Modelling coordination

Australian Journul ./ Public Administrution Vol. XLVII, No. 3 , September 1988

253

MODELLING COORDINATION

JOHN R . MINNERY

Abstract: Coordination is an important concept in both the study and the practice of public administration. Complex tasks are split up into manageable sub-tasks with the result that the pieces need to be coordinated. Coordination is necessary and sensible, yet it is widely recognised that i t can also be a facade to hide coercion and conflict. This article explores the practice of coordination in public adminstration. It develops the four models of hierarchical control, use-of-power, adjustment, and common purpose as forms of coordination then illustrates each from the work of the Queensland Co-ordinator-General. Each model is described in terms of structure, processes, outcome and values. The models help to draw out important but less visible features of central coordination.

Coordination is important from a number of standpoints, ranging from the practicalities of everyday administration to the heady realms of policy formulation. At the practical level lack of coordination leads to frustrations, duplication and inefficiency. From the organisational viewpoint coordination is necessary if task specialisations are to be pulled together to achieve overall goals. At the public policy level, coordination is required “once having divided the job of government up into separate manageable tasks and units, to reactivate some sense of government as a whole”.l Even in the wider, societal context the specialisation which has become part of the modern way of doing things requires coordination of some sort.

In everyday life, as i n government, organisations and administration, coordination is needed to overcome the limitations of human abilities. Large, complex tasks are divided up into simpler sub-tasks which can be handled adequately within human limits, but then the

work of the units dealing with the sub-tasks needs to be coordinated. It is misleading, however, to think of the need for coordination as something which arises only when tasks which follow from objectives are actually being carried out. The sub-division of objectives is also required:

The need for coordination arises from the complexity of our objectives. This complexity demands that, in some way, we divide the objectives themselves, o r their associated agencies, to make the problems manageable at all. Having dividcd, it is necessary to bind the various pieces together again to ensure conformity with the original set of objectives. Coordination is the way of doing this.’ Coordination, then, is sensible and

necessary. Yet most commentators are well aware of its dark side. It can be a disguise for coercion, a shield for the naked exercise of power or even a camouflage for procrastination and delay.

Coordination has many faces. It can be seen as a way of integrating related tasks, as rational authoritative control or direction, as coercion, as a form of mutual adjustment amongst partisan players, as a way of achieving efficiency and economy, as a way of managing or controlling conflict or as the likely result of working to a common purpose. Given the importance of coordination in public administration it is essential that its many faces are recognised. There are considerable benefits to be gained from a structured approach to the concept and practice of coordination, given the variety of meanings given to it both in the abstract and in actual implementation.

Models and coordination There are many forms of model used in the

social sciences. The one used here is the

254 MODELLING COOKDINATION

Weberian “ideal type”, which consolidates the essential characteristics of the phenomenon being described to create an abstracted idcalisation. AS such models do not necessarily describe causal relationships they may be fruitful sources of hypotheses about the relationships amongst the factors considered but do not normally in themselves form testable hypotheses. For example, Weber’s description of the rational- legal forms of authority embodied i n a bureaucracy identifies the structure and some of the processes of bureaucracy. Numerous hypotheses have been developed based on Weber’s analysis but his descriptions themselves are difficult to test. All of Weber’s forms of authority (traditional, charismatic and rational- legal) have several characteristics but in each case there may be more or less of the identified characteristic present in illustrative examples. An analogy can be drawn to a sponge cake: an ideal sponge cake is instantly recognisable and clearly has specific proportions of the right ingredients, but a sponge with too much or too little flour, or with the wrong kind of sugar, is still recognisable as a sponge. Bureaucracy normally has a structure of superiors and subordinates ordered in offices, but there are degrees of super- and sub-ordination, there are variations in forms of office and there are many forms of hierarchy. The resulting organisational forms are all still recognisable as bureaucracies.

Hence, in using this type of model to clarify the meaning of coordination a similar caveat applies. Each model describes the characteristics of a “pure type”; the coordination seen in practice may or may not conform entirely to the model. Nonetheless the models are useful means of coming to grips with the complexities of the idea and practice of coordination in public administration. Any model is, i n fact, a simplified description of reality. Simplification is arrived at through a concentration on the essential elements of the structure and processes involved, to the virtual exclusion of less important features. A model concentrates only on the primary features, and describes how these features interact. The structure and processes relationship is the simplest and most elementary aspect of a model. But it is also possible to hypothesise (or guess) what the possible outcome of the processes working within the structure

might be, leading some way down the track towards testable hypotheses.

The classic use of models in politics and public administration was that of Allison in his analysis of the decision-making process during the Cuban missile c ~ i s i s . ~ His three models (rational actor, organisational processes and hureaucratic politics) arc now wcll known in public administration. The important lesson from his analysis for us is the way that different \YJ/UC,S

underpin each model. He describes the one major international event (outcome) using three distinct sets of structures and processes. Each viewpoint gives greater cinphasis to particular features which, although they may appear in the other modcls, are not given as much emphasis there. Thus the rational actor model cinphasiscs a unitary government actor making rational decisions on the basis o f the balance between costs and benefits to be derived from alternative strategies. The organisational process model emphasises the fragmented nature o f government administration and the well developed procedures used in structured stable organisations fo r providing standard outputs in standard situations (and the resulting problems when an unusual situation is encountered). The hureaucratic politics model also eniphasises the fragmentation of government administration but looks to the warfare which develops between agcncies as they struggle and manoeuvre for prestige and resources.

In other words, different values lead the analyst to emphasise different structures and processes evcn in the one situation with a single known output. Allison does not claim exclusive access to truth through any one of the three models but his sympathies seem to lie with the messiest, least predictable, bureaucratic politics model. In sum, in constructing models to describe coordination in public administration we need to consider structure, proccsscs, output and values for each.

Models of coordination Although there are many concepts o l

coordination it is possible to subsunic them all within four models incorporating all the essential aspects of public administration coordination. The four are described below, and each is applied briefly to the office of the Queensland Co-

MODELLING COORDINATION 255

ordinator-General. This office has a long history, a powerful position in the Queensland public service (even considering the recent substantial changes) and given the term “Co- ordinator-General” provides a good illustration of the use of models for understanding coordination.

Model I: hierarchical control This is the bench-mark for coordination in

public administration. It is based on the concept of authoritative central control and underlies many of the approaches to coordination in the British and European traditions of public administration.6 It is seen as rational, efficient and objective. There is, in fact, a tendency to see hierarchy, control and coordination as being so inter-connected as to be practically synonymous. Many beliefs about public sector coordination appear to assume this as the only possible form. The assumption is clearly erroneous.

The structure for this model is the classic bureaucratic hierarchy of superior and subordinate specialised offices, something which needs little elaboration here. The coordination processes in a hierarchy involve a centralised decision-maker at the apex, communication of directives down and feedback up the “chain of command”, and a concentration on different types of task at different levels. The processes are essentially those associated with the legitimate exercise of power, with the giving and obeying of commands, the specialised actions of experts in defined roles and the flow and processing of information. As decision-making is concentrated at the apex of the hierarchy, SO

too is the processing of information on which decisions are based.

There are a number of expected outcomes of hierarchical coordination. Perhaps the most obvious is unity of direction, through unity of command. Another is efficiency: there would be no unnecessary overlap of tasks, no important gaps and the timing of activities would be entirely appropriate. The values associated wilh hierarchical coordination are those of rationality and legitimacy, implying value neutrality and equality of opportunity and application. As with any “ideal type” model this extracted essence does not fit real life. Two particularly important

ruptures between the model and public practice stem from the requirement for unified directives issuing from a single control centre, and the need for total clarity in the hierarchical structure.

It is common for there to be divergent goals i n public administration just as there is widespread recognition of the disaggregation of government agencies. A good illustration of the divergence of goals is the growing tendency to distinguish “coordination” and “control” in both public administration literature and practice. The two approaches are illustrated by comparing that taken in the Coombs Commission report which devotes a whole chapter to “Co-ordination and Control”, but which sees coordination as something akin to discipline,’ with that of Hage who feels that

coordination involves the reduction of conflict and duplication, and typically is the essence of the managerial function. Control is more concerned with the meeting of a standard. I f coordination brings together the different departments of an organisation. control is concerned with how well each department docs its set of tasks.n Increasingly, Australian public sector

organisations seem to be anxious to distinguish coordination from control. Moves to make individual department heads more accountable and responsible for the functioning of their departments imply less control by the traditional central coordinating agencies. The integration of the work of individual departments is necessary, but “interference” in their direction and activities is less acceptable. As will be shown in relation to model 11 below, legitimacy is important. Legitimacy lies in the eyes of the ”beneficiary” not those of the “donor”. The acceptance of coordination but the rejection of control is not unrelated to the rccent demise of public service boards in the Commonwealth and in a number of states.

The second main problem area, that of the need for clarity in the hierarchy, draws attention to the essentially inter-organisational nature of public administration. Government admini- strations are not coherent single structures; rather they tend to resemble confederations of warring state^.^

The location of the traditional central coordinating agencies in this structure can be a problem. They do not fit within the classic

256 MODELLING COORDINATION

hierarchical administrative coordination model. The Premier’s Department, Treasury and the Public Service Board jostle for position at the first level of the hierarchy down from central cabinet authority. They perform both line and coordinating functions so they a re both coordinators and the coordinated.

The difficulty of fitting a central coordinating agency into the traditional administrative hierarchy can be illustrated by reference to the office of the Queensland Co- ordinator-General (COG), particularly where both coordinating and line functions are involved. From 1939 to the present day the COG has been responsible for producing an annual coordinated program of works for the state, as well as, since 1940, acting as a construction authority for major public works. In coordinating public works the COG lies outside the minister- permanent head-department hierarchy. Yet in terms of status and both formal and informal authority the COG sits at the top of the public service pile.

The State Development and Public Works Organisution Act, 1971-81 requires practically everyone subject to state legislation, including other permanent heads, “to co-operate with the Co-ordinator-General in the performance by him of the functions and duties of the Co-ordinator- General”.’O Sir John Kemp, the first Co- ordinator-General, made certain his was the most senior position in the state public service, a position which continued from 1939 at least until 1986.” Thus legitimate power, or authority, does not have to be located within a classic hierarchy. In a sense a partial matrix structure emerges, with line functions continuing vertically, and coordination (rather than task orientation) applying horizontally at an upper level.

Similarly, the ideas of rationality and efficiency, inherent in the justification for the hierarchical structure, apply to the office of COG, particularly at its beginning. The idea of a central technically expert agency coordinating and establishing priorities within the state’s public works program was seen as a rational and efficient way of dealing with the problems facing Queensland in the late 1930s. The central legitimate control aspects of the office were admirably suited to the substantial role it assumed

during the second world war in organising resources as well as in adjusting public works priorities.

It is clear that a hierarchical control model does not fully explain public sector coordination. The example of the COG’S office points to some of the problems with linking coordination, hierarchy and authoritative control.

Model II: The use of power The second model does not rely on the unity

of direction of a hierarchy. I t derives from the conditions identified by Wildavsky. “If we relax the assumption that a common purpose is involved, however, and admit the possibility (indeed the likelihood) of conflict over goals then coordination becomes another term for coercion’:. l 3 Coercion is the less attractive relation of control but the two are related. Coercion involves the use of power which is not accepted as totally legitimate by the recipient, power used when there is disagrecment o n goals.

In public administration there is a continuum from totally legitimate use of power to totally illegitimate. I n the Australian context, but possibly not in other countries, the illegitimate use of power is unlikely; but there is certainly a range from legitimate to less-than-legitimate use of power. In this regard Lukes’s discussion of the three faces of power - the power to make decisions, the power to prevent decisions being made or to keep items off the decision agenda, and the power to manipulate information - is useful. l 4 The three faces of power are associated with decreasing degrees of legitimacy. There is. in fact, a kind of “secondary legitimacy” where primary legitimacy is extended beyond normally acceptable bounds. This could be involved in access to information, for example, whcre information collected for entirely legitimate purposes is used as a source of less-than- legitimate power; or whev: a primary role is redefined ~ n d extended beyond its primary acceptability.

The model of coordination by use of power thus extends to the use of coercion. The processes involved will vary with the source of coercive power, which might be control of information, special expertise, redefined roles o r flexible interpretations of enabling legislation. The processes of decision-making and

MODELLlNG COORDINATION 25 7

information transfer would be more uni- directional than in the case of Model I . In fact the free flow of information is likely to be hindered by those being coordinated. There is also a strong possibility i n government administration, where appearances may be as important as realities, that informal processes are used more often than formal, and covert more than overt. In other words the threat of the exercise of power may be as common as thc actual exercise of power.

There is, of course, some difficulty in exploring the territory encompassed by this model in real life. Coercive power is not always exercised openly. We have to look for what Argyris and Schon call “theories-in-use” rather than “theories of action” - how things are done rather than how they are claimed to be done. I 5

Power may be gained by association, as Sharman and Stuart’s analysis of the changing roles of the state Premiers’ Departments shows with, for example, the implementation of projects related to Premiers’ special interests. l 6

This is not a value-neutral model. The values inherent in it are those of the coordinating authority. Given this, the agencies being coordinated are likely to resist wherever possible, so the costs of coercion may be high. There is also likely to be a strong divergence between covert and overt values. An implicit assumption in Model I was that policy goals and administrative goals were in tandem. This assumption has less credence in Model 11; coordination may be for the benefit primarily of the coordinating agency rather than for the benefit of policy objectives.

The outcomes will depend on the values of the coordinating agency, the degree and form of power it uses and the success or otherwise of the use of power. I t is likely to lead to the development of countervailing power, so the relationships described by the model are inherently unstable. The structure of this model would normally be centralised, as this is the most effective way of exercising power, but would not necessarily be hierarchical. The structure may be one of clustered power rather than a single centre of power, as in the case of several central coordinating agencies competing for ascendancy, each with a different power base and a different approach to coordination.

In applying this model to the activities of the Co-ordinator-General, what can be demonstrated is an expressed fear of its potential use and the possibility of its use rather than clear examples of its actual application. In the parliamentary debates surrounding the introduction of the Act in 1938 a strong theme argued by opposition members was the potential for the COG to order local authorities to carry out works they did not want to undertake. Such interference in the freedom of local government was seen to be beyond the boundary of acceptable legitimacy. As late as 1973 the then Co-ordinator-General was at pains to stress to local authorities that although the power existed, its use for this type of action would be “irresponsible”.

Soon after, Wiltshire commented on the pivotal and information-rich role of the COG in the Queensland Regional Co-ordination Councils as a potential source of power. He felt that when the Regional Co-ordinator (a person who was a delegate of the COG and who chaired the Council) “acts a s a two-way channel disseminating information to members about State and Commonwealth government activity but at the same time gathering all the complaints of members about the other two levels of government” this was the “underpinning of the whole scheme”. Wiltshire implies that this information-rich influence has been used, and interviews with former COG officers confirm the possibility. l 9 The four men who have filled the role of COG over the years have all been people of considerable personal ability. Sir John Kemp was for some time both Commissioner for Main Roads and Co-ordinator-General. His influence on Queensland affairs stemmed both from his personality and from the positions he filled. As “Chief Advisor to the Queensland Government for 15 years he exercised considerable influence in the development of the State [ . . . I There was scarcely a board in existence relating to construction or development of one type or another of which he was not a mernber”.*O Such influence implies power related to Kemp’s primary roles but spreading beyond them.

The example indicates the possible use of coercive power as a means of coordinating, where coercive power arises from resources such as control of information and personal influence, both outside hierarchical legitimacy. Yet


coercion does not underlie all coordination, for coordination can occur even in decentralised structures.

Model 111: adjustment This model is most closely associated with

writers such as Lindblom.2’ It takes its shape from the structure and processes of the classic free market, in which there is no central coordinator. The structure is thus decentral ised and diffuse. Interaction occurs amongst a number of units each with their own individual goals, negotiating with other units for the resources they need. In certain cases, however, there may be ii central authority which either has power but does not choose to exercise i t , or has the responsibility for maintaining the integrity of the exchange and adjustment mechanisms.

The processes involved are thus the cxchangc of information, and adjustments made on the basis of that information through bargaining, negotiation, persuasion, threat, bribery and so on.22 Processes assume greater salience for this model than does structure. There is a greater variety of processes or mechanisms of ad.justment for participants to choose from and, given the likelihood of differential access to resources and power ( for adjustment does not assume equality of power amongst partisans), considerable variation in the processes actually employed. I t follows that the outcome of this form of coordination is unpredictable in any specific case without detailed knowledge of a huge variety of factors, as was the case with Allison’s model of bureaucratic politics in governmental dccision-making. 2 3

In terms of values there are really two approaches within this model. One assumes the perfection implicit in the parallel with the perfectly free market: total knowledge, perfect exchange of information, total market efficiency in matching needs to resources and a rationality based on something like economic choice. Thus, there will be substantial coordination even with widely differing goals amongst the actors as each adjusts its position in the light of other actors’ actions. The other value approach assumes limited knowledge and an iinpcrfect world: coordination is imperfect and at the margin. This latter view reflects scepticism concerning the limits of human ability to coordinate through a

centralised structure as much as it reflects the imperfections of ad.justment mechanisms.

Despite the fact that the COG’s office is a central coordinating agency, there are glimmerings of the adjustment model in the way the office works in practice. The central activity for the COG in 1939 was the production of a coordinated program of state works for which funding came mainly (but not entirely) from loan funds allocated by the federal Loans Council. The role of loan funds in the state works program is no longer as important as i t once was. Government loan allocation funds have declined steadily from $389 million in 1977178 to $160 million in 1986/87, compared with a total o f capital works funds of $22 10 million in 1977/78, peaking at $3177 million in 1983184 and falling to $2939 million in 1986/87 (all figures in “constant anticipated 1986/87 values”). I n 1987/88 the state loans fund allocation is a mere $37.5 million.24 The effect is that the COG’s power which stems from the production of the annual coordinated program of works is declining. Capital works are now funded more through debenture loans, commonwealth Section 96 payments, consolidated revenue and other sources. ‘The COG is no longer a gatekeeper for major works funds although he is still involved i n discussions with Treasury and other departments o n priorities. Since I971 there has also been a gradual deliberate move away from the COG’s role as a construction authority. In combination these changes have led to a reduction in one source of coercive power, leading to a greater emphasis on adjustment.

In fact, adjustment and negotiation now seem to be the preferred approaches by the COG. They appear now to dominatc his office’s coordinating role, particularly when his staff chair interdepartmental committees o r take part in negotiations with participants outside the public sector. The COG or his staff often act as problem-solvers in dealing with difficulties between state government agencies, in situations where there is n o clear responsibility for any one state department or where more than one department might be involved. In these cases the mechanisms of adjustment arc used, but from a position which overlaps with that o f the hierarchical model or the use-of-power model, 2s

The example demonstrates that less formal


adjustment mechanisms can be employed even in a situation dominated by a central coordinating agency. Some aspects of the work of the office are better explained through this model.

Model IV: common purpose Sometimes a nation or a community is so

seized with the importance of a common goal that all work together to achieve it. Coordination occurs because of the overarching importance of the single goal, as is the case during wars and other man-made or natural calamities. In this case values assume the greatest importance in the model. The structure and processes will depend on the context of the problem. There appears to be a tendency towards centralised coordination as a way of achieving efficient progress towards the goal, as with natural disaster relief organisations, and for the centralised coordinators to be given considerable power. Whether or not such a concentration of power is necessary is a moot point. The technique of creating an external enemy as a single focus for coordinated internal endeavour is well known in many national contexts, a technique similar in outline to this model.

There are degrees of acceptance of a common goal. Where acceptance is less than total the mechanism of coordination will shade over into coercion and control (and possibly to adjustment).

This model can be illustrated by two examples. The first was the role of the first COG during World War 11. Sir John Kemp assumed a pivotal role in setting priorities for state and local works as well as in organising the local war effort.*6 His role continued, although in different forms, into the period of shortages in equipment, foreign exchange and manpower after the war. Acceptance of his role was not complete, but nonetheless there was coherence of state goals and the COG played an important role in working towards achievement of those goals. The second example is the significant part played by the COG in setting up the State Disaster Relief Organisation. His office played a substantial part in the collection and dissemination of information during the 1974 Brisbane floods. Coordination by common purpose may also occur when there is a major event rather than a crisis. The

organisation of the 1982 Commonwealth Games in Brisbane is an example.

Conclusions The four models of coordination explored

here emphasise the importance of different structures, processes, values and outcomes in understanding what coordination in public administration means. The four models and their components are summarised in Figure One.

The bench-mark model of hierarchical control is the unacknowledged underpinning of much discussion of coordination in public administration. This is sometimes assumed to be both the reality and the totality of coordination. Most commentators pay at least passing attention to the adjustment model or something like it. But there is a tendency to ignore the implications of coercion, and few have considered common purpose except as part of hierarchy. Yet it has been shown that all four are relevant to at least one corner of the world of public administration.

I t is important to recognise that, like Allison’s models of decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis, all four models can readily be applied to the one office. They are not mutually exclusive. Each helps to elucidate some of the complexities of the chosen example and by extension each can be applied to other public administration contexts. Use of the models draws attention to other important concepts which may sometimes be neglected in analyses of public agencies, particularly those of legitimacy and the sources of power.

The features of structure, process, vulues and outcomes, taken together and as part of the models, provide a useful structured framework for an analysis of coordination in public administration.

The models have practical application. The coordinating role of the COG has changed over time and the models helped to identify those changes. By extension they would help in understanding and enhancing the coordinating roles of other central agencies.

By extension they also show how inadequate is the single hierarchical control approach to coordination in the public sector. The realities of coordination include coercion, adjustment and occasionally overarching common purpose in

2h0 MODELLING COORDINATION

addition to authoritative control. The models lead one to question the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms which assume (implicitly or explicitly) unity of command. Inadequacies in such mechanisms are clearly shown in practice by the elaborate nature of inter-agency coordinating machinery, The mix of line and

Figure 1: The Four Models of Coordination

Structure

Processes

Outcomes

Values

NOTES

Model I Hierarchical

Control

hierarchy of

centralised offices

legitimate power chain of command

unity of direct ion efficiency

~

rationality efficiency legitimacy neutrality

coordinating functions and an agency’s location astride rather than inside channels of command create hierarchical hiccups. The models show the need to search for sources of coercive power as well as the need to identify the many subtle mechanisms of adjustment - even in a centrally coordinated context.

Model I1 Use-of-Power

centralised or clustered

coercion sources of power

as directed reaction costs

those of coordinator

Model 111 Adjustment

Model 1V Common Purrme

decentralised partisans

variable (probably cent ra I i sed)

adjustment

adjustment (“economic”)

(’ ‘incremental”)

market efficiency incremental change

probably legal power

rapid action single purpose

“market” partisans

~~

common purpose specific achievement

I

I . Martin Painter, “Central Agencies and the Coordination Principle”, Ausfruliun Journd of Public, Adminisfrurion, XL(4), Dcccmber 1981, pp.265-280.

2. Leon Peres, “So where’s the coordinating capacity coming from?” i n R.F.I. Smith and Patrick Weller (eds), Public Service Inquiries in Ausrralia, St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1978, p.249.

3. This paper is based on John Minnery, Coordination and rhe Quernsland Co-ordinator-GenPrcil, MPubAdmin dissertation, Departmcnt of Government, University of Queensland, 1988. The dissertation extracts these seven “concepts of coordination” from an extensive literature review and uses them as the basis for constructing the four models discussed more fully in this paper.

4 . Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston, Little Brown, 1971. 5 . The oflice of Co-ordinator-General of Public Works was created through the State Dwelopmeni and Public

Works Organisarion Acr 1938 (effective 1939). There have been four Co-ordinator-Generals since then. the latest being Sir Sydney Schubert. The title was shortened to Co-ordinator-General in 1971, From 1939 the Premier has been the minister responsible for the administration of the Act, but the Co-ordinator-General’s Department existed in its own right until 1982 when it was amalgamated into an expanded Premier’s


Department with the Co-ordinator-General as its Head. I n 1987 he was made Director-General of the Premier’s Department and some of the Department’s functions were reallocated. The title “Co-ordinator- General” still exists, as the legislation has not yet been amended, but the practice is for him to be called the Director-General of the Premier’s Department. For ease of reference the title Co-ordinator-General is used throughout this article.

6. The idea of “authoritative control” subsumes a number of other concepts about which there is considerable debate in the public administration literature. Here “authority” is taken to mean “legitimate power”. In public administration “legitimacy” has intimate connections to “rationality” and “legality” for justification, but nonetheless legitimacy is essentially something given by the subject of authority rather than properly assumed by the holder of authority. See the discussion in Max Weber, The Theory ofSocial and Economic Organisation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1947, and From Mar Weber: Essays in Sociology, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948. Legitimacy is not the same as legality.

7. Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration, Report, Canberra, AGPS, 1976, Chapter 1 I , “Co-ordination and Control”.

8 . Jerald Hage, Theories of Organisation: Form. Process and Transformation, New York, Wiley Interscience,

9. The flawed role of Cabinet as a supreme coordinating agency is well documented: see, for example Richard Crossman, The Myths of Cabinet Government, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1972; Sol Encel, Cabinet Government in Australiu. second edition, Melbourne. Melhourne University Press, 1974; or Sir Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government, third edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1959. Most texts on public administration which imply a unitary structure contain some discussion of the reality of division for example, R . N . Spann, Government Adtninistration in Australia, Sydney, George Allen and Unwin, 1979 Ch. 15). The prevalence of mechanisms such as inter-departmental committees illustrates perhaps best of all the inter-organisational or inter-corporate reality of government administration: see Martin Painter and Bernard Carey, Politics Between Departments, St Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1979.

10. See Section 16(1) of the Act. They must also make their services available to the COG, confer with him in relevant matters and furnish accurate information to him. The functions and duties of the COG are defined in Section 13 of the Act.

I I . In 1986 senior positions in the Queensland public service were made contract appointments. The conditions of the contracts have not been made public so the relativities of the most senior positions are not known. It is unlikely that the COG was diminished in relative status.

12. See Alfred John Wheeler, To Be a Superman: Intergovernmental Relorions Respecting Queensland Lncal Bodies and Loan Works Co-ordination. 1938-1945, Master of Urban Studies (Government Option), University of Queensland, 1974.

13. Aaron Wildavsky, “If planning is everything. maybe it’s nothing”, Policy Sciences, 4(2), June 1973,

14. Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View. London, MacMillan. 1974. 15. Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schon, Theop in Pructice: IncreasinK Professional Effectiveness. San Francisco,

Jossey-Bass, 1974. 16. Campbell Sharman and Janette Stuart, “Premier’s Departments: Patterns of Growth and Change”, Pr~litics,

17. Charles N. Barton, 77ze State and Regionul Planning and Development, Public Works Organisation and Environmental Control Act, 1971-1973, address to the Executive of the Local Government Association of Queensland, 20th June, 1973, mimeo, p.9.

18. Kenneth Wiltshire, “Regional Coordination in Queensland”, Australian Journal ofpublic Administration, XXXV(2). June 1976, p.136.

19. The research on which this article is based included interviews with seven senior present and former officers of the Co-ordinator-General’s (now Premier’s) Department. They do not wish to be identified, so their anonymity is preserved here.

20. Clem Lack, Three Decades of Queensland Political History, 1929-1960, Brisbane, Government Printer, no date.

7, I . See, for example, Charles E. Lindblom, 7he Intelligence of Democracy, New York, The Free Press, 1965; and Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World’s Political-Economic Systems, New York, Basic Books, 1977. Lindblom is perhaps the best known advocate of this approach in public administration, but see also the contributions in F.X. Kaufmann, G. Majone and V . Ostrom (eds), Guidance, Control and Evahation in the Public Sector: The Bielefild Interdisciplinary Project, Berlin and N.Y., Walter de Gruyter, 1985;

1980, pp. 350-1.

pp. 127-153.

17(1), May 1982, pp.46-58.


and Andre G . Delion, Administrative Problems of Co-ordination in Economic and Socia1 Deve/opment, Brussels, International Institute of Administrative Science, 1970.

22. See Lindblom, 1965, op.cit. , pp.33 f f . for a listing of the various processes of adjustiiieiit. 23. See Allison, op. cit. 24. 1977/78 to 1986/87 figures from the 1987 Annual Report of the Co-ordinator-General, Figure I , p.30;

1987/88 figure from Australian Treasury Budget Paper No. 4, Commonwealth Financial Rdufions with Ofher Ltvels of Government, 19617-88, Canberra, AGPS. 1987.

25. Much of this information comes from interviews with present and past memhers of what was the Co-ordinaror- General's Department. As noted above, those intervicwcd do not wish to be identified.

76. Wheeler, op. cit.

Posrscripr: Sir Sydney Schubert retired as COG and Director-General in June, 1988. Mr John Mulheran has been appointed Acting Director-General and as Co-ordinator-General for six months (the legislation does not allow for an Acting COG). The Government appears to be reevaluating the two roles.

Modelling coordination

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