" ____ , ,, . , , ,.._on' • ,...,,,_,._ ru~""'''""' .... ""

Ch angpyong-ni

Chi song-ni

Cbukk a. e-go 1

Chukkong-ni

Chunchon

Chung-ju

Hah anj on-ni

Hoa.m

Hoengsong.

Imda.ng .... ni

Ka.cbil-bong

Kob a:ng sa:n-ni

Kong-dong

Kung-aong

Kwana ae.:._ri

K~ATangcbi-dong

· G:e;QQRA,PH!.C LOCATIONS*

UNlVERSAL TRANSVERSE MEitCATOR .-; ·'· L ', . ..,, __ . ' ·'

DT0828 Mundung-ni

DT1625 Musumak

DTi629 Pia.-ri \· .-

DT142o Saegonbae

cs8994 Se.mta.e-dong

DR0590 Se.nggonbae ~'

DT1/t2l, Sa.ta.e-ri

*·' Sol~kogae DT1930

··DS1049 Songhyon-ni

'DT1628 · Soyapyong

DT204o Tokkol-li ' - ..

DT1130 Tondul

· ·DT1133 Tutayon

' I;J!fl() 33 Worun-ni

.·.·D'il'~306 Y:acl<lon-ni

DT1821 Ya.nggu

· ·' Y.aq-dong .-· 'DT1619 ' : l ' '

Hill 399 DT146260 ... Hill 656

Hill 485 DT121358 Hill 660

Hill 500 DT159302 Hill 702

Hill 530 DT167341 Hill 728

~Hill 558 DT165365 . Hill 773

Hill 582 DT106337 Hill 778

Hill 618 DT106331 Hill 785

DT1141

DT1725

DT1635

DT1136

DT1537

DT1037

DT1640

DT1524

DT0930

DT1032

DT1526

DT1030

DT1236

DT1631

DT1619

DT2218

DT159404

DT157368

DT1D2376

DT125373

DT1.56338

DT136334

DT126348

*Allplacern.atnes; are sbo1ro on the Korea 1:250,000 AMS Map Series L552 (Sheet<numbers NJ' 52-10, NJ 52-14, and NJ 52-15). They- .also appear on tbe Korea. 1:50 ,ooo L571 Series of the same·. area.· ' ·

-1-


·,

.. Hill 787 DT145286 Hill 931 DT141388

Hill 851 DT141408. Hill 940 D'rl48337

Hill 867 DT096354 Hill 983 DT136334

Hill 868 DT177384 Hill 1024 DTOB1351

Hill 841 DT172394 Hill 1052 DT18440l

Hill 883 DT056338 Hill 1059 DT205368

Hill 894 DT142377 Hill 1100 DT203355

Hill 900 ' DT148337 Hill 1130 DT203398

Hill 901 DT085334 Hill 1148 DT211321

Hill 930 DT22B418 Hill 1181 DT201388

Hill 1211 DT198411

Hill'l243 DT204402

. '·. ;

-2-


!~i~i:Jl . ·. ., ·, ... ··.· !

.PERSONNEL

for

september·l95l

.,

During tbe. first ba.lf of ·-september, all units continued

their missions as previou~ly reported, the 9th and 38th Regi

ments cont 1 nuing tb e a.ttack, e.nd the 23d Regiment remaining

in defensive positions~ Major _General Cla.rk L Ruffner was ' .

rotated to the ZI after seven and one half months as Command-

i~g General of.tbe 2d Infantry Division~ Gen~ral Thomas E -. " j 7'

deSba.zo a.ssu'med .command of· the Division. On 5 September, the •:

9th Infantry secured its objective and on 6 September was re-

lieved by the 23d Infantry~ On 11 September tbe 9th Infa~try

went back in the line, with the 23d shifting to the right to

relieve the 38th Infantry. The 9th Infantry continued the at-·~· ~· '

tack on Hill 894, tbe 23d Infantry continued attacking Hills

851 and 931. The 38th at this time was on a line of defense

a.cross the entire Division sector. The Division Artillery a.nd

other unite continu~d active support of front line units. ,. ~ .. ··- ·- •-:: . ~ )

The 66 tb' Counter .Fire Platoon and tb e 28th FA Counter-

mortar Radar Detachment were attached to the Division on 6 and

11 September, respectively. During the last half of the period

all unite were continuing missions as previously reported. The

9th Infantry was attacking Hill 894 and the 23d Infantry was

~ attackinP" Htl1s 931· .?nd 851. The 38th Infantry remained in

reserve on a defehse line. At obe time or.another, both units

secured their objecti~es, only to receive fierce counterattacks

and forced to fell ba.ck.. On 17 September, the 31st Countermor-

tar Rader Detacnment wa.e a.ttached to the Division. On 20 Sep

tember, M~jot Gerierel Robert N Young assumed commend of tbe

-1-


.. -~ \

~' ' • • .' . . ,. ,; : . i

2d Infe~try Division, vice Brigadier General Thomas E deShazo.

As the period closed toe J.,st Battalion of the 38th Infantry

joined the' 23a Infantry a~,tt'contlnued to atta.ck on Hills 931

and 851. The 9th Infa,ntry was ma.,intaining holdinf positions

on the Division left ,,fl~ak and .·tbe. 38tb (-) was conducting . """'· ' ••. l

training in rear areas~. The Division Rea~ Echelon moved from

Hoengsong, .closing in new locetion six miles south of Chuncbon

on 15 se.Ptember 1951. Thi.$. included Special Services, APO,

and Replacement Company • . The 'Qatt.le ·ca.sualties fo.r .the period totaled 2,858; this

being considerably higher than last period. The Division a.s

in the last period was 'attacl~ing over very mountainous terrain

and against ·heav·ily f.qrtiffed pe>sitions. As the ba .. ttle casual

ties increased so did the non-battle casualties, which totaled ' I" ,·, '·- • ••

780. Administrative losses due to rotation tota.led 41 officers ;::1

and 1,321 enlisted men. The reduction in rotated personnel

over the lest period is directly a.ttributable to the nevr system. 'L_ ~

All officers with· 55.noint~ or over and enlisted men wt th 43

points or over were ~ote.tecL' Personnel gains for the month . \

totaled 6,104. At tb e close of tb e month the strength of tb e

Division was 952 Officers, 41 warrant officers and 18,660 en-' / ~ . . ". \

listed men. The'Division·is overstrength by 1,340, however, c~; ~ ,,,.. r:

it is understrengtb in officers by 116, and overstrengtb in

enlisted men by 1,456. There was a net loss of' 143 ROK personnel

during the .month. There a.re a tot~,l of 727 ROK solqiers (KAT-

USA) a.ttached to the Division \vith an ad:ditiona.l 142 attached

to tbe French Battalion ana 14'6 a.ttacbed to the Netherlands'

Det a.c hm.ent.

Rotation o:f' .. co.m:bat pei;'BOnneJ from Korea to the Zone of

Interior conttnued on· a limi t,ed scale. Since inauguration of'

rota.tion on 15Aprill951; 582 officers e.nd 10,843 enlisted

men be.ve been rotated.· At. the close of the month there were

-2-


I ~'

• . • p,,

1,086 enlisted ,res~rvists remaining in the Division. It is

expected to outship two~thirds during the coming month. These . ' - . - .

' reservists must be, out shipped from Korea. by 15 November 1951

in order to be released from a.ctiv~ duty b; 31 December 1951. ' ';o:•• ~

Prisoners of War processed through Provost Ma.rshal chan...:

nels totaled 1,153, o.f which 5 .tf.ere North Korean, 1 Chinese

Communist Forces soldier, 828 North Korean Soldiers and 319

were civilians.

Military discipline was excellent. Mili blry offenses

were negligible, however, there were ti'ro cases of narcotics, ' ' ~:

nine cases of .larceny, two ca~es of assault a.nd one case of

rape reported.to the Provost Ma,rsha1 during the period. Mil

l tary offenders a.re beinq handled. at the lowest echelon of

commando

· Mora.le of the Division remains excellent, rotation and

R&R leave being important factors. The PX rations (including

beer a..nd soft drinks) continue to be issued to the troops. A , ,; . ',• • • •· I '

total of 2,062 officers, enlisted men a.nd members of the French

a.nd Netherlands' Ba.ttalions visited Jepa.n through the fa.cili ties ., :'.

of Special ·services .R&R program. One USO show, well recet ved,

was presented to the Divisio~ units on ~5, 26, and 27 September . .

1951. Also a. Specla,l Services all soldier show was furnished -:' \

for entertainment of Division personnel on 22, 23 a.nd 24 Sep

tember 1951. Numerous items of equipment were issued to units

!'or distribution to troops. Jl-1oving pictures were shown to

• 11troops whenever possible, depending upon the ta.ctice.l situation.

The Clubmobile made numerous vi sits to elements of the .Division

and attached units.

Religious acttvities ·and coverage for troops were con

sidered adequate~ ·

Tb~ Red Cross bandled:many welfare problems of soldiers, . I

securing. home condition reports to a.leviate tb e worry caused

-3~


1 Ht:. NA lllJNAL }:\RGHIVES

I' :, .. ·~ DECl ASSlFIED .~t~rt1y-~Jl>$\61-Bt~ NAP.A D~te l zZ]

?

'if'

in the minds of persons concerned.

Aitfa.rds and Decorations eontinued to be processed rap-

idly. General of the Army, Omar N Bradley accompanied by Gen-( ' ' .

eral Ridgeway, Lieu tenant General Van· ·Fleet and Major G-eneral

Byers presented the Sil'1~r Star to M/Sgt Jack B Brown, Company

K, 23d· Infantry Regiment, and Capta.in William D Clark, 9th In

fantry Regiment during a ceremony .at the Division a.irstrip in

conjunction with a .. visit to· the. Division. During the period

·the Commanding Genera1 a.pproved fqr presentation:. 42 Si 1 ver

Stars, 34 Bronze S1:,ars for. Va1or, 49 Bronze Stars for Meritor

ious Service, 1. Air Medal and 130 Commendation Ribbons. Notice

wa.s received tba.t 2 Meda.ls of Honor and 2 Distinguished Service

Crosses ha.d been approv.ed for presentation. This brings the

Division total to 10 Meda.ls of Honor and 86 Distinguished Serv-

ice Crosses.

The Civil ~ssistance Section continued to be active

during the month. A.(~tivities of.this section included the

evacuation of 386 r~fugees to the X Corps Refugee Collecting - ' l •

Point, obtaining medica.i treatment _for 765 refugees and local

inhabita .. nts. and dustin~ 386. refup:ees with DDT. No persons were ,·.. ' \-· .. ;. - -"

evacuated to civilia .. n bospitals, a.nd no refugees died during

the period •.

Fourteen field grade officers were lost during tbe month

a.s follows:

Lt Col Gaylord !v1 Bishop 9th Inf Regt Em erg LV

Lt Col Edwin G Clapp, Jr Hq, 2d Inf Div Hota.ted

Lt Col Calvin, S B apn'!ltn 7·2d Ta.nk Bn Rotated

Lt Col .Albert G .. Soderstrom Ha,_ 2d Inf Div Tra.nsferred

Lt Col Neil. Robinson. Hq, 2d Inf Div Rotated ._: . . ·~

Ma.j or Harvey Boese 2d Med Bn Rota.ted

1\-'l.a.j or Jack vi Downing .2d Med Bn Rotated

Major-Herbert R Elmor-e 2d Med Bn Rotated


_ l.:, _.~DEClASSIFIED -- . .

1 ,-Aut~~~%6\tYJ·; - ·, ey~NAPAD~te tz:ti_

Major Frank E Helsel

.HaJor Robert L Hoffman

Mejor Pa.ul S Jones

MaJor Marvin C Vena.ble

~1ajor Charles E Wa.rd

--5-:

38th Inf Regt

Hq, 2d Inf Div

2d En.gr C Bn

Hq, 2d Inf Div

2d. Div Med Det

Rotated

Rotated

Rotated

Rotated

Rotated


·.

INTELLIGE:NCE

Staff Sec.tion Report of G-2, 2d Infantry D1 vision

for

sep·tamber 19 51

Order of Battle: As the p.eriod. opened, tbe enemy r s II. \'

and V NK Corps .were on the. defensi v·e following t.he fa.ilure of

their limited objective counterattacks late in Al.l.gust. N"ortb ', ,, : ' ·.: ,' ,'. \ . .

of Taeu-sa.n, remnants .of the 27th Division, II NK Corps were

fighting desperettely to prevent friendly forces from reaching

their Kacb il ... bong ~trongbold (DT2040). Ho,.,ever, even with the

assistance of 6ne bat~alion from the 15th Regiment, bth Divi-

v' sion, the entire 27th Division, by then reduced to less than

1,000 combat effectives, was unable to do more tba,n sloi'¥" tbe

advance of attac.king US 38th. Infa.ntry troops. The enemy was ' ' ' '

defending from e. series of fortified positions along tbe ridge-

line forming the maJn avenue of approach to Ka,chil~bo,ng from

the south; nevertheless, by 3 September Ka.chil-bon:g had fallen ..

Elsewhere along the 2d Infantry Division front, elements

or the 6tb and 12th Divfslons,. V NK Corps were busily engaged

in improving their defensive positions along a series of ridges

extending from Hi,ll 983. DT1333 on the west to Kacbil-bong on

the· east. In addition, these enemy forces conducted nightly

patrols in the forward areas, probing friendly positions and

o,ccasiona.lly infiltrating into friendly rear .area.s. The 6th

~and 12th Divisions had both suffered severe losses during the

b eevy f'igh ti ng of August; bm•rever, by pouring in large numbers

of' reulacements to f'ill the ranks, the enemy was able to main-

ta.in the combat effectivenes$ of· these units a.t a. fairly con-

stant level. The morale of the troops, however, was very low,

as wa.s attested by tbe steady· flo~v of deserters, a.vereging

-1-


almost 20 daily, .who mede their way to f'riend.ly lines to give

themselves up.

W~ th rrtendly torces .~~cupying Ka.cbil-bong, tbe enemy

had lost his anchor position, and it w~s evident that the rest

of his defense line exte~dtng to tbe. southwest was rapidly

becoming untenable. When elements of the US 9th Infantry ex

pa'1ded their .foothold on "Bloody Ridge" DT1433, the positions

of the 12th Division. on Hill 983, in particular, had become

endangered. Tbua .it was that wben elements of the US 23d In

fantry initiated an E'nveloping movement !n the Hill 983 area

on 6 September, .the ~~ ~~giment, 12th Division gave up this

much-contested- hill ma .. ss a~mo st. wi thou~t a struggle.

After tb e enemy's limited wi tbdrawal on 6 September,

it appea.red that be would move ba.ck far enough to form another

continuous denense line across the front. Therefore, it was

surprising to find the enemy re·sisting stubbornly when elements ,''.,

o~ the Us 38th Infantry.attempted to occupy Hill 868 DT1838

on lC September.- At first only one enemy company was reported . to be defending Hill 868, but the enemy quickly reinforced

this garrison '!lith -the '.remainder of the let Bat tali on, 13tb

' ' :l.egiment, 6th . Dtvi sion. Altb ougb tbe e ~.emy we s being a.ttacked

' I • • '

'·, ~ \·. '• .

from t!o directiobs along the ridgeline, be continuously fed

in reinforcements during a three-day stand. In the end, all

three batta.lions of'. tbe 13th Regiment, 6tb Division ha.d par-

ticipated in this battle that cost tbe enemy over 500 casuelties,

· ,1 of ;prb ich elmo st 200 were. found dead on Hill 868. r.rb e only ap-

'pere ':lt rea. son or such de sper8te re sLst a DC e on tb e part of tb e

enemy ''ra.s e. desire to gain t i.me. to reorganize end regroup b is

force; oltboup;b succes8ful J'O purchaeing three daye of time,

the enemy ps"ia -8. b~eavy._price~ - ' + ~ ' ~

The bad to be relieved after

-2-


withdrawn thrcrugh tbe. 15th Regiment, 6tb Divis1on 'IArbich ba.d

prepared positions ··along tbe. next ridgeli ne to tb e north. In

the r:1ea.ntime, the l£lt Regtme:qt, 6tb Divislon, 'was feverishly

engaged in constructing en elaborate system of f'ortifica.tions

along 'IA.rba.t "~Ara.s a.a.ter to l'H3 known a.s "Heartbreak Ridge 11 (DT1437 ...

DT1440). The le.t Regiment 'ltla.s deployed i.n a. column of ba.ttal-

ions along the ridg.eline and 'l'las well prepared to defend vvben

elements of the. US 9th and 239 lnfantry Regiments launched

separate a.ttacks aga.inst. tbe·se positions on 14 Septembero · En-

emy elements .. .on Hill 894 DT1437 ~,Jere forced to relinquish po s

session of this extremity of' the ridge; however, friendly at

tempts to sever the ridgeltne.fur·tber north met with strong

enemy opnosition., .A.f:ter friendly forces bad occupied Hill 894,

the enemy dispatched a ~attalion from the 2d Regiment, 12th

Division in a futile gesture a.irned a.t the recapture of this ''

importaYJt terrain feature. It ~.,a.s becoming increasingly ap-

pprent ~s time went o~ that the enemy was ~etermined to bold

"Hea.rtbreak Ridge'' a.t all costs.

The '1st Regiment, 6th Division, withstood the steady

pounding of 'uN Artii'lery a.,nd' the relentless attacks of UN

ground :Forces unt1.117 September, Ntit:n the ren'nants of this ·- t \

regiment ~eri relieved b'y 't:ne i3th Regiment of the same di vi-,~ ... - >, ; '-

sion, Immedia.teiy after takingup its positions, thE 13th

Regiment la .. uncbed a countera.t-tack from tbe north in- conjunction

with elements of the .2d Regiment, 12th Division in anothe:t

attempt to drive friendly forces completely off of nHeartbrea,k

Ridge". .Tbi~ attack was intense but short-lived, and tbe enemy

was fore ed to wi tbdraw. after making only limited penetrations.

t~lben friendly forc.es succeeded .in severing the ridgeline between

Hill 931 and Hill Bsi· on 18 'september, the 3d Ba.ttalion, 13th

Regiment which. was defEmding ·Hill 931 DT1438 wa.s 1 sola.ted from

the rest·o.f the regiment. The enemy reacted quickly to this


v

threat and shifted tbe 15th Regiment from its positions to tbe

east of S~ta.e~-~i DTl640 MSRto newpositions north of Hill 851.

Then, on 19 September, be struck. south toward Hill 851 DT1440

with two ba.tte:.?tlons ·from the 13tb ·Regiment .and one battalion

trom tbe newly-a.rri ved 15th Regiment. Once Hill 851 ha .. d been

well secured, the 15th Regiment a.ssumed responsibility 1'or tbe

a .. rea a.nd the 13th Regiment sent more troops to reinforce its

garrison on Hill 931. i,!f1t,b one regiment minus on ea.cb of the

two strong points of Hill 931 and Hill 1:)51, the enemy dug in

a.nd a.wat ted UN a,t ta.ck s.;.

After tb .. e .. westward di.splaeement of the 15tb Regiment on

17-lb September, tbe sector ~ast ~f tbe Satae-ri M.SR rema.ined.

lightly d-efended \J.Titil' 21: Heptember, v-rhen. elements of' the 19th

Regiment, 13th Divis.ion, II .NK Corps made their initial appear ...

ance in the 2d Infantry Division sector since the last days of

t nM .M 11 h_e • ay a.ss~tcre. Tbe mission of the 19tb Regiment was purely

defensive, with its principal positions located on Hill 656

DT1:,40 and Hill 841 DT1739.

During the period 20-23. September, the enemy continued

a.n a.ctive derense or·. bi s ridge-top fortifications and engaged

friendly atta6king ele~ents, ,,ith .hea.vy volumes ot' fire from all

types of infantry wea1Jons. In addition, the enemy made ef1'ective

use of his artillery frequently bar.e.ssing friendly front-line .,:t

units. At tb e,t time, US 2d Inf'a.ntr.y Division u.ni ts were in

contact with element.s of fou.r NK divisions in a. sector extend-

ing from HiJ.l 1024 DTOt335 to Hill 1:)41 DT1739. From west to east,

these vrere the 32d, 12tp e.nd btb Divisions of the V NK Corps

a.·nd tb e 13th Division of the II NK Corps. ~epeated repor:ts were

received f'rom prisoners or war of an expected reliet· ot' the V

NK Corps; however.,· ~hi:s relier· t·a.iled to materialize in Septem

ber, and ~Il t~e unite or tb.is corps continued to derend tneir

positions ±'an_atic~l±Y .<iespite e. deteriora.tion in combat ert·ec

tiveness concomitant with the heavy ca.sualties su.rrered. Elements


iHE NA iiONAl ARClfiiYES;

ot. the US 25d lnr~:mtry succeeded in re8cbing the summit of Hill

951 on 23 Septembe.r,. after a b~tterly contested battle that

moved. slowly from bt.mker to bunker. After relinquishing con-...

trol of Hill 931, the badly decimated 13th Regiment, 6th Divi-

sion withdrew to.the 1$o:#f.bw~st; however, before friendly forces

could completely secure tbis peat;: t.be enemy countered with a.

strong tl'lrust fro~ the west by the 3d Regiment, 12th Division. : c ' ; ' ' '

This la.st mentioned.regiment 'was the only remai'ning reserve ' • c' <"• ' - ( • •'

unit of the V NK .Cor-ps, a~d its COli,J~itment ma.rked the fifth

enemy regiment to participate in the struggle for 11 Hea.rtbrea.k

Ridge. n The recap,'tiure of Bill 931 represented the high point .. ,

in the V NK Corps defense of the' area •. This Wsts the last sue-'

ceesful countera.ttack .. tO be made by the V NK Corps; the losses

in manpower ha .. d been too great to permit the usual rapid re

cuperation mal1e by this corps after previous comba.t engagements.

On the US 2d Infantry Division west front, a. battle was

belng wa.ged between elements of tne US 9tn Infantry and the well

entrenched troo~s oftbe 1st Regiment, 32d Division on Hill

1024 DT0535. Control o·f this bill was. finally· wrested from the

enemy on .25 September.:after a. bitter engagement tbe.t ended in

hand to band fighting before 1 the enemy was ejected. :•., I• i

Once Hill 1024 wa.s in f~iendly hands, the enemy began

making plans for tne recapture of this important terrain fea-

ture. In. order to organize .. a:-force le.rge_ enough to undertake

J such e task, the enemy initlated a readjustment of t.be units

·~of the V NK Corps, with the center of mass sbifti'1g to the west.

"Heartbreak Riage11 was left to be defend eo by tne 15t.b Regiment,

6th NK Division as tt'l e 3d .Regiment, 12tn NK Division wa.s wi tb

drawn from Hill 931 and dispa.tcbed to relieve tne 1st Regiment,

12th N~ ... Divis:l.o~ on Bill tj67, DT0935. In this way the 1st Regi

ment, 12th NK Diyis.i.or1 was treed to lea.d t.be assault on Hill ,.,.,, ~. >

1024. 'l'he mat n etrort vla.s ma.de on the night ot· 27-21:) September

-5-


. '

As the. enemy hurle.d .. success:i. ve wa.ves of company- sized groups

aga; .. nst tne friendly perimeter;- after a.n a.ll-night ba.ttle,

hostile forces were--forced to wt:thdraw.

After the attack on Hill 1024, a NK deserter was picked

up wno identified the 18:tib Divis.ion, VI NK Corps. Tbis repre

sel."1ted the i ni ti al identi:rication or tb e l'dtb Division on tb e

€!?stern :f'ront, and a.t the time it w,gs thought tba.t the entire

division could be expected to a.rrive at the front in a. rein

forcement role. H'oweve;r,, no further reports were received on

this unitt and it wa.~ later concluded that et most one regiment

of tbe_ division had.- been in t-he forward area.s, ana its presence

was e temporary measure to meet the_ emergency.

During tbe last :t'ew: days o!' September, tbe ma1n action

centered around Hill '067, witb tn e 5d Regiment, 12th Di vi sian

conducting an unusua.lly stuboorn defense of this bill mass.

Tbls action was continuing as the period closed. Elsewhere

along tne rront held by the battle-weary V NK- Corps, the en-

emy' s attitude wa.s entirely det·ensive, but there a.ppeered to ',, ,_

be no les.sening or bis will to -resist. The most signl:t'icant ,:; ,---,

order of ba,ttle cnange t,Q te;ke ple,ce during tbe la,st few days

of" the montb .wes a. westward extension of toe II NK Corps to

include the north ern extremity of "Hea.rtbreak Ridge" wb ictJ we,s

occupied oy tbe 23d Regiment, l3tn Division. There v;as also

a. westward shift of tbe 12th ·Division wbicb resulted in one

regiment of the 32d Division being relieved on tbe extreme

west t'la:n.k or the V NK Corps. Otherwise, tne s1tue.tion remained

the same.

September proved to be a ~ontb of:muc~ shifting of units

1-rithin the V NK Corps, as the enemy me.de despera.te efforts to

discourage friendly limited ,objective attacks a.nd to tnainta.in . .

~ ' - ,,

nossession of the key terretn teatures so important- to his de-

fense ot t-he east~rn sector and so essential ~o bis future


D;ATTHE NATIONAL ARCHIVES; I·:, _.,DEC' ~sst FlED ..

j .Au.t'w~~jj6\0l: S)'si;Q£1iAPA D~l~ I 741'

offensive Of)eretions. In the end, the NKP.A bed all but lost

their most effective fighttne: force, the V NK Corps, which was

by then in such a ''J:eakened st.~tte that further attacks by friendly

forces were almost assured of success. Enemy casualties for

the month of September ~~e estimated a..t 7,256 KIA end 9, 878

1riTA, and a tota.l o-f' 544 P\vs were captured. In addition,

close air su-p110rt accounted for another 1,385 enemy KIA and 989

estimated enemy \tf!A. Thus, .. the aggregate total of enemy casu-

alties botb counted a.nd estimated, reported by 2d Infantry Di-

vision units a.nd supporting air elements amounted to 20,052.

~ Of great assistance to the Order of Battle section

in the accomplishment of its ·mission wa.s the informetion sup

plied by the 2d~Divts1on IPW Team through their interrogation

of the great majority of the 544 PWs captured during the period ..

These PWs, who for the most part were deserters, provided a

wealth of inf.ormation not only on current enemy activities along

the front but also on the genera.l enemy situation and the status

of' mora1 e, replacements, supplies, and equipment. Furthermore,

tbese PWs supplied ~nvaluable indications as to the courses of . ·. actio:l ~rhich the enemy would adopt in various operations e.hd

gave additional evidence suggesting possible future courses of

action. The ·o:raerc ~f Battle Section attempted to evaluate a.nd ...

interpret all the reports received and contributed a .. da.i~y annex

to the D.~ vision Periodic Int~lligenc e Report wb ich i nclu.ded .:1ll

pertinent information. obtained from Pi./lfs along wi tb comments on

.its significance. In addition, a ~urrent order of battle over-

lay was prepared daily for publicaticn in the PIR.

During tbe period, tbe IPW Team continued the training

of' re-placement interro,g-etors by· supervised on-the-job trainingo

One thou sand a.nd ·thirteen P'1'/s were screened. A total of

718 PiiiTs V~rere i'hte•rrogated by tbie team. Information obta.ined i

as a result of'-~beee-interro~ations was submitted on POW

-7-


!;QAI; THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

. !-:: .. "'DECJ ASSIFIED ~ . . .. ·. . . . ... ~. . . . . ' ...

',. '\ . ~t'\oott~0:§6\l!J·' Bt~ NAP.A o~te t 2.7]

.,

Interrogation, Reports No's 2-0656 to 2-0873 inclusive, end ·on

informal memore.ndums t:o ' '

AC/S, G-2.

POlfl COUNT

Se:Q t ember 1951

Date 2d Div t:;th RO.llt 7th. ROK 8th ROK TOTAL ...:...;::;~ -- --------1 10 10 2 17 7 1 16 41 3 19 ''15 2 36 4 13 14 25 52 5 23 23 6 22 :3 25 7 17 1 18 8 9 8 2 19 9 2 18 4 24

10 16 16 11 23 22 45 12 ~- .6 2 33 13 . '· 18 :36 14 25 25 15 22' ],6 '13 51 16 27 10 37 17 12 13 13 38 18 34 9 43 19 60 20 80 20 34 14 56 21 20 20 22 29 12 41 23 23 7 6 36 24 22 10 8 40 25 36 4 4 44 26 12 12 27 18 48 66 28 2 i8 20 29 19 5 2.4 30 2

. ~-- 2 -..............-

TOTAL: 611 .. .llJ 265 26 1013

Photo Inter12retation: The operations of, tbe PI Section

during September we.s greatly. enhanced by the addition of three

trained photo interpreters and one draftsma.n. This augme.ntation

of personnel was reflected in the output of photographic ~upport

'1 given to Division units in support of current operations.

The maximum use of basic cover 1rras ma.de during this period ~

;,ritb the units .recei .. ving sufficient copies of annotated nhoto

prints to fill tbetr ne~da~own to company level. As in pre-

vious mont.bs, eecb .. set of prints 'tras e.nnotated Twith names of • ·- ' ·,". • .• ":!

villages, prOminent l.andma.rks, critical bigb ground end in

-8-


.,

• j - ~ '

ma.ny instaJJces. pr.inctpal rid.gelines were indicated which a.s

sisted tbe users in or,hmting the photo to the map. In a.d

dition a. sortie plot ~indica.ting the area covered by the aerial

photo.s on the 1:50,000 opera.tiona.l map ac compa,.ni ed ea.ch set of

photo prints which gr~at:!! facili ta.ted the orientation of the

photos and insu.red immediate use by the units.

A grand total of 7,276 prints of a.nnqtated basic cover

of the. Division aJ:"ea of responsibility was preparedt annotated

and distributed·t·oDi.vi,sion units. In addition, 116 Mosaics

were a.ssembled, annotated a.nd·distributed within the Divisiono

These Mos.aics were prepared in. J,.im1ted sizes of 6 to 8 photos

to facili ta.te ba.ndling and in. some cases distributed in suf ...

ficient copies to ena.ble a greater distribution to lower eche

lons below regimental level. To cite an exa.mple, the 72d Tank

Ba.tta.lion requested and received a. tota,l of 39 Mosaics which

assisted materially in the planning of a.n operation by this unit.

In addition to the above, 108 oblique prints of critical a.rea .. s

of interest were also distributed within the Division. .. '

During September, while the number of prints distributed ' '

to the units was nearlY .doubled from a.ny previous month, the.

number of Mosa.ics distributed wa.s approximately four times that

of a.ny tota.l previou·slY recorded since the Division's la,nding

in Korea.

During September a slight improvement wa,s noted as the

weather ?eca.me more fa.vorabl.e insofar as a.er1al photo recon

naissance was concerned. A total of seven current sorti~s were I]

received by ·the 2d Division from the Air Force through Army

ch a.~nels. In addi t1on · a,pproximately ten missions were flown

by Division Si,gnal and .Artillery '~<rbicb were taken from a K-20 I ' • !- • ··~

mi'3'1Ually operated camera from a.n L-19 plane. Approximately ' . . ''

half of these missio~s ~ere considered satisfactory. A total

of 15 photo interpretation reports were· accomplished by tbe

• -9-


~D AT THEI NATIONAL.ARCHI)IES

section during the period.

Aeria1 nhotos were ai so used during interrogation of

PWs and in one instance tw~.PWs were interrogated in the pres-

ence of the OB a.nd PI officers which resulted in, pinpointing ..

the location of enemy defenses and enemy order of battle on

Hill 1024 DT0835. A number of Mosa.ics and overlays vvere prepared ' .... ,,

and ermoteted indica,ting the enemy's defensee a.nd deployment

of enemy units on this terrain complex. The information derived

from this study was disseminated to the 9th Infantry Regiment

prior to the a.ttack ~a,nd given the· widest distri:Oution possible.

'I'hie report provedto be' successful and quite a.ccurateo

The PI Section during the period continued to be respon

sible for the distribution of photo interpretation reports that

reached as fa.r as Corps and Army. In addition it etlso continued

to keep up tb e covertrace of ma;p sheets of 1: SO ,000 scale by

plotting all sorties received and initiated pboto reconnaissance

decreased due to the paucity of refugees and civilia.ns within

the Division zone notwitbst~ndinp the aggressive forward move

ment of the Division. ·There v.res some increased guerrille activ-

i ty in the rear ere a during tb.e month a.nd anti-guerrilla train-

ing end detection measures were intensified~

ThE ore team at thE 38tb Infantry Regimen~ gave security

··,,instructions to Bll members of the regiment. Interrogations . .

of NKPA P".vs revegled tbeir general belief tbat the OCF would

soon repltJCe tbe 1\Tl::J?A in' t::tlie sector.

During the montb,.S38 persons of doubtful authenticity ' ·. . ,,

were screened by thl~ d~~achment. Twenty-one were found to be

of count erint€3'll1ge-nce inte:re st.

--1c-


·,

Other 8Ctivities durinp: the month are reflected in the

¥ollowina fip:ures:

PencHnci- (all - '·-- types) ............... 30

Agent Reverts:

Esp iona,g~ • .. -,~ .... ., 6 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2

Positive Intelligence ...•...•..••• 9

Politic,gl Activity •••••••..••••••• 9

Guerrilla Activity ••••••••••••.••• 3

Mi scelleneou s ..•. . , ...............• 20

, .. ·.< ,,

..

-11'":'


THENAllONALAR(;HI'lE~i ·. ··I.:,'; ~""-DECI ASSI~IED

.. Aut~rtry·~···116t.tJ:f : . 8y·~ NAPA··o~t~ ,·z:Z:t,

··' f

, Staff Se:ct1on.Rep,6rt oJ~-~ a..-·3, :2d Infantry Division

:for

September ·1951 .

Units of the 2d Division 'Were heavily enga.ged in the ~ ' : "

conduct of two .separa.te att.ecks a:t the beginning of the Sep-

tember period. ·By ·5 Septembel"t the· 9th Infa.ntry and 23d In

fantry suceeded in ca,pt,uring ·a.nd securing the Ridge 983-900-

773 (DT1333 t.o DT1533), thusculmina;ting 20 days of bitter

.fighting a.geinst ':a: determined enemy. The 38th Infantry, which ,, ' ' ''

launched a new a.ttac·k ·on 31. A~gus·t, to secure Hill 1234 DT20~0, : .. ~ '

an objective on the Hays Line, wa.s stro-pgly opposed during its

dogged advance. · However, tbe objective wa.s secured on 3 Sep-

tember and all units then had a period to adjust their positions,

integra.te and train ne1.v replacements, reorganize, patrol, and.

prepare for a new attack.

On 8 Septembe~, when the Division Command Post moved to

a new location, the G-3 Section and the G-2 Section'combined

to effect clo~er coordination. At this sa.me time, the G-3 ;·,· i j "· 1•

Section d,ecentralized into. various addi tionaJ sub- sections:

pla.nning, duty-lil=dson, training, psychological warfare, a .. nd

special projects. This arrangement worked excellently, as it

relieved the AC of S, G ... 3, e.nd Assistant G-3, of an overload

of deta.ils, but permitted closer supervision· of the individual

responsibilities of the Operations Section.

Tbe Fire Support Coordination Center was also moved to

Division Artillery FDC, !::3 September, resulting in better co

ord inat.ion being e,ffe¢.ted between the supporting arms a.nd Air

and Artillery.- It ·w~.s found' thet maximum coordination was ef

fected, by eliminating duplication of effort. , Consta.nt contact

-1-


between the G-3 Air a.nd 'tb:e Division Artillery 8-3 was ma.in

tained in order to ineure tha.t a.ir strikes did not.necessitate .·

cessation of a,rtillery fire on lucra.ti ve ·artillery targets.

By monitoring the Liaison Plane Observers' radios, the G-3

Air keeps informed on:ja~t-illery fire and the possibility of

employing alr- on targets that artil.lery ca.nnot effectively "'

neutra.li ze.

Since the pra.ctice o'f providing one mosquito aircraft

to each Division ba.sbeendiscontinued, it has become necessa:ry

for each Regimental S-3 Air to depend on the Lia .. ison alrcra.ft

to search areas for pos~ible air strike 'targets. Ea.cb Regi-

. mental S-3 Air, monitors the SCR 619 radio in order to accom-

plish this.

The Artillery Liaison Plane is a va.luable aid in adjust

. ing air strikes on point targets tba.t a.re not readily discern

ible to the mosquito observer or fighter a.ircra.ft pilotso A

strafing run, or one bomb run by the lea.d aircraft, can be

corrected in the following manner: The Liaison Observer gives . '

the correction (vi a. SCR 619) to the Regimental s-3 Air, who

in turn passes it to the figpter aircraft via. VHF ra.dio.

It wa.s found that ra.da.r controlled bomber strikes are .,

more effective if employed against enemy assembly area.s in

which troops have recently moved. · Ra.dar controlled. bombing

is not ·a.s a.ccurate. or effecttve a.s daylight dive bombing where

the target can be pin pointed by the fighter pilot. Dive

,1

bombing technique, 1employing 500 pound delay fuze bombs on

bunkers, has proved very .effective when the pilot can identify

the target, for in many. ce,.s:es, a near miss will collapse a.

bunker with tbe resu11;..ing .blast effect.

In these latest Division operations, a definite need

to round-'off the prio:r tr~ining which bad been received by

replacements became a.pparent. Replacements wopld join organ-


' ; ; -~

iza.tions and would be immedia.tely assigned to units, often in

the assault, without receiving the adva.ntage of a final orien-' - ' . '

tat ion. Conseque.ntly, in ini tia.l attacks, many of' these person-

nel were wounded unnecessarily.

To give the ne!: ~lacement confidence in himself, his

weapons and orga:niza .. tiot:J, ·prior to entering combat, training ,,-;jf

memorandum #28 wa.s pUblished, directing that replacement train

ing centers. be e-stablished ~it regimental or battalion level.

Training was condu~ted, in addition to that wbicb was already

bei rig received at the. 2d Replacement Compa.ny, and it generally

lasted t'rom 7 to 14 days. A survey was made a.fter the comple

tion of one period,. to determine bow the ma,terial wc:ts received. ~ .~' :' ' ~ ; ·-· >.- ' ' '

It was .found the tra.intng wa.s well-received by the repla.cements,

as they felt it improved tbe.ir mental attitude a.nd. spirit of

teamwork; tbus it increased the comba.t ef!'iciency within the . '

unit.

To reduce tb_e a.ntic ipated amount of ca.sualties su sts.in~d

in winter operations, a cold weather training progra.m (TM #29)

wa~ instigated;, each i~dividuel was i~structed in self-protective ' ' -· ':'i

measures against symptoms of frostbite, trench foot, and frozen ' ' • J

• .. :-·:\

extremities. The scope of the course also included proper ' ' ' - '

methods of wearing winter .clothlng. The program will be con-:1

tinued by Cold Injury Control Tea.ms, which were esta.blished

down to include company 1eve;t... They also have the continuing

responsibility o!' p-roviding the close supervision needed for

.the success of the overa.ll program.

Training Memorandum, #30 incres.sed the duration of the

radio operators schoo.I,. from. six, to ;ten weeks; the purpose still . .

being, to immedia.tely p1-;ovide units wi tb trained operator re-

pla.cements, who 'will become lost through normal attrition.

Letters qf Instructign were published to include: Radio

logical Warfare Tra.ining, whioh required tbe units to c·onduct

·3-


·,

a two hours course to a.ll enlisted personnel imparting a com-~· .

prehensive introduction in atomic energy information; Defense

Against Air and Airborne At,:tacke, designed to provide and ex-. .

pla.in a.n adequate a.nti-aircrat't warning system a.nd mea.ns of

both active and passive' ~~fensi ve measures; Unit Fire Support,

which requires each batta.lion th,at is a.ttacking or d€f'ending • '~ '<), •

to submit to G-3 ~ prior to the· ope-ration, a. deta.iled plan show-

ing the location and coverage of a.ll s1:1pporting weapons for

tb e purpose of • obtaining ma.ximum utili za.tion through effective

fire support ·from these wea;pons; Destruction and Utilization

o-r Enemy Bunkers, e~ta;blisbed a standard operating procedure

whereby those enemy bunkerswbich could not advantageously be ~. ,- ' i c •• ~

used · a.ga.inst the enemy~ :would be totally destroyed by organized '~ ' ~'

bunker-destruction teams, to deny the enemy the oppor~unity of

reoccupyine; these fortifications in the event that they recap

ture the position; and Wearing or· Winter Clothing, offered the

commenders a basic guide for. obtaining excellent cold i>reather f"" l

discipline within.their units by expla.ining the proper method '

of wearing winter garments • .; ' ':_ \" ·~

Operations Order #36. was published 092200I September, 'u """ '-

directing the 2d Infantry Division to continue with tbe mission • ,. ' , "1 ., :· \

·of conducting l~mited a.tta.cks to secure the commanding terrain

north of the Hays Line. The attack jumped off 13 September,

with the 9th Infantry Regiment, attacking from the south and

the 23d Infe.ntry Regiment, a.ttacking from the east; wbile the

. 38th Infa,ntry Regiment~ supported by fire. Progress toward ~

the objective ridgeline, Hills 894-93h·S51 (DT1437 to DT1440), ,.

was vigorously resisted by a. reeolute enemy •.. Compa.ra.tive sue-

cess was obtained in capturing and belding Hill 894, and the

ridge immedia.tely ·north' of objective Hill 9jl. On va.riou s oc

casions, both <:f?:ills 851' and. 931, were occupied for sbort periods.

of tlme, before fana.t\.c<al enemy counterattacks drove tbe friendly

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.,

i ·,; <. J contenders from the positions .. At the close of the period,

neither of these obJectives 'was secured. ~ .. r:, ; .

Nineteen. 0:-p~.~e.tions Instructions were published, modify

ing boundaries, ·directing thFit the Kansa.s Line be outposted

instead oi' being physt.ca:l:ly manned, conducti.ng reconne.issa.nce

patrols, relieving the Division of the responsibility of secur-

i ng rea.r-a.rea. tnsta,llat ionf?, providing fire support teams, des

igne.ting various missions for. them, ·and making necessary adjust-

ments in proportionate strengths ot' reg1ments by attachments

end detachments of' other units, commensura.te to the type of

mission assigned.

An Opera,tion Instruction directing the 9th In!"antry to

seize end secure Hill 1024 DT0835 and Hill 867 DT0935, wa.s pub-

li shed 212200I September. 'rhE attack was launched 23 September

!"or Hill 102.4, and a.fter a two day a.tta.ck, was successful. The

attack for Hill 1::367 DT0935 wa.s launched 29 September,, and until

the end of t.he period, the regiment had not yet been successful •. ,.l

in obtaining their objective.

The Cornmandi na: ·General directed the Engineers to build i

'i

8 D.ivision 1¥a.r Room, ··and further, that the G ... 3 Section would

be responsible for e'sta.blishinp; and maintaining its interior.

It wa.s complet·ed. the later part of Se,ptember,. and one contri

bution ma .. de by ·tbe ·section,. was a· sa.nd table, built to scale,

of the terra1 n on .which tb€ ·.Division is presently conducting

its operations •.

The wea.tber :for t.he ·mont.b v1a.s generally mild during the

day, turning coloer at night, and rain fell for only five days

of the entire period. Operations i'rere slightly affected dur

ing morning hours, as visibility was reduced by heavy fog. ,. '


' ~bt:.U,A I I HI= NA IIUNAl.. AKt.;HIVt::;i

LOGISTICS

Sta.ff sect1:on Report'of G-4,. 2d· Infantry Division

for.·

Sepit:ember 1951

Throughout the month of,S&:ptember the Division was

actively engaged iri close combat with the enemy. This action ' .

a,nd projected operations pre.sented varied logistical problems.

Airdrops\were made on tbe 2nd, 3rd, and 4th. A total

of 23 C-119s dropped.· Water~ ucn ra.tions, ammunition of a.ll

types, signal equiJ?T!Je!lt,. and fi~ld fortification materia.l to

the 38th Regimepte,l ···Oombe.t Team. Ttle Regimental Combat Team,

which could not be supported logistic ally from the ground, re-

ported a highly satisfactory recovery rate of the supplies

dropped.

In an effort to ~:~.ugment the C-119 airdrops, tbe lia.ison

pla.nes of the .~ivision Air Section, (L-19s) were utilized.

These lig~t ~lanes 9~livered 363 ca.ses of ra.tions, 23 ca.ses \.;,•

of fruit .juices, 3 .~exes of,medical supplies (one containing , i . ' i' : " 1 ~ ' ,.

blood pla.sma), a.nd. 19tL eante(:lns of wa .. ter packed into duffle . . : ~ . - ' '

bags. The number of tt sortfest' involved were 52 .. > ,, 1

The great. dem~.nct for artillery support resulted in the ;._ f,_ : --:, j;;;,. ~~ - (: (' ' '

continuance of the concentrated truok effort, initiated in the

past month, to maintain a f.l.aw of ammunition to the artillery

ba.ttalions. During a. five day period, 3,704 .tons of ammuni-

.·~tion were delivered [)y 823 trucks from ASP #55A (Cbunchon) to

ASP #61 (Ytmggu). On the 6tb the level in the supporting ASP

#61 was sufficient to relieve tbe Division's 'I'OUnd-t.be-clook

truck effort. However, lat~r in tbe month it was necessary

to resume tbe opera:tio"n for 1a short period of time.

The .. transpprta.tion .of tb e Division continued to be aug

mented through tbe services of the Korea.n Service Corps (KSC) •

... 1-


·,

Their "carries'~ ·of. ration.s and ammunitions forwa.rd and evacu ...

ation of our litter eases to the rear, have wo-n them the praise -·

of all commanders and attributed gres.tly to the success of

ts.ctical operations. ·The KSC .suffered casualties of person..:. " . ' .

nel killed, wounded al!ld. mis'sing in a,ction. The assigned ' '

strength for .1 Septemb.er wa.a 3 ,~p4·; for 30 September, 3, 179.

A _progr.em, demanding full uti1iza.tion of all vehicles

throughout "the 2d Div'i sion., was vigorously pursued. Military

Police were iristructed to stop all empty trucks moving gen

erally· south. and 1."out'e· them by the ASP' #61' where they were to

load up with empty brass for movement to the ·rear. Likewise, ' .

all vehicles mo.ving north w;ere ·carrying either ammunition or .. ~ "

fuel.

Maximum attention was devoted to the receiving, inven-. ., ,",

torying, and issuing of winter clothing. Preference of issues •' ' .

went to the "line units". A quartermaster team made a personal '1 ,_,

inspection of the troops to determine the fitting of tbe in-

dividua.l' s clothes. While eerta.in items of the clothing in ._, .. -·

' ·- . . . . . Phase One we~e_still lacking, Phase Two material was received,

. ' '

abea.d of schedule, almo.at one hundred per cent complete. 'While ' ·"f ''"·""' ,", :"', ""( .I

some of the winter ·clot.bi ng 1 s nqt need.ed at pre sent, the i a

sues were made to' the units eo that it will be available when : . ;

adverse weather is encountered.

While being informed-·tbat all replacements received by

the Division after the 15th, would ha.ve wi.nter clothing, a

~ showdown inspection disclosed the contrary. Winter clothing

wa.s being taken up at Camp Drake. during the replacements'

processing. Tb.is m~itter, 'though quickly settled through· chan

nels by teleptlone, neeessi ta:£ed an emergency requisition for

winter clothing f¢~ replacements received and to be received ~ ' er " ~

without the. ;p~o~er. clothing;. .Fine.l approval from Eighth .Army

is sti11pendibg. ·.


·, '

'•·/

Critical items encountered during the month were:

e. Sa.ndhags: The continuous dema.nd ra.pidly de

pleted the stock to a zerGbalsnce ~n the 24th; a resupply

was due in, but not rec~ived by the 30th. ·:~ .. ; .·

I \

b. 4.2 ina·h mortar: Level in unit and ASP #61

reached a point which necesaitat.ed an airlift from Puse.n of

2,500 rounds per da,y for four days and an expeditious shipment

by rail of 25,-000 rounds.

A complete survey of all tentage in the Division was

ma.de. Ba.sed on the a.uthorization outlined in "Tbe Combat Sol

dier", the Division's requirements were presented to Eighth

Army at e meeting expressly planned to discuss winter tentage.

Final a;pproval is resting with the G-4 of Eighth .Army.

Projected tactical operations necessitated the form

ulation of a. sound plan of logistical support which could be

come operationa.l with a minimum amount of delay. The close

of the period _found a.ll the effort.s of the section devoted to

this undertaking •. ·

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v.

EVALUATION AND RECOMME.NDA'fiONS

' '

The month "Of September was ma.rked by exceptiona.lly

·heavy fighting alongth~ ~nti·re .2d Bivis.ion front. The op

era.tion to reduce the '983-900-773 terrain c..omple:x, begun in '

August~ was completed in the .fir<st wEtek of September. The Di-

vision then turned its efforts toward· gaining control of· the·

851-931-894 Hill Ma.ss. · This latter chain of bills wa.s so L ' '

· rugged ·~;md so irrei'gularly patterned tbat it was much more dif-"''

ficult to a.ttacfk than the former •. Furthermore, it wa.s this / ~ I

very irregulatity w~~cb 'gave tbe ·enemy defenders of Hill 931,

in tbe 851-9'31-89·4· HilT Mass, every e.dvantage, except long

fields of fire·, _over that enjoyed by the defenders of Hil~. 940,

in the 983•900-773 .terra,in complex. Tbis one exception, how

ever, did pot have the importance to the ·North Korea.ns th a.t \ .

it would normally b~e expeeted to ba.ve with those possessing

more firepower.

During the mo:nth of September·, engineer activity sup ...

porting the Divisi~n' s efforts cba.nged from the maintenance "

.... of roa.ds and the repair of bridges' (in conjunction with X Corps - .

a.nd Eigh t,b Army engineers, wi;Jose ~.cti vi ~ies they supplemented) ,'.-·-··,

·to the type of work .:.more usually required of engineers in sup

port of combat operations.

In the a.d.va.nce toward assigned objectives, the Division

found its tracked a.nd wheeled vehicles confhled to. a ma.xim,um

~of two a.pproaches. The enemy, in vlitbdrawing and in preparing

his own defenses, ha.d completely demolished t-he roads existing

to the Division fron.t and ba.d heavily mined all va.lleys offer

in~ any route ... of ad.vanc.e. So well bad tbe en.emy denied tb.e -· -· •. ' ' .~

2d Division tbe. use of. tb~se forward area. roads tba.t ta .. ctica.l

opera.tioris .wEire 'fl!eriou.s1y ha.mpered, a.nd front line units came

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to depend increasingly on tb€ use of carrying parties for

lo2:istical support.

Accordingly :the en!$ineers concentrated tbeir primary

effort 1 n pushing fori•rerd new supply roads end in removing

m~nes from and imnro'v:tna- old ones. ... ~-~ ' . '

Despite unremittinp: engi'q,eer efforts end the increased

.. use of carrying parties, the continued advance of front line

Infantry elements of the Division brought them. into almost '• i '. '' '

roadle:ss terra.in during the month of September, making it

evident that existing' log~ stice.l support met bods were becom

lng inadequate. Th.e .use of. orgenic liaison aircra.ft to sup

plement air drops from, large Air Force cargo planes vle.s tried.

It met r,vitb but moderate succesz-... liaison aJrplenes being too

smell to handle appreciable amounts of cargo. Tha.t a.ir drops

were vitally needed is sbo•rrn by tb e fact tb a.t o:ne 2d Division

unit on Hill 851, Company L, 23d Infantry, was overrun by the

enemy after it bad run .out o.f ammunition. The la.st 2,000 to

3,000 yards on the t,o!;'tuous tnr.1ils leading to front line po

sitions came to be the stumbling .. block to carrying parties, ...

a.nd it was here that the demand for air drops proved to be. u •

most great.·· The increased use of large Air Force cargo type

e.ircra.ft like the 07119 .is.:recommend.ed for tb.is purpose. ). ~ ' ) ,. '

In September, the 2d Division instituted a training

program wh icb was designed to. i ndoctrina.te incoming replace

ments with tl1e traditions of tbe Division anc:l to prepare~ them

· ~ pby sic ally and mentally for warfare in Korea. 'rbree factors

mede such a program necessary: .(1)· The Division bad susta.ined

a high loss of tr$ined personnel through rotation.. From the

middle of April to tb.e. end o.f September, 11,425 of fie ers and

enlisted men bad-be~n ·rotate'¢! t6 the Zone of Interior. (2) 1,1ist

ful b'opes for tbe.suoce.ss. ()f the Peace Talks bad dampened the • > ....

normally high fighting spirit o.f the Division .. These hopes

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!·.:, .• ~ DECI·"SSIHED ··· ..

I .~t~:ity f.!~61J6tOl . . ~~NAPAD~tel1r1J,.

had diminisoed ac;Hnewtlat bf the erid of the month. (3) The Di-·

vi siQn had suffered t:lea:vy Hunaes among tbe experienced combat

lea.ders-- sbowHlg 'u.p in tbe month.s of August and September with

a. resultant decrease in tb e comba.t. etfecti venees of tb e Di vi-'

sion. ;-~e day du;ingi, tilt~-; battle for "Bloody Ridge, n for· in

stance, it became neeessa.ry· to ·~ake a batta.lion off Hill 940

du'ring the morning, _till tba.t ba:tta.lion wi tb replacements at

noon, a.nd send it on an envelopme·nt .of tba.t same bill mass

J .tba.t very afternoon. This, of course,.-was a. severe stra..in on

. the un.tried repla.cements. !t is felt that the repla.cement

training will eventually overcome these adverse fa.ctors. ~ - . . . .

In anticipation of spending another winter· in Korea,

the 2d Division initiated an aggressive cold weather training

progra.m during the latter h-alf of September. Und.er the pro-. .

visions of tbi s progra;m the Division organiz~d a Division

Cold Injury Control Team staffed with Line, Medical and Qua.r ... ' '

terma.ster off~.cers from D:1, vision Headquarters. Tbi s· team was

to provide the in1tia.f tra1ning of subordinate unit.s a .. nd super

vi.se the training of .subordina.te teams. Each regiment and

separa.te battalion; down to a.nd inclu.ding company l~vel, and

each separate compa.ny organlzed Unit Cold Il'ljury Teams whicb

were responsible, under tt_letr respeeti ve unit comma..nders, for

the implementation of the progra.m. The scope of training in- ·

eluded instruction in correct foot hygiene, the detection and

prevention of frostbite, and tbe proper wearing of winter

clothing. It is believed tba.t ·thi.s progra.m ·will reduce cold

. wea,tber casualties to a minimum in tbe coming winter month so

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2d Infantry Diviston 'Staff

for Period ·

1 September l!S~ - 30 September 1951

Commanding General Brig .·,;<len Thoma.s E deSbazo (1-19 Sept 51) ·· ··· ol6;479 · USA

' •, I

Maj ~en Robert N Young (20-30 Sept 51) 015068 USA

,. ··:;,

Asst Division Commander Brig Ge:tFHaydon L Boatner 015641 USA

Artillery Officer Colonel Edwin A Wa.lker ' 018552 Arty

Cnief of Staff .Colonel ·:Rupert D Graves . ·· :015794 • GSC

Asst Chief of Sta:ff, G-1 Major ·Neil Robinson ( 1-28 Sept 51) . 059019 GSC - (Lt Col 14 Sept 51)

. ',.,;·;

Major 'Dani'el F Hughes (29-30 Sept 51) 10285055 GSO

Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2 Lt Col Albert W A.ykroyd. 035069 GSC

'·, ' .

A sst Chief or Staff, G-3 Ma.jor Thomas W Mellen 01285267 GSC

.... ' ..

A sst Chief of Staff, G-4· Lt Col .. Arthur J Cornel son 051567 GSC

Adjutant GeneraL·· Lt Ool~Dav.id B Emmons 039979 AGO

., ' ~

Avia.tion Officer ·.·«-· Ma,jor ·Robert t Boatr.ight Jr 01185766 Arty

Cha;pla.in Lf. ·Col Henry L Gillenwa.ters . 041702 ObC

Chemical Officer Major Clair L George ~- 01035260 CmlC

Engineer Officer Lt ColEdmond H Leavey Jr .. 024698 CE

'Lt Col Norman B Branch III ( 1-21 Sept 51) : 0334999 FO

Finance Off'icer

M:ajor John L Fredericks (22-30 Sept 51) ' 047721 FC

Headquarters Commanda.ht .Captain George E Staley (Major 14 Sept 51) 02006401 Inf"


"' \

1.:.·· .-~ Otrt.A,SSIFIED

. ~.AJJ·t~rlti h~O:tl>S t6l .Br~NAPAD~te lz:h,

.. Historian Major 'Fred J Meyer

0463996 Inf ,:>,'\

Inspector General MajorcWilliam A Williams '0403292 IGC

Staff Judge Advocate Lt Col Getoa.rd B Crook ·039713 J AGO

I .'-''

Ordna.nce Officer Lt Col Gervase L Barnhill 0~7901 Or.d

Provost Marshal L:t Col · S~JJiuel 'l' Denton 0499731 CMP

Ca.ptal,n,·Perry H Davis II ( 1-24 Sept 51) .· 020~9143 Arty

Public Information Off:ieer

Ca.pt.ain Raymond E Webb (25-30 Sept 51) 0385322 Armor

Quartermaster Lt. Col Homer P Harris 0311641 Q.MC

Signal Officer Lt Col Ro.bert C Masenga 054101 SigC

,-,>r

Special Service Officer Ca;ptain Peter M Kusa.in ( 1-11 Sept 51) · · 01305071 Inf

Captain William 'l' Ansley ( 12-30 Sept 51) ···· . ;•01540658. Armor

SUrgeon Lt Col Lloyd R Stropee ·:0376'29 MC

T I & E ·· Captain Qui'ntan B LeMonte 0,589840 GSC

Transportation Officer Majo.r Martin J Williams 0'1946640 GSC

Civil Assistance Officer Captaln Vincent W Ba.cb (Major 29 Sept 51) 01324389 Inf

Regimental Comba,t·'feam Commanders

9th Regimental Combat Team Colonel John M Lynch 020377 Inf

.. 23d Regimental Combat Te.am .Colonel James Y Adams

019755 Inf

38tb Regimental Combat Team Lt Col Frank T Mildren , q?,l:992. Inf

2nd Infantry Division - Command Report - September 1951

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Transcript of 2nd Infantry Division - Command Report - September 1951