From Russia, with Love: the Caucasus Emirate as a Dark Network
Contents
Chapter 1: A short history of the Caucasus, the other “Graveyard of Empires”Chapter 2: Global implications of Caucasus Emirate growthChapter 3: Why the violence is a wicked problem Chapter 4: The role of sociology and psychology in the Caucasus
EmirateChapter 5: Visual and social network analysis (SNA) application
to the Caucasus Emirate Chapter 6: Holistic courses of action and conclusionWorks Cited
1
List of Figures
Figure 1: McCormick’s diamond model: the partisan insurgency
Figure 2: Ramzan Kadyrov (with tiger). Source: Instagram
Figure 3: Graph of key variables behavior over time (BOT),
including callout emphasizing the nascent stages of the CE.
Figure 4: Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) of CE violence
Figure 5: Chloropleth map, total events from 2001 to 2011
Figure 6: Event Density from 2001-2007
Figure 7: Event Density from 2007-2012
Figure 8: Complete timeline with events by type. The blue
depicts the bombing events (highest density) and the green
includes the armed attacks.
Figure 9: Represents the link analysis for all entities,
including events.
Figure 10: Represents the linkages between people and
organizations using the entire data set, minus the events and
locations.
2
Figure 11: Represents the linkages between people and
organizations that are still active in the network as of March
2013. Note how it is sparser (at least 20 people removed from
death, none of them from natural causes)
Figure 12: Palantir screenshot of all entities selected for
import into ORA
Figure13. Network of agent x agent via shared organizations
(most dense).
Figure 14. Total Caucasus Emirate organizational network (with
actors, dead and alive). Dead actors are the light pink, living
actors are dark pink. Organizations are in green; the central
organizations are those who are directly connected with the CE
Shura.
Figure 15. Alive informal network, folded (green ties are
organization x organization, and the red ties are agent x
organization).
Figure 16. Agents by informal relationships/tribes.
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Figure 17. Teip by tukhum and nationalities. The green nodes
symbolize ethnic groups (the largest in the center being the
Chechens), the blue nodes represent the tukhum, and the red nodes
represent the teip
Figure 18. Table from processing metrics of all agents taken
from their ties with others via terrorist organizations (alive
and dead; deceased individuals are annotated in red. Values are
normalized, and closeness centrality was calculated in UCINET
using the ARD centrality measure).
Figure 19. Table from processing metrics of all agents taken
from their ties with others via terrorist organizations (values
are normalized, and closeness centrality was calculated in UCINET
using the ARD value).
Figure 20. Centrality measures, formal network.
Figure 21. Centrality, informal network
Figure 22. Network of formal ties (CE unit to CE unit)
Figure 23. Network of informal CE organizations to CE
organizations (through relationships with agents).
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Chapter 1: A short history of the Caucasus, the other “Graveyard
of Empires”
The purpose of this thesis will be to explain why the
current modus operandi against the CE is ineffective, evaluate
its appeal and capabilities with respect to recruitment and
mobilization, demonstrate how the Caucasus Emirate presents
itself as a dark network, support its classification as a wicked
problem, and identify some of the potential points of
intervention which could be utilized in order to combat violence
in the Caucasus. My interest in the Caucasus Emirate (CE)
initially stemmed from the Chechen Black Widows, and how 50% of
the population (women) might contribute to instability in a
region. I completed a country study of Afghanistan back in 2000,
and concluded that the oppression of women (to include a lack of
basic civil rights, access to education and health services) was
a contributing factor to instability, especially prior to the
September 11, 2001 attacks. I had assumed that the Caucasus
might have similar problems based on socioeconomic issues, and
that maybe their women suffered the same level of oppression, but
I was mistaken. Based on my initial readings on the Chechen
6
Black Widows (also known as the Shahidka, who now fall under the
broad umbrella group of the CE), I had sympathetically concluded
that these women had unaddressed grievances against Russian
government policies in the Caucasus. These policies resulted in
police and military operations, which often resulted in the
deaths of militant sons and husbands, whose second order effects
included the volunteering of widows (or other female relatives)
to martyr themselves in retribution. Some of the women had been
widowed multiple times as a result of their husbands’
counterstate activities; in the case of Mariam Sharipova, who
perpetrated the Moscow subway bombings, her husband actually sent
her to conduct the mission (Roggio, 2010). While the choices of
these women in selecting a spouse may raise questions, one study
suggests that most of the women involved had experienced deep
personal traumatization, which may have factored into their
willingness to participate in terrorist acts (Speckhard and
Akhmedova, 2007). In reality, female suicide bombers defy common
convention; according to Ariel Merari in Psychology of Terrorism,
initially there was an organizational rejection of the use of
women in such missions (p. 105). It is easier to accept that men
7
are willing to commit violence to further their cause, but it is
far less acceptable for the Western mind to consider that there
are women who are willing to resort to terrorism and target
innocent victims in order to draw attention to their cause. What
kind of cause could draw such a following, and what in their
society is lacking that could prevent such atrocities from
occurring? In order to understand the premise of the presented
problem and accurately account for why the CE exists as a dark
network, a short history of the Caucasus may assist in
understanding the current environment.
A [Very Brief] History of the Caucasus
Most Americans have little idea what the CE is, and fewer
still have any knowledge regarding its origins. If anyone
remembers newsreels from the mid-1990s, they may recall that a
place known as Grozny (the capital of Chechnya), was a warzone,
and that violence resulting in civilian deaths was commonplace.
But where is Grozny, Chechnya, the Caucasus region, and why does
this matter to regional instability? The Caucasus has been at
the critical geographic and historical juncture of religion,
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nationality, and ethnicity, with Persia to the southeast, Turkey
to the southwest, Europe to the west, and Russia to the north.
Throw in a wide variety of religious influences, to include Sunni
(Sufi and Salafi) and Shia Islam, orthodox Christians, Buddhists,
and Jews, and you have a major collision area of religions and
ethnic groups. Based on its significance, the region has been
devastated by wars between the Ottoman and Russian Empires in the
later part of the last millennia, to include the Russian-
Circassian Caucasus Wars of the 19th century (or genocide,
depending upon the interpreting historian). These events
displaced hundreds of thousands of ethnic Circassians and Vainakh
(two major ethno-linguistic groups native to the Caucasus),
causing diasporas to appear in Turkey, and establishing a
foundation of resentment against Russians. Under the soviet
communist regime, oppression intensified as Islam was nearly
destroyed and driven underground following the revolution. In
the late 1940s, most of the Muslim populations in the Caucasus
were threatened with genocide and persecution by Soviet
leadership; Stalin believed that he had appropriately dealt with
all of the Nazi sympathizers by deporting almost half the
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population of Chechens and Ingush to central Russia. Stalin’s
paranoia and ruthlessness evolved into xenophobia, directed
against the various disparate ethnic minorities of the USSR
(Burds, 2007). It was not until 1957, well after Stalin’s death,
that these populations were permitted to return to their homes,
but many had died in the process. Families were unable to return
to their villages of origin, and had to resettle in places like
Dagestan and other neighboring states. Many other displaced
individuals maintained their diasporas in Siberia and Central
Asia. Seth Jones may have termed Afghanistan the “Graveyard of
Empires”, and while it is true that the long-term (and expensive)
occupation of Afghanistan may have contributed to the implosion
of the Soviet Union, the North Caucasus continues to tax modern
day Russia.
Nationalist Movement to Insurgency; Rise of the Caucasus Emirate
Chechen Separatists emerged in the early 1990’s following
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Similarly, there were other
movements for self-determination and pan-Caucasus unification
afoot, however small and unsupported, some of whom had roots in
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the Islamist movements which propagated in Dagestan during the
mid-1980s (McGregor, 2006). MacGregor also opined that this
religious shift was spurned by the education Caucasian religious
students received from institutions in Saudi Arabia and Egypt
during the late 1980s and 1990s. While the Chechen nationalist
movement (which declared its independence from Russia in 1991)
may have taken center stage, the Abkhazian separatist movement,
and nationalist movements within Dagestan, also contributed to
regional instability. From the fall of the Soviet Union to the
present day, the Russian government’s policy towards perceived
threat in their former colonies has been heavy-handed, but with
good reason. The persistent ethnic tension characteristic of the
region and the dissolution of the USSR created an environment in
which ethno-political violence was inevitable (Markedonov, 2011).
Russian involvement in the region includes action in North
Ossetia to suppress Osset-Ingush interethnic violence, which
resulted in large numbers of displaced peoples pushing into
Ingushetia (Nichols, 1997), two battles for Grozny, the War in
Abkhazia (1992-1993), the Five Days War (more recently, under
Putin in 2008), and targeting of Chechen separatists and later
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Caucasus Jihadist leadership spanning more than two decades.
Russia also successfully conducted political intervention in a
number of Caucasus republics; according to Markedonov, Yeltsin
managed to diffuse the following points of friction: “between
Kabardin and Balkar, Karachays and Cherkes, Russian and Adygei;
the conflicts in Dagestan between Chechen-Akkin and Avar, Lak and
Kumyk, Neocossack and Nogai on the one hand, and Avar on the
other” (2011). The Chechen separatists initially appeared to
function as a revolutionary movement, led by former Soviet
officers of Chechen descent, President Dzhokar Dudayev and
General Aslan Mashkadov. As Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan all
moved forward to independence from the USSR, Chechnya also primed
itself for its own movement, declaring itself the Independent
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) in 1991. However, a
political solution in Chechnya eluded Yeltsin; as of November
29th, 1994, “the Russian leadership had repeatedly declared its
determination to adhere to political means to resolve the Chechen
crisis. Over 1991-93, Dudayev received 11 proposals on the
separation of powers; and he refused them all” (Markedonov,
2011). President Dudayev was killed by a Russian missile in 1996
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and was succeeded by Aslan Maskhadov, who was killed in March
2005, creating vacancies in top leadership positions of the
movement for individuals more inclined to radicalism, including
Abdul-Halim Sadulayev, Shamil Basayev, and Dokku Umarov. Gordon
Hahn describes this process as the “de-Chechenization of the
ideology of the ChRI in favor of an Islamist and jihadist
orientation” (p. 4); he also points to a decline in ethno-
nationalist Sufi leadership within the ChRI prior to the
declaration of the CE in October of 2007, as well as a rise in
Salafist/Wahabbi influence throughout the organization (p. 80).
Complicating matters, Chechens themselves were divided between
the first and second battles for Grozny; entire tribe-based
militias (i.e. the Vostok Battalion) turned to support the
Russians, and it is from these militias that the current
political powerbase in Chechnya originates. Recognized currently
as a federal subject of the Russia Federation with a non-partisan
leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, supported by Vladimir Putin’s government,
Ramzan Kadyrov (son of the former Chechen president, Akhmed
Kadyrov, who was assassinated by Chechen militants in May 2004)
serves as the current president. President Kadyrov appears to be
13
working in concert with Russia to systematically assassinate all
of his political opponents (Somaiya, 2012), but rather than
suppressing the problem, it appears to be contributing to
increasing levels of violence in the Caucasus States. Violence
has specifically decreased in Chechnya, and Jihadism’s rise in
Dagestan and elsewhere is largely an indigenous process.
Kadyrov’s militia (known as Kadyrovites), in concert with Russian
Forces, may have successfully suppressed terrorist activity in
Chechnya, but in neighboring Dagestan and Ingushetia, violence
levels have increased. The situation varies from one republic to
another; in Dagestan, the popularity of the global jihadi-
influenced Islamism has seen increasing levels of support, which
may be in part due to the youth bulge and the lowest per-capita
income in the region (Brooke, 2013), while in Ingushetia there is
some spillover from Chechen events, based on their common Vainakh
nationality. In Karbardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia, the
growth of radical Islam is less pronounced, but has brought
corresponding increase to levels of violence.
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The CE (which originated from the Chechen separatists of the
ChRI) is an amalgamation of regionally oriented Islamic militants
whose goal is an independent pan-Caucasus Islamic state united
under Sharia law, and further the establishment of a global
caliphate in concert with other groups in the global jihadi
revolutionary movement Their current posture is that of an
insurgency whose intent is to destabilize the governments in
Russia’s North Caucasus that are under the umbrella of the
Russian Federation through attacks and a strong propaganda
campaign. The envisioned Caucasus Emirate would include
Krasnodar Krai, Adygea, Karachai-Cherkessia, Karbardino-Balkaria,
Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Chechnya, and Dagestan, and the
organization‘s support base is spilling over into parts of
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the whole of Russia.
Contributing to the problem is an increasing number of Salafi
Islamists, some of whom encourage their followers to follow an
extreme path and take up jihad against the Russian government and
its extensions. There is a growing contingent of not just
Muslims, but specifically Islamists within Russia proper, and
even amongst ethnic Russians. Dr. Alexei Malashenko warned that
15
this spread may be the most dangerous threat that Russia faces;
while it used to be that Russians could specifically profile the
Caucasus peoples by their names and appearances, if ethnic
Russians are converting to Salafi Islam, then threat sources will
become more difficult to identify (November, 2013). The CE has a
growing number of passive supporters who romanticize
participation in the jihad. The initial movement of the ChRI was
focused on radical nationalism and independence and self-
determination, this movement has since radicalized, with
increased external support from Al-Qaeda and other Islamic
extremist entities. While the Al-Qaeda link was more tangible
through the direct presence of Ibn al-Khattab and Abu Umar as-
Sayif during the late 90s and early 2000s (Hahn, p. 53), these
ties are being strengthened through internet ties and the various
Caucasus fighters who have migrated to other parts of the globe
to include Afghanistan and Syria in order to conduct jihad. The
CE is officially part of the Global Jihadi Revolutionary
Alliance; Gordon Hahn referred to the most optimal description of
this relationship as “ally” or “alliance” (2013), based on the
CE’s operational autonomy, with ideological ties in the absence
16
of a closer relationship with AQ Central. Correspondence from
2002 indicated that Maskhadov had conceded to the terrorist
tactics of the jihadists within the ChRI (Hahn, 2013). The
system of Dagestan’s historical tribal protection elements,
jama’ats, which also exist in other countries (consider the
traditional lashkar or arbakai systems in Afghanistan), have been
assimilated in name by the CE, which exist in the form of
regional vilaiyats, and the military fronts which accompany them.
The CE currently has operational cells located throughout
villages in the Caucasus region, from Circassia (on the western
end on the Black Sea) to Makhachkala (on the Caspian Sea border
of Dagestan). The CE and its predecessor organization, the ChRI
has claimed responsibility for significant attacks such as the
Dubrovka Theater Massacre (2002, resulting in 117 dead hostages),
the Beslan School Siege (2004, resulting in 334 dead, including
children), and the Domodedovo Airport Bombing (2011), all with
catastrophic levels of civilian casualties, in addition to
thousands of small arms attacks, bombings, and kidnappings.
Is Sochi Safe?
17
There appears to be a growing level of concern from the
international community for the safety of the upcoming Winter
Olympics (2014), scheduled to take place in Sochi, Krasnodar
Krai, Russia. Dokku Umarov has already posted a video in which
he calls for all mujahedeen to stop the winter games in order to
prevent “Satanic dances” on the graves of Muslims who were killed
by Russian forces in the 19th century (Elder, 2013). A
successful attack or even the threat of such an attack may bring
international attention to the CE’s ongoing quest for a regional
caliphate. While much of the activity of the CE has been focused
in Dagestan and Ingushetia, Sochi is within spitting distance of
the nearest operational units, so an attempted terrorist attack
will not just be an idle threat, but reality for the government
security forces. The successful attack conducted by the Vilaiyat
of Kabardina, Balkaria, and Karachai-Cherkessia (OVKBK) against
the ski resort at Mt. Elbrus on February 18, 2011 (Hahn, 2011)
was proof positive that not only can the CE touch the Olympics,
but that there are significant vulnerabilities that may not be
easily defensible. Mount Elbrus is approximately 221 km from
Sochi, though the site that was designated for the mountain and
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coastal clusters appear to be fairly isolated from main ingress
routes from the north. If Dokku Umarov is successful in the
employment of forces from the Riyad-us al-Saliheyn Martyrs
Brigade (suicide bombers), the Shahidka (the Islamist female
suicide bombers), and ethnic Russian suicide bombers (recruited
by the Dagestani Vilaiyat) against the Olympics, or vulnerable
secondary targets in Moscow (which may be left largely ignored
while the world holds its collective breath for a catastrophic
attack at Sochi) the CE may gain more esteem in the eyes of the
global jihad network. Attacks on the Olympics have historically
been used by extremists to gain recognition for their causes;
consider the bombings during the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games
(meant to draw attention to the anti-abortion and anti-gay
platform championed by the lone perpetrator) and the 1972 Munich
attacks against the Israeli Olympic team by Palestinian
terrorists. Considering the precedence set by previous attacks
against the Olympics, perhaps there should be more concern that
the Russian government will not be able to secure the area.
Another point of friction is that the Russians may be
overzealous in their desire to ensure that the Winter Olympics
19
are conducted safely. Reporting indicates that Russia is intent
on monitoring all communication in and around Sochi and has set
up the critical network architecture to support this surveillance
(Walker, 2013). This is in concert with forcibly collecting DNA
and fingerprints from a small number of Salafi women in the
Caucasus, in order to assist state officials to conduct accurate
post-blast identification of the individual responsible, should a
suicide attack take place (de Carbonnel, 2013). These heavy-
handed preventative measures are feared to be driving an even
deeper wedge between those aligned with the government and those
who have “gone to the woods” (a regional euphemism for joining
the insurgency). As the perception of unjust government
authority increases, the tenuous coexistence between Sufi leaders
tied to the government and the Salafist population is
splintering; CE mujahedeen in Dagestan have targeted Sufi muftis
from Sa’id Muhammad-Haji Abubakarov (in August of 1998; McGregor,
2006), to Sheikh Said Afandi (August, 2012), and the external
influence of Salafi scholars is growing. Even organizations
affiliated with the Salafi movement that claim to be peaceful,
such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Union of the Just, and Akhlu Sunna, may
20
be in the business of recruitment and funding the CE. As the
International Crisis Group pointed out in its study, the
community and population provide this support base (2012), and
very little has been done to diffuse the situation. Although
there were negotiations between the Dagestani government and the
Salafis in 2012; the problem of violence in the Caucasus becomes
more and more wicked.
In the spring of 2013, Sasha Kuhlow and I conducted an
initial project (Abraham and Kuhlow, 2013) where we conducted
geospatial, temporal, and link analysis of the Caucasus Emirate
in Palantir (a multi-faceted program which enables the analyst to
visualize the problem set in a more holistic manner), and we
concluded that the Caucasus Emirate is capable and desirous of
attacking the Sochi Winter Olympics. In a follow-up study
conducted by Edval Zoto and myself (Abraham and Zoto, 2013), we
attempted to ascertain if familial and tribal ties contributed to
the network structure of the Caucasus Emirate (CE). The teip, or
tribes, and the tukkhum, or family groups, have obvious
rivalries, alliances, and dispositions that shape how they
operate within the region, and being able to identify these
21
relationships may provide friendly governments with information
on how to disrupt and deconstruct these networks. We had
insufficient data on the family groups and tribes but were able
to demonstrate that political rivalries within members of the
same tukhum alone had resulted in assassination attempts and
blood feuds.
The lack of data available on the members of the Caucasus
Emirate is probably the result of constant Russian targeting,
high leadership turnover, and a basic darkening of the network. A
dark network, as defined by Milward and Raab, are those networks
that are illegal and who attempt to remain as invisible as
possible (p. 334). In this context, the CE is most certainly a
dark network, though its turn to Salafi theo-ideology may not
have been the intentions of the original Chechen Separatists.
Shamil Salmanovich Basayev and Ibn al-Khattab’s brutality, while
executing operations of the Islamic International Peacekeeping
Brigade, galvanized Putin’s resolve to destroy radical Islam
(Shlapentokh, 2006). While the CE still retains some
characteristics of the initial movement, the Russians have
22
targeted this network into one that may be more resilient and
harder to disrupt, and it is the Islamist theo-ideology which
feeds the insurgency in the Caucasus today.
To reiterate, the purpose of this thesis will be to explain
why the current modus operandi against the CE is ineffective,
evaluate its appeal and capabilities with respect to recruitment
and mobilization, demonstrate how the Caucasus Emirate presents
itself as a dark network, support its classification as a wicked
problem, and identify some of the potential points of
intervention which could be utilized in order to combat violence
in the Caucasus. The following chapters will address the global
implications of CE growth (chapter 2), why the violence
perpetrated by the CE is a wicked problem (chapter 3), the role
of sociology and psychology in the CE (specifically with regards
to recruitment and the spread of Salafi theo-ideology, chapter
4), visual and social network analysis application to the CE
(chapter 5), and recommendations and conclusion (chapter 6).
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Chapter 2: Global implications of CE growth
On 16 August, 2011, President Barack Obama indicated that
the greatest threats the United States now faces are lone wolf
terrorists (Reed, 2011). The tragic bombings of the Boston
Marathon have brought the public’s attention back to Chechnya,
Dagestan, the Caucasus, and has also garnered attention to the
term “lone wolf.” Law enforcement agencies are now freely using
this phrase with respect to incidents in which no external
support was used in the execution of violence or terrorism.
While Tamerlan and especially Dzhokar Tsarnaev may not have had
direct ties to the extremist organizations, denying that the
Tsarnaevs had pre-existing weak ties that made him a prime
recruitment target for the CE, would be to ignore a small but
significant component of the attack. As mentioned by Hahn
(2013), Tamerlan attempted to join and appears to have met with
as many as three CE Dagestani Vilaiyat mujahideen during his trip
to Dagestan in 2012, and may have possibly received training from
them. In network topography, isolates do not truly occur in more
than one or two dimensions. Every person has a physical
environment in which they exist and operate, whether it is real
24
(geographic) or virtual (internet), and it is the fiber of this
network topography that determines which nodes will be attracted
to others. Humans acting as nodes in a network are very
distinct, and their properties (to include environment and theo-
ideology) of individuals predispose them to attraction and
repulsion. Nodes seemingly unrelated to others in a network are
permitted to move about more freely, resulting in their
vulnerability to nodes which may have a large network of weak
ties based on properties such as admiration and shared ideology,
or common enemies.
Dorothy Denning iterated nine axioms of social networks in
Axioms of Social Networks, all of which appear to hold true. The
first two are “1. all persons are connected through a universal
social network, and 2. the universal social network is ill
defined and unknowable” (p. 2). Whether it is through DNA or a
simple keystroke of a computer keyboard, we are all connected by
varying degrees, even those who appear to be isolates.
Disconnected nodes may be the most reactive and dangerous, and
fall in line with the prescribed teachings of Abu Mu’sab al-Suri,
the Muslim cleric who called for the removal of hierarchical
25
structures to be replaced with decentralized cellular structures
linked by ideology and solidarity (Lia, p.7). The ability of the
CE to utilize its internet-based media as a “broadcast link”
platform to reach out to individuals in regional and ethnic
diasporas, ethnic Russians, and altogether unrelated individuals
may have the effect of establishing weak links with sympathetic
nodes who may be socially primed to join a terrorist
organization. The Boston Marathon bombings, as well as the more
recent bombings perpetrated by suicide bombers in Russia,
intimates that the most dangerous course of action would be to
ignore the explosive growth of the Salafi influence which
resonates in the Caucasus, and ignore the global call to jihad
resulting in the targeting of innocent citizens with violence.
Movement, insurgency, terrorist organization?
When the Arab Spring movement began to fan the flames of
revolution in the Middle East and parts of Northern Africa,
regional stability became the foremost concern to the
international community. Another concern was whether Al-Qaeda
would be able to capitalize on the movements and successfully co-
26
opt the story of the distinct revolutionary movements. The
narrative for the Arab Spring uprisings had echoes of Al-Qaeda’s
aspirations, including the blueprint they had set for the
overthrow of authoritarian regimes and government defections
(Rosenthal, 2013). Al-Qaeda has had varying degrees of
involvement and success in the countries where the Arab Spring
has materialized. Certain scholarly articles regarding the
Caucasus and Central Asia’s possible response to the Arab Spring
may be understating the significance of Islamists and Al-Qaeda
influence in the Caucasus (Zikibayeva, 2011). In an article
published by the Center for Strategic & International Studies,
various regional experts state that there would be greater
turbulence in the Caucasus as a result of the Arab Spring (p. 7),
but that “recent events in the Middle East would have little
effect in the Caucasus” (p. 6). In stark contrast, the
contributors to this article ignore the welfare of Russia’s own
burgeoning Muslim population so close to Moscow (Goble, 2010),
the integration of Caucasus Islamists into the conflict in Syria
(Yusin et al., 2013) and Afghanistan (Hahn, 2013), resulting in
more coordinated external support from Al-Qaeda and a situation
27
that is more dire than scholars could predict. In recent news,
Russia and Syria have brokered a deal in which chemical weapons
are to be passed to Russia and the U.S. for disposal. The
greater fear for Russia would be the same fear that Yeltsin had
to contend with in the mid-1990’s, when Dzhokar Dudayev claimed
to have nuclear weapons (Filipov, 2002): if the Caucasus fighters
in Syria were able to procure chemical weapons and somehow manage
to return to the Caucasus, they would comprise a threat whose
capabilities would be amplified.
The CE organization has rejected in total the original
national-separatist goals of the ChRI (see Dokku Umarov’s quote
on p. 17), so is the CE a movement? The academic answer to this
question is it depends. The perspective can be taken from
religious, ethno-linguistic, and ideological vantage points.
While it has not subjugated or officially affiliated itself to Al
Qaeda, the CE has joined the ranks of the global jihadi
franchise, incorporating groups such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram,
Jemaah Islamiyah, and the Taliban, among others. While this has
the effect of splintering the centralization of power in Al
Qaeda, it also affords the disparate groups the autonomy to
28
operate in a decentralized manner. K.W. Watkins refers to theo-
ideology as the process of religious displacement by ideology,
almost as a false religion under the guise of a totalitarian
regime, i.e. the idolatry conferred to party leadership in Nazi
Germany, the USSR, Communist China and North Korea (Ivens, 1975).
Gordon Hahn refers to Salafism as a theo-ideology in the same
manner, ascribing to it a religious pretext for revolutionary or
pre-revolutionary movements (pp. 18-20). It is this theo-
ideology that is finding great traction in the Caucasus, with the
potential to become the most destabilizing factor that Russia may
face in the near future.
Stickiness of the message
According to Malcolm Gladwell, “the specific message quality
that a message needs to be successful is the quality of
‘stickiness’” (2002). He also states that “The Law of the Few
says that there are exceptional people out there who are capable
of starting epidemics. All you have to do is find them” (2002).
The revolutionary leaders within the mujahedin of the Caucasus
have created a legacy they have left for those who would follow
29
in their paths, and the successful incorporation of Salafi theo-
ideology has resulted in successful CE recruitment.
Internalizing the preachings of dynamic leaders such as Maqdisi,
Anwar al-Awlaki, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Hamza, and other radical
clerics (all hailing from different countries but united in their
ideals of Islam) provides the CE with validation that a pan-
Caucasus caliphate is not only possible, but an imperative. The
CE and its support network also have an extremely effective
platform for their narrative; kavkazcenter.com, along with other
more locally managed websites of the CE’s various sub-networks,
its so-called vilaiyats. These websites had been specifically
targeted by Russian officials for propagating extremist views,
and has been subjected to political pressure and Computer Network
Attack (CNA) in the form of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
from unidentified assailants, but it still maintains a high level
of popularity and showcases news from throughout the Muslim
world. The CE and Al Qaeda also have at their disposal media
such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, and a growing number of
other tools in order to export its ideology; the tools they have
at their disposal are limitless. It is through websites such as
30
these that individuals who are primed and open to the message of
extremism are able to self-radicalize, and even passive
supporters can throw their hat in the ring with the ability to
move money anywhere in the world without attribution through
internet based technology (such as Bitcoin). No degrees of
lethal targeting or counterterrorism operations appear to have
impacted the recruitment of the CE; in fact, they appear to be
pushing the population towards supporting the cause, either
actively or passively.
Why the current status quo is not acceptable
According to Conklin, one definitive rule of wicked problems
is that “every solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one-shot
operation’” (p. 8). He further explains that “you can’t learn
about the problem without trying solutions, but every solution
you try is expensive and has lasting unintended consequences
which are likely to spawn new wicked problems.” While it is
possible for Russia to assimilate different approaches, every new
action that the government and CE introduce into the system
creates a new dynamic and unforeseen result that ensures that new
courses of action will be completely unique from those of the
31
past. For example, lethal targeting is an endeavor that capable
countries undertake in order to remove key individuals from enemy
networks and hierarchies in order to cripple their operations.
These operations can be considered contentious, in that the
ethics of modern societies call into question whether or not
death without judgment should be a panacea for terrorism, as well
as the effectiveness of this lethal targeting. Consider
Afghanistan, and the dynamic targeting efforts there, and the
Caucasus, and Russia’s offensive operations against the
Islamists. Based on analysis of terrorism-related incidents
listed in the Global Terrorism Database, it appears that since
the declaration of an Emirate in 2007, the amount of violence has
skyrocketed and shows no sign of abating, despite Russia’s best
efforts (see chapter five, figure eight). This is a case in
which the applied solution to the problem has failed to have the
desired effect. The same is considered true of Afghanistan; the
former Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates stated in 2008 that the
United States “cannot capture or kill its way to victory”
(Niedowski, 2008), and that failing or failed states are more
dangerous than their powerful and stable counterparts. Much as
32
the United States and other developed nations assumed a policy of
containment in order to manage the spread of the USSR’s Communist
ideology, the developed world needs to develop a strategy to
target the ideology of Al-Qaeda and its affiliated non-state
actors (the long term solution), while applying a holistic
treatment of the problem, in order to deter violence and
terrorist acts (the short term treatment). It cannot fall solely
on the shoulders of Russia to contend with the CE; it has to be
accounted for as a local brand of the global Salafi-jihadi
movement, which is capable of transcending nationalities,
ethnicities, languages, and other barriers in order to execute
their brand of Islam.
Chapter 3: Why the violence is a wicked problem
Physicist Fritjof Capra stated that “the systems view looks
at the world in terms of relationships and integration…systems
are wholes whose specific structures arise from the interactions
and interdependence of their parts” (pp. 266-267). These systems
are subject to problems and frustrations, which Jeff Conklin
describes as a result of a paradigm, or “the cognitive foundation
33
upon which attitudes, beliefs, and concepts come and go” (1996,
p.3). Individuals and organizations may be stuck in paradigms
that they may not be able to control, or discover that they must
coexist with competing desires and interests, resulting in a
phenomena known as a wicked problem. Nancy Roberts describes a
wicked problem as one that is “ambiguous, fluid, complex,
political, and frustrating as hell” (2001, p. 354). While this
may be a fairly accurate description, Conklin characterizes
wicked problems as having the following characteristics:
You don’t understand the problem until you have developed a solution, 2) wicked problems have no stopping rule, 3) solutions to wicked problems are not right or wrong, 4) every wicked problem is essentially unique and novel, 5) every solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one-shot operation’, and 6) wicked problems have no given alternativesolution. (2005, p. 7-8)
With respect to the CE, the resulting violence within the
Caucasus is the problem, and one that is especially wicked.
Russia has contributed its half of the violence since 1991, which
is part of the reason that the Caucasus Emirate currently
functions as a dark network. In order to carefully consider how
to intervene in the cycle of violence in the Caucasus, we have to
identify all of the stakeholders, address the violence
34
perpetrated by both state and non-state actors, and identify
possible leverage points and mechanisms for intervention. This
violence is the fundamental problem - it is the result of the
conflict that exists between the Russian government and the
insurgency. Throughout this chapter, coping with this
particularly wicked problem entails consideration of the violence
as a product of systems dynamics, and applying systems thinking
in order to determine adequate coping measures, which will be
further discussed in chapter six.
The Narrative
“Russia doesn’t negotiate with terrorists. Russia destroys them.”
-President Vladimir Putin
The list of key stakeholders regarding the issue of violence
in the Caucasus may seem endless, but they can be grouped into
camps. The Russian government and the subordinate state
governments they support can be lumped together, with the
Caucasus Emirate (the insurgency) and its sympathizers in
diametric opposition. As is evidenced by the quote above, Russia
and its supported government entities take an exceptionally hard
35
line with regards to terrorists. Other key players that should
be considered include citizens of the Caucasus, citizens of
Russia (who discriminate against those of Caucasus origin),
neighboring states, the global jihad network, the international
community (including diasporas), and religious leaders of both
Sufi and Salafi origin. These stakeholders can be counted on for
active and passive support of one of the two major players, with
swing voters existing amongst the Caucasus and Russian citizens,
as well as the international community. These stakeholders are
assumed to be present when there is a state and an opposing
counter-state.
Gordon McCormick has developed a model in which a partisan
insurgency exists, with external support to ensure its viability
(see the model below). Eric Wendt provides an accurate summation
of the model; the diamond model has five legs, which incorporate
the need “for a government to build legitimacy and control with
the population (Leg 1), then lower the insurgent force’s
legitimacy and control with the population (Leg 2),” (2005, p.
5). Wendt also reiterates McCormick’s opinion that “the
government must determine if the insurgency has external support.
36
The conflict which exists between the government and the
insurgency (Leg 3) may entail legitimate grievances which the
government is not addressing, or it may also entail fundamental
and irreconcilable differences, such as ideology, which put the
two at odds. If so, the government must build legitimacy in the
eyes of relevant international actors, represented by Leg 4”, and
that “the government must also attempt to reduce external support
to the insurgents by minimizing or destroying the insurgent
group’s support and sanctuary from international actors (Leg 5)”.
The Caucasus Emirate (CE) exists as the counter-state, and
fits well within the scope of this model, as it has an effective
support base both within the population and from outside actors.
Currently, Russia does not receive much assistance from the
international community in policing the Caucasus Emirate, but as
the threats to the Russia increase and the Islamists encroach on
territories that had previously been unblemished by terrorism,
Moscow will look to outside entities for assistance in managing
the spread of the Caucasus Emirate.
37
Figure 1. McCormick’s diamond model: the partisan insurgency
The Core Problem
“Allah willing, all of the brothers, who are carrying out Jihad in the entire world, are our brothers for the sake of Allah, and we all today are going on one road and this road leads to Paradise.” – Emir Dokku Umarov
The conflict that exists between the Russian government and
the insurgency results in violence, which is the fundamental
problem. Without the violence, there could be room for
mediation, negotiation, concessions, and possibly a transition to
recognized political organization. These are transitions that
have been made in part or in whole by organizations such as the
Irish Republican Army, Hamas, Hizbollah, and the Muslim
38
Brotherhood, so it is not outside the realm of the possible.
During a presentation on Islamic terrorism in Russia, Dr. Alexei
Malashenko made the distinction that most of the violence in the
Caucasus is perpetrated by insurgents or CE against armed state
forces and government officials, while the violence that is
perpetrated in Russia proper by the same entities target innocent
civilians (2013). In order to analyze this as a wicked problem,
we will include both under the label of violence. The Russian
response, sometimes with its own resultant violence, feeds back
into the system, generating a change in the CE organization that
may exacerbate the situation. In the early part of the Chechen
conflict of the past two decades, the Chechen Separatists were
far outmatched in firepower by the Russian military, but what
they lacked in firepower, they made up for in asymmetry and
resourcefulness. The Chechen fighters improvised tactics,
techniques, and weapons to the point where the Russian military
was devastated during the First Battle of Grozny, but the
Russians incorporated lessons learned and were able to raze the
city and surrounding areas during the Second Battle of Grozny,
sending the Separatists to the mountains and forests, where they
39
went underground and transitioned to an insurgency willing to
target innocent civilians in order to advance their cause.
CE initiated violence is comprised of assassinations of
government officials and religious leaders, direct attacks
against security forces in the Caucasus, and terrorist attacks
against civilian targets in Russia and throughout the Russian
Federation. In answer to this, the Russian government reacts in
various ways, including: 1) maintaining policies in Caucasus
which counter the perception of good governance (i.e. state
presidents are for the most part Putin-selected political
appointees), 2) security operations have the effect of alienating
the population, based on violations of human rights and disregard
for collateral damage (operations include attacks against
insurgent safe houses, strategic strikes against key leadership,
and preventative operations), and 3) some suppression of freedom
of speech/journalism, which feeds back into decreased government
legitimacy and the perception from the international community
that the Caucasus region lacks the transparency it needs to
develop into a democracy.
40
Between Putin’s hard line on the Caucasus Emirate, CE
resolve to establish a caliphate, and friction resultant from the
interplay between the two entities with no party capable of
mediating or negotiating the issues, the violence has extended
itself into a vicious cycle from which there appears to be no
recourse or alternative.
Key Variables
“I've already mentioned that all those artificial borders, administrative divisions, which the Taghut [false leader, or liar, a reference to Russia's political leaders]drew, mean nothing to us. The days when we wanted to secede and dreamed of building a small Chechen Kuwait in the Caucasus are over.” - Emir Dokku Umarov
In examining the behavior of the variables, it is possible
to go back to the timeframe when the ChRI more widely recognized
as a partisan party with legitimate political aims, but for the
purposes of examining the behavior of the Caucasus Emirate as an
insurgency, we should focus on the time frame between 2007 to
date, when Sufi leadership within the CE had declined (to include
Maskhadov’s assent to Salafist demands) and pushed the Salafist
to declaring their desire of a pan-Caucasus emirate. This is a
product of two external forces: the influence of the global
jihadi revolutionary movement, and the product of global
41
Islamist/Salafist revolutionary theo-ideology (Hahn, 2013).
These are brought into the causal loop via the Salafi imams and
jihadis who are educated abroad with the more “pure” form of
Islam. Their efforts in the Caucasus have been especially
effective, increasing numbers of mosques and followers, and
capitalizing on the news media to exacerbate perceived
injustices. Initial leaders within the Chechen Separatists
movement, specifically Aslan Maskhadov, had brokered agreements
with the Russian government (the Khasavyurt Ceasefire in 1996
stalled the violence), but he was also Sufi and more open to
negotiations and not as inclined to radicalism as some of his
Salafi compatriots. As mentioned in chapter one, Maskhadov had
made concessions to the growing Islamist presence within the ChRI
(Hahn, 2007) and may have become convinced that the jihadist path
was the correct one in 2002
(Hahn, 2013).
Russian efforts to
legitimize local governments
have been met with abject
failure. While Ramzan
Figure 2: Ramzan Kadyrov (with tiger). Source:
42
Kadyrov (Chechen president and appointee of Vladimir Putin)
appears to have effectively tackled violence in Chechnya, the
management of his personal militia and his penchant for
Lamborghinis, gold pistols, and exotic animals has called into
question his legitimacy and raised the possibility of
mismanagement of government funds. While the Kadyrovites may
have suppressed violence in Chechnya, increasing levels of
violence in Dagestan and Ingushetia indicates a migration of
insurgents to these areas in order to enlarge their effective
support base. Russia effectively deposes those leaders who do
not fall in line with its policies; Putin always appears to have
a say in the hiring and firing of those who aspire to influential
leadership positions in the Caucasus. This political influence,
in concert with a lack of transparency of security operations,
the preponderance of state-run media (especially television),
computer network attack operations on the kavkazcenter.com (the
media platform of the CE), and a record of repeated human rights
violations, has resulted in the decreased perception of
government legitimacy (from Russia down to the Caucasus), leaving
individuals with little recourse but to turn to their imams and
43
Sharia law for legitimate solutions. While the interaction of
these variables may be impacted by other outside influences that
have not been discussed here, they are representative of the most
significant issues facing the Caucasus in the near term. A graph
(figure 3 below) depicting the behavior of these variables over
time may assist in illustrating how the variables are not
independent, but interrelated. It is merely illustrative and not
100% indicative of the actual events over time (for a graph
actually depicting violence by numbers and dates see figure 8 in
the fifth chapter). The Y-axis is a subjective representation of
the variables growth or decline, while the X-axis depicts time.
It is the interplay of the key variables, to include the
stakeholders mentioned above, which feeds into the vicious cycle
of what Anderson and Johnson refer to as “fixes that fail” (p.
124). Russian intervention in response to CE violence has the
unintended consequences of making the violence worse, and
increasing the support base of the insurgency. The situation is
reminiscent of British policies towards the Irish Republican Army
(IRA) and its extensions in the 1960s and 70s (Edwards, 2012);
Putin’s policy of crushing the insurgency using both policing and
44
military force without addressing the underlying causes of
discord may be exacerbating the situation, as opposed to taming
it.
45
Figure 3: Illustrative graph of key variables behavior over time (BOT), including callout emphasizing the nascent stages of the CE.
47
Figure 4: Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) of CE violence
The causal loop diagram (figure 4) can explain this cycle;
Anderson & Johnson explain that diagramming problems from the
vantage point of a system may serve to explain how complex
interrelated components can work or compete against each other
(pp. 88-89). The causal loop diagram explains that as violence
sponsored by the CE in the Russian Federation increases, Russian
intervention into the Caucasus increases (to include some of the
actions previously mentioned, affecting the political scene,
policies, security operations, computer network operations, and
strategic targeting). As this Russian intervention increases,
48
the perception of government legitimacy decreases for Caucasus
citizens, neighboring countries, and the international community
(R1). As this government legitimacy decreases, CE recruitment
increases. As recruitment increases, the cycle starts again with
increased violence. This increased violence results in Russian
intervention (in the form of strategic targeting), which has
resulted in an increase in the death of Sufi leadership within
the CE. The increased deaths of Sufi leaders (R2) have resulted
in an increase of Salafi influence not just within the CE, but
throughout the region. This increase in Salafi influence has
resulted in increased external support, particularly from members
of the Global Salafi Revolutionary Network, and this increased
external support has, in turn, resulted in increased violence,
but not just against the Russian government officials and
security forces, but also against Sufi leaders within the
community. In Dagestan, under the previous president, the Muslim
Spiritual Board (the government backed Sufi contingent) had
conducted talks with leaders of the Dagestani Salafi community,
including members of Akhlu-Sunnah (Vatchagaev, 2012), and the two
organizations had agreed to compromise on some key points. Since
49
then, the murder of Mufti Afandi and the election of President
Ramazan Abdulatipov (after his predecessor stepped down), appears
to have resulted in a harder stance against the Salafists, more
in line with that of Ramzan Kadyrov (Vatchagaev, 2013).
Said Afandi was killed last year in a suicide attack
conducted by an ethnic Russian woman who had recently converted
to Islam. Afandi had condemned Islamist violence and attempted
to increase dialogue between the traditional and non-traditional
Islamic leaders in Dagestan (Recknagel, 2012). The targeting of
community Sufi leadership by the CE and sympathetic Islamists
continues to feed back into increased levels of violence, against
which Russia leverages its vast resources; military, political,
financial, technological, etc. Based on heavy-handed Russian
involvement, perception of government legitimacy decreases, but
in addition to feeding into internal and external recruitment,
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Associated Press,
and others in the international community may be more inclined to
sympathize with the CE as a movement, and may garner more support
for what they perceive are injustices committed by the Russian
government against the CE. As an example, the kavkazcenter.com
50
has found support in Sweden to host its servers there in order to
find a safe haven from Russian government efforts. Sweden’s
liberal freedom of speech laws have been permissive, though
Russian foreign policy is attempting to pressure the Swedish
government to shut them down. Incidentally, the kavkazcenter.com
has been hit numerous times by DDoS attacks. The CE website and
its affiliates post numerous articles published by Western media
in support of their propaganda efforts. The continued external
support reinforces to the CE that their violence is a means to an
end, and the external support of the website, while falling under
the guise of free speech in host countries encourages acts of
martyrdom and jihad (Draitser, 2012).
As contentious counterterrorism operations are executed, and
as the Caucasus populace continues to romanticize fighting
Russian oppression, the never-ending merry-go-round of CT
operations and terrorism incidents will continue to spiral.
While the cycle may look vicious (or, from the perspective of the
insurgents, virtuous), the causal loop diagram offers potential
leverage points, or points in which interested parties may be
able to intervene in order to change the current paradigm. New
51
and innovative ways of intervening may require Russia to
completely change the way in which they approach the Caucasus,
and incorporate a more holistic approach. In order to change
government legitimacy, there are various actions that the Russian
government could take. In tackling the high amount of
unemployment and poverty in the region, Russia has subsidized
much of the economic development in the North Caucasus and will
continue to fund economic development to the amount of $52.2B
between now and 2025 (Fuller, 2012), as well as providing
economic incentives for business who choose to start ventures in
the region (such as Rosneft, primarily state owned, and Lukoil,
privately owned). It may be possible to force elections, though
this may have the opposite of Russia’s desired end state (i.e. if
the free elections of Dagestan or any of the other predominantly
Muslim republics elected a predominantly Salafi government to
power, solidifying the legitimacy of Sharia law in the region).
The various possible pivot points and other courses of action
will be further discussed in chapter six.
52
Chapter 4: The Sociology and Psychology of CE recruitment
The recent trial and sentencing of MAJ Nidal Hassan (the
Fort Hood gunman), the tragic bombings of the Boston Marathon,
the Woolwich attack in the United Kingdom by two Islamic converts
against an off-duty soldier, and similar incidents have centered
public attention on the term “lone wolf.” Law enforcement
agencies are now using this term with respect to incidents in
which seemingly no external support was provided for the
execution of violence or terrorism. Another one of Denning’s
axioms of social networks is that “links can form most anywhere
and without brokerage” (p. 4). Is “lone” an appropriate
adjective if individuals are successfully moved to jihad by a
YouTube video or infrequent contact with a radical cleric? These
individuals, who turn to Inspire magazine to learn the
machinations of pressure cooker improvised explosive devices
(IED), who are inspired by Ayman al-Zawahiri’s most recent call
to conduct lone wolf attacks against the United States its allies
(Corera, 2013), who may reach out to other jihadis using social
media, likely did not always exhibit extremist tendencies. Their
53
predisposition to terrorism may have developed over time, and may
provide fertile ground for the germination of seeds of violence.
Internal factors may include the biology and psychology of the
individual, such as their genetic makeup and personal measures of
chemicals and hormones. External factors may include the
developmental environment (i.e. the Chechen diaspora in the
tumultuous country of Kyrgyzstan, and elsewhere), social
isolation, exposure to ideology, and reinforcing media influence
which may have rendered the individuals vulnerable to the
messages of jihadists, with whom they find a sympathetic cause.
In Psychology of Terrorism, Fathali Moghaddam opines that terrorism is
the option perceived by the perpetrator in order to overcome
perceived injustices (Bongar et al., p. 70), and this is surely a
powerful motivation for those populations who have been subjected
to decades and centuries of oppression. This chapter will
discuss the sociology and psychology of the terrorist, and how
the terrorist organizations such as the CE establish weak ties to
actors susceptible to committing acts of terrorism, and examine
ways in which government and law enforcement officials may
counter these efforts.
54
Who are the isolates?
The American public would like to seek the comfort of an
archetype to which they can ascribe to armed assaults and bombing
attacks, such as loners, sociopaths, and the chemically
imbalanced. There is some evidence that psychologically (whether
it’s in their DNA or their upbringing), these individuals may be
predisposed to violence and/or extremism through religion, and
provide fertile ground in which a sticky message can take hold.
But how does one become predisposed to violence? Studies
regarding the psychology of terrorists are inconclusive. If we
discriminately examine the different motivating factors for
terrorism, not just those perpetrators who are tied to extremism
founded in Wahhabi or Salafi Islam (for example, Anders Breivik
and Cho Seung-Hui), then we have to take into account not just
the individual’s environment, but also their upbringing and
possible reasons for chemical imbalance. In the case of Cho
Seung-Hui, the Virginia Tech shooter, there were obvious
indicators of mental health issues, including suicidal and
homicidal thoughts, and a background which included teasing and a
lack of emotional bonding (Cho & Gardener, 2007), but his rampage
55
was seemingly executed without a greater purpose other than his
narcissistic view of himself as a purveyor of violence (James,
2009). There are many instances in American criminal statistics
which point to a fault in the psychology of mass shooters or
killers; other examples include Aaron Alexis (the Naval Yard
shooter, 16 September 2013), Jared Loughner (the Arizona shooter
who killed six and wounded 13 in January of 2011, including
Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords), Adam Lanza (the Sandy Hook
Elementary School shooter who killed 26 elementary children and
adults in December of 2012), and James Holmes (the Aurora theater
shooter, 20 July, 2012, who killed 12 and injured approximately
70). These very recent instances of domestic terror indicate
more of a problem with weapons control and mental health care,
rather than the momentum of a terrorist movement. In the case of
Anders Breivik, the Norway terrorist who went on to execute the
deadliest terrorist act perpetrated by a single person in modern
history (Amland & Gronnevet, 2012), it was established by the
court that the insanity plea would not be pursued. He had the
motivation of an extreme right wing individual who used violent
means to draw attention to his cause, while using the techniques
56
of the radical Islamists he categorically did not want in his
country (Amland & Gronnevet, 2012). Law enforcement and the
letter agencies that seek to defend nation states have a tendency
to focus on terrorism tied to Islamists and Al-Qaeda, as
numerically those who are affiliated have a higher number of
attempted attacks than other organizations who believe that
violence with the intent of inciting terror in the population is
the best mechanism for the endstate of their organization (i.e.
the Environmental Liberation Front). We will focus on the
Caucasus Emirate, and its establishment of weak ties to lone
actors who might be susceptible to committing acts of terrorism,
why individuals are vulnerable to their influence, and the ways
in which government and law enforcement may counter their
efforts.
The influence of biology
It seems intuitive that individuals are the product of their
environments, but biological composition (DNA, hormones, and
chemicals) may also have a role to play in the psychology of
terrorists. The notion of “nature versus nature” is considered
57
to be an antiquated way in which to explain what is commonly
perceived as the two largest factors that contribute to the
psychology of individual; according to the American Psychological
Association, there are numerous theories on how individuals are
moved to violent action; instinct, drive (frustration, anger),
social learning, and cognitive, etc. (Borum, 2004). There are
even obscure studies that compared physiological differences
between terrorists. It was noted by psychologist David Hubbard
that the terrorists he studied had sustained damage to the inner
ear; they were suffering from vestibular dysfunction (Borum,
2004, p. 14). Whether or not this was a pre-existing condition
or something that came about as a result of similar types of
terrorist training is debatable. Borum also intimates that low
serotonin levels and frontal lobe dysfunction may also be a
contributing factor to violence (p. 14), but this alone is not a
smoking gun. What is commonly accepted is that each group is
distinct from another with respect to the psychological
composition of their individual members, and each individual is a
product of their respective environments. According to Clark
McCauley, it is generally accepted that terrorists typically are
58
not afflicted by any psychopathology (Bongar et al. (Ed.), p.
15), but are instead motivated by the psychology of combat and a
cause they believe is worth dying for (p. 19). In simplified
terms, the group with whom the terrorists share their ideology is
the in-group, whereas everyone else is out-group. According to
Marc Sageman, it is “in-group love rather than out-group hate”
that appeared to have motivated the perpetrators of the 9/11
attacks (2004), and this relational conformity appears to hold
true for separatists in the Caucasus.
External factors: environment and geography
The environments in which terrorists are raised may contribute to
their propensity to commit terrorist acts. Consider diasporas-
populations that may have been ejected from their homeland for
social or political reasons. Their existence outside of their
homeland may significantly lend to their collective perceptions
of injustice, or a feeling that the conflict continues even after
they have left the country. According to Baser, “these
sentiments could just stay as an emotional bond or might actually
grow to extremist feelings that push the diaspora members to
59
commit acts of violence both in the homeland and the hostland”
(2009). This is likely the case for Tamerlan Tsarnaev, who was
quoted as saying in 2009, “I don't have a single American friend.
I don't understand them” (Foster and Parfitt, 2013). In
observing Tamerlan as a case study, this feeling of not
belonging, compounded by other factors in his life including
unemployment, a stagnating boxing career, the influence of
extremist Muslim friends, etc., may have resulted in self-
radicalization. These factors, compounded by his familial and
cultural ties may have culminated in his last trip to Dagestan,
in which he met individuals involved in the Caucasus Emirate with
whom he could relate and possibly received training from with
regards to the construction of pressure cooker explosives he
devised and employed during the Boston Bombing (Anonymous, 2013).
Diasporas, internally displaced people, and other disenfranchised
populations provide terrorists with a ripe population from which
to conduct recruitment operations; based on how well they are
assimilating to their new environments, these individuals may be
more vulnerable to a resonating message. Sageman states that
“second generation Muslims in the diaspora do not compare
60
themselves with their cousins left back in the old home country…
they interpret perceived discrimination in the context of moral
violations against Muslims elsewhere, and the notion that their
local grievances are part of a more general hostility against
Islam appears more compelling to them (2008, pp. 83-84). This
reinforces Sageman’s hypothesis that “joining global Islamist
terrorists is a collective process based on friendship or
kinship” (p. 84), and actually provides a valid argument that
jihadists are not only rational, but are convinced that they are
acting in the best interest of their group. According to
Sageman, approximately 60% of his sample population of terrorists
were expatriates, and an addition 20% were second or third
generation Muslim immigrants (2008, p. 65). This is a
substantive argument that the existence of diasporas contribute
significantly to terrorism.
Impacts of religion and ideology
There are some very important cultural factors, imbued in
the environment in which the individuals are raised, which
contribute to how individuals may accept violence as a mechanism
61
for change. In an article, DeAngelis notes that psychologist
Arie Kruglanski attributes that collectivist mentality plays a
large role in terrorism. In three societies that he studied
(Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians), he found that
individuals who have lower personal success, a fear of cultural
annihilation, and recent presentation to death-related stimuli
are more likely to cling to cultural ideals and support violent
action; “being part of a collectivist cause has always been a
hallmark of people willing to undergo personal sacrifices” (p.
60).
Exposure and conditioning with respect to societal norms
greatly impact where on the scale of tolerance individuals lie on
the sliding scale of terrorism. In Helfstein’s model, where
terrorism progresses from awareness to interest, then acceptance,
and finally implementation (p. 18), the individuals who would
perpetrate terrorism may already be in the acceptance phase, and
merely lack the resources and validation required to go through
with the implementation. The conditioning required for
individuals to move from awareness to acceptance depends largely
upon the environment in which they are raised; according to a
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recent New York Times article, it is not only that Muslims in the
Middle East are exposed to anti-Semitism and anti-Western
sentiment, but that they are bombarded with it from the time they
are children (Hirsi-Ali, 2013), through their formative years,
and it is continuously reinforced throughout their adulthood.
The use by Palestinian media of the Mickey Mouse figure, Farfur,
who appeals to children to defeat the “Zionists” occupiers, in
Tomorrow’s Pioneers (Oliver, 2007) (a Hamas-sponsored children’s show
where martyrdom is encouraged) is a prime example of the
conditioning and reinforcement of negative sentiment towards
Israelis. In Palestine, martyrdom is a matter of national
identity; Palestinians who are martyred are united in death and
lauded through the use of posters, trading cards, and even
receive financial aid for their families (Petersen-Overton, p.
20). But the Palestinians are not alone; even the Egyptian
President Mohammad Morsi was caught on tape in 2010,
urging his followers to ‘nurse our children and our grandchildren on hatred’ for Jews and Zionists. Not long after, the then-leader of the Muslim Brotherhood described Zionists as “bloodsuckers who attack the Palestinians,’ ‘warmongers’ and ‘descendants of apes and pigs.’ (Hirsi-Ali,2013).
63
Reinforcement of xenophobic views are not just restricted to
juveniles, but are reinforced well into adulthood, often by
important figures of authority. Sometimes isolates, raised in
the absence of this reinforcement and grooming, can move to the
acceptance and implementation phase of terrorism just as quickly,
and this may have to do with the effectiveness of the extremist
narrative. Russia should be extremely mindful of Islamists
successfully establishing similar reinforcement mechanisms, and
where possible they should undermine the efforts of the Islamists
to dehumanize others. It is this dehumanization which feeds
violence, and makes it easier for terrorists to lump these people
into the out-group, which can then be targeted.
“Stickiness” of the narrative
Why does the message of jihad have such universal appeal,
especially for those individuals who are clearly removed from the
close social ties that terrorists appear to share? According to
Raab and Milward,
the key to understanding the attraction seems to be the sense of identity Al Qaeda gives its members, especially young Muslim men in Europe who are alienated from their home
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countries but at the same time not at all integrated in the life of their host countries. (p. 422, 2003)
While studies show that more individuals can be reached through
weak ties (Granovetter, p. 1366), it is easy to argue that those
connected by common interests through the Internet have
preexisting weak ties. While the Internet may be valuable in
recruitment and the spread of propaganda, weak ties may also
indicate individuals who lie on the periphery of the network and
may be more willing to conduct extreme measures in order to find
and establish their place in the organization, especially if they
have bought into the idea that they will be serving a high
utility function and that eternal life and martyrdom is
guaranteed. By serving in this high utility function, they would
have earned the trust and admiration of those whose teachings
they seek to emulate. This could be evaluated as a praise or
martyrdom network; Sageman states that “the jihadi warrior hero
must prove himself in this fight”, and “suicide bombers are now
the rock stars of militant Islam” (2008, pp. 81-82). Islamists
have a valuation of network nodes based on their functional roles
which (based on suicidal activities) launch them from positions
of insignificance to stardom in an instant. This is the appeal
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of Al Qaeda appearing to functioning as a loosely coupled
movement (Jackson, p. 248):
Osama bin Ladin’s statements provide strategic level inputs across the loosely coupled organization…Al Qaeda is more than just an idea or concept-it is not fully leaderless resistance (p. 251, 2006).
Movements are rife with weak connections, which make it difficult
to target specific figureheads when tied to action. The
figureheads are talking heads, who merely identify the general
goals of the organizations (Jackson, p. 248). The global jihad
franchise as a largely leaderless organization has the ability to
recruit from the anonymous outliers with its message to the
disenfranchised and disenchanted global diasporas of Muslim
populations, to include those of the Central Asian states and the
Caucasus. This jihad franchise would be appealing to any
enterprising individual who would want to seek and make his own
fortune; especially as it affords for the perpetrators to exert
control at the local level.
Communication: clerics to fighters, fighters to families
As previously mentioned, Abu Mu’sab al-Suri’s message, which
is echoed throughout medium used by AQ and affiliated Salafist
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and Wahabbist terrorist organizations, is a call for individual
citizens not to wait for jihad, but to conduct it independently.
This is the call to action for individuals who may appear to be
isolates in a larger network. This autonomy reinforces the
appeal of the AQ franchise; it displays the characteristics of a
hybridized organization. It is defined by some centralization
and hierarchical structures, while also displaying
characteristics of a decentralized (almost democratic) network
organization (Mayntz, p. 11). This type of organization, which
may have figureheads and local leaders, capitalizes on group
members’ abilities to contribute when and where they can, whether
it is monetarily, via recruitment or media, or with violent
action. The decentralized nature of this model affords
individuals to customize their organization and expand or
contract to accommodate as many or as few members as the
leadership desires. However, it is this autonomy that the
subgroups exercise that allows for the message to be bastardized
in a way that may not fit with the narrative of the larger group.
Consider for example the Syrian opposition-released video, in
which a rebel leader eats the organs of an Assad regime soldier
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killed in action; even the spokesman for the Free Syrian Army
decried this as unacceptable behavior (Newman, 2013). This is
where terrorist organizations lose legitimacy; where specific
nodes go “too far” in an effort to prove their worth to the
movement.
While Western analysts struggle with the idea that weak ties
and self-radicalization may be the wave of the future, strong
ties and trust networks still have overwhelming effect within
terror networks. With respect to the Caucasus, the teip and
tukhum are the equivalent of tribes and tribal federations, or
sub-clans and clans, and may serve as a major source of
recruitment for the CE. This is the significance of the strong
tie; David Krackhardt posited that social network analysts build
on the idea that strong relations enable organizations to stay
intact, provide motivation, and reduce uncertainty for its
members (Nohria & Eccles, Eds., 1992). In a study conducted by
Pedahzur and Perliger with respect to Palestinian suicide attacks
(considered from a network-based perspective), they discovered
that although hierarchical networks are important, horizontal
networks (vice vertical networks, which are hierarchical in
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nature), with hubs instead of leaders, and based on strong ties
such as family, friendship, contributed just as significantly in
recruitment operations (2006, p. 4). The existence of these
horizontal linkages throughout the tribal structures in the
Caucasus should attract those who have historical ties to the
insurgency. It definitively does in other countries where Salafi
influence thrives; Walid Shoebat stated “Americans are clueless
as to clan ties when it comes to terrorism” (2013). He then
provides links to several prominent Saudi families (to include
the al-Harbi, Aldawsari, and Ghamdi clans), and provides examples
of how familial ties foster and encourage participation in jihad.
Politics, fighting, and tribal feuds are quite definitively a
family affair in the Caucasus; consider the Yamadayevs, an
influential family associated with the leadership of the Vostok
Battalion, or the Gakayev brothers, all six of whom were
affiliated with the CE. These horizontal relationships will be
further explored in chapter five, delving into social network
analysis to determine the extent of teip or tukhum affiliation on
participation in the insurgency.
The communication modes
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Modern day communication modes are the ties that bind; if an
isolates has access to the internet, then can he truly be an
isolate anymore? All over the world, the Internet brings
individuals together; media enables collective action, much as
African-American churches in the south enabled the American Civil
Rights movement of the 1960s (McAdam, 1998). The Arab Spring
uprisings successfully employed social media to coordinate
protests, advertise activities, and reach the world outside to
garner support and momentum. While the Internet has had an
amazing impact on commerce and licit activities, it has also
enhanced the abilities of dark networks to function, and recruit
from the fringe of the organization. As applied to Al Qaeda, the
categorizations of groups, networks, and movements (as well as
hybrids of the three) are a convenient way to explain its
hierarchy and function (Jackson, 2006), but its ability to appeal
to isolates and lone wolves relies heavily on the marketing
strategy of the organization. Boston Bomber Tamerlan Tsarnaev
posted a video dubbed “the Black Flags of Khurasan,” which
incorporates a theme that appeals heavily to potential mujahideen
recruits originating from areas outside of the Arabian Peninsula.
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This is based on a hadith that the time for Muslims to rise up
will happen when the black flags of Khurasan come from the east
(Khan, 2008), an area which includes parts of Persia,
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and which may have extended even
further depending upon context (see Khorasan in Encyclopedia
Britannica). While Tamerlan and his brother may have appeared
to have been acting alone during their violence spree, there is
evidence to the contrary in that that 1) Tamerlan may have
received training during his six months in Dagestan, 2) Dzhokar’s
actions were going to be concealed by his Khazak friends who may
have known about his involvement in the bombings (Sacchetti,
2013), and most significantly, 3) that Tamerlan may have
initially radicalized with minimal outside contact, but was
inspired to action by his Dagestani militant connections. This
terrorist moved quickly from communication, using local contacts
in Dagestan to establish bona fides, resulting in an invitation
to training (Anonymous, 2013), which law enforcement authorities
attribute to the effectiveness of the bombs made by the Tsarnaev
brothers, and finally execution of the deadly attack. The
cocktail of mixing one part effective narrative, one part willing
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participant, and one part exposure to a pre-existing terrorist
network resulted in deadly effects.
Impact to the Caucasus Emirate
In the study of social network analysis, it may be cliché to
quote John Donne that “no man is an island”. But with the
impacts of globalization, and recognition of the influence that
mass media of all varieties have on individuals, it is vastly
easier for the isolates of yesterday to become the instrumental
weak links of today, and regardless of the age of the link, it
still bears significance to the interplay of nodes in the web.
The Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, was eventually turned in by his
brother, even after seven years of estrangement (or perhaps as a
result of those seven years; Pilkington, 2009); no amount of
distance or time could sever the tie that had been established at
birth. Granovetter’s work (1973) on the significance of weak ties
may define what is most significant; that weak ties have the
ability to reach more people, and become the nodes capable of
tying together disparate networks. In the instance of the
Tsarnaev brothers, the weak ties Tamerlan had to his homeland
bridged the geographic distance, and facilitated the sharing of
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knowledge which enabled a budding Islamist to strike at a target
he viewed as relevant to jihad. The ability of isolates to
establish weak ties, their ambition to move into positions of
prestige (i.e. become members of the praise or martyrdom
network), their willingness to earn the trust of network inner
circles by any means possible, and the lack of visibility
intelligence agencies have to their motives makes them the
fastest growing violent threat to civil society. While their
environments and biology may affect their willingness to die for
the cause, it is the pervasive theo-ideology which is the true
danger, and this will require protracted time and effort to
counter.
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Chapter 5: Visual and social network analysis application to the CE
While complete understanding and illumination of a network may
not be possible, it is possible to study a network utilizing
tools that provide the analyst with a better understanding of the
network. This chapter draws and builds upon two earlier studies:
1) one that utilized a visual analytic tool (Palantir) to
determine whether the Caucasus Emirate has the ability and intent
to target the upcoming Winter Olympics in Sochi 2014, and 2) a
second that drew on the tools and methods of social network
analysis in order to ascertain the likelihood that teip and tukhum
were significant factors in CE on government violence. Although
the first study concluded that the CE is incapable of carrying
out a successful catastrophic attack at the Olympics, it would
nevertheless attempt to engage in some form of violence in order
to disrupt the games. Interestingly, since this study was
completed, Dokku Umarov has stated his desire to prevent the
games from occurring, and there has been increased reporting on
not just the potential threat but also actual terrorist
incidents. The second study concluded that because family groups
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are geographically-based and family ties appear to be intrinsic
to CE and government leadership, teip and tukhum membership is a
significant factor in CE on government violence. Both studies
resulted in recommendations for possible courses of action, as
well as a series of lessons learned with regards to the
collection, structuring, ingestion, and formatting of data, which
may be of use for future studies utilizing the same software
suites.
This chapter proceeds as follows. It begins with a
methodological overview, followed by some of the major findings
of the visualization project, as well as the significance of the
findings, … [summarize what’s to come in the remainder of the
chapter; one sentence for each major section is sufficient].,
Methodology
Visual analytics is “the science of analytical reasoning
supported by interactive visual interfaces” (Keim et al., 2008).
The following steps describe the methodology applied in order to
conduct both visual analytics and SNA for the two different
studies. As the two studies were conducted sequentially, the
75
methodology outlines this process, and is followed by detailed
visualizations which support the accompanying findings.
1. Identify data sources: As with most analyses of
relational data, the initial challenge was to identify where to
draw the most accurate data. After some digging, data sources
were narrowed down to the Global Terrorism Database (to import
structured data events and locations in the form of a database
file, or .dbf), unstructured dossiers on members of the Caucasus
Emirate and affiliated sub-groups, and news articles from sources
with varying track records for reliability (i.e. the
kavkazcenter.com, a CE-backed internet news source, and the
waynakh.com, the website for the ChRI). While some news articles
and some of the material gleaned from these websites may
constitute misinformation on the part of the CE, what was more
important were the events and the links to individuals who are
affiliated with organizations. The intent was to conduct
exploratory analysis, to see if we could tease out any relevant
information on key individuals based on link analysis. Are there
identifiable patterns and key leaders that have not been
76
identified? Who were the key leaders of historical significance,
and what modus operandi have they established for the Caucasus
Emirate? Is there a precedent for the CE to attack the Olympics?
How are CE sub-units organized, and how does their structure
appear to affect its function?
2. Data structuring. Palantir, which was developed by
former PayPal executives who specialized in identifying
fraudulent activity, is a powerful visual analytic tool that
fuses link analysis, geospatial analysis, and temporal analysis.
It also includes basic SNA processing capabilities, which are not
yet on par with programs, such as UCINET/NetDraw, ORA, and Pajek.
Palantir served as the mechanism by which the data were coded
with relational information in order to export it into another
program for processing. Data from the Internet was the primary
source for the tagging and coding of relationships. Palantir
allows for the analyst to identify key individuals,
organizations, locations, events, and relationships within its
various interfaces, as well as the use of both structured data
(spreadsheets, database files, etc.) and unstructured documents
(Word files and .pdf documents). The activity of “tagging”
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identifies contextual data within unstructured reporting;
reporters and locals can provide fidelity and resolution that
cannot be inferred by structured data. The contextual data was
used in concert with visualizations of structured data to make
assessments.
3. Geospatial and temporal analysis of events: The intent
of the first study was to answer the question of whether these
groups could effectively attack Sochi, despite the impression
that their center of gravity was in either Ingushetia or
Dagestan. We also attempted to identify trends in attack
patterns, in order to determine whether Russian targeting of
leaders had a disruptive effect on the operational capacity of
the CE, or whether it just galvanized the group to conduct future
attacks. This was not entirely possible, as the Global Terrorism
Database (GTD) does not include operational information on when
the government and security forces were conducting their own
operations against the insurgents, nor does it specify whether
insurgent key leaders were killed during the course of the
operations. While Palantir possesses great geospatial
capabilities, we also used ArcGIS, a geospatial tool produced by
78
Esri, that can handle large volumes of data, including the
factoring of layers that include political boundaries,
infrastructure, religious data, ethno-linguistic groups, and any
other structured data with grid reference information. While the
GTD included fairly accurate grid coordinates, though there were
some perceivable faults with the data (see challenges to
analysis, below).
4. Temporal analysis of the network: We also sought to
determine the effectiveness of Russian targeting of CE key
leaders over time, determine the evolution of central figures and
locations within the network, and assess their significance over
the course of the last decade. Palantir has a mechanism by which
it can evaluate events and links temporally, if the requisite
background data are identified within the document. In this
case, the relational data were not structured as to identify the
dates, times, and duration of links (i.e. how long terrorist “a”
was a member of organization “b”, which then morphed into
organization “c”). This would require a herculean effort, which
is beyond the scope of this research.
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5. Link Analysis: Link analysis can be useful for
determining significant individuals, events, organizations, and
the connections between them. While this analysis can provide a
nice visual overview, this portion was conducted in the discovery
phase of this investigation, so the graphics did not include a
number of key leaders. As the initial aggregate of entities and
events did not visually assist in identifying key nodes, we coded
for the inclusion of more individuals, as the majority of
significant actors from the first study were deceased, and would
not be relevant to the network apart from providing historical
context.
6. Social Network Analysis (SNA): SNA is a tool that can
be used in the fight against the terrorism, although
practitioners warn that it is not a panacea and certainly not a
solution that can stand by itself. In spite of this, SNA may 1)
be useful in illuminating dark networks, 2) provide insight as to
why certain networks behave as they do, 3) identify which are the
key nodes (whether they are in positions of brokerage or
centrality), and 4) assist in determining how to go about
impacting the network, whether it is through lethal means,
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targeting media platforms, or intervention in the form of
dialogue with key leaders. A major question from studying the
subordinate organizations of the CE was whether any of the
subordinate networks were more resilient than others, based on
formal vs. informal ties, and whether or not we could identify
any individuals that were more significant than others with
respect to brokerage. The following study focused specifically
on teip and tukhum affiliation, the current structure of the CE to
include its military fronts, jama’ats, and vilaiyats, and the key
individuals within the organizations that have been identified
through various sources (see data sources, below).
7. Challenges to analysis: Including novice experience
with all of the software platforms, they are itemized and
included below.
8. Recommendations and conclusion: see chapter 6.
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Data Processing:
Geospatial: Processing the structured information, the GTD had a
significant number of events (approximately 1,500) but did not
necessarily have grid coordinates associated with them. In order
to ascribe grid coordinates to the GTD, this required the merging
of two separate databases: One from the GTD with the events
selected for Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS) (dtd.
from 2001 to the most recent available as of March 2013), and
one from a gazetteer provided by the National Geospatial-
intelligence Agency (NGA) that was extracted from a text (.txt)
file with the Roman names for all of the villages in Russia with
their respective grid coordinates. These were then combined in
ArcGIS to create a new data source (“city” and “RO NAME”, the
Roman name of the city, were the two joined characteristics for
each of the databases), which was then exported as a database
file (.dbf) so that it could be converted into a comma separated
value (.csv) or an Excel (.xlsx) file, which Palantir can ingest.
Once all of the events were imported, a number of country
geopolitical files were retrieved from DivaGIS and MapDiva (two
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websites that provide free geospatial products), as well as a
Russian Roads overlay. These were initially examined in ArcGIS
in order to ensure they were at the correct projection, and then
saved as a shapefile (.shp) to be dropped into Palantir.
Once the shapefiles and Excel files were dropped into
Palantir, they had to be modified for visual effect, as Palantir
cannot ingest a layer file (.lyr). The resulting chloropleth map
based on the provincial shape files and event data is below, and
draws attention to the Caucasus States.
Figure 5. Chloropleth map, total events from 2001 to 2011
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Figure 6. Event Density from 2001-2007
The heat map pictured above includes data spanning part of
the Second Chechen War (1999-2004), so while it may not
necessarily include force on force events, it includes the
significant activities (SIGACTs) constituting asymmetric warfare
located IVO Grozny and Chechnya, with a few events spilling over
into neighboring Dagestan and Ingushetia. This picture also
includes Moscow, shown because a number of events (attributable
to the organizations preceding the CE) had occurred during both
time periods (notably the Dubrovka Theater hostage situation and
Beslan Secondary School attack).
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Figure 7. Event Density from 2007-2012
The new heat map comprising the timeframe between 2007-2012
indicates no real change to the number of terrorist events
perpetrated by the CE in vicinity of Moscow over the assessed
timeframes. After 2007 in the Caucasus, however, events were no
longer localized just in and around Chechnya, but had spread out
along the M29 route, which parallels the train system and oil
pipeline, which were heavily targeted during this timeframe.
Events are also now occurring primarily in the federal subjects
of Ingushetia and Karbardino-Balkaria, as well as along the route
down into eastern Azerbaijan, through Makhachkala (the capital of
Dagestan). This may be as a result of the increased
operationalization of the Dagestani Vilaiyat, and a change in the
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CE center of gravity. If the capital of Grozny is no longer
perceived as the strategic objective, it could be that their
efforts will span the entire Caucasus, with no clear emphasis on
any given republic.
While the M29 is not directly tied to Sochi (which has also
seen a small growth in the number of events occurring in close
proximity), there are a number of secondary roads and
infrastructure that could serve as viable ingress and egress
routes for the insurgents. If they are to conduct a catastrophic
attack around Sochi, they will have to transport personnel and
logistics to the area. It is during this movement that they will
be the most vulnerable, but if they utilize traditional methods
of transport, to include mule and cart, they may be able to avoid
detection while targeting the periphery of the events. As
mentioned in chapter one, the CE’s military jama’ats have already
demonstrated their ability to conduct operations in Krasnodar
Krai, but the CE could also employ the Volga and Urals Fronts to
conduct a more spectacular attack closer to Moscow, as the
world’s eyes focus on Sochi. While these vilaiyats have not been
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active, like the recent attacks on Volgograd, it is more likely a
result of a plot a result of the Dagestani Vilaiyat plot
organized at the jama’at level; possibly the Temirkhan Shura
(Buinaksk) Jama’at, which includes ethnic Russians (Hahn, 2013).
Temporal Analysis (see graphic below): In the assessment of the
SIGACTs evaluated through temporal analysis, the timeframe
including part of the Second Chechen War, dtd. 1999-2004.
Significant lethal targeting of key individuals within the
Caucasus Emirate occurred from 2005-2007, to include Aslan
Maskhadov (March 2005), Shamil Basayev (July 2006), and Abdul-
Khalim Sadulayev (June 2006), all of whom occupied key leadership
roles in the network. There is a visible lull in the amount of
activity during 2007, and then an explosion of SIGACTs in the
years immediately following. The vast majority of the SIGACTs
were comprised of bombing events (blue), though the number of
armed attacks also saw a large increase (green). This is why in
order to determine how the government’s targeting efforts
affected the network it was important to split our data into
before 1 January 2007 and after. The level of activity within
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the past few years attributed to CE activity far exceeds that
from during the 2nd Chechen War timeframe, but this may be as a
result of the database not including events which were
attributable to conventional type of force on force warfare.
Figure 8. Complete timeline with events by type. The blue depicts the bombing events (highest density) and the green includes the armed attacks.
While it would be presumptuous to attribute the explosion of
SIGACTs mid-way through 2007 specifically to the targeting of key
CE officials (as it may also be the result of improved database
management and record keeping), there may be a correlation
between the insurgent swarms that the Russian government is
facing and visibility. Arquilla and Ronfeldt define a swarm as
an “autonomous or semi-autonomous units engaging in convergent
88
assault on a common target,” and “amorphous but coordinate way to
strike from all directions – sustained pulsing, of force or fire”
(Arquilla & Ronfeldt, p. 21). The Chechens under Aslan Maskhadov
quickly assimilated swarm tactics, i.e. pulsing and coordinated
attacks against a much superior force, so the fact is that the CE
is still employing this tactic, but in a much more ruthless and
decentralized, and certainly less illuminated manner. This may
also explain that high value target (HVT) removal may not always
equate to destroying or neutralizing the network; it may merely
have the effect of darkening it and obscuring external eyes from
identifying the key players. That being said, in specific
networks, targeting key nodes has resulted in the disintegration
of the network, as the network may have been too centralized, or
power consolidated into one individual which the network is
unable to function without; consider the case study of the Tamil
Tigers (LTTE), and its leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. Upon his
death, the organization splintered, and the Sri Lankan government
declared an end to the 25 year civil war (Kardirgamar, 2009).
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Link Analysis: Link analysis is a useful tool to visually examine
how all of the groups and individuals interact with one another.
Sean Everton states that while it is often confused with SNA,
the basic difference between the two approaches is that although link analysis diagrams often include different types of objects, (e.g. individuals, cars, cell phones) and the ties between them, social networks diagram only include ties between similar types of objects. (2012, p. 6)
While it does not necessarily provide a metric that identifies
who the key players are, it does assist analysts in visually
identifying who may lie on brokerage paths between groups, which
clusters might have more members, or which agents have been
members of more than one organization. Figure 9 (below)
represents all of the people, events (which could be attributed
to shared people or organizations), and organizations after
removal of isolate nodes (i.e. events or individuals who had no
discernible relationship with others). The data sources coded
for in the initial study resulted in approximately 501 locations,
91 organizations (both terrorist and government), and 135
individuals. The events from the GTD comprised approximately
1,577 events, which added to the entities already on the visual
graph. This analysis was conducted in the early stages of
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development, and many key individuals included in the early
analysis wound up being deceased, so while it provided historical
context for who has been significant in the past, it is not
necessarily relevant in determining the key individuals in the
SNA portion. While Palantir has a very good graphic user
interface, other tools are available for analyst use, such as
Analyst Notebook, AXIS Pro, and CrimeLink.
In the initial link diagram using all entities, clusters
formed around locations and events. This is likely due to the
significant amount of structured data imported that specifically
correlated events, locations, and perpetrators from the Global
Terrorism Database, and also because the organizations were not
arrayed temporally (i.e. the Chechen Separatists exist in a very
small way, but the Caucasus Emirate was formed in 2007) it
subsumed much of the function of the Chechen Separatists, even
though the former organization still exists in a very marginal
form.
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Figure 9. Link analysis diagram for all entities, including events.
Significance of Link Analysis:
The link analysis, as it was conducted in the elementary
stages of the Olympics study, was cognitive learning; we had
little idea the extent in which the Chechen Separatists
organization had morphed into the CE, as is evidenced by the
title of the study (Chechen Separatists and the 2014 Winter
Olympics). I had only a sophomoric understanding of the
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insurgency, and slowly came to know the organizations better
through the readings and resulting visualizations, as well as
temporally observing the CE subsume a number of the other
subordinate organizations. The errors of this study led to
clarity in the social network analysis study that was conducted
the following quarter. The reduction in the number of
individuals in from the first to the second diagrams reflects the
result of killings and detentions conducted by security services;
however, we were not able to reflect new members entering or
rising within the network. The lack of reduction in organizations
likely demonstrated that we did not accurately account for the CE
subsuming the other Islamist organizations or militias, or that
they were able to maintain their original operational structure
as a subordinate element to the CE. It could also reflect the
network’s resiliency. Combining this indicator with the temporal
analysis depicting increased terror activity suggests that
additional players have entered the network and more of the
network needs to be illuminated.
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Figure 10. Represents the linkages between people and organizations using the entire data set, minus the events and locations.
Figure 11. Represents the linkages between people and organizations that are still active in the network as of March 2013. Note how it is sparser (at
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least 20 individuals removed as a result of death, none of them from natural causes)
Social Network Analysis
In addition to the original Palantir data, additional coding was
completed to add to the initial batch of entities, which resulted
with three different entity types of interest and allowed for
extensive one-mode and two-mode data analysis. According to
Everton, “a one-mode network is a network which consists of a
single set of actors” (2012, p 402), i.e. people are placed
against the same people, and their relationships are defined,
whereas “a two-mode network consists of two sets of actors (i.e.
a dyadic network) or one set of actors and one set of events
(i.e. an affiliation network)” (2012, p. 403). The three
different entity types are 1) people (318), 2) government
organizations (20), and 3) terrorist organizations (152).
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Figure 12. Link Analysis Diagram of all entities, minus events (Palantir)
Relational data for individuals include ties to other individuals
(kinship ties, affiliated/associated, friendship,
subordinate/superior of, enemies) and to government or terrorist
organizations (i.e. member of, leader of, affiliated/associated
with, supporter of); the data also include important attributes
which may be relevant to the analysis, in particular tribal data
(to answer the question of whether teip or tukhum are significant
in the resiliency of the network) and target status (i.e.
detained or deceased). The terrorist organizations can be
organized into hierarchies in one-mode data (organization to
organization), and the affiliated individuals can provide for
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analysis of two-mode data (person to organization, i.e. leader
of, affiliated/associated, participant, linked to, etc.). Within
the individuals of interest (one-mode, person to person), some of
the relationship information reflects positive ties (i.e.
friendship, kinship, linked to, associated/affiliated,
superior/subordinate, supporter), and some reflect negative ties
(i.e. enemy, opponent). This relational data, along with the
attributes of teip/tukhum membership, and target status (deceased
or detained), were layered into the network metafile. Then, the
one-mode and two-mode relationships were displayed as formal and
informal relationships, and then analyzed with respect to
topography, centrality, identification of subnetworks, and
brokerage. With the formal network, individuals were with the
informal network, relationships were inferred from membership
with hierarchical organizations.
One mode relationships (5): person x person (kinship, friendship,
affiliated/associated with), organization x organization
(terrorist organizations only)
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Two-mode relationships (4): people x government organizations,
person x terrorist organizations (member of, supporter of, leader
of, affiliated/associated with), person x teip, teip x tukhum
Extracted relationships (1): organization x organization
(informal, based on relationships between people who are members
of more than one organization). The relational data were
structured in Palantir and then analyzed using ORA.
Attributes (2): tribal affiliation, target status (i.e. alive,
deceased, or detained)
All of the information processed is undirected; therefore, all of
the networks examined below are symmetric.
Significance of SNA
Topography: Inclusion of all of the relational data resulted in
an extremely dense network, which visually resembled a death star
and was of little value to us in evaluating the arcs and nodes.
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Figure13. Network of agent x agent via shared organizations (most dense).
Figure14. Total Caucasus Emirate organizational network (with actors, dead and alive). Dead actors are the light pink, living actors are dark pink. Organizations are in green; the central organizations are those who are directly connected with the CE Shura.
An informal network (figure 15) was generated using the manually
coded one-mode network (organization to organization, which was
somewhat hierarchical based on geography, the directing central
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leadership, and the fighting units), and we derived a one-mode
network from a two-mode agent by organization network.
Figure 15. Folded alive informal network (green ties are organization x organization, and the red ties are agent x organization).
Depicted below (figure 17) is another informal agent by
agent (i.e., one-mode) network that includes shared tribal
affiliation (supporting, affiliated, and member of) and
friendship ties. What it shows is that the Kadyrov and Yamadayev
family groups, which are political rivals and have engaged in
feuds in recent history but are still affiliated with the
government, are both members of the Benoy teip. The Gakayev
brothers belong to a different teip, Elishtanzhxoy, but both are
members of the Noxcmaxkxoy tukhum. They are also rivals with the
Kadyrov family but are affiliated with the Caucasus Emirate
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insurgency. The six Gakayev brothers have historically been
associated with leadership in the CE movement. Four of them died
during the Chechen War, and the two sole survivors, Khuseyn and
Muslim, were recently killed during targeting operations run by
Chechen and Russian security forces in January, 2013.
Figure 16. Agents by informal relationships/tribes.
In figure 17 (below), the agents are depicted by their
respective nationalities and tukhum. The visualization also shows
that there are number of teips that do not belong to a tukhum
(depicted below the central green dot). The figure identifies the teip
linked to the central green icon are Chechens. All the teips of
other ethnicities are depicted in tukhum to the right, with their
The Gakayev brothersand their resultant
networksAkhmed and Ramzan
Kadyrov’s family, withneighboring nodesincluding the
Yamadayev brothers
Alaroy, Benoy,Belgatoi, and
Elishtanzhxoy teip aremembers of the
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respective tribes linking them to their ethnicity (in green).
The third row from the right depicts the Noxmachoy tukhum, which
includes both Dagestani and Chechen teip, and the second row from
the right depicts the Myälxiy tukhum, which includes Dagestani,
Georgian, Circassian and Tartar ethnicities. The teip listed
under the central green node (representing those of Chechen
ethnicity) are those who do not belong to a tukhum. The
representation of the social structure of Chechnya provides a few
interesting findings:
- The tribal federations are not ethnically exclusive - The
Noxcmaxkxoy, Mialkii, and Akii tukhum are composed of teip of the
various ethnicities found in Chechnya.
- There is no segregation in terms of majority vs. minority
- The Chechen tribes are federated with tribes of other
ethnicities. A clear example is the Noxcmaxkxoy tukhum.
- The tribal federations are not religiously exclusive - In
the multi-ethnic tukhum, Muslim Dagestanis are joined by
Christian Orthodox Georgians, or as the case of the Akii tukhum,
Jews, Turks, Abhkazians, and Russians, each from distinct
religious background which comprise the tukhum.
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Figure 17. Teip by tukhum and nationalities. The green nodes symbolize ethnic groups (the largest in the center being the Chechens), the blue nodes represent the tukhum, and the red nodes represent the teip
Centrality: Our initial estimates of centrality included deceased
individuals who were linked through the CE. In order to only
estimate centrality metrics for those individuals who were
affiliated with CE-affiliated organizations (in order to
accurately determine who could be targeted within that
organization), we derived an agent-by-agent matrix from a two-
mode network of shared terrorist organizations. Four types of
centrality measures were calculated for this study: betweenness,
closeness, eigenvector, and degree. Everton best describes these
centrality measures as follows; someone with high betweenness is
“someone who lies on the shortest path between numerous pairs of
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actors in a network”, closeness “is someone who is close (in
terms of path distance) to other actors in the network”,
eigenvector is “someone who has ties to highly central actors”,
and degree is “someone who has numerous ties to other actors”
(2012, p. 207).
The two tables below present the various centrality
measures. The first includes all of the actors, as well as their
1) political links captured in the initial data, and 2) the
deceased individuals linked to the Caucasus Emirate; the second
table presents the measures of those individuals tied to the
Caucasus Emirate who are still alive.
In figure 18 (below), we extracted only those individuals
who were still alive and involved in the CE, and as a result the
network became more disconnected. The numbers of individuals who
are still alive limited the degree to which the analysis could be
conducted (the number of agents dropped from 219 to 75). This
suggested that maybe it would be more productive to focus on the
organizations, rather than the individuals who enter and leave
the network at a much higher rate than do organizations.
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Rank Betweennesscentrality Closeness centrality Eigenvector
centralityTotal degreecentrality
1 Omar Ibn al-Khattab (.0014)
Omar Ibn al-Khattab(.0373)
Omar Ibn al-Khattab(.6135)
Aslan Maskhadov(.026)
2 Aslan Maskhadov(.0011)
Aslan Maskhadov(.0363)
Aslambek Ismailov(.5675)
Omar Ibn al-Khattab (.0227)
3 Usama Bin Laden(.0011)
Aslambek Ismailov(.0319)
KhunkarpashaIsrapilov (.5675)
Usama Bin Laden(.0162)
4 Shamil SalmanovichBasayev (.0003)
KhunkarpashaIsrapilov (.0319)
Ruslan Gelayev(.5675)
ShamilSalmanovich
Basayev (.0162)
5 Ramzan A. Kadyrov(.0001)
Ruslan Gelayev(.0319)
Aslan Maskhadov(.5617)
Aslambek Ismailov(.0162)
6 Aslambek Ismailov(5.29x10-5)
Usama Bin Laden(.0314)
Shamil SalmanovichBasayev (.4895)
KhunkarpashaIsrapilov (.0162)
7KhunkarpashaIsrapilov(5.29x10-5)
Shamil SalmanovichBasayev (.0298)
Usama Bin Laden(.1488)
Ruslan Gelayev(.0162)
8 Ruslan Gelayev(5.29x10-5)
Abu al-Walid(.02273)
Abu al-Walid(.1244)
Ramzan A. Kadyrov(.013)
9 Ruslan Yamadayev(3.17x10-5)
Akhmed K. Zakayev(.0219)
Akhmed K. Zakayev(.1139)
Ruslan Yamadayev(.0097)
10 Nadezhda Pogosova(2.12x10-5)
Umar Khambiev(.0219)
Umar Khambiev(.1139)
Nadezhda Pogosova(.0065)
11 Vladimir V. Putin(2.12x10-5)
Vakha Arsanov(.0219)
Vakha Arsanov(.1139)
Vladimir V. Putin(.0065)
12General Sergei
Kizyun(1.41x10-5)
ZelimkhanAbdumuslimovich
Yandarbiyev (.0219)
ZelimkhanAbdumuslimovich
Yandarbiyev (.1139)
General SergeiKizyun(.0065)
13 Olga Alenova(1.41x10-5)
Abdullah Duhayman(.0203)
Khabibulla Amir(.0992)
Olga Alenova(.0065)
14 Vladimir Ryzhkov(1.41x10-5)
Ayman al-Zawahiri(.0203)
Abdullah Duhayman(.0302)
Vladimir Ryzhkov(.0065)
15 Anatoly Yablochkov(1.06x10-5)
Enaam M. Arnaout(.0203)
Ayman al-Zawahiri(.0302)
AnatolyYablochkov(.0065)
16 Nikolai Yegorov(1.06x10-5)
Mamdouh Salim(.0203)
Enaam M. Arnaout(.0302)
Nikolai Yegorov(.0065)
17 Sergei Ivanov(1.06x10-5)
Khabibulla Amir(.0195)
Mamdouh Salim(.0302)
Sergei Ivanov(.0065)
18 Vasily Pugachyov(1.06x10-5)
Ramzan A. Kadyrov(.0146)
Zelimkhan Kadyrov(5.9x10-10)
Vasily Pugachyov(.0065)
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19 Abu al-Walid(1.06x10-5)
Ruslan Yamadayev(.0124)
Zulay Kadyrov(5.37x10-10)
Aslanbek Vadalov(.0065)
20 Akhmed K. Zakayev(1.06x10-5)
General Sergei Kizyun(.0114)
Zakariya(2.08x10-28)
Dokku Umarov(.0065)
Figure 18. Table from processing metrics of all agents taken from their ties with others via terrorist organizations (alive and dead; deceased individuals are annotated in red. Values are normalized, and closeness centrality was calculated in UCINET using the ARD centrality measure).
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Rank Betweennesscentrality Closeness centrality Eigenvector
centralityTotal degree centrality
1 Daud Akhmadov(.091)
Daud Akhmadov(.545)
Daud Akhmadov(.4147)
Daud Akhmadov(.3649)
2 Dokku Umarov(.0796)
Khadis(.5383)
Khadis(.4130)
Khadis(.3514)
3Tarkhan
IsmailovichGaziyev (.07334)
Israpil Velidzhanov(aka Hasan) (.5225)
Israpil Velidzhanov(aka Hasan) (.4005)
IsrapilVelidzhanov (akaHasan) (.3243)
4 Khadis(.071)
Dokku Umarov(.5)
Dokku Umarov(.3211)
Dokku Umarov(.2703)
5 Aslanbek Vadalov(.0596)
Aslanbek Vadalov(.4932)
Amir SeyfullakhGubdensky (.3201)
Aslanbek Vadalov(.2568)
6Israpil
Velidzhanov (akaHasan) (.0581)
Abu Anas Mukhannad(.4842)
Aslanbek Vadalov(.3198)
Abu Anas Mukhannad(.2432)
7 Asker Djappuyev(.0566)
Supyan Abdullayev(.4842)
Abu Anas Mukhannad(.3171)
Amir SeyfullakhGubdensky (.2432)
8 Assad(.0544)
Asker Djappuyev(.482)
Supyan Abdullayev(.3171)
Asker Djappuyev(.2432)
9 Amir SeyfullakhGubdensky (.0514)
Tarkhan IsmailovichGaziyev (.482)
Asker Djappuyev(.3126)
Supyan Abdullayev(.2432)
10 Abu AnasMukhannad (.0394)
Amir SeyfullakhGubdensky (.482)
Tarkhan IsmailovichGaziyev (.3081)
TarkhanIsmailovich
Gaziyev (.2432)
11 Supyan Abdullayev(.0394)
Assad(.4707)
Assad(.3053)
Assad(.2162)
12 Akhmed K. Zakayev(.0395)
Ali Abu Mukhammad al-Dagistani (.455)
Ali Abu Mukhammadal-Dagistani
(.3026)
Ali Abu Mukhammadal-Dagistani
(.1891)
13 Sultan Khadisov(.0207)
Anvar Labazanov(.455)
Anvar Labazanov(.3026)
Anvar Labazanov(.1891)
14 Usman Firzauli(.02)
Askhab(.455)
Askhab(.3026)
Askhab(.1891)
15 Salikh(.0110)
Muhammad(.455)
Muhammad(.3026)
Khalid Vaykhanov(.1891)
16GadhzimuradKamalutdinov
(.0064)Khalid Vaykhanov
(.4077)Salikh(.1952)
Muhammad(.1891)
17 Marat Kurbanov(.0064)
Salikh(.4077)
Khalid Vaykhanov(.1853)
Salikh(.1891)
18 Omar Ramazanov(.0064)
Bagautdin Magomedov(.3851)
BagautdinMagomedov (.1713)
BagautdinMagomedov (.1487)
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19 Kazbek Tashuyev(.0061)
Khassan Baiev(.3851)
Khassan Baiev(.1713)
Khassan Baiev(.1487)
20 Khalid Vaykhanov(.0055)
Nabi Mediddinov(.3851)
Nabi Mediddinov(.1713)
Nabi Mediddinov(.1487)
Figure 19. Table from processing metrics of all agents taken from their ties with others via terrorist organizations (values are normalized, and closeness centrality was calculated in UCINET using the ARD value).
108
DEGREE CLOSENESS BETWEENNESS EIGENVECTOR
Riyad us-SaliheynMartyrs' Brigade
(.162)
Vilaiyat Nokchicho(.031)
Vilaiyat Dagestan(.311)
Riyad us-SaliheynMartyrs' Brigade
(.244)Vilaiyat Nokchicho
(.149)Riyad us-SaliheynMartyrs' Brigade
(.031)
United VilaiyatKabardia Balkaria
and Karachai (.15)
Vilaiyat Nokchicho(.243)
Vilaiyat Dagestan(.145)
Vilaiyat Dagestan(.031)
Riyad us-SaliheynMartyrs' Brigade
(.131)
Amir of ShaliDistrict(.242)
Amir/Vali of theDagestan Vilaiyat
(.135)
Amir/Vali of theDagestan Vilaiyat
(.031)
Vilaiyat Nokchicho(.130)
Amir/Vali of theDagestan Vilaiyat
(.242)Amir of Shali
District(.135)
Amir of ShaliDistrict(.031)
Vilaiyat Gyalgyaiche(Ingushetia andOssetia) (.118)
Caucasus Emirate(CE) Leadership
(.242)Caucasus Emirate(CE) Leadership
(.135)
Caucasus Emirate(CE) Leadership
(.031)
Southeastern Front(.059)
Al-Ansar Brigade ofForeign Volunteers
(.242)Al-Ansar Brigade ofForeign Volunteers
(.135)
Al-Ansar Brigade ofForeign Volunteers
(.031)
Southwestern Front(.059)
Special FightingUnits Commanders
(.242)Special FightingUnits Commanders
(.135)
Special FightingUnits Commanders
(.031)
Khasavyurt Sector(.057)
Madzhlisul Shura(.242)
Madzhlisul Shura(.135)
Madzhlisul Shura(.031)
Central SectorDagestani
Vilayat/Front (.057)
Amir/Vali of theVilaiyat Gyalgyaiche(Ingushetia) (.242)
Amir/Vali of theVilaiyat
Gyalgyaiche
Amir/Vali of theVilaiyat
Gyalgyaiche
PLAINS OF CHECHNYA(.047)
Mobile SabotageSquad (.242)
Figure 20. Centrality measures, formal network.
DEGREE CLOSENESS BETWEENNESS EIGENVECTOR
Madzhlisul Shura(.092)
Madzhlisul Shura(.002)
Madzhlisul Shura(.208)
Sunzhensky Sector(.446)
Sunzhensky Sector(.063)
Northeastern Front(.002)
Northeastern Front(.053)
Ingush Jamaat(.446)
Ingush Jamaat(.063)
Itum-KalinskiiDistrict(.002)
Vilaiyat Dagestan(.050)
Amanat Jamaat(.446)
Amanat Jamaat(.063)
Shelkovoi village(.002)
Special FightingUnits Commanders
(.041)
Karabulak Sector(.446)
Karabulak Sector(.063)
Borz Regiment(.002)
Caucasus Emirate(CE) Leadership
(.038)
Khalifat Jamaat(.446)
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Khalifat Jamaat(.063)
Sernovodsk Jamaat(.002)
Amir/Vali of theVilaiyat
Gyalgyaiche
Jamaat Siddik(.446)
Jamaat Siddik(.063)
Western Front(.002)
Itum-KalinskiiDistrict(.024)
Ossetiyan Jamaatof Ossetiya Kataibal-Khoul (.360)
Ossetiyan Jamaatof Ossetiya Kataibal-Khoul (.051)
Army of Ichkeria(.002)
Urus Martan Sector(.023)
Operational GroupIraf(.360)
Operational GroupIraf
(.051)
Amir/Vali of theVilaiyat
Gyalgyaiche
Dargo Village(.019)
Operational GroupSunzha (.360)
Operational GroupSunzha (.051)
Naur District(.002)
Shelkovoi Village(.019)
Ossetian Jamaat(.350)
Figure 21. Centrality, informal network
In observing the centrality measures in figure 21 (above),
the Madzhlisil Shura (the center node of the diagram above),
which is the governing body of the CE, had the highest
centrality, as one would expect. The Northeastern Front scored
high as well, but then the Dagestani Vilaiyat (central blue node)
and the Special Unit Fighting Commanders came in behind them as
the best brokers (organizationally). It is interesting to note
that the Borz Regiment (or special fighting unit; the equivalent
of special purpose forces), originally commanded by Ruslan
Gelayev (d. February 28, 2004) no longer exists, but it displays
a high closeness centrality. This may be due to the fact that
individuals who once served in the regiment and now belong to
other various organizations are central to the overall network.
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Identification of Subnetworks: A visual assessment of the formal
organizational network suggests that there it contains a
substantial number of subgroups, based on their affiliation with
the main Madzhisul Shura, as well as the relationships between
individuals who are shura members.
Figure 22. Network of formal ties (CE unit to CE unit)
In order to identify subgroups within the network, we used one of
the Newman group clustering algorithms (see Figure 23).1 The
1 This measure (Clauset, Newman, and Moore) appeared to provide the best fit of the data by the four measures selected to locate a subgroup: Clauset, Newman, and Moore; Girvan-Newman; Components; and Cliques.
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highly connected formal network would be extremely difficult to
deconstruct, but we hypothesized that the informal relationships
that tie the network together have the potential to be extremely
useful in obtaining a more accurate clustering coefficient,
considering that the informal network is more decentralized, and
the leadership for many of these cells appear to rotate within
the larger organization.
Figure 23. Network of informal CE organizations to CE organizations (relationships through people)
Brokerage: We attempted to calculate the brokerage potential of
the individuals after removing the deceased agents. Brokerage is
the idea that “some actors are more likely to control the flow of
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resource than others” and “whose removal will fragment the
network (Everton, 2012, p. 253).” There are various metrics that
measure brokerage (and fragmentation) potential. One, cutpoints,
which ORA calls “boundary spanners,” are those actors whose
removal will disconnect the network. Five such cutpoints are
depicted in Figure 23:. Ali Taziev (captured in 2010 and in
prison for life), Akhmed Zakayev (not a good candidate for
targeting, as he resides in the U.K., protected under political
refugee status, Assad, Daud Akhmadov (now deceased), and Asker
Djappuyev (deceased as of 2011).
Figure 24. Boundary spanner, potential; visually, red is the lowest, and then moves through the visual spectrum to the blue nodes, which have the highest values.
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Challenges to analysis
Data Sources: It was difficult to find enough familial, kinship,
and teip/tukhum data to conduct the requisite analysis. While the
data indicates that the Benoy teip is a very powerful and
influential tribe (i.e. from the President of Chechnya and many
of his rivals and henchmen), the ties do not always indicate a
positive relationship (e.g., the familial feud between the
Kadyrovs and the Yamadayevs), and currently it is difficult to
infer a negative relationship between one individual and another,
particularly in the available software. While teip and tukhum
relationships may be intuitive for a native or an expert, it was
not apparent to us as we were data mining for sources.
Manually coding data requires that analysts create one
and/or two-mode networks (e.g., agent to agent, or agent to
organization), based on readings or by extrapolating data from
other reporting to infer relationships, that are usually binary
in nature; the value of one indicates a relationship, whereas the
value of zero indicates no relationship. We had the challenge of
both manually coded data, as well as the graphs created from the
relationships identified in Palantir. This created a data
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ingestion problem; not all of the organizations that were coded
in Palantir matched the manually coded organizations, which was
generated to reflect the hierarchy of the terrorist network in
the Caucasus Emirate. It would have been easier to stick with
just one mode of data sourcing; either Palantir or manually coded
data.
Faults with data (Structured data): The fault of the GTD lies in
that it is not capable of distinguishing militant activity vs.
criminal activity in all cases (some were attributed to the CE,
while others were perpetrated by unidentified groups), and the
data source or feed contributing to the GTD events may have
changed over time (as proof, there were more events to resolve
after a certain point in time, and duplicate reporting became
more significant after the mid-2000s). Also, the grid
coordinates listed for certain attacks (i.e. pipeline or railway
attacks), when double-checked were not reported accurately. There
were also several catastrophic events (i.e. the Novsky Express
Bombing) that were not listed when the events were reported to
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have occurred. As good as structured data is and as much as it
contributed to the analysis, it is still flawed.
Faults with data (Unstructured data): The unstructured data
lacked accurate numbers and grid coordinates. This was
especially true in events that may have been law enforcement
events or events initiated by military action, which would have
been extremely valuable data to understand the context of who
initiated the action. While utilizing Kavkaz as a data source may
have provided fidelity to the networks, it was clearly biased, as
it has been mentioned previously that it serves as the media
outlet for the Caucasus Emirate. However, it was a good source
of relational information, as well as biographical data for
individuals in the network. Unstructured data is unfortunate in
that it lends itself to bias on the part of the analyst; it may
be easy to get myopically focused on one individual, and then
pull additional reporting to substantiate relationships he/she
may have, at the expense of ignoring other players who may be
influential within the network, or be brokers to external
resources.
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Language: While Russian media content appeared to be fairly
accurate, we experienced challenges with translation. Google
Translate was employed to assist in translation, but some
fidelity was lost in coding miss-matched phrases, and made
structuring data a challenge. Having a regional expert on hand
early on in the project will lend itself to better fidelity and
understanding of context.
Ontology: The SOCOM ontology used to determine relational data
(i.e. limiting the context of relationships) does not address
some of the political and criminal activity and relationships
expressed in this case study. The network had elements of
government, criminal, and other activities which could have
contributed more to the SNA portion, had it been effectively
incorporated. Varying the degrees of relationships could have
been clarified with more specific ontology (i.e. physical enemies
versus political opponents, etc.) may have been useful in a more
accurate determination of centralities.
Classified data sources: there was a dearth of data sources to
determine who was detained, as well as a lack of military and law
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enforcement data in order to compare criminal and terrorist
operations. Classified networks may have more resources
available to study this, and a more specific partnership with
Russian law enforcement and military may be required in order to
procure this type of information. Comparing when the Russian
government was conducting operations as opposed to inferring them
from the timeline where the CE High Value Targets (HVTs) were
killed would have provided greater fidelity on the effect of
Russian military operations.
SNA: An aspect of analysis within Palantir that was not addressed
is the ability to infer relationships through events; i.e. if an
individual participated in an attack, kidnapping, or murder
attempt of someone else, and there was a “victim of” the event,
we can assume that the participant and the victims are enemies.
However, the linkages between the event and individuals would
need to be recoded in Palantir before they are exported for
ingestion, but as there were more than 1,500 events with
incomplete participant data coded for the original Winter Olympic
project, we only used data coded from articles and not the Global
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Terrorism Database import used to retrieve such a large number of
attack events. Political entities appear to have been calculated
on the initial centrality graphs, because they were included in
the analysis as there was much more teip and tukhum data on these
individuals. However, they were removed, as we could not
quantify the ties that they have with the CE, nor could we make
the relationships directional, and take negative ties into
consideration (i.e. Ramzan Kadyrov, Vladimir Putin, some other
significant political figures in Russian politics, as well as a
few some other individuals who were listed as kidnapping
victims). Evaluating negative relationships (i.e. ones of
opposition, whether political otherwise) could provide a valuable
metric in assessing the significance of nodes.
Chapter 6: Holistic courses of action and conclusion
The studies covered in chapter six were conducted with the
intent of providing courses of action in which specific nodes
would be targeted in order to assist in the deconstruction of the
CE network. In undertaking the study, I was initially biased in
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favor of lethal targeting, especially considering that the source
of regional violence is an ideologically driven non-state enemy,
whose theo-ideology seems impervious to external influence. As
previously noted in the Roberts and Everton paper, critics of
utilizing SNA for lethal targeting cite that SNA does not always
utilize comprehensive levels of data, and that lethal targeting
often results in increased levels of violence, and “neglects the
significance of utilizing the network for rebuilding,
reconstructing, and rehabilitating societies” (2011, p. 3). In
addition, considering the violence in the Caucasus as a wicked
problem, the causal loop diagram (from chapter three) indicates
that lethal targeting, while appearing to be effective in the
short term, is not a viable long-term solution to the current
status quo. Russian non-intervention, with the possibility of
contending with the fallout of violence and internally displaced
peoples, is not an alternative. If Russia were to sacrifice what
may be budding democracies in the Caucasus to fundamentalist
Islam, then the Islamists will have a foothold with which to
encroach closer and closer to Moscow, no longer contained in the
periphery of the former buffer states of the Soviet Union. With
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respect to both lethal and nonlethal targeting, to including my
own personal experience with effects-based targeting in
Afghanistan, I wanted to focus the recommendations on methods
that may not currently be employed in the region. The options
presented below are primarily non-lethal, short and long term,
proactive and reactive. That terrorism will be perpetrated in
Russia by the CE is a given, but the manner in which it is dealt
with will be judged on the world stage, and will either suppress
the violence or fan the fire.
Short-term strategy
Proposals to decisively deal with dark networks are a topic
of never-ending discussion; suggestions abound, such as the
removal of decisive nodes, decapitation of the organization,
disruption of communication linkages, etc. However, when dealing
with a network or organization where there appears to be a dearth
of intelligence as to its function and structure, other more
feasible countermeasures may generate better results. Increasing
efforts in intelligence gathering, facilitating ease of reporting
and sharing of information would need it would be good initial
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steps, in addition to a quick and defeating response to terrorism
attacks as soon as they occur.
Intelligence collection and analysis: In this increasingly open
source world, where the quality of classified information is
quickly losing ground to the collective information available to
those who can discover and process it, it will become more
imperative for skilled analysts capable of conducting visual and
social network analysis to partner with regional experts in order
to form “tiger teams” capable of looking at their regional
problem sets in unconventional and innovative ways. In focusing
on organizations subordinate to the Caucasus Emirate during both
of the analytical studies, it was painfully apparent that there
is a dearth of biographical data on the CE leadership, as well as
the younger leadership within the vilaiyats and jama’ats. Other
relations which were not explored to the extent that they could
have been include the ties to criminal activities, as well as
external sources of funding and support (i.e. supporting
charities, or charitable “front” organizations). Codifying and
illuminating these other networks could be crucial in curbing the
source of weapons, ammunition, logistics, and other critical
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resources, especially utilizing information which may be readily
available on social media. While it is possible that this type
of information is known by local law enforcement professionals
and Russian Federal Security Services (FSB), this information is
not openly available to analysts outside of those organizations
(and certainly not without considerable data-mining). Analytical
efforts could assist in the identification of key individuals
within the network, and information and intelligence gathering
efforts could clarify the kinship ties that were missing in the
analysis. Collection and analysis would be critical in
identifying rising leaders and brokers, and the manner in which
they can be engaged. Jon Arquilla has lectured on the
significance of “harvesting from the edges” (2012), where biology
has afforded for the most genetic variety and survivability.
What is true in terms of biology is also true in terms of human
capital; law enforcement and security agencies must get into the
murky gray realm where individuals exist in the network as a
result of strong ties that they cannot sever, be it ties of
friendship or family, as well as those whose livelihood depends
on coexisting with terrorist groups; logisticians, financiers,
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and religious leaders. By incorporating these individuals into
informant networks, even if only for in extremis use, and
affording them the protection and resources at their disposal,
law enforcement agencies could be provided more advanced warning
for the trigger mechanism of major catastrophic events. Human
intelligence (or HUMINT) efforts are definitely not a discipline
in which time sensitive requirements are easily answered; source
operations take time to develop and establish, and are often not
easily conducted in non-permissive environments. But when
effectively applied effectively, the rewards can far surpass that
of any other intelligence discipline, and offer the opportunity
to employ deception, misinformation, and other “seeding”
operations which may serve to fragment the CE.
Social Network Analysis: Right now, information sharing on the CE
between Russia and countries within the Global Counter-Terrorism
Forces (GCTF) may be nonexistent. Information sharing could
allow coalition forces more access and more accurate information
with which to develop a more comprehensive SNA picture, and would
afford Russian security forces access to Western analysts and
analytical tools. This could result in new ideas and strategies
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on countering CE messaging, as well as determining which nodes to
attack. As an example, ORA has a micro-simulation tool, and if
an analyst has accurately depicted a network, they can ascertain
which nodes best assist in the diffusion of ideas. If this tool
could be further developed to depict competing ideas (which could
be seeded in the network), then the micro-simulations could
assist in determining where to inject various themes and messages
in order to fragment the network. SNA has potential which has
yet to be explored, based on the lack of proficient
practitioners, particularly in the Department of Defense.
Attacking CE logistics: Monitoring the logistics of terrorism is
not something that law enforcement has down to a science;
studying sales (from the perspective of industry and services)
makes sense in order to identify which nodes would have the
means, motive, and opportunity with respect to the operations
they plan to execute. The monitoring of materiel that could be
used in the creation of weapons of mass destruction makes sense,
from a legal perspective. Bar codes and required information
could be employed, much as FEDEX and UPS use tracking information
to monitor the movements of their packages; if states can
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document and control the sale and purchase of pseudoephedrine in
order to deter the processing and sale of methamphetamines, then
it seems intuitive that the same would be applicable to
electronics and goods capable of use in the construction of
weapons of mass destruction. Strict rules on goods that can be
employed as explosive precursors (i.e. ammonium nitrate), in
addition to other items identified by monitoring terrorist
literature (such as Inspire magazine) should be enacted and
enforced order to reduce the efficacy of terrorist tactics,
techniques and procedures.
Hitting the terrorists in the wallet: according to multiple news
agencies, in November of 2013 the State Duma approved a bill
requiring the relatives and close associates of those who die
perpetrating a terrorist act to pay reparations or have their
property confiscated, as a measure to curb terrorism prior to the
Olympic Games (Anonymous, 2013). In theory, this is to preempt
the would-be terrorist with post-mortem repercussions that they
now have to take into consideration; trading a hefty fine for
your family for a place in paradise. This could either result in
the desired effect of deterring would-be bombers, or it could
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further emphasize how disconnected those in the State Duma are
from the families of the bombers, who may already be economically
disadvantaged.
Downplay the effects of terror: Americans have unusually
sentimental reactions when it comes to terrorism; memorials
eulogizing the dead and the sacrifices of the victims do more to
remind us of incidents and allow negative feelings associated
with the terrorism to persist. Taking a lesson from the
Russians, consider their response to the March 29th, 2010
Lubyanka and Park Kultury subway bombings in Moscow. Reporting
indicates that although the attacks resulted in 38 dead and 60
wounded, the subway stations were up and running by 5pm (Huey,
2010). While this may be psychologically unthinkable (or
unacceptable) in the United States, it may be part of an
effective Russian recipe to mitigate terrorism. Consider the
effects of a multiple-vehicle accident on the highway. While
passers-by slow down to rubberneck, they do more to disrupt the
flow of traffic and commerce, than if they had merely ignored the
scene. The cleanup crews eventually come and remove the debris
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and impediment to traffic, and the next day, the same area would
look as though nothing had happened, returning traffic patterns
to their status quo. If terror is permitted to permeate everyday
thought and is a regular consideration, then the perpetrators
have achieved their immediate goals of inciting panic and fear in
the civilian population. The best reaction may be no reaction,
denying the terrorists the validation that they desperately seek.
Long-term strategy
President Vladimir Putin commented during a recent interview
that “terrorism has no nationality or religion…the problem is
with these people’s extremist views” (Dewey, 2013). He then
iterated that the “U.S. and Russian security services regularly
exchange information”, and that he hopes that the Boston
terrorist attack “will give a fresh impetus to expand this
cooperation”. This may prove difficult, as the relations between
U.S. and Russia have not been ideal, and are further complicated
by other sources of friction (most recently Syria). Whatever our
differences, concerned governments should have platforms by which
to communicate security concerns when they arise, especially with
respect to the other countries’ citizens or non-resident aliens.
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Countering terrorism in the long term did not truly appear to be
any country’s strategic concern prior to 9-11. Even after that
attack, and with the perception that the significance of
terrorist groups has increased, a long term counterterrorism
strategy has yet to come into preeminence. The U.S. policymakers
and security experts resort to short-term Band-Aids including
direct action and strategic strikes, without making the
calculated projections, coordination with other nations, and
investments required over time in order to deter and manage
future threats. Russia is also resorting to similar Band-Aids,
though their threat is much closer to home. In line with
Helfstein’s model, the success of counterterrorism operations
will hinge on attacking the message, and making extremism and the
correlating violence less appealing. He opined that the West was
successful at “invalidating communism”, even though it took the
better part of a century, and that only in understanding the
ideology that drives Islamists will we be able to successfully
counter their message (2012). The same application of
containment may not be effective against a non-state actor, but
the following courses of action may have a similar effect. It
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will require protracted effort over a long duration, but may be
the only option, short of the genocide of every identifiable
jihadist on the planet.
Politicizing the CE: A few governments have managed to
successfully establish dialogue with the insurgent groups who
once sought to depose them. Consider the establishment of the
autonomous region in the Moro region (Philippines), or the
legitimization of terrorist organizations as political entities
(i.e. Palestine’s Hamas, or Sinn Fein for the Irish Republican
Army). While the CE’s ideology and intention of establishing a
caliphate does not necessarily resonate with most of the Caucasus
population, those who continue to consider it a social movement
united against Russia for self-determination may be the most
supportive of their efforts. This indicates the best point of
intervention may be changing the way in which Russia intervenes,
which may (in turn) change the perception of its legitimacy in
the eyes of the population. While it may be difficult to change
the current way in which Russia conducts security operations and
lethal targeting, it may be feasible to change the political
process. If Putin truly has fears of an Islamist takeover of the
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Caucasus governments, he could ensure the inclusion of minority
interests in all government branches by ensuring that all ethnic
and tribal entities are assured representation, and the Russian
government could facilitate that transparent and internationally
monitored elections are fairly conducted.
Politicizing violent extremist organizations is one way in
which to include them while subjecting them to de-radicalizing
public opinion. Filippo Dionigi argues that
Islamist movements, by interacting with international norms,are being progressively socialized within the international society, rather than remain isolated or even alienated from it (2011, p. 14).
His study focused primarily on Hezbollah, but Hamas, the Muslim
Brotherhood, and other extremist entities have been politicized.
Once politicized, they are subject to external influence, many
become vulnerable to public opinion, and may not be as inclined
to resort to their military arm to enact change (Hersberg-Rothe,
2013). While an open invitation to participate in the political
process may not be seen as anything other than a farce at this
point, if the governments of the Russian Republics begin dialogue
with the leaders of their respective vilaiyat (the CE governing
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body), this could fragment the solidarity of the movement. There
may be some trepidation that recognition of individuals within
the CE may in some way validate or legitimize them, but in order
to enact political change, it may fall back to the people of the
Caucasus to push for free elections, and it may also fall to
Russia to be open to political concessions.
Legitimize and increase law enforcement and judicial efforts:
The CE media makes it a routine to point out or capitalize on the
injustices perpetrated by security forces against Muslims in the
Caucasus. While police brutality is not confined to the North
Caucasus, even in nations with better transparency, the outrage
of the greater society at this type of violence is universal.
When transparency is not very good, as in the republics of the
North Caucasus, accompanied by a historical precedence of law
enforcement resorting to harsh methods and violations of basic
human rights (Hahn, 2013), then the potential for retaliatory
violence and action increases. This can only be remedied with
more effective policing and law enforcement, with increased
understanding and enforcement of rights. Empathetic security
officials, to include those who may come from a variety of ethnic
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and religious backgrounds, may appeal to those who recognize
Shari’a law, and establishing a mediating board between secular
and Shari’a justice systems may improve the perception that
religious context is not being taken into consideration.
The proliferation of automatic weapons, anti-tank weapons,
and insurgent tactics, techniques and procedures makes law
enforcement more of a challenge in areas contending with an
active insurgency. While it is largely understood that it is not
the licit purchase of weapons that results in the bulk of violent
acts, this should not preclude action to prevent future acts of
violence. Gun control measures (while never a popular option in
the United States) could have a deterrent effect to those who
would use weapons against the security forces. Unfortunately for
the region, “the possession of small arms is a tradition in the
North Caucasus” (Karasik & Moroney, 2007). While weapons buy-
back programs in the Caucasus may raise eyebrows and garner a few
laughs, the government could make an effort to stymie the flow of
illicit arms into the region, in close coordination with the
neighboring states, which may (in fact) be the ones supplying the
arms with the intent of keeping the region destabilized. On May
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4-5 of 2011, Russian and Abkhazian forces reportedly uncovered an
elaborate plot with a healthy weapons stockpile coordinated
between the Georgian Intelligence Services (under the Saakashvili
government) and the CE (Hahn, 2013). The idea that a country
which had once been considered a strategic partner (Georgia) is
now aiding Islamists may seem unsettling, but taking into
consideration that their interests are closer to home it may be
easier to rationalize. Only through international pressure and
regional stakeholder involvement will the flow of support to the
CE from the outside be stymied. Until then, it will fall
primarily to the shoulders of the Russian Intelligence Services,
local law enforcement, and military divisions to enforce and
improve the state of security in the region.
Change security force structure: The CE is currently operating as
a swarm; a seemingly amorphous but well-structured,
decentralized, and pulsing entity, capable of engaging an enemy
from all sides (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, p. 3). During a lecture,
Arquilla opined that in order to effectively combat swarms, an
organization that is similarly structured may be optimal
(Arquilla, 2012). In line with this, Russian military and
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policing doctrine would have to undergo a fundamental change
which may result in a more optimal force structure, or (the
alternative) regress into a KGB-infiltration style organization
with operatives and informants in every facet of the Islamists
life. Western logic often times includes the application of a
political and military solution for problems which are not
grounded in the other societies’ values and norms (i.e Iraq and
Afghanistan). Many underdeveloped countries are not necessarily
ready for a traditional, transparent democracy, and may require
warlords and stronger local militias in order to ensure security
(a la the Kadyrovites). While this may not appeal to those
accustomed to democratic ideals, it may be the only option to
provide stability, however temporary, to the ungoverned spaces
that exist in underdeveloped third world countries. The caution
for defaulting to this course of action is also applicable to the
social movement theory; even when analyzed properly, these are
courses of action which are not necessarily controllable, and may
have undesired consequences.
Increased bottom-up government transparency: How do we go about
addressing the grievances of the populace utilizing information
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and communications technology (ICT), especially in locations
where internet penetration may be less than optimal? It has to
be considered seriously, if only because of the potential. While
the level of western intervention into the North Caucasus has
been better in recent years than it has in the past, they still
receive much scrutiny and outside intervention may not be the
best mechanism for change. In order to improve relations between
the population and security forces, major grievances should be
addressed, and could utilize organizations that are already well-
established. One such organization could be the Mothers of
Dagestan for Human Rights (MDHR), which is also endorsed by the
Human Rights Watch (Cartner, 2009). This organization has the
mission of gathering information about police and security agency
abuses committed against locals believed to be supporting the
insurgent movement. If the grievances that dissidents harbor
against the government include improper police procedures,
interrogations, beatings, and the disappearance of loved ones,
then this non-governmental organization may be able to provide a
venue by which to accurately reckon for factual numbers and
events. If the MDHR is able to accurately account for events, it
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may serve to advise the public and international community to
pressure Moscow into taking these accusations more seriously.
Providing this level of transparency may also spur other NGO
involvement; more and more residents of the North Caucasus are
turning to the European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) in order to
address their grievances (Bullough, 2012). The perception of
government targeting of Russian journalists (at least, the ones
that are critical of the current government) is pervasive, and
there have been documented cases in which it was ruled that the
Russian government has committed “political murder”. If a more
accurate database could be populated with possible cases and
background information, then international tribunals could
accurately investigate the allegations and leverage pressure
against the Russian government. If the database is wiki-enabled,
then locals can also report on individuals’ blood feuds and the
possibility of external forces (including personal grievances)
being a contributing factor to the violence.
Use of ethical hackers: International governing bodies should do
more to establish international laws regarding the internet.
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While preservation of the freedom of speech and expression on the
Internet should be paramount, no groups or organizations should
have the ability to wreak terror on civil societies in which
innocent people could suffer consequences. Online companies
frequently leave electronic monitoring (cookies) in order to
determine frequency and scale of sales; if intelligence
organizations can effectively monitor and identify individuals
based on their propensity to visit and communicate on extremist
websites, there may be more opportunities to interdict and
identify terrorist acts prior to their execution. While U.S.
letter agencies may be monitoring and attempting to bring down
terrorist websites, or disrupting online communities which
encourage violent jihad, a more effective mechanism could be to
co-opt concerned citizens to form an “Anonymous-esqe” brigade of
global citizen-volunteers who are interested in the protection of
innocent populations. In advanced societies, there are always
civic-minded people who are truly concerned about preserving
their way of life, from neighborhood watch organizations to crime
stoppers, so mobilization of the masses may be an extremely
effective way to counter terrorism. Demystifying reporting
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procedures, affording normal citizens the ability to report on
those who would perpetrate violence, providing them an anonymous
and web-based venue to counter extremist information operations,
and motivating capable citizens to act against websites that
advocate the use of violence as their means to an end could help
the Russian government’s efforts in countering terrorism. If
nation states must pay for such expertise and grow a field of
ethical hackers, the benefits could far outweigh the cost with
the resultant benefits to security. Attacking the
Kavkazcenter.com has been met with a degree of success (Pauli,
2012). While a more prolonged attack may cripple the CE’s
ability to 1) produce a cohesive message, 2) capitalize on the
appearance of large terrorist attacks, and 3) create disunion and
discord in leadership, it could also inadvertently backfire, and
result in continued CE support from third countries who adamantly
insist on free speech, not matter what the message. But
coordinated network attacks, in conjunction with other major
events or operations, have the power to disrupt the leadership
hierarchy. Back in 2010, Dokku Umarov, reportedly stepped down,
and then the kavkazcenter.com website was taken down and chaos
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ensued as Dokku Umarov retracted his statement, blaming the
Russian government, while attempting to reassert control over the
CE. The potential fallout from misinformation campaigns could
work to further destabilize the CE.
What not to do
The consolidation of terrorists into detention facilities
presents a problem, particularly for those who are not serving
life sentences. The questions that accompany their sentence
include 1) is it possible to de-radicalize them during their
confinement, 2) how do you prevent their ideology from impacting
and radicalizing other prisoners, and 3) how should reintegration
be conducted post-confinement? Studies show varying degrees of
and difficulty in measuring recidivism (Horgan and Braddock,
2010), largely differing from country to country. Michael Brown
recommended a layered approach in his Naval Postgraduate School
thesis, including transparency and awareness of “the
megacommunity”, to include the people and organizations therein,
and involvement of not only the judicial system and security
agencies (such as DHS), but also organizations such as the
American Civil Liberties Union, and the American Psychological
140
Association (2011). Some convicted terrorist in the United
States are sentenced to life prison terms in the ADX Supermax
located in Florence, Colorado, while others receive lesser
sentences and are assigned to other facilities. While indefinite
detention may not be an option, based on lighter sentences
received from plea deals, cooperation with law enforcement, or
good behavior, there is certainly a responsibility to
rehabilitate these individuals prior to reintegration to society,
as well as ensure that there are deterrents to returning to the
theo-ideology or way of life which encouraged terrorist
activities. Russia lacks the advanced judicial and correctional
system of the United States, but it likely has the means to
replicate it, if it desires.
Conclusion
To paraphrase Socrates, “true knowledge exists in knowing
that you know nothing”. During the course of my studies on the
Caucasus Emirate, I embraced the fact that I was at a distinct
disadvantage, having 1) no education on Russian history, language
or culture, and 2) having no practical life experience in the
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same. The more that I read, the more I came to realize how
completely ignorant most Westerners and pundits are with respect
to the history and culture of this amazing region. It is this
very region that is in grave danger of continued violence and
political upheaval, especially if the Salafi theo-ideology
continues to encourage the violence in the name of establishing a
caliphate. This thesis has attempted to frame the problem in the
Caucasus, define how outside agencies may best conduct effective
intervention, and identify tools which might illustrate how nodes
relate to one another; socially, ideologically, and
psychologically. While the Olympics in Sochi looms in the
immediate future, and Russian security forces may not be in a
position to affect what will happen within the next few months, a
change to the long term strategy of fighting terrorism may reap
the greatest benefits, not just in the Caucasus, but globally.
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