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World Development, Vol. 24, No. 9, pp. 1497-1510, 1996 Copyright 0 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd

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Coordination Issues in Policy Implementation

Networks: An Illustration from Madagascar’s

Environmental Action Plan

DERICK W. BFUNKERHOFF* Abt Associates Inc., Bethesda, Maryland, U.S.A.

Summary. - Policy implementation brings together multiple agencies and groups to work in concert to achieve a set of objectives. Making these joint arrangements function effectively depends upon multi- actor linkages and coordination. Drawing upon the interorganizational and policy network literature, this article discusses these issues and applies them to National Environmental Action Plans (NJZAPs). The article looks specifically at Madagascar, examining the implementation structure of the NBAP and how coordination problems are manifested. The essay concludes with some recommendations directed toward improving the effectiveness of Madagascar’s NJZAP, but which have wider applicability to man- aging coordination among policy implementation actors in general. Copyright 0 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd

1. INTRODUCTION

The tasks facing policy managers, whether they deal with macroeconomic or sectoral policies, inevitably call for actions that cross agency bound- aries and, in many cases, extend beyond the public sector to incorporate private sector and nongovem- mental actors. It has long been recognized that policy implementation brings together multiple agencies and groups that are intended to work in concert to achieve a set of objectives. Making these multiactor arrange- ments work effectively is an important management challenge requiring creative and flexible solutions. Ever since Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1973) classic study, analysts have sought to provide guidance on bow to meet this challenge.’

Our focus is upon the linkages created among implementation actors as a function of the policy or policies they are called upon to address - what might be called chains of delegation, authority, oversight, reporting, and so on. These chains, often multiple in nature, join actors and establish varying degrees of interdependency among them. These interdependen- ties create requirements for coordinated action, yet all too often implementation arrangements have been structured with little attention to how coordination, in reality, will function effectively to achieve desired outcomes.2

This article examines several concepts and issues

related to multiactor linkages and coordination, and applies them to the environmental policy frameworks referred to as National Environmental Action Plans (NEAPs). The article looks specifically at Madagascar, a country with the longest implementa- tion experience with a NEAP, and a repository of a significant amount of the world’s unique biodiversity (see Jolly, 1989). Drawing upon the interorganiza- tional and policy network literature, the discussion examines the structure of the NEAP and illustrates several problems associated with coordination. The essay concludes with some recommendations directed toward improving the effectiveness of Madagascar’s NEAP, but which have wider applicability to manag- ing coordination among policy implementation actors in general.

2. IMPLEMENTATION NETWORKS

The structural patterns created by the multiple linkages among implementation actors form webs or

*Support for the preparation of this article is acknowledged from the US Agency for International Development, Implementing Policy Change Project (936-5451). The views expressed are solely those of the author.

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networks of organizations. Concern, both analytic and operational, for linkages and networks is longstanding within the international development community. For example, Uphoff s overview of rural development experience highlights the importance of vertical link- ages between local organizations and higher level agencies (1986). Similarly, studies of decentralization across a wide range of sectors stress the role of center- periphery linkages in project implementation and service delivery (Leonard and Marshall, 1982; Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1984; Silverman, 1992). Analyses of integrated rural development efforts and of program management note the adminis- trative complexities of intersecting vertical and hori- zontal linkages (Grindle, 198 1; Honadle and VanSant, 1985; Brinkerhoff, 1991; Schmidt, 1992). The effec- tiveness of agricultural technology transfer depends upon strong, reciprocal linkages among research insti- tutes, extension agencies, private sector input suppli- ers, and farmers (see Compton, 1989; Tabor, 1995). Linkage issues figure prominently in discussions of the interactions between governments and nongovem- mental organizations (NGOs) engaged in develop- ment activities (see Farrington et al., 1993). At the level of macropolicy reform, a common thread in analyses of structural adjustment experience is the impact of varying degrees of autonomy and control among political and bureaucratic actors on reform out- comes (e.g., Haggard and Kaufman, 1992).

For socioeconomic development objectives, which for the most part involve some type of public good, structuring implementation networks has traditionally meant establishing a hierarchical locus of authority and then building the network downward and out- ward. As Landau notes, this approach is based on

the idea, close to universal in extent, that “the political provision of public goods” requires one center of author- ity and responsibility, that the way to guarantee effective coordination, control, and efficient performance, is through hierarchy and monopoly ( 199 1, p. 6).

An alternative analytic approach sees implementa- tion networks as functioning most effectively when they combine elements of markets and hierarchies in ways that seek to take advantage of the efficiencies each mechanism possesses while minimizing their weaknesses (Alexander, 1995; Chisholm, 1989; Gage and Mandell, 1990; Hegner, 1985; Hjem and Porter, 1981; Miller, 1992; Thompson et al., 1991).

When acting like a market, networks allocate goods and services production to various autonomous and semi-autonomous entities according to their rela- tive production capacities. Structuring implementa- tion by delegating functions to those best suited to carry them out uses the market rationale, which holds that increased effectiveness results from individual actors pursuing what they do best within an opera- tional framework. Here, coordination occurs as a nat-

Ural outgrowth of market forces, serving to correct for inefficiency, incompetence or abuse. This logic assumes that in the marketplace enough entities exist and can be identified with the right capacities to pro- vide the goods and services required.’ To make sure that this assumption is valid, many development programs include creating new institutions or strengthening existing ones. Where the intent is to pursue some limited set of objectives, such as with a NEAP, there is the possibility that the efforts of each individual agency, acting on its own according to its preferences, will not lead to the achievement of the desired goals. This situation can produce a kind of “market failure.”

To avoid this possibility, implementation net- works employ hierarchical structures containing inter- related subunits to establish overarching objectives, planning and resource utilization procedures, moni- toring and evaluation systems, and formal oversight relationships, as in a bureaucracy. Introducing hierar- chy into implementation seeks to take advantage of the ability of hierarchy to shape individual actors’ preferences into patterns that are mutually consistent, something that the marketplace does not do efficiently (Miller, 1992). Here, coordination is an executive function, designed and managed by some central node(s) of authority. The “price” of hierarchy, how- ever, can be high due to: (a) the inherent costs of developing and managing the mechanisms and proce- dures to shape subunit preferences and behaviors into desired directions; and (b) the tendency of individual subunits to subvert the network’s primary objectives in pursuit of their own goals, resulting in the well- recognized phenomenon of “bureaucratic failure.”

The trick to making implementation networks function successfully is to achieve a balance between letting individual actors operate independently, and limiting their independence with supervision and con- trol mechanisms, and resource interdependencies. Success depends upon offsetting plural responsibility diffused among actors with some degree of individual accountability for contributing to the larger outcomes (see White, 1989). Finding the appropriate equilib- rium is both an institutional design question and a management one. On the institutional design side, it involves rule-making and the consequent institutional incentives those rules create.4 The management ques- tion addresses the practical aspects of employing the rules and incentives to influence behaviors and achieve desired policy and program results over time in situations characterized by change, complexity, and uncertainty (e.g., Brinkerhoff, 1991; Grindle and Thomas, 1991; cf., Snow et al., 1992). Particularly in democratizing countries, an important source of this complexity derives from the expanded array of stake- holders who seek to have some kind of input to the policy process (see Haggard and Kaufman, 1992; Marin and Mayntz, 1991).

COORDINATION ISSUES IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 1499

3. MADAGASCAR’S ENVIRONMENTAL

ACTION PLAN

In most cases initiated by the World Bank, the NEAP process has been participatory, cross-sectoral, and demand-driven (Talbot, 1990). NEAPs establish long-term goals related to natural resources and envi- ronment; integrate environmental concerns into sec- toral development planning; develop appropriate policy, legislative, and institutional reforms; build political support for environmental goals; and provide a coordinated framework for implementation and progress monitoring.5 Typically, NEAPs have been developed in a sequence of broad-based information- gathering and analysis, preparation of a NEAP docu- ment, adoption and ratification of enabling legislation, and elaboration of an action program and funding. The action plan includes implementation arrange- ments, where functions are assigned to a range of existing public sector agencies and NGOs, and new entities are often created as well. NEAPs are a classic example of a policy network, where the plan frame- work sets up systematic couplings of actors, inside and outside of government, with interests and func- tions relating to natural resources and environmental policies and programs (see Skok, 1995; Marin and Mayntz, 1991).

(a) NEAP objectives and strategy

Analysis conducted during the preparation of the NEAP in Madagascar identified the country’s major environmental problems as habitat and biodiversity loss across a range of ecosystems, soil degradation and erosion, and inadequate water quality and sanita- tion. In addition, the following were flagged as closely associated with these problems: rural poverty, slash- and-burn agricultural practices, insecurity of land tenure, and weak institutional capacity. Madagascar’s NEAP addresses these problems through a strategy that targets policy reforms; institutional capacity- building in environmental management, monitoring, and research, and experimentation with local-level projects that combine development and conservation objectives (integrated conservation and development projects, or ICDPS).~ Table 1 summarizes the objec- tives and components of the NEAP, the implementing agents assigned to each component, and the funding sources by component. Total NEAP program costs for the components shown in the table are estimated at $US 85-90 million.

(b) NEAP implementation arrangements

The NELWs implementation structure emerged out of the Environmental Charter and its accompany-

ing enabling legislation passed by Madagascar’s National Assembly at the end of 1990. Decree No. 9f!-666 transformed the small support unit that had guided the preparation of the NEAP, housed in the Ministry of Economy and Planning, into the National Office of the Environment (ONE). ONE was intended to be the hub of an implementation network of national government ministries and agencies, NGOs, community groups, and international donors, all con- tributing to achieving the aims of the NEAP. Besides ONE, the Charter established several nongovemmen- tal mechanisms with roles in NEAP implementation:

(i) National Association for the Management of Protected Areas (ANGAP): A small semi- autonomous private agency whose mandate is to oversee and coordinate the management of selected park reserves and of ICPDs adjacent to those reserves. (ii) National Association for Environmental Actions (ANAE): A small, flexible nongovem- mental agency, ANAE is a legally recognized pri- vate foundation. ANAE members include national and international NGOs, religious groups, and rep- resentatives of private business and consultants. (iii) Steering and Oversight Committee (COS): Made up of all the major donors and key executing agencies and ministries, the COS meets each December to discuss policy, program progress, problems and future action including funding. The impetus for extending the NEAP’s implemen-

tation network beyond the public sector came from the international donors who had supported the NEAP analysis and planning phase. Including NGO and pri- vate sector actors called for some significant rethink- ing on the part of the government, some of which was reflected in the Charter, where the text refers to the need to disengage the state progressively from sole responsibility for action. The leadership of Madagascar, like that of many African governments, retained the mindset that almost all socioeconomic interventions were the prerogative of the state (see Rothchild and Chazan, 1988). Despite some change in perspective, many officials retain the old worldview. The creation of ANGAP, for example, was strongly resisted by the Ministry of Forestry and Water’s Forestry Department (DEF).

The DEF-ANGAP relationship illustrates both the benefits and the difficulties in making public-private sector linkages work. The DEF’s failure to protect Madagascar’s forest resources and its biodiversity was well recognized.’ Under donor pressure, the DEF agreed to delegate the management of selected parks and reserves to field operators through ANGAP. By virtue of receiving its mandate and authority through DEF, ANGAP fulfills certain public sector functions. Its nongovernmental status, however, allows it a much larger degree of operational autonomy and capacity than a public agency; for example, exemption from

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Table 1. Madagascar’s National Environmental Action Plan components, implementing agencies, a&funding sources

NEAP Objectives and components Implementing Agencies Funding Sources*

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Protection and management of biodiversity Soil conservation, agroforestry, reforestation, and other rural development activities Mapping and progressive establishment of a geographic information system Establishment of clear boundaries for protected areas and improvement of tenure security through land titling in NEAP priority areas Environmental training, education, and awareness Environmental research on land, coastal, and marine ecosystems Support activities including institution building, establishing environmental assessment procedures, etc.

DEF, ANGAP, GMU, and NGO grantees ANAE and NGO grantees Fl?vl

DDRA

ONE, COMODE AtDB

CNRE, CNRO, FOFIFA ONE, MARD, CE

AfDB, World Bank, FAC, and NORAD

USAID, UNDP, World Bank, FAC, and AfDB

USAID, UNDP, NORAD, KFW, WWF, and U.S. Universities Swiss Cooperation Agency, AfDB, and NORAD FAC, World Bank, and KFW

World Bank, FAC, EEC

*Funding sources acronyms: AfDB African Development Bank EEC European Economic Community FAC Fund for Assistance and Cooperation (France) KFW Financing Agency for Cooperation (Germany) NORAD Norwegian Development Assistance Agency UNDP United Nations Development Program USAID United States Agency for International Development

World Wildlife Fund.

civil service regulations has given ANGAP greater flexibility in staffing decisions and ability to reward good performance.

Considerable tension exists, however, between the DEF and ANGAP. From the DEF’s perspective, ANGAP’s very existence is an inherent criticism of its performance record. The resources available to ANGAP and its Grants Management Unit (GMU), which provides funding to NGOs working with com- munities around the protected areas, provoke further jealousies. The DEF’s willingness to delegate author- ity to ANGAP has been another source of tension. The DEF has sought to retain an element of control over ANGAP and its field activities via personnel deci- sions. The DEF appoints national park directors, even in cases where ANGAP has contracted out the man- agement functions to field operators. The majority of senior ANGAP staff were seconded from DEF. These former DEF employees maintain a sense of loyalty to their original agency. ANGAP has performed well in a difficult setting, the problems with the DEF relation- ship notwithstanding.

Public-private linkages have been less contentious in the case of ANAF, in some degree because ANAE has been able to operate relatively autonomously. It implements small watershed/soil conservation and rural development projects through a network of field operators, both public and private. ANAE has a nom-

inal attachment to the agriculture ministry, but its financing comes from donor agencies. The geo- graphic distribution of ANAE’s miniprojects is demand-driven, in response to community felt needs. Some actors, however, feel that ANAE should be more directive in deciding where to work, and should concentrate its efforts in communities located in the buffer zones adjacent to national parks, thereby enhancing the impact of the NEAP at the local level. ANAE, however, has resisted advocating projects in a given village simply because it is located near a pro- tected area.

The NEAP assigned a set of relatively discrete technical activities (components 3,4, and 6 in Table 1) to several specialized public sector agencies. Mapping and progressive establishment of a geo- graphic information system is conducted by two pub- lic sector institutions, the National Cartographic Insti- tute (FTM) and the National Office for Lands and Agrarian Reform (DDRA). FIM, attached to the Ministry of Public Works, implements all activities involving mapping, remote sensing, and geographic information systems. Once the premier mapping agency of Africa, its data base had fallen behind after decades of neglect, and it was targeted for institutional strengthening under the NEAP.

DDRA’s task is to clarify boundaries for protected areas and improve land security through titling in pri-

ority areas. Its responsibilities for the land registry and transfer process also involve it in policy discussions on land reform, revised tenure law, and problems associated with use-rights in the vast open access areas in the public domain. Three public sector research units also play a role in implementation: FOFIFA (National Research Center for Rural Development) for soil conservation and natural forest management; the Center for Oceanographic Research (CNRO) for coastal and marine research; and the National Center for Environmental Research (CNRB) for other land-based research not covered by FOFlFA.

The NBAP built links to the private sector for implementation at the field level. Both NGOs and for- profit firms are involved, although the bulk of field activities have been undertaken through NGOs. Here, tbe linkage between the implementing actors is a con- tractual one. ANGAP/GMU awards contracts to mau- age national parks, and ANAH works with NGOs and local communities to carry out soil conservation and development initiatives. A separate USAID-funded project supported building new linkages among NGOs themselves to help strengthen their implemen- tation capacity. An umbrella group of 34 urban and rural NGOs was formed, called the “Conseil Malgache des Orgauisations Non-Gouvemmentales pour le Developpement et 1’Environnement” (COMODE). These private sector groups offer the potential to bring the NEAP closer to larger numbers of resource users in the rural areas, at the same time as

promoting the development of the NGO sector as an important intermediary between the public and private sectors.

(c) Searching for effective coordination

As the following quote indicates, NBAP designers were aware that the search for a manageable approach to coordination of implementation actions would not be easy:

The implementation strategy provides for a flexible insti-

COORDINATION ISSUES IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 1501

coordination; a progressive implementation rhythm punctuated by Periodic review, good feedback for moni- toring and evaluation; and a supportive policy environ- ment. . . . Perhaps the greatest risk is that the range, com- plexity, and interdependence of the actions wiil make effective management difficult (World Bank, 1990, p. 54).

The NBAP sought to achieve a balance between operational autonomy and coordinated action mainly through the use of hierarchical mechanisms. The key one was the centralization of NBAP oversight in ONE. As Table 2 illustrates, the majority of ONE’s original mandate revolves around coordination.

Thus the effectiveness of ONE was critical to implementation performance. Besides a well-defined and doable mandate, ONE needed a secure and appro-

Table 2. Mandate of the National Office of the Environment (ONE) as specified in Decree No. 9&6fX

Coordination Monitoring Implementation

ProPose environmental management policy

Coordinate and launch implementation of the NBAP

Promote environmental legislation and define an overall framework for environmental management

Coordinate environmental studies

Coordinate training and education activities

Coordinate activities of the agencies created for NEAP implementation

Coordinate research programs

Coordinate environmental information systems, manage environmental data systems relevant to its mandate

Monitor environmental management policy

Execute the operation of the NEAP

Monitor economic activities to ensnre Execute environmental studies they are not detrimental to the environment

Monitor the activities of the agencies Execute environmental awareness created to implement the NBAP: activities bidding documents, procurement and disbursements for implementing agencies

Execute or ensure execution of dissemination publications

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priate institutional locus within the government, and efficient internal management. All of these proved problematic. During implementation start-up, it quickly became apparent that ONE’s official respon- sibilities vastly exceeded what could reasonably be expected from a small, newly established office.* At the same time, ONE’s original bureaucratic attach- ment (“mtelle”) to the finance and planning ministry, a powerful agency, was changed; ONE was reas- signed to the agriculture and rural development min- istry. Since ONE’s mandate called for intervention across ministries, a bureaucratic placement at the same level posed credibility and access problems in the strongly hierarchical Malagasy public sector. Political dynamics associated with Madagascar’s shift toward democracy further muddied the situation. In 1992, the transition government expanded the number of ministries from 18 to 36 and created an Environmental Commission, whose role appeared to overlap substantially with ONES. Later the number of ministries was reduced, but then in 1994 an environ- ment ministry was created.

Another coordination mechanism built into the NEAP blended hierarchy with the market. This was the use of contracts between central units (ANGAP/GMU and ANAE) and field operators. The intent was that the interagency linkages established through the contracts would provide for: (i) periodic review at the contract letting and award stage to assure compatibility with program objectives, (ii) feedback on progress at specified mid-contract monitoring points, and (iii) evaluation at the end of the contract life so as to learn what works and make adjustments in the program. In addition, the contracting mechanism would have the safeguard of accountability for perfor- mance, with specification of deliverables and a lim- ited timeframe.

In practice, this coordination mechanism met with some difficulties, due in large part to differences in perceptions of appropriate levels of contractor over- sight by ANGAP and ANAE. In the case of ANGAP, NGO field operators felt that staff used the espoused need for coordination as an excuse for inappropriate interference in the internal management of their oper- ations, thus limiting autonomy and flexibility, the sup- posed benefits of using contracts in the first place. ANGAP leadership countered that a “firm hand” was justified because of NGO management weaknesses and the danger that activities could stray off-track.

Another means to achieve coordination was to cre- ate interlocking and overlapping linkages through var- ious interagency committees and boards of directors. The NEAP structure contains three interagency com- mittees: the interministerial coordinating committee, the scientific committee (CS) and the COS, which brings in the international donors. In addition, ONE, ANGAP, and ANAE each have administrative over- sight committees or boards of directors. For example,

ONE has a seat on the boards of ANGAP and ANAE, and participates in the annual workplan reviews of FTM, CNRE, CNRO, and DDRA. Further, each of ANGAP’s ICDPs and ANAE’s miniprojects has a project steering committee.

Several problems arose with this linkage structure. First was the time and effort consumed in attending all the meetings. Many NEAP implementing agency staff were members of several of these committees and boards. Those made up of ministers rarely if ever met because of the conflicting demands on senior off% cials’ time. Ministers unable to attend sent representa- tives, but their stand-ins were not empowered to make any decisions. Often, ministers would send a different person each time, thus continuity of membership was impossible. At the technician level, a similar situation held. Either staff sent last minute stand-ins, or attempted to attend personally as many meetings as possible, with the result being that they were chroni- cally ill-prepared.

Second, because attendees were either represent- ing someone for whom they were not authorized to speak, were first-time attendees, and/or were underin- formed, meetings of these linchpin structures rarely led to the resolution of any issues or to any decisions that facilitated problem-solving. Rather, they tended to breed confusion, frustration, and conflicts whose aftermath negatively affected the day-to-day interac- tions among NEAP implementing partners.

Third, the absence of a clear understanding of each actor’s role in NEAP coordination contributed to peo- ple working at crosspurposes, in many cases seeking to advance their individual agency interests at the expense of progress with the NEAP. Compounding this dynamic is the Malagasy actors’ understanding of the concept of coordination itself. Based on the lin- guistic meaning of the word in French and reinforced by their experience in the government’s French- inspired administrative system, coordination means hierarchical control. Thus if one implementing agency coordinated its activities with another, the interpreta- tion was that they first gave up control and subordi- nated itself to the other. Since all NEAP documents had the term coordination liberally sprinkled through- out their pages without much attention to its opera- tional meaning, this led to endless debates over juris- dictional boundaries. The intended synergy from the combined efforts of all parties toward common goals evaporated in the heat of win-lose bureaucratic poli- tics.

Another mechanism for coordination was the development of interagency information systems. For FIM, information system development was the heart of its role in the NEAP. In addition, though, as part of their institutional capacity-building, each of the NEAP implementing partners set up information sys- tems to track progress on various types of indicators, with ONE serving as a kind of central repository and

COORDINATION ISSUES IN POLICY IMPLEMJZNTATION 1503

clearinghouse. Much of the data called for depended upon sources external to a single agency, thus the intent was that shared information, collected on mutu- ally agreed-upon indicators, would facilitate coordi- nated action. Agreement on information issues was elusive, because they relate closely to the questions of autonomy, authority, responsibility and hierarchy that lie at the core of the implementation network.

On the international donor side, the agencies that had supported the NEAP preparation phase perceived a need to coordinate financing for implementation. In 1990 USAID and the World Bank set up a Multi- Donor Secretariat (MDS) in Washington, DC to man- age donor contributions to funding the various pro- grams and projects under Madagascar’s NEAP. The MIX was instrumental in shaping the activities con- tained in each of the NEAP components (Table 1). During implementation, the MDS has played an on- going role in monitoring and oversight9

4. COORDINATION IN IMPLEMENTATION NETWORKS

As noted above, increased coordination is fre- quently proposed as a solution to project and program implementation problems. To say that a policy, pro- gram, or project is uncoordinated means in a general sense that its elements are somehow incongruent, that they do not interact smoothly to produce desired results, and/or that the links among them create exces- sive friction and conflict. Increasing or improving coordination, however, is rarely elaborated in any meaningful way beyond a vague notion of building more harmonious linkages.‘O Getting specific about coordination in implementation networks leads to ask- ing questions about the nature of the interdependent linkages among the network’s connected members: What do the various actors need from, and furnish to, each other in order to accomplish their respective tasks and objectives?

Honadle and Cooper address this question by defining coordination in terms of three types of link- age activities: information sharing, resource sharing, and joint action (1989). Information sharing essen- tially involves communication; one agency or subunit letting another or others know what it is doing. This can be done through distributing written reports or e- mail messages, holding meetings of various sorts, and/or setting up information units. Resource sharing means that resources controlled by one organization are allocated to another for particular purposes. Examples here are loans, grants, contracts, and/or sec- ondment of personnel. Joint action entails two or more entities collaboratively undertaking some activity together, either sequentially, reciprocally, or simulta- neously (Alter and Hage, 1993). Joint activities could include planning, data gathering, service delivery,

monitoring, training, and/or supervision. Each of these types of coordination activities can be distin- guished according to the degree of mutual adjustment required by the linked actors. In general, information sharing calls for the least degree of adjustment and joint action the most, with coordination by resource sharing falling somewhere in between.

Coordination can be parsed along other dimen- sions as well. Some analysts look at coordination in terms of whether actors emphasize control or assis- tance in their links to other actors (see Leonard and Marshall, 1982; Miller, 1992). Alter and Hage (1993) focus on the purposes of coordination: does it serve administrative ends, or does it contribute to the techni- cal aspects of getting the job done? Chisholm (1989) concentrates on the extent to which coordination is formal or informal. All of these perspectives can he helpful in detailing the specifics of coordination.

For coordination in implementation networks to be effective, network designers and managers must deal with three interorganizational problems: threats to autonomy; lack of task consensus; and conflicting requirements from vertical and horizontal linkages (Brinkerhoff, 1991). Each of these three problems appears in Madagascar’s NEAP implementation experience.

(a) Threats to autonomy

A core dynamic in most organizations is to try to maintain as much independent control over inputs, outputs, and operations as possible. To the extent that coordination requirements impinge upon agency inde- pendence, an agency will be reluctant to coordinate (assuming it has a choice) unless there are clear and significant benefits to be gained. Threats to autonomy are increased when stakeholder interests are diverse, cooperating agency operational procedures are differ- ent, and linkages among agencies are multiple and interlocking. In complex policy areas such as natural resources and environmental policy, some of these linkages are task-driven; that is, the nature of the actions to be undertaken requires significant degrees of information and resource exchange, collaborative planning, and joint task accomplishment. Further, resource scarcity can increase threats to autonomy because actors often must seek out resources that come with “strings attached.”

Contributing to the organizational drive for inde- pendence and control are also individual managerial preferences; it is simply easier to plan and manage without the uncertainties introduced by interdepen- dence. Then there are the harsh, but often unspoken realities of agency competition and jealousies, per- sonal ambitions, the tendency to hoard rather than share information, and so on - in short, bureaucratic politics. These dynamics contrast sharply with the

1504 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

espoused commonality of shared purposes woven throughout the NEAP. Hough (1994), for example, confirms the impact of these dynamics on NGO-gov- emment agency cooperation in ICDP implementation in northern Madagascar, recounting the difficulty in making the partnership function due to competition over resources, differing agendas, and lack of incen- tives for collaboration.

In day-to-day operations, the NEAP implementa- tion network creates numerous threats to autonomy among the actors involved. For example, conflicts between ANGAP and its NGO field operators reflect varying views on the appropriate degree of autonomy of action. Similarly, tensions between DEF and ANGAP revolve around the same issue. Since so many of the NEAP agencies are highly dependent upon international donor funding, there are stresses between those agencies and the donors that relate directly to autonomy issues. Interestingly, because several of the donors argue for looser administrative coordination at the field level than government actors favor, NGOs have as a rule enjoyed more autonomy and fewer “strings” because of their donor funding.

(b) Lack of task consensus

Task consensus means agreement on the client groups to be targeted, the actions to be undertaken, the services to be provided, tbe methodologies to be employed, and so on. Because many of the technolo- gies for socioeconomic development are only partially understood or are site-specific, lack of agreement on what to do, for whom, and how is highly likely. Without some minimum level of agreement, however, cooperation is difftcult. In this area as well, diversity among stakeholder perceptions and interests, multi- plicity of linkages, and scarcity of resources aggravate this coordination problem. Among lateral partners, working at the same level, resolving differing views and disagreements calls for open discussions and negotiations. These participatory processes, however, take time and effort. Frequently, hierarchy is used to deal with lack of task consensus; the problem is han- dled at a higher level and subordinate entities are issued instructions on their tasks.

Among members of the NEAP network, there is agreement on what the general tasks are within the policy framework, a moderate degree of consensus on target groups and their needs, and high levels of debate over how best to carry out those tasks to achieve natural resources and environmental policy objectives. A key example is the discussion among NEAP network partners about how to blend conserva- tion-oriented efforts for the long-term with develop- ment interventions designed to deal with immediate economic survival needs. Much of what the NEAP

aims to accomplish is experimental, and thus one would not expect to find a high degree of task consen- sus at this point.”

Another example is the task of coordination itself. ONE, ANGAP, ANAE, DEF, COMODE, and others are all charged with some form of coordination. The NEAP project documents and enabling legislation pro- vided little definition and guidance, however, and thus consensus on what coordination meant for them opera- tionally was open to interpretation. Particularly among the public sector actors, the tendency has been to inter- pret coordination as close programmatic monitoring and control, a view not shared by the intended subjects of this scrutiny. Over the past two years, however, dis- cussions among the various actors have led to clearer determinations of coordination roles and functions, more agreement, and smoother implementation.

(c) Conflicting vertical-horizontal requirements

Most members of implementation networks belong to more than a single system, and frequently coordination places the unit whose actions are to be coordinated in a situation where it is subject to con- flicting demands. The most common conflict is between the requirements for participating in lateral coordination action at the field level and in vertical sectoral hierarchies.r2 Some of the difficulties here arise from legal barriers imposed by legislation and administrative statutes that place limits on an agency’s margin for maneuver. These are often at odds with the technical requirements of working with multiple units to achieve results in a particular locality. Diversity of stakeholders can aggravate vertical-horizontal strain; for example, agency constituencies may resist coordi- nation if it diverts resources from activities they are interested in maintaining, as when ANAE resisted focusing its projects around protected areas because it wanted to respond to community felt needs.

There can sometimes be restrictions on the use of funds that can hinder coordination. The potential for this conflict is high where resources are scarce, because agencies have little slack available and the costs of coordination are rarely factored into operating budgets. Complex and diverse linkages also heighten the probability of conflict, because there are simply so many connecting threads that some degree of working at cross purposes becomes inevitable.

This vertical-horizontal coordination problem emerged clearly in the case of ONE. As a unit attached to a line ministry, ONE occupies a department-level position in the public sector hierarchy, and yet its mandate calls for a significant crossministerial role. In the strongly vertical Malagasy public sector system, ONE’s mandate immediately creates a multiplicity of “turf” issues.r3 Similarly, although to a lesser degree, ANGAP’s vertical relationship with the DEF is on

COORDINATION ISSUES IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 1505

occasion at odds with the demands of its horizontal linkages with other NEAP actors.

The number and variety of donor agencies sup- porting NEAP implementation also contribute to ver- tical-horizontal conflict, because their programs and projects normally call for procedures and practices on the part of implementing entities that are exceptions to standard procedures in those entities’ supervisory (Qtelle”) hierarchies. In fact, a major source of pres- sure for coordination comes from the donors. This is a new behavior for most Malagasy entities, whose fran- cophone tradition makes them much more attuned to superior-subordinate linkages that are spelled out in official decrees and laws than negotiated partnership arrangements that emerge from externally designed donor programs.

5. IMPROVING IMPLEMENTATION NETWORK FUNCTIONING

The above discussion suggests several lessons for Madagascar’s implementation of the NEAP. These are presented as recommendations for enhancing the effec- tiveness of the NEAP’s implementation network. The general principles within the proposed suggestions also apply to networks dealing with other policy areas.

(a) Concentrate on developing the “rules of the game ”

Because the NEAP is implemented through a net- work of organizations, no single actor is “in charge” of implementation in the sense of being able to command compliance from other actors. Achievement of NEAP objectives will come from the aggregate result of the various actors pursuing their subgoals, as in a market, assuming that appropriate implementation incentives can be created. Networks, like markets, only operate effectively when governed by an accepted set of rules. This suggests the need to focus on developing agreed- upon “rules of the game” (see Kaufmann, 1985).

The types of rules that need specification and negotiation include determination of: who is eligible to make which decisions in which arenas; what actions are allowed, required, or proscribed; what pro- cedures must be followed; what information must be provided, to whom, and when; what benefits and costs are to be assigned to agencies (or individuals) as a result of their actions; and how enforcement will be undertaken. Rules are ineffectual unless the entities they affect know of their existence, except that the rules will be used to monitor behaviors, and anticipate sanctions (formal and/or informal) to be applied for non-compliance (see Ostrom, 1985 and 1990).

In the NEAP, many of these rules are already for- mally expressed in national legislation, administrative

regulations, bilateral and multilateral program and project agreements, and donor agency procedures. As noted above, however, most of these are expressed either as normative generalities (as in what the NEAP should accomplish) or as agency-specific directives. What has been missing are rules (formal and informal) to govern the interactions among the various NEAP implementing partners. These are the ones in need of elaboration and discussion. As to why such elabora- tion has not taken place, Hough (1994) observes that individual agencies’ rules limit the motivation of NEAP partners to work together. For this situation to change, “participating institutions would . . . have to adjust their bureaucratic structures and incentives to ‘reward’ collaboration and cooperation rather than the pursuit of a single institutional goal” (Hough, 1994, p. 123).

(b) Search for win-win opportunities for coordination

The multiplicity of hierarchies involved in the NEAP, those internal to the implementing agencies as well as the interagency ones created by the NEAP, makes the shaping of consistent action on everyone’s part extremely difficult because the three threats to coordination (threats to autonomy, lack of task con- sensus, and conflict between vertical and horizontal linkages) operate both internally among agency sub- units and across agencies as well. The threat of bureaucratic gridlock is very real, but the temptation to pursue additional hierarchical authority to deal with the problem must be resisted. In highly complex and interdependent situations, management based on hier- archical monitoring and control often sets in motion a downward spiral of minimal compliance and declin- ing performance. Coordination that relies heavily on formal mechanisms enforced by a central unit is rarely successful (Chisholm, 1989; Landau, 1991).

The donor agencies funding the NEAP have peri- odically pressured the Madagascar government to increase ONE’s hierarchical authority to orchestrate and monitor activities across implementing agencies. In and of itself, however, administrative seniority will not give ONE the capacity to coordinate NEAP actors. A search for a single “steering wheel” is misguided in a situation where numerous actors can have an impact on the NEAP’s implementation path. A more appro- priate approach is to create policy arenas within which ONE and other NEAP actors can address how to develop mutually beneficial relationships among implementors, that is, where all parties feel that they gain something (win-win). This connects to the devel- opment of the “rules of the game” in that effective enforcement provisions should be based more on prin- ciples of joint benefits and value added than on nega- tive sanctions and hierarchical policing. Again, posi-

1506 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

tive institutional incentives would be important to making such an approach work. If incentive con- straints can be dealt with, then the NEAP could take advantage of a key feature of successful networks, which is their ability to provide an effective way of processing differing views and dissent, articulating points of agreement and airing the rationale for policy decisions, and jointly developing management strate- gies (Miller, 1994; see also Majone, 1985).

(c) Reduce excessively tight interdependencies

Too high a degree of integration and interdepen- dence in the NEAP implementation network risks hampering progress. Tight administrative integration can be very costly in terms of time, personnel, and financial resources. For example, there is a risk that if the information and monitoring systems under devel- opment among the NEAP implementors are too tightly integrated, the result could be an onerous level of information collection at the field level (with increasing resistance to using the systems over time), and information overload at the higher levels. Excessive reliance on coordination by hierarchy is the culprit here.

Besides costing more, high degrees of interdepen- dence can restrict advancement to the pace of the weaker members of the network. In terms of opera- tional capacity, the weak members of the NEAP net- work are in the public sector, which, like the civil ser- vice in many developing countries, is critically lacking in operational capacity. The creation of ANGAP and ANAE and the use of NGG implemen- tors at the field level reflected a recognition of this weakness. Some of these linkages, however, remain extremely tight, for example, between ANGAP and DEF, or between ANGAP and its field operators. This suggests the need either to decouple, or more loosely couple, elements of the NEAP from each other, despite the risks that this could introduce for targeting impacts in the short termI

This relaxation of interdependencies could be accomplished through less frequent formal reporting or supervision, more operational autonomy once con- tracts and workplans are approved, more reliance on informal collaborative arrangements, and/or less information required for existing reporting frame- works. Coordination works best when it combines formal procedures with supportive informal mecha- nisms. Looser interdependencies could also be achieved by less interlocking participation on multiple oversight committees, so as to increase the quality of participation that currently characterizes these coordi- nating structures, whose members consist of the same small set of overcommitted ministers. Looser linkages have the benefit of reducing the threats to autonomy and vertical-horizontal conflicts as well, thereby

increasing the likelihood of cooperation. They could potentially make achieving task consensus more diffi- cult, though careful crafting of the “rules of the game” could offset this risk.

(d) Shorten planning-implementation cycles

From a managerial perspective, a basic rationale for combining market and hierarchical mechanisms in interorganizational implementation structures such as the NEAP is the added flexibility and responsive capacity that can emerge. Bureaucratic requirements, however, for excessively detailed and long-term action plans, some of which derive from international donor requirements, can undermine flexibility and responsiveness (Brinkerhoff and Ingle, 1989). Madagascar’s operating environment is in flux, and the experimental nature of many of the NEAP’s field projects suggests that planning horizons for activities should be shortened. This could strengthen flexibility and potential for adaptation to uncertain and changing conditions, and result in a better fit with the challenge of the natural resources management task at the field level (Brinkerhoff and Gage, 1994).

Further, it could help deal with some of the threats to coordination. Actors would be more inclined to col- laborate if they were not held to what many see as unrealistic planning timeframes. Planning and imple- menting in smaller increments could increase task consensus by making it easier to agree on what to do in the short term, subject to refinement based on the lessons of experience. The increased ability to fine- tune activities in the short term should make achieve- ment of the NEAP’s 15-20-year objectives more likely, as long as government and political commit- ment to the long-term goals remains in place.

(e) Buildpe$ormance capaciw gradually

The capacity demands of managing NEAPs are high (see Dorm-Adzobu, 1995). Implementation net- works are complex structures to manage, and call for management, political, and interpersonal skills that can be difficult to find in any country. Madagascar’s NEAP performance targets for each of the plan com- ponents are quite ambitious in light of the capacities required (World Bank, 1990). The need for capacity- building was recognized from the start, and the NEAP’s design includes institutional development, as Table 1 shows (component 7). The speed, however, with which capacity could be built and then translated into performance was consistently overestimated. Thus, the perspective of various donor oversight mis- sions during the first years of NEAP implementation was that things were “behind schedule.” Building sus- tainable capacity is a long-term endeavor, and one that

is best accomplished gradually, allowing actors to progress incrementally along their own path (see Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 1990). A donor-driven, “crash course” approach is a ticket to frustration and failure.

Besides capacity, time can be an important factor here. When actors do not have much experience with each other, cooperative strategies are less likely. As the number of interactions grows, cooperation becomes a more viable (though not inevitable) option. As time passes, the benefits of coordination become more apparent and trust among actors is built up, thereby increasing the likelihood of collaboration (Axelrod, 1984; Alter and Hage, 1993). Particularly in the early 199Os, NBAP implementation network actors had a relatively short history of working collab- oratively in a nonhierarchical mode. In fact, several key organizations had a short history of existence. Observers have noted improvements in the NBAP’s implementation performance, some of which can be attributed to members of the NBAP network gaining more experience in working together to solve prob- lems.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The importance of the network perspective pre- sented in this article is that it directs management attention away from (largely unproductive) efforts to coordinate implementation solely through supervision and control from some central node of authority. It recognizes that the performance and problem-solving

capacities of the network emerge Born the interactions among its members. Solutions grow from a dynamic exchange of information, experience, and resources. In some cases there will be overlap and duplication, but as Landau (1991) points out, these are sources of vitality to be capitalized upon, not of waste to be. elim- inated. Besides some measure of supervisory control, the central management task expands to include assur- ing the “care and feeding” of the network itself, inter- vening to keep information flowing and joint actions on track according to the agreed-upon rules of the game, with periodic feedback and self-assessment (Miller, 1994; Snow, Miles and Coleman, 1992).

As the introduction sketched out, network actors are linked by a web of administrative and task-related chains. The article pointed out the need to focus on the specifics of the coordination activities involved in these chains, and on the factors that create incentives for cooperation and collaborative action or for auton- omy and competition. The rules governing coordina- tion, and the incentives they create, are key determi- nants of whether network actors experience the linkages among each other as lifelines or shackles. The case of Madagascar’s NBAP provides a living example of the interplay and impacts of these coordi- nation issues. Effective natural resources and environ- mental policies are critical to the well-being of large numbers of people across the globe. The health and sustainability of the world’s natural resource base depends upon the coordinated endeavors of a wide range of different actors. Making coordination work better is an essential piece of the sustainable develop- ment puzzle.

COORDINATION ISSUES IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 1507

NOTES

1. These efforts have produced a huge literature, which is far beyond the scope of this article to review here. See, for example, the overviews by O’Toole (1986) and Matland (1995). For other useful discussions, see Raufmann, Majone and Ostrom (1985). Gage and Mandell (1990). and Skok (1995). AlexamIer(l995)and Alter andHage (1993) bring to bear the organization theory literature, as well as public pol- icy studies, in their analyses of interorganizational action.

2. Robert Chambers once quipped that the value of an institutional analyst’s report varies in inverse proportion to the number of times increased coordination and integration are recommended as a solution to implementation problems (1974, p. 25).

3. As Landau points out, weaknesses derive not simply from the absence of entities capable of producing the required goods and services, but also from an insufficient number of them to provide the systems with redundancy (1991). Without any mdtmdancies or slack, breakdown of key components can have a negative impact on performance,

or in the extreme, precipitate system failure (see also Wirth, 1985).

4. The public choice literature’s fundamental concern is with institutional rules and incentives. Ostrom, for example, distinguishes among a nested hierarchy of operational rules, situated within collective-choice rules, positioned within constitutional-choice rules (1990). Rule-making at these higher levels is a basic function of government. Most imple- mentors concentrate mainly on devising operational rules, rarely on collective-choice rules, and never on constitu- tional-choice rules. For an application of the public choice framework to service delivery in developing countries, see Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne (1993). For an application to the analysis of coordination, see Ostrom (1985).

5. Since the late 1970s over 100 developing countries have initiated or completed some form of national-level environmental study or plan (Tunstall and van der Wansem, 1992). i%APs are underway in approximately 30 countries on the African continent (Dorm-Adzobu, 1995).

1508 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

6. For detailed analysis and discussion of the technical issues relating to Madagascar’s NEAP and its objectives, see Larson (1994). For discussion of the NEAP’s institutional and management dimensions, see Brinkerhoff and Yeager (1993), and Talbott (1993). The analysis of Madagascar’s NEAP presented here draws on these sources, as well as the author’s fieldwork conducted for the 1993 study, supple- mented by follow-up interviews with staff of the National Gffice of the Environment and the Multi-Donor Secretariat in 1995. For additional background on NEAP institutional issues in Africa, see Dorm-Adzobu (1995).

I. The World Bank’s Forest Management Project worked with the DEF to strengthen its capacity to set national forestry policy and provide extension, regulation, and enforcement services in national parks, nature reserves, and gazetted forests. Forestry departments in developing coun- tries face numerous impediments to becoming more effec- tive, not the least of which are the rent-seeking opportunities their official mandate presents individual staff members. The temptations for underpaid civil servants to profit personally from their control over access to forest resources are myriad, whether fuelwood for local charcoal production or tropical hardwoods for industrial export. Corruption coupled with weak organizational capacity presents one of the most diffi- cult institution-building challenges (see Klitgaard, 1991, Chapter 8).

8. Madagascar’s political situation at the time of the start- up of NEAP implementation and the creation of ONE con- tributed to the office’s difficulties in fulfilling its responsibil- ities. Popular pressure to oust the Ratsiraka regime led to a general strike that shut down the government in 1991-92 for nearly 10 months.

9. Although originally established for Madagascar’s NEAP, since 1990 the MDS has expanded its coordinating role to other African countries undertaking NEAPs. The MDS has become an important conduit of NEAP informa-

tion and experience among countries, as well as a broker for donor financing.

10. For excellent and in-depth discussions of coordination, see Alexander (1995, Chapter l), Alter and Hage (1993, Chapter 3). Chisholm (1989), and Kaufmann, Majone and Ostrom (1985, Parts 4 and 5).

11. The long-term timeframe for natural resources and environmental policy outcomes is one of the key defining fea- tures of this sector. As a result, a significant portion of the pol- icy problem concerns how to reconcile short and long-term goals and incentives, and how to maintain progress toward the larger objectives over time without getting derailed (see Brinkerhoff and Gage, 1994). For a discussion of these issues as they relate to integrating conservation and development at the community level, the major premise of the NEAP’s ICDPs, see the chapters in Western and Wright (1994).

12. This tension is a classic issue that has been the subject of numerous analyses. In the development literature, it is reflected in discussions of decentralization (see Leonard and Marshall, 1982; Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1984; and Silverman, 1992) rural development (Grindle, 1981; Honadle and VanSant, 1985; and Uphoff, 1986) and pro- gram management (Brinkerhoff, 1991). In the US domestic policy literature, it arises, for example, in treatments of inter- governmental relations (Gage and Mandell, 1990) service delivery networks (Alter and Hage, 1993; Matland, 1995) and public administration (Skok, 1995; White, 1989).

13. For this reason, the donors pushed strongly to have ONE formally attached to the prime minister’s or the presi- dent’s office.

14. Chisholm (1989, Chapter 1) discusses the benefits of loosely coupled systems. Such systems also benefit from redundancies, which provide the necessary slack to allow system response capability in the case of breakdown of indi- vidual units (see Landau, 1991; Wirtb, 1985).

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