Inter-Firm Training Coordination in Britain

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British Journal of Industrial Relations 44:2 June 2006 0007–1080 pp. 191–214 © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2006. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.Oxford, UKBJIRBritish Journal of Industrial Relations0007-1080Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2006June 2006442191214Articles Inter-Firm Training Co-ordination in BritainBritish Journal of Industrial Relations Howard Gospel is at the Management Department, King’s College London, Centre for Eco- nomic Performance, London School of Economics, and the Said Business School, Oxford. Jim Foreman is at the National Institute for Economic and Social Research, London. Inter-Firm Training Co-ordination in Britain Howard Gospel and Jim Foreman Abstract This paper examines employer co-operation in the provision of training. Such collective action has a long history in Britain, but has varied over time in extent and strength. It exists in a strong form in the German-speaking countries, where employers’ organizations and chambers of commerce are a fundamental part of the training system. On the basis of new data, we argue that this form of training is important in the UK and has a positive effect on the quantity and quality of training. Case studies are presented on several examples of collective action — a local chamber of commerce, an industry-wide employers’ organization, a group training association, a network of firms in a large company’s supply chain and a local consortium of big employers. Although such forms of organization have much to commend them, in the UK coverage is uneven and stability is fragile. 1. Introduction This paper examines why and how employers co-operate in the provision of training. Such co-operation has a long history in Britain, but has varied over time in extent and strength. However, it has tended to be neglected in the UK, with commentators concentrating on single employers and often neglect- ing group activities. Co-operative behaviour exists in a strong form in the German-speaking countries, where employers’ organizations and chambers of commerce are a fundamental part of the training system. It exists in a more informal manner in Italian industrial districts. In Britain, we argue that this form of training is more prevalent than is often thought and that it has a positive effect on the quantity and quality of training. However, coverage is uneven and many organizations are fragile. Periodically, governments have sought to encourage such training, and at present, there is renewed policy interest in it (CBI 2005; Department for Education and Skills (DfES) 2002a,b; DTI 2001).

Transcript of Inter-Firm Training Coordination in Britain

British Journal of Industrial Relations

44:2 June 2006 0007–1080 pp. 191–214

© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2006. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd,9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

Blackwell Publishing Ltd.Oxford, UKBJIRBritish Journal of Industrial Relations0007-1080Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2006June 2006442191214Articles

Inter-Firm

Training Co-ordination in BritainBritish Journal of Industrial Relations

Howard Gospel is at the Management Department, King’s College London, Centre for Eco-nomic Performance, London School of Economics, and the Said Business School, Oxford. JimForeman is at the National Institute for Economic and Social Research, London.

Inter-Firm Training Co-ordination in Britain

Howard Gospel and Jim Foreman

Abstract

This paper examines employer co-operation in the provision of training. Suchcollective action has a long history in Britain, but has varied over time in extentand strength. It exists in a strong form in the German-speaking countries, whereemployers’ organizations and chambers of commerce are a fundamental part ofthe training system. On the basis of new data, we argue that this form of trainingis important in the UK and has a positive effect on the quantity and quality oftraining. Case studies are presented on several examples of collective action —a local chamber of commerce, an industry-wide employers’ organization, a grouptraining association, a network of firms in a large company’s supply chain anda local consortium of big employers. Although such forms of organization havemuch to commend them, in the UK coverage is uneven and stability is fragile.

1. Introduction

This paper examines why and how employers co-operate in the provision oftraining. Such co-operation has a long history in Britain, but has varied overtime in extent and strength. However, it has tended to be neglected in theUK, with commentators concentrating on single employers and often neglect-ing group activities. Co-operative behaviour exists in a strong form in theGerman-speaking countries, where employers’ organizations and chambersof commerce are a fundamental part of the training system. It exists in a moreinformal manner in Italian industrial districts. In Britain, we argue that thisform of training is more prevalent than is often thought and that it has apositive effect on the quantity and quality of training. However, coverage isuneven and many organizations are fragile. Periodically, governments havesought to encourage such training, and at present, there is renewed policyinterest in it (CBI 2005; Department for Education and Skills (DfES)2002a,b; DTI 2001).

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The first section provides background for an understanding of inter-firmco-operation in the training area. The following section analyses several casesof multi-employer training, chosen to provide a spread of types — a localmulti-industry chamber of commerce, an industry-wide employers’ organiza-tion, a group training association, a network of firms in a large company’ssupply chain and a local consortium of big employers. The final sectionconsiders factors that shape these arrangements and draws conclusions.

There is an extensive literature on why firms co-operate as well as compete.Briefly, the literature has the following concerns. In economics, there was anold tradition which focused on the negative aspects of co-operation such asanti-competitive behaviour (see Sachwald 1998 for a review). Later, othereconomists also stressed how vested interests could be entrenched by collec-tive action (Olson 1971). However, it has also been acknowledged that marketfailure may lead to more benign forms of co-operation and attempts togenerate positive externalities. Here a traditional and contemporary approachhas been to stress the positive effects of agglomeration and co-operation inindustrial clusters and industrial districts (Krugman 1991; Marshall 1890).Similar ideas have more recently been developed in sociology and arereviewed in Crouch and Trigilia (2001). Here again, the emphasis is on thepositive effects of such forms of organizations and on the explanations of theconditions which make for successful co-operation. In addition, sociologistsand political scientists have recently considered the notion of social capitaland how this is generated by collective action (Coleman 1990; Putnam 2000).The intention in this paper is not to test these theories, but rather to providean overview of co-operative behaviour in the UK training market and toconsider the following four questions: What are the distinguishing character-istics of inter-firm organization? What do these organizations add to trainingin Britain? How do we explain this behaviour? Are the arrangements sustain-able and could they be transferred to other parts of the economy?

Throughout, the focus is on the intermediate level training of young per-sons via apprenticeship. During the early period of the research these werereferred to as Modern Apprenticeships (MA), and were divided into Foun-dation Modern Apprenticeship (FMA) and Advanced Modern Apprentice-ship (AMA), the former at level 2 and the latter at level 3 National VocationalQualification (NVQ). These are now referred to in the official data, whichwill be used further, as work-based training for young people via AdvancedApprenticeships.

2. Background: definitions, concepts and mapping

Inter-firm or multi-employer skill formation is defined as any situation wheretwo or more firms co-operate in the organization of training. This may covervarious stages of training — setting of standards, sourcing of trainees, deliv-ery of training, monitoring of progress, and assessment and certification.Co-operation takes various forms in the UK. Thus, it may be organized

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throughout an industry by an employers’ association. It may be organized ona local basis, but still within one industry, by a group training association(GTA). Training may be organized on a local basis and cover a number ofindustries or occupations, as with some chambers of commerce. Co-operationdoes not just cover small- and medium-sized firms. Here we present two formsof large-firm collaboration. One exists where large employers, of a specialistkind and geographically concentrated, come together to provide training.Another is to be found where a leading firm co-ordinates training for othercompanies in its supply network.

Some organizations are excluded from our analysis. We exclude statutoryor quasi-governmental bodies that allocate state funds, hence, the formerTraining and Enterprise Councils (TECs) and the present Learning and SkillsCouncils (LSCs) are excluded. Similarly, bodies which are mainly involvedin establishing training frameworks such as the former National TrainingOrganizations (NTOs) and the present Sector Skills Councils (SSCs) areexcluded. Although these organizations partake of some of the characteristicsof multi-employer organizations and are supposed to be ‘employer-led’, theyare in practice state-sponsored and technocratically led bodies. However, inour statistical analysis, we include two statutory industry training boards(ITBs) — the Construction Industry Training Board and the EngineeringConstruction Industry Training Boards — and the former Direct ContractUnits which existed under some TECs.

1

There is a long history of employer collective action in the training field inthe UK. Some national employers’ associations negotiated industry frame-works with trade unions, and sometimes, local associations were involved inthe detailed implementation of training. However, from the 1960s onward,as employers’ organizations declined in significance, this activity waned,although with exceptions referred to later on (Keep 1992). In particularlocalities, chambers of commerce had an interest in commercial and technicaltraining. From the 1980s, some became more closely involved in actual pro-vision, seeking to meet local employer needs and to use opportunities offeredby government schemes. Under the 1964 Industrial Training Act, ITBs wereestablished and supported by a levy-grant system. Although these werestatutorily created bodies and included non-employers in their governance,they were largely influenced by employers. Under their aegis, many voluntaryGTAs were established. Despite the disbandment of most of the ITB systemin the 1980s, the ones cited earlier survived, as did many GTAs (King 1993;Senker 1992). In the 1980s and early 1990s, TECs were established to co-ordinate training at local level and NTOs were formed to create frameworksat industry level. Both sponsored employer co-operation in training. Thesebodies have been replaced by LSCs and SSCs, respectively. More recently thegovernment has shown a new interest in employer networks and has providedfunds to support Business Clusters (DTI 2001) and Employer LearningNetworks (DfES 2002a).

Thus, there has been a long history of employer co-operation in trainingprovision, albeit fluctuating and uneven. Equally, on the part of governments,

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there has been periodic inventiveness in this area, albeit with some tendencyto reinvent the wheel.

Of course, training may be provided in ways other than by a single or groupof employers. It may be co-ordinated by further education colleges (FEs),local authority bodies, charities and private for-profit companies. In the fol-lowing tables, we present previously unused data on UK training provision.The figures were constructed from a reclassification of a database collectedby the former Training Standards Council (TSC) and the present AdultLearning Inspectorate (ALI). They cover all training providers who receivedgovernment funding. The sampling is not random and there is some under-estimation of training provision, in particular by single employers.

Table 1 shows that the most numerous types of providers are private train-ing companies, FEs and groups of employers (making up 29, 18.5 and 13.9per cent of the total, respectively). In terms of trainee numbers, the largestproviders are private training companies, groups of employers and FEs(38.5, 23.3 and 19.1 per cent, respectively). The table also shows that onaverage multi-employer bodies train larger numbers than any other provid-ers. In the case of apprenticeship training, Table 2 shows that multi-employertraining provides 25.4 per cent of all AMAs. This is particularly high inconstruction (48.2), engineering (46.3), manufacturing (45.9) and printing(38.0).

Table 3 presents performance grades as awarded by TSC/ALI inspec-tors using a national inspection framework (where 1 and 2 are good, 3 is

TABLE 1Training Providers in England as Inspected by TSC/ALI

Type Providers Trainees Average size

N % N %

Single employers 233 17.0 12,129 4.8 52Employer group training organizations

Group training associations 117 8.6 26,184 10.4 224Chambers of commerce 23 1.6 6,586 2.6 286Employers’ associations 11 0.8 2,266 0.9 206Industry training boards 2 0.2 8,081 3.2 4,040TEC Direct Contract Units 26 1.9 8,559 3.4 329Employer groups (Other) 11 0.8 6,976 2.7 634

Further education colleges 253 18.5 48,042 19.1 190Local authorities 115 8.4 14,573 5.8 127Charities/Not-for-profit 96 7.0 15,520 6.2 162Private training companies 397 29.0 96,817 38.5 244Other/Unidentified 84 6.1 5,823 2.3 69All training providers 1,368 100 251,556 100 184All employer group training providers 190 13.9 58,652 23.3 309

Note

: Tables 1, 2 and 3 are based on different lists, with slightly different total numbers ofproviders.

Source

: Constructed from the ALI database, June 2001.TSC, Trainings Standards Council; ALI, Adult Learning Inspectorate; TEC, Training andEnterprise Council.

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satisfactory, and 4 and 5 unsatisfactory). This suggests that the best perform-ers are single employers. However, in engineering and construction, these arefollowed by multi-employer groupings, although their score is reduced bythe poor performance of chambers of commerce. Outside these areas,employer group training organizations show average performance.

The following case studies are designed to investigate further the quantityand quality of multi-employer training and whether, in its absence, less train-ing would be done, especially by small firms.

3. Case studies in inter-firm co-ordination

The case studies were chosen to present a spread of the main types of organi-zation in terms of employer collective action. We begin with a local chamberof commerce. Next, we examine an industry-wide employers’ association anda local GTA. We then take a grouping of firms in a large company’s supplynetwork and a local ‘club’ of big employers.

In-depth interviews were conducted with staff of the case-study organiza-tions, supplemented by interviews with three member firms from eachorganization. These were supported with TSC/ALI documents, unpublishedstatistics and inspection reports — the latter constitute an important new datasource, used for one of the first times in this study. We interviewed a numberof other informants: staff of the DfES, TSC/ALI, local LSCs, two tradeunions (Amicus and TGWU) and the Confederation of Group Schemes. Intwo cases, we were able to observe training in progress. In all, a total of 80interviews were conducted.

TABLE 3Performance of Training Providers in England (Data are the TSC/ALI Inspection Grades for

All Types of Training)

Training Providers Engineering Construction

Good Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Good Satisfactory UnsatisfactoryN % % % N % % %

Single employers 40 75 23 2 7 86 14 0Employer group training

organizationsChambers 14 22 64 14 7 15 71 14GTAs 83 45 42 13 17 41 47 12Other employer-led 5 60 20 20 2 50 50 0TEC Direct Contract 13 61 31 8 6 33 50 17

FEs 94 27 65 8 69 27 58 15Local authorities 23 17 65 18 40 17 70 13Charities 16 31 50 19 17 23 71 6Private providers 54 33 46 21 26 23 46 31Other/Unidentified 32 25 41 34 27 11 59 30All training providers 374 38 48 14 56 26 58 16All employer group organizations 115 44 43 13 32 34 53 13

Note

: Tables 1, 2 and 3 are based on different lists of providers, with slightly different total numbers of providers. In this case,not all providers had been graded at the time the table was compiled. The table includes Foundation Modern Apprenticeship,Advanced Modern Apprenticeship and Other Training

Source

: Constructed from ALI database, June 2001.TSC, Trainings Standards Council; ALI, Adult Learning Inspectorate; GTA, Group Training Associations, TEC, Training andEnterprise Council, FEs, Further education colleges.

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The case studies are presented in an approximate rising order of effective-ness, as will be explored later in the paper.

Mid-Yorkshire Chamber of Commerce and Industry

Like all chambers of commerce, and indeed all the case-study organizations,the Mid-Yorkshire Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MYCCI) is a not-for-profit organization accountable to its member firms, for whom it providesbusiness supports (information, lobbying, networking). It is a large chamber,formed by a merger of smaller bodies covering Huddersfield, Halifax andWakefield. It has 2,000 member firms — mainly small enterprises with fewerthan 25 employees. Members pay subscriptions and participate in the gover-nance of the Chamber, although dues are a small proportion of income andparticipation in governance is low. The Chamber has a total staff of 364, witha training staff of 107.

Long interested in commercial and technical training in its locality, Mid-Yorkshire itself entered the training market in the early 1980s, at the time ofthe Youth Training Scheme (YTS), and since then has developed a numberof programmes, in part driven by government funding opportunities and inpart reflecting the demands of member firms. At present, it offers levels 2 and3 training in a number of areas. At the time of the last ALI inspections (ALISeptember 2003), the number of youth trainees was as follows: 161 in businessand professional administration; 113 in retailing and transportation; 25 inICT; 134 in engineering and manufacturing; and 43 in construction. In addi-tion, lower-level training is provided for young people, in special needs andpre-vocational programmes, and for adults.

Business administration All other occupations

Good Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Good Satisfactory UnsatisfactoryN % % % N % % %

29 55 38 7 64 53 30 17

21 24 67 9 19 18 41 4149 41 47 12 43 40 41 193 0 100 0 9 45 33 22

12 17 83 0 17 35 58 794 31 56 13 118 33 45 2287 31 55 14 69 43 40 1769 23 58 19 67 33 50 17

143 36 49 15 240 41 43 1699 31 49 20 123 39 37 24

606 33 53 14 769 39 42 1985 32 59 9 88 35 43 22

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Training is organized in the following manner. By trial and error over theyears, the Chamber has developed a training plan, based on an assessmentof employer needs, consultation with schools concerning the flow of leaversand the estimated availability of funds. It then recruits, selects, inducts andmatches young people with employers. If necessary, it will hold trainees fora short time until a suitable employer is found and will move trainees betweenfirms until a proper match is arranged. All apprentices are employed byparticipating firms, but a sizeable proportion of non-apprentices are kept onthe books of the Chamber and placed with firms for work experience. Foreach trainee, the MYCCI staff organize the delivery of a training plan. There-after, staff visit trainees, monitor progress and provide or facilitate off-the-job training. In the case of business administration, ICT, and retailing, thisis arranged in one of the MYCCI training centres; in the case of engineeringand construction, it is subcontracted to local colleges. In addition, staffprovide much of the key skills training, often in their training centres. In themajority of cases, staff assess the progress and verify the work of trainees;where it lacks the technical capability, this is subcontracted to local colleges.Finally, if a position cannot be found with the firm upon completion of thetraining, the MYCCI staff attempt to find permanent employment withanother member firm.

The Chamber provides real benefits. It is able to draw on its network ofcompanies and use its reputation to recruit and match employers seekingtrainees and young people seeking training. It has good long-term relation-ships with local firms and colleges, who hold Chamber staff in high regard(ALI, June 2002: summary; ALI, September 2003: 3; TSC, November 1998a:48). We noted that the staff provide considerable pastoral support for trainees.In practice, the Chamber takes some of the burdens of training away fromemployers and relieves them of the onus of navigating government fundingand standards requirements. Some of the small accountancy, insurance andlaw firms we interviewed believed they had neither the resources nor theexpertise to organize training themselves and were reluctant towards ‘any-thing as complex’ as modern apprenticeship training without the help ofMYCCI. Equally, one large national drinks distributor said it preferred ‘toconcentrate on its core business’ and outsource maintenance training to aspecialist organization. For more expensive training, as in engineering andICT, there is a small cross-subsidy from other Chamber activities such ascommercial courses and consultancy. Our meetings with local employersconfirmed the ALI inspection findings that training is good in businessadministration and construction, but only satisfactory in areas such as ICT,manufacturing and retailing (ALI, June 2002: summary; ALI, September2003: 2).

This suggests shortcomings in the Mid-Yorkshire approach. Its activitiestend to be driven by the supply of young people and government funds asmuch as by demand from member firms. Indeed, the involvement of firms inthe planning and the actual implementation of training is often limited,mainly by size and resources. Moreover, the number of Advanced Apprentices

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is small, especially in business administration and ICT, where it might bethought that a chamber of commerce would have a particular interest. Inaddition, retention rates are poor in all areas except retailing, and completionrates are poor in all areas — a figure of around one-third completion of thefull Advanced Apprenticeship framework (NVQ3, Technical Certificate andKey Skills) is quoted for engineering (ALI, June 2002: 3; ALI, September2003: 10–23). The Chamber is the weakest of our case-study organizations interms of high-quality training output. However, the counterfactual is that,in the absence of the MYCCI, it seems likely that many of the smaller firmsin the area would not take on apprentices and completion rates would be evenlower.

In other parts of the UK (the North-East, North Derbyshire, Coventry,Hereford and Worcester), there are other chambers that are active in thetraining area. However, there is great diversity, and these voluntary bodies —often small and poorly resourced — are very different from their statutorilybased German counterparts, which provide an essential underpinning oftraining in that country (Bennett

et al

. 1993).

ReMIT and the Garage Trade

There are a number of national employers’ organizations, in sectors such aselectrical contracting and printing, which are actively involved in training.ReMIT is the training arm of the Retail Motor Industry Federation, the maintrade association for the motor sales and repair trade. The Federation pro-vides the usual representational and advisory services of a trade associationand acts as the employers’ organization in national negotiations with theindustry’s trade unions. Its involvement in training began during the SecondWorld War when it entered into an industry agreement with the unions forthe training of apprentices (Keep 1992: 76–91). In the late 1960s, collectiveaction developed further when the Road Transport ITB established a numberof local GTAs. In 1983 ReMIT was created, largely to take advantage of YTS.

The present-day ReMIT covers more than 4,000 companies which sell andmaintain cars. Membership covers main dealerships and large franchisedoutlets, but the majority of members are small independent garages. Theseare serviced by a ReMIT staff of 330, the majority of whom are training co-ordinators and assessors. In practice, company involvement in governance ofthe organization is low.

ReMIT is by far the largest provider of training in the motor trade, witharound 5,500 apprentices at any one time — about half the industry total. Ofits trainees, most work towards level 3 Advanced Apprenticeships over athree-year period. Over one-third are with dealerships, other large outlets andmajor fleet operators; one-third are with other medium-large dealerships; andone-third are with smaller independent garages.

Historically, ReMIT acted as a ‘managing agent’ in that it was primarily abroker, bringing together employers, trainees, trainers, and government funds.It is now more closely involved in all stages of training. Nationally, it has been

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active with the SSC in the creation of the industry apprenticeship frameworkand with awarding bodies in the design of curricula. Regionally, ReMITpromotes jobs in the industry and recruits young people as trainees. It alsoevaluates garages for their suitability to train under its aegis. In practice, thisusually means finding trainees rather than employers. Those selected are thenoffered to garages for interview, and the vast majority of trainees find employ-ment in this way. If a placement cannot be found, ReMIT will hold the youngperson for a bridging period; if a placement fails for whatever reason, itwill move an apprentice to another garage. As with most of our case studies,ReMIT’s finances depend crucially on government funds — in its case pro-viding 90 per cent of income. Other income comes from a small subscriptionfee and some revenue is earned from other sources.

After recruitment, ReMIT subcontracts most off-the-job training to FEs,GTAs and private training companies. Because of its size, it is able tonegotiate favourable contracts with them. Trainees attend such courses on aday- or block-release basis. ReMIT has some of its own training facilitiesbut, with one exception, these are limited and used mainly for basic training.Local ReMIT staff then oversee the training; thus, co-ordinators and asses-sors visit trainees in their workplaces or at college to provide pastoral sup-port, review progress and set learning targets. Simultaneously, staff monitorthe standards of the training providers and seek to establish links betweenwork, NVQs and college training. Finally, ReMIT staff assess and verifyprogress.

ReMIT works to a set of national operating standards, while at the sametime trying to respond flexibly to member firms. Thus, larger members canmake arrangements on a national level for the whole of their organizations.In addition, ReMIT will organize either block or day release and arrange forqualifications over and above the national framework. It will also arrangespecial facilities in FEs for particular manufacturers (Ford) and organizemarque-specific training to supplement generic training (Vauxhall, LandRover).

There are strengths in ReMIT’s approach, based on intermediation withits network of companies. As noted, it plays an important part in the recruit-ment and selection of applicants. It then matches trainees with employers andboth with colleges. Its bargaining power has enabled it to keep down the priceand ensure the quality of contracts for off-the-job training, thus making thetraining attractive to employers. Through the training process, its local co-ordinators provide pastoral care and assessors give learning support to train-ees. In addition, ReMIT will organize additional off-the-job training, andthereby many trainees take qualifications in addition to NVQs. A furtherstrength is that it provides a nationwide system of training for all sizes offirms, and there is some cross-subsidization of training, which helps ruralareas. This gives ReMIT economies of scale and helps ensure that training isin transferable skills. Given the numbers, ReMIT is one of the UK’s largestapprenticeship schemes and, with a low dropout rate (15 per cent), it producesapproaching 2,000 apprentices a year. Overall, its TSC/ALI inspection grades

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for core garage training have been good. However, it has obtained onlysatisfactory ratings in the retailing and business administration areas, intowhich it has recently expanded (ALI, May 2004: 3; ALI, September 2002: 33;TSC, December 1998: 6, 7, 16).

Small garages often consider themselves too small to train and see ReMITas obviating the costs of recruitment, training organization, and the paper-work of assessment. One medium-sized dealership whom we interviewed saidit preferred ReMIT to the manufacturer’s own scheme because the lattercould supply training locally without block release away from home, andthereby offered cost savings. Another large group chose ReMIT becauseit provided national coverage for all its outlets, allowed for central co-ordination of training and was ‘cheaper and safer’ than doing it themselves.One of the bigger firms interviewed had considered a for-profit private pro-vider, with excellent facilities in a number of dedicated training centres;however, the company favoured ReMIT because the latter offered a custom-ized local service without residential block release.

However, there are limitations to the ReMIT approach. Its size means thatit is not always able to guide individual training plans or control quality. Inparticular, there can be problems in maintaining tight control over a myriadof subcontractors and assessment processes. As a result, both the workplaceand college training is variable and only around one-third achieve the fullAdvanced Apprenticeship framework. However, as ReMIT has moved froma looser ‘managing agent’ role, it has established greater control and stand-ardization over the system (ALI, May 2004: 4–8; ALI, September 2002:8–10; TSC, December 1998: 6, 10, 22).

As with all these organizations, the key question is what value does ReMITadd. In its absence, apprenticeship in the industry would survive — there isreal demand, a tradition of training and other providers. In the absence ofReMIT, some manufacturers might organize more training themselves — butit should be noted that the trend is increasingly to outsource training. Largedealerships would have to train, but only a few now do this internally, claim-ing the process is too expensive. It is the medium and small independents whowould be least likely to train; and here ReMIT undoubtedly facilitates skillformation.

A GTA: Aylesbury Training Group (ATG)

GTAs are local associations of mainly small- and medium-sized employerswho combine to share the training costs and to obtain scale economies in itsprovision. They had their origins after the Second World War in engineeringand in other manufacturing industries. In the 1960s, with ITB support, theirnumbers grew and they expanded to new sectors such as road transport,retailing and construction. In the early 1970s, their work was praised insuccessive government reports (Perry 1976: 253–70). Since then, some haveceased to exist, other new ones have been created, some have been boughtout as private companies and most have diversified into training beyond their

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traditional areas. Latterly, they have also begun to cater for larger firms, whichare increasingly outsourcing their training functions.

ATG, established in 1967, has 90 members, ranging from traditional engi-neering firms, to small high-tech companies, to local plants of large nationalenterprises. It has charitable status and is owned by its member companies,who elect a board of directors. However, as with the previous organizations,participation in governance was said to be low. About half of GTAs owntraining facilities, and the Aylesbury Group is one of these, with its ownengineering workshops and a business centre with ICT classrooms. It has 44full-time and 48 part-time staff.

At its last ALI inspections, ATG had 223 FMAs and 94 AMAs inengineering and technology. In response to employer demand, in the early1990s, it had diversified into business administration (174 FMAs and 44AMAs) and ICT (29 FMAs and 30 AMAs). More recently, the Group hasfurther diversified into retailing and distribution (9 FMAs and 33 AMAs)and care services (29 FMAs and 27 AMAs) (ALI, April 2002; ALI, July2003).

More actively than the two previous cases, ATG works with local firms toidentify skill needs and develop training plans. It then recruits and selectsschool-leavers. These are directly employed by ATG for a block period of in-house foundation training (8 weeks for business administration, 8–16 weeksfor ICT, 24 weeks for engineering). During this period, trainees are paid anallowance by ATG. The period is used to induct trainees and to teach keyskills and basic occupational skills. At the end of the period, the trainees arehelped to find jobs with local employers. By this route, over 90 per cent obtainfull-time jobs with associated training. (It is common for multi-employertraining providers to assume the employer role during a foundation period,especially in the case of GTAs with their own training centres. However, itis less common to use government funds to finance the training allowancein this way.) Not surprisingly, this approach is attractive to employers whotake on the trainees when they are ‘work-ready’ and can contribute someimmediate productivity. At the next stage, alternating between workplace andcollege, trainees then work towards level 2 and 3 NVQs, sometimes supple-mented by other qualifications such as National or Higher National Certifi-cates (NCs and HNCs). During this period, ATG staff visit trainees in theworkplace, review performance and provide assessment and verification.Again, as with many of these organizations, if a participating firm goes outof business or cannot offer employment on completion, ATG finds employ-ment with another member firm.

In terms of finance, members pay a small fee, and ATG earns income fromother training and consultancy work. However, 85 per cent of its incomecomes from government funding. At the foundation stage, ATG pays theallowance and finances the training; firms pay wages once the trainees becomeemployed; at the later stage, ATG recovers its expenses via LSC funding. Inthe case of more expensive engineering and ICT apprenticeships, there is somecross-subsidization from other activities.

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Our interviews showed that ATG is well regarded in its locality by memberfirms for recruitment, selection and induction. It is seen as providing first-class training in its core area of engineering, and good training in businessadministration, ICT, retailing and care work. This is endorsed by the TSC/ALI inspectors who also refer to the up-to-date facilities and experiencedstaff. ATG co-ordinates the link between the employer, trainee and college,and provides pastoral and technical support. Retention and completion ratesare deemed to be medium to high for engineering, but poor for businessadministration, retailing and care services, with only a quarter achieving thefull framework under these schemes (ALI, April 2002: 5–11; ALI, July 2003:4–8).

The Aylesbury Group offers members economies of scale, assistance withgovernment funding and help with assessment procedures. In addition, itshares with firms the costs and risks of employing the apprentice. In this way,it has built long-term relations with companies, and these encourage the take-up of training. A small firm we interviewed, producing high-tech mouldings,felt they were too small to train and needed the assistance of ATG. Anotherlarger engineering employer, finding it needed more maintenance staff,returned to apprentice training via ATG after a gap of several years. Finally,a positive important consideration is that, if ATG ceased to exist, othertrainers might take up some of its cheaper training, but probably notengineering.

On the other hand, in terms of weaknesses, ATG has only recently beengiven satisfactory grades in new areas such as retailing and care services (ALI,April 2002: 5–11; ALI, July 2003: 1–8). Moreover, like so many of theseorganizations, it is highly dependent on the government funding regime forits highly labour-intensive operations. As a result, in recent years, a numberof GTAs have collapsed or merged. However, it is also notable that new oneshave come into existence in sectors as diverse as offshore oil and horticulture(DfES 2002b).

Automotive Sector Strategic Alliance (ASSA): A Large-Firm Supply Network Relationship

The ASSA was established in 1996 to meet the training needs of a group offirms in the North-East. The force behind its creation was Nissan, which hadopened its local assembly plant in 1987. Nissan had early established its ownapprenticeship, more multi-skilled flexible than existing arrangements. How-ever, it also found it could not obtain sufficient already trained staff from thelocal labour market. Its primary aim in establishing ASSA was therefore tofacilitate its own training. In addition, Nissan was concerned with supple-menting the regional pool of quality labour in an area with poor educationaland skills levels. A related aim was to support the training of its local suppli-ers. Some of these were ‘world-class’ producers, but others were not; theintention was to maintain standards in the former and to raise good practicein the latter. This was especially important given its lean production system,

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based on ‘just-in-time’, which required that suppliers had the skilled labournecessary to ensure quality and reliability. In addition, in terms of culture,Nissan also wanted to promote an approach on the part of suppliers and theiremployees which stressed continuous improvement in productivity and qual-ity. We were told by suppliers that Nissan did not require them to be membersof ASSA, but it would be ‘unhappy’ if they did not join. Indeed, membershiphas advantages in terms not only of economies of scale in training but alsoof access to technical expertise. Finally, an important reason for creating andjoining the Alliance is the greater experience it has developed to access UKand European Union funds than any individual firm.

Over time, membership of ASSA has grown to 57 companies, with over25,000 employees, of whom 5,000 are from Nissan. The group is a complexweb of companies governed by ASSA Ltd, which is run by directors, themajority of whom came from the founding companies. The Alliance has afull-time staff of 27 and two training centres.

At the time of the last two ALI inspections, ASSA had just over 100 AMAs.The majority of these were in maintenance engineering, following a pro-gramme which involved two years’ block-release at college and a further twoyears’ full-time on the shop floor. This comprised an innovative curriculum,with a high level of mechanical, electrical and software training. There wasalso a more traditional toolmaking apprenticeship for which ASSA subcon-tracts the off-site training to a local GTA. In addition, the Alliance has asmaller group of ICT, business administration, and warehousing and distri-bution apprentices. This latter training resulted from a realization that mem-ber firms could not rely on local colleges and needed to develop their ownICT staff. All those mentioned are expected to attain level 3 NVQs andrelevant NCs and HNCs (ALI, July 2004: 2; TSC, November 2000: 2).

In addition to the training of skilled intermediate staff, at any one time,ASSA also provides training for around 400 line workers. Most of these areon six-month programmes, but about one-third are on a two-year programmewhich takes them to level 2 NVQ in manufacturing. However, this is anexclusively ASSA framework and does not include key skills. Most of thesetrainees are employed by member firms, but some are employed by ASSAand sponsored by a company. At the end of their training, firms then makeoffers. The training is a mixture of on and off the job with, in the case of thelevel 2 trainees, up to nine months’ college attendance (Kazis and Evans 1999;New Deal Task Force 1999). In all programmes, emphasis is placed on ‘soft’skills, especially teamworking.

In the case of apprentices, ASSA recruits the young people, directlyemploys some of them, inducts all into the world of work and monitors theirprogress. The off-the-job training is subcontracted to a number of closelymonitored organizations, three colleges and one GTA. The Alliance thereforebrings together firms, trainees and trainers; it then co-ordinates the trainingand ensures that standards are met. In addition, it organizes financing: mem-bers pay a joining fee and a small fee per trainee, which they recoup throughtraining, and ASSA secures government funding, and member firms pay

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apprentice wages. However, in addition, compared to the previous case stud-ies, ASSA is less closely involved in formal NVQ assessment and verification.

One criticism of ASSA might be that some of the training it provides doesnot keep within the established engineering framework in that ASSA hasinsisted on developing its own formats distinct from national frameworks andthat it pays less attention to transferable skills and key skills. Indeed thesehave been criticisms in TSC reports (TSC, November 2000: 7, 15, 50; TSC,September 1999). On the other hand, there are certainly strengths. ASSAorganizes good on- and off-the-job training closely linked to its members’needs. It ensures that modern facilities and experienced staff are available inlocal colleges, and its bargaining power guarantees that colleges meet mem-bers’ needs. Its programmes have high retention and completion rates andgood progression, sometimes leading to level 4 components and degrees forengineering and ICT trainees. On this basis, ASSA was recently awarded agrade 1 (excellent) for its engineering training (ALI, July 2004: 4–6; TSC,November 2000: 11, 16–21, 34, 44).

From our interviews, Nissan appears satisfied with the arrangements andover time has passed most of its training over to the Alliance. Other membercompanies are happy with both the technical skills and soft skills acquiredby trainees. The two first-tier firms we interviewed could have done their owntraining, but saw advantages in outsourcing this to ASSA, in terms of costsand standards. Our research and other evidence suggests that smaller second-and third-tier firms would have more difficulty doing their own training tothis level (Brown

et al

. 2001).

2

It might be suggested that ASSA reflects the traditions of its Japanesefounder and is not more widely applicable in the UK (Crouch

et al

. 1999:178–95). However, historically in the UK a small number of big companies(both private and public sector) acted as ‘lead’ employers and overproducedapprentices, with the expectation that these would find jobs in smaller firmsoften in the large organization’s supply network.

3

There are also other embry-onic cases of supply network situations — elsewhere in automobiles (Honda,Toyota and the Mersey Automotive Group) and in aerospace (BAE Systems).In addition to manufacturing, there are some areas in construction whereprincipal contractors actively co-ordinate the training of subcontractors.

Technical Training Enterprises Ltd (TTE): A Local Big Employers’ Group

TTE was founded in 1990 by Shell, ICI and Associated Octel. It is one of anumber of similar big-firm ‘clubs’ which exist in the UK. Others includeTeeside Training Enterprise (established by ICI and Corus), Gen II inCumbria (founded by BNFL, Corus and three smaller companies) andFlagship Training in Hampshire (led by BAE Systems, Vosper Thorneycroftand Johnsons Controls, in association with the Royal Navy).

TTE is based at Ellesmere Port and was established to train apprentices tooperate, maintain and support petrochemical process plants. It has impressivetraining facilities, including mechanical and electronic equipment, laboratory

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space, and ICT suites. It is governed by a board of directors comprisingmember firms. It has 11 full-time training staff (two seconded from Shell) anda number of part-time training consultants.

The organization was created by its members to produce a ‘modernapprenticeship’ — having itself coined this term before it was later adoptedby government. By this, they meant an apprenticeship based on high compe-tence, multi-skilling and teamworking. From the start, the aim was to reducethe costs of training by pooling resources and obtaining economies in firmswhose labour forces were shrinking and who felt they could no longer sustainin-house apprentice programmes. Indeed, in some of the companies, appren-ticeship training had been discontinued in the 1980s as the firms downsizedand found it easy to obtain skilled labour in a slack external market. Accord-ing to interviewees, there were also ‘cultural’ objectives in the creation of TTEin that a further aim was to create ‘modern’ employees who were simulta-neously ‘rounded individuals’ and ‘team players’. An important corollarywas to take trainees away from the traditional practices of the shop-floor.Last but not least, this also enabled it to break the link with craftsmen’s payenshrined in union agreements, thereby allowing lower training wages to bepaid.

The three founders contributed start-up money and, for a time, as a furthersubsidy, sponsored more trainees than actually required. Over the years,members have also provided sophisticated process and laboratory equipmentand support in the form of staff secondment. In turn, TTE has obtainedgovernment funding for training in member firms. Over time, it has openedits training programme to other local companies and now has 33 associatedfirms. With its overheads covered by apprentice training, it has diversified intoother training. TTE charges sponsoring companies a commercial rate forapprenticeship training, which also includes the cost of the trainees’ salaries.It retains the government funding, which trainees attract.

At the time of the last ALI inspection, TTE had 128 AMAs, of whom 13were laboratory apprentices (ALI, March 2002: 3). Each year the processstarts with members signalling needs and offering places. TTE then recruitsand selects the young people, with sponsor companies in attendance. Selec-tion is rigorous and effective supply just about meets demand. Once recruited,trainees are employed and paid by TTE, but sponsored by a participatingcompany until the apprenticeship is completed. In year one, TTE providesbasic training on its own site, with some workplace experience. In year two,training is again on the TTE site, but with more workplace experience, andproceeds to level 2 NVQ in specialist areas, such as maintenance work. Inpractice, maintenance apprentices take a multi-skilled mix of mechanical andelectrical training. In these two years, there are also residential courses aimedat developing communications skills and team working. In year three/four,trainees complete level 3 on sponsoring companies’ sites, with TTE monitor-ing progress. Throughout, the trainees follow FE courses to supplementpractical skills and take a NC (a level 3 award) in year two and a HNC (level4) in year three. TTE co-ordinates the links between the firm, the young

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person and the college, and throughout, the staff give pastoral support andprovide the NVQ assessment. Upon completion, if the apprentice does notobtain a place with the sponsoring company, TTE will find an employeramong other member companies.

In terms of strengths, reflecting the high demands of member firms, TTEhas up-to-date facilities and staff with current experience. Training is of ahigh standard and exceeds level 3 NVQ, with a high (90 per cent plus)completion rate. In observing training, we noted that, along with technicalexpertise, apprentices were encouraged to develop a team working approach,important in complex and dangerous settings. One of TTE’s main strengthsis the close involvement of member companies who drive the training process(ALI, March 2002: 16, 19; TSC, July 1998: 11–15). Company intervieweeswere very positive. According to one, ‘our apprentices hit the ground running,working independently and in teams’. Several firms stated that apprenticeswere likely to progress into supervisory roles. It is not surprising that, on thebasis of its strengths, TTE helped develop the chemical industry apprentice-ship framework for both plant and laboratory staff, and has recently beenawarded government Centre of Vocational Excellence status.

This is not to say there are no weaknesses in the approach. The third- andfourth-year training on the employer’s premises is less well monitored, withownership of the training process less clear and considerable reliance on localsupervisors. Laboratory apprentices do not seem to get as much support andtheir college work is less well integrated than that of plant apprentices (TSC,July 1998: 14, 23–26).

4. Discussion and conclusions

Four questions were posed at the beginning. What are the distinguishingcharacteristics of these organizations? What do they add to training inBritain? How do we explain this behaviour? Are the arrangements sustainableand could they be transferred to other parts of the economy?

The Nature of the Organizations

The organizations mentioned earlier share certain common characteristics.They are all multi-employer groupings that provide collective goods to mem-ber firms. They also supply broader public goods and social capital to theirlocalities and the national economy. These goods are supplied with a highdegree of government subsidy. However, there are also differences betweenthem along three dimensions.

First, there are differences which relate to the origins and governance ofthe organizations. In terms of origins, there is an exogenous/endogenouscontinuum (Crouch and Trigilia 2001). Endogenous organizations are thosewhere co-operation has developed between firms with little external co-ordination, as in the case of TTE. Mid-Yorkshire and ReMIT are also largely

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endogenous, although founded by their parent organizations in response togovernment funding opportunities. Exogenous organizations are those wherethere is a more external origin or source of governance. Here we place ATGwith its origins in the ITB system and ASSA with its foundation by one firm,namely Nissan.

In governance, there is also a continuum in terms of how active or inactivemembers are in running their organizations. Here we would put TTE andASSA towards the active end of the spectrum, ATG somewhere in the middle,and ReMIT and Mid-Yorkshire towards the inactive end. In large part, thisreflects the number of firms in the organizations, their relative homogeneity,their geographical proximity and the size of benefits they deliver, as will beanalysed later in the paper. However, low involvement does not mean that thelatter are entirely run by their officials — ultimately all the organizations areaccountable to their members and in the training area day-to-day interactionscan be substantial.

Second, there are differences which relate to the functions these organiza-tions perform. Some of the organizations provide only training services tomembers, while others provide multiple services. Aylesbury, TTE, and ASSAconcentrate on training; ReMIT (through the Motor Industry Federation)and Mid-Yorkshire offer a broader set of representational and advisory, andnetworking services to members. For Mid-Yorkshire, this is extremely impor-tant in enhancing its reputation and underpinning its training activities.

In terms of training, some organizations actually train, others managetraining. Towards the training end of the continuum are TTE, Aylesbury andASSA, and towards the facilitating end are Mid-Yorkshire and ReMIT. Again,it is not necessarily a criticism of the latter type of organizations that theirmain role is to manage the training process. Rather, this reflects their circum-stances and the lack of training facilities, especially where there has been nogifting of facilities from large firms or from government. In the medium andsmall firm sectors, the facilitation of training is extremely important.

A related dimension concerns whether the organization actually employsthe trainees or whether they are employed by member companies. TTE andto a lesser extent ASSA and ATG are towards the employing end of thespectrum; ReMIT and the MYCCI are not significant employers of traineesfor any length of time.

Third, there are differences relating to the market situation of these orga-nizations. One difference is along the demand/supply continuum. Demand-led training provision exists where member requirements drive the training;supply-led training is where the availability of government funds plays a largerrole in the process. ASSA, TTE and Aylesbury are towards the demand endof the spectrum; ReMIT and Mid-Yorkshire tend more towards the supplyend. Again, this is not necessarily a criticism of the latter type of organization,because supply can create its own demand and there is a valuable role whichthese organizations play, especially with small firms. Equally, it must be addedthat even the more demand-led organizations are constantly seeking govern-ment funding.

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In terms of their market situation, the organizations may also be seen assingle- or multi-occupational. ReMIT, ASSA and TTE are single occupa-tional, in that they train only for their own sector and for a limited numberof occupations; Mid-Yorkshire and Aylesbury provide training over a widerrange of occupations. However, there is pressure on ASSA and TTE to moveinto wider areas of training. In this respect, there may be some dynamics,where the availability of government funds and opportunities to obtaineconomies of scope may induce organizations to diversify. While this mayhave some advantages in terms of spreading risks, we have also suggested thatorganizations tend to perform best in their core areas.

The Added Value of the Organizations

All forms of training provision have advantages and disadvantages. Single-employer training has much to commend it — as seen in our analysis of TSC/ALI data, single employers score best. Here, the responsibility lies with theactual employer, who is well placed to assess training needs and results.Moreover, if the employer can then retain staff by broader human resourcepolicies, this is a further inducement to more and better training. On theother hand, there are disadvantages of single-employer training. One dangeris that such training may create high-skilled islands within a low-skilled sea(Marsden and Ryan 1991). In addition, individual employers may not trainbecause of fears of poaching or, to prevent this, may seek to make trainingmore firm specific and less transferable. In turn, this may be less attractive topotential trainees. In addition, there is a particular problem with medium andsmall firms who lack the in-house capability. Moreover, even in the case oflarge firms, there has been an increasing tendency to outsource training.

Colleges provide apprentice training of various kinds. Most provide keyskills and underpinning knowledge; some go beyond this and are regis-tered training providers. Colleges have real strengths: they can offer broadaccess and they have advantages in delivering key skills and technical cer-tificates. However, colleges have weaknesses. They remove the responsibil-ity for training from the employing organization and can be remote fromactual employer needs. Alone, they are unable to provide the workplaceexperience necessary for the apprentice. In addition, their equipment andstaff can become out of date, especially in high-technology sectors. More-over, their training can be along traditional occupational lines and lackthe multi-skilling which firms increasingly require. A final, but significant,disadvantage is that for many young people, college-based training isunattractive.

For their part, private for-profit training companies have of necessity to beflexible and responsive to market demands. As with all providers, there is aspread among them, with some excellent examples, and others which are verymuch driven by the availability of government funds. There is also a tendencyfor them to concentrate on less expensive areas, such as business administra-tion and ICT.

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We have focused on multi-employer training. Undoubtedly such traininghas shortcomings, especially when it is too supply-driven and attempts tocover too many occupations. Moreover, it is concentrated in certain industriesand has been less successful in new areas. However, there are real benefits ofemployer co-operation in the training market. Such collaboration reducesadministrative costs of training, especially for small- and medium-sizedemployers. At the same time, it does not remove training too far from actualemployers, who should be best able to assess needs. From an employer’sviewpoint, it can also reduce costs where the group actually employs thetrainees and produces work-ready employees. In the case of TTE, we saw anexample where employer collective action was said to have allowed for areduction in the apprentice wage and, thereby, group training can increaseemployer demand. In addition, it is possible that group provision may helpovercome poaching externalities. If more firms in an industry or locality sharethe costs of training, this potentially reduces the likelihood that any oneemployer will fear being at a competitive disadvantage, and more are likelyto train. Finally, because of its group nature, such provision may ensuretraining in broad skills of a potentially transferable kind. If this is thecase, this will reduce risks for trainees by ensuring that skills are portable.Indirectly, therefore, it may make them more prepared to start an apprentice-ship and share the costs of training with the employer.

We suggested that there are differences in the relative effectiveness of ourcase-study organizations, as judged by the quantity and quality of training.We put this in the rough order of ReMIT and Mid-Yorkshire performing leastwell, ATG in the middle, and TTE and ASSA performing best. Of course,any judgement must be subject to the constraints under which each organi-zation operates. Moreover, with a body such as Mid-Yorkshire, there is alwaysthe counterfactual as to how much and at what level training would be donein its absence. Attempting to generalize, it would seem that drivers of effec-tiveness may be as follows. Organizations are more likely to add value wherethere is a smaller number of member firms or where firms are active ingovernance and where the association is close to its members. Organizationswhich concentrate on training and on the training of a limited set of closelylinked occupations may also be more effective. The quality of training mayalso be better where it is more demand- rather than supply-driven. Equally,the case studies suggest that organizations perform better when they do theirown training, rather than when they act as managing agents and subcontractto others. Finally, the organizations which actually employ the young peoplefor a time have some advantages.

Explanations for Co-operation and Non-Co-operation

There are two interrelated phenomena to be explained: why co-operativebehaviour occurs and why there is not more of it in the UK.

The first question we have already begun to answer. In some sectors, suchas engineering, there is a long history of such behaviour which has provided

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support and resources. Certain conditions have also been identified which aresupportive of co-ordination on these lines. We have suggested that this is morelikely to occur where there is homogeneity among the co-operating firms,where there is a strong-felt need to overcome market failures, and where realbenefits accrue. Crucially, there has also been periodic government supportfor employer collective action and that is seen at the present time in theavailability of funds, which play an important part in driving theseorganizations.

The second question relates to why there is relatively less employer col-lective action in the UK than in some other countries. We have cited theGerman-speaking countries. Here, state legal underpinning for associativebehaviour is important, as are the involvement of other institutions of socialpartnership, especially trade unions (Streeck 1989). Neither of these exists ina significant manner in Britain. We have also cited Italian industrial districtsand here, the support of the local state and other local institutions is alsoimportant (Crouch and Trigilia 2001). In addition, we have cited the growthof group training in Australia, where the state has helped with institutionbuilding and has encouraged more direct employment by these organizations(House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment, Educationand Training 1995; Cooney 2004). In the UK, the state has been prepared tointervene in terms of the structure of certification and funding, but the sup-port has been fluctuating and (with the possible exception of the ITB period)the commitment to principles of a liberal market economy have limited sup-port (Crouch

et al

. 1999). UK employers are left to their own devices. As aresult, we see a set of arrangements which are patchy and uneven.

Sustainability and Transferability?

Many multi-employer arrangements were created endogenously in the past,as in the case of employers’ organizations and chambers of commerce. Somewere created exogenously, as in the case of many GTAs, with governmentsupport or help from large firms. Some existing GTAs have extended into newsectors, but have tended to perform less well in such areas. However, we haveseen from our case studies that organizations can be created anew. Otherexamples of embryonic multi-employer action may be cited — some success-ful, others less so (DfES 2002a).

This is not to say that existing organizations are robust. Indeed, manyGTAs and chambers are fragile, reflecting the disinclination of employers totrain, uncertainties about funding, the vagaries of a commercialized trainingmarket and the broader lack of government support (Ryan and Unwin 2001).They are very dependent on government funding. However, any new supportor intervention would have to be careful not to undermine existing arrange-ments (Peacock 2002). In some instances, there may be a case for mergers orpartnerships with local colleges to provide firmer foundations.

In the UK, there are insufficient employers singly and voluntarily offeringquality apprentice places. Simultaneously, employers complain of the need to

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improve the quantity and quality of apprenticeship training (Cassels Report2001). Where single-employer provision is constrained, college provisioninappropriate and private provision limited, multi-employer training hasmuch to commend it. A strengthening of the employer side by better cost andrisk sharing through inter-firm co-operation offers some prospect of easingconstraints on training. At most, but unlikely, it is a system which might begiven some statutory support as in Germany. At least, there is scope for thedissemination of best practice arrangements, targeted support with start-ups,and more consistent and more generous financing arrangements. As in Aus-tralia, direct employment of apprentices might even be encouraged, for thewhole or an initial period, with the organization drawing funding for trainingand receiving a further grant for the placement of trainees with employers.On the lines of the Cassels Report, they might also receive an agency fee forthe services they provide, and it would help with membership if incentivepayments could be made, through these bodies, to member employers whosetrainees complete their full apprenticeship (Cassels Report 2001: 24–26, 44).

Final version accepted on 7 October 2005.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the Esmee Fairbairn Foundation and the Centre forEconomic Performance for financial support. We would like to thank staff ofall the case-study organizations and the DfES and ALI. Thanks are due toDavid Ashton, Colin Crouch, Paul Ryan, Mari Sako, Hilary Steedman andLorna Unwin who commented on the paper.

Notes

1. The Direct Contract Units were more employer-led and more closely involved intraining than the TECs themselves.

2. Recently some non-supply-chain companies have been admitted into membershipif they can show they follow good manufacturing practice.

3. Rolls Royce (in the past) and BNFL (at present) are examples of where sparetraining capacity in a big firm has been opened up to smaller companies.

References

ALI (2002, April).

Aylesbury Training Group

. Coventry: ALI.—— (2002, March).

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