From Russia, with Love: the Caucasus Emirate as a Dark Network

Contents

Chapter 1: A short history of the Caucasus, the other “Graveyard of Empires”Chapter 2: Global implications of Caucasus Emirate growthChapter 3: Why the violence is a wicked problem Chapter 4: The role of sociology and psychology in the Caucasus

EmirateChapter 5: Visual and social network analysis (SNA) application

to the Caucasus Emirate Chapter 6: Holistic courses of action and conclusionWorks Cited

1

List of Figures

Figure 1: McCormick’s diamond model: the partisan insurgency

Figure 2: Ramzan Kadyrov (with tiger). Source: Instagram

Figure 3: Graph of key variables behavior over time (BOT),

including callout emphasizing the nascent stages of the CE.

Figure 4: Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) of CE violence

Figure 5: Chloropleth map, total events from 2001 to 2011

Figure 6: Event Density from 2001-2007

Figure 7: Event Density from 2007-2012

Figure 8: Complete timeline with events by type. The blue

depicts the bombing events (highest density) and the green

includes the armed attacks.

Figure 9: Represents the link analysis for all entities,

including events.

Figure 10: Represents the linkages between people and

organizations using the entire data set, minus the events and

locations.

2

Figure 11: Represents the linkages between people and

organizations that are still active in the network as of March

2013. Note how it is sparser (at least 20 people removed from

death, none of them from natural causes)

Figure 12: Palantir screenshot of all entities selected for

import into ORA

Figure13. Network of agent x agent via shared organizations

(most dense).

Figure 14. Total Caucasus Emirate organizational network (with

actors, dead and alive). Dead actors are the light pink, living

actors are dark pink. Organizations are in green; the central

organizations are those who are directly connected with the CE

Shura.

Figure 15. Alive informal network, folded (green ties are

organization x organization, and the red ties are agent x

organization).

Figure 16. Agents by informal relationships/tribes.

3

Figure 17. Teip by tukhum and nationalities. The green nodes

symbolize ethnic groups (the largest in the center being the

Chechens), the blue nodes represent the tukhum, and the red nodes

represent the teip

Figure 18. Table from processing metrics of all agents taken

from their ties with others via terrorist organizations (alive

and dead; deceased individuals are annotated in red. Values are

normalized, and closeness centrality was calculated in UCINET

using the ARD centrality measure).

Figure 19. Table from processing metrics of all agents taken

from their ties with others via terrorist organizations (values

are normalized, and closeness centrality was calculated in UCINET

using the ARD value).

Figure 20. Centrality measures, formal network.

Figure 21. Centrality, informal network

Figure 22. Network of formal ties (CE unit to CE unit)

Figure 23. Network of informal CE organizations to CE

organizations (through relationships with agents).

4

Figure 24. Boundary spanner, potential

5

Chapter 1: A short history of the Caucasus, the other “Graveyard

of Empires”

The purpose of this thesis will be to explain why the

current modus operandi against the CE is ineffective, evaluate

its appeal and capabilities with respect to recruitment and

mobilization, demonstrate how the Caucasus Emirate presents

itself as a dark network, support its classification as a wicked

problem, and identify some of the potential points of

intervention which could be utilized in order to combat violence

in the Caucasus. My interest in the Caucasus Emirate (CE)

initially stemmed from the Chechen Black Widows, and how 50% of

the population (women) might contribute to instability in a

region. I completed a country study of Afghanistan back in 2000,

and concluded that the oppression of women (to include a lack of

basic civil rights, access to education and health services) was

a contributing factor to instability, especially prior to the

September 11, 2001 attacks. I had assumed that the Caucasus

might have similar problems based on socioeconomic issues, and

that maybe their women suffered the same level of oppression, but

I was mistaken. Based on my initial readings on the Chechen

6

Black Widows (also known as the Shahidka, who now fall under the

broad umbrella group of the CE), I had sympathetically concluded

that these women had unaddressed grievances against Russian

government policies in the Caucasus. These policies resulted in

police and military operations, which often resulted in the

deaths of militant sons and husbands, whose second order effects

included the volunteering of widows (or other female relatives)

to martyr themselves in retribution. Some of the women had been

widowed multiple times as a result of their husbands’

counterstate activities; in the case of Mariam Sharipova, who

perpetrated the Moscow subway bombings, her husband actually sent

her to conduct the mission (Roggio, 2010). While the choices of

these women in selecting a spouse may raise questions, one study

suggests that most of the women involved had experienced deep

personal traumatization, which may have factored into their

willingness to participate in terrorist acts (Speckhard and

Akhmedova, 2007). In reality, female suicide bombers defy common

convention; according to Ariel Merari in Psychology of Terrorism,

initially there was an organizational rejection of the use of

women in such missions (p. 105). It is easier to accept that men

7

are willing to commit violence to further their cause, but it is

far less acceptable for the Western mind to consider that there

are women who are willing to resort to terrorism and target

innocent victims in order to draw attention to their cause. What

kind of cause could draw such a following, and what in their

society is lacking that could prevent such atrocities from

occurring? In order to understand the premise of the presented

problem and accurately account for why the CE exists as a dark

network, a short history of the Caucasus may assist in

understanding the current environment.

A [Very Brief] History of the Caucasus

Most Americans have little idea what the CE is, and fewer

still have any knowledge regarding its origins. If anyone

remembers newsreels from the mid-1990s, they may recall that a

place known as Grozny (the capital of Chechnya), was a warzone,

and that violence resulting in civilian deaths was commonplace.

But where is Grozny, Chechnya, the Caucasus region, and why does

this matter to regional instability? The Caucasus has been at

the critical geographic and historical juncture of religion,

8

nationality, and ethnicity, with Persia to the southeast, Turkey

to the southwest, Europe to the west, and Russia to the north.

Throw in a wide variety of religious influences, to include Sunni

(Sufi and Salafi) and Shia Islam, orthodox Christians, Buddhists,

and Jews, and you have a major collision area of religions and

ethnic groups. Based on its significance, the region has been

devastated by wars between the Ottoman and Russian Empires in the

later part of the last millennia, to include the Russian-

Circassian Caucasus Wars of the 19th century (or genocide,

depending upon the interpreting historian). These events

displaced hundreds of thousands of ethnic Circassians and Vainakh

(two major ethno-linguistic groups native to the Caucasus),

causing diasporas to appear in Turkey, and establishing a

foundation of resentment against Russians. Under the soviet

communist regime, oppression intensified as Islam was nearly

destroyed and driven underground following the revolution. In

the late 1940s, most of the Muslim populations in the Caucasus

were threatened with genocide and persecution by Soviet

leadership; Stalin believed that he had appropriately dealt with

all of the Nazi sympathizers by deporting almost half the

9

population of Chechens and Ingush to central Russia. Stalin’s

paranoia and ruthlessness evolved into xenophobia, directed

against the various disparate ethnic minorities of the USSR

(Burds, 2007). It was not until 1957, well after Stalin’s death,

that these populations were permitted to return to their homes,

but many had died in the process. Families were unable to return

to their villages of origin, and had to resettle in places like

Dagestan and other neighboring states. Many other displaced

individuals maintained their diasporas in Siberia and Central

Asia. Seth Jones may have termed Afghanistan the “Graveyard of

Empires”, and while it is true that the long-term (and expensive)

occupation of Afghanistan may have contributed to the implosion

of the Soviet Union, the North Caucasus continues to tax modern

day Russia.

Nationalist Movement to Insurgency; Rise of the Caucasus Emirate

Chechen Separatists emerged in the early 1990’s following

the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Similarly, there were other

movements for self-determination and pan-Caucasus unification

afoot, however small and unsupported, some of whom had roots in

10

the Islamist movements which propagated in Dagestan during the

mid-1980s (McGregor, 2006). MacGregor also opined that this

religious shift was spurned by the education Caucasian religious

students received from institutions in Saudi Arabia and Egypt

during the late 1980s and 1990s. While the Chechen nationalist

movement (which declared its independence from Russia in 1991)

may have taken center stage, the Abkhazian separatist movement,

and nationalist movements within Dagestan, also contributed to

regional instability. From the fall of the Soviet Union to the

present day, the Russian government’s policy towards perceived

threat in their former colonies has been heavy-handed, but with

good reason. The persistent ethnic tension characteristic of the

region and the dissolution of the USSR created an environment in

which ethno-political violence was inevitable (Markedonov, 2011).

Russian involvement in the region includes action in North

Ossetia to suppress Osset-Ingush interethnic violence, which

resulted in large numbers of displaced peoples pushing into

Ingushetia (Nichols, 1997), two battles for Grozny, the War in

Abkhazia (1992-1993), the Five Days War (more recently, under

Putin in 2008), and targeting of Chechen separatists and later

11

Caucasus Jihadist leadership spanning more than two decades.

Russia also successfully conducted political intervention in a

number of Caucasus republics; according to Markedonov, Yeltsin

managed to diffuse the following points of friction: “between

Kabardin and Balkar, Karachays and Cherkes, Russian and Adygei;

the conflicts in Dagestan between Chechen-Akkin and Avar, Lak and

Kumyk, Neocossack and Nogai on the one hand, and Avar on the

other” (2011). The Chechen separatists initially appeared to

function as a revolutionary movement, led by former Soviet

officers of Chechen descent, President Dzhokar Dudayev and

General Aslan Mashkadov. As Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan all

moved forward to independence from the USSR, Chechnya also primed

itself for its own movement, declaring itself the Independent

Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) in 1991. However, a

political solution in Chechnya eluded Yeltsin; as of November

29th, 1994, “the Russian leadership had repeatedly declared its

determination to adhere to political means to resolve the Chechen

crisis. Over 1991-93, Dudayev received 11 proposals on the

separation of powers; and he refused them all” (Markedonov,

2011). President Dudayev was killed by a Russian missile in 1996

12

and was succeeded by Aslan Maskhadov, who was killed in March

2005, creating vacancies in top leadership positions of the

movement for individuals more inclined to radicalism, including

Abdul-Halim Sadulayev, Shamil Basayev, and Dokku Umarov. Gordon

Hahn describes this process as the “de-Chechenization of the

ideology of the ChRI in favor of an Islamist and jihadist

orientation” (p. 4); he also points to a decline in ethno-

nationalist Sufi leadership within the ChRI prior to the

declaration of the CE in October of 2007, as well as a rise in

Salafist/Wahabbi influence throughout the organization (p. 80).

Complicating matters, Chechens themselves were divided between

the first and second battles for Grozny; entire tribe-based

militias (i.e. the Vostok Battalion) turned to support the

Russians, and it is from these militias that the current

political powerbase in Chechnya originates. Recognized currently

as a federal subject of the Russia Federation with a non-partisan

leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, supported by Vladimir Putin’s government,

Ramzan Kadyrov (son of the former Chechen president, Akhmed

Kadyrov, who was assassinated by Chechen militants in May 2004)

serves as the current president. President Kadyrov appears to be

13

working in concert with Russia to systematically assassinate all

of his political opponents (Somaiya, 2012), but rather than

suppressing the problem, it appears to be contributing to

increasing levels of violence in the Caucasus States. Violence

has specifically decreased in Chechnya, and Jihadism’s rise in

Dagestan and elsewhere is largely an indigenous process.

Kadyrov’s militia (known as Kadyrovites), in concert with Russian

Forces, may have successfully suppressed terrorist activity in

Chechnya, but in neighboring Dagestan and Ingushetia, violence

levels have increased. The situation varies from one republic to

another; in Dagestan, the popularity of the global jihadi-

influenced Islamism has seen increasing levels of support, which

may be in part due to the youth bulge and the lowest per-capita

income in the region (Brooke, 2013), while in Ingushetia there is

some spillover from Chechen events, based on their common Vainakh

nationality. In Karbardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia, the

growth of radical Islam is less pronounced, but has brought

corresponding increase to levels of violence.

14

The CE (which originated from the Chechen separatists of the

ChRI) is an amalgamation of regionally oriented Islamic militants

whose goal is an independent pan-Caucasus Islamic state united

under Sharia law, and further the establishment of a global

caliphate in concert with other groups in the global jihadi

revolutionary movement Their current posture is that of an

insurgency whose intent is to destabilize the governments in

Russia’s North Caucasus that are under the umbrella of the

Russian Federation through attacks and a strong propaganda

campaign. The envisioned Caucasus Emirate would include

Krasnodar Krai, Adygea, Karachai-Cherkessia, Karbardino-Balkaria,

Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Chechnya, and Dagestan, and the

organization‘s support base is spilling over into parts of

Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the whole of Russia.

Contributing to the problem is an increasing number of Salafi

Islamists, some of whom encourage their followers to follow an

extreme path and take up jihad against the Russian government and

its extensions. There is a growing contingent of not just

Muslims, but specifically Islamists within Russia proper, and

even amongst ethnic Russians. Dr. Alexei Malashenko warned that

15

this spread may be the most dangerous threat that Russia faces;

while it used to be that Russians could specifically profile the

Caucasus peoples by their names and appearances, if ethnic

Russians are converting to Salafi Islam, then threat sources will

become more difficult to identify (November, 2013). The CE has a

growing number of passive supporters who romanticize

participation in the jihad. The initial movement of the ChRI was

focused on radical nationalism and independence and self-

determination, this movement has since radicalized, with

increased external support from Al-Qaeda and other Islamic

extremist entities. While the Al-Qaeda link was more tangible

through the direct presence of Ibn al-Khattab and Abu Umar as-

Sayif during the late 90s and early 2000s (Hahn, p. 53), these

ties are being strengthened through internet ties and the various

Caucasus fighters who have migrated to other parts of the globe

to include Afghanistan and Syria in order to conduct jihad. The

CE is officially part of the Global Jihadi Revolutionary

Alliance; Gordon Hahn referred to the most optimal description of

this relationship as “ally” or “alliance” (2013), based on the

CE’s operational autonomy, with ideological ties in the absence

16

of a closer relationship with AQ Central. Correspondence from

2002 indicated that Maskhadov had conceded to the terrorist

tactics of the jihadists within the ChRI (Hahn, 2013). The

system of Dagestan’s historical tribal protection elements,

jama’ats, which also exist in other countries (consider the

traditional lashkar or arbakai systems in Afghanistan), have been

assimilated in name by the CE, which exist in the form of

regional vilaiyats, and the military fronts which accompany them.

The CE currently has operational cells located throughout

villages in the Caucasus region, from Circassia (on the western

end on the Black Sea) to Makhachkala (on the Caspian Sea border

of Dagestan). The CE and its predecessor organization, the ChRI

has claimed responsibility for significant attacks such as the

Dubrovka Theater Massacre (2002, resulting in 117 dead hostages),

the Beslan School Siege (2004, resulting in 334 dead, including

children), and the Domodedovo Airport Bombing (2011), all with

catastrophic levels of civilian casualties, in addition to

thousands of small arms attacks, bombings, and kidnappings.

Is Sochi Safe?

17

There appears to be a growing level of concern from the

international community for the safety of the upcoming Winter

Olympics (2014), scheduled to take place in Sochi, Krasnodar

Krai, Russia. Dokku Umarov has already posted a video in which

he calls for all mujahedeen to stop the winter games in order to

prevent “Satanic dances” on the graves of Muslims who were killed

by Russian forces in the 19th century (Elder, 2013). A

successful attack or even the threat of such an attack may bring

international attention to the CE’s ongoing quest for a regional

caliphate. While much of the activity of the CE has been focused

in Dagestan and Ingushetia, Sochi is within spitting distance of

the nearest operational units, so an attempted terrorist attack

will not just be an idle threat, but reality for the government

security forces. The successful attack conducted by the Vilaiyat

of Kabardina, Balkaria, and Karachai-Cherkessia (OVKBK) against

the ski resort at Mt. Elbrus on February 18, 2011 (Hahn, 2011)

was proof positive that not only can the CE touch the Olympics,

but that there are significant vulnerabilities that may not be

easily defensible. Mount Elbrus is approximately 221 km from

Sochi, though the site that was designated for the mountain and

18

coastal clusters appear to be fairly isolated from main ingress

routes from the north. If Dokku Umarov is successful in the

employment of forces from the Riyad-us al-Saliheyn Martyrs

Brigade (suicide bombers), the Shahidka (the Islamist female

suicide bombers), and ethnic Russian suicide bombers (recruited

by the Dagestani Vilaiyat) against the Olympics, or vulnerable

secondary targets in Moscow (which may be left largely ignored

while the world holds its collective breath for a catastrophic

attack at Sochi) the CE may gain more esteem in the eyes of the

global jihad network. Attacks on the Olympics have historically

been used by extremists to gain recognition for their causes;

consider the bombings during the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games

(meant to draw attention to the anti-abortion and anti-gay

platform championed by the lone perpetrator) and the 1972 Munich

attacks against the Israeli Olympic team by Palestinian

terrorists. Considering the precedence set by previous attacks

against the Olympics, perhaps there should be more concern that

the Russian government will not be able to secure the area.

Another point of friction is that the Russians may be

overzealous in their desire to ensure that the Winter Olympics

19

are conducted safely. Reporting indicates that Russia is intent

on monitoring all communication in and around Sochi and has set

up the critical network architecture to support this surveillance

(Walker, 2013). This is in concert with forcibly collecting DNA

and fingerprints from a small number of Salafi women in the

Caucasus, in order to assist state officials to conduct accurate

post-blast identification of the individual responsible, should a

suicide attack take place (de Carbonnel, 2013). These heavy-

handed preventative measures are feared to be driving an even

deeper wedge between those aligned with the government and those

who have “gone to the woods” (a regional euphemism for joining

the insurgency). As the perception of unjust government

authority increases, the tenuous coexistence between Sufi leaders

tied to the government and the Salafist population is

splintering; CE mujahedeen in Dagestan have targeted Sufi muftis

from Sa’id Muhammad-Haji Abubakarov (in August of 1998; McGregor,

2006), to Sheikh Said Afandi (August, 2012), and the external

influence of Salafi scholars is growing. Even organizations

affiliated with the Salafi movement that claim to be peaceful,

such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Union of the Just, and Akhlu Sunna, may

20

be in the business of recruitment and funding the CE. As the

International Crisis Group pointed out in its study, the

community and population provide this support base (2012), and

very little has been done to diffuse the situation. Although

there were negotiations between the Dagestani government and the

Salafis in 2012; the problem of violence in the Caucasus becomes

more and more wicked.

In the spring of 2013, Sasha Kuhlow and I conducted an

initial project (Abraham and Kuhlow, 2013) where we conducted

geospatial, temporal, and link analysis of the Caucasus Emirate

in Palantir (a multi-faceted program which enables the analyst to

visualize the problem set in a more holistic manner), and we

concluded that the Caucasus Emirate is capable and desirous of

attacking the Sochi Winter Olympics. In a follow-up study

conducted by Edval Zoto and myself (Abraham and Zoto, 2013), we

attempted to ascertain if familial and tribal ties contributed to

the network structure of the Caucasus Emirate (CE). The teip, or

tribes, and the tukkhum, or family groups, have obvious

rivalries, alliances, and dispositions that shape how they

operate within the region, and being able to identify these

21

relationships may provide friendly governments with information

on how to disrupt and deconstruct these networks. We had

insufficient data on the family groups and tribes but were able

to demonstrate that political rivalries within members of the

same tukhum alone had resulted in assassination attempts and

blood feuds.

The lack of data available on the members of the Caucasus

Emirate is probably the result of constant Russian targeting,

high leadership turnover, and a basic darkening of the network. A

dark network, as defined by Milward and Raab, are those networks

that are illegal and who attempt to remain as invisible as

possible (p. 334). In this context, the CE is most certainly a

dark network, though its turn to Salafi theo-ideology may not

have been the intentions of the original Chechen Separatists.

Shamil Salmanovich Basayev and Ibn al-Khattab’s brutality, while

executing operations of the Islamic International Peacekeeping

Brigade, galvanized Putin’s resolve to destroy radical Islam

(Shlapentokh, 2006). While the CE still retains some

characteristics of the initial movement, the Russians have

22

targeted this network into one that may be more resilient and

harder to disrupt, and it is the Islamist theo-ideology which

feeds the insurgency in the Caucasus today.

To reiterate, the purpose of this thesis will be to explain

why the current modus operandi against the CE is ineffective,

evaluate its appeal and capabilities with respect to recruitment

and mobilization, demonstrate how the Caucasus Emirate presents

itself as a dark network, support its classification as a wicked

problem, and identify some of the potential points of

intervention which could be utilized in order to combat violence

in the Caucasus. The following chapters will address the global

implications of CE growth (chapter 2), why the violence

perpetrated by the CE is a wicked problem (chapter 3), the role

of sociology and psychology in the CE (specifically with regards

to recruitment and the spread of Salafi theo-ideology, chapter

4), visual and social network analysis application to the CE

(chapter 5), and recommendations and conclusion (chapter 6).

23

Chapter 2: Global implications of CE growth

On 16 August, 2011, President Barack Obama indicated that

the greatest threats the United States now faces are lone wolf

terrorists (Reed, 2011). The tragic bombings of the Boston

Marathon have brought the public’s attention back to Chechnya,

Dagestan, the Caucasus, and has also garnered attention to the

term “lone wolf.” Law enforcement agencies are now freely using

this phrase with respect to incidents in which no external

support was used in the execution of violence or terrorism.

While Tamerlan and especially Dzhokar Tsarnaev may not have had

direct ties to the extremist organizations, denying that the

Tsarnaevs had pre-existing weak ties that made him a prime

recruitment target for the CE, would be to ignore a small but

significant component of the attack. As mentioned by Hahn

(2013), Tamerlan attempted to join and appears to have met with

as many as three CE Dagestani Vilaiyat mujahideen during his trip

to Dagestan in 2012, and may have possibly received training from

them. In network topography, isolates do not truly occur in more

than one or two dimensions. Every person has a physical

environment in which they exist and operate, whether it is real

24

(geographic) or virtual (internet), and it is the fiber of this

network topography that determines which nodes will be attracted

to others. Humans acting as nodes in a network are very

distinct, and their properties (to include environment and theo-

ideology) of individuals predispose them to attraction and

repulsion. Nodes seemingly unrelated to others in a network are

permitted to move about more freely, resulting in their

vulnerability to nodes which may have a large network of weak

ties based on properties such as admiration and shared ideology,

or common enemies.

Dorothy Denning iterated nine axioms of social networks in

Axioms of Social Networks, all of which appear to hold true. The

first two are “1. all persons are connected through a universal

social network, and 2. the universal social network is ill

defined and unknowable” (p. 2). Whether it is through DNA or a

simple keystroke of a computer keyboard, we are all connected by

varying degrees, even those who appear to be isolates.

Disconnected nodes may be the most reactive and dangerous, and

fall in line with the prescribed teachings of Abu Mu’sab al-Suri,

the Muslim cleric who called for the removal of hierarchical

25

structures to be replaced with decentralized cellular structures

linked by ideology and solidarity (Lia, p.7). The ability of the

CE to utilize its internet-based media as a “broadcast link”

platform to reach out to individuals in regional and ethnic

diasporas, ethnic Russians, and altogether unrelated individuals

may have the effect of establishing weak links with sympathetic

nodes who may be socially primed to join a terrorist

organization. The Boston Marathon bombings, as well as the more

recent bombings perpetrated by suicide bombers in Russia,

intimates that the most dangerous course of action would be to

ignore the explosive growth of the Salafi influence which

resonates in the Caucasus, and ignore the global call to jihad

resulting in the targeting of innocent citizens with violence.

Movement, insurgency, terrorist organization?

When the Arab Spring movement began to fan the flames of

revolution in the Middle East and parts of Northern Africa,

regional stability became the foremost concern to the

international community. Another concern was whether Al-Qaeda

would be able to capitalize on the movements and successfully co-

26

opt the story of the distinct revolutionary movements. The

narrative for the Arab Spring uprisings had echoes of Al-Qaeda’s

aspirations, including the blueprint they had set for the

overthrow of authoritarian regimes and government defections

(Rosenthal, 2013). Al-Qaeda has had varying degrees of

involvement and success in the countries where the Arab Spring

has materialized. Certain scholarly articles regarding the

Caucasus and Central Asia’s possible response to the Arab Spring

may be understating the significance of Islamists and Al-Qaeda

influence in the Caucasus (Zikibayeva, 2011). In an article

published by the Center for Strategic & International Studies,

various regional experts state that there would be greater

turbulence in the Caucasus as a result of the Arab Spring (p. 7),

but that “recent events in the Middle East would have little

effect in the Caucasus” (p. 6). In stark contrast, the

contributors to this article ignore the welfare of Russia’s own

burgeoning Muslim population so close to Moscow (Goble, 2010),

the integration of Caucasus Islamists into the conflict in Syria

(Yusin et al., 2013) and Afghanistan (Hahn, 2013), resulting in

more coordinated external support from Al-Qaeda and a situation

27

that is more dire than scholars could predict. In recent news,

Russia and Syria have brokered a deal in which chemical weapons

are to be passed to Russia and the U.S. for disposal. The

greater fear for Russia would be the same fear that Yeltsin had

to contend with in the mid-1990’s, when Dzhokar Dudayev claimed

to have nuclear weapons (Filipov, 2002): if the Caucasus fighters

in Syria were able to procure chemical weapons and somehow manage

to return to the Caucasus, they would comprise a threat whose

capabilities would be amplified.

The CE organization has rejected in total the original

national-separatist goals of the ChRI (see Dokku Umarov’s quote

on p. 17), so is the CE a movement? The academic answer to this

question is it depends. The perspective can be taken from

religious, ethno-linguistic, and ideological vantage points.

While it has not subjugated or officially affiliated itself to Al

Qaeda, the CE has joined the ranks of the global jihadi

franchise, incorporating groups such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram,

Jemaah Islamiyah, and the Taliban, among others. While this has

the effect of splintering the centralization of power in Al

Qaeda, it also affords the disparate groups the autonomy to

28

operate in a decentralized manner. K.W. Watkins refers to theo-

ideology as the process of religious displacement by ideology,

almost as a false religion under the guise of a totalitarian

regime, i.e. the idolatry conferred to party leadership in Nazi

Germany, the USSR, Communist China and North Korea (Ivens, 1975).

Gordon Hahn refers to Salafism as a theo-ideology in the same

manner, ascribing to it a religious pretext for revolutionary or

pre-revolutionary movements (pp. 18-20). It is this theo-

ideology that is finding great traction in the Caucasus, with the

potential to become the most destabilizing factor that Russia may

face in the near future.

Stickiness of the message

According to Malcolm Gladwell, “the specific message quality

that a message needs to be successful is the quality of

‘stickiness’” (2002). He also states that “The Law of the Few

says that there are exceptional people out there who are capable

of starting epidemics. All you have to do is find them” (2002).

The revolutionary leaders within the mujahedin of the Caucasus

have created a legacy they have left for those who would follow

29

in their paths, and the successful incorporation of Salafi theo-

ideology has resulted in successful CE recruitment.

Internalizing the preachings of dynamic leaders such as Maqdisi,

Anwar al-Awlaki, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Hamza, and other radical

clerics (all hailing from different countries but united in their

ideals of Islam) provides the CE with validation that a pan-

Caucasus caliphate is not only possible, but an imperative. The

CE and its support network also have an extremely effective

platform for their narrative; kavkazcenter.com, along with other

more locally managed websites of the CE’s various sub-networks,

its so-called vilaiyats. These websites had been specifically

targeted by Russian officials for propagating extremist views,

and has been subjected to political pressure and Computer Network

Attack (CNA) in the form of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)

from unidentified assailants, but it still maintains a high level

of popularity and showcases news from throughout the Muslim

world. The CE and Al Qaeda also have at their disposal media

such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, and a growing number of

other tools in order to export its ideology; the tools they have

at their disposal are limitless. It is through websites such as

30

these that individuals who are primed and open to the message of

extremism are able to self-radicalize, and even passive

supporters can throw their hat in the ring with the ability to

move money anywhere in the world without attribution through

internet based technology (such as Bitcoin). No degrees of

lethal targeting or counterterrorism operations appear to have

impacted the recruitment of the CE; in fact, they appear to be

pushing the population towards supporting the cause, either

actively or passively.

Why the current status quo is not acceptable

According to Conklin, one definitive rule of wicked problems

is that “every solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one-shot

operation’” (p. 8). He further explains that “you can’t learn

about the problem without trying solutions, but every solution

you try is expensive and has lasting unintended consequences

which are likely to spawn new wicked problems.” While it is

possible for Russia to assimilate different approaches, every new

action that the government and CE introduce into the system

creates a new dynamic and unforeseen result that ensures that new

courses of action will be completely unique from those of the

31

past. For example, lethal targeting is an endeavor that capable

countries undertake in order to remove key individuals from enemy

networks and hierarchies in order to cripple their operations.

These operations can be considered contentious, in that the

ethics of modern societies call into question whether or not

death without judgment should be a panacea for terrorism, as well

as the effectiveness of this lethal targeting. Consider

Afghanistan, and the dynamic targeting efforts there, and the

Caucasus, and Russia’s offensive operations against the

Islamists. Based on analysis of terrorism-related incidents

listed in the Global Terrorism Database, it appears that since

the declaration of an Emirate in 2007, the amount of violence has

skyrocketed and shows no sign of abating, despite Russia’s best

efforts (see chapter five, figure eight). This is a case in

which the applied solution to the problem has failed to have the

desired effect. The same is considered true of Afghanistan; the

former Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates stated in 2008 that the

United States “cannot capture or kill its way to victory”

(Niedowski, 2008), and that failing or failed states are more

dangerous than their powerful and stable counterparts. Much as

32

the United States and other developed nations assumed a policy of

containment in order to manage the spread of the USSR’s Communist

ideology, the developed world needs to develop a strategy to

target the ideology of Al-Qaeda and its affiliated non-state

actors (the long term solution), while applying a holistic

treatment of the problem, in order to deter violence and

terrorist acts (the short term treatment). It cannot fall solely

on the shoulders of Russia to contend with the CE; it has to be

accounted for as a local brand of the global Salafi-jihadi

movement, which is capable of transcending nationalities,

ethnicities, languages, and other barriers in order to execute

their brand of Islam.

Chapter 3: Why the violence is a wicked problem

Physicist Fritjof Capra stated that “the systems view looks

at the world in terms of relationships and integration…systems

are wholes whose specific structures arise from the interactions

and interdependence of their parts” (pp. 266-267). These systems

are subject to problems and frustrations, which Jeff Conklin

describes as a result of a paradigm, or “the cognitive foundation

33

upon which attitudes, beliefs, and concepts come and go” (1996,

p.3). Individuals and organizations may be stuck in paradigms

that they may not be able to control, or discover that they must

coexist with competing desires and interests, resulting in a

phenomena known as a wicked problem. Nancy Roberts describes a

wicked problem as one that is “ambiguous, fluid, complex,

political, and frustrating as hell” (2001, p. 354). While this

may be a fairly accurate description, Conklin characterizes

wicked problems as having the following characteristics:

You don’t understand the problem until you have developed a solution, 2) wicked problems have no stopping rule, 3) solutions to wicked problems are not right or wrong, 4) every wicked problem is essentially unique and novel, 5) every solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one-shot operation’, and 6) wicked problems have no given alternativesolution. (2005, p. 7-8)

With respect to the CE, the resulting violence within the

Caucasus is the problem, and one that is especially wicked.

Russia has contributed its half of the violence since 1991, which

is part of the reason that the Caucasus Emirate currently

functions as a dark network. In order to carefully consider how

to intervene in the cycle of violence in the Caucasus, we have to

identify all of the stakeholders, address the violence

34

perpetrated by both state and non-state actors, and identify

possible leverage points and mechanisms for intervention. This

violence is the fundamental problem - it is the result of the

conflict that exists between the Russian government and the

insurgency. Throughout this chapter, coping with this

particularly wicked problem entails consideration of the violence

as a product of systems dynamics, and applying systems thinking

in order to determine adequate coping measures, which will be

further discussed in chapter six.

The Narrative

“Russia doesn’t negotiate with terrorists. Russia destroys them.”

-President Vladimir Putin

The list of key stakeholders regarding the issue of violence

in the Caucasus may seem endless, but they can be grouped into

camps. The Russian government and the subordinate state

governments they support can be lumped together, with the

Caucasus Emirate (the insurgency) and its sympathizers in

diametric opposition. As is evidenced by the quote above, Russia

and its supported government entities take an exceptionally hard

35

line with regards to terrorists. Other key players that should

be considered include citizens of the Caucasus, citizens of

Russia (who discriminate against those of Caucasus origin),

neighboring states, the global jihad network, the international

community (including diasporas), and religious leaders of both

Sufi and Salafi origin. These stakeholders can be counted on for

active and passive support of one of the two major players, with

swing voters existing amongst the Caucasus and Russian citizens,

as well as the international community. These stakeholders are

assumed to be present when there is a state and an opposing

counter-state.

Gordon McCormick has developed a model in which a partisan

insurgency exists, with external support to ensure its viability

(see the model below). Eric Wendt provides an accurate summation

of the model; the diamond model has five legs, which incorporate

the need “for a government to build legitimacy and control with

the population (Leg 1), then lower the insurgent force’s

legitimacy and control with the population (Leg 2),” (2005, p.

5). Wendt also reiterates McCormick’s opinion that “the

government must determine if the insurgency has external support.

36

The conflict which exists between the government and the

insurgency (Leg 3) may entail legitimate grievances which the

government is not addressing, or it may also entail fundamental

and irreconcilable differences, such as ideology, which put the

two at odds. If so, the government must build legitimacy in the

eyes of relevant international actors, represented by Leg 4”, and

that “the government must also attempt to reduce external support

to the insurgents by minimizing or destroying the insurgent

group’s support and sanctuary from international actors (Leg 5)”.

The Caucasus Emirate (CE) exists as the counter-state, and

fits well within the scope of this model, as it has an effective

support base both within the population and from outside actors.

Currently, Russia does not receive much assistance from the

international community in policing the Caucasus Emirate, but as

the threats to the Russia increase and the Islamists encroach on

territories that had previously been unblemished by terrorism,

Moscow will look to outside entities for assistance in managing

the spread of the Caucasus Emirate.

37

Figure 1. McCormick’s diamond model: the partisan insurgency

The Core Problem

“Allah willing, all of the brothers, who are carrying out Jihad in the entire world, are our brothers for the sake of Allah, and we all today are going on one road and this road leads to Paradise.” – Emir Dokku Umarov

The conflict that exists between the Russian government and

the insurgency results in violence, which is the fundamental

problem. Without the violence, there could be room for

mediation, negotiation, concessions, and possibly a transition to

recognized political organization. These are transitions that

have been made in part or in whole by organizations such as the

Irish Republican Army, Hamas, Hizbollah, and the Muslim

38

Brotherhood, so it is not outside the realm of the possible.

During a presentation on Islamic terrorism in Russia, Dr. Alexei

Malashenko made the distinction that most of the violence in the

Caucasus is perpetrated by insurgents or CE against armed state

forces and government officials, while the violence that is

perpetrated in Russia proper by the same entities target innocent

civilians (2013). In order to analyze this as a wicked problem,

we will include both under the label of violence. The Russian

response, sometimes with its own resultant violence, feeds back

into the system, generating a change in the CE organization that

may exacerbate the situation. In the early part of the Chechen

conflict of the past two decades, the Chechen Separatists were

far outmatched in firepower by the Russian military, but what

they lacked in firepower, they made up for in asymmetry and

resourcefulness. The Chechen fighters improvised tactics,

techniques, and weapons to the point where the Russian military

was devastated during the First Battle of Grozny, but the

Russians incorporated lessons learned and were able to raze the

city and surrounding areas during the Second Battle of Grozny,

sending the Separatists to the mountains and forests, where they

39

went underground and transitioned to an insurgency willing to

target innocent civilians in order to advance their cause.

CE initiated violence is comprised of assassinations of

government officials and religious leaders, direct attacks

against security forces in the Caucasus, and terrorist attacks

against civilian targets in Russia and throughout the Russian

Federation. In answer to this, the Russian government reacts in

various ways, including: 1) maintaining policies in Caucasus

which counter the perception of good governance (i.e. state

presidents are for the most part Putin-selected political

appointees), 2) security operations have the effect of alienating

the population, based on violations of human rights and disregard

for collateral damage (operations include attacks against

insurgent safe houses, strategic strikes against key leadership,

and preventative operations), and 3) some suppression of freedom

of speech/journalism, which feeds back into decreased government

legitimacy and the perception from the international community

that the Caucasus region lacks the transparency it needs to

develop into a democracy.

40

Between Putin’s hard line on the Caucasus Emirate, CE

resolve to establish a caliphate, and friction resultant from the

interplay between the two entities with no party capable of

mediating or negotiating the issues, the violence has extended

itself into a vicious cycle from which there appears to be no

recourse or alternative.

Key Variables

“I've already mentioned that all those artificial borders, administrative divisions, which the Taghut [false leader, or liar, a reference to Russia's political leaders]drew, mean nothing to us. The days when we wanted to secede and dreamed of building a small Chechen Kuwait in the Caucasus are over.” - Emir Dokku Umarov

In examining the behavior of the variables, it is possible

to go back to the timeframe when the ChRI more widely recognized

as a partisan party with legitimate political aims, but for the

purposes of examining the behavior of the Caucasus Emirate as an

insurgency, we should focus on the time frame between 2007 to

date, when Sufi leadership within the CE had declined (to include

Maskhadov’s assent to Salafist demands) and pushed the Salafist

to declaring their desire of a pan-Caucasus emirate. This is a

product of two external forces: the influence of the global

jihadi revolutionary movement, and the product of global

41

Islamist/Salafist revolutionary theo-ideology (Hahn, 2013).

These are brought into the causal loop via the Salafi imams and

jihadis who are educated abroad with the more “pure” form of

Islam. Their efforts in the Caucasus have been especially

effective, increasing numbers of mosques and followers, and

capitalizing on the news media to exacerbate perceived

injustices. Initial leaders within the Chechen Separatists

movement, specifically Aslan Maskhadov, had brokered agreements

with the Russian government (the Khasavyurt Ceasefire in 1996

stalled the violence), but he was also Sufi and more open to

negotiations and not as inclined to radicalism as some of his

Salafi compatriots. As mentioned in chapter one, Maskhadov had

made concessions to the growing Islamist presence within the ChRI

(Hahn, 2007) and may have become convinced that the jihadist path

was the correct one in 2002

(Hahn, 2013).

Russian efforts to

legitimize local governments

have been met with abject

failure. While Ramzan

Figure 2: Ramzan Kadyrov (with tiger). Source:

Instagram

42

Kadyrov (Chechen president and appointee of Vladimir Putin)

appears to have effectively tackled violence in Chechnya, the

management of his personal militia and his penchant for

Lamborghinis, gold pistols, and exotic animals has called into

question his legitimacy and raised the possibility of

mismanagement of government funds. While the Kadyrovites may

have suppressed violence in Chechnya, increasing levels of

violence in Dagestan and Ingushetia indicates a migration of

insurgents to these areas in order to enlarge their effective

support base. Russia effectively deposes those leaders who do

not fall in line with its policies; Putin always appears to have

a say in the hiring and firing of those who aspire to influential

leadership positions in the Caucasus. This political influence,

in concert with a lack of transparency of security operations,

the preponderance of state-run media (especially television),

computer network attack operations on the kavkazcenter.com (the

media platform of the CE), and a record of repeated human rights

violations, has resulted in the decreased perception of

government legitimacy (from Russia down to the Caucasus), leaving

individuals with little recourse but to turn to their imams and

43

Sharia law for legitimate solutions. While the interaction of

these variables may be impacted by other outside influences that

have not been discussed here, they are representative of the most

significant issues facing the Caucasus in the near term. A graph

(figure 3 below) depicting the behavior of these variables over

time may assist in illustrating how the variables are not

independent, but interrelated. It is merely illustrative and not

100% indicative of the actual events over time (for a graph

actually depicting violence by numbers and dates see figure 8 in

the fifth chapter). The Y-axis is a subjective representation of

the variables growth or decline, while the X-axis depicts time.

It is the interplay of the key variables, to include the

stakeholders mentioned above, which feeds into the vicious cycle

of what Anderson and Johnson refer to as “fixes that fail” (p.

124). Russian intervention in response to CE violence has the

unintended consequences of making the violence worse, and

increasing the support base of the insurgency. The situation is

reminiscent of British policies towards the Irish Republican Army

(IRA) and its extensions in the 1960s and 70s (Edwards, 2012);

Putin’s policy of crushing the insurgency using both policing and

44

military force without addressing the underlying causes of

discord may be exacerbating the situation, as opposed to taming

it.

45

46

Figure 3: Illustrative graph of key variables behavior over time (BOT), including callout emphasizing the nascent stages of the CE.

47

Figure 4: Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) of CE violence

The causal loop diagram (figure 4) can explain this cycle;

Anderson & Johnson explain that diagramming problems from the

vantage point of a system may serve to explain how complex

interrelated components can work or compete against each other

(pp. 88-89). The causal loop diagram explains that as violence

sponsored by the CE in the Russian Federation increases, Russian

intervention into the Caucasus increases (to include some of the

actions previously mentioned, affecting the political scene,

policies, security operations, computer network operations, and

strategic targeting). As this Russian intervention increases,

48

the perception of government legitimacy decreases for Caucasus

citizens, neighboring countries, and the international community

(R1). As this government legitimacy decreases, CE recruitment

increases. As recruitment increases, the cycle starts again with

increased violence. This increased violence results in Russian

intervention (in the form of strategic targeting), which has

resulted in an increase in the death of Sufi leadership within

the CE. The increased deaths of Sufi leaders (R2) have resulted

in an increase of Salafi influence not just within the CE, but

throughout the region. This increase in Salafi influence has

resulted in increased external support, particularly from members

of the Global Salafi Revolutionary Network, and this increased

external support has, in turn, resulted in increased violence,

but not just against the Russian government officials and

security forces, but also against Sufi leaders within the

community. In Dagestan, under the previous president, the Muslim

Spiritual Board (the government backed Sufi contingent) had

conducted talks with leaders of the Dagestani Salafi community,

including members of Akhlu-Sunnah (Vatchagaev, 2012), and the two

organizations had agreed to compromise on some key points. Since

49

then, the murder of Mufti Afandi and the election of President

Ramazan Abdulatipov (after his predecessor stepped down), appears

to have resulted in a harder stance against the Salafists, more

in line with that of Ramzan Kadyrov (Vatchagaev, 2013).

Said Afandi was killed last year in a suicide attack

conducted by an ethnic Russian woman who had recently converted

to Islam. Afandi had condemned Islamist violence and attempted

to increase dialogue between the traditional and non-traditional

Islamic leaders in Dagestan (Recknagel, 2012). The targeting of

community Sufi leadership by the CE and sympathetic Islamists

continues to feed back into increased levels of violence, against

which Russia leverages its vast resources; military, political,

financial, technological, etc. Based on heavy-handed Russian

involvement, perception of government legitimacy decreases, but

in addition to feeding into internal and external recruitment,

Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Associated Press,

and others in the international community may be more inclined to

sympathize with the CE as a movement, and may garner more support

for what they perceive are injustices committed by the Russian

government against the CE. As an example, the kavkazcenter.com

50

has found support in Sweden to host its servers there in order to

find a safe haven from Russian government efforts. Sweden’s

liberal freedom of speech laws have been permissive, though

Russian foreign policy is attempting to pressure the Swedish

government to shut them down. Incidentally, the kavkazcenter.com

has been hit numerous times by DDoS attacks. The CE website and

its affiliates post numerous articles published by Western media

in support of their propaganda efforts. The continued external

support reinforces to the CE that their violence is a means to an

end, and the external support of the website, while falling under

the guise of free speech in host countries encourages acts of

martyrdom and jihad (Draitser, 2012).

As contentious counterterrorism operations are executed, and

as the Caucasus populace continues to romanticize fighting

Russian oppression, the never-ending merry-go-round of CT

operations and terrorism incidents will continue to spiral.

While the cycle may look vicious (or, from the perspective of the

insurgents, virtuous), the causal loop diagram offers potential

leverage points, or points in which interested parties may be

able to intervene in order to change the current paradigm. New

51

and innovative ways of intervening may require Russia to

completely change the way in which they approach the Caucasus,

and incorporate a more holistic approach. In order to change

government legitimacy, there are various actions that the Russian

government could take. In tackling the high amount of

unemployment and poverty in the region, Russia has subsidized

much of the economic development in the North Caucasus and will

continue to fund economic development to the amount of $52.2B

between now and 2025 (Fuller, 2012), as well as providing

economic incentives for business who choose to start ventures in

the region (such as Rosneft, primarily state owned, and Lukoil,

privately owned). It may be possible to force elections, though

this may have the opposite of Russia’s desired end state (i.e. if

the free elections of Dagestan or any of the other predominantly

Muslim republics elected a predominantly Salafi government to

power, solidifying the legitimacy of Sharia law in the region).

The various possible pivot points and other courses of action

will be further discussed in chapter six.

52

Chapter 4: The Sociology and Psychology of CE recruitment

The recent trial and sentencing of MAJ Nidal Hassan (the

Fort Hood gunman), the tragic bombings of the Boston Marathon,

the Woolwich attack in the United Kingdom by two Islamic converts

against an off-duty soldier, and similar incidents have centered

public attention on the term “lone wolf.” Law enforcement

agencies are now using this term with respect to incidents in

which seemingly no external support was provided for the

execution of violence or terrorism. Another one of Denning’s

axioms of social networks is that “links can form most anywhere

and without brokerage” (p. 4). Is “lone” an appropriate

adjective if individuals are successfully moved to jihad by a

YouTube video or infrequent contact with a radical cleric? These

individuals, who turn to Inspire magazine to learn the

machinations of pressure cooker improvised explosive devices

(IED), who are inspired by Ayman al-Zawahiri’s most recent call

to conduct lone wolf attacks against the United States its allies

(Corera, 2013), who may reach out to other jihadis using social

media, likely did not always exhibit extremist tendencies. Their

53

predisposition to terrorism may have developed over time, and may

provide fertile ground for the germination of seeds of violence.

Internal factors may include the biology and psychology of the

individual, such as their genetic makeup and personal measures of

chemicals and hormones. External factors may include the

developmental environment (i.e. the Chechen diaspora in the

tumultuous country of Kyrgyzstan, and elsewhere), social

isolation, exposure to ideology, and reinforcing media influence

which may have rendered the individuals vulnerable to the

messages of jihadists, with whom they find a sympathetic cause.

In Psychology of Terrorism, Fathali Moghaddam opines that terrorism is

the option perceived by the perpetrator in order to overcome

perceived injustices (Bongar et al., p. 70), and this is surely a

powerful motivation for those populations who have been subjected

to decades and centuries of oppression. This chapter will

discuss the sociology and psychology of the terrorist, and how

the terrorist organizations such as the CE establish weak ties to

actors susceptible to committing acts of terrorism, and examine

ways in which government and law enforcement officials may

counter these efforts.

54

Who are the isolates?

The American public would like to seek the comfort of an

archetype to which they can ascribe to armed assaults and bombing

attacks, such as loners, sociopaths, and the chemically

imbalanced. There is some evidence that psychologically (whether

it’s in their DNA or their upbringing), these individuals may be

predisposed to violence and/or extremism through religion, and

provide fertile ground in which a sticky message can take hold.

But how does one become predisposed to violence? Studies

regarding the psychology of terrorists are inconclusive. If we

discriminately examine the different motivating factors for

terrorism, not just those perpetrators who are tied to extremism

founded in Wahhabi or Salafi Islam (for example, Anders Breivik

and Cho Seung-Hui), then we have to take into account not just

the individual’s environment, but also their upbringing and

possible reasons for chemical imbalance. In the case of Cho

Seung-Hui, the Virginia Tech shooter, there were obvious

indicators of mental health issues, including suicidal and

homicidal thoughts, and a background which included teasing and a

lack of emotional bonding (Cho & Gardener, 2007), but his rampage

55

was seemingly executed without a greater purpose other than his

narcissistic view of himself as a purveyor of violence (James,

2009). There are many instances in American criminal statistics

which point to a fault in the psychology of mass shooters or

killers; other examples include Aaron Alexis (the Naval Yard

shooter, 16 September 2013), Jared Loughner (the Arizona shooter

who killed six and wounded 13 in January of 2011, including

Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords), Adam Lanza (the Sandy Hook

Elementary School shooter who killed 26 elementary children and

adults in December of 2012), and James Holmes (the Aurora theater

shooter, 20 July, 2012, who killed 12 and injured approximately

70). These very recent instances of domestic terror indicate

more of a problem with weapons control and mental health care,

rather than the momentum of a terrorist movement. In the case of

Anders Breivik, the Norway terrorist who went on to execute the

deadliest terrorist act perpetrated by a single person in modern

history (Amland & Gronnevet, 2012), it was established by the

court that the insanity plea would not be pursued. He had the

motivation of an extreme right wing individual who used violent

means to draw attention to his cause, while using the techniques

56

of the radical Islamists he categorically did not want in his

country (Amland & Gronnevet, 2012). Law enforcement and the

letter agencies that seek to defend nation states have a tendency

to focus on terrorism tied to Islamists and Al-Qaeda, as

numerically those who are affiliated have a higher number of

attempted attacks than other organizations who believe that

violence with the intent of inciting terror in the population is

the best mechanism for the endstate of their organization (i.e.

the Environmental Liberation Front). We will focus on the

Caucasus Emirate, and its establishment of weak ties to lone

actors who might be susceptible to committing acts of terrorism,

why individuals are vulnerable to their influence, and the ways

in which government and law enforcement may counter their

efforts.

The influence of biology

It seems intuitive that individuals are the product of their

environments, but biological composition (DNA, hormones, and

chemicals) may also have a role to play in the psychology of

terrorists. The notion of “nature versus nature” is considered

57

to be an antiquated way in which to explain what is commonly

perceived as the two largest factors that contribute to the

psychology of individual; according to the American Psychological

Association, there are numerous theories on how individuals are

moved to violent action; instinct, drive (frustration, anger),

social learning, and cognitive, etc. (Borum, 2004). There are

even obscure studies that compared physiological differences

between terrorists. It was noted by psychologist David Hubbard

that the terrorists he studied had sustained damage to the inner

ear; they were suffering from vestibular dysfunction (Borum,

2004, p. 14). Whether or not this was a pre-existing condition

or something that came about as a result of similar types of

terrorist training is debatable. Borum also intimates that low

serotonin levels and frontal lobe dysfunction may also be a

contributing factor to violence (p. 14), but this alone is not a

smoking gun. What is commonly accepted is that each group is

distinct from another with respect to the psychological

composition of their individual members, and each individual is a

product of their respective environments. According to Clark

McCauley, it is generally accepted that terrorists typically are

58

not afflicted by any psychopathology (Bongar et al. (Ed.), p.

15), but are instead motivated by the psychology of combat and a

cause they believe is worth dying for (p. 19). In simplified

terms, the group with whom the terrorists share their ideology is

the in-group, whereas everyone else is out-group. According to

Marc Sageman, it is “in-group love rather than out-group hate”

that appeared to have motivated the perpetrators of the 9/11

attacks (2004), and this relational conformity appears to hold

true for separatists in the Caucasus.

External factors: environment and geography

The environments in which terrorists are raised may contribute to

their propensity to commit terrorist acts. Consider diasporas-

populations that may have been ejected from their homeland for

social or political reasons. Their existence outside of their

homeland may significantly lend to their collective perceptions

of injustice, or a feeling that the conflict continues even after

they have left the country. According to Baser, “these

sentiments could just stay as an emotional bond or might actually

grow to extremist feelings that push the diaspora members to

59

commit acts of violence both in the homeland and the hostland”

(2009). This is likely the case for Tamerlan Tsarnaev, who was

quoted as saying in 2009, “I don't have a single American friend.

I don't understand them” (Foster and Parfitt, 2013). In

observing Tamerlan as a case study, this feeling of not

belonging, compounded by other factors in his life including

unemployment, a stagnating boxing career, the influence of

extremist Muslim friends, etc., may have resulted in self-

radicalization. These factors, compounded by his familial and

cultural ties may have culminated in his last trip to Dagestan,

in which he met individuals involved in the Caucasus Emirate with

whom he could relate and possibly received training from with

regards to the construction of pressure cooker explosives he

devised and employed during the Boston Bombing (Anonymous, 2013).

Diasporas, internally displaced people, and other disenfranchised

populations provide terrorists with a ripe population from which

to conduct recruitment operations; based on how well they are

assimilating to their new environments, these individuals may be

more vulnerable to a resonating message. Sageman states that

“second generation Muslims in the diaspora do not compare

60

themselves with their cousins left back in the old home country…

they interpret perceived discrimination in the context of moral

violations against Muslims elsewhere, and the notion that their

local grievances are part of a more general hostility against

Islam appears more compelling to them (2008, pp. 83-84). This

reinforces Sageman’s hypothesis that “joining global Islamist

terrorists is a collective process based on friendship or

kinship” (p. 84), and actually provides a valid argument that

jihadists are not only rational, but are convinced that they are

acting in the best interest of their group. According to

Sageman, approximately 60% of his sample population of terrorists

were expatriates, and an addition 20% were second or third

generation Muslim immigrants (2008, p. 65). This is a

substantive argument that the existence of diasporas contribute

significantly to terrorism.

Impacts of religion and ideology

There are some very important cultural factors, imbued in

the environment in which the individuals are raised, which

contribute to how individuals may accept violence as a mechanism

61

for change. In an article, DeAngelis notes that psychologist

Arie Kruglanski attributes that collectivist mentality plays a

large role in terrorism. In three societies that he studied

(Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians), he found that

individuals who have lower personal success, a fear of cultural

annihilation, and recent presentation to death-related stimuli

are more likely to cling to cultural ideals and support violent

action; “being part of a collectivist cause has always been a

hallmark of people willing to undergo personal sacrifices” (p.

60).

Exposure and conditioning with respect to societal norms

greatly impact where on the scale of tolerance individuals lie on

the sliding scale of terrorism. In Helfstein’s model, where

terrorism progresses from awareness to interest, then acceptance,

and finally implementation (p. 18), the individuals who would

perpetrate terrorism may already be in the acceptance phase, and

merely lack the resources and validation required to go through

with the implementation. The conditioning required for

individuals to move from awareness to acceptance depends largely

upon the environment in which they are raised; according to a

62

recent New York Times article, it is not only that Muslims in the

Middle East are exposed to anti-Semitism and anti-Western

sentiment, but that they are bombarded with it from the time they

are children (Hirsi-Ali, 2013), through their formative years,

and it is continuously reinforced throughout their adulthood.

The use by Palestinian media of the Mickey Mouse figure, Farfur,

who appeals to children to defeat the “Zionists” occupiers, in

Tomorrow’s Pioneers (Oliver, 2007) (a Hamas-sponsored children’s show

where martyrdom is encouraged) is a prime example of the

conditioning and reinforcement of negative sentiment towards

Israelis. In Palestine, martyrdom is a matter of national

identity; Palestinians who are martyred are united in death and

lauded through the use of posters, trading cards, and even

receive financial aid for their families (Petersen-Overton, p.

20). But the Palestinians are not alone; even the Egyptian

President Mohammad Morsi was caught on tape in 2010,

urging his followers to ‘nurse our children and our grandchildren on hatred’ for Jews and Zionists. Not long after, the then-leader of the Muslim Brotherhood described Zionists as “bloodsuckers who attack the Palestinians,’ ‘warmongers’ and ‘descendants of apes and pigs.’ (Hirsi-Ali,2013).

63

Reinforcement of xenophobic views are not just restricted to

juveniles, but are reinforced well into adulthood, often by

important figures of authority. Sometimes isolates, raised in

the absence of this reinforcement and grooming, can move to the

acceptance and implementation phase of terrorism just as quickly,

and this may have to do with the effectiveness of the extremist

narrative. Russia should be extremely mindful of Islamists

successfully establishing similar reinforcement mechanisms, and

where possible they should undermine the efforts of the Islamists

to dehumanize others. It is this dehumanization which feeds

violence, and makes it easier for terrorists to lump these people

into the out-group, which can then be targeted.

“Stickiness” of the narrative

Why does the message of jihad have such universal appeal,

especially for those individuals who are clearly removed from the

close social ties that terrorists appear to share? According to

Raab and Milward,

the key to understanding the attraction seems to be the sense of identity Al Qaeda gives its members, especially young Muslim men in Europe who are alienated from their home

64

countries but at the same time not at all integrated in the life of their host countries. (p. 422, 2003)

While studies show that more individuals can be reached through

weak ties (Granovetter, p. 1366), it is easy to argue that those

connected by common interests through the Internet have

preexisting weak ties. While the Internet may be valuable in

recruitment and the spread of propaganda, weak ties may also

indicate individuals who lie on the periphery of the network and

may be more willing to conduct extreme measures in order to find

and establish their place in the organization, especially if they

have bought into the idea that they will be serving a high

utility function and that eternal life and martyrdom is

guaranteed. By serving in this high utility function, they would

have earned the trust and admiration of those whose teachings

they seek to emulate. This could be evaluated as a praise or

martyrdom network; Sageman states that “the jihadi warrior hero

must prove himself in this fight”, and “suicide bombers are now

the rock stars of militant Islam” (2008, pp. 81-82). Islamists

have a valuation of network nodes based on their functional roles

which (based on suicidal activities) launch them from positions

of insignificance to stardom in an instant. This is the appeal

65

of Al Qaeda appearing to functioning as a loosely coupled

movement (Jackson, p. 248):

Osama bin Ladin’s statements provide strategic level inputs across the loosely coupled organization…Al Qaeda is more than just an idea or concept-it is not fully leaderless resistance (p. 251, 2006).

Movements are rife with weak connections, which make it difficult

to target specific figureheads when tied to action. The

figureheads are talking heads, who merely identify the general

goals of the organizations (Jackson, p. 248). The global jihad

franchise as a largely leaderless organization has the ability to

recruit from the anonymous outliers with its message to the

disenfranchised and disenchanted global diasporas of Muslim

populations, to include those of the Central Asian states and the

Caucasus. This jihad franchise would be appealing to any

enterprising individual who would want to seek and make his own

fortune; especially as it affords for the perpetrators to exert

control at the local level.

Communication: clerics to fighters, fighters to families

As previously mentioned, Abu Mu’sab al-Suri’s message, which

is echoed throughout medium used by AQ and affiliated Salafist

66

and Wahabbist terrorist organizations, is a call for individual

citizens not to wait for jihad, but to conduct it independently.

This is the call to action for individuals who may appear to be

isolates in a larger network. This autonomy reinforces the

appeal of the AQ franchise; it displays the characteristics of a

hybridized organization. It is defined by some centralization

and hierarchical structures, while also displaying

characteristics of a decentralized (almost democratic) network

organization (Mayntz, p. 11). This type of organization, which

may have figureheads and local leaders, capitalizes on group

members’ abilities to contribute when and where they can, whether

it is monetarily, via recruitment or media, or with violent

action. The decentralized nature of this model affords

individuals to customize their organization and expand or

contract to accommodate as many or as few members as the

leadership desires. However, it is this autonomy that the

subgroups exercise that allows for the message to be bastardized

in a way that may not fit with the narrative of the larger group.

Consider for example the Syrian opposition-released video, in

which a rebel leader eats the organs of an Assad regime soldier

67

killed in action; even the spokesman for the Free Syrian Army

decried this as unacceptable behavior (Newman, 2013). This is

where terrorist organizations lose legitimacy; where specific

nodes go “too far” in an effort to prove their worth to the

movement.

While Western analysts struggle with the idea that weak ties

and self-radicalization may be the wave of the future, strong

ties and trust networks still have overwhelming effect within

terror networks. With respect to the Caucasus, the teip and

tukhum are the equivalent of tribes and tribal federations, or

sub-clans and clans, and may serve as a major source of

recruitment for the CE. This is the significance of the strong

tie; David Krackhardt posited that social network analysts build

on the idea that strong relations enable organizations to stay

intact, provide motivation, and reduce uncertainty for its

members (Nohria & Eccles, Eds., 1992). In a study conducted by

Pedahzur and Perliger with respect to Palestinian suicide attacks

(considered from a network-based perspective), they discovered

that although hierarchical networks are important, horizontal

networks (vice vertical networks, which are hierarchical in

68

nature), with hubs instead of leaders, and based on strong ties

such as family, friendship, contributed just as significantly in

recruitment operations (2006, p. 4). The existence of these

horizontal linkages throughout the tribal structures in the

Caucasus should attract those who have historical ties to the

insurgency. It definitively does in other countries where Salafi

influence thrives; Walid Shoebat stated “Americans are clueless

as to clan ties when it comes to terrorism” (2013). He then

provides links to several prominent Saudi families (to include

the al-Harbi, Aldawsari, and Ghamdi clans), and provides examples

of how familial ties foster and encourage participation in jihad.

Politics, fighting, and tribal feuds are quite definitively a

family affair in the Caucasus; consider the Yamadayevs, an

influential family associated with the leadership of the Vostok

Battalion, or the Gakayev brothers, all six of whom were

affiliated with the CE. These horizontal relationships will be

further explored in chapter five, delving into social network

analysis to determine the extent of teip or tukhum affiliation on

participation in the insurgency.

The communication modes

69

Modern day communication modes are the ties that bind; if an

isolates has access to the internet, then can he truly be an

isolate anymore? All over the world, the Internet brings

individuals together; media enables collective action, much as

African-American churches in the south enabled the American Civil

Rights movement of the 1960s (McAdam, 1998). The Arab Spring

uprisings successfully employed social media to coordinate

protests, advertise activities, and reach the world outside to

garner support and momentum. While the Internet has had an

amazing impact on commerce and licit activities, it has also

enhanced the abilities of dark networks to function, and recruit

from the fringe of the organization. As applied to Al Qaeda, the

categorizations of groups, networks, and movements (as well as

hybrids of the three) are a convenient way to explain its

hierarchy and function (Jackson, 2006), but its ability to appeal

to isolates and lone wolves relies heavily on the marketing

strategy of the organization. Boston Bomber Tamerlan Tsarnaev

posted a video dubbed “the Black Flags of Khurasan,” which

incorporates a theme that appeals heavily to potential mujahideen

recruits originating from areas outside of the Arabian Peninsula.

70

This is based on a hadith that the time for Muslims to rise up

will happen when the black flags of Khurasan come from the east

(Khan, 2008), an area which includes parts of Persia,

Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and which may have extended even

further depending upon context (see Khorasan in Encyclopedia

Britannica). While Tamerlan and his brother may have appeared

to have been acting alone during their violence spree, there is

evidence to the contrary in that that 1) Tamerlan may have

received training during his six months in Dagestan, 2) Dzhokar’s

actions were going to be concealed by his Khazak friends who may

have known about his involvement in the bombings (Sacchetti,

2013), and most significantly, 3) that Tamerlan may have

initially radicalized with minimal outside contact, but was

inspired to action by his Dagestani militant connections. This

terrorist moved quickly from communication, using local contacts

in Dagestan to establish bona fides, resulting in an invitation

to training (Anonymous, 2013), which law enforcement authorities

attribute to the effectiveness of the bombs made by the Tsarnaev

brothers, and finally execution of the deadly attack. The

cocktail of mixing one part effective narrative, one part willing

71

participant, and one part exposure to a pre-existing terrorist

network resulted in deadly effects.

Impact to the Caucasus Emirate

In the study of social network analysis, it may be cliché to

quote John Donne that “no man is an island”. But with the

impacts of globalization, and recognition of the influence that

mass media of all varieties have on individuals, it is vastly

easier for the isolates of yesterday to become the instrumental

weak links of today, and regardless of the age of the link, it

still bears significance to the interplay of nodes in the web.

The Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, was eventually turned in by his

brother, even after seven years of estrangement (or perhaps as a

result of those seven years; Pilkington, 2009); no amount of

distance or time could sever the tie that had been established at

birth. Granovetter’s work (1973) on the significance of weak ties

may define what is most significant; that weak ties have the

ability to reach more people, and become the nodes capable of

tying together disparate networks. In the instance of the

Tsarnaev brothers, the weak ties Tamerlan had to his homeland

bridged the geographic distance, and facilitated the sharing of

72

knowledge which enabled a budding Islamist to strike at a target

he viewed as relevant to jihad. The ability of isolates to

establish weak ties, their ambition to move into positions of

prestige (i.e. become members of the praise or martyrdom

network), their willingness to earn the trust of network inner

circles by any means possible, and the lack of visibility

intelligence agencies have to their motives makes them the

fastest growing violent threat to civil society. While their

environments and biology may affect their willingness to die for

the cause, it is the pervasive theo-ideology which is the true

danger, and this will require protracted time and effort to

counter.

73

Chapter 5: Visual and social network analysis application to the CE

While complete understanding and illumination of a network may

not be possible, it is possible to study a network utilizing

tools that provide the analyst with a better understanding of the

network. This chapter draws and builds upon two earlier studies:

1) one that utilized a visual analytic tool (Palantir) to

determine whether the Caucasus Emirate has the ability and intent

to target the upcoming Winter Olympics in Sochi 2014, and 2) a

second that drew on the tools and methods of social network

analysis in order to ascertain the likelihood that teip and tukhum

were significant factors in CE on government violence. Although

the first study concluded that the CE is incapable of carrying

out a successful catastrophic attack at the Olympics, it would

nevertheless attempt to engage in some form of violence in order

to disrupt the games. Interestingly, since this study was

completed, Dokku Umarov has stated his desire to prevent the

games from occurring, and there has been increased reporting on

not just the potential threat but also actual terrorist

incidents. The second study concluded that because family groups

74

are geographically-based and family ties appear to be intrinsic

to CE and government leadership, teip and tukhum membership is a

significant factor in CE on government violence. Both studies

resulted in recommendations for possible courses of action, as

well as a series of lessons learned with regards to the

collection, structuring, ingestion, and formatting of data, which

may be of use for future studies utilizing the same software

suites.

This chapter proceeds as follows. It begins with a

methodological overview, followed by some of the major findings

of the visualization project, as well as the significance of the

findings, … [summarize what’s to come in the remainder of the

chapter; one sentence for each major section is sufficient].,

Methodology

Visual analytics is “the science of analytical reasoning

supported by interactive visual interfaces” (Keim et al., 2008).

The following steps describe the methodology applied in order to

conduct both visual analytics and SNA for the two different

studies. As the two studies were conducted sequentially, the

75

methodology outlines this process, and is followed by detailed

visualizations which support the accompanying findings.

1. Identify data sources: As with most analyses of

relational data, the initial challenge was to identify where to

draw the most accurate data. After some digging, data sources

were narrowed down to the Global Terrorism Database (to import

structured data events and locations in the form of a database

file, or .dbf), unstructured dossiers on members of the Caucasus

Emirate and affiliated sub-groups, and news articles from sources

with varying track records for reliability (i.e. the

kavkazcenter.com, a CE-backed internet news source, and the

waynakh.com, the website for the ChRI). While some news articles

and some of the material gleaned from these websites may

constitute misinformation on the part of the CE, what was more

important were the events and the links to individuals who are

affiliated with organizations. The intent was to conduct

exploratory analysis, to see if we could tease out any relevant

information on key individuals based on link analysis. Are there

identifiable patterns and key leaders that have not been

76

identified? Who were the key leaders of historical significance,

and what modus operandi have they established for the Caucasus

Emirate? Is there a precedent for the CE to attack the Olympics?

How are CE sub-units organized, and how does their structure

appear to affect its function?

2. Data structuring. Palantir, which was developed by

former PayPal executives who specialized in identifying

fraudulent activity, is a powerful visual analytic tool that

fuses link analysis, geospatial analysis, and temporal analysis.

It also includes basic SNA processing capabilities, which are not

yet on par with programs, such as UCINET/NetDraw, ORA, and Pajek.

Palantir served as the mechanism by which the data were coded

with relational information in order to export it into another

program for processing. Data from the Internet was the primary

source for the tagging and coding of relationships. Palantir

allows for the analyst to identify key individuals,

organizations, locations, events, and relationships within its

various interfaces, as well as the use of both structured data

(spreadsheets, database files, etc.) and unstructured documents

(Word files and .pdf documents). The activity of “tagging”

77

identifies contextual data within unstructured reporting;

reporters and locals can provide fidelity and resolution that

cannot be inferred by structured data. The contextual data was

used in concert with visualizations of structured data to make

assessments.

3. Geospatial and temporal analysis of events: The intent

of the first study was to answer the question of whether these

groups could effectively attack Sochi, despite the impression

that their center of gravity was in either Ingushetia or

Dagestan. We also attempted to identify trends in attack

patterns, in order to determine whether Russian targeting of

leaders had a disruptive effect on the operational capacity of

the CE, or whether it just galvanized the group to conduct future

attacks. This was not entirely possible, as the Global Terrorism

Database (GTD) does not include operational information on when

the government and security forces were conducting their own

operations against the insurgents, nor does it specify whether

insurgent key leaders were killed during the course of the

operations. While Palantir possesses great geospatial

capabilities, we also used ArcGIS, a geospatial tool produced by

78

Esri, that can handle large volumes of data, including the

factoring of layers that include political boundaries,

infrastructure, religious data, ethno-linguistic groups, and any

other structured data with grid reference information. While the

GTD included fairly accurate grid coordinates, though there were

some perceivable faults with the data (see challenges to

analysis, below).

4. Temporal analysis of the network: We also sought to

determine the effectiveness of Russian targeting of CE key

leaders over time, determine the evolution of central figures and

locations within the network, and assess their significance over

the course of the last decade. Palantir has a mechanism by which

it can evaluate events and links temporally, if the requisite

background data are identified within the document. In this

case, the relational data were not structured as to identify the

dates, times, and duration of links (i.e. how long terrorist “a”

was a member of organization “b”, which then morphed into

organization “c”). This would require a herculean effort, which

is beyond the scope of this research.

79

5. Link Analysis: Link analysis can be useful for

determining significant individuals, events, organizations, and

the connections between them. While this analysis can provide a

nice visual overview, this portion was conducted in the discovery

phase of this investigation, so the graphics did not include a

number of key leaders. As the initial aggregate of entities and

events did not visually assist in identifying key nodes, we coded

for the inclusion of more individuals, as the majority of

significant actors from the first study were deceased, and would

not be relevant to the network apart from providing historical

context.

6. Social Network Analysis (SNA): SNA is a tool that can

be used in the fight against the terrorism, although

practitioners warn that it is not a panacea and certainly not a

solution that can stand by itself. In spite of this, SNA may 1)

be useful in illuminating dark networks, 2) provide insight as to

why certain networks behave as they do, 3) identify which are the

key nodes (whether they are in positions of brokerage or

centrality), and 4) assist in determining how to go about

impacting the network, whether it is through lethal means,

80

targeting media platforms, or intervention in the form of

dialogue with key leaders. A major question from studying the

subordinate organizations of the CE was whether any of the

subordinate networks were more resilient than others, based on

formal vs. informal ties, and whether or not we could identify

any individuals that were more significant than others with

respect to brokerage. The following study focused specifically

on teip and tukhum affiliation, the current structure of the CE to

include its military fronts, jama’ats, and vilaiyats, and the key

individuals within the organizations that have been identified

through various sources (see data sources, below).

7. Challenges to analysis: Including novice experience

with all of the software platforms, they are itemized and

included below.

8. Recommendations and conclusion: see chapter 6.

81

Data Processing:

Geospatial: Processing the structured information, the GTD had a

significant number of events (approximately 1,500) but did not

necessarily have grid coordinates associated with them. In order

to ascribe grid coordinates to the GTD, this required the merging

of two separate databases: One from the GTD with the events

selected for Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS) (dtd.

from 2001 to the most recent available as of March 2013), and

one from a gazetteer provided by the National Geospatial-

intelligence Agency (NGA) that was extracted from a text (.txt)

file with the Roman names for all of the villages in Russia with

their respective grid coordinates. These were then combined in

ArcGIS to create a new data source (“city” and “RO NAME”, the

Roman name of the city, were the two joined characteristics for

each of the databases), which was then exported as a database

file (.dbf) so that it could be converted into a comma separated

value (.csv) or an Excel (.xlsx) file, which Palantir can ingest.

Once all of the events were imported, a number of country

geopolitical files were retrieved from DivaGIS and MapDiva (two

82

websites that provide free geospatial products), as well as a

Russian Roads overlay. These were initially examined in ArcGIS

in order to ensure they were at the correct projection, and then

saved as a shapefile (.shp) to be dropped into Palantir.

Once the shapefiles and Excel files were dropped into

Palantir, they had to be modified for visual effect, as Palantir

cannot ingest a layer file (.lyr). The resulting chloropleth map

based on the provincial shape files and event data is below, and

draws attention to the Caucasus States.

Figure 5. Chloropleth map, total events from 2001 to 2011

83

Figure 6. Event Density from 2001-2007

The heat map pictured above includes data spanning part of

the Second Chechen War (1999-2004), so while it may not

necessarily include force on force events, it includes the

significant activities (SIGACTs) constituting asymmetric warfare

located IVO Grozny and Chechnya, with a few events spilling over

into neighboring Dagestan and Ingushetia. This picture also

includes Moscow, shown because a number of events (attributable

to the organizations preceding the CE) had occurred during both

time periods (notably the Dubrovka Theater hostage situation and

Beslan Secondary School attack).

84

Figure 7. Event Density from 2007-2012

The new heat map comprising the timeframe between 2007-2012

indicates no real change to the number of terrorist events

perpetrated by the CE in vicinity of Moscow over the assessed

timeframes. After 2007 in the Caucasus, however, events were no

longer localized just in and around Chechnya, but had spread out

along the M29 route, which parallels the train system and oil

pipeline, which were heavily targeted during this timeframe.

Events are also now occurring primarily in the federal subjects

of Ingushetia and Karbardino-Balkaria, as well as along the route

down into eastern Azerbaijan, through Makhachkala (the capital of

Dagestan). This may be as a result of the increased

operationalization of the Dagestani Vilaiyat, and a change in the

85

CE center of gravity. If the capital of Grozny is no longer

perceived as the strategic objective, it could be that their

efforts will span the entire Caucasus, with no clear emphasis on

any given republic.

While the M29 is not directly tied to Sochi (which has also

seen a small growth in the number of events occurring in close

proximity), there are a number of secondary roads and

infrastructure that could serve as viable ingress and egress

routes for the insurgents. If they are to conduct a catastrophic

attack around Sochi, they will have to transport personnel and

logistics to the area. It is during this movement that they will

be the most vulnerable, but if they utilize traditional methods

of transport, to include mule and cart, they may be able to avoid

detection while targeting the periphery of the events. As

mentioned in chapter one, the CE’s military jama’ats have already

demonstrated their ability to conduct operations in Krasnodar

Krai, but the CE could also employ the Volga and Urals Fronts to

conduct a more spectacular attack closer to Moscow, as the

world’s eyes focus on Sochi. While these vilaiyats have not been

86

active, like the recent attacks on Volgograd, it is more likely a

result of a plot a result of the Dagestani Vilaiyat plot

organized at the jama’at level; possibly the Temirkhan Shura

(Buinaksk) Jama’at, which includes ethnic Russians (Hahn, 2013).

Temporal Analysis (see graphic below): In the assessment of the

SIGACTs evaluated through temporal analysis, the timeframe

including part of the Second Chechen War, dtd. 1999-2004.

Significant lethal targeting of key individuals within the

Caucasus Emirate occurred from 2005-2007, to include Aslan

Maskhadov (March 2005), Shamil Basayev (July 2006), and Abdul-

Khalim Sadulayev (June 2006), all of whom occupied key leadership

roles in the network. There is a visible lull in the amount of

activity during 2007, and then an explosion of SIGACTs in the

years immediately following. The vast majority of the SIGACTs

were comprised of bombing events (blue), though the number of

armed attacks also saw a large increase (green). This is why in

order to determine how the government’s targeting efforts

affected the network it was important to split our data into

before 1 January 2007 and after. The level of activity within

87

the past few years attributed to CE activity far exceeds that

from during the 2nd Chechen War timeframe, but this may be as a

result of the database not including events which were

attributable to conventional type of force on force warfare.

Figure 8. Complete timeline with events by type. The blue depicts the bombing events (highest density) and the green includes the armed attacks.

While it would be presumptuous to attribute the explosion of

SIGACTs mid-way through 2007 specifically to the targeting of key

CE officials (as it may also be the result of improved database

management and record keeping), there may be a correlation

between the insurgent swarms that the Russian government is

facing and visibility. Arquilla and Ronfeldt define a swarm as

an “autonomous or semi-autonomous units engaging in convergent

88

assault on a common target,” and “amorphous but coordinate way to

strike from all directions – sustained pulsing, of force or fire”

(Arquilla & Ronfeldt, p. 21). The Chechens under Aslan Maskhadov

quickly assimilated swarm tactics, i.e. pulsing and coordinated

attacks against a much superior force, so the fact is that the CE

is still employing this tactic, but in a much more ruthless and

decentralized, and certainly less illuminated manner. This may

also explain that high value target (HVT) removal may not always

equate to destroying or neutralizing the network; it may merely

have the effect of darkening it and obscuring external eyes from

identifying the key players. That being said, in specific

networks, targeting key nodes has resulted in the disintegration

of the network, as the network may have been too centralized, or

power consolidated into one individual which the network is

unable to function without; consider the case study of the Tamil

Tigers (LTTE), and its leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. Upon his

death, the organization splintered, and the Sri Lankan government

declared an end to the 25 year civil war (Kardirgamar, 2009).

89

Link Analysis: Link analysis is a useful tool to visually examine

how all of the groups and individuals interact with one another.

Sean Everton states that while it is often confused with SNA,

the basic difference between the two approaches is that although link analysis diagrams often include different types of objects, (e.g. individuals, cars, cell phones) and the ties between them, social networks diagram only include ties between similar types of objects. (2012, p. 6)

While it does not necessarily provide a metric that identifies

who the key players are, it does assist analysts in visually

identifying who may lie on brokerage paths between groups, which

clusters might have more members, or which agents have been

members of more than one organization. Figure 9 (below)

represents all of the people, events (which could be attributed

to shared people or organizations), and organizations after

removal of isolate nodes (i.e. events or individuals who had no

discernible relationship with others). The data sources coded

for in the initial study resulted in approximately 501 locations,

91 organizations (both terrorist and government), and 135

individuals. The events from the GTD comprised approximately

1,577 events, which added to the entities already on the visual

graph. This analysis was conducted in the early stages of

90

development, and many key individuals included in the early

analysis wound up being deceased, so while it provided historical

context for who has been significant in the past, it is not

necessarily relevant in determining the key individuals in the

SNA portion. While Palantir has a very good graphic user

interface, other tools are available for analyst use, such as

Analyst Notebook, AXIS Pro, and CrimeLink.

In the initial link diagram using all entities, clusters

formed around locations and events. This is likely due to the

significant amount of structured data imported that specifically

correlated events, locations, and perpetrators from the Global

Terrorism Database, and also because the organizations were not

arrayed temporally (i.e. the Chechen Separatists exist in a very

small way, but the Caucasus Emirate was formed in 2007) it

subsumed much of the function of the Chechen Separatists, even

though the former organization still exists in a very marginal

form.

91

Figure 9. Link analysis diagram for all entities, including events.

Significance of Link Analysis:

The link analysis, as it was conducted in the elementary

stages of the Olympics study, was cognitive learning; we had

little idea the extent in which the Chechen Separatists

organization had morphed into the CE, as is evidenced by the

title of the study (Chechen Separatists and the 2014 Winter

Olympics). I had only a sophomoric understanding of the

92

insurgency, and slowly came to know the organizations better

through the readings and resulting visualizations, as well as

temporally observing the CE subsume a number of the other

subordinate organizations. The errors of this study led to

clarity in the social network analysis study that was conducted

the following quarter. The reduction in the number of

individuals in from the first to the second diagrams reflects the

result of killings and detentions conducted by security services;

however, we were not able to reflect new members entering or

rising within the network. The lack of reduction in organizations

likely demonstrated that we did not accurately account for the CE

subsuming the other Islamist organizations or militias, or that

they were able to maintain their original operational structure

as a subordinate element to the CE. It could also reflect the

network’s resiliency. Combining this indicator with the temporal

analysis depicting increased terror activity suggests that

additional players have entered the network and more of the

network needs to be illuminated.

93

Figure 10. Represents the linkages between people and organizations using the entire data set, minus the events and locations.

Figure 11. Represents the linkages between people and organizations that are still active in the network as of March 2013. Note how it is sparser (at

94

least 20 individuals removed as a result of death, none of them from natural causes)

Social Network Analysis

In addition to the original Palantir data, additional coding was

completed to add to the initial batch of entities, which resulted

with three different entity types of interest and allowed for

extensive one-mode and two-mode data analysis. According to

Everton, “a one-mode network is a network which consists of a

single set of actors” (2012, p 402), i.e. people are placed

against the same people, and their relationships are defined,

whereas “a two-mode network consists of two sets of actors (i.e.

a dyadic network) or one set of actors and one set of events

(i.e. an affiliation network)” (2012, p. 403). The three

different entity types are 1) people (318), 2) government

organizations (20), and 3) terrorist organizations (152).

95

Figure 12. Link Analysis Diagram of all entities, minus events (Palantir)

Relational data for individuals include ties to other individuals

(kinship ties, affiliated/associated, friendship,

subordinate/superior of, enemies) and to government or terrorist

organizations (i.e. member of, leader of, affiliated/associated

with, supporter of); the data also include important attributes

which may be relevant to the analysis, in particular tribal data

(to answer the question of whether teip or tukhum are significant

in the resiliency of the network) and target status (i.e.

detained or deceased). The terrorist organizations can be

organized into hierarchies in one-mode data (organization to

organization), and the affiliated individuals can provide for

96

analysis of two-mode data (person to organization, i.e. leader

of, affiliated/associated, participant, linked to, etc.). Within

the individuals of interest (one-mode, person to person), some of

the relationship information reflects positive ties (i.e.

friendship, kinship, linked to, associated/affiliated,

superior/subordinate, supporter), and some reflect negative ties

(i.e. enemy, opponent). This relational data, along with the

attributes of teip/tukhum membership, and target status (deceased

or detained), were layered into the network metafile. Then, the

one-mode and two-mode relationships were displayed as formal and

informal relationships, and then analyzed with respect to

topography, centrality, identification of subnetworks, and

brokerage. With the formal network, individuals were with the

informal network, relationships were inferred from membership

with hierarchical organizations.

One mode relationships (5): person x person (kinship, friendship,

affiliated/associated with), organization x organization

(terrorist organizations only)

97

Two-mode relationships (4): people x government organizations,

person x terrorist organizations (member of, supporter of, leader

of, affiliated/associated with), person x teip, teip x tukhum

Extracted relationships (1): organization x organization

(informal, based on relationships between people who are members

of more than one organization). The relational data were

structured in Palantir and then analyzed using ORA.

Attributes (2): tribal affiliation, target status (i.e. alive,

deceased, or detained)

All of the information processed is undirected; therefore, all of

the networks examined below are symmetric.

Significance of SNA

Topography: Inclusion of all of the relational data resulted in

an extremely dense network, which visually resembled a death star

and was of little value to us in evaluating the arcs and nodes.

98

Figure13. Network of agent x agent via shared organizations (most dense).

Figure14. Total Caucasus Emirate organizational network (with actors, dead and alive). Dead actors are the light pink, living actors are dark pink. Organizations are in green; the central organizations are those who are directly connected with the CE Shura.

An informal network (figure 15) was generated using the manually

coded one-mode network (organization to organization, which was

somewhat hierarchical based on geography, the directing central

99

leadership, and the fighting units), and we derived a one-mode

network from a two-mode agent by organization network.

Figure 15. Folded alive informal network (green ties are organization x organization, and the red ties are agent x organization).

Depicted below (figure 17) is another informal agent by

agent (i.e., one-mode) network that includes shared tribal

affiliation (supporting, affiliated, and member of) and

friendship ties. What it shows is that the Kadyrov and Yamadayev

family groups, which are political rivals and have engaged in

feuds in recent history but are still affiliated with the

government, are both members of the Benoy teip. The Gakayev

brothers belong to a different teip, Elishtanzhxoy, but both are

members of the Noxcmaxkxoy tukhum. They are also rivals with the

Kadyrov family but are affiliated with the Caucasus Emirate

100

insurgency. The six Gakayev brothers have historically been

associated with leadership in the CE movement. Four of them died

during the Chechen War, and the two sole survivors, Khuseyn and

Muslim, were recently killed during targeting operations run by

Chechen and Russian security forces in January, 2013.

Figure 16. Agents by informal relationships/tribes.

In figure 17 (below), the agents are depicted by their

respective nationalities and tukhum. The visualization also shows

that there are number of teips that do not belong to a tukhum

(depicted below the central green dot). The figure identifies the teip

linked to the central green icon are Chechens. All the teips of

other ethnicities are depicted in tukhum to the right, with their

The Gakayev brothersand their resultant

networksAkhmed and Ramzan

Kadyrov’s family, withneighboring nodesincluding the

Yamadayev brothers

Alaroy, Benoy,Belgatoi, and

Elishtanzhxoy teip aremembers of the

101

respective tribes linking them to their ethnicity (in green).

The third row from the right depicts the Noxmachoy tukhum, which

includes both Dagestani and Chechen teip, and the second row from

the right depicts the Myälxiy tukhum, which includes Dagestani,

Georgian, Circassian and Tartar ethnicities. The teip listed

under the central green node (representing those of Chechen

ethnicity) are those who do not belong to a tukhum. The

representation of the social structure of Chechnya provides a few

interesting findings:

- The tribal federations are not ethnically exclusive - The

Noxcmaxkxoy, Mialkii, and Akii tukhum are composed of teip of the

various ethnicities found in Chechnya.

- There is no segregation in terms of majority vs. minority

- The Chechen tribes are federated with tribes of other

ethnicities. A clear example is the Noxcmaxkxoy tukhum.

- The tribal federations are not religiously exclusive - In

the multi-ethnic tukhum, Muslim Dagestanis are joined by

Christian Orthodox Georgians, or as the case of the Akii tukhum,

Jews, Turks, Abhkazians, and Russians, each from distinct

religious background which comprise the tukhum.

102

Figure 17. Teip by tukhum and nationalities. The green nodes symbolize ethnic groups (the largest in the center being the Chechens), the blue nodes represent the tukhum, and the red nodes represent the teip

Centrality: Our initial estimates of centrality included deceased

individuals who were linked through the CE. In order to only

estimate centrality metrics for those individuals who were

affiliated with CE-affiliated organizations (in order to

accurately determine who could be targeted within that

organization), we derived an agent-by-agent matrix from a two-

mode network of shared terrorist organizations. Four types of

centrality measures were calculated for this study: betweenness,

closeness, eigenvector, and degree. Everton best describes these

centrality measures as follows; someone with high betweenness is

“someone who lies on the shortest path between numerous pairs of

103

actors in a network”, closeness “is someone who is close (in

terms of path distance) to other actors in the network”,

eigenvector is “someone who has ties to highly central actors”,

and degree is “someone who has numerous ties to other actors”

(2012, p. 207).

The two tables below present the various centrality

measures. The first includes all of the actors, as well as their

1) political links captured in the initial data, and 2) the

deceased individuals linked to the Caucasus Emirate; the second

table presents the measures of those individuals tied to the

Caucasus Emirate who are still alive.

In figure 18 (below), we extracted only those individuals

who were still alive and involved in the CE, and as a result the

network became more disconnected. The numbers of individuals who

are still alive limited the degree to which the analysis could be

conducted (the number of agents dropped from 219 to 75). This

suggested that maybe it would be more productive to focus on the

organizations, rather than the individuals who enter and leave

the network at a much higher rate than do organizations.

104

Rank Betweennesscentrality Closeness centrality Eigenvector

centralityTotal degreecentrality

1 Omar Ibn al-Khattab (.0014)

Omar Ibn al-Khattab(.0373)

Omar Ibn al-Khattab(.6135)

Aslan Maskhadov(.026)

2 Aslan Maskhadov(.0011)

Aslan Maskhadov(.0363)

Aslambek Ismailov(.5675)

Omar Ibn al-Khattab (.0227)

3 Usama Bin Laden(.0011)

Aslambek Ismailov(.0319)

KhunkarpashaIsrapilov (.5675)

Usama Bin Laden(.0162)

4 Shamil SalmanovichBasayev (.0003)

KhunkarpashaIsrapilov (.0319)

Ruslan Gelayev(.5675)

ShamilSalmanovich

Basayev (.0162)

5 Ramzan A. Kadyrov(.0001)

Ruslan Gelayev(.0319)

Aslan Maskhadov(.5617)

Aslambek Ismailov(.0162)

6 Aslambek Ismailov(5.29x10-5)

Usama Bin Laden(.0314)

Shamil SalmanovichBasayev (.4895)

KhunkarpashaIsrapilov (.0162)

7KhunkarpashaIsrapilov(5.29x10-5)

Shamil SalmanovichBasayev (.0298)

Usama Bin Laden(.1488)

Ruslan Gelayev(.0162)

8 Ruslan Gelayev(5.29x10-5)

Abu al-Walid(.02273)

Abu al-Walid(.1244)

Ramzan A. Kadyrov(.013)

9 Ruslan Yamadayev(3.17x10-5)

Akhmed K. Zakayev(.0219)

Akhmed K. Zakayev(.1139)

Ruslan Yamadayev(.0097)

10 Nadezhda Pogosova(2.12x10-5)

Umar Khambiev(.0219)

Umar Khambiev(.1139)

Nadezhda Pogosova(.0065)

11 Vladimir V. Putin(2.12x10-5)

Vakha Arsanov(.0219)

Vakha Arsanov(.1139)

Vladimir V. Putin(.0065)

12General Sergei

Kizyun(1.41x10-5)

ZelimkhanAbdumuslimovich

Yandarbiyev (.0219)

ZelimkhanAbdumuslimovich

Yandarbiyev (.1139)

General SergeiKizyun(.0065)

13 Olga Alenova(1.41x10-5)

Abdullah Duhayman(.0203)

Khabibulla Amir(.0992)

Olga Alenova(.0065)

14 Vladimir Ryzhkov(1.41x10-5)

Ayman al-Zawahiri(.0203)

Abdullah Duhayman(.0302)

Vladimir Ryzhkov(.0065)

15 Anatoly Yablochkov(1.06x10-5)

Enaam M. Arnaout(.0203)

Ayman al-Zawahiri(.0302)

AnatolyYablochkov(.0065)

16 Nikolai Yegorov(1.06x10-5)

Mamdouh Salim(.0203)

Enaam M. Arnaout(.0302)

Nikolai Yegorov(.0065)

17 Sergei Ivanov(1.06x10-5)

Khabibulla Amir(.0195)

Mamdouh Salim(.0302)

Sergei Ivanov(.0065)

18 Vasily Pugachyov(1.06x10-5)

Ramzan A. Kadyrov(.0146)

Zelimkhan Kadyrov(5.9x10-10)

Vasily Pugachyov(.0065)

105

19 Abu al-Walid(1.06x10-5)

Ruslan Yamadayev(.0124)

Zulay Kadyrov(5.37x10-10)

Aslanbek Vadalov(.0065)

20 Akhmed K. Zakayev(1.06x10-5)

General Sergei Kizyun(.0114)

Zakariya(2.08x10-28)

Dokku Umarov(.0065)

Figure 18. Table from processing metrics of all agents taken from their ties with others via terrorist organizations (alive and dead; deceased individuals are annotated in red. Values are normalized, and closeness centrality was calculated in UCINET using the ARD centrality measure).

106

Rank Betweennesscentrality Closeness centrality Eigenvector

centralityTotal degree centrality

1 Daud Akhmadov(.091)

Daud Akhmadov(.545)

Daud Akhmadov(.4147)

Daud Akhmadov(.3649)

2 Dokku Umarov(.0796)

Khadis(.5383)

Khadis(.4130)

Khadis(.3514)

3Tarkhan

IsmailovichGaziyev (.07334)

Israpil Velidzhanov(aka Hasan) (.5225)

Israpil Velidzhanov(aka Hasan) (.4005)

IsrapilVelidzhanov (akaHasan) (.3243)

4 Khadis(.071)

Dokku Umarov(.5)

Dokku Umarov(.3211)

Dokku Umarov(.2703)

5 Aslanbek Vadalov(.0596)

Aslanbek Vadalov(.4932)

Amir SeyfullakhGubdensky (.3201)

Aslanbek Vadalov(.2568)

6Israpil

Velidzhanov (akaHasan) (.0581)

Abu Anas Mukhannad(.4842)

Aslanbek Vadalov(.3198)

Abu Anas Mukhannad(.2432)

7 Asker Djappuyev(.0566)

Supyan Abdullayev(.4842)

Abu Anas Mukhannad(.3171)

Amir SeyfullakhGubdensky (.2432)

8 Assad(.0544)

Asker Djappuyev(.482)

Supyan Abdullayev(.3171)

Asker Djappuyev(.2432)

9 Amir SeyfullakhGubdensky (.0514)

Tarkhan IsmailovichGaziyev (.482)

Asker Djappuyev(.3126)

Supyan Abdullayev(.2432)

10 Abu AnasMukhannad (.0394)

Amir SeyfullakhGubdensky (.482)

Tarkhan IsmailovichGaziyev (.3081)

TarkhanIsmailovich

Gaziyev (.2432)

11 Supyan Abdullayev(.0394)

Assad(.4707)

Assad(.3053)

Assad(.2162)

12 Akhmed K. Zakayev(.0395)

Ali Abu Mukhammad al-Dagistani (.455)

Ali Abu Mukhammadal-Dagistani

(.3026)

Ali Abu Mukhammadal-Dagistani

(.1891)

13 Sultan Khadisov(.0207)

Anvar Labazanov(.455)

Anvar Labazanov(.3026)

Anvar Labazanov(.1891)

14 Usman Firzauli(.02)

Askhab(.455)

Askhab(.3026)

Askhab(.1891)

15 Salikh(.0110)

Muhammad(.455)

Muhammad(.3026)

Khalid Vaykhanov(.1891)

16GadhzimuradKamalutdinov

(.0064)Khalid Vaykhanov

(.4077)Salikh(.1952)

Muhammad(.1891)

17 Marat Kurbanov(.0064)

Salikh(.4077)

Khalid Vaykhanov(.1853)

Salikh(.1891)

18 Omar Ramazanov(.0064)

Bagautdin Magomedov(.3851)

BagautdinMagomedov (.1713)

BagautdinMagomedov (.1487)

107

19 Kazbek Tashuyev(.0061)

Khassan Baiev(.3851)

Khassan Baiev(.1713)

Khassan Baiev(.1487)

20 Khalid Vaykhanov(.0055)

Nabi Mediddinov(.3851)

Nabi Mediddinov(.1713)

Nabi Mediddinov(.1487)

Figure 19. Table from processing metrics of all agents taken from their ties with others via terrorist organizations (values are normalized, and closeness centrality was calculated in UCINET using the ARD value).

108

DEGREE CLOSENESS BETWEENNESS EIGENVECTOR

Riyad us-SaliheynMartyrs' Brigade

(.162)

Vilaiyat Nokchicho(.031)

Vilaiyat Dagestan(.311)

Riyad us-SaliheynMartyrs' Brigade

(.244)Vilaiyat Nokchicho

(.149)Riyad us-SaliheynMartyrs' Brigade

(.031)

United VilaiyatKabardia Balkaria

and Karachai (.15)

Vilaiyat Nokchicho(.243)

Vilaiyat Dagestan(.145)

Vilaiyat Dagestan(.031)

Riyad us-SaliheynMartyrs' Brigade

(.131)

Amir of ShaliDistrict(.242)

Amir/Vali of theDagestan Vilaiyat

(.135)

Amir/Vali of theDagestan Vilaiyat

(.031)

Vilaiyat Nokchicho(.130)

Amir/Vali of theDagestan Vilaiyat

(.242)Amir of Shali

District(.135)

Amir of ShaliDistrict(.031)

Vilaiyat Gyalgyaiche(Ingushetia andOssetia) (.118)

Caucasus Emirate(CE) Leadership

(.242)Caucasus Emirate(CE) Leadership

(.135)

Caucasus Emirate(CE) Leadership

(.031)

Southeastern Front(.059)

Al-Ansar Brigade ofForeign Volunteers

(.242)Al-Ansar Brigade ofForeign Volunteers

(.135)

Al-Ansar Brigade ofForeign Volunteers

(.031)

Southwestern Front(.059)

Special FightingUnits Commanders

(.242)Special FightingUnits Commanders

(.135)

Special FightingUnits Commanders

(.031)

Khasavyurt Sector(.057)

Madzhlisul Shura(.242)

Madzhlisul Shura(.135)

Madzhlisul Shura(.031)

Central SectorDagestani

Vilayat/Front (.057)

Amir/Vali of theVilaiyat Gyalgyaiche(Ingushetia) (.242)

Amir/Vali of theVilaiyat

Gyalgyaiche

Amir/Vali of theVilaiyat

Gyalgyaiche

PLAINS OF CHECHNYA(.047)

Mobile SabotageSquad (.242)

Figure 20. Centrality measures, formal network.

DEGREE CLOSENESS BETWEENNESS EIGENVECTOR

Madzhlisul Shura(.092)

Madzhlisul Shura(.002)

Madzhlisul Shura(.208)

Sunzhensky Sector(.446)

Sunzhensky Sector(.063)

Northeastern Front(.002)

Northeastern Front(.053)

Ingush Jamaat(.446)

Ingush Jamaat(.063)

Itum-KalinskiiDistrict(.002)

Vilaiyat Dagestan(.050)

Amanat Jamaat(.446)

Amanat Jamaat(.063)

Shelkovoi village(.002)

Special FightingUnits Commanders

(.041)

Karabulak Sector(.446)

Karabulak Sector(.063)

Borz Regiment(.002)

Caucasus Emirate(CE) Leadership

(.038)

Khalifat Jamaat(.446)

109

Khalifat Jamaat(.063)

Sernovodsk Jamaat(.002)

Amir/Vali of theVilaiyat

Gyalgyaiche

Jamaat Siddik(.446)

Jamaat Siddik(.063)

Western Front(.002)

Itum-KalinskiiDistrict(.024)

Ossetiyan Jamaatof Ossetiya Kataibal-Khoul (.360)

Ossetiyan Jamaatof Ossetiya Kataibal-Khoul (.051)

Army of Ichkeria(.002)

Urus Martan Sector(.023)

Operational GroupIraf(.360)

Operational GroupIraf

(.051)

Amir/Vali of theVilaiyat

Gyalgyaiche

Dargo Village(.019)

Operational GroupSunzha (.360)

Operational GroupSunzha (.051)

Naur District(.002)

Shelkovoi Village(.019)

Ossetian Jamaat(.350)

Figure 21. Centrality, informal network

In observing the centrality measures in figure 21 (above),

the Madzhlisil Shura (the center node of the diagram above),

which is the governing body of the CE, had the highest

centrality, as one would expect. The Northeastern Front scored

high as well, but then the Dagestani Vilaiyat (central blue node)

and the Special Unit Fighting Commanders came in behind them as

the best brokers (organizationally). It is interesting to note

that the Borz Regiment (or special fighting unit; the equivalent

of special purpose forces), originally commanded by Ruslan

Gelayev (d. February 28, 2004) no longer exists, but it displays

a high closeness centrality. This may be due to the fact that

individuals who once served in the regiment and now belong to

other various organizations are central to the overall network.

110

Identification of Subnetworks: A visual assessment of the formal

organizational network suggests that there it contains a

substantial number of subgroups, based on their affiliation with

the main Madzhisul Shura, as well as the relationships between

individuals who are shura members.

Figure 22. Network of formal ties (CE unit to CE unit)

In order to identify subgroups within the network, we used one of

the Newman group clustering algorithms (see Figure 23).1 The

1 This measure (Clauset, Newman, and Moore) appeared to provide the best fit of the data by the four measures selected to locate a subgroup: Clauset, Newman, and Moore; Girvan-Newman; Components; and Cliques.

111

highly connected formal network would be extremely difficult to

deconstruct, but we hypothesized that the informal relationships

that tie the network together have the potential to be extremely

useful in obtaining a more accurate clustering coefficient,

considering that the informal network is more decentralized, and

the leadership for many of these cells appear to rotate within

the larger organization.

Figure 23. Network of informal CE organizations to CE organizations (relationships through people)

Brokerage: We attempted to calculate the brokerage potential of

the individuals after removing the deceased agents. Brokerage is

the idea that “some actors are more likely to control the flow of

112

resource than others” and “whose removal will fragment the

network (Everton, 2012, p. 253).” There are various metrics that

measure brokerage (and fragmentation) potential. One, cutpoints,

which ORA calls “boundary spanners,” are those actors whose

removal will disconnect the network. Five such cutpoints are

depicted in Figure 23:. Ali Taziev (captured in 2010 and in

prison for life), Akhmed Zakayev (not a good candidate for

targeting, as he resides in the U.K., protected under political

refugee status, Assad, Daud Akhmadov (now deceased), and Asker

Djappuyev (deceased as of 2011).

Figure 24. Boundary spanner, potential; visually, red is the lowest, and then moves through the visual spectrum to the blue nodes, which have the highest values.

113

Challenges to analysis

Data Sources: It was difficult to find enough familial, kinship,

and teip/tukhum data to conduct the requisite analysis. While the

data indicates that the Benoy teip is a very powerful and

influential tribe (i.e. from the President of Chechnya and many

of his rivals and henchmen), the ties do not always indicate a

positive relationship (e.g., the familial feud between the

Kadyrovs and the Yamadayevs), and currently it is difficult to

infer a negative relationship between one individual and another,

particularly in the available software. While teip and tukhum

relationships may be intuitive for a native or an expert, it was

not apparent to us as we were data mining for sources.

Manually coding data requires that analysts create one

and/or two-mode networks (e.g., agent to agent, or agent to

organization), based on readings or by extrapolating data from

other reporting to infer relationships, that are usually binary

in nature; the value of one indicates a relationship, whereas the

value of zero indicates no relationship. We had the challenge of

both manually coded data, as well as the graphs created from the

relationships identified in Palantir. This created a data

114

ingestion problem; not all of the organizations that were coded

in Palantir matched the manually coded organizations, which was

generated to reflect the hierarchy of the terrorist network in

the Caucasus Emirate. It would have been easier to stick with

just one mode of data sourcing; either Palantir or manually coded

data.

Faults with data (Structured data): The fault of the GTD lies in

that it is not capable of distinguishing militant activity vs.

criminal activity in all cases (some were attributed to the CE,

while others were perpetrated by unidentified groups), and the

data source or feed contributing to the GTD events may have

changed over time (as proof, there were more events to resolve

after a certain point in time, and duplicate reporting became

more significant after the mid-2000s). Also, the grid

coordinates listed for certain attacks (i.e. pipeline or railway

attacks), when double-checked were not reported accurately. There

were also several catastrophic events (i.e. the Novsky Express

Bombing) that were not listed when the events were reported to

115

have occurred. As good as structured data is and as much as it

contributed to the analysis, it is still flawed.

Faults with data (Unstructured data): The unstructured data

lacked accurate numbers and grid coordinates. This was

especially true in events that may have been law enforcement

events or events initiated by military action, which would have

been extremely valuable data to understand the context of who

initiated the action. While utilizing Kavkaz as a data source may

have provided fidelity to the networks, it was clearly biased, as

it has been mentioned previously that it serves as the media

outlet for the Caucasus Emirate. However, it was a good source

of relational information, as well as biographical data for

individuals in the network. Unstructured data is unfortunate in

that it lends itself to bias on the part of the analyst; it may

be easy to get myopically focused on one individual, and then

pull additional reporting to substantiate relationships he/she

may have, at the expense of ignoring other players who may be

influential within the network, or be brokers to external

resources.

116

Language: While Russian media content appeared to be fairly

accurate, we experienced challenges with translation. Google

Translate was employed to assist in translation, but some

fidelity was lost in coding miss-matched phrases, and made

structuring data a challenge. Having a regional expert on hand

early on in the project will lend itself to better fidelity and

understanding of context.

Ontology: The SOCOM ontology used to determine relational data

(i.e. limiting the context of relationships) does not address

some of the political and criminal activity and relationships

expressed in this case study. The network had elements of

government, criminal, and other activities which could have

contributed more to the SNA portion, had it been effectively

incorporated. Varying the degrees of relationships could have

been clarified with more specific ontology (i.e. physical enemies

versus political opponents, etc.) may have been useful in a more

accurate determination of centralities.

Classified data sources: there was a dearth of data sources to

determine who was detained, as well as a lack of military and law

117

enforcement data in order to compare criminal and terrorist

operations. Classified networks may have more resources

available to study this, and a more specific partnership with

Russian law enforcement and military may be required in order to

procure this type of information. Comparing when the Russian

government was conducting operations as opposed to inferring them

from the timeline where the CE High Value Targets (HVTs) were

killed would have provided greater fidelity on the effect of

Russian military operations.

SNA: An aspect of analysis within Palantir that was not addressed

is the ability to infer relationships through events; i.e. if an

individual participated in an attack, kidnapping, or murder

attempt of someone else, and there was a “victim of” the event,

we can assume that the participant and the victims are enemies.

However, the linkages between the event and individuals would

need to be recoded in Palantir before they are exported for

ingestion, but as there were more than 1,500 events with

incomplete participant data coded for the original Winter Olympic

project, we only used data coded from articles and not the Global

118

Terrorism Database import used to retrieve such a large number of

attack events. Political entities appear to have been calculated

on the initial centrality graphs, because they were included in

the analysis as there was much more teip and tukhum data on these

individuals. However, they were removed, as we could not

quantify the ties that they have with the CE, nor could we make

the relationships directional, and take negative ties into

consideration (i.e. Ramzan Kadyrov, Vladimir Putin, some other

significant political figures in Russian politics, as well as a

few some other individuals who were listed as kidnapping

victims). Evaluating negative relationships (i.e. ones of

opposition, whether political otherwise) could provide a valuable

metric in assessing the significance of nodes.

Chapter 6: Holistic courses of action and conclusion

The studies covered in chapter six were conducted with the

intent of providing courses of action in which specific nodes

would be targeted in order to assist in the deconstruction of the

CE network. In undertaking the study, I was initially biased in

119

favor of lethal targeting, especially considering that the source

of regional violence is an ideologically driven non-state enemy,

whose theo-ideology seems impervious to external influence. As

previously noted in the Roberts and Everton paper, critics of

utilizing SNA for lethal targeting cite that SNA does not always

utilize comprehensive levels of data, and that lethal targeting

often results in increased levels of violence, and “neglects the

significance of utilizing the network for rebuilding,

reconstructing, and rehabilitating societies” (2011, p. 3). In

addition, considering the violence in the Caucasus as a wicked

problem, the causal loop diagram (from chapter three) indicates

that lethal targeting, while appearing to be effective in the

short term, is not a viable long-term solution to the current

status quo. Russian non-intervention, with the possibility of

contending with the fallout of violence and internally displaced

peoples, is not an alternative. If Russia were to sacrifice what

may be budding democracies in the Caucasus to fundamentalist

Islam, then the Islamists will have a foothold with which to

encroach closer and closer to Moscow, no longer contained in the

periphery of the former buffer states of the Soviet Union. With

120

respect to both lethal and nonlethal targeting, to including my

own personal experience with effects-based targeting in

Afghanistan, I wanted to focus the recommendations on methods

that may not currently be employed in the region. The options

presented below are primarily non-lethal, short and long term,

proactive and reactive. That terrorism will be perpetrated in

Russia by the CE is a given, but the manner in which it is dealt

with will be judged on the world stage, and will either suppress

the violence or fan the fire.

Short-term strategy

Proposals to decisively deal with dark networks are a topic

of never-ending discussion; suggestions abound, such as the

removal of decisive nodes, decapitation of the organization,

disruption of communication linkages, etc. However, when dealing

with a network or organization where there appears to be a dearth

of intelligence as to its function and structure, other more

feasible countermeasures may generate better results. Increasing

efforts in intelligence gathering, facilitating ease of reporting

and sharing of information would need it would be good initial

121

steps, in addition to a quick and defeating response to terrorism

attacks as soon as they occur.

Intelligence collection and analysis: In this increasingly open

source world, where the quality of classified information is

quickly losing ground to the collective information available to

those who can discover and process it, it will become more

imperative for skilled analysts capable of conducting visual and

social network analysis to partner with regional experts in order

to form “tiger teams” capable of looking at their regional

problem sets in unconventional and innovative ways. In focusing

on organizations subordinate to the Caucasus Emirate during both

of the analytical studies, it was painfully apparent that there

is a dearth of biographical data on the CE leadership, as well as

the younger leadership within the vilaiyats and jama’ats. Other

relations which were not explored to the extent that they could

have been include the ties to criminal activities, as well as

external sources of funding and support (i.e. supporting

charities, or charitable “front” organizations). Codifying and

illuminating these other networks could be crucial in curbing the

source of weapons, ammunition, logistics, and other critical

122

resources, especially utilizing information which may be readily

available on social media. While it is possible that this type

of information is known by local law enforcement professionals

and Russian Federal Security Services (FSB), this information is

not openly available to analysts outside of those organizations

(and certainly not without considerable data-mining). Analytical

efforts could assist in the identification of key individuals

within the network, and information and intelligence gathering

efforts could clarify the kinship ties that were missing in the

analysis. Collection and analysis would be critical in

identifying rising leaders and brokers, and the manner in which

they can be engaged. Jon Arquilla has lectured on the

significance of “harvesting from the edges” (2012), where biology

has afforded for the most genetic variety and survivability.

What is true in terms of biology is also true in terms of human

capital; law enforcement and security agencies must get into the

murky gray realm where individuals exist in the network as a

result of strong ties that they cannot sever, be it ties of

friendship or family, as well as those whose livelihood depends

on coexisting with terrorist groups; logisticians, financiers,

123

and religious leaders. By incorporating these individuals into

informant networks, even if only for in extremis use, and

affording them the protection and resources at their disposal,

law enforcement agencies could be provided more advanced warning

for the trigger mechanism of major catastrophic events. Human

intelligence (or HUMINT) efforts are definitely not a discipline

in which time sensitive requirements are easily answered; source

operations take time to develop and establish, and are often not

easily conducted in non-permissive environments. But when

effectively applied effectively, the rewards can far surpass that

of any other intelligence discipline, and offer the opportunity

to employ deception, misinformation, and other “seeding”

operations which may serve to fragment the CE.

Social Network Analysis: Right now, information sharing on the CE

between Russia and countries within the Global Counter-Terrorism

Forces (GCTF) may be nonexistent. Information sharing could

allow coalition forces more access and more accurate information

with which to develop a more comprehensive SNA picture, and would

afford Russian security forces access to Western analysts and

analytical tools. This could result in new ideas and strategies

124

on countering CE messaging, as well as determining which nodes to

attack. As an example, ORA has a micro-simulation tool, and if

an analyst has accurately depicted a network, they can ascertain

which nodes best assist in the diffusion of ideas. If this tool

could be further developed to depict competing ideas (which could

be seeded in the network), then the micro-simulations could

assist in determining where to inject various themes and messages

in order to fragment the network. SNA has potential which has

yet to be explored, based on the lack of proficient

practitioners, particularly in the Department of Defense.

Attacking CE logistics: Monitoring the logistics of terrorism is

not something that law enforcement has down to a science;

studying sales (from the perspective of industry and services)

makes sense in order to identify which nodes would have the

means, motive, and opportunity with respect to the operations

they plan to execute. The monitoring of materiel that could be

used in the creation of weapons of mass destruction makes sense,

from a legal perspective. Bar codes and required information

could be employed, much as FEDEX and UPS use tracking information

to monitor the movements of their packages; if states can

125

document and control the sale and purchase of pseudoephedrine in

order to deter the processing and sale of methamphetamines, then

it seems intuitive that the same would be applicable to

electronics and goods capable of use in the construction of

weapons of mass destruction. Strict rules on goods that can be

employed as explosive precursors (i.e. ammonium nitrate), in

addition to other items identified by monitoring terrorist

literature (such as Inspire magazine) should be enacted and

enforced order to reduce the efficacy of terrorist tactics,

techniques and procedures.

Hitting the terrorists in the wallet: according to multiple news

agencies, in November of 2013 the State Duma approved a bill

requiring the relatives and close associates of those who die

perpetrating a terrorist act to pay reparations or have their

property confiscated, as a measure to curb terrorism prior to the

Olympic Games (Anonymous, 2013). In theory, this is to preempt

the would-be terrorist with post-mortem repercussions that they

now have to take into consideration; trading a hefty fine for

your family for a place in paradise. This could either result in

the desired effect of deterring would-be bombers, or it could

126

further emphasize how disconnected those in the State Duma are

from the families of the bombers, who may already be economically

disadvantaged.

Downplay the effects of terror: Americans have unusually

sentimental reactions when it comes to terrorism; memorials

eulogizing the dead and the sacrifices of the victims do more to

remind us of incidents and allow negative feelings associated

with the terrorism to persist. Taking a lesson from the

Russians, consider their response to the March 29th, 2010

Lubyanka and Park Kultury subway bombings in Moscow. Reporting

indicates that although the attacks resulted in 38 dead and 60

wounded, the subway stations were up and running by 5pm (Huey,

2010). While this may be psychologically unthinkable (or

unacceptable) in the United States, it may be part of an

effective Russian recipe to mitigate terrorism. Consider the

effects of a multiple-vehicle accident on the highway. While

passers-by slow down to rubberneck, they do more to disrupt the

flow of traffic and commerce, than if they had merely ignored the

scene. The cleanup crews eventually come and remove the debris

127

and impediment to traffic, and the next day, the same area would

look as though nothing had happened, returning traffic patterns

to their status quo. If terror is permitted to permeate everyday

thought and is a regular consideration, then the perpetrators

have achieved their immediate goals of inciting panic and fear in

the civilian population. The best reaction may be no reaction,

denying the terrorists the validation that they desperately seek.

Long-term strategy

President Vladimir Putin commented during a recent interview

that “terrorism has no nationality or religion…the problem is

with these people’s extremist views” (Dewey, 2013). He then

iterated that the “U.S. and Russian security services regularly

exchange information”, and that he hopes that the Boston

terrorist attack “will give a fresh impetus to expand this

cooperation”. This may prove difficult, as the relations between

U.S. and Russia have not been ideal, and are further complicated

by other sources of friction (most recently Syria). Whatever our

differences, concerned governments should have platforms by which

to communicate security concerns when they arise, especially with

respect to the other countries’ citizens or non-resident aliens.

128

Countering terrorism in the long term did not truly appear to be

any country’s strategic concern prior to 9-11. Even after that

attack, and with the perception that the significance of

terrorist groups has increased, a long term counterterrorism

strategy has yet to come into preeminence. The U.S. policymakers

and security experts resort to short-term Band-Aids including

direct action and strategic strikes, without making the

calculated projections, coordination with other nations, and

investments required over time in order to deter and manage

future threats. Russia is also resorting to similar Band-Aids,

though their threat is much closer to home. In line with

Helfstein’s model, the success of counterterrorism operations

will hinge on attacking the message, and making extremism and the

correlating violence less appealing. He opined that the West was

successful at “invalidating communism”, even though it took the

better part of a century, and that only in understanding the

ideology that drives Islamists will we be able to successfully

counter their message (2012). The same application of

containment may not be effective against a non-state actor, but

the following courses of action may have a similar effect. It

129

will require protracted effort over a long duration, but may be

the only option, short of the genocide of every identifiable

jihadist on the planet.

Politicizing the CE: A few governments have managed to

successfully establish dialogue with the insurgent groups who

once sought to depose them. Consider the establishment of the

autonomous region in the Moro region (Philippines), or the

legitimization of terrorist organizations as political entities

(i.e. Palestine’s Hamas, or Sinn Fein for the Irish Republican

Army). While the CE’s ideology and intention of establishing a

caliphate does not necessarily resonate with most of the Caucasus

population, those who continue to consider it a social movement

united against Russia for self-determination may be the most

supportive of their efforts. This indicates the best point of

intervention may be changing the way in which Russia intervenes,

which may (in turn) change the perception of its legitimacy in

the eyes of the population. While it may be difficult to change

the current way in which Russia conducts security operations and

lethal targeting, it may be feasible to change the political

process. If Putin truly has fears of an Islamist takeover of the

130

Caucasus governments, he could ensure the inclusion of minority

interests in all government branches by ensuring that all ethnic

and tribal entities are assured representation, and the Russian

government could facilitate that transparent and internationally

monitored elections are fairly conducted.

Politicizing violent extremist organizations is one way in

which to include them while subjecting them to de-radicalizing

public opinion. Filippo Dionigi argues that

Islamist movements, by interacting with international norms,are being progressively socialized within the international society, rather than remain isolated or even alienated from it (2011, p. 14).

His study focused primarily on Hezbollah, but Hamas, the Muslim

Brotherhood, and other extremist entities have been politicized.

Once politicized, they are subject to external influence, many

become vulnerable to public opinion, and may not be as inclined

to resort to their military arm to enact change (Hersberg-Rothe,

2013). While an open invitation to participate in the political

process may not be seen as anything other than a farce at this

point, if the governments of the Russian Republics begin dialogue

with the leaders of their respective vilaiyat (the CE governing

131

body), this could fragment the solidarity of the movement. There

may be some trepidation that recognition of individuals within

the CE may in some way validate or legitimize them, but in order

to enact political change, it may fall back to the people of the

Caucasus to push for free elections, and it may also fall to

Russia to be open to political concessions.

Legitimize and increase law enforcement and judicial efforts:

The CE media makes it a routine to point out or capitalize on the

injustices perpetrated by security forces against Muslims in the

Caucasus. While police brutality is not confined to the North

Caucasus, even in nations with better transparency, the outrage

of the greater society at this type of violence is universal.

When transparency is not very good, as in the republics of the

North Caucasus, accompanied by a historical precedence of law

enforcement resorting to harsh methods and violations of basic

human rights (Hahn, 2013), then the potential for retaliatory

violence and action increases. This can only be remedied with

more effective policing and law enforcement, with increased

understanding and enforcement of rights. Empathetic security

officials, to include those who may come from a variety of ethnic

132

and religious backgrounds, may appeal to those who recognize

Shari’a law, and establishing a mediating board between secular

and Shari’a justice systems may improve the perception that

religious context is not being taken into consideration.

The proliferation of automatic weapons, anti-tank weapons,

and insurgent tactics, techniques and procedures makes law

enforcement more of a challenge in areas contending with an

active insurgency. While it is largely understood that it is not

the licit purchase of weapons that results in the bulk of violent

acts, this should not preclude action to prevent future acts of

violence. Gun control measures (while never a popular option in

the United States) could have a deterrent effect to those who

would use weapons against the security forces. Unfortunately for

the region, “the possession of small arms is a tradition in the

North Caucasus” (Karasik & Moroney, 2007). While weapons buy-

back programs in the Caucasus may raise eyebrows and garner a few

laughs, the government could make an effort to stymie the flow of

illicit arms into the region, in close coordination with the

neighboring states, which may (in fact) be the ones supplying the

arms with the intent of keeping the region destabilized. On May

133

4-5 of 2011, Russian and Abkhazian forces reportedly uncovered an

elaborate plot with a healthy weapons stockpile coordinated

between the Georgian Intelligence Services (under the Saakashvili

government) and the CE (Hahn, 2013). The idea that a country

which had once been considered a strategic partner (Georgia) is

now aiding Islamists may seem unsettling, but taking into

consideration that their interests are closer to home it may be

easier to rationalize. Only through international pressure and

regional stakeholder involvement will the flow of support to the

CE from the outside be stymied. Until then, it will fall

primarily to the shoulders of the Russian Intelligence Services,

local law enforcement, and military divisions to enforce and

improve the state of security in the region.

Change security force structure: The CE is currently operating as

a swarm; a seemingly amorphous but well-structured,

decentralized, and pulsing entity, capable of engaging an enemy

from all sides (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, p. 3). During a lecture,

Arquilla opined that in order to effectively combat swarms, an

organization that is similarly structured may be optimal

(Arquilla, 2012). In line with this, Russian military and

134

policing doctrine would have to undergo a fundamental change

which may result in a more optimal force structure, or (the

alternative) regress into a KGB-infiltration style organization

with operatives and informants in every facet of the Islamists

life. Western logic often times includes the application of a

political and military solution for problems which are not

grounded in the other societies’ values and norms (i.e Iraq and

Afghanistan). Many underdeveloped countries are not necessarily

ready for a traditional, transparent democracy, and may require

warlords and stronger local militias in order to ensure security

(a la the Kadyrovites). While this may not appeal to those

accustomed to democratic ideals, it may be the only option to

provide stability, however temporary, to the ungoverned spaces

that exist in underdeveloped third world countries. The caution

for defaulting to this course of action is also applicable to the

social movement theory; even when analyzed properly, these are

courses of action which are not necessarily controllable, and may

have undesired consequences.

Increased bottom-up government transparency: How do we go about

addressing the grievances of the populace utilizing information

135

and communications technology (ICT), especially in locations

where internet penetration may be less than optimal? It has to

be considered seriously, if only because of the potential. While

the level of western intervention into the North Caucasus has

been better in recent years than it has in the past, they still

receive much scrutiny and outside intervention may not be the

best mechanism for change. In order to improve relations between

the population and security forces, major grievances should be

addressed, and could utilize organizations that are already well-

established. One such organization could be the Mothers of

Dagestan for Human Rights (MDHR), which is also endorsed by the

Human Rights Watch (Cartner, 2009). This organization has the

mission of gathering information about police and security agency

abuses committed against locals believed to be supporting the

insurgent movement. If the grievances that dissidents harbor

against the government include improper police procedures,

interrogations, beatings, and the disappearance of loved ones,

then this non-governmental organization may be able to provide a

venue by which to accurately reckon for factual numbers and

events. If the MDHR is able to accurately account for events, it

136

may serve to advise the public and international community to

pressure Moscow into taking these accusations more seriously.

Providing this level of transparency may also spur other NGO

involvement; more and more residents of the North Caucasus are

turning to the European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) in order to

address their grievances (Bullough, 2012). The perception of

government targeting of Russian journalists (at least, the ones

that are critical of the current government) is pervasive, and

there have been documented cases in which it was ruled that the

Russian government has committed “political murder”. If a more

accurate database could be populated with possible cases and

background information, then international tribunals could

accurately investigate the allegations and leverage pressure

against the Russian government. If the database is wiki-enabled,

then locals can also report on individuals’ blood feuds and the

possibility of external forces (including personal grievances)

being a contributing factor to the violence.

Use of ethical hackers: International governing bodies should do

more to establish international laws regarding the internet.

137

While preservation of the freedom of speech and expression on the

Internet should be paramount, no groups or organizations should

have the ability to wreak terror on civil societies in which

innocent people could suffer consequences. Online companies

frequently leave electronic monitoring (cookies) in order to

determine frequency and scale of sales; if intelligence

organizations can effectively monitor and identify individuals

based on their propensity to visit and communicate on extremist

websites, there may be more opportunities to interdict and

identify terrorist acts prior to their execution. While U.S.

letter agencies may be monitoring and attempting to bring down

terrorist websites, or disrupting online communities which

encourage violent jihad, a more effective mechanism could be to

co-opt concerned citizens to form an “Anonymous-esqe” brigade of

global citizen-volunteers who are interested in the protection of

innocent populations. In advanced societies, there are always

civic-minded people who are truly concerned about preserving

their way of life, from neighborhood watch organizations to crime

stoppers, so mobilization of the masses may be an extremely

effective way to counter terrorism. Demystifying reporting

138

procedures, affording normal citizens the ability to report on

those who would perpetrate violence, providing them an anonymous

and web-based venue to counter extremist information operations,

and motivating capable citizens to act against websites that

advocate the use of violence as their means to an end could help

the Russian government’s efforts in countering terrorism. If

nation states must pay for such expertise and grow a field of

ethical hackers, the benefits could far outweigh the cost with

the resultant benefits to security. Attacking the

Kavkazcenter.com has been met with a degree of success (Pauli,

2012). While a more prolonged attack may cripple the CE’s

ability to 1) produce a cohesive message, 2) capitalize on the

appearance of large terrorist attacks, and 3) create disunion and

discord in leadership, it could also inadvertently backfire, and

result in continued CE support from third countries who adamantly

insist on free speech, not matter what the message. But

coordinated network attacks, in conjunction with other major

events or operations, have the power to disrupt the leadership

hierarchy. Back in 2010, Dokku Umarov, reportedly stepped down,

and then the kavkazcenter.com website was taken down and chaos

139

ensued as Dokku Umarov retracted his statement, blaming the

Russian government, while attempting to reassert control over the

CE. The potential fallout from misinformation campaigns could

work to further destabilize the CE.

What not to do

The consolidation of terrorists into detention facilities

presents a problem, particularly for those who are not serving

life sentences. The questions that accompany their sentence

include 1) is it possible to de-radicalize them during their

confinement, 2) how do you prevent their ideology from impacting

and radicalizing other prisoners, and 3) how should reintegration

be conducted post-confinement? Studies show varying degrees of

and difficulty in measuring recidivism (Horgan and Braddock,

2010), largely differing from country to country. Michael Brown

recommended a layered approach in his Naval Postgraduate School

thesis, including transparency and awareness of “the

megacommunity”, to include the people and organizations therein,

and involvement of not only the judicial system and security

agencies (such as DHS), but also organizations such as the

American Civil Liberties Union, and the American Psychological

140

Association (2011). Some convicted terrorist in the United

States are sentenced to life prison terms in the ADX Supermax

located in Florence, Colorado, while others receive lesser

sentences and are assigned to other facilities. While indefinite

detention may not be an option, based on lighter sentences

received from plea deals, cooperation with law enforcement, or

good behavior, there is certainly a responsibility to

rehabilitate these individuals prior to reintegration to society,

as well as ensure that there are deterrents to returning to the

theo-ideology or way of life which encouraged terrorist

activities. Russia lacks the advanced judicial and correctional

system of the United States, but it likely has the means to

replicate it, if it desires.

Conclusion

To paraphrase Socrates, “true knowledge exists in knowing

that you know nothing”. During the course of my studies on the

Caucasus Emirate, I embraced the fact that I was at a distinct

disadvantage, having 1) no education on Russian history, language

or culture, and 2) having no practical life experience in the

141

same. The more that I read, the more I came to realize how

completely ignorant most Westerners and pundits are with respect

to the history and culture of this amazing region. It is this

very region that is in grave danger of continued violence and

political upheaval, especially if the Salafi theo-ideology

continues to encourage the violence in the name of establishing a

caliphate. This thesis has attempted to frame the problem in the

Caucasus, define how outside agencies may best conduct effective

intervention, and identify tools which might illustrate how nodes

relate to one another; socially, ideologically, and

psychologically. While the Olympics in Sochi looms in the

immediate future, and Russian security forces may not be in a

position to affect what will happen within the next few months, a

change to the long term strategy of fighting terrorism may reap

the greatest benefits, not just in the Caucasus, but globally.

142

Works Cited

Abraham, C.H.S. and Kuhlow, S. (2013, March 20). Chechen Separatists and the 2014 Winter Olympics. Unpublished draft.

Abraham, C.H.S. and Zoto, Edval (2013, May 8). Clans and Power in Chechnya. Unpublished draft.

Amland, B.H. and Gronnevet, J. (2012, April 20). Anders Breivik details Norway massacre plans, cites Al-Qaeda inspiration. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-04-20/world/35453479_1_utoya-island-worst-peacetime-massacre-anders-breivik.

Anonymous. (2013, November 3). Putin signs law requiring terrorists’ relatives to pay for damages. Russia Today. Retrieved from http://rt.com/politics/putin-law-relatives-terrorists-166/.

Anonymous. (2011, May 27). US slaps sanctions on Caucasus

Emirate as violence continues in North Caucasus. The Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved from http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37981.

Anonymous. (2012, May 10). Sochi Olympics under threat of bombing. Georgia Times. Retrieved from http://www.georgiatimes.info/en/articles/75847.html.

Anonymous. (2013, May 24). Revealed: Tamerlan Tsarnaev went to Dagestan in 2012 to try and join a militant group but had a change of heart and returned to U.S. Mail Online. Retrieved fromhttp://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2330721/Revealed-Tamerlan-Tsarnaev-went-Dagestan-2012-try-join-militant-group-change-heart-returned-U-S.html.

Arquilla, J. (2012, October). Warfare in the information age. Lecture presented at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

143

Arquilla, J. & Ronfeldt, D. (2000). Swarming & the future of conflict. Rand National Defense Research Institute, Santa Monica, CA.

Baser, B. (2009, November 8). Diasporas and their links to political violence and terrorism. Retrieved from http://www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/2581.

Bhattacharya, S. (2013, April 12). Al Qaeda video resurfaces claiming how easy it is to buy guns in U.S. CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/11/politics/al-qaeda-video/index.html.

Bongar, B., Brown, L. M., Beutler, L. E., Breckenridge, J. N., and Zimbardo, P. G. (Eds.). (2007). Psychology of terrorism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Borum, R. (2004). Psychology of terrorism. Tampa, FL: University of South Florida.

Brooke, J. (2013, May 22). Dagestan: Russia’s wild but beguilingsouthern frontier. Voice of America. Retrieved from http://blogs.voanews.com/russia-watch/2013/05/22/dagestan-russias-wild-but-beguiling-southern-frontier/

Brown, M. A. (2011, March). Freed: ripples of the convicted and released terrorist in America. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.

Bullough, O. (2012, August 29). Inside Chechnya: Putin’s reign of terror. Retrieved from http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2012/08/inside-chechnya-putins-reign-terror.

Burds, J. (2007). Soviet War against `Fifth Columnists': The Case of Chechnya, 1942-4. Journal of Contemporary History. 42(267), 267-314. Retrieved from http://jch.sagepub.com/content/42/2/267.

Capra, F. (1982). The turning point. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

144

Carley, K. M., Reminga, J., Storrick, J., and Columbus, D. ORA (Version 2.3.6) [computer software]. Pittsburg, PA: Carnegie Mellon University.

Cartner, H. (2009, August 20). Russia: investigate Dagestan arson attack. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/08/20/russia-investigate-dagestan-arson-attack

Cho, D. & Gardener, A. (2007, April 21). An isolated boy in a world of strangers. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/20/AR2007042002366.html.

Conklin, J. (1996). The age of design. Retrieved from http://cognexus.org/ageofdesign.pdf.

Conklin, J. (2005). Wicked problems and social complexity. In Dialogue mapping: building shared understanding of wicked problems. (1-20). Retrieved from http://www.cognexus.org.

Corera, G. (2013, September 13). Al-Qaeda chief Zawahiri urges ‘lone-wolf’ attacks on US. BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24083314.

Dangermond, J. (1999). ArcGIS (Version 10.1)[computer software]. Redlands, CA: Esri.

DeAngelis, T. (2009, November). Understanding terrorism. AmericanPsychological Association. 40(10), 60. Retrieved from http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/11/terrorism.aspx.

De Carbonnel, A. (2013, October 31). Insight: Putin targets Dagestan insurgents as Olympics loom. Reuters. Retrieved fromhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/31/us-olympics-sochi-dagestan-insight-idUSBRE99U04O20131031.

Denning, D. (2011, September 26). Axioms of Social Networks. Unpublished draft.

Dewey, C. (2013, April 25). Putin’s 9 most notable quotes from in his five-hour Q&A. The Washington Post. Retrieved from

145

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/04/25/putins-9-most-notable-quotes-from-in-his-five-hour-qa/.

Edwards, A. (2012). Lessons learnt: dissident Irish Republicans and British security. Wiltshire, U.K.: Arts and Humanities Research Council.

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. & Jones, C. (2008, fall). Assessing thedangers of illicit networks: why Al-Qaida may be less threatening than many think. International Security, 33(2), 7-44.

Elder, M. (2013, July 3). Russian Islamist Dokku Umarov calls for attacks on 2014 Winter Olympics. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/russia-islamist-attack-olympics-sochi?CMP=twt_gu

Everton, S. F. (2012). Disrupting Dark Networks. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Filipov, D. (2002, December 2). New fears Chechens may seek nukes. Boston, MA: Boston Globe. Retrieved from http://nuclearno.com/text.asp?4526.

Foster, P. and Parfitt, T. (2013, April 20). Boston bomber arrested: Tamerlan Tsarnaev's hateful rage behind American dream. The Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10007975/Boston-bomber-arrested-Tamerlan-Tsarnaevs-hateful-rage-behind-American-dream.html.

Freni, S. J. (2012). Examining the radicalization of Chechen Separatists during the resistance movement. Student Pulse. 2(02),1-2. Retrieved from http://www.studentpulse.com/a?id=182.

Fuller, L. (2012, June 20). Russian government slashes funding for North Caucasus. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. Retrieved fromhttp://www.rferl.org/content/russia-north-caucasus-funding-slashed-/24620406.html.

Gladwell, M. (2002). The tipping point: how little things can make a big difference. Little, Brown and Company; New York, NY. Retrieved from http://www.amazon.com.

146

Global Terrorism Database, Data set of incidents in the USSR & the Newly Independent States (NIS). http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?region=12.

Goble, P. (2010, February 24). Moscow’s Muslim slums now breeding grounds for despair. The Moscow Times. Retrieved from http://www.themoscowtimes.com/columns/article/moscows-muslim-slums-now-breeding-grounds-for-despair/400345.html.

Granovetter, M. S. (1973, May). The strength of weak ties. The American Journal of Sociology, 78(6), 1360-80. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hahn, G. (2011, March 11). The OVKBK’S Sochi vector. In Islam, Islamism, and politics and Eurasia report, 36. Monterey Terrorism Researchand Education Program (MonTREP). Retrieved from http://csis.org/files/publication/110311_Hahn_IIPER_36.pdf.

Hahn, G. (2013). The Caucasus Emirate: Global Jihadism in Russia’s North Caucasus and beyond. Manuscript submitted for publication.

Helfstein, S. (2012, February). Edges of radicalization; individuals, networks and ideas in violent extremism. Retrieved from http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/edges-of-radicalization-ideas-individuals-and-networks-in-violent-extremism.

Hirsi-Ali, A. (2013, January 17). Raised on hatred. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/opinion/global/ayaan-hirsi-ali-morsis-comments-on-jews.html?_r=1&.

Horgan, J., and Braddock, K. (2010). Rehabilitating the terrorists?: challenges in assessing the effectiveness of de-radicalization programs. In Terrorism and Political Violence. 22. 267-291. Retrieved from http://scholar.google.com/scholar_url?hl=en&q=http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/Derad.pdf&sa=X&scisig=AAGBfm39a3Y0APBunsDacTKKeW7cLGWJ3Q&oi=scholarr.

Huey, J. H. (2010, March 30). Learning from the Russians; response and reaction to the subway bombings. Retrieved from

147

http://www.noquarterusa.net/blog/43565/learning-from-the-russians-response-and-reaction-to-the-subway-bombings/.

Ivens, M. (1975, July 25). Theo-ideology. The Spectator Archive. Retrieved from http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/26th-july-1975/16/theo-ideology.

Jackson, B. A. (2006). Groups, networks, or movements: a command-and-control-driven approach to classifying terrorist organizations and its application to Al Qaeda. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 29, 241-62. Arlington, VA: Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.

James, S. D. (2009, April 16). Psychology of Virginia Tech, Columbine killers still baffles experts. Retrieved from http://abcnews.go.com/Health/MindMoodNews/story?id=7345607&page=1.

Karasik, T., and Moroney, J. (2007). Case study: the North Caucasus. In Ungoverned territories: understanding and reducing terrorism risks. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.

Kardirgamar, A. (2009, May 18). Tamil Tiger leader killed; Sri Lanka claimsvictory in 25-year civil war. Retrieved from http://www.democracynow.org/2009/5/18/tamil_tiger_leader_killed_sri_lanka.

Keim, D. A., Mansmann, F., Stoffel, A., and Ziegler, H. (2008). Visual Analytics. University of Konstanz, Germany. Retrieved from http://infovis.uni-konstanz.de.

Khan, B. (2008, March 30). The Bilad-e-Khurasan in making. Retrieved from http://www.grandestrategy.com/2009/06/research-paper-by-bilal-khan-paper-is.html.

Khorasan. (2013). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/316850/Khorasan .

Lee, D. W. (2013, January-March). A social movement approach to unconventional warfare. Special Warfare. 27(1), 29-34. Retrieved from http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive.html.

148

Lia, B. (2008) Architect of global jihad: the life of al-Qaida strategist Abu Mus’abal-Suri. New York, NY: Columbia University Press

McGregor, A. (2006, September 14). Military Jama’ats in the Northern Caucasus: a continuing threat. Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved from http://www.jamestown.org/fileadmin/Recent_Reports/Trans_amd_Speaker_NCC09142006/McGregor-14Sep06.pdf

Malashenko, A. (2013, November 7). Islamic terrorism in Russia.

Lecture presented at Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA.

Markendonov, S. (2011, February 19). Yeltsin’s complicated legacy in the Caucasus. Retrieved from http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/sergei-markedonov/yeltsin%E2%80%99s-complicated-legacy-in-caucasus.

Mayntz, R. (2004, May). Organizational forms of terrorism: hierarchy, network, or a type sui generis? Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne. Retrieved from http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de.

Milward, H.B. & Raab, J. (2006). Dark elements as organizationalproblems: elements of a theory. International Public Management Journal. 9(3), 333-360. Retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/upmj20/current.

McAdams, D. (1998, November 23). Revisiting the U.S. social rights movement: toward a more synthetic understanding of the origins of contention. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Database. Various terrorist organizations. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/start/.

Newman, A. (2013, May 15). Syrian rebel leader filmed eating soldier’s body organs. The New American. Retrieved from http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/asia/item/15411-syrian-rebel-leader-filmed-eating-soldier-s-body-organs.

149

Nichols, J. (1997, February). The Ingush (with notes on the Chechen): background information. University of California Berkely. Retrieved from http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~ingush/ingush_people.html.

Niedowski, E. (2008, December 7). US cannot kill its way to victory, says Gates. The National. Retrieved from http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/americas/us-cannot-kill-its-way-to-victory-says-gates.

Nohria, N., and Robert G. Eccles (Eds.) (1992). Networks and

organizations: structure, form, and action. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

[The] North Caucasus: the challenges of integration (II), Islam, the insurgency and counter-insurgency. (2012, October 19). In Europe Report. 221. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=154097

Oliver, M. (2007, May 9). Palestinian TV uses Mickey Mouse to promote resistance. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/09/usa.israel.

Pedahzur, A. & Perliger, A. (2006, June). The changing nature ofsuicide attacks: a social network perspective. Social Forces. 84(4),1987-2008. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Petersen-Overton, K. J. (2010, June). Inventing the martyr: martyrdom as Palestinian national signifier. Retrieved from http://www.academia.edu/301405/Inventing_the_Martyr_Martyrdom_as_Palestinian_National_Signifier.

Pilkington, E. (2009, September 14). My brother, the Unabomber. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/15/my-brother-the-unabomber.

Raab, J. & Milward, H. B. (2003, October). Dark networks as problems. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 13(4), 413-39.

150

Reed, J. (2011, August 16). Obama says “lone wolf terrorist” biggest U.S. threat. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/16/us-usa-obama-security-idUSTRE77F6XI20110816.

Roberts, N. (2001). Coping with wicked problems: the case of Afghanistan. Learning from International Public Management Reform. 11B, 353-375. Elsevier Science Ltd.

Roberts, N. & Everton, S. F. (2011). Strategies for combating dark networks. Journal of Social Structure. 12. Retrieved from https://cle.nps.edu/access/content/group/af7dc2a3-12d2-4d19-ad16-133fc046b0e3/Readings%20-%20SNA%2C%20ORA%2C%20etc./Roberts%20and%20Everton%202011%20_Strategies_.pdf.

Roggio, B. (2010, August 22). Russians kill top Caucasus

Emirate leader. The Long War Journal. Retrieved from http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/08/russians_kill_top_ca.php.

Roggio, B. (2013, January 24). Two Islamic Caucasus Emirate leaders reported killed in Chechnya. The Long War Journal. Retrieved from http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/01/2_islamic_caucasus_emirates_le.php.

Rosenthal, J. (2013, October 13). Is Libi’s Al-Qaeda manual a blueprint for Arab Spring? Retrieved from http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/al-qaeda-manual-blueprint-arab-spring-abu-anas-al-libi.html#

Russia. (2013). In World almanac of Islamism. American Foreign Policy Council. Retrieved from http://almanac.afpc.org/sites/almanac.afpc.org/files/Russia_0.pdf.

Sacchetti, M. (2013, August 29). Dzhokhar Tsarnaev college buddy is indicted; Robel Phillipos is third to face charges. Retrieved from http://www.boston.com/metrodesk/2013/08/29/phillipos/L4Z45nkikfBYbGWIYEA73J/story.html.

151

Sageman, M. (2004). Understanding terror networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sageman, M. (2008). Leaderless jihad. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Samuels, D. (2012, April 6). The new mastermind of jihad. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303299604577323750859163544.html.

Schlapentokh, D. (2006, March 8). Putin’s war with radical Islamists. Asia Times Online. Retrieved from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/HC08Ag02.html.

Shoebat, W. (2013, April 17). “Innocent” Saudi has ties to several Al-Qaeda terrorists. Retrieved from http://shoebat.com/2013/04/17/innocent-saudi-has-ties-to-several-al-qaeda-terrorists/

Smick, E. (2006, July 18). The Chechen Separatist Movement. The Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/chechnya/chechen-separatist-movement/p11121.

Somaiya, R. (2012, April 1). Britain cites Chechen plot to killexile. The New York Times. Retrieved from Torrey, E.F. (2008, June17). The insanity offense: how America’s failure to treat the seriously mentally ill endangers its citizens. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.

Speckhard, A. and Akhmedova, K. (2006). Black Widows: the Chechen female suicide terrorists. In Female suicide bombers: dying for equality? Tel Aviv, Israel: Institute for International Security Studies. Retrieved from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=91164.

Thiel, P. and Lonsdale, J. (2004). Palantir [computer

software]. Palo Alto, CA: Palantir Technologies.

152

Vatchagaev, M. (2012, May 18). Sufis and Salafists temporarily unite in Dagestan. In Eurasia Daily Monitor. 9(95). Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved from http://www.refworld.org/docid/4fbdfc0a2.html.

Vatchagaev, M. (2013, July 25). Ramazan Abdulatipov Consults Ramzan Kadyrov’s Playbook. In Eurasia Daily Monitor.10 (137). Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved from http://chechen.org/archives/1638.

Walker, S. (2013, October 6). Russia to monitor ‘all communications’ at Winter Olympics in Sochi. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/06/russia-monitor-communications-sochi-winter-olympics

Wendt, Eric P. “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling.” Special Warfare 18 (2005): 9.

Yarlykapov, A. (2012). Dagestan: stable instability. Retrieved from http://www.saferworld.org.uk/

Yusin, M., Muradov, M., & Kuznetsova, O. (2013, July 31). Chechen extremists aiding opposition fighters in Syria. Russia & India Report. Retrieved from http://indrus.in/world/2013/07/31/chechen_extremists_aiding_opposition_fighters_in_syria_27825.html.

Zikibayeva, A. (Ed.). (2011, September). What does the Arab Spring mean for Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus? Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

153