Economics 314 Make-up Assignment
Transcript of Economics 314 Make-up Assignment
Economics 314 Make-up Assignment
Paul Robertson
G11r1064
1. According to Smit (2008:89) South Africa has historically
been influenced heavily by the balance-of-payments flows,
this stems from it being a small open-economy as well has
high in natural resources allowing large exports of raw
materials. Because South Africa had a large share in the
international trade of gold, a large portion of its GDP
came from gold and other metals. Mining accounted for 21%
of GDP in 1970, however in recent times it has fallen to
only 6%, however because of the large share of GDP being
from mining South Africa developed a dependency and a
reliance on its exports of these metals in order to
finance its spending (ADB, 2009:10).
Another reason and through analysis of historical data
SARB (28:2013) for South Africa’s dependency on foreign
Capital inflows is that South Africa’s current deficit
has historically been large and therefore has needed
foreign direct investment in order to finance this debt
and enable South Africa to still invest in infrastructure
and technology in order to stimulate growth
(Mohamed,2012:2).Since 1994 South Africa has also opened
up the economy and implemented many orthodox economic
policies, these were in the hopes of attracting even more
FDI. Mohamed (2012:8) argues that opening up the economy
results in South Africa’s economy becoming increasingly
volatile, therefore it is increasingly important that
opening up the economy does indeed attract foreign
investment, or else the policy changes lead to more
volatility with nothing to show for it. Some of these
policy liberalisations included the abolition of exchange
controls on all current account transactions as well as
exchange controls on non-residents, Global leniency in
regards to outward FDI and overall progressive relaxation
of controls.
It is therefore clear that South Africa needs the FDI in
order to finance its current-account-deficit as well as
its public debt. As a developing country it also needs
access to capital and resources that other countries can
provide, therefore encouraging trade liberalising
policies as well as increasing our reliance on FDI as
this will enable us to finance the new technology and
capital acquired form developed countries. FDI also
allows capital to be allocated most efficient through
private markets instead of government allocation which is
susceptible to corruption and administrative costs
(Mohamed, 2012:11).
A problem with the capital inflows we receive is that the
majority of it comes from volatile portfolio flows. These
portfolio flows are volatile as they are easily
reversible, investors are free to buy and sell their
portfolios very easily, and therefore in the emergence of
a nominal shock or a global downturn, it is detrimental
for South Africa’s exchange rates. Appendex A shows how
the exchange rates adjust according to the supply and
demand of foreign capital.
2. There were a number of attributing factors that lead to
capital outflows in 1998 and 2001. Firstly the Asian
stock market collapses of 1997 which was mainly caused by
currency devaluations of Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. Another problem
was that people did not diversify their investments
therefore leading to larger losses due to concentration
of investments in the same markets that collapsed.
Because of the loss of funds this lead to capital being
drawn out of South Africa, due to the demand for
immediate funds in Asian countries (Garay: 2003:1). But
overall the main problem was due to rand depreciation,
causing weakened exchange rates.
In 1998 one of the reasons for the weakening was
commodity prices, global demand for South African exports
decreased due to the Asian market collapse mentioned
above. Analysis reveals that a 1 percent fall of real
prices can account for 0.5 percent depreciation of real
exchange. Another reason for the deprivation of the rand
according to Bhundia (2004:167) was the role of Highly
Leveraged Institutions. Some of these institutions were
selling the rand short, and therefore driving up the
domestic interest rate, the rationale behind this was
that these same investors would sell government bonds
short and then make a profit as the interest rate spiked
on the government bonds.
Although not vital to the depreciation of the rand, it
must still be noted that the increases of AIDS and
unemployment increase the volatility of the rand to
sudden changes as well as presenting tough decisions to
policy makers. Because of the challenges these present,
it could consequently mean that a small shock results in
economic instability because of the fragility of our
workforce and the high unemployment rate Bhundia
(2004:167).
Another nominal shock that possibly could have affected
investors’ confidence in South Africa was contagion from
the events in Zimbabwe and its economic deterioration. It
is hard to pinpoint the exact shock that lead to South
Africa’s depreciating rand and weakening exchange rate,
however from the above it can be seen that it was a
combination of nominal shocks, relaxed monetary response
and financial market expectations (Bhundia,2004 164-167).
Lastly in 1998 Russian defaulted on domestic debt, which
gave international markets another reason to fear
investing in emerging markets. This resulted in more
capital outflows from South Africa as the fear was that
emerging markets are too risky to invest in (Keeton,
2013:57).
2001
As with the depreciation of the rand in 1998, it is hard
to determine which causes had the most impact, therefore
they need to need to be looked at collectively. The first
source of capital outflows stemmed from the slowing of
Economic reform. There was large pressure on South Africa
to open its market and this including privatisation of
Telkom. The reason that there was a delay was because of
the weakened global stock market, which would mean that
Telkom shares would be cheaply priced, therefore choosing
to wait until the stock market had recovered. However in
doing so, globally this was associated with not being
committed to economic reform, therefore losing out on a
lot of capital inflows and investors even withdrawing
capital from South Africa (Bhundia,2004 162).
Another reason was the enforcement of existing capital
controls. SARB announced that it would tighten
enforcement controls, and a number of observers including
those who testified in front of the Myburgh Commission
argued that the effect of this was perverse as it led to
a sharp deprivation of the Rand, because of reduced
market liquidity (Bhundia,2004 162).
A third possible reason for the increase of capital
outflows was the world decrease in world economic
activity which inevitably led to decrease demand for
South African exports and services. Furthermore
deteriorating economic conditions in Argentina may have
slightly affected South Africa, but only very marginally.
However the further decline of Zimbabwe may have deterred
foreign investment and foreigners may have thought South
Africa was going to end up like Zimbabwe. As mentioned
above Aids and unemployment rates may also have been seen
by foreigners as declining social state, and as pointed
out by Strauss (2013) that in order for economic growth,
the culture needs to be synonymous with economic growth
and heavy unemployment levels and aids may have been seen
as indicated as social instability.
Lastly a large reason of the capital outflows of South
Africa were attributed to Economic decline in America.
More specifically the dot-com bubble burst as well as the
Twin tower attacks. (Keeton,2013:66). The dot com bubble
bursting meant that many people lost out on their shares,
causing extreme losses on their investments, some of
these companies included pet.com, boo.com and
infospace.com where shares dropped from 1305 Dollars per
share to 22 Dollars per share. Because of the losses
people withdrew there offshore investments as they wanted
their money “closer to home” possibly also because they
did not want to lose money even further since it was
widely regarded that investing in emerging markets was
quite risky (BBC, 2001:1). Furthermore economic decline
in America decreased further after the 9/11 attacks, also
reiterating the point mentioned above about withdrawing
capital to safer developed markets (Keeton, 2013:66).
Empirical evidence:
Empirical evidence from an exchange rate model developed
by Clarida and Gali(1994) as well as a model from Bhundia
and Gottschalk(2003) of the dynamics of the rand found
that nominal shocks were the primary driving force in
both 1998 and 2001, and supply shocks and real demand
shocks were not statistically relevant (Bhundia,2004 164-
167).
3. Policy responses in 1998
The policy’s around 1990 were mainly dominated by GEAR.
The Growth, Employment and Redistribution plan (GEAR) was
a basic social development plan which focused on
redistribution of wealth, increase in job creation and
overall economic growth (Knight, 2001:1). This included a
policy response of Austerity, which included large cuts
in government expenditure, and an overall cut in the
national budget deficit. They also tightened fiscal
policies as well as implementing more cost-effective
civil services. Although GEAR was hoping to increase the
scope subsidies of grants, because of the economic
pressure it was currently experiencing, they had to also
cut down on the subsidy scope as well as a decrease in
overall jobs ensued, partly because of cutting on the
public sector expenditure (knight,2001:1).
Because of the depreciation of the rand, policy makers in
South Africa opted for an interventionist approach. This
included borrowing foreign currency in the forward market
and sold in the spot market, in the hopes that this would
stem the pressure of the rand (Bhundia, 2004 164-167)..
According to Keeton (2013:62) the reserve bank intervened
heavily in order to try protecting the value of the rand,
this was actually the opposite of what GEAR stated. They
borrowed 10 Billion Dollars from the forward book and in
reference to appendix A, was in order to shift the supply
curve right in order to stop the Rand’s slide, a
rightward shift would mean an increase the supply of
foreign capital in South Africa, which would bring down
the interest rates.
This resulted in the net foreign position (which is
basically the international reserves - the forward
liabilities of the central bank) being reduced by 10
billion US dollars between April and September 1998. This
soon proved to be unsuccessful, which led to the central
bank needing to increase its repo-rate to approx. 22% in
September 1998, in order to try and reduce current
account deficits by crushing investment and domestic
expenditure as well as to attract foreign capital. The
long-term government bonds rate also increased from 13
percent to 18 percent (Bhundia, 2004 164-167).
The South African reserve Bank was also stressing
monetary policy that would ensure stability over economic
growth, even though economic growth had slowed-down,
reasons for this included keeping high interest-rates in
order to avoid more International capital leaving the
country. High interest rates were also maintained due to
the weakening exchange rate and the high inflation. This
policy was partly successful as there was dwindling
fiscal deficits which allowed the pressure on South
Africa’s capital market to finance large government
needs, however the high interest rates did have a
negative effect on the economic growth (Khamfula,
2005:9)..
According to Khamfula (2005:10) the South African Reserve
Bank continued in its pursuit of its existing policy
goals which included growth as well as stabilizing the
exchange rate, while keeping the capital account
liberalized. In order to keep a competitive exchange rate
however they required a combination of increased real
interest rates and a decrease in the capital inflows in
order to limit money growth, this turned out to be a
terrible move, as the net capital inflows fell abruptly
in 1998, in order to try and absorb exchange rate-risk
the Reserve bank tried to reduce this outflow by selling
dollars into the market and increasing real interest
rates to 7% in 1998, in a desperate attempt to attract
foreign portfolios back (Khamfula, 2005:10).
Because of the increase in the repo rate by the reserve
bank, Commercial banks had to respond by increasing their
prime overdraft rate to an all-time high of 25% in the
third quarter, however by the end of the fourth quarter
they had decreased down to 21%. It must also be noted
that another reason the reserve bank raised interest
rates as mentioned earlier is that it discourages
investors from borrowing rands for the sole purpose of
taking speculation spots on the currency. Maphumulo
(1999:24) also argues that the reserve bank initially
thought that the short-term volatility of the rand was a
short-term weakness that would soon reverse, which
allowed them to borrow dollars from the forward market
and to sell in the spot marker. In July the total foreign
credit reached 18.5 billion rand, while during the same
time period the net forward position of the bank
increased from 12.8 billion rand to 25 Billion rand. In
order to change investor perception, SARB needed to
stabilize interest rates and limit its intervention in
the market; however a decrease in interest rates would
fuel more speculative positions on the currency. Appendix
3 shows the relationship between Net foreign reserves and
net open forward position (Maphumulo,1999:25).
Lastly because of the borrowing that South Africa did in
order to try and stabilize the exchange rates and because
of its ineffectiveness it lead to South Africa being in a
worse position due to the fact that it now had to repay
its debt with a depreciated currency, this contradicted
GEAR’s goal of trying to escape the debt trap (Keeton,
2013:62). Another reason that the exchange rate did not
attract capital flows even after borrowing was because
interest rates can move from 2-3 percent a day, whereas
interest rates for FDI are annualised.
2001
In 2001 we were currently not face a current account
deficit, however because of the reasons mentioned
earlier, the rand started depreciating affecting the
exchange rate. However Because of the unsuccessful
attempts at stabilizing the exchange rate in 1998, as
well as the new policy of targeting inflation, South
Africa decided to not try and directly influence the
exchange rate through direct intervention. The exchange
was also not increased until Jan 2002, which also saw a
modest increase to 17% rather than the 25.5% peak we saw
in 1998. (Keeton, 2013:66).
According to Bhundia (2004:166), one of the reasons for
the success in combating the economic downturn of 2001,
was that overall South Africa had better macro-economic
policy. An example of this is that the foreword book was
disbanded, as well as the inflation targeting framework
rather than focusing on the exchange rate proved to be a
more credible anchor for exchange rate fluctuations.
The Reserve Bank (2013:1) states that inflation targeting
was officially implemented in February 2000. This
includes bring greater transparency to monetary policy.
They note however that monetary policy does not directly
contribute to the growth and employment in the long-run
however a stable financial environment is synonymous with
the attainment of growth and development.
Inflation targeting also creates a co-ordination between
all economic policies and it targets a specific goal. It
also makes monetary policy less volatile due to the
accountability of the central bank. If the clear
inflation targets are not met, the central bank is held
accountable, this leads to better monetary decisions
being made, as well as more public awareness and
therefore confidence and trust, stemming from the fact
that transparency decreases impulsive responses by the
public (SARB,2004:2).
It must however be noted that although South Africa has
changed its policy framework to that of inflation
targeting is still is aware that changes in the exchange
rate are an important determination of monetary policy,
especially since South Africa is a small open economy.
Another reason why exchange rates are still important in
South Africa is that still rely heavily on foreign
investment therefore rand depreciation can easily lead to
a financial crisis(SARB,2004:13). It is for this reason
that South Africa has still chosen to focus narrowly on
exchange rate stability, hence the narrow increase of
17%. It is not always a clear-cut decision in which
policy’s to change, for example when the rand was
depreciating, South Africa could have opted to decrease
interests rates which according to SARB (2004:13) could
have benefited economic growth due to increased exports,
however it would of led to increase of inflation and
therefore because of the choice to target inflation, was
not implemented. South Africa also chose to not install a
crawling-peg or fixed-band exchange rate; they chose a
freely floating exchange rate policy with moderate
intervention by the central bank.
Therefore overall in the crisis of 2001 there was
definitely not as much intervention as in 1998. This
definitely seemed to help South Africa reach economic
stability sooner than in 1998. Therefore overall in 2001
the rand was mostly left to the supply and demand
conditions of the market of foreign exchange.
4. Question 4 has partly been answered above due to the
complexity of explaining the macro-economic policies.
However from the evidence and analysis done in question
1-3 it is clear that the response to the crisis in 1998
was not as effective as the policy response in 2001.
In 1998 South Africa opted for a heavy interventionist
approach whereby the central bank tried to control the
exchange rate. This was because South African policy
framework was centralised around the exchange rate.
However in February 2000 it was formally announced that
South Africa was switching to an inflation target
framework. This proved successful and thereby showing
that for South Africa, interfering with the exchange rate
too much leads to further economic instability and
therefore inflation targeting was more successful.
Another reason they differed is the fact that exchange
rate policies include a lot of intervention from the
central bank. Whereas inflation targeting includes less
intervention such as leaving the foreign funds market
open to supply and demand determinants that occurred
naturally in the market with modest control from the
central bank (SARB,2004:13). Appendix 2 (Keeton, 2013:71)
shows that South African GDP grows more through inflation
targeting than exchange rate control.
Another reason that the policy responses in 2001 were
better than in 1998 was because South Africa borrowed
money to pump into the supply of foreign capital, however
this had the perverse effect of increasing the debt at a
lower exchange rate, making repayments more expensive.
Another reason is that currencies can move easily up to
2-3% per day and therefore eliminating any incentives
that foreigners would have in investing because bond and
share rates are determined annually (Keeton, 2013:62).
This is also a good example of how the policies differed
and how much less intervention there was in 2001.
Lessons we learn from the above are that Its better to
target the inflation rate rather than the exchange rate
during rand exchange weakness. We also learn that
interest rates needed to combat inflation are far less
those needed to combat exchange weaknesses. Therefore
during this exchange rate weakness we expect no policy
response due to inflation targeting, however if the
central bank does not think that they will meet the
inflation targets, then they will change the exchange
rate policy (Keeton, 2013:70-80)
Appendix A
A decrease in capital flows causes
Supply curve to shift leftward. An
increase causes the supply curve to
shift rightwards.
An increase in capital outflows
causes the demand curve to shift
rightward, and a decrease in capital
outflows causes the demand curve to
shift leftward.
As the demand curve shifts leftward
or the supply curve shifts rightward
the interest rate will increase.
Indicated on our diagram is the
situation whereby there is a decrease
of capital inflows, and an increase
in capital outflows, pushing up the
exchanger rate.
Appendix 2
Appendix 3
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08
SA GDP growth (% )
'84-93= 1% pa '94-'08 = 3.5% pa
'04-'07 = 5.1% pa
'09 = Reuters Consensus
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