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Co�management and

self�determination in Nunavut

Thierry Rodon a

a Groupe de recherche sur les interventions gouvernementales,

Département de science politique, Pavilion De Koninck,

Université Laval, local 2466, Québec, PQ, G1K 7P4

Available online: 23 Dec 2008

To cite this article: Thierry Rodon (1998): Co�management and self�determination in Nunavut,

Polar Geography, 22:2, 119-135

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CO-MANAGEMENT AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN NUNAVUT

Thierry Rodon1

(Groupe de recherche sur les interventions gouvernementales, local 2466,Département de science politique, Pavilion De Koninck, Université Laval,

Québec, PQ G1K 7P4)

Abstract: This paper explores the question of power relations within co-managementinstitutions in Nunavut and, in particular, their role in the Inuit peoples' efforts to achieveself-determination. Following the presentation of an interpretive model outlining thethree possible interactions within co-management institutions—integration, transaction,and empowerment—a case study of the co-management institutions pertaining to wild-life in Nunavut is conducted. The experience of the interim wildlife board, established in1990, particularly the crisis surrounding the setting of a quota for beluga harvest in threesoutheast Baffin communities, can be interpreted as an attempt at co-optation. Resistancefrom Inuit hunters allowed for an increase in the quotas, although the concept of quotasper se was not called into question. The Nunavut Wildlife Management Board, estab-lished in 1994, has more power than its predecessor. However, the initial experiences ofthe NWMB indicate that the Federal government is determined to maintain tight controlover the management of sensitive wildlife species for economic or symbolic reasons. Theco-management experience in Nunavut must fit within the framework defined by Cana-dian society, thereby allowing for only limited self-determination.

INTRODUCTION

Co-management of wildlife resources with indigenous communities is gainingwide acceptance within international organizations involved in conservation issues. InCanada, this concept emerged during negotiations for the James Bay and NorthernQuebec Agreement (JBNQA) (Canada and Quebec, 1975). The purpose of this agree-ment was to resolve conflicts over land use and allow Cree and Inuit hunters to pro-tect their traditional hunting and gathering activities.

Since then, all land-claim settlements have foreseen the creation of co-manage-ment regimes. These regimes are comprehensive, inasmuch as they provide for themanagement of all wildlife and fishery resources in a given territory. They cover vastareas and since they are part of a land-claim agreement they are protected underarticle 35.1 of the Constitutional Act of 1982 and cannot be unilaterally terminated.Thus far, except for the JBNQA, all land claims have been made in the Territories,where the Federal government has jurisdiction over the land.

Specific resource regimes also have been created in order to manage particularwildlife species believed to be endangered. For example, the Beverly and Qamanir-juak Caribou Management Board (BQCMB) was created in order to resolve a conflict

1 I wish to thank Pierre-Gerlier Forest for his assistance in developing the interpretive framework usedin this paper and anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. I finally want to thank all thepeople who provided answers to my questions and who gave me very helpful insights into the working ofco-management in Nunavut. The field trip to Iqaluit was financed by a grant from the Northern ScientificTraining Program of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

119

Polar Geography, 1998, 22, 2, pp. 119-135.Copyright © 1998 by V. H. Winston & Son, Inc. All rights reserved.

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in which biologists thought that the caribou were on the verge of extinction, whereasthe aboriginal hunters considered them to be plentiful (Osherenko, 1988; Cizek,1990). These co-management regimes usually have jurisdiction over smaller territo-ries and often overlap with land-claim regimes.

There also is a difference between the northern and southern co-managementexperience. In the North of Canada, with the exception of Yukon and Labrador,Aboriginal peoples are in the majority and are less likely to be in competition withother wildlife users. In the South, they are in a minority and have to share their tradi-tional territories with sport hunters, anglers, and extractive industries.

This paper assesses the co-management experience in Nunavut, investigatingInuit and Federal government expectations of co-management in the territory. Forwell over a decade, the Inuit of Nunavut had been negotiating a land-claim settlementwith the Federal government of Canada. In 1993, they finally signed both a land-claim agreement and a political agreement. The first implemented a co-managementregime in the Nunavut territory, whereas the second foresaw the creation of a new ter-ritory in Canada in 1999. This territory is inhabited mainly by Inuit (85% of the popu-lation) and covers 1.9 million km2, making it the largest area under co-management inCanada.

This paper explores primarily the question of power relations within co-manage-ment institutions in Nunavut and their role in the Inuit peoples' efforts to achieve self-determination. Following a definition of the concept of co-management and proposalof an interpretive model, the paper turns to an analysis of co-management structuresand practices.

CO-MANAGEMENT AND SELF-DETERMINATION

The term "co-management" encompasses a wide range of practices. There aresubstantial differences in terminology, both in the English and French languages. Forinstance, in the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (Canada and Quebec,1975), the French text refers to a "Comite conjoint" (joint committee), whereas thetext in English mentions a "Coordinating Committee." The Inuvialuit Final Agree-ment (Canada, 1984), refers to a "Wildlife Management Advisory Council," whereasin the Nunavut Final Agreement (Canada and Tungavik, 1993) a "Nunavut WildlifeManagement Board" has been created. In practice, co-management is used to describea wide variety of activities, ranging from a token consultation to some sharing ofdecision-making, as noted in the report of the Standing Committee on Indian Affairsand Northern Development.

It can range from as little as receiving information from the government, tofulfilling an advisory role of the government, to being delegated legislativeauthority, and finally to assuming co-jurisdiction of resources with govern-ment (Canada, House of Commons, 1995, p. 3)

This wide range of powers subsumed under the term "co-management" reflectsboth differences in interpretation and the lack of a mutually accepted definition of theterm. The degree of decision sharing also is variable, and reflects the actual bargain-ing power of the two groups during the negotiation of the co-management agreement.

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The negotiating power of Aboriginal peoples can be seriously curtailed when non-aboriginal interests are present, as is often the case in southern Canada.

Government agencies consider themselves to be the depository of public interestand Aboriginal peoples as privileged users of a resource. Co-management thusimplies an asymmetrical relationship in which the State holds the ultimate power inorder to protect the general interest (Usher, 1987; Pinkerton, 1989). On the otherhand, Aboriginal peoples consider that they have an equal responsibility in the man-agement of the resources of their ancestral territories, and view such management asan integral part of their inherent right to self-government. They interpret co-manage-ment as a genuine sharing of power between equal partners, a nation-to-nation rela-tionship based on co-existence. Furthermore, in the treaty areas, Aboriginal groupsconsider that treaty rights guarantee a continued right of access to their ancestral terri-tory for hunting, fishing, and gathering and in this context co-management regimescould allow the perpetuation of these activities (Usher, 1993). There is an ever-present tension between these two views, as each side tries to actively promote hisown position of what co-management should be.

Two existing definitions of the term co-management each describe the phenome-non at a different level. Osherenko (1988), speaking from an institutional point ofview, defines the concept of co-management as follows:

A co-management regime is an institutional arrangement in which govern-ment agencies with jurisdiction over resources and user groups enter into anagreement covering a specific geographic region and make explicit (1) a sys-tem of rights and obligations for those interested in the resource, (2) a collec-tion of rules indicating actions that subjects are expected to take undervarious circumstances, and (3) procedures for making collective decisionsaffecting the interests of government actors, user organizations, and individ-ual users (Osherenko, 1988, p. 94).

Two key concepts—the State and the user—are integral to this definition. Thus,co-management is a mode of interaction between two entities, each of which has aninterest in the management of a resource—(1) the State as the depository of sover-eignty over a territory and its resources, and (2) Aboriginal peoples as privilegedusers of a resource. Within this framework, "use" refers to the fulfillment of Aborigi-nal peoples' needs. This definition implies an asymmetrical relationship, since theState retains ultimate power. It is very broad, in that it may include everything frominstitutions seeking simple consultation to effective participation of users in the deci-sion-making process.

In fact, most researchers consider co-management to be a combination of twoideal management types: State and indigenous management (Freeman, 1985; Feit,1988; Osherenko, 1988; Berkesetal., 1991; Usher, 1993). Usher (1987) defined Statemanagement as centralized, using laws and regulations to manage a resource in theinterest of all Canadians. This management system is based on the accumulation,organization, and scientific interpretation of data. It is a bureaucratic and hierarchicalsystem that differentiates managers from users.

On the other hand, indigenous management tends to be self-regulated and decen-tralized (Freeman, 1985; Usher, 1987; Feit, 1988; Osherenko, 1988; Berkes et al.,

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1991). It is a wildlife management system based on social norms and unwritten rulesproviding the framework for hunting and fishing. The regulatory instruments are cul-tural and ethical (taboos, myths, etc.). Knowledge of wildlife resources is based onobservation and oral tradition. An empirical knowledge of the milieu is transmittedorally from generation to generation (Usher, 1987). In effect, this system correspondsto the Canadian Aboriginal peoples' mode of wildlife management.

Within this context, co-management implies a sharing of power and responsibil-ity between governments and Aboriginal peoples, each recognizing the validity of theother's system of management (Berkes et al., 1991). This concept of co-managementhas greater implications than the definition advanced by Osherenko (1988) since itnot only entails the question of participation, but also the fact that each participantrecognizes the other's management culture in order to manage co-operatively.

Nevertheless, co-management institutions are not solely management structures.They also involve negotiation, decision-making processes, and inherently a powerstruggle between two players—the State and Aboriginal nations—each of whom pos-sess a different political culture. There are two decision-making systems or conceptsof power—in other words, two political systems.

One can question whether an integration into Western culture or an exchangebetween two cultures is being encouraged. A study of co-management institutionsmay lead to a better understanding of the change induced by the process of self-determination. Co-management institutions exist at the interface between the Cana-dian and the Aboriginal political systems and can be considered indicators of theinteraction between these two systems.

This study employs a scenario-based analyses to better understand the processesinvolved in co-management. This method was successfully used by Cassidy andNorman (1988) in their work on the implications of the Aboriginal land claims settle-ments for natural resources in British Columbia. In this case, scenario-based analysiswas used to circumscribe the possible effects of a negotiation process. The construc-tion of three scenarios allowed the authors to explore the possible future by identify-ing the critical uncertainties.

Scenario-based analysis also can be applied to organize complex realities throughinterpretive models. Instead of determining the outcome of a process, scenarios areused to determine the plausible interpretation of a complex phenomenon, the objec-tive of the study being to identify the dominant model structuring the reality (Forestand Rodon, 1995). These scenarios are not mutually exclusive. In this paper, thismethod is used to design three interpretive scenarios, each representing one possiblemode of interaction within a co-management institution.

INTERPRETIVE SCENARIOS

Integration

Co-management institutions encourage the integration of Aboriginal peoples intothe Canadian resource management system. Assimilation and, more recently, integra-tion of Aboriginal peoples into Canadian society has always been one of the principalobjectives of Aboriginal policies in Canada (Manuel and Posluns, 1974; Dyck, 1985;Gibbins and Ponting, 1986; Cassidy and Bish, 1989; Boldt, 1993). Co-management

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institutions allow for the sharing of management functions but do not permit the exer-cise of authority (Usher, 1993; Haugh, 1994). Hence, they can be considered to bestructures of formal co-optation as defined by Selznick (1966, p. 13): "Cooptation isthe process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determiningstructure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or exist-ence." Selznick considered that formal co-optation arises when an organization needsto establish its authority and its legitimacy, or attempts to access a particular sector insociety. It would appear that these two elements are an objective of government agen-cies that have established co-management institutions with Aboriginal groups.Finally, co-management institutions limit choices in decisions made by Aboriginalpeoples by obliging them to work within a framework determined by the dominantsociety (LaRusic, 1983; Usher, 1993). Consequently, co-management institutionsmay be regarded as a means of integrating Aboriginal people into a Canadian politicaland administrative system. Participation of Aboriginal peoples in resource manage-ment encourages them to accept scientific and administrative norms—in other words,the values and standards of the Canadian society.

Intercultural

Co-management institutions could permit the operation of a "transaction" pro-cess between Aboriginal peoples and representatives of the Canadian State. Co-management institutions are places of interaction between two actors, and within thisresearch context, between Aboriginal peoples and civil servants. An exchangedynamic might thus come to light. The concept of transaction developed by Barth(1981) refers to the interaction between two culturally different groups. For Barth,transactions occur when their meeting creates a climate where participants learn toconsider each other's goals and values. This process leads to sharing of certain estab-lished or created values. This phenomenon has been identified in the Canadian con-text (Webber, 1995; Hamelin, 1996). This is also recognized as one of the objectivesof co-management by Chesley Anderson, Vice-President of Inuit Tapirisat ofCanada:

The objective of co-management is to bring together the traditional Inuitsystem of knowledge and management with that of Canada's. We knew thatwe could manage our resources in our own tradition, but we also recognizedthat the government's management system has something to offer. Our def-inition of co-management is the blending of these two systems of manage-ment in such a way that the advantages of both are optimized and thedomination of one on the other is avoided (Canada, House of Commons,1994, p. 5).

Co-management institutions therefore can allow each group to contribute its ownvalues and objectives. For instance, the use of aboriginal traditional knowledge andconsensus decision-making could be a good indicator of this process. The result couldthereby be the creation of a management culture that is unique to co-managementinstitutions.

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Empowerment

Co-management institutions could be a means of empowering the Aboriginalpeoples of Canada. The Aboriginal peoples are seeking greater self-determination andco-management institutions are a means of reaching this objective. Control over terri-tory and its resources is a crucial aspect of this process. It is, in fact, quite difficult toconceive of political autonomy without a territorial base. Co-management is espe-cially important for Aboriginal groups, as it allows them to regain control over territo-ries that they must share with other groups. The different Aboriginal groups believethat they have status as a people and are therefore not merely citizens. They do notwish to be regarded as mere users of a resource but as a people who possess ancestralrights over their territory and its resources. They feel that they have a right to influ-ence decisions pertaining to the management of wildlife resources. Therefore, theybelieve that co-management should provide for the fair sharing of power in decision-making between two sovereign groups. In fact, co-jurisdiction would more aptlydescribe such a situation. From this perspective, co-management is an instrument thatAboriginal peoples can use to regain some control over their land, their resources, andfinally their lives (Berkes et al., 1991).

CO-MANAGEMENT IN NUNAVUT

Wildlife resources are crucial for the Inuit of Nunavut—both at the symbolic andeconomic level (Brody, 1991; Usher, 1993). In the northern communities where theylive, the cost of imported foods is prohibitive and continuous and guaranteed accessto wildlife is essential to the sustainability of Inuit communities. Unlike the situationwith respect to the Indians of southern Canada, Inuit hunting and trapping activitieswere not regulated by the state until the 1950s. In addition, they do not have to com-pete with sport hunters and fishermen because of the remoteness of their territory.

The management of wildlife resources has been one of the key elements inNunavut land-claim negotiations. This particular claim was accepted by the federalgovernment in 1979 within the context of the settlement policy for comprehensiveland claims. As early as 1981, the two parties signed an agreement in principle forwildlife management foreseeing the establishment of a co-management regime on theterritory that eventually would be known as Nunavut. However, the Nunavut WildlifeManagement Advisory Board (NWMAB) was not put into place until 1989.

The delay can be explained by a misunderstanding between the two parties overthe powers of the management organization. In the 1981 agreement in principle, aclause permitting recourse was foreseen if decisions made by the co-managementorganization were disallowed by the Minister of the Environment. This clauseextended beyond the power to make recommendations and therefore was notacceptable to the federal and territorial government (Bob Kadlun cited in CaribouNews, 1984).

The creation of the Nunavut Wildlife Management Advisory Board in 1989 rep-resented a concrete victory of the government vision. As suggested by its title, it onlyhad the power to make recommendations to the concerned Department—Environ-ment, Fisheries and Oceans, and the Government of the Northwest Territories Renew-able Resources—and no recourse in case of disallowance.

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Finally, in 1994, following the signing of the Nunavut final agreement, a neworganization was created—the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board (NWMB). Thisorganization not only had powers of recommendation but also of regulation, since theNWMB is destined to become a public agency (Dacks, 1994). It should also be notedthat with the creation of the Nunavut territory in 1999, the Inuit, who are in a major-ity, should be able to control the public structure of the new territory.

The question of power and its distribution was at the heart of the negotiation overwildlife management in Nunavut. The Inuit considered co-management as an equalsharing of powers in management, whereas for the federal government co-manage-ment cannot question its sovereign power to manage wildlife in the interest of allCanadians.

The distribution of powers evidenced by the different agreements illustrates theidentification by the actors of their capacity to impose their preferences. It may besaid that the agreement in principle of 1981 permitted the Inuit to realize their prefer-ences, whereas the NWMAB demonstrated the capacity of the federal government toimpose its vision of co-management. Finally, the creation of NWMB appears to havereturned to the Inuit control over management of wildlife within their territory. Nev-ertheless, over and above the legal structures, co-management should be observed inactual practice.

THE NUNAVUT WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT ADVISORY BOARD

The Nunavut Wildlife Management Advisory Board (NWMAB) was an interimstructure destined to prepare the way for the creation of the definitive board once thefinal agreement was signed. It was intended to operate according to the spirit andgoals of the agreement in principle of the Nunavut land claim (NWMAB, 1991a).

This organization consisted of four Inuit appointees from three regional associa-tions of hunters and trappers—one from Keewatin, one from Kitikmeot, and two fromBaffin—and four representatives from government agencies—Indian and NorthernAffairs, Environment Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and the Department ofRenewable Resources of the Northwest Territories. In addition, the members of thecommittee chose an independent chairman (NWMAB, 1991a).

The NWMAB only had the financial resources to hold regular meetings andcould not conduct any research or extensive community consultation (Richard andPike, 1993). Wildlife management entails understanding the size and dynamics ofanimal populations, which is possible either by conducting research or by assessingthe research conducted by other organizations. In a co-management situation wheretwo management traditions are present, such research should utilize both the localhunters' knowledge and scientific data. However, it was impossible for the consulta-tive management council to carry out a task of this nature. Insufficient funds neverpermitted the NWMAB to question the scientific data put forth. This was stressed byone of the appointees, who noted that "this raised a larger issue that the board shouldconsider, [of] whether the board should study issues such as this before making rec-ommendations or whether the board can make recommendations based only on a fewminutes discussion around the table. Just because we read a report, does that mean webelieve it? The board does not have the resources to study these issues, so do we justrubber stamp them?" (NWMAB, 1991b, p. 11).

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As a result, the consultative management council found itself at the heart of acontroversy that resulted in the undermining of the credibility of the concept of co-management in Nunavut. Since the late 1970s, the Department of Fisheries andOceans (DFO) had conducted studies that suggested there was an alarming drop in thebeluga populations in the southeast Baffin region due to overexploitation (Richardand Pike, 1993). Consequently, Inuit hunters were asked to reduce their catch and aquota was negotiated, first in Pangnirtung in 1980. Then in 1988, DFO's Arctic Fish-eries Scientific Advisory Committee recommended a 10-year moratorium on thehunting of beluga and the following year, the Committee on the Status of EndangeredWildlife in Canada classified the southeast Baffin beluga stock as an endangered spe-cies (Richard and Pike, 1993). Armed with these two reports, DFO asked theNWMAB to make recommendations in order to preserve the beluga stock for the ben-efit of the future generations.

After having heard arguments advanced by DFO and Inuit hunters, the NWMABrecommended the establishment of a quota of five belugas for Iqaluit and Pangnir-tung, and a quota of five belugas during the summer and no limitation the rest of theyear for Kimmirut (Lake Harbour). It also recommended that a survey with fullinvolvement of the Inuit be conducted later in the year (Richard and Pike, 1993). Fur-thermore, DFO asked the communities to decide upon the allocation of the quotas(NWMAB, 1990a, p. 4; NWMAB, 1990b, p. 4). Eventually, the Hunters and TrappersAssociations (HTAs) of Pangnirtung and Iqaluit refused to handle the distribution ofthe tags (NWMAB, 1990b, p. 4).

This decision provoked a strong reaction from Inuit hunters in the three commu-nities concerned, despite their representation in the management organization that hadrecommended the quota. The hunters rebelled, refused to respect the quotas, and wenton to take about 50 belugas over quota (Smellie, 1990; Richard and Pike, 1993). Onegroup briefly occupied the offices of DFO in Iqaluit. It was an act of civil disobedi-ence that led to the repudiation of the NWMAB by principal Inuit organizations, nota-bly, the Baffin Regional Hunters and Trappers Association (BRHTA), the TungavikFederation of Nunavut (TFN), and the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) (The PlanningCommittee, 1994). TFN went so far as to express to the chairman of the Board that"it's TFN view that the Nunavut Wildlife Management Advisory Board is a govern-ment body established for interim purposes and bears no resemblance or has no con-nection to the NWMB" (TFN, 1991).

The reasons for this revolt are both numerous and complex. First, hunters did notreally know much about the NWMAB because of its lack of visibility (Richard andPike, 1993). In their opinion, the recommendation to impose quotas represented anattack on their ancestral rights, just as they were about to be recognized in the finalagreement for Nunavut (Richard and Pike, 1993). Furthermore, most Inuit hunters didnot believe in a decline of beluga stocks (Richard and Pike, 1993; The PlanningCommittee, 1994) and they felt that hunting benefited beluga populations(Nakashima, 1991; The Planning Committee, 1994). Finally, they argued that quotashad been imposed on them at the end of a management procedure in which they hadhad no part (Smellie, 1990, Richard and Pike 1993; The Planning Committee, 1994).Co-management, as defined by most authors, had failed because decisions had beensolely based on the scientific data put forward by the government biologists and didnot succeed in convincing the Inuit hunters of its validity.

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The importance of hunting in Inuit culture should also be considered, especiallysince the presence of the State with its methods of wildlife management is quiterecent in the Arctic. It has only been 30 years since Inuit have had to deal with theCanadian State (Usher and Bankes, 1986; Abele, 1987). Prior to this time, they werethe sole managers of their resources. Moreover, as noted in the report of the commit-tee established to resolve the conflict, this disagreement was not only about beluganumbers; it also involved the significance of whaling and conservation:

Inuit and DFO have fundamentally different perspectives on the matter ofconservation pertaining to beluga whales in the southeast Baffin region.DFO interprets conservation as managing this group or groups of whales toensure their maximal long-term productivity. Inuit perceive the focus of con-servation to be much broader, encompassing the full range of Inuit-belugarelationships. These differing perspectives have been manifested in this casein a cultural conflict characterized by lack of agreement on facts and by lackof concurrence about the values by which facts can be interpreted (The Plan-ning Committee, 1994, p. Ill)

Despite the presence of four Inuit representatives, the NWMAB was not able topromote the objective of the Inuit hunters—the continuation of their traditional bel-uga hunt. Instead, it legitimized management recommendations decided upon by sci-entific committees and imposed quotas. It therefore could be seen as a co-optationattempt.

Its failure can be explained in part by its lack of financial and therefore scientificindependence. Because of a lack of funds for research, the NWMAB had to base itsdecisions solely on information offered by the two parties present—managers andbiologists from Fisheries and Oceans Canada armed with their scientific studies fore-casting the extinction of beluga populations, and Inuit hunters speaking of their hunt-ing experiences. It is not difficult to foresee who would win in the final decision.

Moreover, despite the presence of four Inuit appointees, the NWMAB appears tohave little connection with the Inuit hunters represented by the hunters and trappersassociations existing in each community. The latter did not participate in decision-making or in research and for that reason did not believe that they had to respect theNWMAB decision (Smellie, 1990; The Planning Committee, 1994). Moreover, con-sidering the importance of beluga meat in their diet, they could not respect an overlyreduced quota.

This management crisis was resolved by the creation of the Southeast BaffinBeluga Review Committee. The mandate of the Committee was to prepare a report tothe Minister proposing for his consideration solutions to the southeast Baffin belugaissue. This committee proposed a quota of 35 belugas for Iqaluit and Pangnirtung, and20 belugas from 1 June to the 30 September, with no quota during the rest of the yearfor Kimmirut (Richard and Pike, 1993). This represented substantial increase in com-parison to previous quotas although it should be noted that this process led Inuit com-munities to accept the principle of quotas.

However, the experience of the NWMAB has shown that the Inuit hunters werenot willing to abide by a decision taken without the consideration of their opinionseven if DFO had attempted to co-opt the Inuit appointees on the NWMAB. DFO was

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forced to respond to their concern and to accept higher quotas, even if the DFO biolo-gists felt that it could endanger the beluga population (Daniel Pike, pers. comm.,Iqaluit, 1994). Finally the creation of an ad hoc committee on the beluga allowed theInuit to present their views on beluga whale management. However, this empower-ment did not originate from the co-management regime but from the capacity of resis-tance of the Inuit hunters.

THE NUNAVUT WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT BOARD

The Nunavut Wildlife Management Board (NWMB) is defined by the Nunavutfinal agreement as "the main instrument of wildlife management in the Nunavut set-tlement area and the main regulator of access to wildlife" (art. 5.2.33). It should havebeen created with the ratification of the agreement in June 1993, but because the fed-eral government was late in nominating its representatives, its creation was delayedanother six months. It was on this occasion that the Nunavut Tunngavik, Inc. (NTI)for the first time threatened to institute legal proceedings over the implementation ofthe agreement (NTI, 1993).

Unlike the NWMAB, the new institution has guaranteed funding—first in orderto assure its operation but also to conduct research. The Federal government has tofund a wildlife harvest study in Nunavut (art. 5.4.4) and a bowhead traditional knowl-edge study (art. 5.5.2).

The NWMB also is provided with funding to finance hunters and trappers organi-zations (HTOs) and regional wildlife organizations (RWOs) (art. 5.7.13). The endresult will be a pyramidal structure with the NWMB at the top, followed by the threeregional organizations—Baffin, Kitikmeot, and Keewatin—and, at the bottom, theHTO. Consequently, a better integration of hunters in the wildlife management struc-ture might be expected. However, this management structure will not be easy toinstall. According to the implementation contract negotiated between NTI and theFederal Government, the funds necessary for its functioning are controlled and dis-tributed by the NWMB. For example, the NWMB has to decide how funds would bedistributed between the different levels and has asked for a restructuring of all Inuithunter organizations in accordance with the requirements of the Nunavut final agree-ment (art. 5.7.8-10). To receive financing, each organization must adopt new bylawsin conformance with laws governing organizations in the Northwest Territories. Thisinsures the entry of Inuit HTO into a bureaucratic structure based on a Westernmodel. With some exceptions, HTOs have had a relatively informal structure, resem-bling the traditional groupings of hunters (Brody, 1991). This new framework couldlead to the creation of a hierarchical structure, where the NWMB would have a domi-nant position based on knowledge and money.

Moreover, these new structures will necessitate the creation of full-time adminis-trative and coordinating positions that will be filled by Inuit accustomed to Westernbureaucracy. This side effect of land-claim settlements already has been noted by LaRusic (1983) in his study of the effect of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agree-ment on the Cree way of life. On the other hand, it will provide about 30 jobs that didnot exist before.

This structure also maintains the offloading pattern, since the NWMB has theresponsibility to make decisions on the "total allowable harvest" (art. 5.6.16)—in

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other words, the quotas—and the HTOs decide on the allocation and enforcementamong its members of the "basic needs level" (art. 5.7.3)—in other words, the alloca-tion of the quota to the community hunters. This is a top-down approach, where pol-icy decisions are made at the top and allocation decisions are left to the lower level.One can expect the same problems experienced by the NWMAB to occur when a con-tentious and unpopular decision will have to be made.

The structure established by the Nunavut final agreement tends to facilitate theintegration of Inuit hunters into the bureaucratic apparatus of the Canadian State andtherefore it could be identified with the first "integration" scenario. For the moment, itis difficult to characterize the Nunavut co-management regime as a "transaction." It isnot that shared values and common goals have been created, but that the State wildlifemanagement regime has been extended with the participation of the Inuit of Nunavut.The Nunavut final agreement establishes a very precise and somewhat complicatedsystem of rights and obligations for the management of wildlife in Nunavut. TheNWMB has the obligation to conduct a harvest study for all the species in Nunavut(art. 5.4.1). One of the purposes of this study is to establish the "basic needs level"(BNL) for the Inuit (art. 5.6.19) and, when needed, a "total allowable harvest" (TAH)(5.6.16). The BNL is defined as economic, social, and cultural needs (art. 5.6.1), butdoes not cover the commercial uses. Both the TAH and the BNL are established by abureaucratic structure where the Inuit hunter is allowed to give his input but where hehas to wait for the NWMB to tell him what and how much he can hunt. This structureappears to lead to the establishment of a Western wildlife management systemthroughout the Nunavut territory. Indigenous knowledge is used only to supplementscientific data in the harvest study. The only part of the agreement where indigenousknowledge is explicitly recognized is in the Inuit Bowhead Knowledge Study, whichis based on an "Inuit knowledge study to record sightings, location, and concentra-tions of bowhead whales in Nunavut" (art. 5.5.2).

Does the Nunavut co-management regime ultimately favor Inuit self-determina-tion? Control of wildlife resources is undeniably essential for Inuit society, as muchon an economic level—hunting activities make up an important share of local foodneeds (Usher, 1987, Elias; 1995)—as on a cultural level—hunting activities are a fun-damental element of Inuit identity (Brody, 1991; Nuttall, 1992). The Nunavut wildliferegime makes an allowance for some control since Inuit are guaranteed the right offirst harvest in case of quotas (art. 5.6.20) and they can hunt to fulfil their "basicneeds level" without any quota. Nevertheless, the government is able to keep a certainlevel of control over wildlife management in Nunavut. For instance, the designatedMinister has the power to accept, vary, or refuse the decisions made by the NWMBsince, as the final agreement stipulates, "Government retains ultimate responsibilityfor wildlife management" (art. 5.2.33). It may be that the government has littleinterest in intervening in the management of species of minor symbolic importance. Itcould be otherwise for species that have a high symbolic value, such as the bowheadwhale, or for species that are shared with other users backed by powerful lobbies, as isthe case for migratory birds and depleted fish stocks. For instance, in the first monthof the existence of the NWMB, new quotas on turbot fishing were imposed by DFOwithout prior consultation with the NWMB (Gregoire, 1994a). To justify this action,DFO referred to an extraordinary procedure outlined by the Nunavut final agreementthat gives the Minister or his delegated agent the power to make an interim decision

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130 THIERRY RODON

without consulting the NWMB "when urgent and unusual circumstances require animmediate modification in harvesting activities" (art. 5.3.24). The decision shall bereviewed by the NWMB thereafter. These powers are more akin to self-managementthan to self-determination.

For the moment, assertion of the self-determination of the Inuit people appears tobe operating through other means. In fact, in September 1994, three Inuit huntersfrom Igloolik captured a bowhead whale without seeking permission from the DFO,the NWMB, or any "designated Inuit organization" (Gregoire, 1994b). They mighthave been convinced that following the signing of the final agreement, Inuit hadregained control of the resources in their territory and were free to pursue their tradi-tional activities. They might not have understood all the subtleties of the languageemployed by lawyers in the drafting of the final agreement.

The reaction of Inuit organizations—notably, the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada,Nunavut Tunngavik, Inc., and the Baffin Region Inuit Association (BRIA)—to thisevent was very revealing. They moved from a unanimous condemnation of the Igloo-lik hunters' actions to a mitigated support of their cause once they saw that a trendhad emerged in Inuit communities to sympathize with the hunters. Finally, NTI andBRIA declared their support for the hunters and stated that they would cover theirlegal costs (Gregoire, 1995b).

The NWMB thus found itself at the heart of a controversy where it became diffi-cult to take a position. Following a Nunavut Bowhead Traditional Knowledge Study,the NWMB can decide on the harvest of one or more bowhead whale (art. 5.6.18). Byignoring this process, the Igloolik hunters questioned the authority of this new institu-tion. However, if the NWMB condemned the hunters, it would alienate itself from Inuitcommunities; on the other hand, it could not approve the hunters' actions and thus callinto question its own authority as the main instrument of wildlife management inNunavut. Moreover, Fisheries and Oceans and Environment Canada appointees whosat on the NWMB were not very likely to approve a motion supporting the Igloolikhunters' actions. At the express request of the NWMB, DFO has recently decided todrop the charges, allowing the NWMB to get out of this bind. This issue could haveproven quite damaging for the future of the Nunavut territory since the NWMB was thefirst public government agency to be set up under the Land Claim Agreement.

Recently, the NWMB organized a "legal" whale hunt in Repulse Bay. Thishighly organized and supervised hunt experienced only quite mixed success. Theteam of selected hunters did not know how to use the modern whaling equipment andused rifles to kill the whale. Finally, after having been shot hundreds of times, thewhale sank. It resurfaced two days later after gases had accumulated in its body. Fur-ther delays in butchering the carcass lead to the spoilage of most of the meat(Kringayark, 1996; Wilkin, 1997). Organization of the hunt was reported to have cost$100,000 (Van Rassel, 1996).

It is difficult to avoid comparisons with the "illegal" Igloolik hunt, where, at therequest of an elder, three Inuit hunters seized an opportunity and killed a whale rap-idly, as they had been taught to do (Saladin d'Anglure, 1998). The carcass wasquickly butchered and shared among the community. A witness reported that thiswork was conducted in a festive mood:2

2The quotation published here is a translation from the original French—Ed., PSGE.

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During the return trip, it seems to me I have just witnessed a community pic-nic where everybody participated in the festive mood, making a game of thehard work of carrying the piece of meat away from the seaside. In theevening, the party continued in all the houses of Igloolik, and the people whocouldn't go to the whale enjoyed the whale meat that was brought to them(Georgia, 1995-1996, p. 14).

CONCLUSION

Co-management in Nunavut has been and will continue to be a contentious expe-rience. Upon reflection, this situation is not surprising. Co-management institutionsare in a difficult position. They are obliged to act as a bridge between two differentcultures and ideally promote exchange and cooperation between them. Nevertheless,the two cultures do not carry the same weight. Even though Aboriginal cultures haveundergone a renaissance, they remain a minority culture that cannot easily imposeitself, nor force its values to be respected. Moreover, the symbolic legitimation doesnot have the same significance for each of the parties. Inuit are claiming the rights toancestral traditions of their people, whereas state officials act in the name of publicinterest.

It also should not be forgotten that Canada is being subjected to the effects ofglobalization. The Canadian government might well have closed its eyes to the cap-ture of one whale by the Inuit, but its international partners, particularly the UnitedStates, Norway, and New Zealand (Gregoire, 1995a), were ready to remind Canadathat bowhead whales were an endangered species and that the International WhalingCommission (IWC) lobbied for the suspension of whale hunting in the Arctic. IWCofficials asked the Canadian government what it intended to do about the bowheadkill (Richard Hegan, International Advisor for DFO, cited in Gregoire, 1995b). Can-ada no longer belongs to the IWC but has been under constant pressure from theUnited States and other countries who are members of the IWC to join this organiza-tion (Usher, 1994). Recently, in September 1996, the United States issued a strongprotest to Canada for allowing the Inuit to kill bowhead whales. A proposition wasconsidered by President Clinton to ban the import of Canadian fish products in orderto punish it for allowing the whale hunt (Reuters, December 18, 1996). Finally, Presi-dent Clinton chose not to apply the ban, but instructed "the Department of State tooppose Canadian efforts to address taking of marine mammals within the newlyformed Arctic Council. These actions grow from our concern about Canada's effortsto move whaling issues to fora other than the IWC and, more generally, about takingof marine mammals in ways that are inconsistent with sound conservation practices"(Clinton, 1997).

For now, the most plausible scenario seems to be that of integration. The co-management institutions of Nunavut permit Inuit to participate in wildlife resourcemanagement but only according to Western standards of management and conserva-tion. Inuit hunters are gradually being subjected to quotas, hunting seasons, andinstruction on how to "scientifically" manage their resources. The difference betweena co-management regime and state management is that Inuit presently participate inthe elaboration of standards that will be imposed upon them. This may well be seen asa process of co-optation.

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Have Inuit been empowered as a result of the processes of co-management? Notif one believes that the empowerment of Aboriginal peoples is related to their abilityto make choices within a framework that they themselves must define. The answer isaffirmative if one believes, as do the governments, that empowerment is based on theability to make choices within the context defined by the Canadian system.

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