UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS

School of International Relations

Germany and the Libya Intervention:

Identity and Foreign Policy in Crisis?

110012578

(14 815 words)

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction (4)

2. A discourse theoretical framework for foreign policy analysis in Europe (9)

a. Poststructuralist Discourse Theory: Discourse and articulation (9)

b. Identity and foreign policy: Clarifying the concepts (13)

c. Web of identities: Analysing foreign policy in Europe (16)

d. Methodology and Research Design (21)

3. Germany’s foreign policy in the Libya crisis (25)

a. Avoiding ‘the slippery slope’: Germany’s official foreign policy discourse (25)

b. Responsibility, sovereignty and pacifism: Domestic discursive arena (29)

c. ‘Risks of inaction’: International discursive arena (36)

d. Discourses in interaction (39)

4. Conclusion (42)

5. Bibliography (46)

a. Literature (46)

b. Documents (53)

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Abstract

The thesis follows the two inter-related goals of (1) building a refined discourse theoretical

framework for analysing foreign policy in Europe through the lens of identity construction,

and (2) utilising this model in a case study of Germany in the Libya crisis of 2011. It departs

from three critical observations regarding poststructuralist and critical constructivist

approaches to the relationship between identity and foreign policy: Lack of engagement with

recent developments in discourse theory in social sciences and humanities, oversimplified

focus on a coherent single Self without clear conceptualisation of identity, and neglect of

international discourses. Building on these observations, the first part presents an account

grounded in the Poststructuralist Discourse Theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.

Understanding identity as a discourse-specific differential construction and foreign policy as

a set of discursive practices, the paper argues for analysing the construction of a national

foreign policy identity in a web of relations with other subject identities – e.g. those of

international organisations and subnational political actors. It further calls for incorporating

international discourses alongside those of domestic opposition and ‘published opinion’ into

the analysis, as they all create the discursive environment within which officials operate. The

second part utilises this model to address the question of how Germany’s foreign policy

identity was constructed in the Libya crisis, subjecting approximately 200 texts (speeches,

parliamentary debates, newspaper articles) to a discourse analytical reading. It observes the

transformation of Germany’s identity from early leadership in Gaddafi-bashing, through

reluctance to engage in military actions, towards articulating solidarity with allies through

willingness to bear increased burdens elsewhere. These shifts are put into a wider discursive

context and analysed as stemming from officials’ simultaneous engagement with three

different discourses, highlighting international responsibility, sovereignty and pacifism

respectively.

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1. Introduction

Germany’s international performance has recently been a source of frustration for domestic

and international voices alike. 2011 was a particularly tough year, dominated by the Libyan

civil war resulting in a NATO-led intervention, the focus of this paper, as well as the

continuing Eurocrisis. Evaluating German foreign policy (FP), elder statesmen across the

political spectrum (Helmut Schmidt, Helmut Kohl, Volker Rühe, Joschka Fischer) did not

hesitate to make their bitterness heard, whilst crowds in Athens were waving caricatures

approximating Angela Merkel to Adolf Hitler, and even the Polish foreign minister resorted

to a public appeal lecturing Berlin what it should do.

The fact that the discourses of and about a major international actor like Germany keep

reintroducing the situation of ‘identity crisis’ (Stahl 2011: 30) presents an important issue

both for academia and the ‘real world’: After all, it is within and through these discourses

that actions are taken. Approaching from a critical, discourse theoretical perspective, I

cannot aspire to ‘solve the problem’ and explain Germany’s FP in a law-like fashion.

Instead, I am offering a study that will pierce right through these discourses and analyse

them from the perspective of ‘what they do’ (Doty 1993: 304; Weldes et al. 1999: 10), in

particular how identities are constructed on the level of articulations. For the purpose of the

dissertation, I will focus exclusively on the Libya crisis. However, as it is intended to be

followed by a more extensive research project, it has a wider conceptual ambition.

Therefore, I will also outline a refined theoretical framework for analysing FP policy in the

European context.

With these dual foci, the analysis is building on multiple literatures. Due to the short

temporal distance, there is little work published directly on the Libya crisis. The few papers

available rather partake in the policy debate than strive for an academic analysis, let alone a

critical one. They range from drawing general ‘lessons of Libya’ (Berry 2011; Etzioni 2012)

and evaluating the impacts the intervention had on NATO (Michaels 2011; Hallams and

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Schreer 2012) to reflections on Germany’s role within the Alliance (Keller 2012) and her

character as a ‘geo-economic power’ (Kundnani 2011). These works are of little relevance

for my account. They could surely be used as empirical material; nevertheless, they are

outside of my sample (presented at the end of the first chapter).

A different case is Stahl’s (2011) conference paper offering a ‘discourse-bound’ analysis of

Germany’s position on Libya in the context of the official discourse on military interventions

since early 1990s. Whilst our analyses necessarily overlap and sometimes work with the

same texts (e.g. parliamentary debates that are of crucial importance for any analyst

browsing into this area), there are also stark differences: Stahl combines aspects of

Foucauldian archaeology with culturalist arguments and a narrow understanding of discourse

as a ‘communicative interaction’ (Stahl 2011: 4). Consequently, he limits the possibility of

change only to the situations of ‘critical junctures’ (ibid.: 8) and ends up with a largely linear

historical account of developments and splits of different ‘discursive formations-coalitions’

(ibid.: 7) that is in a way more similar to conventional constructivist scholarship criticised

below than to a critical framework emphasising instability and contingency of articulations.

Further, he offers no systematic criteria for choosing texts and has little to say about

international discourses as well as other identities than that of Germany. Therefore, I am not

engaging him directly and offer a distinct account that is open to a critical comparison.

The extensive body of literature dealing with Germany’s post-unification foreign and

security policy is dominated by conventional constructivist scholarship, with critical

accounts remaining rare (Bach 1999; Wæver 2002). Working with a number of concepts,

conventional constructivists differ rather in terms of perspective than substance as they tend

to raise analogous points and arrive at similar conclusions: Germany’s foreign policy is

influenced/limited by historically and culturally determined principles of self-restraint,

reflexive multilateralism, pro-integration stance, respect to international law and loyalty to

allies. These general lines are then advanced in a number of directions. From German

academia arose the concept of ‘civilian power’ as introduced by Hanns Maull (1990, 1999,

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2001, 2006) with the core thesis that post-1945 Germany developed into a new type of

power, radically different from traditional Great Powers. Predominantly Anglo-Saxon

authors used Germany as a case to refine and apply the concept of culture, labelled as

‘strategic’ (Longhurst 2004) or ‘politico-military’ (Berger 1996, 1998). Culturalist accounts

focus on how historically developed habits, norms and values influence foreign policy

behaviour by setting limits for decision making. Arguably most sophisticated are the works

deploying role theory (Tewes 2002; Aggestam 2004), providing operationalisation of

norms/culture/identity through the concept of roles, defined as normatively shaped, relatively

stable patterns of behaviour, which every actor can have a number of.

This scholarship is definitely valuable as it allows deeper understanding of the context and

parameters of German FP debate. Nevertheless, there are serious limits for its utility in a

discourse theoretical account. Above all, there are important epistemological differences.

Most conventional constructivists opt for causal science and law-like relations between

dependent (FP) and independent (identity, culture, norms) variables – a move firmly rejected

by poststructuralist and critical constructivist scholarship upon which I am drawing.

However, there are also problems beyond metatheory: Conventional constructivists tend to

solidify culture and identity and therefore, are biased towards emphasising stability – a

useful way how to legitimise policies. The possibility of change is admitted, but not very

well developed and the politics of FP is largely out of the picture. Further, the prevailing

conception of analysing policy in dualistic terms of continuity/change is highly problematic

in its assumption that there can be a continual and predictable ‘line’, rather than a myriad of

possibilities, discontinuities and contradictions.

Therefore, my account is primarily drawing upon and contributing to the literature in the area

of critical international relations (IR) theory. Identity has been in the centre of FP analyses

offered both by (self-declared) poststructuralists (Campbell 1998[1992]; Wæver 2002;

Hansen 2006; Müller 2008b) and critical constructivists (Weldes 1999a, b; Milliken 1999b;

Fierke 1999). Deploying discourse as the central concept of their analyses, these schools

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reject causal epistemology, focus on the performative nature of language and highlight the

constitutive character of the identity-FP relationship as well as the instability and political

nature of meaning construction.1 Providing a strong stepping stone for my approach, this

scholarship is not without its own problems. It is the three following issues that I will try to

address in constructing a distinct framework:

First, most discourse accounts in critical IR are not explicitly and/or sufficiently grounded in

recent developments of discourse theory in social sciences and humanities. As there are

important differences between various understandings of discourse, ambiguity results in lack

of clarity with respect to crucial ontological and epistemological assumptions. Second, the

conceptualisation of identity usually focuses on a single, coherent and predominantly (but

not exclusively) national Self, leading to an analysis that overlooks that foreign policy

discourses may simultaneously construct multiple, possibly split identities locked in a

complex web of relationships. It is also often not clear which kind of identity is analysed –

‘comprehensive’ national identity vs. more specific foreign policy identity. Third and

relatedly, the influence of ‘external’ discourses on the official FP discourse is not accounted

for – a position hardly tenable at times when national FP decisions are casually articulated in

terms of ‘solidarity with allies’. These three objections structure the argument in the first

chapter, which also presents the discussion of methodological problems.

The second chapter utilises these general insights in an analysis of the first phase of the

Libya crisis, starting with the outbreak of demonstrations in Benghazi on 15 February 2011

and ending right in the aftermath of the NATO Foreign Ministers’ Summit in Berlin on 18

April 2011 as most articulations of FP identities had occurred by this moment and the

following were of a largely repetitive nature. The primary research question asks how the

foreign policy identity of Germany was constructed in relation to other identities. This leads

to two secondary questions: Which identities were articulated (and how) in the German

1 This literature is engaged in detail throughout the following chapter.

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official, German oppositional/media and international discourses? How did these different

discourses interact?

Before releasing the reader to the first chapter, I would like to address the position of my

work in terms of disciplinary labels in IR. I have stated that I am engaging both

poststructuralist and critical constructivist literature. Where does my account belong and is

this even possible without resorting to superficial eclecticism? No doubt that there are

differences between both schools which cannot be addressed here in any detail (for a

poststructuralist view see Campbell 1992[1998]: 207-28; for a critical constructivist one see

Fierke 2001). However, at the same time the very border seems blurred: To give an example,

Hansen’s poststructuralist (2006: 5) critique of Campbell on the grounds that (1)

methodology is important and not mutually exclusive with non-causal epistemology and

critical attitude, (2) empirical application is desirable and (3) binary Self/Other approach in

identity construction is not sufficient, is actually very close to how Fierke outlines her

critical constructivist position (2002: 122). I observe a significant overlap of both streams

and therefore, my position is rather integrative than divisive, emphasising shared focus on

discursive construction of identity and joint commitment to the critical project in IR.

I am not advocating a ‘plug-and-play’ approach with no limitations. Rather than that, I take

Laclau and Mouffe’s Poststructuralist Discourse Theory (PSDT) as the starting point for an

analysis that feels free to draw upon ideas from a wide range of schools as long as these can

be articulated within its framework. It is necessary to bear in mind that PSDT is not

synonymous to (all) poststructuralism: It is a synthetic account building upon the

poststructuralist canons of Derrida, Lacan and Foucault (as well as other authors including

Gramsci, Althusser and Wittgenstein), but differing from each of them. As most IR

poststructuralists do not ground their work primarily in Laclau and Mouffe (e.g. Campbell

1998[1992]; Doty 1993, 1997; Weber 1995), there is no reason why their insights should be

in principle more useful than those of Weldes (e.g. 1999a) who also occasionally refers to

the PSDT classics. I consider myself closer to IR poststructuralism, but at the same time

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having more in common with Weldes than Weber in my focus on the traditional issue of FP

of a Western state. Thus, I do not insist on a label and rather feel free to honour the various

inspirations as long as the resulting work remains coherent – a criterion dependent above all

on the reader’s judgement.

2. A discourse theoretical framework for foreign policy analysis in Europe

This chapter presents a theoretical framework for the analysis of foreign policy through the

perspective of identity construction. I will argue that foreign policy identities are unstable

discursive constructions that are produced and reproduced by FP practices. These practices

are performed predominantly by state officials, however, at the same time they are relying on

a number of discourses within which these agents simultaneously operate – both domestic

and international. In the first part, I will outline the key tenets of the Poststructuralist

Discourse Theory (PSDT) – the concepts of discourse and articulation. The second section

offers a conceptual clarification of identity and foreign policy, preparing ground for the

presentation of a model of their relation in the third part. The last section comments on

methodology and research design.

a) Poststructuralist Discourse Theory: Discourse and articulation

The concept of discourse is one of the most used yet least clearly defined terms in IR

scholarship (for overviews see e.g. Milliken 1999 and Fierke 2007), that often seems

reluctant to engage directly with recent developments in discourse theory and rather

somewhat eclectically creates own frameworks (for some exceptions see e.g. Müller 2008a,

2010; Stritzel 2007). Indeed, there are different schools of discourse theory in social sciences

and humanities (see Fairclough 1992; Howarth 2000; Torfing 2005), possibly further

complicating the situation for scholars in need of easily transferable concepts. I will try to

avoid confusion by locating myself explicitly in the PSDT scholarship based on Ernesto

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Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and some of their followers – above all David Howarth and

Jacob Torfing.

At the heart of PSDT is the notion of “enlarg[ing] the scope of discourse analysis to include

all social practices, such that discourses and discursive practices are synonymous with

systems of social relations” (Howarth 2000: 8). As such, discourse is more than just

language. The ideas from linguistics are extended further in claiming that all practices,

objects and subjects are meaningful significations and that this meaning is produced in

discourse. Therefore, discourses are “historically specific systems of meaning which form

the identities of subjects and objects” (ibid: 9). PSDT thus rejects the dichotomy between

discursive and non-discursive practices and the very possibility of the latter: Meaning does

not arise from a reference to the ‘real thing’, but from differentiation within a system of

signs. However, this does not mean denying ‘reality’ independent of thought (Laclau and

Mouffe 2001 [1985]: 108), but that it is inaccessible otherwise than through discursively

produced knowledge. Laclau and Mouffe (1987: 84-5) later clarified their distinction

between discursive, contingent and meaningful being and non-discursive existence that can

be neither approached nor comprehended.

Building on Derrida’s critique of structuralism, PSDT argues that discourses are inherently

incomplete and open due to their incapability to exhaust the meaning(s) arising from the

‘play of differences’ and the “overflowing of the signifier by the signified” (Laclau and

Mouffe 2001 [1985]: 11). All discourses are limited by their exterior, the ‘field of

discursivity’, where the ‘surplus of meaning’ is located (ibid: 105-112). Meaning is not

impossible or in constant flux; but it is unstable, contingent and ultimately political. This is

where Foucault’s (1998 [1976]) notion of productive power joins the picture: “Any discourse

is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of

differences, to construct a centre.” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001 [1985]: 112) These ‘centres’ are

‘nodal points’, privileged signifiers around which discourses are constructed and temporarily

fixed. In order to achieve this temporal stability, nodal points need to be flexible enough to

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withhold a scale of interpretations. Thus, they are usually ‘floating’, or even ‘empty

signifiers’ – “universal containers of meaning which can be filled with varying content in

different discourses” (Müller 2008b: 11). From the perspective of PSDT, politics can be

analysed as struggle over temporary fixation of meaning of these floating signifiers

(Howarth 2005: 324; Diez 2001: 16).

Discourses do not have ‘actual’ or ‘empirical’ existence: They are ‘virtual’ in the sense that

their “existence we infer from their realization in activities, texts and speeches” (Ó Tuathail

and Agnew 1992: 80). Therefore, discourses cannot be analysed directly and other concepts

are needed. Laclau and Mouffe offer articulation as the starting point, defining it as

“political construction from dissimilar elements” and “any practice establishing a relation

among subjects such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice”

(Laclau and Mouffe 2001 [1985]: 85, 105; for overviews of different uses of the concept and

critiques see Grossberg 1996; Slack 1996; Hart 2007). Meanings are partially and

temporarily fixed through articulations by reducing the infinitely ambiguous ‘elements’

located in the field of discursivity to ‘moments’ of a particular discourse. In articulation,

nodal points are constructed and discourse is built as the “structured totality resulting from

the articulatory practice” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001 [1985]: 105).

Elements pre-exist articulations as ‘floating signifiers’, but the “act of linking in a particular

discourse modifies their character such that they can be understood as being spoken anew”

(DeLuca 1999: 335). For Laclau and Mouffe (2001 [1985]: 113), every practice is in effect a

practice of articulation. Discourses act as ‘fermenting agents’ for articulations (ibid: 155),

and, in turn, articulations (re)construct discourses. No articulation is possible without

drawing upon discursive structure and the history of articulations out of which this structure

has arisen as it simply would not be comprehensible, meaningful and thus, possible at all. At

the same time, no practice is ever simply repeated as there are no discursive contexts that

would be purely identical across time and space. Therefore, neither pure stability/continuity,

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nor pure instability/discontinuity in articulations is possible – the logics of ‘necessity’ and

‘spontaneity’ are in a constant interplay (ibid: 12).

The concept of articulation is crucial for locating the argument within the structure/agency

debate. IR poststructuralism (e.g. Doty 1993 and 1997; Wæver 2002) often tends to

ultimately structuralist analyses, neglecting actual practices in favour of searching for

‘conditions of possibility’ regulating what can be said and done within a particular discursive

structure. This approach resembles – and in Wæver’s case explicitly draws upon –

Foucault’s ‘archaeological period’ (Foucault 1972; Howarth 2000: 48-66). However, I agree

with Diez (2001: 17) that Laclau and Mouffe’s work does not follow this path and, on the

contrary, offers significant space for political agency: After all, Hegemony and Socialist

Strategy was written to “outline a new politics for the Left based upon the project of a radical

democracy” (Laclau and Mouffe (2001 [1985]: 3) – an ambition that would be hollow if

practices were merely effects of hegemonic discourses. As Diez (2001: 6-7) puts it, “[e]ach

policy articulation is both enabled by and reproduces […] a larger discursive structure, and

thus is part, and not merely a consequence, of the latter.”

Therefore, in contrast to the structuralist aspects of Foucauldian archaeology, Laclau and

Mouffe’s work in principle resembles Giddens’ (1993: 123) structurationist position in the

agency/structure debate, which claims that agents and structures are mutually constituted:

Agents draw upon structures in their actions, whereby structures are reconstructed

retrospectively. Examination of (dis)similarities and (in)compatibilities of structuration

theory and PSDT would require a separate dissertation and cannot be pursued here in any

detail. Nonetheless, drawing the parallel is beneficial for the sake of the argument that the

gulf between PSDT and IR constructivism – with the latter deliberately drawing on various

strands of structuration theory (see e.g. Wendt 1987; Fierke 2001) – is not unbridgeable,

insights can be exchanged and inspiration flow freely: A very important point for an analysis

working with more than one school of thought.

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b) Identity and foreign policy: Clarifying the concepts

Identity research has been the trademark of both IR constructivists – conventional (Wendt

1992, 1999; Katzenstein 1996) and critical (Weldes 1999a,b; Milliken 1999b; Fierke 1999,

2007) – and poststructuralists (Campbell 1998 [1992]; Doty 1993; Wæver 2002; Hansen

2006). It will be the latter two that I will engage in building my framework for analysing FP

in the European context.2 The approach is grounded in PSDT insofar it rejects the possibility

of extra-discursive practices and adopts articulation as the central category. At the same

time, it takes inspiration from constructivist and arguably even rationalist scholarship in its

focus on policy. In accord with Diez (2001: 19), I do not find this ‘sitting between two

chairs’ necessarily problematic as I believe that PSDT can and should be engaged with

traditional issues and participate in a broad inter-school dialogue.

What is identity and how can it be defined? Surprisingly enough, poststructuralists both

within and outside of IR often fail to provide an explicit answer (Laclau and Mouffe 2001

[1985]; Howarth 2000; Torfing 2005; Wæver 2002; Campbell 1998 [1992]; Hansen 2006).

PSDT optics rejects the well-defined IR constructivist conception of identity as “relatively

stable, role-specific understanding and expectations about self” (Wendt 1992: 397) due to its

grounding outside of discourse – within people’s minds. At the same time, however, one can

hardly escape the fact that the term has a socio-psychological genealogy. Anderson (2006

[1983]: 204-5), to whom Hansen and Campbell refer in their discussions, defines identity as

a ‘conception of personhood’ at the individual level, which is then metaphorically extended

to political communities. Such identity clearly refers to subjects. On the other hand, Laclau

and Mouffe (2001 [1985]) and Howarth (2000), freely speak about identities of objects,

discourses and concepts as much as those of subjects.

2 My model was constructed with the particular case of Germany in an international intervention in

mind and further applications are limited, albeit possible. I am not offering a definition of ‘Europe’ as

I do not want to deduce the borders of the applicability of the model. I only suppose that most

European states (in terms of EU/NATO membership) operate in a similar political space as Germany.

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My conception is closer to the latter: Identity is a differential construction referring to the

discursive being, a set of attributes, predicates, relationships and storylines giving to a thing

its characteristics that make it somewhat unique – including the very borders delineating its

being. At the same time, however, I reserve the term for subjects. From a PSDT perspective,

subjects are constituted by the discourses within which they operate, so it is more precise to

speak about discursive subject positions with each agent occupying multiple subject

positions at the same time as (s)he is operating in a number of different discourses (Laclau

and Mouffe 2001 [1985]: 118-9). For example, one can be simultaneously located in the

positions of ‘white’, ‘Catholic’, ‘gay’ and ‘student’. Identity is then “always contingent and

precarious, temporarily fixed at the intersection of these subject positions” (Mouffe 1992:

28). However, as subject positions are unstable themselves, identity is more than just a

summary of them (Torfing 2005: 17). There are different ways of being ‘white’ or ‘student’

individually, as well as of being ‘white student’. Identity is thus much more particular,

unique; it is a creative performance on the intersection of subject positions.

Identities are contested and can be split due to their simultaneous articulation within different

and possibly contradictory discourses. This would typically be the result of the clash of

simultaneously occupied subject positions: Whilst there is no apparent contradiction in being

‘white’ and ‘student’, it may be much more difficult to be ‘Catholic’ and ‘gay’. To give an

example closer to my case, it was difficult for many countries to articulate their FP identities

in the 2002/3 Iraq crisis as the discourses of ‘Europeaness’ and ‘special partnership with the

US’ within which they operated diverged significantly. Therefore, there is nothing special

about the reoccurring of the situation of ‘identity crisis’ – only perfectly solid and complete

discourses, impossible by the PSDT definition, would be capable to fix identity once and for

good.

The construction of an identity is thus an attempt to fix meaning around floating signifiers

referring to a political subject (e.g. ‘Germany’, ‘Foreign Minister’, ‘the West’), performed by

a political subject – either the same, or another one. Laclau and Mouffe (2001 [1985]) offer

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two intertwined logics how identities can be created – of equivalence and difference. Hansen

(2006) develops this into her concepts of linking and differentiating, arguing that identities

are constructed as nodal points of ‘Selves’ around which a number of signs are clustered,

referring either to what the Self is (linking) or what it is not (differentiating). It is through

these logics that identities are related to each other in relationships that combine equivalence

and difference in some degree.

Foreign policy can be understood as a state-centred and state-bound discourse that is

constituted by a set of practices whereby the ‘antropomorphised state subject’ (Weldes

1999b: 55) interacts with its ‘exterior’. FP practices lay at the boundary between the ‘inside’

and the ‘outside’ of the state, which they in turn reproduce by making certain actors and

practices ‘foreign’ (Campbell 1998[1992]: 61). FP discourse is a highly institutionalised one,

drawing its legitimacy and power from more general, deeply sedimented discourses that

organise political communities – e.g. constitutional discourses. FP discourse also constructs

particular subjects to act on behalf of the state: Politicians and high officials are ‘privileged

storytellers’ at sites of power (stemming from the specific subject position constructed in

FP/constitutional discourses) with granted ‘author-ity’ in terms of constructing foreign

policy (Campbell 1993: 7).

Foreign policy is inherently paradoxical and extraordinary powerful practice as it

(re)constructs the very identity of the state (boundaries, history, ‘interests’, ‘people’) on

behalf of which it is supposed to operate (Campbell 1998[1992]: 73). As such it calls for a

problematising (genealogical) analysis – the approach of Campbell (ibid.) and Weber (1995).

However, my interest is different and much more limited. Whilst staying with the

assumptions of PSDT, I opt for a move resembling IR constructivism and treat the ‘reality’

of FP discourse and its location at the state as sedimented and thus – within the time frame

and for the purposes of my study – stable. I am aware of the contingent character of the

discursive conditions upon which FP is brought into being and do not want to naturalise

them. I am only saying that the articulations that reconstruct e.g. the subject positions and

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rules for the conduct of the practice of foreign policy (FP officials as the actors on behalf of

‘the state’, regularised patterns of inter-state interaction) are uncontested in the horizon of

the few weeks of my analysis.

Put bluntly, nobody seriously challenges the discourse that brings about the ‘fact’ that the

German Foreign Minister is representing the Federal Republic and conducting FP practices

on its behalf. What is contested is the character of these practices and the ability of the

incumbent Guido Westerwelle to stand up to the challenge of his job. What I refer to as FP

discourse is thus rather about the conduct than very being of foreign policy. As such, official

FP discourse can be analysed as a series of articulations constituting particular identities as

the nodal points, the analytical centres around which the discourse can be reconstructed.

c) Web of identities: Analysing foreign policy in Europe

Three objections were raised against critical IR scholarship in the introduction: Lack of

engagement with discourse theory, oversimplified focus on a coherent single Self without

clear specification of what sort of identity is engaged, and neglect of international discourses.

Having dealt with the former by grounding my approach in PSDT, I will now proceed to the

latter two and construct my model thereupon.

The first of the remaining criticisms points to the conceptualisation of identity in IR

scholarship. Critical constructivist and poststructuralist scholars argue for a constitutive

relationship between identity and foreign policy where FP is not only a product of, but at the

same time also a tool for creating and maintaining identity. However, it is not always very

clear what sort of identity they mean. On the one hand, Wæver (2002) clearly speaks about a

comprehensive identity of a nation/state, which is supposed to be constructed in a wide array

of discourses, not only that of foreign policy. However, linking this to FP requires partially

essentialist understanding of this national identity as all-determining and/or positing a quasi-

causal link between its discourse and that of foreign policy. Wæver succumbs to the latter in

his pledge for a simple, structuralist model that is capable even to predict FP behaviour.

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On the other hand, Campbell (1998[1992]: 73, emph. added) sees FP3 as “one of the

practices that contingently constructs through stylized and regulated performances the

identity of the state in whose name it operates”, implying that the identity constructed by FP

practices is only one of the identities, i.e. a partial one. Other studies (Weldes 1999a, 1999b;

Hansen 2006) seem to be oscillating between the two, using the language of state identities

yet analysing predominantly FP discourses. It is the Campbell’s way that I find more

convincing. Therefore, it is FP identity that is at the centre of my analysis; an issue-specific

identity constructed within FP discourse.

From this point of view, FP and identity are in a much closer relationship than Hansen

(2006) suggests in her ‘model of combinability’. She argues that there are no necessarily

predictable links between certain identities and FP constructions and “[t]herefore, foreign

policy discourse can be conceptualized as a simple model centred on creating a stable link

between identity and policy.” (Hansen 2006: 26-7) Again, this would be possible if we

retoured to some degree of essentialist ontology and/or postulated a quasi-causal link

between different discourses – effectively putting FP practices outside of the discursive

structure of identity that is supposed to regulate them (this argument is drawing on Diez

2001). Hansen seems inconsistent here as she is implicitly treating FP in two different ways

– not only as discursive practice, but also as ‘real world action’. She speaks of policies of

‘lift and strike’, ‘non-intervention’ etc. as if they were constructed in these neutral terms

across discourses and thus had no effect on the identities of those involved; as if there was a

gap between ‘who we are’ and ‘what we do’ and the responses to these questions were not

articulated simultaneously.

Weldes (1999a: 15, orig. emph.) is perfectly aware of this problem: “In representing for

themselves and others the situation in which the state finds itself, state officials have already

3 Campbell here speaks about ‘Foreign Policy’ writ large, a state-bound practice equivalent to the

understanding offered in this study. Besides that, he also conceptualises ‘foreign policy’, which he

understands as any practice of boundary creation on any level – sometimes completely detached from

international politics (1998[1992]: 68-9). It is always the former that I have in mind when referring to

Writing Security.

18

constructed the national interest.” The same argument can be made for identities – in

representing ‘liberation’, ‘occupation’ or ‘oppression’, we have already articulated

‘liberators’, ‘occupiers’ and ‘oppressors’. Therefore, identities and FP are articulated

together into the nexus of FP identity, a nodal point that at any moment in time encompasses

both what a subject ‘is’ and what it ‘does’ or ‘should do’ (the latter will be later referred to as

a temporal dimension of identity). From this perspective, ‘this is what we (should) do’ in

terms of foreign policy is only another way of saying ‘this is who we are’ as a foreign policy

actor.

Officials’ privileged role in articulating FP-identity has been mentioned. However, their

discourse is not isolated from wider discursive environment. Doty (1993) and Weldes et al.

(1999) are early realisations of the fact that official discourses must fit with general public

that has the capacity to contest them. Hansen (2006: 6) makes this the core of her explicitly

intertextual analysis: “[F]oreign policy decision-makers are situated within a larger political

and public sphere, and […] their representations as a consequence draw upon and are formed

by the representations articulated by a larger number of individuals, institutions and media

outlets.” This is an extremely valuable argument which I share completely.

Nevertheless, moving to my second criticism, the particular nature of European (discursive)

political space calls for taking this one step further and incorporating ‘external’ discourses. It

is scholars working in the conventional constructivist tradition that raise the argument about

the peculiar nature of the European political space, e.g. in claiming that states within a

security community are sovereign but contingent by shared normative structures (Adler and

Barnett 1998: 36) or that policy-makers are “on the intersection of transnational processes

and domestic structures” (Aggestam 2004: 85). Taking this point as a loose inspiration, one

can actually observe that official FP discourses are rich on intertextual links and references

to each other. This trend can be demonstrated on the discourses on interventions (and

military deployment in general), which are full of references to ‘allied solidarity’,

‘international obligations’ or ‘the need to be a responsible and dependable partner’. These

19

arguments are going way beyond the simple Campbellian logic of the inside/outside

boundary construction. Indeed, European states do not conduct their FP in isolation. In the

case of military interventions, it seems the very contrary: These are negotiated and

undertaken collectively.

Seen through the lens of PSDT, it can be argued that in the history of collective conduct of

certain FP practices (e.g. interventions) shared international discourses emerged that regulate

articulations, which, in turn, reconstruct these discourses. It would be very interesting to

engage in a genealogical enterprise that would analyse how this came about; unfortunately, it

lies out of the scope of this paper and I need to limit myself to a short illustration: In the

discourse on recent interventions, such as Libya, the references to previous cases are

omnipresent: Politicians and journalists alike quote the ‘lessons’ of ‘Bosnia’, ‘Rwanda’ or

‘Iraq’ in giving reasons why and how another intervention should (not) be undertaken.

Indeed, ‘Bosnia’ or ‘Iraq’ are mere signifiers, articulated in different and often starkly

contradictory ways. Nevertheless, they are the nodal points that knit the international

discourse together.

Therefore, I argue that official FP discourse is embedded simultaneously within wider

domestic and international discourses. This should not be read as reintroduction of the old

line about ‘multiple levels’ (Putnam 1988; Moravcsik 1998). To make this clear, I prefer the

term discursive arenas, among which there is no hierarchical relationship. They are fields

from which discourses challenging the official FP discourse may arise. Thus, the picture of

Europe I am offering is one of a complex discursive space in which the organising principle

of inside/outside is still partially structuring the FP practices around the notion of

sovereignty, but clearly fails to do so completely.

Under these conditions, it is necessary to break with the argument that FP-identity of a

nation/state is the sole one that is constructed as the Self within the official FP discourse.

20

One can rather observe the knitting together of a complex ‘web of identities’4 (again, in the

sense of discourse-specific identities). In this web, the national FP-identity is entangled in

complex relationships with a number of ‘Selves’ and ‘Others’ of varying degrees of

equivalence and difference, ranging from antagonist, ‘barbarian’ Others as presented by

Campbell (1998[1992]), to much more nuanced ‘degrees of otherness’ (Wæver 1996; Kuus

2007). Some of these relationships may be hierarchical, e.g. ‘the West’ as a shared identity

for multiple states (as explored by Milliken 1999b), other will be built on par.

Articulations would typically construct the identities as resulting from a cluster of

relationships. For instance, the identities of ‘the US’, ‘France’ and ‘Germany’ may be

articulated as equivalent in their relationship to ‘the West’, within which ‘France’ and

‘Germany’ may be further linked together and juxtaposed towards ‘the US’ by a reference to

‘Europe’, within which they can be differentiated by a number of attributes, yet still linked as

‘equal sovereigns’. Identities can be very well sub-national (‘Conservative Party’) as well as

cross-national (‘Christian’, ‘socialist’).

Stating that the ambiguous ‘we’ that officials articulate (Weldes 1999a) can mean different

things is not the same as claiming these multiple identities matter to the same extent. This is

definitely not so – different aspects of identity (including belonging to collective subjects)

are articulated in different contexts, understood as “[a]nything that is not explicitly expressed

in the data corpus yet manifests its traces and is considered necessary as an interpretive

frame for meaning fixations that occur in discourses” (Müller 2008b: 8). Contextual analysis

will look at the discourses within which an articulation is pursued, its institutional location

and probable primary audience. For example, one should differentiate if and articulation was

made in a speech to party fellows (which would probably much emphasise the particular

party identity), or in an interview for a major global newspaper (usually presenting a more

internationalist outlook).

4 The term is from Hansen (2006: 36). She mentions this possibility in passing yet does not elaborate

on it in her analysis.

21

This brings back the notion of split, possibly contradictory identities: “Taking the

situatedness of identities seriously forces us to recognize that identities shift and that the

same subjects can have different identities, that they are positioned situationally by different

discourses.” (Müller 2008b: 24) Discourses resulting from either arenas create pressure on

the FP-identity by articulating the ‘same’ move in radically different ways and thereby

constructing very different identities – by not engaging in an intervention, a state subject can

be ‘reasonably restraint’ as well as ‘irresponsibly free-riding’ at the same time. The politics

of foreign policy is then about denying this shift of identities and split of subjects by

attempting to construct hegemonic discourses of FP-identities that would appear natural and

consistent.

d) Methodology and Research Design

A number of IR scholars express dissatisfaction with the lack of methodology in discourse

studies (e.g. Milliken 1999a; Fierke 2001; Hansen 2006). The core problem seems to be no

longer the a priori resentment of methodology that was typical for some early IR

poststructuralism (e.g. Campbell 1998[1992]), but rather the thin ice upon which this

discussion is based from the perspective of scholarship that rejects sharp distinctions

between theory and method. As Howarth (2005: 317) notes, in discourse theory “[m]ethod is

not synonymous with a free-standing and neutral set of rules and techniques.” It cannot be an

impartial objective framework ‘applied’ on empirical data ‘out there’. The processes of

empirical study and theoretical abstraction must go hand in hand; concepts and logics are

transferrable in principle, but at the same time must be sufficiently open for rearticulation

vis-à-vis the data they are supposed to analyse (Howarth 2000: 130-9; Milliken 1999a: 234).

Understood as explicit reflection on the way research is conducted and the criteria upon

which choices are made, methodology stands in intimate relationship with ontology and

epistemology (Howarth 2005: 317; Müller 2010: 8). The anti-essentialist ontological stance

which presents the very core of PSDT (Howarth 2000: 112; Torfing 2005: 13) has been

22

discussed throughout this chapter. As long as it is argued that meaningful reality cannot be

separated from our way of knowing about it, it is also clear that epistemology and ontology

are indivisible (Fierke 2002: 343). With respect to epistemology, PSDT approach firmly

rejects scienticist research designs based on separation of variables and identification of

causal relationships between them. However, neither would it be accurate to place PSDT into

the realm of pure hermeneutical understanding. Discourse analysis proceeds from the

understanding of meanings that individuals attach to the ‘reality’ of their lives, to a

contingent and necessarily limited explanation based on the objectification of these meanings

and putting them into wider discursive contexts (Pouliot 2007: 370-1; Howarth 2005: 319-

20). An analyst thus cannot aspire for an Archimedean point or ‘Olympian objectivity’

(Weldes et al. 1999: 21), but this does not necessarily mean epistemological relativism with

all account being equal. As long as ‘truth’ is understood as discourse-specific, it is perfectly

possible to make ‘small-t-truth’ claims based on the best knowledge available and supported

by some sort of evidence (Price and Reus-Smith 1998: 272; Howarth 2000: 133).

Methodology for critical constructivist/poststructuralist research is necessarily ‘inductive,

interpretive and historical’ (Pouliot 2007: 359) and seeks to discover things anew, rather than

find support for deductively postulated theses. The furthest one can characterise such

approach is probably ‘reading’ (Hansen 2006: 2) or ‘look and see’ (Fierke 2002: 346).

Therefore, the following comments cannot outline a sophisticated system of equations.

Nevertheless, they can make visible the strategy I followed and thereby show that the

research was conducted in a systematic way. In the remainder of this chapter I will shed light

on (1) the steps I followed in reconstructing the webs of identities and (2) the way discursive

arenas were operationalised and texts selected.

First of all, subjects were identified in the texts. These are the nodal points, the floating

signifiers. The central subject of interests is ‘Germany’, however, a number of others were

discovered as well. The construction of subject’s FP identity was examined through multiple

analytical lenses guiding the reading – the dimensions of identity (this is based above all on

23

Törrönen 2001 and Hansen 2006; but also on Milliken 1999a, 1999b; and Müller 2008b).

The first of them is the spatial dimension, summarising categories and predicates in the form

of nouns, verbs and adverbs attributed to subjects in texts. The second dimension is

temporary and includes storylines – how the history of a subject was constructed and how it

implies/legitimises what it is or should be doing. The third is the relational/positional

dimension, asking how these identities were articulated into structures of interaction, which

identities were reinforced by the context of the articulation and how relations were

articulated between them. In this dimension, I partially stepped out of the text to analyse

contexts and thereby introduced a larger degree of ‘subjective’ interpretation. 5 This analysis

enables “to piece together a map of identities” (Fierke 2001: 129) in the form of a snapshot.

To analyse the discourse in its development, one needs to put a multiple ‘snapshots’ along

temporal axis and examine them in a historical perspective.

Official FP discourse was analysed simultaneously with those of the two discursive arenas –

domestic and international – in order to search for interactions in terms of explicit

engagement (direct replies in debates and interviews) as well as implicit intertextual

influences (incorporation of elements of rival discourses to accumulate or deny them).

Indeed, the crucial problem here is constructing representative corpus of data. Howarth

(2005: 337) refers to Derrida in stating that “there are no fully saturated contexts”, calling for

“explicit, consistent and justified selection” upon which readers can critically evaluate

author’s choices. Hansen (2000: 76) offers three criteria for selecting texts; they should be

‘widely read and attended to’, contain explicit articulations of identity and have a ‘formal

authority to define a political position’. Drawing on both, I collected my corpus in the

following way (the selection respects the timeframe of 15 February – 18 April 2011):

Official FP discourse was analysed in speeches, articles and interviews of two key

‘privileged storytellers’ – the Chancellor Angela Merkel and the Foreign Minister

5 It is useful to stick to these three dimensions in the process of reading – which I did. However, it

may appear cumbersome to use them for structuring the resulting text. Therefore, I am mentioning the

dimensions only occasionally in the case study.

24

Guido Westerwelle. These were collected at the websites of the Chancellor’s Office

and the Foreign Ministry. Only the texts that contained the sign ‘liby’ were selected.

Further, traces of the official discourse were tracked in the following two arenas (e.g.

statements on behalf of the government carried in the parliament by other officials).

Domestic discursive arena was operationalised as the political debate and ‘published

opinion’. The former was tracked in the transcripts of the parliamentary proceedings,

accessible from the website of the Bundestag. All debates within the timescale were

searched for the sign ‘liby’, leading to the incorporation of 11 debates. For the latter,

three newspapers were chosen: Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and Frankfurter

Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) as the two leading broadsheets in terms of both

circulation and reputation, and Der Spiegel as the most influential weekly

(Weischenberg et al. 2006). These were searched manually, looking for articles

related to the crisis in their domestic, foreign and commentary sections.

International discursive arena was analysed in terms of official political discourses.

Applying similar criteria as for the German official discourse, I focused on the heads

of the executive and the Foreign Ministers of France, Britain and the US.6 US and

British official discourses were analysed in speeches, interviews and articles that are

accessible online. French official discourse was analysed in the English language

releases of the Agence France Presse.

The texts resulting from this systematic selection were further sorted in the process of the

first reading. The criteria here were much more ‘subjective’ and interpretive. In general

terms I was looking at the relevance of each piece for my research questions. Therefore, e.g.

field reporting from Libya was of interest only inasmuch it engaged with some of these

identities, whereas texts directly commenting on German FP were of high relevance.

6 These states were chosen as comparable as they have common history of interventions, were all

present at the UN Security Council at the time, are the leading NATO nations in terms of both

contributions to the Alliances and total military expenditures and refer to each other as close allies.

25

3. Germany’s foreign policy in the Libya crisis

This chapter will analyse Germany’s foreign policy in the Libya crisis by reconstructing the

web of identities with that of ‘Germany’ in the centre. In the first step, I will examine the

development of the official discourse. Second, I will move to the domestic (and later, to the

international) discursive arena to identify wider discourses which challenged and, being

intertextually incorporated and drawn upon, structured the official articulations. Last but not

least, on an example of two important FP texts, I will demonstrate how these interactions

actually took place.

a) Avoiding ‘the slippery slope’: Germany’s official foreign policy discourse

Germany’s official foreign policy discourse, represented above all by a number of speeches

and interviews of the Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, travelled a very interesting curve

in the period of our interest: From early Gaddafi-bashing, through reluctance to engage in

military actions against him, towards articulating solidarity with allies through willingness to

bear increased burdens in Afghanistan and the ‘EUFOR Libya’ mission (that never

materialised). In this section, I will reconstruct the official discourse with only occasional

contextual comments.

Beginning with the ‘on-ground’ subjects of the Libya crisis, it is very interesting how

unequivocal the articulations were: The identity of ‘Gaddafi’ (sometimes extended as ‘the

Gaddafi regime’, ‘the Gaddafi family’ or ‘the Gaddafi clan’) was constructed in terms of

ultimate otherness, as firmly separated from and sharply contrasted to ‘the Libyan people’.

Gaddafi was routinely referred to as ‘dictator’ and ‘despot’ with a ‘doubtful sense of reality’

(State Secretary Werner Hoyer in Deutscher Bundestag 2011a), who commits ‘horrendous

violations of human rights’ (Westerwelle 2011b) and ‘fights his own people’ – an

articulation repeated throughout the texts. His regime ‘had lost all legitimacy’ and ‘must go’

(e.g. Westerwelle 2011d,h). Gaddafi was not only juxtaposed against domestic and

international subjects alike; the logic of difference in the relational construction of his

26

identity reached its climax in an outright exclusion: By his deeds, Gaddafi positioned himself

‘outside of the international community’ (Westerwelle 2011f).

On the very contrary, the people protesting against the regime were ‘young’ and ‘brave’,

resembling the East Germans and East Europeans of 1989 (Westerwelle 2011b). Thus,

Germany and the international community were linked to the Libyan people as standing on

their side (e.g. Westerwelle 2011a). Interestingly, the identities of ‘Gaddafi’ and ‘the Libyan

people’ were not only very stable in time, but also constructed in very similar terms across

all the discourses analysed in this paper.

The case was starkly different with respect to the FP identity of ‘Germany’, which shifted

significantly. The major change can be located in the early days of March when the

possibility of military action in Libya began to structure the discourse. In the preceding

weeks, the identity of Germany was constructed in terms of the ‘leader in human rights’

(State Secretary Pieper in Deutscher Bundestag 2011a), who advocated and pushed for

stronger sanctions against Gaddafi and deemed the EU too slow and reluctant in its approach

(Westerwelle 2011a). This identity peaked in the days following the adoption of the UN

Security Council Resolution 1970 on 26 February, which introduced the first round of

sanctions.

Around the middle of March, however, Berlin’s ‘leadership’ virtually disappeared. Instead,

the Federal Republic was articulated as ‘reticent’ with respect to the no-fly-zone:

“[Germany] sees military attack in the form of a no-fly-zone with great skepticism.

We do not want to and cannot become a war party in a civilian war in North Africa.

We do not want to get to the slippery slope [schiefe Ebene], which ends with

German soldiers becoming a part of war in Libya.” (Westerwelle 2011f)

This short paragraph became the official mantra, repeatedly articulating Germany’s identity

in terms of war-avoidance, caution and limited capacities: “[U]s Germans cannot intervene

with German soldiers everywhere in the world where injustice is happening” (Westerwelle

2011g). Own sovereign decisions need to be taken where Germany would get involved and

where it would not (Westerwelle 2011l). It was on these grounds that the abstention from the

27

17 March voting on the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (authorising air attacks on the

Libyan soil and calling for the establishment of a no-fly-zone) was constructed.

However, Germany’s identity was ‘not neutral’ (Merkel 2011b, Westerwelle 2011j); she

supported the non-military elements of the 1973 resolution and ‘shared its goals’

(Westerwelle 2011h). Voting in favour of the resolution would have necessarily led to

German military participation in Libya, something Berlin was not ready undertake; therefore

the abstention was necessary (Westerwelle 2011p). Germany’s ‘international responsibility’

(which came under strain as I will show later) was (re)articulated in references to her role in

Afghanistan and participation in a number of other missions. The attributes of ‘solidarity and

responsibility’ were explicitly linked to the identity of Germany in the immediate revoking

of the earlier decision not to participate in NATO’s AWACS air surveillance mission in

Afghanistan, all in order to “relieve the allies without participating ourselves with the

Bundeswehr in Libya” (Westerwelle 2011j, emph. added). Later on, the government added a

strong commitment to a possible future EU humanitarian mission EUFOR Libya – including

soldiers to protect the delivery (Westerwelle 2011o).

Besides the effort to articulate the policies into the storyline of ‘German responsibility’, the

official texts also focused on tying the identity of Germany to as many other countries as

possible by relations of equivalence. In the Security Council, Germany was joined by its

‘important partners’ Brazil, India, China and Russia – notably, they were always mentioned

in this order, with China and Russia moved to the end (Westerwelle 2011h,l). Those who

voted in favour, nevertheless, had ‘honourable motives’ which Germany respected

(Westerwelle 2011i). In turn, identities of these partners, especially those of France and the

United States, were articulated as ‘understanding’ and ‘respecting’ Germany’s position

(Westerwelle 2011h). After all ‘more than a half of Europeans’ did not participate militarily

in Libya (Westerwelle 2011k) and it is the Arab League and the states of the region that were

supposed to take primary responsibility (Westerwelle 2011g,i)

28

This ‘business-as-usual’ framework of meaning that downplayed any sense of problem was

reflected also in the way identities of wider international subjects were constructed.

Civilizational signifiers of ‘Europe’ or ‘the West’ remained scarce; it was rather the

organisational identities of UN, EU and NATO, or the somewhat slippery notion of

‘international community’ that appeared in the official discourse. These were articulated in

rather general terms: As condemning violence (Pieper in Deutscher Bundestag 2011a),

supporting the Libyan people (Westerwelle 2011a) and united in the goals of the 1973

resolution and in the persuasion that Gaddafi had to go (Merkel 2011c) – thus, equivalent

with the identity of Germany.

The official discourse often melted together identities of the officials and the state-subject.

Whenever this was the case, I related these articulations to ‘Germany’ as the privileged

subject of foreign policy. However, one can still observe that particular sub-state identities

emerged in the discourse. First of them is that of the cabinet/government (Die

Bundesregierung), which was articulated as ‘united’ in its decisions, above all with respect

to the UN abstention and the following policies (Merkel 2011b; Westerwelle 2011f). With

respect to Merkel’s identity, what is particularly stunning is her invisibility or even absence

within the discourse. The Chancellor herself spoke out only very occasionally and made little

effort to partake in the debate.

Guido Westerwelle is a more interesting case, especially in relation to the overall

development of the FP discourse. In the first phase, before the no-fly-zone structured the

discourse, Westerwelle used multiple press interviews to articulate a distinct identity as an

active pusher and ‘liberal Foreign Minister’:

“I am a liberal Foreign Minister and therefore, when in doubt, I always stand for

freedom. That is why it was important for me to raise my voice [with respect to the

Arab Spring].” (Westerwelle, 2011d)

This accent can be understood in light of Westerwelle’s short period of appraisal in German

public discourses following his fast reaction to the ‘Arabellion’. The minister seemed to have

used the chance to rearticulate his identity vis-à-vis the public and his own liberal Free

29

Democrats party. However, as the discourse became dominated by the military option,

Westerwelle’s identity was downplayed in favour of the unity of the government.

In sum, the web of identities constructed by the German official discourse underwent an

interesting transformation with Gaddafi and the Libyan people remaining the only ones that

were both at the forefront and largely stable. FP identity of Germany entered the picture as a

self-confident leader pushing the international community to get together and act, only to

end up in defensive as remaining solidary, responsible, equivalent to other (inter)national

subjects and firmly against Gaddafi. Concurrently, a distinct discursive identity of the

Foreign Minister Westerwelle was initially articulated as ‘liberal Foreign Minister’, but later

deemphasised.

b) Responsibility, sovereignty and pacifism: Domestic discursive arena

This section explores the domestic discursive arena in order to capture the wider

environment within which the official FP articulations were located. I will argue that the

official articulations drew upon three distinct discourses. The first of them, which I call

‘International Responsibility’, emphasised the need for Germany to play an active global role

alongside its allies and dominated in the media. Second was the ‘Cautious Sovereignty’

discourse, highlighting Germany’s independence in decision-making and the necessity to

think twice before actions are taken. This line was common among the parties of the

government and some commentators of the FAZ. Finally, there was the ‘Pacifism’ discourse

rejecting war in principle. Marginalised in the media, it was carried above all by the Left

party (Die Linke).

Three issues need to be dealt with before I proceed further. First of all, these discourses

started diverging with the appearance of the possibility of a military solution. Prior to that,

the government was generally supported – e.g. FP speaker of the oppositional Social

Democrats (SPD) Rolf Mützenich called the policies ‘exemplary’ (Deutscher Bundestag

2011b). Second, party identities – with the exception of Die Linke – were largely

30

downplayed in the debate and articulated as divided, with splits running through the parties

(F.A.Z. 2011h; Sattar 2011b; Löwenstein, 2011). Last but not least, all the discourses

reproduced the sharp binary of Gaddafi vs. Libyan people. Despite few articles (especially

early in the crisis) pleading against reducing Gaddafi to ‘mad dictator’ (Follath 2011a; Kister

2011), the papers largely followed dramatic depictions: “[Gaddafi] murders and appears as

mad as Charlie Chaplin in the role of Adolf Hitler” (Höges 2011). Likewise, the ‘rebels’

received some critical coverage (e.g. Mittelstaedt and Windfuhr 2011), but predominantly

remained linked to the positive identity of the ‘Libyan people’.

FP identity of Germany became the primary battlefield between the International

Responsibility and Cautious Sovereignty discourses. Within International Responsibility,

Germany’s temporal identity in the crisis – above all that associated with the abstention and

the following implementation of the resolution – was articulated as a ‘historical mistake’

with ‘no precedent’ (Richter 2011; Brössler 2011d). Veteran SPD parliamentarian

Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul (in Deutscher Bundestag 2011d) joined ranks with retired

general Klaus Naumann (2011) and former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (2011) to

articulate Germany in terms of ‘shame’. As Wieczorek-Zeul put it, “there is no abstention

against despots.” (in Deutscher Bundestag 2011d) After all, Germany could have supported

the resolution without direct participation in its implementation (Naumann 2011). Instead,

Germany stood by and would have to face the consequences: “The price for withdrawing

from actions against Gaddafi is high: Berlin walks again a Sonderweg and raises doubts

about its reliability.” (Kohler 2011a, emph. added). 7

Germany’s identity was constructed as isolated, and putting itself ‘in offside’ (Brössler

2011d; Beste et al. 2011a). Crucially, Berlin was supposed to have hurt its own national

interests (Fischer 2011; Naumann 2011; Stelzenmueller 2011.). Interestingly, the candidacy

for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council was articulated together with the abstention:

7 Originally a historical concept tracking the woes of the 20

th century in a particular way

modernisation occurred in Germany (see e.g. Kocka 1982), Sonderweg (‘special path’) functions in

the political discourse as an ultimately negative signifier, referring to a particularly dangerous

situation when Germany is supposed to be ‘deviating’ or ‘going it alone’.

31

Germany seriously damaged her chances by ‘failing the first test’ (Fischer 2011). Further,

Germany was constructed as contradictory and inconsistent: Berlin voted in favour of

NATO’s involvement in operations off the coast of Libya, but withdrew her ships and

personnel (Beste et al. 2011b). She mobilised and argued against ‘war’, whose operations

were conducted from military bases and operation centres on her soil (Brössler and Höll

2011). Berlin wanted ‘to belong without participating’ and therefore, the approach to the

operations in Libya ended up somewhere between Ja and Nein – as Jein (ibid.).

Most dramatic, however, is the articulation of the relational dimension of Germany’s

identity, building on the unusual grouping of votes in UN Security Council. The following

statement, providing a textbook example of differentiating and linking, is probably the best

example:

“Germany […] now voted against the Americans, the Brits and the French,

nonetheless, together with the Chinese, the Russians, the Brazilians and the Indians –

against the most important allies from the West and thereby on the side of dictators,

autocrats and two faraway democracies. […] Even Portugal, the other EU country in

the Security Council, voted for the resolution.” (Brössler 2011d)

The Cautious Sovereignty articulated sovereignty as the crucial attribute of Germany’s

identity: Berlin should make its own decisions independently (Müller 2011). In the words of

the Christian Democrats’ (CDU/CSU) FP expert Ruprecht Polenz:

“Alliance does not mean that Germany should in principle be part of everything that

NATO does. Otherwise we would not need the parliament and could just say:

Everything is decided by NATO in Brussels, and we are in.” (in Deutscher

Bundestag 2011d)

Thus, Germany had to prioritise her interests as it was not possible to pursue all of them

simultaneously – with Libya possibly not on the top. Crucially and in accord with the

official discourse, Germany was articulated as ‘not neutral’ and ‘sharing the aims of 1973’

(Andreas Schockenhoff of the CDU/CSU in Deutscher Bundestag 2011e). This logic

highlighted Germany’s willingness to participate in sanctions, building on the argument that

they may be slow, but “often better and more effective than military adventures” (Steltzner

32

2011). Crucially, Germany was neither isolated, nor alone ‘in puncto solidarity’ – only seven

NATO members participated in the military mission (Bc 2011).

Therefore, Germany was only considerate and did not get carried away by ‘wishful thinking

about an easy military mission’ (Gutschker 2011b). Many of the objections of the

government were portrayed as reasonable, the problem was rather that “[i]n the end,

everything was reduced to the as desperate as honest sentence of the Foreign Minister that

Germany does not want to get dragged into a war.” (Busse 2011c) Here we can see that

Cautious Sovereignty was not merely supporting the government – this statement is a clear

critique of Westerwelle’s engagement of the Pacifist discourse.

The Cautious Sovereignty discourse also offered different articulations of Germany’s

historical identity and relation to the allies. Most of the criticisms of International

Responsibility were rearticulated as symptoms of Germany’s tendency to self-bashing and

excessive fascination with the past: “Between Sonderweg and loyalty to allies tortures itself

the European central power that is today considerably smaller than it used to be, but likes to

make itself even smaller.” (Müller 2011) The ‘self-image of the loyal ally’ was presented as

illusory, with the argument that all recent German governments were seen by NATO as

‘naysayers, skeptics, doubters and waiting’. (Busse 2011c)

The Pacifist discourse constructed an identity of Germany that rejected the involvement in

military operations in principle, following the logic that no-fly-zone is war and Germany

should not participate in any wars – especially those that can be seen as ‘wars for oil’

(Wolfgang Gehrcke of Die Linke in Deutscher Bundestag 2011b,c). Therefore, Germany’s

abstention was seen as rightful and praised loudly (Jan van Aken of Die Linke in Deutscher

Bundestag 2011d). The Pacifist discourse largely revolved around this single argument.

With respect to identities of international subjects, articulations defy classification into the

three discourses as there is not that much of a difference between them. The main division

lies in the way Germany was related to these subjects (e.g. as ‘splitting the West’ in

33

International Responsibility) – not in their identities themselves. Therefore, I will focus on

the dominant constructions and refer to the discourses only when their resurfacing is

strikingly apparent. Out of the picture stands the identity of the United Nations (Security

Council), constructed as ‘surprisingly’ fast and united in passing both crucial resolutions,

1970 and 1973 (Klüver 2011a; Richter 2011). Of course, this positive articulation largely

builds upon the low expectations projected onto the UN; nonetheless, it is in stark contrast

with the way other identities were articulated.

The ambiguous identity of ‘the West’ was mobilised above all in the days and weeks before

the 1973 resolution – and it was all but positive. The West was articulated in terms of

doubtful morals as all its leaders used to ‘sit in the Gaddafi’s tent’ (Avenarius 2011a). Vis-à-

vis Gaddafi’s action, it stood ‘helpless’, disunited and full of ‘misunderstandings’ and

‘prejudices’ (Avenarius 2011d; Hujer, M. et al., 2011). EU was embodied with little more

optimism. It seemed united ‘only in the empty formula’ that Gaddafi must go and rebels be

supported – without knowing how exactly this was supposed to be done (Nonnenmacher

2011a; Winter 2011c). The Union ‘missed a chance’ to take a common position and – as the

International Responsibility articulation highlights – Germany was largely to blame

(Mützenich in Deutscher Bundestag 2011c,d). NATO was the subject dominating in the

weeks following the 1973 resolution. Again, its identity did not receive any better handling

and was also spoken in terms of divisions and arguments (nbu 2011c; Brössler 2011f).

The identity of the US was also constructed in terms that largely defy easy classification: As

having changed its opinion (from the early skepsis towards no-fly-zone to its eventual

support), unwilling to lead the operation on herself, supporting NATO to take over the

command from the initial ‘coalition of willing’ (US, UK, France) and ‘friendly critical’ of

Germany (Rüb et al. 2011; SZ 2011d; Kornelius 2011a). Whilst UK was more or less absent

in the discourse (besides being linked to Paris as ‘leaders’ and ‘pushers’), it was France that

was given most space and used as a mirror for the debate on Germany’s FP identity.

34

For International Responsibility, France’s leadership in pushing and implementing the 1973

resolution was a ‘triumph’ (Bidder et al. 2011) and French FP ‘rose from ashes’ (Ulrich

2011). In the person of the Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, Paris could rely on a personality

that was ‘experienced’ and ‘heavyweight’ – unlike Westerwelle (Nm 2011b). In relation to

Berlin, France felt ‘betrayed’, ‘angry’ and ‘resented’ the German position (Brössler and

Ulrich 2011; Brössler 2011g). France would now think twice about Germany’s dependability

and rather rely on Britain as its crucial partner in security matters (Ulrich 2011; Brössler

2011g). The Cautious Sovereignty articulations painted a different picture: One of France

that publicly rejected ‘any drama’ in relations to Germany (Sattar 2011d). Furthermore,

French initial opposition to allow NATO to take over the command was constructed in terms

of ‘vanity’ (Kornelius 2011a), and therefore, France was equally to blame for the divisions

within the Alliance.

Prominent was the identity of the Foreign Minister Westerwelle, who was made the main

target of criticism for the discourse of International Responsibility, whilst receiving little

support from elsewhere. The Cautious Sovereignty discourse was rather defending the

rationale of the policies related to ‘Germany’, than Westerwelle in personal. Ironically, these

oppositional and public discourses focused on Westerwelle’s identity exactly at the time

when the official discourse was downplaying it.

Within the International Responsibility discourse, Westerwelle was constructed as ‘wearing

the glasses of domestic politics’, prioritising own particular political motives over

Germany’s wider interests (Mützenich in Deutscher Bundestag 2011c,d). Westerwelle

‘wimped out’ in the crucial moment (Fischer 2011) and instead of showing leadership, he

‘broke’ the EU’s common approach (Beste et al. 2011a) and ‘let Gaddafi rest in his tent’

(Beste et al. 2011b). His position as the Foreign Minister was thus ‘damaged’ once again and

the credit gained in the earlier handling of the Arab Spring inevitably lost (Beste et al.

2011a,b).

35

Moreover, Westerwelle’ was constructed as confused and contradictory, having troubles to

explain his policies (Beste et al. 2011a). The offer of German involvement in the AWACS

mission in Afghanistan (which Westerwelle opposed in January 2011) was articulated as

nothing more than ‘damage limitation’ (Schadenbegrenzung; Kohler 2011b):

“There is an apparent suspicion that you [Westerwelle] are following one simple

reason. You want the public to forget as soon as possible about the disaster of the

passivity of the government, this German Sonderweg in the Libya question, and that

is indisputable.” (Omid Nouripour of the Greens in Deutscher Bundestag, 2011e,

emph. added)

Similar irritation accompanied Westerwelle’s later statements that the course of events in

Libya confirmed his skepsis (e.g. Westerwelle 2011n), being articulated as ‘I-told-you-so’

behaviour (Rechthaberei; dbr 2011). Altogether, Westerwelle’s identity was constructed as

someone who ‘cannot do foreign policy’ (Beste et al. 2011b), or – in quotations of French

intellectuals – an outright ‘disaster’ and the ‘worst foreign minister’ in a long time (Sandberg

and Diez 2011; Brössler and Ulrich 2011.).

In the Pacifist discourse of Die Linke, Westerwelle enjoyed (most probably undesired) praise

shortly after the abstention, with the parliamentarian Jan van Aken (in Deutscher Bundestag

2011d) calling him ‘very smart and very consequent’. However, the consistency in

opposition to war was seen as broken with by authorisation of the use of US bases on

German soil for the Libya operation and above all, by Westerwelle’s support of the AWACS

solution. According to another parliamentarian of Die Linke, Wolfgang Gehrcke (in

Deutscher Bundestag 2011e), it was a ‘perverse logic’ of Westerwelle to call for ‘escalating

the war’ in Afghanistan’ as a result of non-participation in Libya.

Angela Merkel’s identity was largely secondary, mostly articulated in terms of her support

and unity with the Foreign Minister (e.g. Bannas 2011; Beste et al. 2011b). Indeed, she was

not spared of the critique and most of the points raised above were linked to her as well.

However, the agency was attributed to Westerwelle. A very similar case was the identity of

‘the government’, which was not mobilized very much (also as there was no united

‘opposition’ to relate it against) – it was either articulated in terms of ‘Germany’ (acting

36

internationally), or as ‘supporting the Foreign Minister’. Therefore, separate analysis of its

identity would not bring new information into the picture.

In short, the domestic discursive arena produced three main discourses that engaged with

that of the government, both structuring and challenging its articulations. The International

Responsibility discourse was strongly critical and constructed a picture of Germany that was

irresponsible and isolated from its allies, splitting the multilateral bodies and led by an

incompetent Foreign Minister. The Cautious Sovereignty discourse articulated Germany as a

sovereign and considerate actor weighing her own interests, carrying international

responsibility elsewhere than in Libya and meeting understanding internationally. Of lesser

importance was the Pacifist discourse, revolving around anti-war identities.

c) ‘Risks of inaction’: International discursive arena

Analysis of international discourses is inherently tricky as a large amount of articulations

remains outside of the grasp of the researcher, much larger than in the domestic arena.

International allies do not tend to criticise each other very much in public (but remember the

case of Iraq). Nevertheless, public discourses can also provide us with very interesting

constructions of identities that interact with those of German oppositional discourse and at

least reach to the official FP discourse. Unlike in the previous sections, I will not reconstruct

the webs in their complexity as they are knitted around the FP identities of France, Britain

and the US – not Germany. Instead, my focus is on the way Germany is directly, but also

indirectly articulated within these discourses. By the latter I refer to constructions that do not

mention a subject directly (‘Gaddafi is barbarian’), but make this link in an indirect manner,

e.g. by connecting storylines with predicates (‘those who shot at peaceful protestors are

barbarians’). This move does not reintroduce psychologising speculations as it may appear: I

do not claim to know whom the agents had in mind when uttering this or that; I am only

showing what these articulations do, where Germany fits into the webs of identities.

37

The split between Gaddafi and the ‘Libyan people’ was articulated in the usual terms once

again. Gaddafi was “a brutal dictator […] threatening his people and saying he will show no

mercy and go door-to-door hunting people down” (Obama 2011e). In contrast, the people of

Libya were “braving the dictator’s bullets and putting their lives on the line to enjoy the

freedoms that are the birthright of every man, woman, and child on earth.” (Clinton 2011b)

There are rather few explicit mentions of Germany within the international discourses – an

observation notable on itself when compared to the American, British and French

omnipresent references to each other or to some other states. When appeared, which was

almost exclusively in the context of state visits to Germany and interviews with the German

press, these articulations largely repeated the diplomatic line about ‘shared goals’ that was

common in the German official discourse. Meeting Angela Merkel in Berlin, US Secretary

of State Hillary Clinton (2011j) stated:

“We [US and Germany] are also sharing the same goal which is to see the end of the

Qadhafi regime in Libya. And we are contributing in many ways in order to see that

goal realized.”

The catchphrase was adopted also by the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé (in Sattar

2011d). Open criticism was absent or downplayed (e.g. Wauquiez in Wiegel 2011b). The

strongest objection one can find is probably Juppé’s quote for the press that he “wished

Germany had accompanied us” (in Ulrich 2011). Indeed, this clicks into the framework of

Cautious Sovereignty.

However, an indirect analysis leads to strikingly different conclusions. This regards above all

the much repeated and cherished attribute of ‘responsibility’. In an ‘address to the nation’,

Barack Obama articulated the US identity as follows:

“To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader, and, more profoundly, our

responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances, would have

been a betrayal of who we are. Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to

atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different.” (Obama

2011f, emph. added.)

38

When pushing for the adoption of the 1973 resolution on 16 March, Sarkozy called “for all

the Security Council’s members fully to assume their responsibilities and support this

initiative.” (Sarkozy in AFP 2011o) Two days later, David Cameron told the House of

Commons that “[n]ow that the UN Security Council has reached its decision there is a

responsibility on its members to respond.” (Cameron 2011c) Clearly, Germany did not fall to

the ‘responsibility’ camp by these definitions. On the very contrary – it was ‘different’ and

among those who ‘turned the blind eye’. Interestingly, this very quote was rearticulated as

direct critique of Germany in a FAZ commentary (Sattar 2011e).

Similar logic is followed in articulating the consequences of the military action undertaken in

Libya. In their joint op-ed, Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy (2011) claimed that they have

“halted the bloodbath”. Particularly dramatic constructions are offered by Cameron’s

(2011e) engagement with his domestic critics who stood on similar grounds as the German

government: Not only that the ‘bloody massacre of Benghazi’ was averted ‘just in the nick of

time’. Crucially, the international community had to prove its very capability and legitimacy:

“To do otherwise would have completely undermined the United Nations risking it

becoming just another League of Nations. […] alongside the risks of action, we have

to weigh the risks of inaction. [Such as] [t]he sight of the international community

condemning violence but doing nothing to stop it.” (ibid.)

Again, Germany can be hardly linked to those who ‘averted the bloodbath’ and prevented the

UN from ‘becoming just another League of Nations’.

In contrast, the identities of France, Britain and the US were articulated in strong

equivalence. This was especially so for the former two. Cameron and Sarkozy issued their

first joint statement already on 28 February (AFP 2011c), followed by a joint letter to the

President of the European Council on 11 March (Cameron and Sarkozy 2011a), another joint

statement before the London conference on Libya on 28 March (Cameron and Sarkozy

2011b) and finally, the op-ed co-authored also by Barack Obama. In contrast, there was

neither a joint document of this kind Germany would co-author, nor a strong statement

highlighting the role of Germany as a partner vis-à-vis Libya. Whereas “Britain and France

39

[were] at the heart of this coalition” (Cameron 2011h), Germany stood aside. Emblematic in

this respect is Clinton’s (2011e) speech at the Paris conference on Libya on 19 March, which

articulates France and Britain as ‘key partners’, whilst Germany makes in only to the list of

‘our other partners’ – positioned alphabetically between Denmark and Greece.

The examination of French, British and American discourses thus shows that despite explicit

downplaying of any rifts and refraining from open criticism, Germany was indirectly linked

to narratives of irresponsibility and largely marginalised whilst others were praised.

Therefore, these discourses bear much resemblance to the International Responsibility

discourse, which, as I have demonstrated especially on the construction of the identity of

France, was in turn rich on references to dissatisfaction with Germany.

d) Discourses in interaction

The case study began by the examination of official articulations, which were subsequently

located into the wider context of domestic and international discourses. This very last section

will put the parts together and show how the discourses actually interacted with each other.

For now, I will resort to referring only to the centre of the web of identities I reconstructed –

the FP identity of Germany.

As stated earlier, my analysis builds on the assumption that FP officials are located in a large

number of discourses upon which their own articulations are drawing. To simplify the

complexity of the German discursive arena, I (re)constructed three basic discourses:

International Responsibility, Cautious Sovereignty and Pacifism. I also showed that the

international discourses articulated Germany’s identity – albeit indirectly – in a way that was

similar to that of International Responsibility. In turn, the International Responsibility

discourse explicitly drew upon international discourses in bringing ‘evidence’ for its

arguments – e.g. in the case of Sattar’s (2011e) use of Obama’s phrase in her critique that

was mentioned.

40

Now how did these discourses reflect themselves in that of the officials? In my reading, the

official articulations were drawing upon each of them. The transformations and supposed

inconsistencies and ‘crisis of identity’ resulted from this simultaneous engagement at a

moment when the discourses constructed identities differently. There was little tension both

in domestic and international arenas in the first weeks, as the push for sanction was easily

articulated in terms of responsibility, sovereignty and war avoidance at the same time. This

was no longer the case vis-à-vis the military option.

The initial official articulation of the abstention operated predominantly on the intersection

of the Pacifist and Cautious Sovereignty discourses: Germany’s identity was constructed as

‘not becoming a war party’ and ‘carefully taking a sovereign decision’. As this came under

pressure from the International Responsibility and international discourses, the official

articulations reached towards them both to deny some of their identity constructions

(Germany is ‘not isolated’) and to accommodate others into the official story (Germany ‘is

responsible and solidary’ and proves this even more by participating in the AWACS mission

in Afghanistan and EUFOR Libya).

A complex demonstration of the intertextual links could very well be the focus of another

dissertation and lies outside of my scope. Instead, I will show how articulations shaped by

these different discourses were simultaneously present on the example two key official texts

of the Foreign Minister: The parliamentary speech on behalf of the government in the

Bundestag on 18 March (Westerwelle 2011h) and the article written for the Süddeutsche

Zeitung, published on 24 March (Westerwelle 2011l).

The discourse of International Responsibility (and thereby also the logic of international

discourses) is referred to in both texts, similarly rejecting the criticism in the first part, in

order to bring own arguments subsequently. The former also articulates the AWACS mission

in terms of responsibility – notably, only few hours after the 1973 resolution passed in the

UN:

41

“It is not that Germany was not ready to assume its international responsibility.

Germany carries responsibility, for example in the fact that 7 000 German soldiers

serve in foreign missions of the Bundeswehr. [...] We will consider, ladies and

gentlemen, whether we concentrate our engagement accordingly. That means that

other questions which are on the agenda today, for instance the question of the

potential AWACS mission, must be discussed in NATO.” (Westerwelle 2011h,

emph. added)

“The core of the criticism goes: Germany isolated itself in foreign policy. Germany

failed in Alliance solidarity. Neither one nor the other is correct. [...] For us, inaction

is not the alternative to military attack. [...] We have pushed hard sanctions. We

prepare humanitarian aid.” (Westerwelle 2011l, emph. added)

The texts appear to be structured above all by the logic of Cautious Sovereignty that

highlighted independence and thorough consideration in decision making. The bottom line of

no drama’ in disagreement (and thus, equivalence in legitimacy) can also be read in both:

“We understand those who had honourable motives to call for an international

military action in Libya. We understand the desperation of many people in the region

in light of the development in Libya in the last days. However, the Federal

Government, in the face of substantial foreign policy and military risks, after

considerations in the Security Council, came to a different result.” (Westerwelle

2011h, emph. added.)

“[T]he decision regarding the secondment of own troops cannot be taken away from

any [NATO or EU] member state. Such decision cannot be adopted only on the

grounds that others have taken it too. Such decision must be taken only in an own,

careful considerations of pros and cons [...] That is what we did.” (Westerwelle

2011l, emph. added.)

Interestingly enough, the Foreign Minister refrained from the ‘slippery slope’ and ‘no war

with German soldiers’ articulations in these two texts. Nevertheless, the Pacifist discourse

slipped through the backdoor into the SZ article in dealing with the criticism of Joschka

Fischer:

“A former Foreign Minister, who sent as many soldiers to combat missions as no

other Foreign Minister before or since, denoted the abstention as ‘a scandalous

mistake.’” (Westerwelle 2011l, emph. added.)

Apparently, and with no regard of solidarity, responsibility, caution or sovereignty, Fischer

is disqualified from criticism due to sheer numbers of ‘soldiers sent to combat missions.’

This demonstration should help understand both the supposed contradictions in official

statements and ritual repetitions of the same phrases. The former can be seen as a result of

the effort to engage with multiple discourses simultaneously at a moment when they differ

42

rather strongly, whilst the latter as a way how to hold a hard-found position on their

intersection.

4. Conclusion

In this thesis, I set myself the twofold task of constructing a discourse theoretical framework

for analysing FP policy in Europe, and utilising it in a case study of Germany in the first two

months of the Libya crisis of 2011. I will use the following lines to address both parts in

turn, in order to summarize their main arguments and address some of the problems and

avenues for further research subsequently.

In the theoretical chapter, I grounded my approach in the Poststructuralist Discourse Theory

of Laclau and Mouffe. Equipped by the concepts of discourse and articulation, I reviewed

the poststructuralist and critical constructivist literature on the link between identity and

foreign policy to argue for my own, refined model. Identity was defined as an unstable

differential construction delineating the discursive being of a subject that needs to be

performed and constantly rearticulated and therefore, is in a way in a permanent ‘crisis’.

Foreign policy was outlined as a set of discursive practices that reproduce the identity of a

state. Rather than a ‘comprehensive’ national identity, I preferred to deal with a more limited

foreign policy identity, an issue specific construct articulated by FP practices.

Foreign policy officials were introduced as the ‘privileged storytellers’ positioned at sites of

power by deeply sedimented discourses, e.g. constitutional ones. Nevertheless, the official

discourse was at the same time analysed as entangled in a number of discourses from the

domestic arena, both structuring official articulations and having the capacity to challenge

them. In Europe, where intense interactions had led to the establishment of specific

discourses structuring practices such as interventions, articulations arising from this

international arena also had to be taken in account. In result, I offered a model that made FP

identity of a state the central nodal point around which the FP discourse could be

reconstructed. However, as other identities were articulated in FP discourse alongside

43

national ones with mutual relations presenting an important attribute of these identities, I

argued for incorporating these into the analysis as well, resulting in a web of identities.

In the latter part, I offered a case study of the Libya crisis, focusing on the construction of

the FP identity of Germany in the web of other identities. Analysing the official discourse, I

observed a profound change: In the first weeks, Germany was articulated as a leader of the

international community against Gaddafi, pursuing a tough approach based on sanctions.

However, once the military solution entered the discourses, Germany was constructed as

‘cautious’ and ‘reticent’, peaking in the abstention from the UN Security Council voting on

the 1973 resolution on the grounds that Germany would not participate in war. In the

aftermath, the official articulations made effort to reconstruct Germany as a ‘responsible’

partner, also the by revoking the earlier decision not to participate in the AWACS mission in

Afghanistan and the willingness to engage in a potential EU mission in Libya.

Whilst Guido Westerwelle was articulating a distinct personal identity of an active statesman

and ‘liberal Foreign Minister’ in the first phase, this largely disappeared from the discourse

in favour of the construction of the government as ‘united’ at a later stage. Collective

international identities were downplayed, whereas relations of equivalence with other nations

(especially the US and France) were articulated very often. Interestingly, the constructions of

Gaddafi (‘brutal dictator’) and ‘Libyan people’ (brave, equivalent to East Europeans in 1989)

were largely stable – also in other than official discourses.

In the domestic arena, three basic discourses were identified. The first of them, International

Responsibility, constructed Germany as irresponsible, isolated and harming its interests.

International identities were split – largely due to Germany’s role – and other nations

annoyed. To complete the gloomy picture, Westerwelle was articulated as incompetent,

inconsistent and focused on domestic politics. Second was the Cautious Sovereignty

discourse that articulated Germany’s identity in terms of sovereignty and careful

consideration of own interests, as well as exercising responsibility elsewhere and by other

44

means. It refused the dramatic nature of the situation – international partners were

constructed as understanding and respecting Germany’s position. The least visible was the

Pacifist Discourse arguing against war in principle. This discourse supported the abstention

and constructed positive identities of both Germany and the Foreign Minister right after the

voting. Nevertheless, it moved to criticisms later on as it articulated the AWACS solution

and the authorisation of the use of US bases in Germany as inconsistent with the pacifist

identities of both the Federal Republic and the Foreign Minister.

In the international arena, I observed that Germany was mentioned very scarcely and that

these occasions largely followed the diplomatic line similar to the German official and the

Cautious Sovereignty discourses. Resorting to a deeper analysis that considered also the

indirect articulations of Germany’s identity, however, I found a picture that was strikingly

similar to the International Responsibility discourse: Germany was largely marginalised, did

not figure in the strong links of equivalence articulated between France, Britain and the US

and was linked to narratives of irresponsibility.

There are two important issues that require further examination beyond the scope of the

dissertation. First of all, some domestic discourses may be very similar to international ones,

obscuring the argument about the need of the incorporation of the latter. Discourse analysis

cannot seek to ‘prove’ that the articulation of AWACS solution in terms of responsibility

responded rather to the constructions of domestic critics than that of Sarkozy’s when they

offer similar pictures. Explicit intertextual links with international discourses (‘I want to

respond to the critique of Sarkozy’) were absent, whilst implicit intertextuality (‘we are not

irresponsible’) pointed both ways. Undoubtedly, this is a problem that requires further

theorisation. For now, I offer an interim conclusion in the argument that international

discourses matter even in these cases as long as they are explicitly intertextually linked with

those of the opposition e.g. as providing ‘evidence’ for the critique and mirror the official

discourse – even without explicit linkage.

45

Second, what is the applicability and generalisability of my model? This paper is an initial

exploration and I cannot pretend to know the answer – it will be a matter for further

empirical research. Whilst staying with the claim that there is no simple and innocent

‘application’, I expect that the key tenets should work for the analysis of European states – at

least in terms of NATO and EU membership – when considering military action (I do not

dare speculate about other areas at this stage). Indeed, each state has its discourses structured

in a different way. However, there are at least two essential commonalities important for my

model: These states operate in the particular European discursive space as discussed earlier,

and they are all democracies that need to articulate their policies in public.

There are many ways how to extend the analysis, each of them valuable. Examination of

qualitatively different empirical material would add a new dimension as well as precise some

of my points. Ethnographic interviews would bring to light institutional micro-discourses.

Analysis of visual materials such as caricatures or photographs accompanying the news

articles would portray the context in a more comprehensive manner. A large space for

extending the scope is left in the international arena – calling for the incorporation of

newspaper discourses, as well as those of politicians of other countries, including non-

Western ones. Last but not least, both the case study and the theoretical model would benefit

immensely from a further comparison, both diachronic, looking at other cases of German FP,

and synchronic, analysing e.g. the French and British discourses.

46

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Westerwelle, G., 2011b. Rede von Außenminister Guido Westerwelle vor dem

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Westerwelle, G., 2011h. Regierungserklärung durch Bundesminister Westerwelle vor dem

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Westerwelle, G., 2011j. Rede von Außenminister Westerwelle vor dem Deutschen Bundestag

zum AWACS-Einsatz. 23 March 2011. Available at: <http://www.auswaertiges-

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Westerwelle, G., 2011k. Außenminister Westerwelle im SWR-Tagesgespräch zu Awacs und

Libyen. SWR, 23 March 2011. Available at: <http://www.auswaertiges-

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Westerwelle, G., 2011l. Außenminister Westerwelle in der Süddeutschen Zeitung zur Libyen-

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[Accessed 1 July 2012]

Westerwelle, G., 2011m. Rede von Außenminister Westerwelle vor dem Deutschen

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Westerwelle, G., 2011n. Außenminister Westerwelle im Interview mit RBB Inforadio zur

Lage in der arabischen Welt. Interviewed by Michael Castritius. RBB Inforadio, 25 March

2011. Available at: <http://www.auswaertiges-

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Westerwelle, G., 2011o. "Wir wollen keine Kampfeinsätze mit deutschen Soldaten in

Libyen". Interviewed by Peter Kapern. Deutschlandfunk, 12 April 2011. Available at:

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Westerwelle, G., 2011p. Ansprache von Außenminister Westerwelle zur Begrüßung der

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April 2011. Available at: <http://www.auswaertiges-

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[Accessed 1 July 2012]

Westerwelle, G., 2011q. Außenminister Westerwelle im Interview mit der Berliner

Zeitung/Frankfurter Rundschau zum NATO-Einsatz in Libyen. Interviewed by Damir Fras.

Berliner Zeitung and Frankfurter Rundschau, 14 April 2011. Available at:

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Westerwelle, G., 2011r. Laudatio von Außenminister Westerwelle auf Secretary of State

Hillary R. Clinton anlässlich der Verleihung des Walther Rathenau Preises in Berlin. 15

April 2011. Available at: <http://www.auswaertiges-

amt.de/DE/yyy_Archivlisten/ArchivPresse/BM-Reden/dyn_Liste_lang_node.html >

[Accessed 1 July 2012]

57

Plenary sessions of the German Bundestag

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Deutscher Bundestag, 2011b. Plenarprotokoll der 93. Sitzung von Donnerstag, dem 24.

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Deutscher Bundestag, 2011c. Plenarprotokoll der 95. Sitzung von Mittwoch, dem 16. März

2011. Available at:

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Deutscher Bundestag, 2011d. Plenarprotokoll der 97. Sitzung von Freitag, dem 18. März

2011. Available at:

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Deutscher Bundestag, 2011e. Plenarprotokoll der 98. Sitzung von Mittwoch, dem 23. März

2011. Available at:

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Deutscher Bundestag, 2011f. Plenarprotokoll der 99. Sitzung von Donnerstag, dem 24. März

2011. Available at:

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ml> [Accessed 7 July 2012]

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Deutscher Bundestag, 2011g. Plenarprotokoll der 100. Sitzung von Freitag, dem 25. März

2011. Available at:

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ml> [Accessed 7 July 2012]

Deutscher Bundestag, 2011h. Plenarprotokoll der 101. Sitzung von Mittwoch, dem 06. April

2011. Available at:

<http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/protokolle/plenarprotokolle/plenarprotokolle/index.ht

ml> [Accessed 7 July 2012]

Deutscher Bundestag, 2011i. Plenarprotokoll der 103. Sitzung von Freitag, dem 08. April

2011. Available at:

<http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/protokolle/plenarprotokolle/plenarprotokolle/index.ht

ml> [Accessed 7 July 2012]

Deutscher Bundestag, 2011j. Plenarprotokoll der 104. Sitzung von Mittwoch, dem 13. April

2011. Available at:

<http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/protokolle/plenarprotokolle/plenarprotokolle/index.ht

ml> [Accessed 7 July 2012]

Deutscher Bundestag, 2011k. Plenarprotokoll der 105. Sitzung von Donnerstag, dem 14.

April 2011. Available at:

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UK official discourse

Cameron, D., 2011a. Prime Minister’s Statement on Libya. 28 February 2011. Available at:

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2012]

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Cameron, D., 2011b. Statement from the PM on Japan and the Middle East. 14 March 2011.

Available at: <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news-type/speeches-and-transcripts/>

[Accessed 15 July 2012]

Cameron, D., 2011c. PM Statement on the UN Security Council Resolution on Libya. 18

March 2011. Available at: <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news-type/speeches-and-

transcripts/> [Accessed 15 July 2012]

Cameron, D., 2011d. Prime Minister’s Statement on Libya. 19 March 2011. Available at:

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2012]

Cameron, D., 2011e. PM Statement to the House on Libya. 21 March 2011. Available at:

<http://www.number10.gov.uk/news-type/speeches-and-transcripts/> [Accessed 15 July

2012]

Cameron, D., 2011f. Press Conference at European Council. 25 March 2011. Available at:

<http://www.number10.gov.uk/news-type/speeches-and-transcripts/> [Accessed 15 July

2012]

Cameron, D., 2011g. PM speech at London Conference on Libya. 29 March 2011. Available

at: <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news-type/speeches-and-transcripts/> [Accessed 15 July

2012]

Cameron, D., 2011h. Transcript of the PMs interview on situation in Libya. 13 April 2011.

Available at: <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news-type/speeches-and-transcripts/>

[Accessed 15 July 2012]

Cameron, D. and Sarkozy, N., 2011a. Letter from the PM and President Sarkozy to President

Van Rompuy. 11 March. Available at: <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news-type/speeches-

and-transcripts/> [Accessed 15 July 2012]

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Cameron, D. and Sarkozy, N., 2011b. Joint Statement on Libya by the PM and President

Sarkozy. 28 March 2011. Available at: <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news-type/speeches-

and-transcripts/> [Accessed 15 July 2012]

US official discourse

Clinton, H., 2011a. Holding the Qadhafi Government Accountable (Press Statement). 26

February 2011. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/index.htm>

[Accessed 15 July 2012]

Clinton, H., 2011b. Remarks at the Human Rights Council. 28 February 2011. Available at:

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/03/index.htm> [Accessed 15 July 2012]

Clinton, H., 2011c. Interview With Kim Ghattas of BBC. 16 March 2011. Available at:

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/03/index.htm> [Accessed 15 July 2012]

Clinton, H., 2011d. Interview With Wyatt Andrews of CBS. 16 March 2011. Available at:

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/03/index.htm> [Accessed 15 July 2012]

Clinton, H., 2011e. Press Availability at Chief of Mission Residence. 19 March 2011.

Available at: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/03/index.htm> [Accessed 15 July

2012]

Clinton, H., 2011f. Interview With Diane Sawyer of ABC News. 22 March

2011. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/03/index.htm> [Accessed 15

July 2012]

Clinton, H., 2011g. Remarks After the International Conference on the Libyan Crisis. 29

March 2011. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/03/index.htm>

[Accessed 15 July 2012]

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Clinton, H., 2011h. Remarks at the International Conference on Libya. 29 March 2011.

Available at: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/03/index.htm> [Accessed 15 July

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Clinton, H., 2011i. Remarks With Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini After Their

Meeting. 6 April 2011. Available at:

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Clinton, H., 2011j. Remarks With German Chancellor Angela Merkel Before Their Meeting.

14 April 2011. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/04/index.htm>

[Accessed 15 July 2012]

Obama, B., 2011a. Remarks on the Situation in Libya. 23 February 2011. The American

Presidency Project. Available at: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=89480>

[Accessed 15 July 2012]

Obama, B., 2011b. The President's News Conference With President Felipe de Jesus

Calderon Hinojosa of Mexico. 3 March 2011. The American Presidency Project. Available

at: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=89712> [Accessed 15 July 2012]

Obama, B., 2011c. The President's News Conference. 11 March 2011. The American

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Obama, B., 2011d. Remarks on the Situation in Libya From Brasilia, Brazil. 19 March 2011.

The American Presidency Project. Available at:

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Obama, B., 2011e. The President's News Conference With President Carlos Mauricio Funes

Cartagena of El Salvador in San Salvador, El Salvador. 22 March 2011. The American

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Obama, B., 2011f. Address to the Nation on the Situation in Libya. 28 March 2011. The

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Obama, B., 2011g. Remarks at the Dedication of the Ronald H. Brown United States Mission

to the United Nations in New York City. 29 March 2011. The American Presidency Project.

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Obama, B., Cameron, D. and Sarkozy, N., 2011. Libya's Pathway to Peace: Joint Op-ed by

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Agence France Presse (AFP)

AFP, 2011a. Kadhafi faces EU sanctions calls over 'bloodbath'. 23 February 2011.

AFP, 2011b. Obama, Sarkozy demand immediate end to use of force in Libya. 24 February

2011.

AFP, 2011c. Cameron, Sarkozy call for EU to up pressure on Libya. 28 February 2011.

AFP, 2011d. France working for Libyan no-fly zone: foreign minister. 5 March 2011.

AFP, 2011e. Sarkozy to meet Libyan opposition envoys. 9 March 2011.

AFP, 2011f. 'Kadhafi and his clique must go': Britain and France. 10 March 2011.

AFP, 2011g. Sarkozy threatens Libya air strikes: source. 10 March 2011.

AFP, 2011h. Sarkozy takes lead on Libya despite risk of EU rifts. 11 March 2011.

AFP, 2011i. France, Britain want strikes if Kadhafi bombs civilians. 11 March 2011.

63

AFP, 2011j. West heads divided into pivotal Libya crisis talks. 11 March 2011.

AFP, 2011k. France 'very clear' on UN mandate for Libya no-fly zone. 12 March 2011.

AFP, 2011l. France says Libya no-fly zone plan overtaken by events. 15 March 2011.

AFP, 2011m. G8 shies away from Libya intervention. 15 March 2011.

AFP, 2011n. France pleads to divided UN for Libya no-fly zone. 16 March 2011.

AFP, 2011o. Sarkozy asks UN Security Council to back Libya no-fly zone. 16 March 2011.

AFP, 2011p. NATO ready to back up Libya action in 'few days: France. 21 March 2011.

AFP, 2011q. Europe strives to bridge divisions over Libya. 24 March 2011.

AFP, 2011r. Germany slams 'dangerous' Sarkozy comments. 25 March 2011.

AFP, 2011s. France, Britain agree more Libya 'military pressure': source. 13 April 2011.

Der Spiegel

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F.A.Z., 2011d. Auch Berlin hält Flugverbotszone nun für zu riskant. Frankfurter Allgemeine

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nbu, 2011c. Nato uneins über militärischen Beitrag. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21

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nbu/cheh, 2011. EU fordert Gaddafi zum sofortigen Rücktritt auf. Frankfurter Allgemeine

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12 March, p. 1.

nbu/sat/anr, 2011. UN, EU und Nato beraten über Libyen-Sanktionen. Frankfurter

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Nm, 2011d. Strategische Geduld. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 April, p. 10.

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Süddeutsche Zeitung

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csc/chi, 2011. Libyen droht ein langer Bürgerkrieg. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 7 March, p.2.

csc/wtr, 2011. Nato erwägt Flugverbot über Libyen. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3 March, p.1.

dbr, 2011. Hilfe über die Hintertreppe. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8 April, p. 4.

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eli/wtr, 2011. Europa drängt UN zu Sanktionen gegen Gaddafi. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26

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Klüver, R. and Wernicke, C., 2011. Bombenstimmung. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8 March, p. 2.

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Stelzenmueller, C., 2011. Libyen, eine Deutschstunde. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15 April, p. 2.

SZ, 2011a. Gaddafi: Notfalls werde ich als Märtyrer sterben. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23

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SZ, 2011b. NATO warnt Libyen. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8 March, p. 1.1.

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Winter, M., 2011e. Der Westen isoliert Gaddafi. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 March, p. 1.

Winter, M., 2011f. Europa rückt von Militäreinsatz in Libyen ab. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12

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Winter, M., 2011j. Einsatzbefehl um Mitternacht. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 March, p. 7.

Winter, M., 2011k. Allianz auf dem Hochseil. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30 March, p. 4.

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