Development of Nuclear Safety Technology - OSTI.GOV

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Development of Nuclear Safety Technology

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Performance Evaluation of Nuclear Power Plants

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iv

SUMMARYI . Project Title

Background and procedure analysis for threshold of safety significance determination

II. Objective and Importance of the Project

The safety significance determination process (SDP) is a regulatory program

which gives an emphasis to the real insights gained from risk information rather than

to the assurance of as-stated deterministic codes and standards; it has been used in

the NEC's inspection for the purpose of determining the risk significance against

potential findings. The implementation of SDP can help us to improve the regulatory

effectiveness when it is intensively used in the high resource-demanding affairs, for

which may be able easily to make a risk-informed decision to an inspector or a

regulatory staff. The further consequences of SDP are outlined as follows:

o In the implementation of well-known new regulatory system, i.e. Reactor

Oversight Process, it provides us with a measure of evaluation regarding the

safety significance.

o It provides a rationale for a regulator whose actions and in-time evaluations are

required in association with inspector's findings,

o It gives the inspector some information gained from risk insights so as to utilize

during the inspection.

o It can make an open-room for negotiation and a common language used by both

the regulator and the licensee, including the stakeholders.

Therefore, it would be urgent and necessary for establishing our own effective

regulatory system that the survey and the research for the background of threshold of

SDP, including the procedure for its determination, should be done by us.

v

III. Scope and Contents of the Project

The SDP, being applied by USNRC, is one of regulatory approaches which can

improve the regulatory effectiveness and efficiency by utilizing the risk information to

any regulatory inspections and issue resolution. The decision-making criteria and some

risk thresholds for the determination of significance can be, therefore, essential

elements in actual SDP implementation. Based on USNRC's experiences, this study has

the purpose to identify the rationale and background for the determination of

significance and to check the feasibility of the implementation to Korean nuclear

power plants. Our attentions have been basically concentrated on establishing its

step-by-step processes, identifying the current issues, and assessing major issues for

the application to domestic plants. Practically, two examples have been analyzed after

consulting the database on our actual regulatory inspections and incidents.

IV. Results and Recommendations for Application

Regardless of our current non-preparation of SDP, we are sure that the

regulatory matters relevant to the SDP be seriously considered at present, which

includes major two tasks both for preparing a decision-making criteria and for

establishing some risk thresholds for the determination of significance. Some resolution

for issues, identified through establishing process of each phase of SDP, would give a

technical support to enhance the domestic regulatory inspections and/or formal

incident/accident survey program.

VI

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1. S7lA}^^ 7)1^ Sjl .........................................................37

2. h|5^ Farley SDP Worksheet...........................................................51

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1

# 7|-x|°| cj-yy 7{|S (2 Diverse Trains)-2tH°| yyg gy 7j|S^ fg- yaw g#gymg y-g-- o| Tjjyg mg, sj §ti| #o^ ojy # JZg-Sfg# yTIIS^I yy#ao| ti||7) £|H5. °f 0.0001 5. 7IS

4(2 + 2)

yu|-o| yg 7j|S ys|-#s| (1 Multi-Train)-2 7U oigg ci-# gs yg7|#- ysggmg- TiEi; ggxi % n Tiisoi yyy go}SIS*! HE}#x| ys.- o| Ttisg mg-, gx|. y yn| #o^ yy # Tig#me y 0.001 s. 7^g

3

y 7j|S# 9S|## (1 Train)- 100% §§§ 7|gl 0}E-| 7|7|# si® 7}|S- oi tiis —i Tig, sa|. s gui °jy § mg##e yo.oi s. 7ig

2

Tigy TIIS# ## 4# (Recovery of Failed Train)- ^7|x|.g s-g o|* mgy 7p|g #gy s|g-m*| m#- zA|# #AticHgom ygoiig sgew, zx| 7(#go| @7(go}o|: y- zA| gnn#se s o.i ^ 7fg

1

ggy^A| sg (Operator Action Credit)- y a|-tia|i_p|2.oj|a-} f gg# #a eggmg*

yg- ZA|o###0}| a(B|- 3 7p|^ e#- mgm###o| o.5 oil a) o.05 a|-o|oi g°; yg#g = 1- ZA|o##*0| 0.05 oil A.-} 0.005 A|0|y , SSfey =2- mA|m###o| 0.005 011 A-} 0.0005 A)o|S #£]■## =3

1,2, Er3

14

Table 2 Column 3

2 Trains Remaining(Both Remaining Trains are Diverse - Not Subject to CCF)

TRAIN - Remaining

TRAIN - Remaining

TRAIN - Remaining

TRAIN - Remaining

4-1. ^4-22} ^3^4 2)]# tiJl'I

Table 2 Column 4

1 Redundant (Multi-Train) System Remaining (Remaining Trains Subject to CCF)

TRAIN - Remaining

TRAIN - Remaining

OR

TRAIN - Remaining

TRAIN- Failed

TRAIN - Remaining

4-2. &4-24 ^4^4 2)]# till* 1! ^4)

15

Table 2 Column 5

1 Train Remaining(Remaining Train Not Affected by CCF)

TRAIN - Failed

TRAIN - Remaining

4-3. IL4-2-2] ^5^4 M

Table 2 Column 2

1 Redundant (Multi-Train) System + 1 Train Remaining

TRAIN - Failed - ----------

TRAIN - Remaining

TRAIN - Remaining

TRAIN - Remaining

4-4. 7] Bj- 7}^#

16

(5) LERF 4 ## 4 iE 714# 4# (Phase 2 #4)

47}a. 444 #4 244 sdp #44# 45. i 444 #53 445.1- 4445 41- 7>44 444 4-5441- l##5 444 lerp 4 44 453. 7(44 4444& 14##. lerf 4 44 453 7]44 44444 #5S 4444. [44 44]

• Interfacing System LOCA

• Transient (445 44 4344 5#)

• Small LOCA

• SGTR

(6) 344 47>44 (Phase 3 44)

444 4444 4447] 444 454, 144 4 2 444444 444

54 44#! 34444 447}# 4 44. ##5S1 2 44445s

47>4 4 ### 44 447>41 47}#4s 44. 344 sdp 47>444 54 4445 444 4441 44 #44 a-551 34 (41: spar)4 psa 7141 #144 1444 453 1444 4144 4143s 444

47}444- 444 14444 #4.

5. 44 nrc4 sdp 71] #4-4 414 #44 13 #4

7>. 44 i: 44H4 tfltb 14444 44

i) sdp7} 44 #4^1-41 14414 44 44^1-4 44 415 #471-44 #4 44 44441 41# 1 414 ##44. 44 4#4 4&#1 41# #4.- phase 1 47} 304 444 phase 2 #7f7f #3-# 1 414,

- phase 3 #7>4 90%7} phase 1 #7} 904 444 #3# 1 414,- phase 3 #7f# 100%7} phase 1 #7> 120# 444 #3# 1 #14 #4

17

2) *4 S:7H1 4*5 44444 Bj-y- #45 5* sdp *#4 57}

**4* 44 *4 *## 4*4* *4* *55 444*. 444#* *55 #44^* *4*44 44. 444 4441 444 4^ 444

445 5* a>ji*4 ** sdp 1l^i7} 7B4*44 4*5 #5*44-

3) 444 4^-4 4*55 4# 44s. 44^ #4 sdp 47}4 *71*44#

47>44 4^44.

4) phase 3 47H44 psa #** #444 447} 44A}4 NRC4 45:4*

444 54 4 44444 445 45444.

4- 44 2: 4## 444 444 47}

1) 444 4A}4% 711444. 4a} 4'4a}4°1 4 44 4 444 44 44

445 *** 444 444 4 444 4444.

2) Phase 2 worksheet7> 4 4 4 445 4444 4 554 7}4 714 444 444444 4 $44 444 ui^**# 444 5 44. #4 *4A}##*

455 44A}7} 54 444 44 (non-Green issue)#* 4455 H #544 45# 4444 44A) 4544 Phases #4* 4W4 *4 4544.

3) SDP *4444* 4445 44 4# 4 *a> 44A}4* 95% 44*44*1 4#4 4*, 454 95%4 4a} #4A}44 sdp* 44 444 4*4 * *** 54# * *4. 44 *5**4 54 4554 44* 4a}

*4a}4#4 44**** 4** *444.

4) 44 4 * (human performance)* 4* ## 4*44 (cross-cutting issues)*

4*44 *4* 7>4a>44 444* *4-455 #44 * 4*4*5571^01 o}?$ 571 * *5**5 *5*4*.

18

5) A>y tjj* * ^ * £ *(enforcement)^ *444 CDF 4# CDP* #*44,

44£ SDP 4 44 *4# CDP *34 CDF* ##44 *734

*-#*1 tfl«H *4* 4*4* * 4 *£4431

6) 4**1 4# 4 4 4134* *4 4 71 o]^o]]£ #a}47} *4 4 SDP 4**1

*444 £44# *44# 4#4 *£* *### sdp 44 *£44

#4444 44-31 4*4-.

4-- 44 3: PSA #4 4 ?M4 #4

1) 44 nrc4 #*-£ #44-** 4^=a. #*#4 #** 4#|a3 4*a *44

4 #444 4# 4M4 4**# **(tooi)4 #44 #444 4*44. 44 nrc* 4*£ *J£ #44 #4 *4 7}# *44 ** 7fl*4 ;13#

*#£4 psa4 341 4*431 444 44* *#* 44444.

2) #44 Phase 2 worksheet* #444 *4* 44 441 &4* *##£51

4 *4 #4. Phase 3 *4* 414 4* 4 7>4 ##A}4#4| 4#

*4 7}# *4* nrc7> ul 444 #4# 4*4 44 * 4*1# (44*7}

#444) 44* #*# ** 4447} *44 *££ 4*44. * 4*1 #

tool# a}#** #7}# ## *££ #4£* 44444 7}*#4 *£££

4* #44 44#(predictability)# *#5L 4*44.

3) 44# 4 £##Ai s** *444 *4 *#* £# #a} ##a}4* #7}4

4 44*437 *44 44# ## 4 #* 4*1 £44 44# 44444.

444 #7}s. *-##44 4# 7fl443L £#44 *££ *#734*

4*4* £44 *£44.

19

6. % 44 44

4 444* *444541 4^h. ^5# 4*44 44 *4444 44445 *444* 54*7) 44 107H 7l^-3lo] 4*44* 4*4 #4

4* 4*4 4* 414 4^*5 #55 4: 444. [3]

(1) 444 4^4^ 44

SDP# ^a>x>7> A>-g-§>^^] 44 #^4 -447} ^}* 44# 4 ^4 #4 44444 44. 4# 441 4*3 *44^ 444 4** 44444 444 A}4-1-4 5 54:2 7l]44 4 444- 3|7}4 (SDPPanei)4 44444 4-4.

(2) 444 45 4 4A1# 44

444 47} 444 #5§}7l 444 5.4 7}*4-5 444 45.44 444

*Ais}(documentation)4 444 4-g-s]4 4 44- 4 45.44 4444 4441: iff 4 44 AM}#4 e#5 £444.

(3) 3:44 4 44 4*

444 ^r.2.4 444 44 4 #*#5 3:445.5. 44* 444 4 44444- 4* 44) 45*4 4(over-conservative) SDP 44444 45*4 4(non

conservative) SDP 44444 *# 4*# 4444. 4 44*4 *44**

4444 444 454* 44* 54* 44 44444.

(4) *A} 4* 7]# 44

54 4*44 4 *4*41 4*4 **4 4*55 #47)e* #4444

44. 4* # 4 4444 44) sdp 44444 4444 4 A1 4^-ofl 4 s. 44*44* 4*7} 44.

(5) a}-§- 444 5*/44 4*

4a}54*4 4 4# *444 4* 4 *4 4* #444 **441 A}_&^

20

# 4# is.a. 444 SDP 7M4 All#444 fl-rq-.

(6) i-EH 44

44# 44 4 4W4 44# 4## 4444 4i4i4 4 4#### i-i#-# 4 #4 4-4-. 4##4 5 ##4A<H 4i4 4### tl 44# 4-44-s 4*d ### #-44- i5744 iiii 4^444 #4.

(?) #4 #444 #4#44 4444 4A} y>#A}#i ^01 44431 #4 ###4 444

44444 44. 4# 44 471 4 4 # a] 3b 4 a] a] 45. (timeliness goal)?}

44444 44.

(8) #4 444 7}##°144-a>a>i-oi sdp 44# 4^4 44 #44 is# 7>4ji 7D### 4

4# 7l#4 444 #4444 44.

(9) #4 #4444 44a>44 ##4 44 4444 4#444 44444 44. 4

4444# 444 4444 #4 4#s s#44. s# 447} 44a}7} sdp 44# 44444 44, 44(appeal) A}^# 44431 44440} 44,

(10) Ai) 4 4s/#i44 til#4 44 44 ##4 s# 44 #4 tii^-^444 ^4^- 31444

4#444 44. 4# 44 444#4 #444, 44 444 444i-(non-green finding)4 44 Si444 ## Afli#4 444-4--

21

7. t* *#44

7.1. 44#4*## 444 sdp* *4 *4 #4, *5* 44*#*, #*## *

4*a}* 4*4* #44 #444## W#*# *44* #*# *#4* 4M4. M**4 *4 4# 44444 44 *4A}4#, *5* 4 ##4* 4444 444 44 44* 44 #44 442} #47}*# 444 #4* 44

47}* * *4.

5. 7-1-8: #4 nrc4 sdp #4 44444 kins44 4*84# 4^ 4444* #h* 444. 44 #4444 44 sdp 4445* rop 44 4445. 4S.4 4444 licensee 44# 4 7}#-*# #*44- SDP 44444 44 44# .4*#22 4444s.* *4*4 44A>44 4# NRC 44 4 4*4(enforcement

actions)# *444. 44 *444# sdp #4*5 4444# 444*4 #4* 444* 4# #4 * 7ie* 444*4 4* 4*5 44*4.

** 4a> ji*A}#i- #5* 45* 4*4 #4*5 a>##^ 4* **#

##* *4# #4**4 *** #4 ***4. *aH4 #4*4 4 #4* #44 ### #44 *44 4** *44 *4* 44 4*4* 44 **4 44* 4* 44# 4# *4* 45 ###A}5 *47} #*| 44.

sdp 44# #Afl# *44* *4* 4# 4**4 4*2 *4a}# *a>*7>**7> *4 7} 4 7l#**4 7]#4 45 4 #4 7>4a>#^oii #5ii *4*4# 4*4. ## *-4*-##* nrc 4*244# ##4*5 ##4# 47]* #** 44 #*a>#o] ## #4* #44 45*4* *4# # 4 *4. 4* nrc #*2*4474444 **7> *44 a>o]# *#oi 55 #4* ,*4* *#**# 4 *4. 4# *4 #a>7>^* **7> *4-7}# psa #5* 5*4# sdp# a}#-# 54 45#* #4 4##4 *4* ^444.

22

3. 7-i.nrcsdp â}«4 h

#4 gAÂ, ROP (Inspection) °ll a)s|SDR 3@33

4-MlSDP3ss ?ie3SA)#

gA) Z3I§7|SA\U} gj Sig-^xm-w X| 2

33 4413 44, S2A|337) x|3

2 A) 0|#333# 3 3A)y ys 34 (2X)S13)

77H safety cornerstone (S7| A)3, 3S)7||#, b|#E:M #) #o) #0) 23 |2

2 A) ## 7|#XI23 SSfH77H safety cornerstone 4XI 33# ?!3 397H baseline 2x)ifs.

40)22 |2

2 a) 33 22227| #^5)2

SAWnj-ôll $|-°

(433, 223)

3 X)A) (0609.02)011 [[)# 3 2)2) &7| #223 Z!|#3 A|Aj 5)

3x) SK S2

2a) 2°) X-IEiy- 3

Mj¥ x(e.|2x)oi| 37) 3 2t|| (3 phases) Af|# x) B| 3 x) 2x) ya| a<2_

gS-y §7W a AW §i @7)335| SERF (SDR and Enforcement Review Panel)

S3 §22 @7) 7|§

22^3 7|g (Code & Standard,T/S Si HaW #2 #)

A|| 7)X| S#e| 2@/A)3 X|#A] 30|| CC)E) X)# 7|# $4#S)0i 7)3 233 2xi##a|l.)b|2# 3^5)3 ?lt)4 33 (risk level)33

7|# *il3 mo

S3 §22 @7|- 32 Si X|xjo| 2 3-711 437|| color (graded approach) 7|# A||§ m°

33 aID/Sx)SJ3 2a)x|*]a) + e:H2 gf-y^“ot« gA[gg =

RIBI/SDP 2 a)x|xia) + ?|Sj27| 3 3322# 2A)325(RI inspection notebook)

x|5) 7H1 |2

§2 7|y ss. T/S, FSAR Si 7(Bj- 3# 7|#7| 34 #4 + PSA 35) Si 33237)21 (SPAR)

21 7H# 12

a|23Ex| @23371231 a|22x| 23 (x|5j A)#3B|gx)) + T/S ?! tLWS-21 33 #W2E%|

Action MatrixO|| rr)H 2x|Hj# x) # + Licensee Appeal 32 2# 3 Assessment & Enforcement Process

Sx) SU mo

23

7.2. ^7]A>g

#5 44 NRC5 4 #4 994a] r]-994l 999 4"45 19874451995444 444 22A]^ NUREG/CR-5750[4]# 44494- 4 7] A] NRC5 49

44^114442-4 5°1 44 5 4 °l 44 a}ji^- throughwall crack 444

4^445.44 444 correlation^#9# 44494- 4 22AiS}- ir4

5,6571 PSA iLJ7.Ai[5]i- 9-52 44 44 7}99529 444 44 7}#9 sdp

Phase 2 47}# 44 44 244 27]A}£ 444 worksheet# 44494- 44

445 5. 4-H 4444 924, nureg/cr-575(M14 45, 454 94

4444442, 44 44444, 444 4444, 44444444 44

9544- nureg/cr-5750 53.AMI 444944 955 2# #44 94

7}9#5 #4 5,654 PSA 52Ai# 95994. 49 5,657] PSA 52A] °\)

9447] 95 RCP 99 LOCA, Safety/Relief Valve Stuck Open, 449 94 44444 455 nureg/cr-57504 945 49 49494.

7.3. 54A>y^ iM3 99495 94 9-9a>49 54A}4^ 49 444 495 44 4 #4 9 4

54494. 99925 99 44 54 49# 4 95 54a>4s] 444 245 ###22# s] 494 40] 944 9 94. 44A] ±45 45525 45 94

54.

g~a Ctxp(x',a) =-----— x = 0,l,2,... (1)

x!

4 245 525 #94 94 2# Ml 444 #9-445 %4 49 9495 (probability mass function)# 4444- 4 #2# 99 At a]^> 94 99#5 A>4(event)4 4444 94 499 99 4445 45# x 2 5# 91,

e~^’(AA tYp(x;AAt) =------ a = 0,1,2,... (2)

x!

24

444 2-5 (parameter) 2 5 54 7}^, 444 JE# a 5 5444 54444 44 55^ 4#44&# <*£ 4 #4- ## 54 At 4# ^o> 544

#54 4445 4#5 ##4 54.

P(2f >1) = 1-P(2f = 0) = 1------^^- = 1- 5^0!

(3)

At (3)4 54 55 44 (infinite series expansion)#4 544 54 44,

P(X > 1) = 1 - (1 - 2At + (2At)2 / 2! + -....) « 2At (4)

454 4(4)5 44 At 44 544 a 5455 7}4jz 44 444 444 4#5 5445 44 44. 4# 54444 4444 44, 44 t,4 t2 444 4445 i,E # 7>4 444 5444 44 4#4 454 44 444 5 54.

Pr(/P between /, and t2) « 2jE(t, - z\2) (5)

5 4-14 445 “54 545 445 4545 2:54 4444”5 44 305 44, 3044 35 44, 35 444 344^ 454454 4# #544 4444454 4 44444 4445 4444 444 454 45 4534444.

• 2:71 44444 44 it (upperrange)# 4544-• 45444 305 444 55 14P-5. 7}444.

• 44444 3054 35 444 55 o.i4P.s 7} 444.• 44444 35 445 55 0.014P.S 7>444.

44 45 7}5# 4-8-44 454P-& 4 iM### 4784 55 4^4 44444.

25

4-5-4 14 44 415 44 44. 5. 4-i-ir 51 125V 445-4 444

ml4 4444 4£7} io2 444 103 4 444 4 4 44, 4 44 l0~2/yrl

44 15# 44 45.5. 4444. 44 4 444 4444 444 44 444

44 5# 44444 4 "s 44 444 4 2514 44414s. 4441

A444 444 4^ 44 444 14 34 44.

vV = - log10 (Pr(IE’ during condition period)) = - log10 (1 O'2 x 10”1) = 3

44 44 44 445. 144 4444 544 44444 44 44444

NRC4 37>4 44454 44444 14 414 5444 1444 444

scfls. #5414. 54 4414 455 5. 4-M4 5.5 44 14 o44 744

nrc4 447>45. 87>4s. 554144 44 nrc 455 144 844 4444

14 4 54 45 54455 44414.

7.4. 7] 4 44

4# 544 44545 45 55 445 44444 1444.

(1) #54 54 414 14.

(2) 454 4545 #4514 14.

(3) 4## 14 54# 4## 4447} 14.

(4) 44# 5144 11 4445 51# 444 14.

(5) 54# 54454 #5# 7147} 4444 45 44444 14.

#14 45/444 1# 5441 444 1145 4445 554 545

#15 54 #44 4544 4555. 54 444s 1141 445 44444

#4. 4 554 5#444 45 455 45 #15 s# 544 4514. 5

15# 54 7il#l 571414 451 544 1445 (DIM: dependency linking

matrix)5 55 l4 4444 154, 45 515,657] PSA# %4s. 5 57]4

5441 55 455 44-55 14# 144. 5544 55 44 14 444

26

3]#4 4# ZL #_& 44# 4#7fl# ### A

7H#/7]7]4 444# 34 a}# 4 #4# 41454. #34 4 a]# 4 4#4

34a}#4 444 ##44 4 #4 4# 4# 444 44# 44 444 44# 5344-.

8- 44 AM 4###

44#4 sdp 4414 4M4-7} #43 444 #634 =4 5#4 4444

444 #41 a>41 #4# #W£#. A}413# 7}## 44 444444 4 4,

7}^f 1M# AM414 4 4# 44- 444S4. 444 4 44 4)334#^

3 Loop 900MWe 7}<44#3^M JL# 3,43:71 # 44 1,231714- 4444, 4All

SDP worksheet7> 4444 44 &333 #A} 444 44 2:41= 444 (Joseph

M. Farley) #444 200144 4444 7)144 4^3 43 4a}443[6]4

worksheet# #&444. ¥ 4 £t 4 a} #4A}4o]4 7>4S}J1 44#

#634434, #44 44# 44-4 34=44 7}4 4 7}#4 4# 34#

43444.

7}. A}4 1: 314 434 7l7l444=(CCW) 43 71### 4AH4

4 AM<41 A) 44# 4a} ##A}## 4## 44-.

“20004 34 437] 12# 47]4A}6)]4 CCW 43## AH## 4A]#3

3#4 4«fl 1ST 344 44 #4444 43 4444^14 #*344 #3

37fl# #7]3 ##634##4-0] #@34ji 4# A}## #4444. (44 a}#

4443 00-3-018)” [7]

4 4 a} iMa}#-# 44- ##] #434 A}# o}# 44# a] 4## 4#A}#ofl #4444 4 #444# 3##33 #7]#4 3# ccw

434 Afl##4 #### #44A] 7)44 4#44* ###3 ##433

27

4#### 444# #7}} 4# ## 7}4#4. 44 44 SDP

14 #7}# 4444.

(1) m^il SDP: #4 5. 3-2(l/3)°ll 445 4144# 4544. 444 5#4

4444# l### #4- 444 4# 5 Cornerstone4 4444 -£#

554 Check Point?} 444a4 444 4 444 144 SDP

4444 SI4 45- 244 SDP 4445# 44444 44 45.5.

4444. (5 8-i %>5)

(2) 44 5454 4-4: ccw 44# a# 44 545 ^44##45 5

445.5444# 444 544-44 4454.

(3) 4 54544 444 54: 5 4-14 305 444 4#44 54

45444 44 -£# l(row)4 444 454 4444.

(4) 44 44#4 54 4 45#4 45 54= 5 4-2# 4544 ccw

41 #4 44 45#4# "44444 554 ?}4# 44 44#4# 25

44. 444 CCW 4144 445. 521454 5#4# 444l#(frontline

system)4 44 ?) 4I#4 54 44#4 54# 4 4# 4 414

4#454 44 4# 44 4#4 44#4 44-7} 44 4 44. 4

44# 4 5?}# 5 4-2# #554 5444.

(5) 5^444 44-545 44: 4# 545 444 444 4## 45

44445 157}) worksheet# 4#54 244 sdp 44 44# 5W4.

444 ccw 41## cvcs/hpsi, rhr/lpsi 5 rcp# 445# 4444.

454 44 41 #4 4 4115 4###445 54455 7}4#4.

444 5 8-24 4 5.7155 SDP Worksheet^)# H?)## 44#44

4444 Si# 4W44 4444# 4#45 44#4 45 144

4# 4444.

(6) 4 7}14, 4# 57154 4#4444 #4555 4 ## 27}), 5## 57i), 6

## 47H 4#4 5544 444457} 45455a. red# 44444.

(5 8-2 45) #4 47114## a#4# 4445 4#4S1# #4# 44

#44# 47}_s_## ### 3441 sdp #44 ##544.

28

4- 431 2: 4# 13171 44444(MFIV) 31#

4 4314 7]7} 31445. 47>5.7> 444 44444 4444 44 3144444 4444^ 444 4^-^ 4444 4444.

“20024 64 194 44 1^7] #444# #44 44#4 3i##5.#7] 4-737HI ##7> #4431 #714-737] 4-4 433] 431 #7>5. 4 44-

4447> 444. 31444# #4# 44## 4## #44144 #4 #4## 4##7> ##4 44 7144. (ler #31 43. 2002-06#[020619Y1])” [8]

44 4# sdp 44 44# 4444.

(1) 1431 SDP: #4 & 3-2(1/3)31 444 4444# 7]#44. 444 #444#444 44 o/h (20024 2#)3] 44444 #334 4# 4444 444 444 444 44 27I# 4## 44. 44-4 4# 4Cornerstone4 4444 2-1 #7] 4-4 4 4-SA]-g4 4# 144 Check Point7> 44434 4-4-4 4# 1431 sdp 4444 #5- 4 4 #4. (& 8- 3 ##)

(2) 5 3-2(2/3)31 444 4444# 4444. #7]Al-4 comerstone3l 44 24 ##314 447144 4###3]# 44# #43i 4444 244 sdp 4444## 4#44 44.

(3) 44 #444 44: mfiv# 4#44 44# #7]A}43]4 4444.

(4) 4 #444# 4AH4 #4: s 4-i# 30# 0)44 4444 34

444431 44 444 434 4444. 444 34 a} 4 4-44 4##

o# 44.

(5) 44 4##4 #4 4 4##4 44 #4: ### 31## #4433

A}3.4#3] A}#5]4 ^OnS o] y-Til# #A)44.

29

(6) 4:2#41 Ajzl-Ajxls: 4^: 4# ^Bjol 444 Siâ 4M.

4444S# 4S/)-44 5)14# 27)1 worksheet# 4##4 2#4 SDP14 #4# #444.

(7) 3|7>#4, 6 ## 37]), 8 ## 37M A>J1^^| ^4^x157} ijEl^ÊS

## S414# 44 4#4SS 5##4 4 $#4 4-4-4 YELLOWS

45444. (5 8-4 #S) 4#4ss #4 4- -2-4-45# 4a54

7)44 (accident sequence precursor: ASP) #4# #4) 4 L3 444#

#4444 1 4SS 4-454-.

9. W <9# 44

4## 471 #44444 4-4-4 4# #4 1SA}4#^- 444 444-.

(1) 444444 4 #7)44 #4S 44# (worksheet)# 44# -H#444 44444 444 44# #4444 44. 44 #444# 44#s 44 #7#}4 44# 44## 4444.

(2) 44 4444 444 44 44 #4444 #741-44 #47}#4#

#7>4444 # #47}#4# 44 #4444 44. #444 44 #444# 4 #4 <9 #4# 4S44 *11444.

(3) lerf 4 44 4â 7H^ 4444# l#s #444.

(4) 444#4 44444 44s 44, #444, s#4#, #4 4## 44s 44#4 44 4#4 444 44 4#4 454 444# 54 44454 4â 444# 441- # 5# 14# 7j)H4.

(5) 44 71)14 s4444 4#4 #44 s# (5# 1 4#)4 4444 444# (v&v)# #W4.

30

10. 9# 4 a#

4# NRC# A) 7ij# A}-g-S}31 ## 99 993 #Aj (SDP) 99# 5)33-93#

99 #44 #-§-#4 3#94 349# 4U#71 #9 4#4 444494. n

sdp 944 #-§-4# 4# 44#4 99 4## ## #9# 5)33 #3# 49

444(threshold)# ##4 "a4 4—3 43# #4 #-§-##4 #4 ##4#

Ri7} #4. 94 ##44# 44 nrc4 ## A}## ei|s. zl 444 44

444- #4 #4# 3A> #4 ##4-. #4# #3 67}%) 49# 44 #4#

4 44-31 ##4- 93 34A}## 9994 44 43# #443# 94444 #

44## 3#4#4 344 9444. 44 44 9 a} 9 399-91- #-## #

244 A>3n#Aio] #^494. 3# ## 44 44944 sdp 4# #9# 94

7)44 9 4994# 49494.

n. #3 #4

[1] 6th Technical Meeting Minute of Risk-based Precursor Analysis, Association Vincotte Nuclear, November 6-7, 2003.

[2] NRC Inspection Manual, Chapter 0609, March 21, 2003.[3] ROP Performance Metrics, October 12, 2000.

[4] J. P. Poloski, et al., Rates of Initiating Events at U. S. Nuclear Power Plants: 1987-1995, NUREG/CR-5750, US NRC, February 1999.

[5] #9 5,637) PSA 331 A), #499#%M9), 2002. 6.

[6] M. A. Azam, et ah, Risk-informed Inspection Notebook for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, BNL/NRC, Rev.0, September 7, 2001.

[7] KINS/AR-I09, 315) #a}9 437) ^A}#J7A), 412# 9 7) 9 A},

94949 997)^9,2000.10.

[8] KINS/AR-813, 2002#3 #9 A)-3-3# #A}#j7A), 94#A}#9971##, 2003.

5.

31

it 8-1. JLEJ 43:7] x>3i]o]] tfltlr l^l SDP 44 44

LER tiS ( ) gx^32AH H}S (KINS/AR- 109 )

(1) ig 7HS (-MS):CCW Tge# 2,#0)1

4)6)1 583gAiy °1 4=^5)7) ##

1-1 zlSE! sgo)| °]SH xisi-g 7f|# xp|yg^7||5

1-2 sgoH 2|§H xj#g 7)|g

1-3 4I# 5E# 2IISS] 7|M 7|^•n-y 51i^s (gxiazr) §j gyy#

I2||7i

1-4 ?ii'e c)s

1-5 N/A

1-6 #sr@ sgo| 7|^ 7|t> ( 365 ) 1 ( ) a|t>

(2) xlsl-sj 7|#r g! Cornerstone 99:

2-1 S7|A|-S

O 2f£Af>! (gx^EEj [2]

o LOCA S! 2## c|jStiHg-n)cr [22]

2-2 glsMi#

O 5L?| Sl# Xl«X-j|7)7|^ [ y\ O 5PI £M*l|7p|^ IJ7

o S#^g|o) 7)^ | | O SM/S^/X|ZI/S# 1

2-3 orgurw

o 17) 2#e ss [2

o ttj<ys ds |

o gyys ss |/|

(3) 7|Ef Si 7)# 7|# gg:

3-1sl2HS&7|# | tf

3-2@x|# °)#7|(=- | j/f

SB

o 2?H o|-y°) Check Point Si# | V\ ------------—► 2E14I SDP

o VH°| Check Point Si# [2] ------------*" "=!# E121I (2#)

o Check Point Si# | j ---------------- ► 1 &J\\ SDP #S

32

Table 8-2(2) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant Transients with Loss of PCS (TPCS)

Estimated Frequency (Table 1 Row) / *7Exposure Time / Table 1 Result (circle):ABCDEFGH

Safetv Functions Needed:Secondary Heat Removal (AFW)

Early Inventory, High Pressure Injection (EIHP) Primary Heat Removal, Feed/Bleed (FB)High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)

Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:1/2 MDAFW trams (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW tram (1 ASD train) to 2/3 SGs xvith 1/5 SG safety valves cm each SG fed by AFW(l>1/2 charging pumps or use of spare charging pump (I multi-tram system)691/2 PORVs open for Feed/Bleed (operator action = 2)1/2 charging pumps with 1/2 RHR pumps and with operator action for switchover (operator action =3)

Circle Affected Functions Recovery of Remaining Mitigation Capability Ratio? for Each Affected SequenceFailed Train Sequence Color

I TPCS-AFW-HPR (3) o ■/ 3 -f-

2 TPCS - AFW - FB (4) f 3 -/ 3 i

3 TPCS - AFW - E1HP (5)o -i ■> / 5-

Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event:

if operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recover)' actions, such credit should be given only if the Followcig criteria are met: ?) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procefcires exist. 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.

Table 8-2(3) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant — Small LOCA (SLOCA)

Estimated Frequency (Table 1 Row) Exposure Time f 7 ^ Table 1 Result (circle):

ABCDEFGH

Safety Functions Needed: Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:

Early Inventory, HP Injection (EIHP)Secondary' Heat Removal (AFW)RCS Cooldown / Depressurization (DEP1)RCS Cooldown / Depressurization (DEP2)Primary Heat Removal, Feed/Bleed (FB)Low Pressure Injection (LPI)High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)Low Pressure Recirculation (LPR)

1/2 charging trains or use of spare charging pump (I multi-train system)<l>1/2 MDAFW trains (l multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train)Operator depressurizes RCS using 1/2 PORVs (operator action = 2)Operator depressurizes RCS by using 1/2 PORVs and by opening 2 Z3 AKVs (operator action™ 2)1/2 PORVs open for Feed/Bleed (operator action = 2)1/2 RHR trains (1 multi-train system)1/2 charging trains with 1/2 RHR trains and with operator action for switchover (operator action = 3) 1/2 RHR trains with operator action for switchover (operator action = 3)

Circle Affected Functions Recovery of Remaining Mitigation Capability Rating for Each Affected SequenceFailed Train Sequence Color

1 SLOCA - LPR (2, 9) 3 f

2 SLOCA - DEPI - HPR (4)~b -7" 3- -f 2- 7

3 SLOCA - AFW - HPR (6) 3 -f -h 2- • 74 SLOCA-AFW-FB (7) t / > -/- 3 9

5 SLOCA-EIHP-LPI (10) v f 2- ~f 2- 7

6 SLOCA-EIHP-DEP2 (11)9 -t ■*- -f 3- 7

7 SLOCA-EIHP-AFW (12) *

33

Table 8-2(7) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant — Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP)

Exposure Time ^ Table 1 Result (circle):

ABCDEFGH

Full Creditable Mitigation Caoabilitv for Each Safety Function:

Emergency AC Power (EAC)Turbine-driven AFW Pump (TDAFVV)Secondary Heat Removal (AFW)Recovery of AC Power in < 1 hr (REC1)Recovery of AC Power in <5 hrs (REC5)Early Inventory, HP Injection (EIHP)Primary Heat Removal (FB)High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)

1/1 dedicatedEDG(Itiain)or 1/1 swing EDG (operator action =l)w1/1 TDP trains of AFW with 2/3 ARVs (1 ASD bain)1/2 MDAFW trains (I multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train)Recovery of AC power within I hour (operator action = 1}<2*Recovery of AC power within 5 horns (operator action = I)1/2 charging pumps or use of spare charging pump (1 multi-tram system)*5*Operator uses 1/2 piessurizer PORVs (operator action * 2)1/2 charging pumps with 1/2 RHR pumps and with operator action for switchover (operator action = 3)

Recovery of Remaining Mitigation Caoabilitv Ratine for Each Affected SeauenceFailed Train Sequence

1 LOOP- AFW -HPR (3) // ?-y-5- i

2 LOOP-AFW-FB (4) /-f 3 + 3 7

3 LOOP - AFW - EIHP (5) / -f 3 ■+ 3-

4 LOOP - EAC - HPR (7,11) (AC recovered) / -+ 3- -+ 3- ir

5 LOOP - EAC - EIHP (8, 13) (AC recovered) ( -f -7- -f 2-

6 LOOP - EAC - REC5 (9) / -h 3- -y- /

7 LOOP - EAC - TDAFW - FB (12) !-f- t

8 LOOP - EAC - TDAFW - REC1 (14)/ •/- 2- -f i V- i 7

Table 8-2(12) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant — Loss of Instrument Air (LIA)(1)

Estimated Frequency (Table 1 Row) Exposure Time / J ^ Table I Result (circle):

ABCDEFGH

Safety Functions Needed: Full Creditable Motivation Canabilltv for Each Safety Function:

RCP Seal Injection and HP Injection (EIHP)

Secondary Heat Removal (AFW)

1/2 charging trains or use of spare charging pump provide RCP seal injection and high-pressure injection (1 multi-train system)(2>1/2 MDAFW trains (operator action = 2)®

Circle Affected Functions Recovery of Remaining Mitigation Capability Rating for Each Affected SeauenceFailed Train Seauence Color

ILIA-AFW (2)

2 LIA-EIHP (3)3- -j >- ¥■

Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event

If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are mer. 1} sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed. 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.

34

5. 8-3. <8^ 1^7) a>bH 41# 1#4) SDP ## 4^

#519#: LER BI ( 2002-0651 ) 33S5IA) 921 ( )

(1) 493 2L3 7Ka(^@): 454= 39# “ 9## 55ns9=|2-H #9°s. 9## V#

1-1 393 ^gloll °ISfi 3# 454=3#

1-2 393 ^ycH| °|si| 343 39

1-3 Til# EE# 7l|g°| 7|S. 71# 233# 9374

1-4 Til# 55# Ti|9=| c|# =137|#

1-5 9359 9^ N/A

1-6 393 3sy o| X|# 7|9 ( 60 ) 9 ( ) 93

(2) 343 71-5- 9 Cornerstone @9:

2-1 S7|A^>| xO 3933 (99SH9 #) [_KJ

o LOCA 9 234 CHSBH94-9 [ |

2-2 333#o S7| ## 39Til737|# j | o 371 39A||73T|#

o 9#£34 7|# | | o sM/#^/x|3/3#□□

2-3 9399o 13 T||* yw □ o 333# 33 Q

o 39# 333 99 | |

(3) 7|E|. <ggt 7f# 7|* gg:

3-1 33 927]# | |

3-2 @3# 937|# | |

35

o 23 o|3°| Check Point 9# j^j ---------- ► 293 SDP#3

o 13=| Check Point 9# | l/\ --------K 9* 93 33 (2#)

o Check Point 9# | | -----------► 1 93 SDP #S

35

Table 8-4(1) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant — Transients with PCS Available (Reactor Trip) (TRANS)

Estimated Frequency (Table 1 Row)Exposure Time , ^ Table 1 Result (circle):

ABCDEFGH

Safety Functions Needed:

Power Conversion System (PCS)Secondary Heat Removal (AFW)

Early Inventory, High Pressure Injection (EIHP) Primary Heal Removal, Feed/Bleed (FB)High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)

Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:

1/2 Main Feedwater trams with 1/3 condensate trains (operator action = 2)1/2 MDAFW trains (1 mute-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW train (I ASD train) to 2/3 SGs with 1/5 SG safety valves on each SG fed by AFW11*1/2 charging trains or use of spare charging pump (1 multi-train system)121 i/2 PORVs open for Feed/Bleed (operator action = 2)1/2 charging trains with 1/2 RHR trains and with operator action for switchover (operator action = 3)


1 TRANS-PCS-AFW-HPR (4)0-f T'-f 3 Sr

2 TRANS-PCS-AFW-FB (5)a -/ 2- -f 3

3 TRANS-PCS-AFW-EIHP (6)o V a- -f- 3 -T 3 B

Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event.

If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment m service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met: 1) sufficient lime is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.

Table 8-4(2) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant — Transients with Loss of PCS (TPCS)

Estimated Frequency (Table 1 Row)Exposure Time ^ ° ^ Table 1 Result (circle):

ABCDEFGH

Safety Functions Needed:Secondary Heal Removal (AFW)


Full Creditable Mitigation Canabititv for Each Safetv Function:1/2 MDAFW trains (I multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW train {1 ASD train) to 2/3 SGs with 1/5 SG safety valves on each SG fed by AFW(I}1/2 charging pumps or use of spare charging pump (1 multi-train system)1211/2 PORVs open for Feed/Bleed (operator action = 2)1/2 charging pumps with 1/2 RHR pumps and with operator action for switchover (operator action =3)

Circk: Affected Functions Recovery of Remaining Mitigation Capability Rating for Each Affected SequenceFailed Train Sequence Color

1 TPCS - AFW - HPR (3)i

2 TPCS-AFW-FB (4)» -/ ? -f- 3

3 TPCS-AFW-EIHP (5)£> f 3 B 3 t?


If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment m service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met: 1) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.

36

w 1

^7]A>yjq.

49#DLM (Dependency Linking Matrix)

between Initiators and MitigatingSystems

37

Initiators and System Dependency in UCN 5&6

Sys CompCode Code

1-.

Affected Systems :0:2:;2:;: Saasgfasi1 4.16kv SW01A, 125V DC DC01A, #7|

SI p 2ofof2ôig2 5SfTlST||™ a, yS2@i8#8s-Aag}yg?gj«H 2 4.16kv SW01B, 125V DC DC01B, S?lza}T{#4@ b, yg28868£-BSI 617, 627, 637, 480V MCC MC 08A, yg2y8S8£

SI 2gm£!2g|4ft v_ 3ojof2?o)25fâ| 647 -ASI 616, 626, 636, 4BOV MCC MC 08B,646 -B

SI-603 480V MCC MC05ASI-604 4BOV MCC MC05B

mt§m 2€3 2jB|W»SI-321 125V DC DC01CSI-331 125V DC DC01D SLOCA, LOFW, SGTR, ATWS(CSGTR), LSSB, LOCV, LOOP, LOCCW, LOKV, LODC, SBC, GTRN, ATWS, LLOCA,III! 2 Of 012 ôj Til s. III ayyg^gjgH, 2 B|5|^^s|geSI—699 480V MCC MC05ASI-698 480V MCC MC05B MLOCA, ATWStPSVstuck open)SI-667 480V MCC MC05A, 42% 858S.-A

0i# 2yyg2S4s Eitii *|5 ^s| ^5 4a| 1 SI-666 4B0V MCC MC05B, 42% Sf€8s-BSI-659 125V DC DC01A, 42% 8S8S.-ASI-660 125V DC DC01B, 42%

Si jiofofgôjTjs. V_ 4'82# 825 3E| SI-675 480V MCC MC01A, 42% ^tSil2-ASI-676 480V MCC MC01 B, 42% i|§i!2-BCH-531 4BOV MCC MC01ASi 30f0f2^0l7)g V_ 489233 4all5CH-530 480V MCC MC01B

2005-05-08 39

2.

:'Aifect6^Sy^t:e%S;;y ivVSStipftdtti^ initiating Event.

4,16kv SW01A, 125V DC DC01A, 33asaaf3@a1 ?y 3532 43 a , 4 ?a 363

3333?945 ■>. ag}33?aaHayaa^san2

2. 49 A, 57|Z£|45 49 A

4.16kv SW01B, 125V DC DC01B, 33?a 3532 49 b, 4 eaa^ds

49 B, S7|Z£|7|# 49 B

SI 615480V MCC-MC08B, 33? 9 5,'§i!S

49 B

SI 625

SI 635

480V MCC-MC08B, 33? 3 3532

1)11 aya3?945 v_ 3a33?SHaaB| Tim B480V MCC-MC08A, 33?3 3532

49 A

SI 645480V MCC-MC08A, 33? 3 3532

49 A

SI-668480V MCC-MC05B, 4S@ 3532

49 B

3y3t3?34* 111! ay9S?33:£°4iavails

SI-669

SI-659

480V MCC-MC05A, 4r@ 3532 49 A

125V DC-DC01 A, 4t9 3532 4 9 A

SLOCA, SGTR, LLOCA

SI-660125V DC-DC01B, 4?3 3532 4

9 B

WM a993?34s i>ill- ayy# 3?2 aa SI-675

SI-676

480V MCC-MC01A, 4S3 3532 49 A

480V MCC-MC01B, 4r3 3532 49 B

§il 3933?94s iSII; 3333?3a263a asi^s

SI-691

SI-692

480V MCC-MC01A

480V MCC-MC01B

uiM ayaa?g4# v_4yaa?3aH «@ ?, 33^34* 9JZ ¥!7| 3?? Hx(3 4

B|502

SI-693

SI-694

480V MCC-MC05A

480V MCC-MC05B

433?aa2?E| 5 CH-530 480V MCC-MC01BSixx; ag}33?34s V 33333365521

ci53 3392 CH-531 480V MCC-MC01A

2005-05-08 40

3

Support Systems

4.16kV SW01A, 125V DC DC01A, 39XISM^SSH 1 ?3 $t69£ MS1|°! A, 9ie#969

£ 593 A, 57|S$|7||E — *-fi 3 ASI @9yzi7«# Siffig 9 3334^® 2

93394;3@h 24.16kV SW01B, 125V DC DC01B, 39 4=3 9B9£ sen3 B. 7H£i* 969£ S3|3 B, 37|Z#7#* £S13 B

SI-615, 625 480V MCC-MC08B, 39f 3 469 £SI v_ 933a 4s 39 âis B9I3 B

SI-635, 645 480V MCC-MC08A, 334=3 469 £ Eejol A

9 339 4s 3 @= s 3S 9a|Ms

SI-691 480V MCC-MC01Afe sgyzMis v_

SI-692 480V MCC-MC01 B

ga^g^gJSHBHT SI-693 480V MCC-MC05AWM :. s, 99 yziTis #3

isf3 zjaiSSs SI-694 480V MCC-MC05B

SI-695 480V MCC-MC05A

s^mzfê ms S9S47II5 uHtS 9aiWH

S1-69 6 480V MCC-MC05B


SI-658 480V MCC-MC05B SLOCA, SGTR; LOOP,SBC, ATWS, LSSB,

9339t3@hgâigs

SI-307 480V MCC-MC05A LOCV, LOFW, GTRN,§îyz}7is V

SI-306 480V MCC-MC05BLOCCW, LODC, LOKV

HX 1 7|7|yz|4: 7j« A@9^44# HX_ 9999716 WH#7|

HX 2 7|7|yz{4: 7fl« B


SI-656 480V MCC-MC01B

Ill gîyzjTis V.3913971# *14=32;

91 =

SI-653 125V DC DC01A

SI-654 125V DC DC01B



SI-689 480V MCC-MC08AsîyziTis i®l; 0133 4412


gift ;ll||#4=

325Ê} §7|UjZ|7j% 63S259 2}a|

V-0033 480V MCC-MC01A

V—0034 480V MCC-MC01B

2005-05-09 41

4. ziWasaK8**

: i MeetbilSysfefb 6 l :;;'-.;i; ;^|b;r: SoMp'OiRentS;^;:;: ;•:.; i':.‘.;i:i:;':;;i: Support Systems

4.16kV SW01, 125V DC DC01A, 2W4yy#^4Hz1 2# 4*4=*iS4l4 A, 57|3E$17||

#0 3fet2e-kiT?iis :s#lll ay*2S 4*4=tiH * saia a

4.16kV SW01B, 125V DC DC01B, AH4yy##4=az 2 2# 44= 4*52$ 7*@ B, 07|2S^

e MZ1|°I B

Hi ati2S4*4=7is HI! 2!yss#T sas ^aias

V—0035

V—0036

480V MCC-MC08A, 4y2# 4*4= $t S23:7ig A

480V MCC-MC08B, ab*2S 4*4= $i #2z7#a B

Hi 4H2##4=M* :IHI1 4y*2# 4*4=1!H Sf V-0025

V-0026

480V MCC-MC05A, 7452$7|@ A

480V MCC-MC05B,7|1 B

Alt except for ISLOCA and RVR

gsisj ohQMH| @ =4a|g2

SI-659125V DC-DC01 A, H

s ACR : 4y2s#4=7{* V.SI-660

125V DC-DC018. *169 21523. 7| a B

W^> 4y2#44=7|# lilt 4yy#a4=z ^si SI-675480V MCC-MC01A, 4149 45 4 3

7| s A

' SI-676480V MCC-MC01B, JfSdS

7#@ B

ills 4W2##^4# HX_ qyys#^a is71

HE01A 7171^24= 7|« A

HE01B 7|7|yz> 4=781 B

5.

Affected, System s 1:1:; ? > i 1: 1:: P ^ e . Support Systems

254*a7i|s mi ygyyTjg g*#^si RC101

RC102

125V DC - DC01C

125V DC - DC01D All except for LLOCA, MLOCA, ISLOCA and

liii ygygMs atisRC103 480V MCC - MC03A

RVR + Consequential SGTR in ATWS

RC104 480V MCC - MC03B

2005-05-08 42

6. sMgxmqoM

11 : C:Offi-pdfi : |i::?s^p^j£;Sysf4iS:S|i: |l|::ll;ll 1: IH

@5 1 4.16W SW01A, 57|2S[7|S Til AC.Vx-:; 3! i|^*#0)7|S fills #s@“

85 2 4.16kV SW01B, 125V DC DC01B, g7|

Hill S(Sf y *M4|oj7||e lllll 632 4#g} *flo)»S CH-239 H| IBS 125V DC01M,

CH-240 H| 1E5 125V DC01N, BS57|7||#

llll iF*f y lililM33|o|ga 40 3

yyss CH-501 480V MCC MC05A

CH-504 480V MCC MC05B

S(6f y 442|0M# v_qye§ CH-514 H| 1E5 MCC MC30N ATWS, SGTR

lllll SfSf y 4^410)7#* RWT S44B2 4B| CH-534 480V MCC MC01B

CH-536 480V MCC MC01A

cv am y :||1|1 #24£» B2B2 1 n| 1E3 MCC MC28N

BE 2 «l 1EB MCC MC28N

cv ifSf y *aw7|0)7ts Hill 25443 #ziao|s CH-203 125V DC DC01B

CH-205 125V DC DC01A

nSr

Systemisi: Major Components

RG-103 Class 1 Eg 125V 2-7?-S3 DC4-01A

RG-104 Class 1 Eg 125V DC4-01B

u«7|7|#

lllill 6Ef5iO|B 46 BalRG-105 Class 1 Eg 125V 3452 DC4-01C SGTR

RG-107 Class 1 Eg 125V B#40 DC4-01C

RG-108 Class 1 Eg 125V DC4-01D

2005-05-08 43

:y- G>;m:p<>06rits;*:: [.: :%'y: :<:) Vei^tyi ^x-:

01A 4.16kV SW01A, 125V DC 01A, g7|2n°A A,;i|i; 2E1f#2234=@S

02B 4.16kV SW01B. 125V DC 01B, 57|2 SITUS 783 B, 2234= *[#7)2-2

01B 125V DC01B, 253t *t#tiz-12234=78# PT_ E)gt?s si^tg:

02A 125V DC 01 A, 2234=^t^d2-2

V0044 125V DC 01C, 2334=*t#dz- 1 (cycling) SLOCA, LOFW, LOCV,

V0043 480V MCC 8-MC08A, 2234= *t#ti GTRN, LOOP, LSSB,2234=78# V ^-1 (cycling) SGTR, SBO, LOCCW,

V0045 480V MCC 8-MC08B. 2234= *[##1 LOKV, LODC,2-2(cycling)

VO 04 5 125V DC 01D, 2234=^(#d^- 2(cycling)

VO 03 5 125V DC 01A, 2234= *l#d2-1

V0036 125V DC 01B, 2234= *I#t|S-1#:;;g S!23=r^lS 2234= @3#2

V037 125V DC 01A, 2234= *t#£!:2-2

V038 125V DC 01B, 2234= *t#ti2-2

9.^34= J##

Affected- Systems Major Components Support Systems

FAT ?34=7|* fill 7|S34=BH 07 P ti| 1E3 13.8kV SW02N, «| 1E3 125V DC01N

111: 4^4=78# lllil;: ^34=^RISH131,133 125V DC01B, 3S57|78S

132, 134 - 125V DC01A, 3Rg7|78S SGTR, LOCV, GTRN,

F* ?^4=78# y_093 u| 1E3 480V MCC MC05N

LOCCW, LOKV

058 »l 1E3 480V MCC MC06N

1m ?34=7|@ #7|7|78Sga(DST) W47| u| 1E^ 13.8kV SW02M, »l 1E^ 13.8 kV SW02N

2005-05-08 44

10. y\n%

/ll.rlrllSUppPft^Sy Sfejti

171 480V MCC MC04A, 125V DC 01 A, 125V DC 01C

^#7|79S llfil; q]7|gnw2172

173

480V MCC MC04B, 125V DC 01B,125V DC 01 D

480V MCC MC04A, 125V DC 01A, 125V DC 01C

174 480V MCC MC04B, 125V DC 01B, 125V DC 01D

ill V.. E)aJ^Sj«H V1001-1008 H| 1ES 125V DC MC01M, 8#g7|7{ *SGTR, Consequential

SGTR, SLOCA

V105 480V MCC MC04A

v„. qpig^xtygeV106 480V MCC MC04B

V107 480V MCC MC04A

V108 480V MCC MC04B

11.S7|WS7i4le7t#

SD S7iws7|$ie7«s ^ya#4BlSH AV-005

MV-007

125VDC01A, °j^57|7lS

125V DC01A, 480V AC MCC MC04A

SD S7|u^7|*|#7(e ill HCBD AV-017 «1 1ES 125VDC01M, 54@7|2|# SGTR

SD S7|tijS7|$|#7lS ill hcbd goi^ysggAV-023 HI 1 Eh 125VDC01M. y^37|7is

SD S7|Wj97|-He7*S 1111:11 HCBD go| g5 P-022 h| 1 Eh 480V MCC MC02M

2005-05-08 45

la.g^Tis

StimpMerii'S [S tti: :S y St S ^ > I:!;: : I:::!

MP,APDC

1E3 4.1 6kV S34.16kV SW01A

4.16kV SW01B

DG 01 A, Unit Aux. XFMR TR01M, Standby Aux. XFMR TR02M

UU U1t5, AAU Uti Ulfc, unit AUX.

XFMR TR01 Nr Standby Aux. XFMR

f’fAPDC..;

6D_ 44HW3S c|l!S}3 7|

4.16kV SW01E

AAC DQ

AAC DQ 01E

125V DC, 07I2SWI*

MFAP,DC

344# •ill 434#St37|DG 01A

DG01B

125V DC, 7|7|yzt4=7lS, 571z$|t| S

125V DC, 7|7|yz{4=7ls, 57!2ES|7S#

480V AC LC LC01A 4.16kV SW01A

M-’AP,DC

344# 1EB 480V 3H34

480V AC LC LC01B

480V AC LC LC02A

4.16kV SW01B

4.16kV SW01A

480V AC LC LC02B 4.16kV SW01B

AAC 480V AC LC01E AAC AC LC 9-LC01A

480V AC MCC01A 480V AC LC 9-LC01A

480V AC MCC01B 480V AC LC 9-LC01B

AAC 480V MCC01E 4.16kV BUS SW01E

480V AC MCC02A 480V AC LC LC01A

480V AC MCC02B 480V AC LC LC01 B

AAC 480V MCC02E 4.16kV BUS SW02E



MP,mm

DC344* 1E3 480V SEJ443

4

480V AC MCC04A

480V AC MCC04B

480V AC LC 9-LC02A

480V AC LC 9-LC02B








480V AC MCC08B 480V AC LC 9-LC02B Subtree of HPSI, LPSI,eves, css, ccws,

ECWS, ESWS, AFWS, SCS, EPS, HVAC,

SDS, MSS, SGBDS, MEWS, RCGVS, SWS,

MP,AP fla?fim- 1P^ 1W t?Ai

125V DC 13-DC01A

125V DC 13-DC01B

AM 13-BT01A, AM 13-BC01A

AM 13-BT01B, AM #M 13- BC01B

2005-05-08 46

HP,:

ap,lie

MrDC

HI#0:DC

MP,AP,DC

Ml

AP,.DC

MP,APDO,

' '

DC

954 TUB

9^4 7||S

954 T«S

95473#

95473 =

9B471S

9a?73S

BC_

1 1— [=1 ItJV —1 TT

125V DC 13-DC01C ^9^i.13-BT0lC, #g7| 13-BC01C

RCGVSF, IAS (Hl2)

125V DC 13-DC01D 13-BT01D, 13-BC01D

Battery Charger BC01A 480V AC LC01A

Battery Charger BC01B

Battery. Charger BC01C

480V AC LC01BlEg 499 597|

480V AC LC02A

Battery Charger BC01D 480V AC LC02B

H|.1Eg 13.8kV 3- Unit Aux.. XFMR TR01M, Standby. Aux.

H| 1Eg 13.8kVSW02M

u| 1Eg 13.8W 3- SW02N

XFMRTR02M

Unit Aux. XFMR TR01 N„ Standby. Aux. XFMR TR02N

B| 1Eg 4.16kV 4- Unit Aux.. XFMR TR01M,. Standby Aux.

ti| 1Eg 4.16W SW02MB| 1 Eg. 4.16kV 4-

XFMR TR02MUnit Aux.. XFMR TR01N, Standby Aux.

SW02N XFMR TR02Nul.1E5.480V.AC 7-

LC11M H|.1Eg.4.16kV 4-SW02M

H| 1 Eg 480V AC 7- LC09N h|. 1 Eu. 4.16kV 4-SW02N

n| 1Eg 480V AC 7- LC1 ON 1Eg 4.16kV 4-SW02N

u| 1 Eh 480VE4

u| 1ES. 480V AC. 7- LC11N H| lEg 4.16kV 4-SW02N

H|.1Eg 480V AC 7- LC11M b[ 1Eg 13.8kV 3-SW02M

ul 1Eg 480V AC. 7- LC03N u| 1 Eg 13.8W 3-SW02N

u| 1 Eg 480V AC 7- LC05M h| 1 Eg. 13.8kV 3-SW02M

B| 1Eg 480V AC. 7- MC05N H| 1 Eg 480V LC7-LC11N

uf.1E5 480V AC 7- MC06N B| 1Eg 480V LC 7-LC11N

H| 1ES 480V. AC. 7- MC28N

h| 1 Eg 480V LC 7-LC10N

B|1Eg 480V HE4*30| -9IE4

u| 1Eg 480V AC. 7- MC30N

H| 1 Eg 480V LC 7-LC10N

u| 1 Eu 480V AC 7- MC06M 9.1 Eg 480V LC 7-LC03M

h| 1Eg 480V AC. 7- MC07N

u| 1Eg 480V LC 7-LC03N

u| 1 Eg 480V AC 7- LC10M u| 1Eg.13.8kV 3-SW02M

u| 1 Eg 125V DC #99 59?| 13-BC01M, *99 59u| 1Eg 125V 13-DC01M 7l 13-BC03M, #99 13-BT01M

H| 1Eg 125V DC 499 S97| 13-BC01N, #99 5913-DC01N 7| 13-BC03N, #99 13-BT01N

.13-BC01M

Agx| 6£7| 13-' BC03N

H| 1 Eg 480V LC 7-LC11MuhEg 499 597|

b| 1 Eg 480V LC 7-LC07N

2005-05-08 47

13.7}7|^44=711

Affected Systems Initiating Event

01 PA 4.16kV AC - SW01A, 125V DC-DC01A, S7|5$f7l|# 7j|^ A

01B 4.16kV AC - SW01B, 125V DC -7|7!y44=7j# P_ 7|7)yZ|f @5 DC01B, S7|5i}7«# 7|fl B

02PA 4.16kV AC - SW01A, 125V DC -DC01A, 57|5$l7«S 7#@ A

02PB 4.16kV AC - SW01B, 125V DC-DC01B, 57|5$t7«# 7*@ B

HX01A 7|7|yzf=l|f7l# 7|@ A

HX01B 7|7|yqsflf7|s 7|@ B

HX02A 7|7|yzf=i|4=7$# A7|7|U<44=71|# H' 7|7|yz{4= wm#7[

HX02B 7|7|yZMf7|# 7|^ BSubtree of 4 w4##

HX03A 717|yztei|4-75# 711 A 4=7i#, g^Ti#, if y^TlS, STiiyzfTl

HX03B 7|7|y4Sfl4=7)#71" B# (0|72)

SXISZJSHSPI f °J MOV 073 480V AC - MC01A7|7|y44=7ts S^12H

MOV 074 480V AC - MC01B

MOV 141

MOV 142

480V AC - MC01A, 3®}4^a#H|7|

7|7|y44=7fS V_fa

zjaiW=,*

480V AC - MC01B, 3*f4 2hg^u|7fl *

7|7|yzf4=7«5 V_S4=y47| Mf7| y

«Z|2|WS

MOV 095 480V AC - MC05A

MOV 096 480V AC - MC05B

7171^4 4=711# v_ r.m^g7| ^m#7[ MOV 105 480V AC - MC02A

MOV 106 480V AC - MC02B

14.717|yz|5l|T7|S

.: A ffected System s: Major Components Support Systems

01 PA 4.16kV AC - SW01A, 125V DC - DC01A, 37|S$17|# 7*« A

4.16kV AC - SW01A, 125V DC -02PA7l7|uzt5g^7||# p 7|7|yztii|4=®5 DC01A, 37|Z#7## 7|« A

4.16kV AC - SW01B, 125V DC - DC01B, g7|2#7{# 7#™ B

4.16kV AC - SW01B, 125V DC -

Subtree of 7|7|y4f711* (u|2) '

01PB

02PB DC01B, 37|ZSM* 7«S B

2005-05-06 48

:: iA:ffe'di;£&:SVst>to-S::> ::y: •:: .'i:;:S'UPP'Oft:>Sy-S-teili iv;: lAitiAWn#. :EVe%i>:

PP01A 480V AC MC05A

B4y44S ### a4y4@EPP02A 480V AC MC05A

PP01B 480V AC MC05B

PP02B 480V AC MC05B Subtree of 3^1?

CH01A 4.16kV AC SW01A, 480V AC MV05A, 125V DC DC01A, CCWS

# M2)

B4-y44* B4=y4=yz{7iCH02A

CH01B

4.16W AC SW01A, 480V AC MV05A, 125V DC DC01A, CCWS

4.16kV AC SW01 B, 480V AC MV05B, 125V DC DC01B, CCWS

CH02B 4.16kV AC SW01B, 480V AC MV05B, 125V DC DC01B, CCWS

16.57|3ESW*

:;!% \StipP bftySysterh iS;:;!:!:: . Initiating Event

VY{?)Hi-yic^az)7j|« 7|71B .'37|5EJtt4S 959945929

be a ayzj7i y

be b gyB7i y

480V AC MC05A, #4yi4SlS SIW A

480V AC MC05B, H4I34SIS Slg B

ti|9ic9y44S 7| mm 459@#44*9E BE A 4'y47| y 480V AC MC05A, 814)34SIS Slg Avi\a 7|# g7|Z#4* . a

BE B 4'9B7| y 480V AC MC058, 814)34= SIS Slg 8

VY{?> ui-yic-yy^Tis 7| 7IB g7|si)4S

ifiiii 299945929Be A 4'y47| y

BE b ay47i y

480V MCC MC05A, #4)34= SIS Sl“ A

480V MCC MC05B, B4S34SIS SIS 8

7| 1111 E2gt SN7# a be ia ay 47i y 480V MCC MC01A, B4S34SIS SI5 A

7|B 37|3L£(4B Itl

IU>

be 2b ayzM y 480V MCC MC01B, #4S34SIS Sg B

VY<7) H|9E9y44* 7|7IB 37i5E£|4S @9929

BE ia 9y 47| y 480 V MCC MC05A, M4S4SIS SIS A

be ib 4!y^7i y 480 V MCC MC05B, #4y4SIS SIS 8

ui-y^ByztTi# 7j 7|B 37l2£)4S

be a ayB7i y

BE b tiy47i y

480 V MCC MC06A, #4)34318 SI s A

480 V MCC MC068, #4!343IS Sl“ 8VY{?) 1111 7|7|yz

Subtree ofS, 7|7|UjZ*44#, £|#5 ^19444*. 4 52eiK"4S, @%iy 94*. 352*9454 B, 9559454S,

VY{?) C|^@t97|# 57|3 S)4B

1111 q^s97ia a57|s $)4S

03A,05A

2## oH7|5fl 04A, 06A

480V MCC MC02A

480V MCC MC02A

qsws7ia 57i$ lilii 4#g,*97|9 B57|S03B,

05B 480V MCC MC02B94354*. 7|7|yz*

S#4* £)4S 2Sg “H7|y 04B,

06B

2ig B7[y

480V MCC MC02B(H|2)

15CE

17CE

480V MCC MC02E

480V MCC MC01E

2005-05-08 49

VY(?) qg^xpi*! =7|s 19CE 480V MCC MC02ESMIS 7|^ g7|Z#7|e

2§ o “»7|at

1 6CE 480V MCC MC02E

18CE 480V MCC MC01E

20CE 480V MCC MC02E

7|7|yzj4=6#-M5 57|$# g yy«7||

sAC_ 7|7iyz}4= i(^52

# 3713# Tflg.

7|7|gzii#=?=flH A a# 37|3#7S*.S

7| at7|7|y#5i|4=@” ba# g7|3#7ie g

7\M

480V. AC MC07A

480V AC. MC07B

17.1 7M#

Affected Systems •:• Initiating:Event".. .•

CM 01

CM02

u| 1 Eg 4.16kV SW02M, «l 1 Eg 480V

2f#37|7|* MC_ 37|gfS?7|AC MC06M, TBCCW

u| 1 Eg 4.16kV SW02N, "I 1Eg AC MC07N. TBCCW

480V Subtree of ## % ^0j7|S,

A DP-01 S u| 1 Eg 480V AC MC06M4#7|7|#. =7|ttta7| ?IS7j* (H|T2)

y^57|7!IS MD_ #7|aZ7|

ADP-02S o] Class 1 Eg 480V AC MC23N

i8.°ig^g!ga

. Affected .Systems:. :-:Si^pb!A:::S^sientSy ijili ;i: V-

efg^gjga HHe1E g @7| BUS Tie- 480V HE4 *»(X y. i|t§7jffi. srtgg

7|*LLOCA, SLOCA, SQTR

2005-05-08 50

4^" Farley

2

SDP Worksheet

Transients with PCS Available (ReactorTable 2(1) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant — Trip) (TRANS)

Estimated Frequency (Table 1 Row) Exnosure Time Table 1 Result (circle):ABCDEFGH

Safety Functions Needed: Full Creditable Mitigation Canabilitv for Each Safety Function:

SGs with 1/5

or action = 3)

Power Conversion System (PCS) 1/2 Main Feedwater trains with 1/3 condensate trains (operator action = 2)Secondary Heat Removal (AFW) 1/2 MDAFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train) to 2/3

SG safety valves on each SG fed by AFW(I)

Early Inventory, High Pressure Injection (EIHP) 1/2 charging trains or use of spare charging pump (1 multi-train system)(2)Primary Heat Removal, Feed/Bleed (FB) 1/2 PORVs open for Feed/Bleed (operator action = 2)High Pressure Recirculation (HPR) 1/2 charging trains with 1/2 RHR trains and with operator action for switchover (opera

Circle Affected Functions Recovery of Remaining Mitigation Canabilitv Rating for Each Affected Sequence

1 TRANS - PCS - AFW - HPR (4)

Failed Train Sequence Color

2 TRANS-PCS-AFW-FB (5)

3 TRANS - PCS - AFW - EIHP (6)


If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met: 1) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to

the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.

53

Table 2(2) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant Transients with Loss of PCS (TPCS)

Estimated Frequency (Table 1 Row) Exuosure Time Table 1 Result (circle):

ABCDEFGH

Safety Functions Needed:



Full Creditable Mitigation Canabilitv for Each Safety Function:

1/2 MDAFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train) to 2/3 SGs with 1/5 SG safety valves on each SG fed by AFW(I)1/2 charging pumps or use of spare charging pump (1 multi-train system)(2)

1/2 PORVs open for Feed/Bleed (operator action = 2)1/2 charging pumps with 1/2 RHR pumps and with operator action for switchover (operator action = 3)

Circle Affected Functions Recovery of Remaining Mitigation Canabilitv Rating for Each Affected SequenceFailed Train Sequence Color

1 TPCS-AFW-HPR (3)

2 TPCS - AFW - FB (4)

3 TPCS - AFW - EIHP (5)


If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met: 1) sufficient time is

available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.

54

Table 2(3) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant — Small LOCA (SLOCA)

Estimated Frequency (Table 1 Row) Exposure Time Table 1 Result (circle):ABCDEFGH

Safety Functions Needed: Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:Early Inventory, HP Injection (EIHP) 1/2 charging trains or use of spare charging pump (1 multi-train system)(l)

Secondary Heat Removal (AFW) 1/2 MDAFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train)RCS Cooldown / Depressurization (DEP1) Operator depressurizes RCS using 1/2 PORVs (operator action = 2)

RCS Cooldown / Depressurization (DEP2) Operator depressurizes RCS by using 1/2 PORVs and by opening 2 /3 ARVs (operator action = 2)

Primary Heat Removal, Feed/Bleed (FB) 1/2 PORVs open for Feed/Bleed (operator action = 2)

Low Pressure Injection (LPI) 1/2 RHR trains (1 multi-train system)

High Pressure Recirculation (HPR) 1/2 charging trains with 1/2 RHR trains and with operator action for switchover (operator action = 3)

Low Pressure Recirculation (LPR) 1/2 RHR trains with operator action for switchover (operator action = 3)


1 SLOCA-LPR (2,9)


2 SLOCA-DEP1 - HPR (4)

3 SLOCA-AFW-HPR (6)

4 SLOCA-AFW-FB (7)

5 SLOCA-EIHP-LPI (10)

6 SLOCA-EIHP-DEP2 (11)

7 SLOCA-EIHP-AFW (12)

55

Table 2(4) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant — Stuck Open PORV (SORV)(l)


Safety Functions Needed: Full Creditable Mitigation Canabilitv for Each Safety Function:

)r action = 3)

Isolation of Small LOCA (BLK) The closure of the block valve associated with stuck open PORV (1 train)(2)Early Inventory, HP Injection (EIHP) 1/2 charging trains or use of spare charging pump (1 multi-train system)(3)Secondary Heat Removal (AFW) 1/2 MDAFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train)

RCS Cooldown / Depressurization (DEP1) Operator depressurizes RCS(4) (operator action = 2)

RCS Cooldown / Depressurization (DEP2) Operator depressurizes RCS by opening 2/3 ARVs (4) (operator action = 2)

Primary Heat Removal, Feed/Bleed (FB) Operator carries out Feed/Bleed ^ (operator action = 2)

Low Pressure Injection (LPI) 1/2 RHR trains (1 multi-train system)

High Pressure Recirculation (HPR) 1/2 charging trains with 1/2 RHR trains and with operator action for switchover (operate

Low Pressure Recirculation (LPR) 1/2 RHR trains with operator action for switchover (operator action = 3)


1 SORV - BLK - LPR (2, 9)


2 SORV - BLK - DEP1 - HPR (4)

3 SORV-BLK-AFW-HPR (6)

4 SORV-BLK-AFW-FB (7)

5 SORV - BLK - EIHP - LPI (10)

6 SORV - BLK - EIHP - DEP2 (11)

7 SORV - BLK - EIHP - AFW (12)

56

Table 2(5) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant Medium LOCA (MLOCA)

Estimated Frequency (Table 1 Row) Exposure Time Table 1 Result (circle):ABCD EFGH

Safety Functions Needed:Early inventory, HP Injection (EIHP)Secondary Heat Removal (AFW)RCS Depressurization (DEP1)RCS Depressurization (DEP2)Accumulators (ACCU)Low Head Injection (LHI)High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)Low Pressure Recirculation (LPR)

Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:1/2 charging trains or use of spare charging pump (1 multi-train system) ^

1/2 MDAFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train)2/3 ARVs (operator action = 1)(2)2/3 ARVs (operator action = 3)(3)2/2 remaining accumulators ^ (1 train)

1/2 RHR trains (1 multi-train system)1/2 charging trains with 1/2 RHR trains and with operator action for switchover (operator action = 3) 1/2 RHR trains with operator switchover from injection to recirculation (operator action = 3)


1 MLOCA - LPR (2, 8)

2 MLOCA - DEP2 - HPR (4)

3 MLOCA - AFW - HPR (6)

4 MLOCA - EIHP - LHI (9)

5 MLOCA - EIHP - ACCU (10)

6 MLOCA - EIHP - DEP1 (11)

7 MLOCA-EIHP-AFW (12)

57

Table 2(6) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant Large LOCA (LLOCA)

Estimated Frequency (Table 1 Row) Exuosure Time Table 1 Result (circle):ABCDEFGH

Safety Functions Needed:Accumulators (ACCU)Early Inventory, LP Injection (EILP)Low Pressure Recirculation (LPR)

Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safetv Function:2/2 remaining accumulators(l) (1 train)

1/2 RHR trains (1 multi-train system)

1/2 RHR trains with operator switchover from injection to recirculation (operator action = 3)


1 LLOCA-LPR (2)

2 LLOCA-EILP (3)

3 LLOCA-ACCU (4)



available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to


58

Table 2(7) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP)


Safety Functions Needed: Full Creditable Mitigation Canabilitv for Each Safety Function:Emergency AC Power (FAC) 1/1 dedicated EDG (1 train) or 1/1 swing EDG (operator action =1)(1)

Turbine-driven AFW Pump (TDAFW) 1/1 TDP trains of AFW with 2/3 ARVs (1 ASD train)

Secondary Heat Removal (AFW) 1/2 MDAFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train)

Recovery of AC Power in < 1 hr (REC1) Recovery of AC power within 1 hour (operator action = 1)(2)

Recovery of AC Power in < 5 hrs (REC5) Recovery of AC power within 5 hours (operator action = 1)(3,4)

Early Inventory, HP Injection (EIHP) 1/2 charging pumps or use of spare charging pump (1 multi-train system)(5)

Primary Heat Removal (FB) Operator uses 1/2 pressurizer PORVs (operator action = 2)

High Pressure Recirculation (HPR) 1/2 charging pumps with 1/2 RHR pumps and with operator action for switchover (operatoraction = 3)


1 LOOP - AFW - HPR (3)


2 LOOP-AFW-FB (4)

3 LOOP-AFW-EIHP (5)

4 LOOP - EAC - HPR (7, 11) (AC recovered)

5 LOOP - EAC - EIHP (8,13) (AC recovered)

6 LOOP - EAC - REC5 (9)

7 LOOP - EAC - TDAFW - FB (12)(AC recovered)

8 LOOP - EAC - TDAFW - REC1 (14)

59

Table 2(8) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)(I)


Safety Functions Needed: Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:Secondary Heat Removal (AFW)Early Inventory, HP Injection (EIHP)Pressure Equalization (EQ)

Feed-and-Bleed (FB)High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)

(1/2 MDPs of AFW or 1/1 TDP of AFW) with 2/3 ARVs (operator action = 3)1/2 charging pumps or use of spare charging pump (1 multi-train system)(2)

Operator isolates the ruptured SG and depressurizes RCS using 1/1 SG ARV (on each SG fed by AFW) to less than setpoint of relief valves of SG (1 train)(3)

Operator uses 1/2 pressurizer PORVs (operator action = 1)(4)

1/2 RHR trains with 1/2 charging pumps and with switchover to recirculation (operator action = 3)

Circle Affected Functions Recovery of Remaining Mitigation Capability Rating for Each Affected Sequence

1 SGTR - EIHP - EQ (3)


2 SGTR - AFW - HPR (5)

3 SGTR-AFW-FB (6)

4 SGTR-AFW-EIHP (7)

60

Table 2(9) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant Anticipated Transients without Scram (ATWS)


Safety Functions Needed: Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:Turbine trip (TTP)Secondary Heat Removal (AFW)

Primary Relief (SRV)Emergency Boration (EMBO)

AMS AC system trips the turbine and starts AFW pumps (1 train)2/2 MDPs of AFW with 1/1 TDP of AFW (1 ASD train) to 3 SGs with 4/5 SG safety valves open on each SG3/3 SRVs with 2/2 PORVs open (1 train)Operator conducts emergency boration using 1/2 charging pumps with 1/2 boric acid transfer pumps (operator action = 2)


1 ATWS-EMBO (2)

2 ATWS-SRV (3)

3 ATWS-AFW (4)

4 ATWS - TTP (5)

61

Table 2(10) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant — Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (MSLB)


Safety Functions Needed: Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:MSLB Isolated (MSIV)(1) 2/3 steam paths close(2) (1 multi-train system)Early Inventory, HP Injection (EIHP) 1/2 charging trains or use of spare charging pump (1 multi-train system)(3)Secondary Heat Removal (AFW) 1/2 MDAFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train)Feedwater valves close (FWVC) Operators close the valves feeding the SG whose MSIV did not close (1 train)(4)Stop Injection (STIN) Operators stop high pressure injection (operator action = 2)(5)Primary Heat Removal, Feed/Bleed (FB) 1/2 PORVs open for Feed/Bleed (operator action = 2)High Pressure Recirculation (HPR) 1/2 charging trains with 1/2 RHR trains and with operator action for switchover (operator action = 3)


1 MSLB - FWVC - STIN (3)


2 MSLB-AFW-HPR (5)

3 MSLB - AFW - FB (6)

4 MSLB - EIHP - FWVC (8)

5 MSLB-EIHP-AFW (9)

6 MSLB - MSIV (10)

62

Table 2(11) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant — Loss of On-Service Train of Cooling (LOTC)(1)


Safety Functions Needed: Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:RCP Trip (RCPT) Operator trips RCPs in less than 3 minutes after loss of cooling (operator action - 2)Off-service Train (OFST) Operator aligns mitigating equipment to the off-service train and provides RCP seal cooling (operator

action = 1)®

Secondary Heat Removal (AFW) 1/2 MDAFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train)Early Inventory, HP Injection (EIHP) 1/1 charging pump or use of spare charging pump (1 train)(3)RCS Cooldown / Depressurization (DEP1) Operator depressurizes RCS using 1/2 PORVs (operator action = 2)

RCS Cooldown / Depressurization (DEP2) Operator depressurizes RCS by using 1/2 PORVs and by opening 2/3 ARVs (operator action = 2)

Primary Heat Removal, Feed/Bleed (FB) 1/2 PORVs open for Feed/Bleed (operator action = 2)

Low Pressure Injection (LPI) 1/1 RHR train (1 train) .

High Pressure Recirculation (HPR) (1/1 charging train or use of spare charging pump) ® with 1/1 RHR train and with operator action forswitchover (1 train)(4)

Low Pressure Recirculation (LPR) 1/1 RHR train with operator action for switchover (1 train)(4)


1 LOTC - AFW - HPR (3,16)


2 LOTC-AFW-FB (4,17)

3 LOTC-AFW-EIHP (5,18)

4 LOTC-OFST (6,19)

5 LOTC - RCPT - LPR (8,12)

6 LOTC - RCPT - DEP1 - HPR (10)

7 LOTC - RCPT - EIHP - LPI (13)

8 LOTC - RCPT - EIHP - DEP2 (14)

63

Table 2(12) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant — Loss of Instrument Air (LIA)(1)


Safety Functions Needed:RCP Seal Injection and HP Injection (EIHP)


Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:1/2 charging trains or use of spare charging pump provide RCP seal injection and high-pressure injection (1 multi-train system)®

1/2 MDAFW trains (operator action = 2)(3)


1 LIA - AFW (2)

2 LIA - EIHP (3)


If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met: 1) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to


64

Table 2(13) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant — Loss of a DC Bus (LBDC)(,)


Safety Functions Needed: Full Creditable Mitigation Canabilitv for Each Safety Function:Early Inventory, HP Injection (EIHP) 1/1 charging train or use of spare charging pump (1 train)®

Secondary Heat Removal (AFW) 1/1 MDAFW train (1 train) or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train)

RCS Cooldown / Depressurization (DEP) Operator depressurizes RCS by using 1/1 remaining PORV and by opening 2/3 ARVs (operator action= 1)(3)

Primary Heat Removal, Feed/Bleed (FB) 1/1 remaining PORV open for Feed/Bleed (operator action = 2)

Low Pressure Injection (LPI) 1/1 RHR train (1 train)

High Pressure Recirculation (HPR) (1/1 charging train or use of spare charging pump) ^ with 1/1 RHR train and with operator action forswitchover (1 train)(4)

Low Pressure Recirculation (LPR) 1 /1 RHR train with operator action for switchover (1 train)(4)


1 LBDC - AFW - HPR (3)


2 LBDC-AFW-FB (4)

3 LBDC - EIHP - LPR (6)

4 LBDC - EIHP - LPI (7)

5 LBDC - EIHP - DEP (8)

6 LBDC - EIHP - AFW (9)

65

Table 2(14) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant Loss of 4160 V Bus F or G (LBAC) (i)

Estimated Frequency (Table 1 Row) Exnosure Time Table 1 Result (circle):ABCDEFGH

Safety Functions Needed: Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:RCP Trip (RCPT) Operator trips RCPs in less than 3 minutes after loss of cooling (operator action = 2)Off-service Train (OFST) Operator aliens mitigating equipment to the off-service train and provides RCP seal cooling (operator

action = 1)®

Secondary Heat Removal (AFW) 1/1 MDAFW train (1 train)Early Inventory, HP Injection (EIHP) 1/1 charging pump or use of spare charging pump (1 train)(3)RCS Cooldown / Depressurization (DEP1) Operator depressurizes RCS using 1/1 remaining PORV (1 train)(4)

RCS Cooldown / Depressurization (DEP2) Operator depressurizes RCS by using 1/1 remaining PORV and by opening 2/3 ARVs (1 train)(4)

Primary Heat Removal, Feed/Bleed (FB) 1/1 remaining PORV open for Feed/Bleed (1 train)(4)

Low Pressure Injection (LPI) 1/1 RHR train (1 train)

High Pressure Recirculation (HPR) (1/1 charging train or use of spare charging pump)(3) with 1/1 RHR train and with operator action forswitchover (1 train)(5)


Circle Affected Functions Recovery of Remaining Mitigation Cauabilitv Rating for Each Affected Sequence

1 LBAC-AFW-HPR (3, 16)


2 LBAC - AFW - FB (4,17)

3 LBAC - AFW - EIHP (5,18)

4 LBAC - OFST (6,19)

5 LBAC - RCPT - LPR (8,12)

6 LBAC - RCPT - DEP1 - HPR (10)

7 LBAC - RCPT - EIHP - LPI (13)

8 LBAC - RCPT - EIHP - DEP2 (14)

66

Table 2(15) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant — LOOP with Loss of 4160 V Bus F or G (LEAC)(I)


Safety Functions Needed: Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:PORV Recloses (PORV) 2/2 Pressurizer PORVs reclose after opening during transient (1 train)Secondary Heat Removal (AFW) 1/1 MDAFW train (1 train)Early Inventory, HP Injection (EIHP) 1/1 charging train or use of spare charging pump (1 train)(2)RCS Cooldown / Depressurization (DEP) Operator depressurizes RCS by opening 2/3 ARVs (operator action = 2)

Primary Heat Removal, Feed/Bleed (FBI) 1/1 remaining PORV open for Feed/Bleed (1 train)(3)Primary Heat Removal, Feed/Bleed (FB2) Operator carries out Feed/Bleed(4) (operator action = 2)

Low Pressure Injection (LPI) 1/1 RHR train (1 train)High Pressure Recirculation (HPR) (1/1 charging train or use of spare charging pump)(2) with 1/1 RHR train and with operator action for

switchover (1 train)(5)


Circle Affected Functions Recovery of Remaining Mitigation Cauabilitv Rating for Each Affected Sequence

1 LEAC - AFW - HPR (3, 13)


2 LEAC - AFW - FBI (4)

3 LEAC-AFW-EIHP (5, 15)

4 LEAC - PORV - LPR (7, 9)

5 LEAC - PORV - EIHP - LPI (10)

6 LEAC - PORV - EIHP - DEP (11)

7 LEAC - PORV - AFW - FB2 (14)

67

Interfacing SystemsTable 2(16) SDP Worksheet for Farley Nuclear Plant — LOCA (ISLOCA)(1)

Estimated Frequency (Table 1 Row) _________________ Exposure Time _________________ Table 1 Result (circle):ABCDE FGH

Safety Functions Needed: Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:RHR Hot Leg Suction Line Isolation Valves2 Low Pressure Injection System3 Residual Heat Removal System3 High Pressure Injection System (suction)3 Chemical and Volume Control System (suction)3Component Cooling Water System (thermal barrier heat exchanger)3




available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to


68

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BIBLIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SHEET

Performing Org. Report No.

Sponsoring Org. Report No.

KINS/RR-304

Title/Subtitle

Background and procedure analysis for threshold of safety significance determination

Sponsoring Org. Project and

Project Manager

Development of risk-informed regulation technology (K. Y. Sung)

Researcher and Dep't. C. }. Lee (Nuclear Safety Research Department)

Pub.Place

Daejon Pub. Org. KINS Pub. Date 2005. 1.

Page 80 p. 11. and Tab. Yes (O), No ( ) Size 210mm x297mm

Note

Classified Unclassified(O), Classified( ) Report Type Research Report

Sponsoring Org. Contract No.Abstract (About 200 Words)

The safety significance determination process (SDP), being applied by USNRC, is one of regulatory approaches which can improve the regulatory effectiveness and efficiency by utilizing the risk information to any regulatory inspections and issue resolution. The decision-making criteria and some risk thresholds for the determination of significance can be, therefore, essential elements in actual SDP implementation. Based on USNRCs experiences, this study has the purpose to identify the rationale and background for the determination of significance and to check the feasibility of the implementation to Korean nuclear power plants. Our attentions have been basically concentrated on establishing its step-by-step processes, identifying the current issues, and assessing major issues for the application to domestic plants. Practically, two examples have been analyzed after consulting the database on our actual regulatory inspections and incidents.

Subject Keywords (About 10 Words)

safety significance determination, probabilistic safety assessment, risk-informed regulation, risk measure, regulatory inspection

Development of Nuclear Safety Technology - OSTI.GOV

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