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The Bonn Institutions and ethnic diversity in Afghanistan. Has the Bonn process

alleviated problems of ethnic fragmentation in Afghanistan?

Introduction

1. Theoretical Foundations: Ethnic Fragmentation and Institutional models

- Ethnic Fragmentation

- Intuitional models

2. Ethnic Fragmentation and the Bonn Institutions: The case of Afghanistan

- Ethnic Fragmentation in Afghanistan

- Conflict resolution theory for Afghanistan

-What institutional approach was taken at Bonn?

3. Assessment: The Bonn Institutions - The Centralised state

- Religion, Human rights and Citizenship

-Electoral mechanisms and the National Assembly

4. Empirical Assessment: effects of the Bonn Institutions

- Statistical analysis

-Did it work? Is Fragmentation more or less evident?

-What those effects tell us about the theories

5. Conclusion

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Introduction

It is the objective of this paper to establish whether or not the Bonn institutions provide a

basis from which problems of ethnic fragmentation can be alleviated. The Bonn institutions

were set up in order to pursue state formation. The argument of this paper is that it will be

extremely difficult for these new institutions to gain political control, given Afghanistan’s

fragmented past (chapter 2). It is therefore essential to assess the impact of these institutions

on Afghanistan, first by outlining them and then by analysing their success at creating central

political authority and a cohesive state. Additionally, since the institutions have had time to

settle through both parliament and the president being in their second term of office, this

paper feels confident that it can identify what impact these institutions have had on ethnic

cohesion.

The main presumption of this paper is that Afghanistan’s new institutions will be an essential

first step for a transition to a stable democracy. Institutions often form the only platform on

which homogeneous groups can confer. It is therefore their primary objective to soften these

channels of communication to help manage divisions. This makes it important to assess these

institutions in divided Afghanistan to see whether they provide a basis for a cohesive state to

be established. Rubin highlights the importance of robust institutions as a critical part of

Afghanistan’s successful transition and warns policy makers from simply bringing past

offenders to justice. Rather, effective institutions will make these future offenders law bound1.

This paper therefore also assumes that acceptance, and thus legitimacy, by Afghans for the

Constitution will be a critical determinant of a successful transition. The paper also presumes

that, democracy is the best system of government, even in divided societies as it helps avoid

exclusion which is desirable to Afghans. Rustow argues that for a successful transition to take

place, national unity is vital2. Hence, successful transition is unlikely in a fragmented state

like Afghanistan and makes it important to assess to what extent these new institutions

alleviate ethnic divisions.

1 B. Rubin, Transitional Justice in Afghanistan (Feb. 2003)

http://www.soas.ac.uk/cccac/events/anthonyhyman/file25446.pdf [date accessed: 10.01.2012] 2 D. Rustow, Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model (Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Apr.,

1970)p.338

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My argument is based on that currently legitimacy and authority are held by the wrong people

and this will need to be dealt with before Afghans are ready to accept democratic debate and

openly try to overcome ethnic differences. This is best achieved through transparent power-

sharing mechanisms where ethnic groups can contest for power fairly. Traditionally, Afghans

saw local and often corrupt warlords as the main sources of authority. Authority and

legitimacy for the new institutions is only likely to develop in a situation where Afghan

factions don’t feel excluded from democratic debate in a transparent power-sharing arena

which avoids misrepresentation. Unfortunately, some of the new institutions only provide for

a strong, ‘winner takes all’ central system but not one based on organised groups contesting

for power. These institutions create fractionalisation by encouraging candidates to run neither

a moderate campaign, nor form coalitions. They can receive a legislative post by simply

attracting a small local vote. By preventing ethnic factions from forming and competing for

power in a consociational manner, continued exclusion is likely to occur preventing the

formation of an inclusive, cohesive state. The 2004 Constitution provides a basis for

unification through respect for human and minority rights.

Firstly, this paper looks to investigate the background and historical implications of ethnically

divided societies as well as ‘conflict resolution theory’. Chapter 2 looks to build on this by

studying these factors in the case of Afghanistan concluding in an outline of the Bonn

institutions. Exploring the divided nature of Afghanistan and institutional theory will give me

a good basis from which to identify and assess the Bonn institutions. Chapter 4 will follow on

from this by conducting a more in depth assessment of the implemented institutions in order

to establish whether they help alleviate ethnic tensions. The final chapter looks at the

consequences of the new institutions in order to see whether the framework has been

successful at alleviating ethnic fragmentation. It will do this by examining the most

heterogenic provinces and see how voter behaviour has changed over the 2 elections.

For the benefit of this analysis it is important to get an accurate reflection of the country’s

ethnic make-up. As there hasn’t been a national census it is difficult to estimate the ethnic

proportions of different provinces from data at hand. Afghanistan Information Management

Services provides the ethnic figures for each province. This will be particularly vital when

assessing presidential election statistics in the last chapter.

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1: Theoretical Foundations:

Ethnic Fragmentation and Institutional models

Rubin explains that “where the population is fragmented and not integrated into a single

national society, the state cannot represent a common interest3.” Many agree that ethnicity

represents the most difficult type of cleavage for a democracy to manage4’. During the last

decade of the 20th

Century 110 major armed conflicts were inflicted of which only 7 were

interstate conflicts. The other 103 are classified as civil wars, mostly focussed on ethnic

issues5. Clearly such internal conflicts act as a severe obstacle towards democracy.

Unsurprisingly, a majority of post-Cold war scholars have since stressed the positive

correlation between internal ethnic divisions and democratic instability.

The argument suggesting incompatibility of democracy in multiethnic states is not a new one,

as J.S Mill wrote “free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different

nationalities6”. It is therefore difficult to argue that ethnic divisions have a positive impact on

the prospect of democracy. What’s more, academic studies indicate that ethnic fragmentation

not only proves to be an obstacle to democratisation but also increase the potential of

conflict7. This phenomenon can increasingly be seen in newly independent Asian and African

states8, and explains why many of the most prominent democratisation scholars such as Dahl

emphasise the severe problem of “subcultural pluralism9” in these often already fragile states.

Nevertheless, despite these seemingly unanimous scholarly interpretations there is still some

debate on whether different levels of ethnic heterogeneity hinder or help democratic

development. Horowitz argues that certain compositions of ethnic plurality within transitional

states in fact encourage democratic development10

. If no single group is large enough to

dominate, alliances are formed and compromises made. This can be seen in multi ethnic India

3 B. Rubin,‘The Fragmentation of Afghanistan’ (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002)p. 15.

4 L. Diamond, and M. Plattner, eds., Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy (Baltimore and London: The

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994)p.XVII 5 P. Wallensteen & M. Sollenberg, “Armed Conflict, 1989-99“ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 5

(September 2000)p.2 6 J.S Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958[1861], p.230.

7 G. Almond, “Comparative Political systems,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 18 (1956)pp.391-409.

8 D. Low, Eclipse of Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni Press, 1991)pp. 272-3

9 R. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (new Haven, Conn.: Yale Uni Press, 1971) pp. 109-111.

10 D. Horowitz, “Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?” in Designing Democratic Institutions, Shapiro, I. and

Macedo, eds. (New York: New York University Press, 2000)p.10

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for example, which is rated as a ‘free’ democracy by freedom house11

today. A similar theory

is used to describe the unlikely success of democracy in Indonesia. In 2009, over 100 million

voters scattered across 920-plus permanently inhabited islands went to the voting booth on

Election Day12

, voting for moderate, all encompassing candidates. These recent studies

therefore show little evidence of a negative effect of ethnic diversity on stability13

. Reilly

notes the case of Papua New Guinea as another example of this14

. The debate concerning the

effect of ethnic fragmentation on democratic development therefore lives on.

Institutional models

To combat this issue of ethnic fragmentation scholars have put forward theories on which

institutional models should be based. Traditionally, ‘conflict resolution theory’ has been split

between Lijphart’s accommodationist, often referred to as consociational theory and

Horowitz’s integrationist or centripetalist model. The main difference between these two

theories is that Consociationalism argues that distributing power fairly and proportionally

between different groups is the correct approach for conflict resolution. Centripetalism

believes that different ethnic factions can be moderated by institutions incentivising < to fight

for the moderate voter. This can be achieved through second preference systems like AV,

while highly proportional systems encourage power-sharing and consociationalism.

Neither Lijphart nor Horowitz considers the other’s approach to have any merit in deeply

divided entities. Lijphart argues that centripetalism is unlikely to receive consent from

minority groups and, as such, is unlikely to be adopted anywhere, let alone in the cases of

deep division15

. He points to the power-sharing success of Belgium or Switzerland but also

notes failed cases such as the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia. Horowitz contends that

“consociational methods are inapt to mitigate conflict in severely divided societies [and] are

more likely the product of resolved struggles or of relatively moderate cleavages than they are

11

Freedom House, Map of Freedom in the World,

http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2011&country=8055

[date accessed: 07.12.2011] 12

L. Diamond, “Why Are there No Arab Democracies?”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 21, no. 1 (January

2010)p.97 13

J.Lane & S.Ersson, Comparative Politics, An introduction and a New approach (Cambridge Polity Press,

1994)p. 204 14

B. Reilly, ‘Democracy, Ethnic Fragmentation and Internal Conflict’ International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3

(2000-01) p. 184 15

A. Lijphart, Thinking About Democracy, (Rutledge, 2008)p. 279

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measures to resolve struggles and to moderate cleavages.16

” In Lijphart, it is the language of

consociational pluralism and its desire ‘to ‘‘share, diffuse, separate, divide, decentralise, and

limit power17

’’that holds firm. Horowitz criticises this ethos as idealistic, naive or

‘motivationally inadequate’. He questions why leaders of ethnic groups have an incentive to

cooperate and enter into power-sharing arrangements in the first place. Horowitz also

discusses the implications of a 60:40 ethnic population split creating tyranny of the majority

exacerbated by a firmly entrenched consociational model18

. If ethnic identities do prove to be

fluid, the best way to avoid tyranny of the majority is by encouraging integration through

moderation.

Relevant to this paper Kymlicka highlights a diverse society’s need for a shared identity. For

this end, Kymlicka recommends accommodation rather than subordination19

. More recently,

hybrid theories have been introduced to the debate. Pildes suggests a system which is

accommodationist in the beginning, becoming more integrationist during the states

evolution20

. A successful evolution can be seen in Iraq were initially non-Shiite minorities

would not have accepted a majoritarian system but did after a period of accommodation. For

Pildes, it is therefore vital to have institutions which are flexible and not set in stone, as inter-

ethnic relations are never static.

In terms of implementing an institutional model there is no panacea. Different divided

societies require different conflict resolution strategies and Afghanistan is likely to be no

exception. There is no doubt that ethnic fragmentation does present an obstacle to the

development of coherent institutions focussed on creating a cohesive state.

The next chapter will establish the extent to which Afghanistan is ethnically divided and from

this, assess the institutional model most suitable for Afghanistan. The chapter will conclude

by highlighting the institutional framework that came to bear following the Bonn Agreement.

16

G. Almond op.cit., p.256 17

A. Lijphart, Cited in Meyers, J.B. Rethinking ‘Constitutional Design’ and the Integration/Accommodation

Dichotomy (The Modern Law Review Limited vol. 73, Issue 4, 2010)p.34 18

D. Horowitz, “Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States,” William and

Mary Law Review 49, 4 (2008), pp.12-17 19

W. Kymlicka, ‘Multicultural Citizenship’ (Clarendon Press, 1995)p.189 20

R., Pildes, "Ethnic Identity and democratic institutions: A Dynamic Perspective" New York University,

2008)p.1

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2: Afghanistan, Ethnic Fragmentation and the Bonn institutions

Afghanistan is a nation-state with a diverse ethnic and tribal make-up that has attempted state

formation on numerous occasions over the years. The CIA estimates that its ethnic breakdown

is made up of 42% Pashtun, 27% Tajik, 9% Hazara and Uzbek, 4% Aimak, 3%

Turkmen, 2% Baloch, and 4%other and these are further divided into sub groups21

.

Pashtun political dominance has been a recurring theme throughout Afghanistan’s history

which has caused tensions with smaller, excluded ethnic groups. The Pashtuns have also been

in direct conflict with other major ethnic groups such as the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazara22

.

Ethnic groups often incorporate major tribes. These tribes have been in conflict with one

another for much of recorded history. Pashtuns officially stress the importance of tribal

structures which is evident from their references to Pashtunwali (Pashtun Tribal Code)23

.

Most of these have remained self-sufficient and autonomous, accepting central control only

when in their material interest or when faced with overwhelming force24

.

Thus, the underlying problem for Afghanistan’s governments has been their inability to create

a sense of genuine national unity in times other than during crisis25

. Max Weber premises that

only the state possesses sufficient national authority to make and enforce laws that are

universally binding. In this respect, Afghanistan has never had a central state strong enough to

penetrate the entire country. The underlying issue for Afghanistan’s governments has been

their inability to create a sense of genuine national unity in times other than during crisis. Roy

writes that a ‘process of ethnicisation’ has occurred since the end Soviet invasion in 1992.

Roy continues that “one’s allegiance belonged to the restricted group and tribal code, not to

the community or the state.26

” The issue of self-sufficiency and lack of central authority was

also reiterated after 200127

. It is difficult to argue that ethnic pluralism has done anything but

proved to be a severe obstacle towards democratisation. Most agree that tribal identity and

21

CIA ‘The World Factbook’ https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2075.html

[date accessed:05.12.11] 22

D. Young, ‘Overcoming The Obstacles to Establishing a Democratic State in Afghanistan’, (Carlisle, USAWC

2007) p. 10 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub818.pdf [date accessed:12.01.2012] 23

G. Rasuly-Paleczek, “The Struggle for the Afghan State: Centralization, Nationalism, and

their Discontents,” in ‘Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World. The Struggle for the Afghan

State’, eds. W. Van Schendel and E. J. Zurcher (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2001), p. 151. 24

J. Roberts, The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan (Praeger Publishers, 2003)p. XII. 25

J. Griffiths, Afghanistan: Key to a Continent (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981)p.78. 26

O. Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, Melbourne, and Sydney:

Cambridge University Press, 1990)p.13. 27

J. Roberts, ‘The origins of conflict in Afghanistan’(Greenwood Pub. Group, 2003) p.XXI

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loyalty are of paramount importance to the people living within the boundaries of modern day

Afghanistan28

. On several occasions in Afghanistan’s history, national boundaries have been

drawn and attempts made to create and stabilize a central government. These attempts have

failed, largely due to the resistance of and loyalty to local tribes and religious structures

already in place29

.

Contrary to this common view, Schetter argues that “most of those ethnic groups in

Afghanistan were shaped or even ‘created’ in the course of the 20th

century and are still not

the main references of identity in Afghanistan itself30

”, thus stressing the need not to

overemphasise the importance of ethnicity. Barfield agrees by pointing out that in spite of the

many differences dividing groups within Afghanistan; there is still a sense of “nation.31

Simonsen has noted the recent increase in salience of ethnicity, but emphasises the

importance of not institutionalising these differences via a consociational approach. The

conflict since 1992 has been essentially ethnically based, and the leaders of rival factions have

exploited ethnicity for their own personal gains he argues32

. More recently scholars of the

Afghan Study Group have concurred that ethnic divisions are not insurmountable noting the

additional importance of rural/urban and party sectarian divides in the conflict33

.

Nonetheless, this paper accepts the high salience of ethnicity within Afghanistan. Its internal

divides have led to, and have been caused by ethnic exclusion and persecution. In the short

term, whether ethnic and tribal groups in Afghanistan can put differences aside is highly

questionable, given the deeply divided society that exists within its ‘artificial’ boundaries. It is

therefore important that above all else, the new institutions should avoid subjugation which is

likely to occur through the implementation of a purely centripetal system.

28

L. Goodson, ‘Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban’

(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001)p.14 29

T. Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building after War,” (Central Asian

Survey, Vol. 25, March-June 2006) p.7 30

C. Schetter, Ethnicity and the Political Reconstruction in Afghanistan (ZEF, Bonn University, 2003)

http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/arg/arp/schetter.pdf [date accessed:05.04.2012]p.10 31

T. Barfield, ‘Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History’. (Princeton University Press, 2010) p. 27. 32

S. Simonsen "Ethnicising Afghanistan?: Inclusion and Exclusion in Post-Bonn Institution Building," Third

World Quarterly 25 (2004)pp.707-29 33

Afghan Study Group http://www.afghanistanstudygroup.org/ [date accessed 15.03.12]

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Institutional models for Afghanistan

In terms of institutional design, both mainstream theories outlined above have flaws when

implemented in Afghanistan.

The centripetal concern regarding the creation of zero-sum politics under entrenched

accommodation is not valid as there is no dominant ethnic faction within Afghanistan. Even

the dominant Pashtun faction is forced to some form of accommodation and power sharing as

it does not possess an overall majority.

Aiming for a fully accommodative strategy is also far from the perfect fit solution for

Afghanistan. As Shapiro notes, this would lead to a form of consensual democracy “in which

all major groups are represented in governing grand coalitions in proportion to their

numbers.34

” Afghanistan is home to small, distant tribes, which, as both Roy and Rasuly-

Paleczek argue, are of significant importance in Afghanistan. These are unlikely to receive

fair representation and would inevitably feel aggrieved and disaffected. Additionally, the

accommodative preference for a decentralised state is likely to be dangerous in the case of

Afghanistan as the analytical chapter will clarify. Thus, both theories have their drawbacks

when implemented in Afghanistan.

Although accommodationist institutions might exacerbate ethnic differences in the short term,

if institutions provide good governance with equal representation, then this is the easiest way

to build transparent communication channels between groups who need to talk35

. When

properly implemented they also avoid subjugation. Barry criticises this view and supports a

simple majoritarian system, suggesting that minorities would accept subjugation36

. This

cannot be expected from minority ethnicities in Afghanistan who, under the banner of the

Northern Alliance, played such a key role in ousting the Taliban from power.

As Pildes suggests, after a period of accommodative trust building, de-ethnicising of politics

can take place through integration and moderation. The assessment above has shown that

integration and moderation is unlikely in a country that currently suffers from deep divisions

like Afghanistan. A flexible, carefully considered, accommodative framework is likely to

stand the best chance of preventing short term disintegration in Afghanistan. Transparent, fair

34

I. Shapiro, Designing Democratic Institutions (New York university press)p.256 35

B. Reilly, & A. Reynolds, ‘Electoral systems and conflict in divided societies’ (National Academies

Press, 1999)p.4

36 B. Barry ‘The Consociational model and its dangers’ European Journal of Political Research (Vol 3, Is 4,

1975) pp 393–412

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and central power-sharing methods can foster ethnic cooperation and create cross-ethnic trust

for integration to take place in the long term.

The Bonn institutions

The Bonn Agreement set out the process for drafting the new 2004 Constitution and

implementing electoral systems in Afghanistan after the ousting of the Taliban in 2001.

This was ‘intended as a first step toward the establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive,

multi-ethnic and fully representative government37

’. Interim institutions certainly incorporated

ethnic diversity to reflect this intention. However the permanent institutions that sprang up as

a result are incoherent in terms of institutional design.

Some aspects encourage a ‘winner takes all’ majoritarian system, whilst avoiding power-

sharing and the institutionalisation of ethnicity. This can certainly be seen in the strong

powers allocated to the president and the banning of political parties from forming along

ethnic lines. This aspect of the institutions does not equally and openly reflect the ethnic

realities of Afghanistan. Hence, they serve as an obstacle to the legitimacy of those

institutions, and thus for state stability and cohesion. A potential threat to central legitimacy

can also be identified with the formation of a centralised political system rather than one

focussed on regional power-sharing.

In terms of religion and human rights; liberal consociationalism was adopted as on the face of

it, the new Constitution provides protection for religious groups and the moderation of Islamic

law.

The next chapter will assess Afghanistan’s new institutional model in detail to establish what

impact they have on ethnic fragmentation. The final chapter will assess its effects which

should go some way to establishing whether my hypothesis of promoting flexible

accommodation is a plausible option in the quest to alleviate ethnic fragmentation.

37

‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent

Government Institutions

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4. Assessment: The Bonn Institutions

The Centralised State

On the face of it, a ‘unitary and indivisible’ state is a vital stepping stone towards integration

of all ethnic and tribal factions within Afghanistan.

Initially, there seemed to be considerable divergence in opinion regarding the structure of the

state and the delegation of power and authority. Afghan born Nazif Shahranifor for example

was in favour of a “decentralized democracy based on community self-government.38

” This

bears a resemblance to the federal system that received much attention during the institution

making process. To add to this, the Junbish party under General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a

predominantly Uzbek group and the Hazara dominated Hizb-i Wahdat party initially evinced

support for a less-defined federalism39

. This was in contrast to Pashtun and Tajik support for a

strong central government.

The “centralisers” eventually won this argument, and Article 1 of the Constitution specifically

states that:

“Afghanistan shall be an Islamic Republic, independent, unitary and indivisible state.40

”

Regardless of the early cross ethnic debate on the structure of state power and authority, as the

ICG points out, the only groups and individuals who supported federalism in any form were

those who stood to gain from it. Even Hizb-i-Wahdat leaders Khalili and Muhaqiq later

changed their position and expressed modified priorities: “the main thing is for all the

different ethnic groups to be satisfied, whether the government is local or in the centre41

”.

Thus, there seems to be a cross ethnic consensus amongst Afghans that after deliberations

article 1 of the new Constitution can go some way to soften ethnic divisions, providing central

governing is conducted on a level and transparent political playing field. This is the only way

38

B. Rubin, H. Hamidzada, and A. Stoddard, “Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond: Prospects for Improved Stability,”

Report, (Afghanistan, 23 February 2005)p. 8 39

B. Rubin and A. Malikyar, “The Politics of Center-Periphery Relations in Afghanistan”, Center for

International Cooperation, (New York University, March 2003)p. 15 40

The 2004 Afghan Constitution http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html [date

accessed:02.10.11] 41

ICG interview with UN staff, Mazar-i Sharif, April 2003

http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/icg/afghanistanflawedconstitutionalprocess.pdf [date accessed: 04.02.12]

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central government will be perceived as legitimate in all strands of Afghanistan’s diverse

society in the long term.

Although this consensus might exist amongst most Afghans there is a wide plethora of

academics who stress that Afghanistan would be well suited to a federal system. David

Cameron noted that Afghanistan “looks like a perfect candidate for federalism.42

” Hale

concurs by suggesting that presidential centralization is poorly adapted to Afghan realities,

which would better accommodate either a federal republic or a parliamentary system. He

concludes that federalism best favours the multi-ethnic makeup of Afghan society by reducing

tensions that are normally present between geographically concentrated groups and allows

them to decide their own fates43

. On the face of it, these views can easily be sympathised with

as Afghans have always resisted central control. Both Roy and Rasuly-Paleczek stress the

reluctance of Afghans whose “allegiance belonged to the restricted group and tribal code, not

to the community (ethnic) or the state.44

” These scholars hold that the central government

does not exercise effective control over most of the country’s territory, which is in the hands

of a patchwork of regional commanders, the majority of whom are loosely affiliated with one

or other mujahidin party.

In the case of decentralisation, if ethnic areas roughly correlate with geography, then

administration and districting of these areas can be designed to reflect that. Federalism in

theory would have given policy makers the opportunity to structure different levels of

authority and representation (both national and sub-national) to the realities of the pluralistic

state.

However this would not have been a simple task. The main challenge of creating such a

system of ‘flexible federalism’ is the requirement of distinguishing between territorial and

non-territorial ethnic diversity. No province in Afghanistan is ethnically homogenous and the

various population groups are very difficult to site geographically, let alone separate into

autonomous entities. Realistically, it would be impossible to divide Afghanistan along ethnic

lines and deciding which group deserves which province will inevitably spark conflict. The

tribal and local village groups feel a very strong bond to the geographical area that they

42

K. Adeny, ‘Constitutional Design and the political salience of “community” identity in

Afghanistan’(California University Press2008)p.542 43

H. Hale, “The Federal Option for Afghanistan,” Policy Brief (New York: East West Institute) 1, no.7

(November 2002)p.3 44

O. Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press, 1990)p 13

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inhabit. Success in defusing Afghanistan’s tensions will reside in the creation of transparent,

unitary, power sharing and conflict resolution institutions. This success cannot be achieved by

separating Afghanistan’s ethnic and tribal groups into areas with independent jurisdiction over

governance and lifestyle. Ethnic geographical desires can be addressed and tensions defused

by allowing the local populace to attain and live in their chosen area but still feel a sense of

national identity. Under firm decentralisation groups could be split into an entity to which

they don’t feel culturally connected or even suffer from persecution.

It is critical that Afghanistan is capable of distributing foreign aid in an equitable manner that

leaves no room for claims of ethnic favouritism. These tasks are likely to ignite ethnic

divisions which would be exacerbated in a non-unitary system. As a result federalism would

significantly increase the risk of national disintegration45

. Approaching the argument from the

opposite angle Bermeo argues that “federalism provides more layers of government and thus

more settings for peaceful bargaining” in plural societies. Therefore federalism could have

provided a better platform for frequent inter-ethnic bargaining which,, over time, would

undoubtedly alleviate ethnic tensions. Bermeo also agrees with Lijphart’s claim that

federations can produce stability. Although Bermeo does not focus specifically on the merits

of federalism in Afghanistan, she does produce empirical evidence that suggests that

federalism has proved successful in relatively wealthy states46

. Afghanistan does not meet this

criterion, possessing a GDP per capita of just $100047

. Federalism, according to Bermeo’s

condition is therefore not suited to Afghanistan.

Regardless of these often well justified counter-arguments to a strong centralised Afghanistan,

it should ultimately be left to Afghans themselves to decide. As Afghans have shown desire

for a strong central government, this is what should be implemented. Elazar recognised this

vital condition when he wrote “The federal process requires a sense of partnership48

”. From

this, one can conclude that regardless of the arguments provided by the likes of Hale,

federalism cannot be imposed if it does not summon an indigenous consensus. To underline

this vital point, the word federal is derived from the Latin term ‘foedus’ meaning covenant or

45

C. Johnson, W. Maley, A. Their and A. Wardak, “Afghanistan’s political and constitutional development”,

(Overseas Development Institute , 20 January 2003)p. 20 46

Bermeo, N. “The Import of Institutions: A New Look at Federalism.” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April

2002)p. 99 47

CIA The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html [date

accessed 02.02.2012] 48

D, Elazar. Exploring Federalism, (University of Alabama Press, 1987)p.67

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compact. As Bermeo points out, covenants have to be voluntary49

. Bermeo also provides

convincing empirical evidence that indicates that when federalism is exogenously imposed it

will unavoidably fail50

. Therefore, as most Afghans rejected federalism in the drafting period

its implementation would inevitably have lead to disintegration which would further spark

cross-ethnic fragmentation.

For this reason the 1st Article of the 2004 Constitution goes some way to softening ethnic

tensions as it encourages cross-ethnic cooperation and negotiation rather than separation.

Afghanistan’s borders may be ‘artificial’ imperial ones, but identities are to some extent,

flexible and can form around transparent central power-sharing institutions. Afghanistan’s

unitary government is desirable to Afghans which could help prevent ethnic disintegration.

However unity can only be achieved if central government can provide good, transparent and

proportional governance to all segments and ethnicities in its state in the future.

49

N. Bermeo, ‘The Import of Institutions cited in Democracy: A Reader’, L Diamond, & M. Plattner (eds.) (The

John Hopkins University Press, 2009)p.178 50

Ibid. p.179

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The role of Islam and Human rights

As Roy rightly notes “where the state is seen as external to society and where people’s

allegiance is directed primarily towards their local community, the only thing which all

Afghans have in common is Islam51

”. Thus, it makes sense to fully incorporate Islam into the

Constitution as this in turn could go some way to incorporating Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic

groups under the universal banner of Islam. Naby agrees that Islam can unite Afghanistan52

.

The majority of Afghans are Sunni Muslim, but a minority of Shia Muslims also inhabit the

country. This disparity adds another element of prejudice, segregation, and source of possible

conflict to the already complicated task of unifying Afghanistan. It is thus important to

enshrine Islam thoroughly and also make sure it is done so in a broad way.

This has been achieved as Afghanistan’s new Constitution is a thoroughly Islamic

Constitution. Islam is incorporated into 14 of its 162 articles. However, the role of Islam has

changed in the new Constitution. The official name of the state was extended by adding

‘Islamic’ to the ‘Republic of Afghanistan’. More importantly the Constitution enshrined that

‘no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam’. This

contrasts with the 1964 Constitution which claimed that ‘Islam is the sacred religion of

Afghanistan. Religious rites performed by the state shall be according to the provisions of the

Hanafi doctrine.’ Thus, the 1964 Constitution placed emphasis on the Sunni Hanafi sect of

Islam, which marginalised about 20% of the population. The predominately Shi’ite Hazara

minority suffered from exclusion and persecution as a result. This legal alienation of a

significant indigenous group is bound to emphasize ethnic divisions in the future and partially

explains Afghan ethnic fragmentation of the past.

This kind of religious exclusion was not included in the 2004 Constitution. Article 2

emphasises that ‘followers of other religions are free to exercise their faith and perform their

religious rites within the limits of the provisions of law.’ Thus, on paper, the new Constitution

provides a platform for religious equality and inclusion. Whether this persecution can be

prevented in a country where local powerbrokers still hold much authority is questionable.

Nevertheless this aspect of the Constitution does go some way in alleviating ethnic divisions

through religious moderation.

51

O. Roy, op.cit., p.30 52

E. Naby, “The Changing Role of Islam as a Unifying Force in Afghanistan,” in The State, Religion, and

Ethnic Politics of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, (ed) Banuazizi Weiner (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,

1996)p. 149

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16

After studying the new Constitutions in more detail it becomes evident that there is still cause

for concern and a hint of the Hanafi doctrine. Article 130 articulates that whenever no

provision exists or the laws for a case under consideration, the court shall follow the

provisions of the Hanafi jurisprudence. Additionally Article 3 states that ‘in Afghanistan, no

law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam’. This is

certainly a cause for concern as the court has been known to be dominated by conservatives.

Deputy Supreme Court Justice Fazel Ahmad Manawi has advocated that Sharia be the sole

source of law, a very restrictive position that would extinguish most efforts at moderation and

toleration53

.

Nonetheless, this was rejected and the Constitution has made it clear that when dealing with

personal matters involving Shi’ites, courts must apply Shia jurisprudence, thus being

accommodative and flexible. Moreover, although a presidential candidate still has to be

Muslim, the Constitution contrasts to previous ones in that he is no longer required to be a

Sunni Hanafi devotee. There is no explicit declaration of equality between religions; indeed,

article 2 states that “followers of other religions are free to exercise their faith and perform

their religious rights within the limits of the provisions of the law.” Such “limits and

provisions” could be construed as sanctioning discrimination.

Articles 72 and 118 necessitate incoming Ministers and Supreme Court justices to have a

“good reputation.” This normative statement does not quantify what a good reputation entails

and it is therefore likely that this will be measured against those who hold views contrary to

the majority Islamic establishment. These articles contradict the Constitutions commitment to

human rights and equality also mentioned above and shows that Afghanistan is far from a

liberal state in de jure terms.

Nonetheless, it is a step in the right direction as although it indicates that equality of religions

will not be upheld, near to 100% of Afghans follow Islam and thus, this article will not lead to

large scale discrimination and/or disintegration. As a result, it can be concluded that the de

jure institutionalisation of religious freedoms and human rights have come a long way in the

new Constitution. Toleration of minority Islamic groups has put Afghanistan in good stead to

softening its diverse cleavages in the future. Other religions are still not treated in an

53

.Judge Fazel Ahmad Manawi “Islam only source of law in Afghanistan”, (The Independent Bangladesh, 4

May 2003)

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egalitarian way. Formerly prosecuted ethnic Islamic groups like the Hazara stand a better

chance of being tolerated and thus should find it easier to integrate.

The Afghan Constitution of 2004 entrenched the AIHRC (Afghan Independent Human Rights

Commission). Consequently, many hailed the Constitution as a triumph for human rights.

The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan labelled it "one of the most enlightened Constitutions in

the Islamic world54

" and Karzai called it "the most enlightened in that part of the world.55

"

Under Article 7, “the state shall abide by the UN Charter, international treaties and

international human rights conventions that Afghanistan has signed and the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights.”

Historically, having a state with such a religiously conservative society could prove to be

counterproductive if it aims to mirror a liberal western society. Although many consider

giving people social liberties to be righteous, it is important, as Aristotle claims, to focus on

what is possible under the prevailing circumstances not necessarily what is best56

. For this

reason the new Constitution seems a more realistic stepping-stone but it is again important to

introduce amendments in future when necessary.

In terms of citizenship “the word Afghan shall apply to every citizen of Afghanistan” and the

defence of the Afghanistan is the responsibility of all citizens. Through this, the Afghan

institutions are broadening its acknowledgment and inclusion of ethnic and tribal identities.

By listing the different languages and ethnicities considered “Afghan” inclusion and tolerance

is being promoted. Article 4 mentions every major Afghan tribe which gives it an air of

pluralism while Article 20 states that the tribal names are to be mentioned in the national

anthem. Diamond notes that in areas that suffer from strong ethnic cleavages: “the overriding

imperative is to avoid broad and indefinite exclusion from power of any significant group.”

Article 6 adheres to this by codifying the egalitarian treatment of, “all ethnic groups and

tribes.” As with previous Constitutions, the 2004 Constitution recognised Pashto and Dari as

the official languages but also, for the first time stated that any other major spoken language

in the area in which it is spoken as the third official language (Article 16).

54

UN Envoys Welcome Afghan Constitution, OUTLOOK INDIA (Jan. 5,

2004), at http://news.outlookindia.com/items.aspx?artid=192469. 55

Bush: Afghanistan Is a Victory Over Terrorism, CNN.COM (June 15,

2004), http://edition.cnn.com/2004/US/06/15/karzai/index.html 56

Aristotle, The Politics, trans, and ed. E. Barker(Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 155-6

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18

In de Jure terms, this aspect of the 2004 Constitution goes a long way to promote a country

with firm and equal human rights. This is a vital foundation from which, in the long term,

unification of diverse groups can take place.

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Electoral Mechanisms and the National Assembly

Reilly and Reynolds find that the choice of electoral system can have an impact on the

prospects of violent conflict in plural societies like Afghanistan. However they also agree that

there is no panacea57

. Hence, it makes sense to examine Afghanistan’s electoral system to

establish whether it has a softening impact on ethnic fragmentation in Afghanistan. Electoral

systems have long been regarded as an instrumental institutional mechanism that can be

imperative in alleviating ethnic fragmentation. There seems to be a consensus that due to

“fractionalised nature of Afghan politics, the primary goal should be to produce

proportionality”58

. Tsebelis on the other hand argues that proportional arrangements may

serve to reinforce and perpetuate rigid segregation along narrow ethnic-cultural, religious and

linguistic cleavages59

.

Afghanistan adopted Single Non Transferable Vote (SNTV) as the mechanism for its

elections to its lower house legislature. Most consider it to be a semi-proportional system

which combines multimember districts with a First Past the Post method of vote counting.

Each voter casts one vote for many seats; and the candidates with the most votes win and take

up the available seats allocated to that province. It was hoped that under SNTV Afghanistan's

lower house elections will provide broad and equal representation of Afghanistan's diverse

ethnic groups.

When SNTV was chosen as ‘the least bad system’ because the drafting executive considered

it well suited to Afghanistan. It was easy to understand and administer with a simple balloting

method, which would play into the hand of generally poorly educated Afghans who lacked

experience with voting. This is an imperative first step to encourage broad inclusion with the

population buying into a system which they understand. A complex system on the other hand

would only serve to confuse Afghans and slow down the democratic learning process. In

addition, SNTV increases accountability, as individuals vote for a certain candidate and

thereby believe they have a vested interest in the system. As with the Westminster system, it

seems to provide a link between these distant tribal voters and their representatives, which if

57

B.Reilly and Reynolds, Electoral systems and conflict in divided societies (National Academies Press,

1999)p.x 58

C. Johnson, et al., “Afghanistan’s Political and Constitutional Development” (Overseas development Institute,

2003)p.7 59

G. Tsebelis, ‘Elite interaction and constitution building in consociational democracies’, (Journal of

Theoretical Politics, 2 (1), 1990) pp 5–29

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20

accurate can help form a connection to the central state and make Afghanistan less

fragmented.

Contrary to this, there is a concern that in vast constituencies, politicians have widely varying

mandates and will find it difficult or confusing to represent these large geographical areas.

Many officials do not feel connected to tribes within their constituency and vice versa.

Representatives don’t go beyond the provincial level and have little connection to local

groups and thus they feel their views are not adequately represented.

The SNTV system has several other drawbacks which could make it ineffective at producing

a cohesive state. In terms of national results, although benefiting minority candidates, it does

not ensure a fully proportional outcome. Hence, it contradicts what the Constitution demands,

which is a proportional legislature. In the case of having one particularly popular choice or

many different contenders for seats within a constituency, candidates could receive a seat with

a low vote count beating many others with few, spread out votes. Those elected on few votes

are put in office by chance or even worse, resulting from manipulation as even a small swing

in votes can have a significant impact on the electoral outcome. For those elected on few

votes, there was little incentive to form broad coalitions or move beyond ethnic or local

interests in their constituency60

. Rather than promoting broad-based constituencies SNTV

encourages candidates to appeal to small ethnic or tribal groups. This could be a recipe for

disintegration as it is unlikely that significant factions will be able to exert power within the

new National Assembly. A less divisive, more representative system is required in

Afghanistan.

It is therefore understandable why analysts argue that SNTV will lead to an unrepresentative

assembly of local powerbrokers, with no incentive to cooperate and neglect issues of national

importance. As long as they have a sound core vote, they can win seats without needing to

appeal to outsiders. The system is neither consociational nor centripetal as it is not nationally

proportional or gives candidates the incentive to fight for the moderate voter. However having

a constituency link, if well regularly included, could serve to involve Afghanistan’s periphery

in the central political process. Disaffected tribes could thus find central representation of

some sort but is unlikely to cause an all-encompassing national identity. Regional leaders are

likely to pursue their local interests.

60

D. Farrell, Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction: (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001)p.45

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Article 35 of the Constitution recognises that “the citizens of Afghanistan have the right to

form political parties in accordance with the provisions of the law”, provided that they are not

ethnic or tribal in agenda or membership.

However, SNTV encourages individuals to run in the multimember constituencies as the

system discriminates against large ethnic parties which are in danger of splitting their

supporters if they put up more than one candidate per constituency. There is also no mention

of party affiliation on the ballot.

Wilder argues that “the absence of strong and effective political parties to help organize the

politics of the highly fragmented legislature increases the likelihood of paralysis.61

” Lipset has

called political parties “indispensable” in democracies by recalling E.E. Schattschneider’s

famous pronouncement that “modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties.62

”

Many Afghans have shown concern, especially in the years following the ousting of the

Taliban, that political parties might empower ethnic actors or warlords more than reformists,

technocrats, or individuals with a national agenda63

. This concern of instability and insecurity

derives from Afghans associating parties with both the Communists who brought in the

resented Soviet invaders and ethnic militias groups that plundered the country after the Soviet

downfall. Taking this recent history into consideration it is understandable why Afghans are

weary about party formation. If ethnic ties can be overcome, it is likely that a party based

system at this stage would only serve to further entrench ethnic ties as parties are likely to

form along ethnic regional or sectarian lines leading to factional strife. However ethnic ties

are unlikely to be surmounted at this stage.

Given that no one ethnic group has a majority in either house or indeed in terms of estimated

population; continuous accommodation through compromise will have to occur regardless.

Additionally, party infrastructure and debate can be a means of providing voter education or

facilitate guidance for the political system. Strong ethnically based parties can highlight and

contest policies of national interest publicly, engaging and educating a population that has low

democratic experience and literacy. Having a system which encourages individual-centric

politics is expected to lead to further parliamentary and national instability and public

disaffection from central politics.

61

A. Wilder, “A House Divided? Analyzing the 2005 Afghan Elections” (AREU, 2005)p. 44. 62

E. Schattschneider, ‘Party Government’ (Transaction Publishers, 1942)p.1 63

R. Neumann, The Other War: Winning and Losing in Afghanistan (Potomac Books, 2009),pp. 18-20

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22

Hence, the Constitution is wrong to discourage party formation and prevent groups from

forming along ethnic lines. It would provide an incentive for Afghans to participate in an

equal and ethnically representative political process on the national stage. Malley takes note

of this by stressing the importance of ethnic grievances being articulated and addressed on a

level Constitutional playing field64

. This means that minority groups like the formerly

persecuted Hazaras can become a significant political player and provide a platform from

which, gradually, the salience of ethnicity in the political process can be diminished through

cross-ethnic accommodation, being replaced by parties formed on political ideology.

Article 82 provides for a bicameral National Assembly (NA) made up of an upper house or

House of Elders (Meshrango Jirga) and lower house or House of the People (Wolesi Jirga).

Since the Constitution demands a representative legislature it is imperative to evaluate to what

extent this institution holds the strong executive to account, by receiving important law-

making, representative and oversight functions.

Article 92 gives the power of no-confidence voting to the lower house. Article 111gives the

power of Constitutional alterations and impeachment of the President to an enshrined Loya

Jirga. Its body includes all the institutions of the state, but the NA is the only body with

voting rights. It is recognised as “highest legislative organ” in Article 81 representing the will

of Afghans. It achieves this through executive oversight, as the president must go receive NA

approval on fundamental state policies. Legislative veto powers are given to the President

(Article 94). Despite this, it is the first Constitution to provide checks on presidential power as

the Wolesi Jirga can review and pass legislation without presidential consent providing it has

2/3 approval. To add to this the more ethnically inclusive Loya Jirga can amend the

Constitution. Article 117 requires lower house endorsement of the Presidents selection of

Supreme Court selections. In the event that the lower house is suspicious of any member of

the cabinet, only 20 percent of house has to propose an inquiry, but a majority has to vote for

their dismissal. The Constitutional and legislative amendment process is meant to be a

64 W. Malley, “Interpreting the Taliban”: Afghanistan and the Taliban: the rebirth of fundamentalism? (Hurst &

Co. Publishers , 1998)pp. 4-7

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difficult process by including all political spheres is the process (Article 149& 150) so as to

prevent governments from changing laws at will.

Historically the politically dominant Pashtun faction often excluded minority ethnicities from

power causing ethnic friction. As the new Constitution states that the lower house should be

elected "in proportion to population" the legislature, if given adequate powers, can fairly

reflect the views of all ethnicities and hold the ruling elite to account.

If this aspect of the Constitution is reflected in the legislature, one can expect legislative

factions to become multi-ethnic and become one of many factors that cause political

competition and thus alleviate ethnic fragmentation amongst elites eventually filtering down

to the population.

However, this is an idealistic prediction as SNTV is likely to cause the election of local

conservative powerbrokers with tribal agendas which will make sure that Afghans remain tied

to their clan, even if their ethnic faction is proportionately represented. SNTV does not

completely exclude minorities but does so more so than a purely PR system and thus causes

misrepresentation that is likely to aggrieve underrepresented ethnic factions.

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Statistical analysis and evaluation:

Since the recent 2009 election, it is possible to make an educated estimate how the salience of

ethnicity amongst Afghans has changed. This can be done by assessing the trend of ethnic

census votes by comparing the 2004 and 2009 presidential election results. As mentioned in

chapter one, estimates of ethnic proportions are unlikely to be 100% accurate as the figures

were not sourced from a reliable national census. Afghanistan Information Management

Services provides accurate ethnic data for each province and will be used65

.

The Constitution requires that elections be administered by an Independent Electoral

Commission (Article 156). Its independence should avoid bias and consequently, this paper

will rely on the commissions electoral figures for both elections in 200466

and 200967

to

compile the statistical analysis. In order to better illustrate its point this paper uses maps of

Afghanistan reflecting ethnic demographics. It also presents maps indicating provincial voting

preferences in 2004 and 2009 (page 32).

It is not possible to definitively declare that people of one ethnicity are or are not voting for

their same ethnicity. However by having reasonably accurate provincial ethnic population

estimates, as well as trustworthy election results it is possible to approximate the extent to

which the salience of ethnicity has changed through voting behaviour.

I will look at some of the most heterogenic provinces and see how voter behaviour has

changed over the 2 elections.

When looking at the IEC data presented for the first presidential election results confirmed the

fear that voting would conform to entrenched ethnic biases regardless of institutional changes.

Votes cast mirrors ethnic make-up almost 1-to-1 in both elections. Clear cut margins were

reflected across Afghanistan particularly if the province consisted of a large majority single

ethnic group. In 2004 particularly, electoral partition fell along ethnic lines. Seven provinces

saw more than 90% of their vote going to one candidate. In each of these provinces, the same

65

Afghanistan Information Management Services , Provincial demographic data:

http://www.aims.org.af/Afghanistan-Regional-Maps.html [date accessed:12.01.2012] 66

2004 Afghan election results, published by the IEC

http://www.iec.org.af/Public_html/Election%20Results%20Website/english/english.htm [date

accessed:15.03.2012] 67

2009 Afghan election results, published by the IEC http://www.iec.org.af/results_2009/ [date

accessed:17.03.2012]

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proportion or more belonged to one ethnicity indicating to what a large extent ethnicity was a

vote winner in 2004.

Mohaqiq, a leading figure of the Hazara faction received barely a tenth of the total vote.

However, in Hazara dominated Bamyan province (67.4% Hazara) he secured 76% of the vote.

In the neighbouring Daikondi he won a staggering 84% approval; a province consisting to

86% of Hazaras.

In 2009 by contrast, the main Hazara candidate fighting for nomination Bashardost received,

it would appear, votes on other grounds than ethnicity. Bashardost defied the odds in Ghazni,

his home province, garnering 61.1% of the vote, despite Hazaras only making up an estimated

30% of the population indicating that Bashardost won over double the vote he should have

done. 2009 Runner up Abdullah achieved a similar feat in Jawzjan. Bashardost managed to

cling on to the Hazara stronghold of Daikondi but failed to secure Bamyan Province receiving

only 38.8% to Karzai’s 39.1%, again defying the provinces ethnic make-up. Overall, the

Hazara vote increased by

This trend is mirrored across many Afghan provinces where results were not as clear cut,

regardless of how dominant one ethnic faction was. In the province of Paktia, Karzai received

95.9% of the vote (91% Pashtun majority) whereas in 2009 he got 71.6% support. Similarly

the homogeneous Lagham and Paktika provinces votes for Pashtun candidates reduced by

10.2% and an astounding 33.4% respectively. Thus, in both cases minority candidates were

able to gain votes against the odds.

In 2004 Kundus ratio votes to Pashtun candidates was almost 1-to-1 and this fell by almost

half in 2009. Abdullah evidently profited from Pashtun votes as he received 40% more votes

than the proportion of his ethnicity in Kundus. Subsequently, Abdullah defied the odds and

took Kudus off Karzai. For ethnic Tajik’s who voted, the salience of ethnic affiliation also

seems to have weakened. In Tajik dominated Panjshir, 95% of the vote went to the Tajik

Qanooni with Karzai receiving a meagre 0.8%. This changed dramatically in 2009 as Tajik

Abdullah could win only 68.7%, Karzai making up ground by winning 30.3% of the vote.

Of the seven most ethnically homogeneous provinces mentioned above it has proven to be

less of a safe haven, 5 years on. Kandahar is another example of this where Karzai’s vote in

was reduced from 91% to 73.8%. Nonetheless, as Kandahar is a Taliban stronghold, not too

much should be read into these figures. The Taliban which is mainly Pashtun, reiterate that

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voting in the election will be punished by death. Thus Pashtuns might simply have been

scared away from the ballot box due to the increasingly bad security situation.

Additionally, it is conceivable that Pashtuns consider their vote a wasted one as Karzai was

overwhelming favourite and the danger involved in the voting process meant it was a risk not

worth taking. A similar phenomenon, where the margin of the leading ethnic candidate has

diminished in the recent election, can be found in the provinces of Panjshir and Lagham

where the correlation between votes cast to ethnic demographics has weakened. It is also a

common phenomenon that incumbents loose popularity in office due to broken promises, or

the public desire for a change.

As the individual cases above signify, the 2009 the national results were much closer. Karzai

received 49.67% of the total vote, only just short of a total majority while Abdullah and

Bashardost received 30.59% and 10.46% respectively. Votes for all Pashtun and Tajik voters

combined amounted to 55.69%, and 34.61%. Although these percentages still almost perfectly

mirror Afghanistan’s estimated ethnic make-up, the provincial cases above point towards

ethnic factors being a less significant vote winner in 2009. Of course, these are estimates and

one cannot guarantee that those who are of the same ethnicity support each other with votes.

Nevertheless, the importance ethnicity has played in Afghanistan’s past combined with the

empirical evidence presented make this quite a convincing argument.

Initially, given Afghanistan’s deep divisions, this thesis argued that power-sharing is the right

mechanism for central government. It is important to see what impact SNTV has had on the

proportionality and effectiveness of the legislature since the Constitutions inception. For

ethnic fragmentation to be alleviated the new institutions must firstly provide for ethnic

proportionality in the legislature and secondly ensure that these have the power to hold the

executive to account. From this it is possible to estimate how much ethnic inclusion is taking

place on the stage of national governance.

By looking at the composition of the legislature both after 2005 and 2010 it becomes clear

that a similar trend to that observed in the presidential election has occurred. The initial

Pashtun majority formed in the first term has vanished and Tajik’s, Uzbek’s and Hazara’s

have gained a disproportionate amount of seats. Also, concerns articulated about SNTV

helping maintain warlords, who lead individualistic campaigns, in power has also proven to

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be a real. After the first election, Reynolds calculated that 68% of votes countrywide in

Afghanistan were cast for losing candidates confirming the systems non-proportional

tendencies68

. Nevertheless, distributed seats seem to be reasonably proportionate as the

individuals of the Pashtun faction remain the largest group but must still seek a cross ethnic

consensus when proposing or overturning bills.

The multi-ethnic parliament has provided checks and balances on the executive as stipulated

in the Constitution. After being elected, it took Karzai three rounds to have cabinet ministers

approved. Parliament successfully rejected most of Karzai’s selections. Furthermore, Karzai’s

recent attempt to seize control of electoral watchdog was also overwhelmingly rejected.

Regardless of the encouraging cross ethnic inclusion at central government, the institutions

have failed to unify Afghan tribes. Local Afghans were recently asked:

“In your local community, who commands power and the capability to influence the behavior

of Afghans?” respondents first noted religious scholars (38 percent), then commanders (24

percent), tribal elders (23 percent), and elected officials (16 percent)69

.

Thus, it would seem that the democratic institutions have failed to change Afghans mentality

of trusting undemocratic strands of authority. As long as this is the case, Afghans are unlikely

to communicate and debate national issues at central government with local, tribal and ethnic

concerns remaining of paramount importance. It would therefore appear that the institutions

have failed to unite a fragmented Afghanistan so far.

68

A. Reynolds, “The Curious Case of Afghanistan” (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) p.112 69

R. Ponzio ‘Democratic Peacebuilding’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)p.169

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Conclusion

After assessing the impact of the Bonn institutions following the first years of its

implementation, it is difficult to see whether the wrong institutions were chosen, or that it is

simply too early for diverse tribal Afghans to buy into a unitary framework and democratic

institutions. It seems that to integrate all strands of Afghan society will require more than

institutions promoting good, equal and transparent governance. The continued softening of

ethnic tensions is likely to require time and, as Norris puts it, ‘social development70

’.

However, this paper holds on to the premise that the right institutions provide a vital stepping-

stone for a successful transition.

In de jure terms, the institutions do provide a decent platform from which ethnic

fragmentation can be alleviated and a cohesive Afghanistan formed.

For Afghan citizens, it does this through toleration of ethnic minority groups under the banner

of Islam. As the poll suggests, Afghans believe religious scholars still hold most influence

which makes it even more important that all ethnicities, whether predominantly Sunni or

Shiite can unite under Islam. Additionally, for the ruling classes, it provides a basis for

cooperation in the National Assembly and limits the absolute power of the executive who

struggle to assemble majorities on individual bills.

The electoral system and the Articles hindering the development of political parties will only

help stall the process of true ideological polarisation and competition. It provides for a

fragmented legislature which will filter through to the people, who have no opportunity to be

educated or be made aware of policies with national importance. It encourages the election of

warlords with local agendas. Having individualistic MP’s without national Parties pursuing a

national agenda will encourage Afghan’s to continue holding on to multiple loyalty ties.

This makes it near impossible to alleviate ethnic fragmentation completely in the short term.

Thus, this paper stands by its proposition that a form of flexible accommodation should be the

aim to avoid the ethnic exclusion and persecution of the past. It should be particularly flexible

as the presidential election results show that salience of ethnicity seems to be becoming less

significant to voters. This is very encouraging but will amount to nothing unless the

70

P. Norris Stable democracy and good governance in divided societies: Do power-sharing institutions work?

JFK School of Government (Harvard University, 2005)p.1

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institutions remain open and malleable, in line with changes in Afghanistan social and ethnic

composition.

Afghans can be integrated into the central political process through active parties,

campaigning on national issues and holding the executive to account on countrywide issues.

Unfortunately, both SNTV and parts of the Constitution discourage this. In terms of ethnic

integration and toleration, some of the institutions seem to be leading Afghanistan down the

right path to alleviating ethnic fragmentation. However it is a long and bumpy path.

Word count (including footnotes): 9 908 words

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Maps and Appendix

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/1231/Is-power-in-Afghanistan-returning-to-ethnic-fault-lines

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2004: How Afghans voted

2009

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/1231/Is-power-in-Afghanistan-returning-to-ethnic-

fault-lines

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Acknowledgements

The author takes entire responsibility for the content and potential shortcomings, but

gratefully acknowledges the guidance offered by Dr. Oisin Tansey.

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