Governing the Water-Energy-Food Nexus: collaboration in the

Machángara river basin

MSc Thesis Environmental Policy Group

Student

Marco van Burik

Student number: 920320148020

Supervisors

Art Dewulf (PAP)

Mattijs Smits (ENP)

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Abstract

With a finite amount of natural resources being drawn from an increasingly contested

geographic area, efficiency is crucial. The Water-Energy-Food Nexus concept strives to

achieve efficiency of resource use by emphasizing the importance of interdependencies of its

sectors. However, limited knowledge and consensus on a Nexus concept is available raising

many questions, especially regarding the governing of actors and their processes of managing

resources. The research focuses on actors within the Machángara river council in Ecuador and

evaluates how collaboration therein allows for the implementation of a Nexus. The analysis

contains both qualitative as well as quantitative methods in order to precisely locate the

importance of collaboration within the theoretical as well as the practical realm of the Nexus.

Several semi-structured interviews were conducted with members of the river council

providing among other, data for the use of a Social Network Analysis in which complex

interactions can be mapped out. Theoretical multiplicity will be used as the theoretical

framework and includes network, multi-level and multi-scale governance. Progress is made

by disentangling and clarifying the high complexity of the linkages between theory and

practice and find common assumptions. The findings conclude that collaboration in the basin

tends to focus on a mixture of network and semi-leveled structures of governance, wherein a

decentralized role exists for governmental actors. Sectors, such as those within the Water-

Energy-Food Nexus, collaborate on the basis of a shared interest that tends to lie outside the

concept itself. Members of the river council share the interest of maintaining environmental

quality in the basin rather than each pursuing their own targets. However, the future of the

council is unclear as the institutional context is rapidly changing providing new challenges.

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Title Page

Abstract

1. Introductory chapter Page 3

1.1. Problem description

1.2. Research questions

2. Conceptual framework Page 8

2.1. Theoretical Multiplicity

2.2. Network governance

2.3. Multi-level governance

2.4. Multi-scale governance

2.5. Linking network, multi-level and multi-scale governance

2.6. Collaboration

2.7. Hypothesis

3. Research Questions Page 19

4. Methodology Page 20

5. Results Page 24

5.1. The Institutional setting

5.2. The Actor setting

6. Answering the research question Page 38

7. Discussion Page 55

8. Conclusion Page 59

9. References Page 62

10. Appendix Page 66

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1. Introductory chapter

1.1 Problem description

Currently there are about 1.1 billion people without access to clean water, 1 billion who are

undernourished and 1.5 billion who don‟t have access to electricity (Human Development

Report 2006, IFRC 2011, IEA). With current growth projections, we will need to increase

global agricultural output and fresh water availability by 50% and increase energy production

to 70% (Hoff, 2011). It is expected that events, such as droughts and floods, are going to

increasingly reach extremes causing for disturbances in availability of natural resources

(IPCC, 2007). For example, droughts will challenge the increase in agricultural output

needed. Without adequate counter measures such as reforestation, creating natural areas,

maintaining water quality and educating people, this situation will continue to deteriorate.

This implies that human (mis)management can affect the security of natural resources.

Imagine a large dinner party. The host only has a set amount of food and decides to serve it

buffet style. The servers keep filling the buffet trays giving a feeling of abundance to the

dinner guests so they take as they please, sometimes having extra on their plate. In reality,

there is no abundance, and the food runs out before the last few guests fill up their plates.

Now imagine that there are more guests arriving (population growth), that people stay longer

(aging population) and that there is a preference for a type of food (concentration due to

urbanization). These factors will create problems in a very short period of time (McGivern et.

Al., 2010). This problem setting shows that although there are many solutions visible, the best

ones will tackle all three problem areas rather than just one. Only limiting the amount of

guests (population growth) will not solve the other problems. Our society has become more

complex than we currently realize, requiring holistic solutions to its problems.

Holger Hoff was triggered by this problem setting and reignited the concept of a Water

Water-Energy-Food Nexus (WEF Nexus). It states that the three sectors need to been seen as

an integrated system rather than individual sectors. Many examples present the

interconnectedness between these sectors such as water use for the production of

hydroelectric energy or the use of energy to pump up groundwater used for irrigation. Hoff

calls for the importance of integration across sectors “in order to achieve reduction of

negative economic, social and environmental externalities” (2011). One way this can be

achieved is by „increasing efficiency, reducing trade-offs, building synergies and improving

governance across sectors‟ (Hoff, 2011). His view connects the natural and the social realms

and proves a social dependency on natural resource management.

The Nexus cannot be understood without regarding its theoretical and practical origins. These

can be traced back to the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) theory. Both

perceive the interdependencies of their sectors however IWRM keeps the focus point on water

as the most important sector. It does so by perceiving the only natural dimension, water, to be

the breeding ground for the others. The Nexus looks at all three sectors equally with the

intention of solving complex problems in complex manners, such as the previous problem

setting outlined. It also becomes clear is that the problem setting is a social one, rather than a

natural one. Although the natural resource water is vital to life on earth, it cannot be

prioritized to energy and food. Similar to the described problem setting, the social dimension

to managing resources and tackling problems such as urbanization is crucial. This is where

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similarities of both IWRM and Nexus come into play. Both face questions such as: How are

traditional management structures impacted by restructuring governance arrangements and

how resilient is it? Which levels are most important when looking at resource management at

a basin scale? One of the main reasons the IWRM theory was deemed a failure was because

of the lack of focus on a more flexible way

to govern its stakeholders (Gyawali, 2015).

Even though it contains such a high

ambiguity, limited selection of recognized

examples exists regarding the Nexus

concept. An example of a WEF Nexus with

focus on actors rather than institutions is

found in the Machángara basin in southern

Ecuador. Currently this Nexus is being

successfully implemented through a

mediating council (WEF Nexus Website,

2012). This council is made up of all

stakeholders related to the allocation of

water drawn from the river. This body

gathers on a regular basis to discuss and

allocate resources according to demands.

Current successes are visible through the

establishment of a water fund for

conservation activities, a community

natural resource management program

enabling local participation, and education

programs on water use for children.

However, since its creation several

droughts as well as political challenges

have caused problems of water allocation

and will do so in the future. In 2009,

Ecuador was hit by an electricity crisis due

to the extreme droughts limiting

hydropower potential. Furthermore, in times of crisis, concessions have to be made with

regard to water allocation. As a result, tensions may occur between different levels of

governance as well as between sectors. Additionally, the position of the council is not always

guaranteed as the current successes show, bigger actors possess better capabilities to create

change. This can cause for imbalance of power relations and influence water allocation. The

focus on actors as units of analysis is vital for this case. The main reason is that the

composition of the council dictates the interaction between levels and sectors. This unique

phenomenon shows the importance of good communication and interaction as a basis on

which long term rules and procedures can be built. Arguably, the WEF Nexus case of the

Machángara basin allows for a detailed analysis and can answer the ambiguities concerning

actors within the WEF Nexus and their integration across sectors.

The main problem within the Machángara river basin is the withdrawal of water for purposes

related to the energy, food and water demand, each to the extent they saw fit. This creates

severe stress on natural resources and their environment, especially in times of extreme

climatic conditions. To manage the withdrawal of natural resources, such as water, efficient

Figure 1: Map showing the location of the Machángara river basin within Ecuador and the Azuay region. Source: River council

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governance arrangements need to allow for integration across sectors. The current governance

arrangement in Ecuador and specifically in the Azuay region is complex. Several times the

water management was rescaled from regional, to municipal and basin levels (Warner et al.,

2014). Currently the basin is regulated through an inter-institutional entity, called the

Machángara River Council, attempting to integrate stakeholders across sectors in the scalar

conundrum. The Council has no legal or executive power and faces different regional and

local scales, operating at their own spheres of influence. In addition, the basin contains a high

complexity of actors with different interests and motives (Warner et al., 2014). Enforcing this

complexity is the current phase of decentralization which is being implemented rather

drastically from a top-down approach.

1.2 Research objective

In order to analyse the problems mentioned previously, this research will look at the

governance arrangements in the case study and find out how actors collaborate therein. The

importance thereof stems from both the gaps within the WEF Nexus concept regarding its

social application and the role these actors play in managing natural resources. An important

feature of the case study is the high variability of environmental and social conditions with

the 2009 drought as a good example. Therefore, it is important to regard adaptability and

flexibility when analyzing the interaction of stakeholders and the governance structure in

place.

The importance of governance as a means of regulating the flow of resources becomes

evident when limitations thereof start to occur. Abundance of water does not have to be

regulated, whereas shortage requires delicate management in order to prevent conflict. The

Nexus should strive to tackle the missing aspect of governance which caused its predecessor,

the IWRM theory, to fail. Regretfully, the Nexus concept is not fully elaborated and several

knowledge gaps exist. One of these regards the aspect of governance of actors and institutions

alike (Hoff, 2011).The main problem of the WEF Nexus is that it does not directly prescribe

guidelines on governance processes (Kattelus, 2009). However, this ambiguity can also serve

as breeding ground for new ideas and methods of governance by allowing flexibility and

innovation. This favours the nature of a WEF Nexus as it can occur at any scale and location

and consist in all shapes and sizes.

One problem of the current Nexus understanding is how actors actually cooperate between

these sectors and deal with or avoid conflict. Considering the ambiguity of the Nexus and

increasing complexity stemming from higher levels of integration worsens the problem (Hoff,

2011). Hoff found that there are significant tensions arising when integrating across sectors

and levels. The Nexus requires an internalization of externalities, in that interaction with

others sectors need to be integrated into holistic planning instead of being seen as „external

factors‟. Hoff claims the need of the Nexus to be addressed and applied at all levels of

governance in order to be truly effective, yet research on this and its interaction between the

different levels is still lacking (2011). This implies that an understanding of actors and

institutions is important when looking at governance processes.

To complete the investigation, it is important to see how stable the analyzed governance

arrangement is. This should be done through testing the linkages and the flexibility they

maintain. Also the governing environment in Ecuador and specifically the Azuay region

should be taken into account. As Warner claims, the governance structure has changed several

times during the last years (Warner et. Al., 2014). The aspect of stability is vital if the

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arrangement is to last in the future and prove a suitable insertion into the WEF Nexus

governance framework.

The units of analysis are the actors within the river council and the interaction they maintain

between themselves within the council when governing the natural resources of the

Machángara basin. The paper will focus on the interaction actors maintain between sectors of

the Nexus and levels of governance. Typically, this would involve the concept of

collaboration. This rather broad research angle leaves open the possibility to reason in both

actor and institutional standpoints due to the relative ambiguity surrounding the Nexus

concept. The reasoning is that actors are directly analysable objects of research, whereas

institutional settings encompass greater scopes and leave room for interpretation.

Nevertheless, this research will include the institutional setting as this would limit the validity

of the conclusion. A lacking concrete analysis is also part of the reasoning why the Nexus has

such a high degree of ambiguity.

In order to discover more about the Nexus, both theory and practice need to produce relatable

results. This can be done by linking the ambiguous WEF Nexus concept to more accepted

theories such as network and multi-level governance (see figure 4). Using such a „proxy‟

method requires a specific angle of analysis, since all theories involved are far more extensive

than their purpose for governance analysis. Therefore collaboration, used within these

theories, provides the connection between theory and practice for this research as it is more

analysable than the respectable governance theories due to their high ranging applicability.

Specifically, when searching for the theoretical application in the field, a concept is needed

that can be grasped and analysed. Hence, the connecting link is made between the case study

and the theory and the following research question can be perceived:

“How do actors collaborate across sectors, levels and scales in the Water-Energy-Food

Nexus and to what extent are they able to adapt to new challenges?”

Regarding the actor analysis, it is important to relate to several features of governance such as

power relations, communication and interactions between levels and scales. Such concepts are

important in analysing actor interactions within governance arrangements. For example,

powerful actors can steer negotiations in their favour due to their economic power or social

backing. Looking at scales and their (mis)matches can provide a good insight in the workings

of governance arrangements. Agricultural output of the Azuay region is mainly used for local

consumption, water use is distributed regionally and energy use is assigned on a larger basin

scale or even used nationally. These scales are important when looking at the stakeholder

interactions. Due to different scales, various interests and capacities are involved. Concluding

on such features is important to completing and understanding the investigation on the Nexus.

An important focus area regarding the governance analysis of the WEF Nexus is the role of

the local and community levels. Decentralization is a known phenomenon in Ecuador and the

current political power emphasizes more social empowerment. Research on local participation

has normally concluded a lack thereof and governance arrangements in developing countries

show sparse prospects. Therefore, expectations are instable regarding the achievement of a

different outcome. Nevertheless, these local realities are vital for Nexus research as, for

example, rural farmers have always approached these sectors conjointly. It is typically the

higher levels of bureaucracy that are slow to adapt (Middleton et al., 2014). As such there is

much to learn from these actors.

In summary, the primary aim of the research is to solve some of the ambiguity surrounding

the WEF Nexus concept. This paper will look at one of the acknowledged knowledge gaps,

namely that of collaboration between actors of different sectors. This question will be

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answered through the analysis of both actors and institutions alike, since they are interlinked

and jointly form a governance arrangement. Using a theoretical multiplicity approach

mitigates the problem of a lacking WEF Nexus theory or guidelines. In addition, the case

study of the Machángara river basin should provide for a functioning practical example of a

Nexus. Collaboration is also the connecting link within the theories used and the functioning

of a governance arrangement but also the link between these two realms. Concluding on the

existing actor interaction and the institutional framework in place, should answer the main

research question.

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2. Conceptual framework

The complexity of this research stems in part due to the ambiguity surrounding the WEF

Nexus concept. The lacking framework and guidelines on how to implement a Nexus cause

this research to pioneer in this field. In order to give guidance and structure to this

investigation, established theories should aid in creating a foundation on which to build the

theoretical analysis. This entails that the chosen conceptual framework will fill in missing

links that arise during the investigation, aid in the evaluation of the research, and finally

support to applicability of conclusions for further research. In order to better understand this

research, it is important to investigate all concepts, terms and theories that will be used. Due

to the scope of the investigation, an array of these will be used. This chapter will outline all

needed explanations and definitions in order to better understand the following empirical

chapters and support the conclusion.

First, the theoretical multiplicity approach will be outlined using the main theories used.

These are Network governance, multi-level governance and multi-scale governance. As a

continuation, all three theories will be compared to each other in order to find similarities

which can be used in the analysis. Thereafter, a short explanation of the term collaboration

should give insight into the idea of this research. This chapter will conclude with an overall

summary as well as the formulation of hypotheses.

2.1 Theoretical Multiplicity

Finding appropriate methods and forms of managing natural resources has been a crucial

phenomenon in current global politics as well as natural resource management literature

(Dietz, et. Al.,2003). In order to effectively allocate natural resources, the social (as opposed

to ecological) context carries significant weight. Therein, actors involved in the process of

resource allocation embody an important unit of analysis. Actors can influence institutions

and shape the cultural context of the area of analysis and vice versa. Governing this multitude

of actors requires flexible and adaptive structures of governance. Therefore, an evident shift

from government to governance as a means of governing processes within a certain policy

domain has been emerging.

The issue with analyzing complex governance structures is that they tend to comprise several

shapes and forms and favor change over time. In order to make sense of this social

complexity, theories have tried to find patterns and reasons. Regarding the complexity of both

social structures and the WEF Nexus ambiguity, not one theory can suffice. This is mainly

because it would create a one dimensional image rather than the needed three dimensional

one, thereby grasping complexity rather than simplifying it. In addition, the WEF Nexus

strives to be a theory on its own, whereby it leaves sufficient room for interpretation, which in

turn leaves room for a multitude of ideas and theories to give it shape. Therefore, this research

will use the method of theoretical multiplicity in order to view the problem from different

angles, thereby filling in missing links where necessary. Theoretical multiplicity, as opposed

to using a single theory, draws the needed information from each theory in order to create

connecting links for complex issues. It does so by comparing theories according to their

differences and similarities and draws from the distinctiveness of each (Termeer and Dewulf,

2009). The idea was previously defined by Termeer and Dewulf (2009), connecting four

theoretical frameworks together. Considering the analytical structure outlined in figure 2,a

concept is needed that allows for the analysis of actors across sectors, levels and networks.

Multi-level governance is extensively used to study the interaction between public and private

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actors within governance systems. This theory will outline how these actors cooperate across

vertical as well as horizontal boundaries. Complementing this analysis, Multi-scale

governance adds the scalar dimension to the discussion. Network governance analyzes actors

according to relative networks and the manner in which actors behave within them. This

research will use these two theories in order to gain understanding of the complexity involved

and visualize the actor interactions. Importantly, they will help establish a theoretical contour

for the WEF Nexus from which further research can advance.

2.2 Network Governance

Network governance theory focuses on the interaction between networks of actors from

public to private (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). A network can be defined as the „patterned

relationships between individuals, groups, and organizations‟ (Dubini & Aldrich, 1991). The

theories complement the trend of shifting government to governance in an attempt to move

towards less hierarchy and more interactive forms of managing actors. Hereby, the role of the

government remains important as it has the ability to steer networks and facilitate processes

therein. Nevertheless, there is a consensus that „more has to be done with less‟, indicating the

role of alternative governance arrangement to complement the work of the theoretically

quantitatively decreasing government (Weimer, 1994).

The origins of this theory are multiple and sometimes stem from conflicting sources.

Arguably, the beginnings of the network approach started with the gaining momentum of

„bottom up approach‟ calling for more citizen participation in policy making. The further

development of the concept relates to models focusing on interaction processes which adapt

and change according to the complexity of the objective and problems. The network theory

used for this research is based upon the inclusion of the institutional context, whereas

previous theories of networks focused on actor interaction solely (Klijn and Koppenjan,

2000). These previous theories drew much of their content from management practices in the

private sector.

The idea of the network governance theory is that policy is made through the interdependence

of relevant actors. This means that an objective can only be reached if collaboration exists

between parties‟ which dependent on each other‟s resources. In such a way, resource

efficiency is created as rules need to regulate the allocation of scarce resources and that

benefits are present for more than the signatories of bilateral agreements (Klijn and

Koppenjan, 2000). These rules are complex and need to grasp the interdependency of the

system as one missing link could result in serious problems. Within such a system, actors

need to be more aware of the institutional and actor context and require more careful thought

when engaging in collaboration. Especially for natural resources, such an approach could

establish resource efficiency and improve the quality and quantity of the ecosystem.

Problems do arise in network even with strong interdependencies. Issues could for example

revolve around the sharing of costs and benefits. Mitigating conflict is a matter of steering the

network collaboration in a successful manner, which means implementing management

structures. Currently, there are two acknowledged types of network management structures,

which are process management and network constitution. The main difference between these

two types is their focus on actors and institutions respectively. Process management looks at

how the interaction between actors can be managed to avoid conflict. This could typically be

done through changing perceptions and strategies of each actor. Network constitution looks at

organizational structures in managing conflict. This can be done by changing actor

constellations, the rules within the network and rehearsing the functioning of the network

(Termeer and Dewulf, 2009). The two differ in the approach they take towards changes.

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Process management seeks to change the network through its actors, whereas network

constitution tries to change actor processes through the institutional traits of the network. This

research will focus on network constitution more so than process management due to the aim

of analysing and configuring the larger picture. The research objective strives to answer part

of the WEF Nexus, which cannot be done when focusing on actor interactions within the river

council only. Nevertheless, both types form the larger network governance theory and are

thus important to take into account.

Success and failure of a network is important to understand for this research and the wider

importance for governance theories. The main problem within an interdependent system such

as a network is that actors possess resources that are scarce or the actor embodies an

authoritative entity. In such a situation, actors possess „veto power‟ in that they control the

flow of resources, whether beneficial or not to the system (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000).

Especially with natural resources, control can increase the power that actor has in the direct as

well as indirect environment. For example, a hydroelectric power plant controls the water

flow of the river and thus has a relative advantage over lower lying actors. Using its „veto

power‟ it could halt the flow of water for the sake of gaining strategic benefits. Another

important aspect of the success/failure scenario is the awareness of the actor‟s respective

network regarding their interdependencies. If actors fail to acknowledge such, veto power will

become a common instrument to use. The objective of the network composition is to align

goals and interest in such a way that no actor is excluded and that exchange of scarce

resources is beneficial to all. If a network changes shape or composition, it is this

characteristic that will cause for friction (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). Thus, common

objectives are important when working with the complexity flowing from different actors,

sectors and levels. The government plays an important role in this regard. Another aspect of

success/failure is the risk of stagnation. If actors feel a loss of benefits of their membership

within the network, they could opt to withdraw, undermining the foundation. It is not

uncommon that networks produce benefits beyond their borders which outsiders can reap

benefits from without contribution (Barney and Hesterly, 2006). If local users draw water

from the river but do not invest in its upkeep, other basin members might opt to choose the

same strategy or initiate conflict with non-participatory actors. Although this phenomenon is

hard to solve, it is important that actors are aware of risks and costs to taking part in a

network. Nevertheless, benefits should generally outweigh the costs, whether in the long or

short term, for any arrangement to work. Regarding the joint perception and objective,

networks do not focus on achieving singular goals. Rather, they strive to emphasize

collaboration with the addition of acknowledging a multitude of goals of each actor. Hence,

the objective is the process in which individual or joint goals are realized (Klijn and

Koppenjan, 2000).

Power and rules are related key characteristics of most networks and tend to influence the

output of them. Most networks create rules on which processes are based and through which

collaboration, rather than conflict, is maintained. These informal, and mostly unwritten, rules

are established through time and experience. They tend to change over time and thereby

influence the way power is distributed within the network (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). For

example, an actor can be excluded from a certain process if costs and risks are not bearable.

Likewise, it is sometime more practical to reach objectives in the most efficient way, thereby

excluding actors that do not have sufficient capacities. Like previously stated, the overall

benefits should be maintained, for both the excluded and the included. The problem with

network rules is that they are slow to change and hence might hinder collaboration for a

certain composition of the network, which in turn needs to simultaneously create newer rules.

Hence, evident is a „lag-time‟ applied to these rules. Academic consensus states that “the

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stronger the territorial demarcations in a network and the weaker the rules for conflict

management and mediation, the more difficult decision making will be” (Klijn and

Koppenjan, 2000). Adding to this phenomenon is the fact that power differences influence the

way processes and rules evolve. As long as actors hold veto powers, rules will likely prevail.

A main criticism of networks within the academic realm, focuses on the perceived limited

role of the government and hence the lack of steering. The claim is that an equal

governmental role within the network stimulates problems of accountability and creates a

closed system based on interests rather than interaction of ideas. Results of such perceived

systems are a lack of innovation and increasing privatization of benefits. However, the

governmental and other public actors represent the „common interest‟ and are therefore

important to include in any decision making process, especially if the network leans towards

being a closed system. There is also the opposing view that public actors should not interact

with other societal actors due to the special representative role they carry with regard to public

interest. Entering into agreements could alter this representation; especially in more closed

systems it could threaten the democratic accountability of these actors. On the other hand, it

might well change the legitimacy of the network and hence improve its status (Klijn and

Koppenjan, 2000). This is the uniqueness that governmental actors possess due to their

characteristics which other private actors might not have. Those are among others, a “sizeable

budget and personnel, special powers, access to mass media, a monopoly on the use of force

and democratic legitimization” (Kickert et al. 1997). With such capacity, the government can

change the aspects of a network, whether the rules, composition or other traits. Academics

have identified four methods of engagement for governmental or public actors within

networks. The first option would be that of imposing rules and regulation on the network from

a steering position. Although unpopular, might it break deadlocks and potentially create

benefits. Secondly, it could collaborate with the network as one of the members with the

previously mentioned pros and cons. Third option would be a facilitating role for integration

in which processes might be improved and outcomes stimulated. A final option would be that

of constructing and shaping the network through the governmental characteristics. Shaping a

network could steer a network towards a certain objective such as efficiency, quality or even

democratic legitimacy.

Concluding, it can be stated that there is a sufficient theoretical foundation for the concept of

network governance. This is an important aspect for this research as it allows for the use of

important aspects to place within the still ambiguous WEF Nexus theory. Whether it will have

practical applicability will be seen in the case study of the Machángara basin and be evaluated

in the discussion chapter. It is clear that a network can only exist with good collaboration of

its actors, which in turn can be shaped by the institutional context of the environment of the

network itself. Rules and procedures within a network tend to change and adapt, making it

flexible but also susceptible to powerful actors. These can shape processes through several

methods and could cause for tensions. The role of the government hereby is crucial as it has

special abilities and traits that can positively alter a network. Doing so, a possible problem

could be the decreasing democratic accountability, which tends to be seconded to the creation

of output.

2.3 Multi-level Governance

“Multi-level governance is the dispersion of governance across multiple jurisdictions, such

that decision-making is shared among multiple actors at different levels” (Hooghe and Marks,

2002). Research on multi-level governance strives to understand connections between these

levels, encompassing actors at the local, national and global stage (Adger et. al., 2005). The

directions of such analysis of levels can be performed in a vertical, horizontal or cross sectoral

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manner. It is important for any governance arrangement to encompass multiple scales in order

to internalize externalities. This aspect is important when dealing with interconnectedness and

the efficient management of scarce natural resources. Hence, the dispersion of authority is

vital to, among others, stimulate innovation and embody several public interests (Hooghe and

Marks, 2002).

Within multi-level governance two main types have been identified, namely Type I and Type

II (Hooghe and Marks, 2002). The first perceives a dispersion of power over a limited number

of actors as well as levels. These tend not to overlap and usually remain rather stable

constructions. Type I then focuses on the role of government to ensure authority is derived

from central locations and that power is concentrated to few levels. The second type perceives

a more complex and overlapping arrangement in which several actors, mainly public, could

potentially replace the governmental role. These arrangements tend to be more flexible and

can be more easily altered according to changing jurisdictions and capacities. Type II

connects towards the network governance model in that the arrangement is more flexible,

adjustable and limits the authority of the government. Henceforth, it stimulates a more

decentralized mode of governance. Comparatively to the network governance theory, this

research will focus on only one branch of the theory more suited to the case study but keep

the other within grasp. Therefore, Type II multi-level governance will be the main reference

point for Multi-level governance in analysing the Nexus concept.

There are several acknowledged features of Type II multi-level governance systems, each

creating different functions of structure and objective for their respective system. For

example, Task-specific jurisdictions as identified by Ostrom, whereby citizens are represented

by service sectors rather than governmental entities (1999). Examples of such sectors would

be the police, fire or health service sector. Type II also differs from its counterpart through the

existence of overlapping and thus competing jurisdictions whereby no hierarchy exists

between larger and smaller jurisdictional areas (Frey and Eichenberger 1999). One could call

this arrangement „polycentric‟ in that several centres of authority and decision-making power

exist and that collaboration exists to avoid conflict due to overlapping jurisdictions (Ostrom,

1999).

The question remains regarding the characteristics that create a successful jurisdiction and

differentiate Type I from type II multi-level governance. One aspect creating difference in

Types regards to multitude of jurisdictions that can form. Any group of citizens has the ability

to create authority from a shared set of ideas or demands. Within Type I, this process would

have to formally go via a governmental entity or an acknowledged system (Hooghe and

Marks, 2002). A unique and important feature is the fact that jurisdictions can be created at all

levels and do not have to be bound by traditional administrative/governmental levels (local,

regional, national). This is an important feature for the Nexus as it bases its governance

arrangement on criteria of efficiency, democratic accountability or others. However, such a

phenomenon can also create problems of acknowledgement or adaptability to the larger

national system and could be deemed „fragmentation‟. A final characteristic is that of

flexibility. Due to the ease of creating a jurisdiction they tend to be rather flexible and

adaptable. This proves vital in times of institutional change but can also aid in the adaptation

to internal demands. However, such flexibility stands contrary to stability and creates certain

risks within the governance arrangement. Jurisdictions can be created based on demand, but

once this objective has been achieved, the relative authority created no longer has a standing

(Ostrom, 1999). With the increasing complexity of current governance processes, such a

phenomenon could heavily impact the interdependent system and potentially cause it to fail.

This is where the pros and cons counteract each other, as flexibility of creation can also create

13

failure, which in turn can cause for the adaptation of the system to the new change. Arguably,

this would create a different kind of stability.

Arguably, the problems of both Type I and II relate to the respective role of the government

therein. The main problem of multi-level governance is the amount of jurisdictions and their

spill over of externalities. Hence, more actors require more coordination in order to include

adverse effects of policy making and make sure that all aspects of governance are covered. A

sole jurisdiction cannot do this alone and thus needs to collaborate. The problem is that

collaboration costs increase drastically with increasing numbers of jurisdictions (Hooghe and

Marks, 2002). Type I solves this problem by limiting its jurisdictional numbers and enforces a

top-down approach of coordinating collaboration. The role of the government consists of

steering and accounting for its jurisdictions, even in highly decentralized systems. However,

Type II compensates for a lack of governmental hierarchy, with a problem based division of

authority. Collaboration amongst and within jurisdictions is based upon the specific problem

and do not seek to impact the wider society.

Whereas power plays a crucial role within network types of governance, identity does so for

Multi-level jurisdictions. Type I, more so than Type II, governance structures are maintained

through territorial jurisdictions. The reasoning is that citizens allocate identity to certain levels

within governance because of the affiliation citizens perceive with them. As such do citizens

perceive local, regional and national jurisdictions more clearly than any further level.

Therefore, limited trust and support for EU integration policy stems from the perceived

national identity (Hooghe and Marks, 2002). Stronger national identity (hence, acceptance of

territorial jurisdictions) result in weaker support for EU policy changes. Typically, this

phenomenon can be witnessed in countries such as Austria, Hungary or Great Britain. This

perceived identity within territorial jurisdictions can also be witnessed in regional levels such

as in Belgium or Spain. The role of the government is important when regarding identity as it

has the capacity to steer the institutional context. In Type I scenarios the governmental role

has limited effect on changing the institutional setting as it is more robust to change. Type II

settings are more easily affected by institutional change, however the role of the government

is limited. Hence, there is a trade-off between strong jurisdictional structures (Type I) and

weaker structures but limited authority of governmental bodies (Type II).

2.4 Multi-Scale governance

To add to the complexity of theoretical multiplicity, researching governance arrangements,

especially in ambiguous contexts, multi-scale governance cannot be neglected. Its purpose

within this research is to create a better understanding of the interdependency within

governance arrangements and the relation between theories. Academics often connect multi-

level and multi-scales of governance as these overlap and sometimes co-depend on each

other. With regard to theoretical multiplicity, this theory will serve as an additional source on

which to understand the governance arrangement in the Machángara basin.

A scale can be defined as the spatial, temporal, quantitative and analytical dimension of

analysis. Levels are defined as units of analysis spanning across different scales (Cash et al.,

2006). Scale dimension dictate the spatial context of the analysis. The scale for this research

will be the Machángara river basin, wherein multi-levels as well as scales are visible. This

implies that the basin can actually span across several administrative scales/boundaries such

as municipal or regional. Furthermore, the multi-sector approach of the Nexus creates several

spatial or temporal dimensions as each sector operates at different scales. For example, does

energy production typically serve for a regional or national purpose, whereas the agricultural

14

output of the Azuay region maintains a domestic character. Arguably, a strong governance

arrangement will take these scales into account and adopt a structure that allows for the

cohesion of such. This implies that when looking at WEF Nexus governance, one should take

into account the scalar dimension of the analysis.

The following diagrams were created to present the two theories (multi-level/scale) visually,

thereby aiding the understanding of examples given. The idea to place them together stems

from the fact that the two complement each other in some aspects. Noticeable is that the

complexity of multi-level reaches beyond the simple interaction of levels, but that each level

has internal processes and that several connections to other levels might be evident.

Especially in Type II, levels do not collaborate according to strict hierarchies, but maintain a

free flowing interaction. Therefore, it is possible that governmental actors engage directly

with local authorities. This aspect relates well to the multi-scale diagram, as it shows that each

respective level-based interaction can be placed on a scale. These scales on the other hand,

impact the respective levels through variables such as time. Time changes constellations of

actors and the institutional setting and thereby also the respective governance arrangements.

Related to the diagrams on both multi-scale and multi-level governance, several aspects

related to decentralization and power come to mind. It is important not to restrict the relative

view on governance arrangements through using only acknowledged theories. In fact, the

following accounts are made without regard to a previously described theory and therefore aid

in the understanding of the complexity of governance arrangements.

As a reoccurring phenomenon, decentralization is an important concept to take into account

when looking at scales and the levels therein. Natural resources do not follow the

administrative scales of communities or cities. As such it is important to realize the effect of

decentralization for multiple levels. Participation within a multi actor setting is crucial for

governance effectiveness and equality. Especially in the multi-local level, advocacy of such

actors is often limited. NGO‟s acting in the interest of locals can be falsely interpreted. Within

vulnerable levels, multi actor settings need to be carefully reviewed as to their actual power

constellation (Bebbington et. al., 2006). Hierarchies tend to be necessary in social governance

processes. Empowering local communities will strengthen their ability to control their

Figure 2: Multi-scale governance Figure 3: Multi-level governance

15

respective level better, without the hierarchical structure. Local chiefs might obtain more

horizontal power in the absence of governmental control (Markelova and Mwangi, 2012).

Accountability does increase when empowering locals or decentralizing and can result in

more effective/efficient allocation of resources (McCaryhy, 2003). The trade-off has to be

made regarding the scale of the natural resource to be governed. Decentralization does create

difficulties for cross-sector cooperation. A river basin concludes many communities and

possibly levels, making coordination a complex task. Therefore, the approach to governing

multiple levels has to be heavily related to the context of the natural resource to be allocated.

Roggero (2010) states that when controlling factors like hierarchy or general authority are

flexible and not well established can actors within the social process fill the gap. Therefore,

power relations are inconclusive when lacking agreement exists between public and private

entities. This lack of hierarchy creates a vacuum in which actors pursue their own ways of

dealing with each other to conclude resource allocation. The typical multi-level perception

hereby is that these actors would not have concluded an agreement without their pre-set

levels. In other words, these levels define the actors and their „power‟ when clear hierarchy

ceases (Roggero, 2010). The role of the state is hereby multi-faceted and divided. The state

does not act as one coherent entity and therefore concludes multiple actors with multiple tasks

and capabilities (Markelova and Mwangi, 2012).

2.5 Linking network, multi-level and multi-scale governance

In order to adhere to the principles of theoretical multiplicity, all theories will be compared in

order to find overlapping or linking features. For this research the theories generally

complement each other. As such, certain criteria can be formulated regarding the comparison.

The chosen criteria will return in the discussion chapter in order to link theoretical with

practical findings. This approach will create a strong foundation for the conclusion regarding

the WEF Nexus.

The main connection between the theories can be found within their connecting and

overlapping boundaries. The limitations of multi-level governance can be filled by the theory

of networks. The extent to which actors can cooperate across levels depends on the context of

the setting. With heavy decentralization come significant pitfalls in creating a spanning

cooperation. Network governance allows these level boundaries to subside and creates

cooperation based on different values and with less hierarchy. The role of the government is

in all theories based on the relative power it can obtain, whereby networks dictate a weaker

role for governmental agents than Type I multi-level governance. An intriguing finding is

that, were power plays an important role in networks, identity does so for levels.

Nevertheless, their functionality is very similar and therefore provides a good analytical scope

for analyzing the Machángara basin. Another important finding is the interaction between the

institutional and actor context. Whereas in networks, the interaction is strongly two sided,

multi-level governance arrangements have stronger foundations for their jurisdictions.

Especially with a blurred border between Type I and II, this aspect can be decisive when

analyzing the effect of institutional change on the river council. Finally, is it interesting to see

that like networks, Type II jurisdictions can be formulated at any chosen level of governance,

creating high flexibility and impose a direct challenge to the „status quo‟.

The following table, partly adopted from Termeer and Dewulf (2009), compares the two

theories according to perceived characteristics. The multi-level theory is divided into two

categories as first proposed by Hooghe and Marks. Noticeable is that Hooghe and Marks use

multi-level governance mainly in the intergovernmental setting whereas it can be applied in

16

more detail within national boundaries. As such, it is relatively new ground to apply this

theory at a river basin scale, challenging the theoretical boundaries. Multi-scale is not

included in this table as it is not fully comparable as a theory, but functions as an addition to

multi-level.

Multi-level governance

(Type I)

Multi-level governance

(Type II)

Network

governance

Main actors Central Government and

sub-national

governments (general

purpose jurisdictions) at

different/most important

levels

Public service industries

(task-specific

jurisdictions)

Public and private

actors linked in

networks,

supporting or

hindering policy

strategies

Relationship

between actors

Exclusive jurisdictions.

No overlap

Spanning across levels

due to function focus

(forming networks),

overlap possible

Sustainable

interdependencies

between actors,

engaged in

overlapping policy

networks

Steering/influencing Assignment of functions

to level by central organ.

Policy not unit of

analysis, no overlap

Open method of

coordination1,

Polycentric, overlap

Providing

incentives for co-

operation, process

management,

network

constitution,

Leading figures State Citizens, public bodies, Network manager

or process manager

Role of government Multi-function.

Functions bundle to

central organs

Decentralized Partner, process

manager, network

builder or staying

out

Success Keohane: state never

replaced but

complemented by

multiple actors

Effective management of

tasks/problems (input vs

output trade-off)

Win-win situations

Enriched chance of

policy

implementation

Democracy

Adaptive capacity Limited due to pre-set

jurisdictions

Flexible in design,

fragmentation

High

Aim of theory Interaction between

levels and shared

competences

Multitude of actors

integrating across levels

and role of state (pre-

modern theory)

Mitigating the use

of administrative

deadlocks?

Example EU, Federalism in

Germany

EU, Zweckverbände

(goals oriented

organizations) in

Switzerland

Coastal fisheries in

Sweden/Amazonas

etc. in managing

resource allocation Table 1. Comparing the main theories Source: Adapted from Termeer and Dewulf (2009)

1The open method of coordination (OMC) adapted from the European Union can be described as a form of ‘soft’ law.

Policy-making that does not result in binding legislative or legal measures (EUR-Lex website).

17

Typically, Type I multi-level governance constitutes a greater role for governmental

institutions and centralizes administration. This means that actors of greater influence are

likely to dominate allocation of resources. Furthermore, the network of actors is

predominately collaborative system instead of an interdependent and mutually beneficial one

like that of network governance. It seems that networks contain the characteristics needed for

integration across Nexus sectors. Type II multi-level governance should aid in the allocation

of leading figures in order to stimulate whether a governance arrangement is likely to fall

under network governance structures. This is also a main overlap between the two theories, as

one identifies the borders on which the other can build. Finally, multi-level governance, being

more sector/level dependent constitutes much more innovation (especially in type II) as

opposed to networks, which typically serve as managerial systems where innovation stems

from the flexibility/adaptability of the arrangement.

The theory on seeing social interaction as a process of networks is important in order to

understand wider ranging governance arrangements other than those limited to administrative

or hydrological boundaries. Network governance can complement multi-level analysis by

giving the broader picture, whereas multi-level would indulge into the sector or level specific

activities. The use of a network interaction tool will allow the mathematical measurement of

each interaction and conclude, amongst others, upon strength and weaknesses within the

network. Further elaboration on the network and multi-level theory will be given in the

conceptual framework section.

2.6 Collaboration

During the description of the theoretical framework, it became clear that the focus of this

research lies with the interaction between actors within a given governance setting. In order to

define such interaction a concept is needed that will give shape to the relevant interaction. The

main concept used in this research will be that of „collaboration‟, especially between the

actors of the river Council. Collaboration is the act were two or more people/entities are

working together to achieve the same goal (Cambridge Advanced Learner‟s Dictionary &

Thesaurus, 2016). This implies that there is a mutual understanding of the need to reach a

common target and that collaboration is the most efficient way of doing so. This seems highly

similar to the concept of cooperation, however crucial differences exist. Cooperation is the act

of working together or doing what someone asks you to, in order to reach aligned yet possibly

selfish goals (Cambridge Advanced Learner‟s Dictionary & Thesaurus 2016). The difference

stems from the fact that cooperation reaches lesser depths, as goals may differ and do not

dictate the act of working together. Collaboration only exists when trying to reach a common

goal, without which no collaboration can exist. Thereby, the path or method is also aligned.

Within the capitalistic realities of the private sector, cooperation is the prevailing method of

progress. The problem this causes is the lack of interdependent thinking and the inclusion of

externalities within the action plans. The creation of waste from one source is not linked to

possible use for another. This creates higher resource use and possibly inefficiency. The

previous metaphor of the dinner buffet touches upon this concept of cooperation instead of

collaboration. In order to achieve Nexus thinking, collaboration is crucial in order to create

interdependencies and limit the exclusion of externalities. The reason this research focuses on

collaboration rather than cooperation stems from the fact that the chosen case study of a WEF

Nexus has to adhere to the principles of collaboration. Nevertheless, this is open to academic

debate and for reasons of simplicity, this term will be used in this research.

18

The question remains as to how collaboration is measured and how it will be used in this

research. There are many methods of analysing it and thus exist multiple scales and

indicators. In order to avoid going into the theory of collaboration, it will simply be used as a

given fact within the case study and that all activities contribute towards it. Furthermore, the

research question does not analyse collaboration but the use of it within the WEF Nexus.

Hence, collaboration as a concept will be taken as a given phenomenon within the council and

the research will not compare results to the collaboration guidelines.

The diagram above (figure 4) shows part of the theories used, applied to the WEF Nexus

concept. It shows how governance between sectors, scales and levels interact with each other

in order to create functioning management structures. The complexity thereof is highlighted

through the limited explanation each of the theories (arrows) can provide. Thus, the diagram

shows that multiple theories are needed in order to better understand the Nexus concept and

collaboration therein. The use of the network governance theory can best be explained in its

own right, and has previously been outlined. What becomes clear with the diagram is the

complexity of collaboration streams in the Nexus case study.

In order to obtain a holistic and realistic idea of this collaboration, it would be important to

know how stable it actually is. This stability should allow for the adaptation to change,

whether social or natural, and should therefore encompass a certain degree of flexibility. A

mentioned before, this aspect was the arguable cause of failure of the IWRM theory. Hence,

we arrive at the last part of the main research question; the aspect of adaptability to change.

Multi

level

analy

sis

Multi sector analysis

Multi scale analysis

Figure 4: The multiple theories applied to the WEF Nexus

19

2.7 Hypotheses

Concluding the conceptual chapter as well as the first part of this thesis, it is feasible to state

certain hypotheses which will later be concluded upon. They should also aid in summarizing

the previous chapters and put them into practical outcomes.

1. Regarding the network theory, it is expected that the Machángara river council will

adopt a similar formation and maintain processes of collaboration therein. A network

approach is expected to mitigate the problems of hierarchy and also give certain

flexibilities in the structure.

2. The role of the government is expected to be rather demanding and following a Type I

top-down approach. This comes in contrast to the expected network formation, and

hence shows the benefit of conducting a theoretical multiplicity approach. The

expectation comes from the fact that the president has since his election implemented

several top-down laws, shifting authority to higher institutions.

3. Collaboration within the council will be based on the sector (horizontal) rather than

level based (vertical) processes. This means that collaboration will exist due to similar

sector related interests rather than political or administrative interests.

3. Research question

With the background to the research, the objective, and the theory outlined the following

research questions will guide and finally conclude this research.

Main research question

“How do actors collaborate across sectors, levels and scales in the Water-Energy-Food

Nexus and to what extent are they able to adapt to new challenges?”

Sub-questions

How do actors collaborate horizontally across sectors in the Water-Energy-Food Nexus for

the Machángara catchment?

How do actors collaborate vertically across levels in the Water-Energy-Food Nexus for the

Machángara catchment?

How do the different scales affect the ability of actors to govern natural resources coherently?

To what extent are stakeholder formations able to adapt the Water-Energy-Food Nexus to

current and/or future climate change impacts?

20

4. Methodology

The study area for this research is the Machángara river basin in southern Ecuador, flowing

past the city of Cuenca in the Azuay region. The analysis will focus on stakeholder/actors

connected to the WEF Nexus in the region. This entails that the span of research should not

exceed that of the river basin but the larger context will be taken into account. This means that

government policy or even regional settings will influence the basin scale and therefore play a

role in this investigation. This research will collect information from all existing levels of

governance and possibly all participating actors. This ranges from national to local levels. The

Machángara river council includes several important governmental actors, representing a

national interest in the matter. The involved actors in the region range according to their

respective sectors such as the industry or the agriculture sector. Although the industry is

theoretically not part of the WEF Nexus, it contributes and influences decisions on water

governance. As such, could this research deal with a more elaborate Nexus, containing four

instead of three sectors. However, concluding upon this aspect will occur at a later stage. Due

to their size, some sectors will be summarized through a selection of actors therein. For the

farmers, this selection is based upon the analysis of the farmer union, acting as a mediating

entity. Another important aspect to consider are the three sectors (water, energy and food)

which tend to span across actors. This requires a delineation of sector involvement of each

actor.

Collaboration was taken as the aspect of analysis as it summarizes the functioning of the

council and thus a WEF Nexus. It is also a relatively easy concept to study as it can be

translated in both qualitative and quantitative results. Furthermore, it is an aspect within

governance arrangement that hasn‟t been fully understood and has the tendency to change.

Especially within the larger WEF Nexus investigation, this aspect can bring forth important

information regarding the functioning of the larger system. This research focuses on the

positive collaboration that actors maintain and does not delve into the conflicts within the case

study. This decision was based on the image that the case study possesses, which is that of a

functioning example of a Nexus approach.

Several connections for this research pre-existed from my personal network and aided in the

development of the research angle and questions as well as the furthering of the network such

as Jorge Rodrigo Nuñez. The thesis supervisor also contributed to advancing my network

which proved essential upon arrival. He introduced the professors from the IDHRIA

department of the university of Cuenca, Rolando Celleri and Alex Aviles. They were of vital

help due to their involvement in the council and their experience with similar types of

research conducted in the area. The plan was to use their contacts in order to initiate a first

introduction and encounter. It is very useful to have third persons do the introduction

regarding you and the project as this adds importance to the research. Furthermore, in

developing countries, status is deemed important when trying to realize research. This proved

more efficient than having to write emails and calling these institutions until one actors would

be willing to speak. In fact, one of the closer contacts was Catalina Diaz, who is the technical

secretary of the council. She was able to produce a list of personal contact details of actors

involved in the council. This method of indirect contact proved a long process. One reason

could be the holiday season of the research period or possibly the failing information which

the actors had. In any case it is expected that personal contact would have taken longer due to

the missing status of the research. Furthermore, the Machángara basin is closed to the public

and access is difficult. Due to the introduction to the IDHRIA group I was able to meet other

students doing research in the area who hold an access pass to the area. In addition, through

21

the group I was able to visit the hydroelectric reservoir, which is impossible to reach without

proper vehicle and an experienced driver.

The analysis will be limited to an actor analysis and therefore avoids taking the entire

complexity of the institutional context into account. This is due to time and financial issues,

which exists in most research. Furthermore, focusing on one aspect will give more definite

answers to the research questions, formulated more precisely. Legal statutes and political

realities, as part of the institutional context, will be used to fill the gaps explanatory within the

actor analysis. For example, a new water law has been introduced and constitutes updates to

the old and outdated ones. This law should benefit the integration across sectors as it, for

example, defines more clearly the relative importance of each sector. Furthermore, actors

influence institutional developments and vice versa, indicating that there is no limitation of

importance of institutional change to this research. These aspects are also of importance when

looking at the aspect of durability of the governance arrangement. The institutional setting can

influence the composition of the arrangement and shift it in such a way that it might break, or

vice versa.

Empirical research is crucial for this study in order to obtain relevance through applicability.

Studying governance arrangements and processes in a developing country is hard to base on

existing documents and data as these can be inaccessible or limited in validity/relevance.

Therefore, going into the field to obtain first-hand information is necessary. Methods of

obtaining information include interviews with council members, informal discussions with

relevant external actors and sending out questionnaires. The interviews were conducted in a

semi-structured manner. This was done to steer the conversation in a controlled direction and

yet allow for a certain degree of flexibility which could be used to discuss additional topics

deemed important by the interviewee. This proved very important as the new water law

proved to be an important institutional change for the collaboration within the council. With

the semi-structured format, I was able to adapt the questions and manoeuvre more easily. The

informal discussions were held with actors to whom I held closer ties. These included the

interviews held prior to the research, university professors at the University of Cuenca, the

technical secretary and Mr. Bustamente from the GPA as well as Mr. Idrovo from Elecaustro.

From these discussions I was able to learn a lot about interviewing techniques, the context of

the case study and detailed accounts on how the council functions. Keeping this informal

relationship with certain actors also facilitated the inclusion within the network of actors in

the basin. This proved especially vital as interviews were hard to obtain as actors did not

answer calls or emails. The third method of questionnaires relates to the formal interviews, in

which the interviewees were asked about the cooperation within the council. This information

was given in a quantitative way which allowed me to create the SNA diagram. The final form

of analysis is the use of literature. Although this has been extensively done prior to the data

collection phase, it will serve as a verification of obtained information. Although the research

angle is unique in its way, prior research on governance arrangements in Ecuador does serve

as a comparative method. Yet, it proved insufficient as new laws and organizational

developments were more important than assumed from prior literature review.

In order to obtain data through interviews actors have to be contacted and motivated to

participate in the research. Several aspects aided in the process of obtaining these such as

network use, status of research, and hierarchical consent.

The status of the research proved to be very important. Due to the professors of IDHRIA I

was able to formulate the importance of my research in such a way that it connects to a future

plan of the Azuay government to create a larger Santiago river basin council. My study would

act as a pilot and thus gain importance and status. This aspect was included in all interview

22

invitations I sent out and motivated some actors to speak more openly. There is a trade-off

between being seen as a simple student researcher and being part of a larger project.

Depending on the strived for results, it is best to connect with interviewees on a similar level.

Defending a position relevant to the larger Santiago river plans allowed me to talk to

governmental officials more easily. Yet, having a too high position within a project could

eliminate the openness of local actors. This is where the network comes in place, as it

connects external researchers with local actors through a known mediator.

A final aspect that aided in obtaining interview concessions was the hierarchical path of

working. The initial idea was to contact the top of the council first, in this case the director of

the technical council. Arguably this would avoid cancellations from actors that didn‟t find

confirmation in the status of the research nor the network through which I obtained their

contact. This plan would also create more openness of answers as the director has given

consent to the investigation. The latter happened as several times actors asked from whom I

received the consent to draw information from council functioning. Mentioning the directors

name satisfied these concerns. However, the directors stimulating efforts to bring actors to

answering my email didn‟t bring the expected results. In fact, all interviews were set up

through personal contact or phone. One council actor didn‟t respond to the emails, phone calls

or invitations from the director, leaving ambiguity to the explanation.

A total of fifteen interviews, nine questionnaires and several informal conversations were held

in the duration of the data collection phase from July until September 2016 at the case study

location. The majority of interviewees were members of the Machángara river council. All

interviews were preceded by a formal email with all necessary

information about the research and about the confidentiality

thereof. Each interviewee was informed about their right to

cancel the interview at any given stage and had the right to

review information obtained. In addition, an agreement was

made with the director of the technical council, which stated

that the results of the investigation were to be sent to the

council members. The intention was to record all interviews

that were held with council members as this would avoid loss

of information. Since council member interviews were held in

Spanish, some words were lost in translation but could be

reused after the transcribing the recordings. Consent was asked

with regard to the recordings as well as to the general purpose

and use of the information obtained. Use of a translator was

only necessary for the information leaflets (see figure 5). The

interviews held in Spanish went unexpectedly well and

brought forth fruitful discussions. To ensure proper

understanding, interviewees were occasionally asked to verify a

short summary of the conversational highlights.

The received data should be analysed using proven methods. The interviews will be evaluated

according to qualitative measures whereby the creation of a quantitative scale could aid the

understanding. Interview recordings are transcribed according to keywords and themes. In

general, the interviews were grouped according to various categories such as „cooperation‟

and ‟new water law‟. This automatically highlights the two important aspects of this research

which are the actor and institutional setting. In order to obtain quantitative data from the

interviews, the questionnaires are reviewed through ranking the given answers. This is only

possible with certain answers which regard a hierarchical response (eg. very bad to very

Figure 5: Interview invitation info sheet

23

good). The responses can be used for the Social Network Analysis (SNA) tool in order to

create a network diagram. This diagram can highlight the complexity and density of

interaction within the council and beyond. It aids in the understanding of the qualitative

results by visualizing outcomes. Furthermore, graphs are helpful when comparing certain

hypotheses to be tested. When analysing interaction within certain settings they can produce

valuable insights. In summary, this research will focus on both the qualitative and quantitative

aspects when analysing the collaboration within the governance arrangement in the

Machángara river basin.

We have delved into the general context of what this research aims to achieve, established a

research framework and connected a methodology to it and have outlined a complex but solid

theoretical framework which will compensate for any lacking guidance from the WEF Nexus

concept. Therefore, progress will be made towards answering the research question through

the presentation of the results gathered at the case study. Hereby, it is important to keep the

theoretical characteristics in mind as these will be combined with the empirical results in the

discussion chapter. The points drawn from there will finalize this research in the conclusion

chapter.

24

5. Results

The empirical findings of this research will be presented according to the following structure.

At first, this chapter will present findings regarding the institutional and actor context.

Therein, overarching developments, problems and characteristics will be described.

Thereafter, the explanatory results will be presented, which include the preliminary answers

to the research questions.

5.1 The Institutional setting

Agriculture, hydropower generation and drinking water and sanitation are the key components

the Azuay region depends on from the river (Borrero Vega, 2015). Furthermore, the third

largest city in Ecuador, Cuenca, is located at the Machángara river basin. Many people

depend on the environmental services of the region to maintain these three sectors (Buckalew

et. al., 1998). Per year, about304 hm3 of water is available for hydropower production,

irrigation, drinking water systems and industrial users (Celleri, 2016). This amount is split

between the three sectors and creates input and output on a regional scale. The hydropower is

generated by the Saucay and Saymirin dams, generating 39.5 MW of electricity. 840 l/s of

water are used for the drinking water treatment plant Tixán and the industrial park north of the

city. The irrigation system composes the third part of the WEF Nexus, consisting of the

Machángara, Checa-Sidcay and the Ricaurte systems. The natural complexity makes this case

study relatively unique and thus difficult to compare to other examples.

Good natural resource governance requires that the institutional processes go paired with the

given natural setting such as described above. To balance the allocation of resources, such as

water, efficient governance arrangements need to allow for integration across sectors.

Furthermore, with changing environmental contexts social structures need to be sufficiently

flexible in dealing with change. The current governance arrangement in Ecuador and

specifically in the Azuay region is complex. Several times the water management was

rescaled from regional, to municipal and basin levels (Warner et. al., 2014). Currently the

basin is regulated through an inter-institutional entity struggling to integrate stakeholders

across sectors in the scalar conundrum. The basin scale only regulates water resources and

does not contain any governmental capacity such as jurisdictional or administrative powers.

Thus, the council has no legal or executive power and faces different regional and local

scales, operating at their own spheres of influence. In addition, the basin contains a high

complexity of actors with different interests and motives (Warner et. al., 2014).

From the above description, several

themes stick out and provide a

guideline for further analysis.

Examples are the rescaling of

governance arrangements, inter-

institutional entities and balancing

use of resources. Thus, the

institutional setting will be presented

according to three main phenomena.

These are the new water law,

decentralization and the Machángara

river council.

In summary: The new water law

- Entered into force in 2014

- Official name: Ley orgánica de recursos

hídricos, usos y aprovechamiento del agua

- Approved by the national assembly, created

by SENAGUA

- Sets the prioritization of water in times of

shortage

- Reorganizes the river council structure:

larger Santiago basin will oversee its sub-

basins among which, the Machángara

- SENAGUA is the implementing body

25

The new water law

Confronting this given social complexity, the previous administration has implemented

several changes to the institutional setting. Part of the reason was the 2009 drought, which

impacted the whole of Ecuador and caused shortage in electricity. In part, this was due to the

limited hydropower output due to the lowwater flow and the subsequent downstream uses

such as irrigation and drinking water. In times of crisis concessions must be made regarding

water allocation and use thereof. This causes tensions between various levels of governance

as well as between sectors. A new „water law‟ was introduced to set certain managerial and

structural rules which should improve the governance of water. This new law sets forth a set

of priorities which should take effect in times of water shortage. These are 1. Drinking water,

2. Irrigation, and 3. Ecological purposes. Fourth priority are the production activities which

include Hydroelectricity, touristic activities etc. (Ley de recursos hidricos, 2014). Hence, the

new law impacts the way in which natural resources are prioritized and thus governed. This

will have consequences for the relationships within the way these governance arrangements

function. Most notably, a governmental entity needs to implement and control this law. In the

case of Ecuador, SENAGUA is the governmental body that oversees that the water law is

implemented correctly. This actor also provides the permits for using the water in the region

for which stricter rules have been introduced. Formerly one permit could hold up to 5

companies but now each entity needs to apply separately to obtain a license (Bustamente,

2016). The new law supports the claim that the state owns the natural resources and hence

holds sole power to decide upon its use.

The new law also carries significant additional changes to the Azuay region. For example,

article 5 of that lawdictates that the State is the main authority of all water related activities

and should always be consulted (Ley de recursos hidricos, 2014). Regarding the duties of the

same state, environmental protection and conservation only comes as a subsection within

article 83, in which it falls under climate change adaptation and mitigation. In effect, the state

prioritizes water governance over any other sector, failing to adhere to the fragile

interlinkages between ecosystem and natural resources and thereby limits the importance of

the third priority of the new water law, ecological purposes.

Another change is the restructuring of the river council and other water managing bodies. The

idea is to create larger administrative areas in which one large council assimilates knowledge

and information to and from the smaller councils and bodies. This means that the Machángara

river council will fall under the Santiago council and report to it. The purpose is to facilitate

communication and improve knowledge transmission. Essentially framed as

„decentralization‟ this restructuring should give local councils a more effective voice than

being a dispersion of unofficial entities regulating local water supplies. Nevertheless, the

water law and its responding changes are subject to a top-down approach of governance,

whereby the state maintains authority and directs processes. In effect, not much changes for

the Machángara river council in terms of composition or status. For the long term, power is

diverted upwards as local basins indirectly follow the guidelines of the state. It is debatable

whether this change will be a positive or negative step towards decentralization as this change

is only in its planning stage.

Decentralization

The priorities set as well as the Santiago river council plans, are created and implemented

from the government down to the people (top-down). This is occurringwhile the general trend

in recent years in Ecuador was that of decentralization. This has mainly been attributed to the

former president, Correa (Aviles, 2016). The idea is to give regional and local authorities

more power to implement more efficiently, projects according to perceived necessities.

26

However, through laws such as the new water law of 2014, the reality shows that the

government gives the orders from the top to be implemented locally. The reasoning is that

these laws are produced and enforced at the top and limited consultation with, for example,

the river basin councils is evident. The new law proposes a larger basin council to take over

the authority of smaller river councils such as the Machángara river council. The aim is to

minimize bureaucracy and increase efficiency (Bustamente, 2014). Furthermore, benefits

arise for finances as these can be distributed by and according to regional needs instead of a

central organ. Financing from a higher levelled or foreign source is still needed and sought

(Bustamente, 2016). Ecuador and the Machángara basin have close ties to the World Bank

and institutions such as GIZ (Uyaguari, 2016). However, simplification causes issues of

adaptability and flexibility at the regional and local levels as this is where the law is turned

into action. Due to the numerous levels of governance involved, it becomes apparent that the

communication between them needs to be fluent for any change to its structure to be

successful. Thus, one of the key features to find during the actor analysis is the cooperation

between vertical administrative levels (multi-level governance).

Historically the Azuay region has been known to cooperate effectively within its boundaries.

However, Quito (the capital) limited its cooperation with southern regions in the past, leaving

them to run autonomously while creating a perception of distrust (Idrovo, 2016). As such,

private and public bodies within Cuenca, act on a familiar basis and keep a broad network of

relationships. Many activities are governed by friendship ties due to the relatively small size

of the city. Furthermore, the Azuay region is known for its good cooperation especially

regarding the water sector. There are examples of neighbouring regions in which water

conflicts are evident.

The Machángara river council

The Machángara river basin council (Consejo de la cuenca del rio Machángara) is an inter-

institutional formation composed of eight different actors from the private as well as public

domains. Allactors are related to the allocation of water drawn from the river for purposes of

energy, food and water and hence directly compose the stakeholders of a WEF Nexus. The

council is structured according to a board of directors, which formulates actions and a

technical council which implements them. Each of the eight entities bring forth two or three

people to be involved in the technical council‟s processes. For larger actors, their functions

would be director, general secretary and technical advisor (Diaz, 2016). The council functions

on a rotating chair, typically the general secretary, who facilitates communication between the

board of directors and the technical council as well as within the technical council.

This council gathers on a regular basis to discuss future activities and allocate resources

according to the demands. Current activities are the establishment of a water fund for

conservation activities, community natural resource management program enabling local

participation, education programs on water use and the legalization of properties. The council

also advises and finances technical solutions such as the lining of irrigation channels,

reforestation, implementing drip irrigation and maintaining/building new canals (Celleri,

2016). Due to the lacking official status of the council regarding its voluntary membership, it

does not meet on a regular basis. This is interesting regarding the fact that departments within

institutions are devoted to the council‟s activities which creates a core group of active

members. Its unofficial status bestows no legal or administrative powers onto its activities.

Impact of the council‟s output is therefore limited to its basin boundaries unless governmental

decree states otherwise.

27

The Machángara river basin is divided into three main sections, namely the lower, middle and

upper basin (see figure 1). These parts divide the basin according to natural borders, such that

the upper basin contains most of the paramo (moorland) vegetation whereas the lower basin

has a higher urbanized area. Furthermore, these divisions allow the river council to divide

their work according to their competences (table 2). As such, the council works on specific

tasks needed per geographic region of the basin. This means that the governance

arrangements adapt their structure and activities according to the natural surroundings. Hence,

there is a subordination of governance structures to that of natural structures. Such a

prioritization benefits collaboration as hierarchy is created on natural terms and not on social

ones. Arguably, this should create more stable social relations as nature is less fragile than

social processes.

To understand the context in which the council operates and justifies its actions on a basin

level, it is important to understand the problems it faces. Furthermore, knowing the specific

problems will aid in the understanding and developing analysis of the council‟s composition

in which detailed functions of individuals will become clearer. The problems can be grouped

into environmental, social and technical categories and influence the relationships which

council members maintain. It is these problems that shape or break the ties between actors.

The following problems are specific for the Machángara river basin and do not relate to the

larger institutional context such as the new water law or larger climate change problems. First,

the environmental problems will be explained, followed by the social and then technical ones.

The main natural problem within the Machángara basin is the changing precipitation patterns

which result in extreme variance in terms of water availability. Although the river is fed by an

underground spring stemming from ayear-round wet peat land, it is significantly reduced

during the dryer periods. To counter this, reservoirs have been built aiding the ecosystem as

well as the water availability downstream. Nevertheless, water use is reduced during the dry

season to keep a constant water table. Thus, the phenomenon of precipitation goes paired with

desertification of the basin. Besides the decreasing rainfall, increasing human migration as

well as production output cause for vegetation covers to decline. This directly affects water

retention and affects water flow. Henceforth, reforestation is one of the key projects in the

basin conducted by the council. Foremost, information on these geophysical activities is still

lacking but required in order to develop further programs countering these natural problems.

The social problems in the basin, arguably related to the increasing migration of people, focus

on matters of legal ambiguity and issues of competences. Farmers must compete on land use

and rights with private land owners, who have acquired land in the past. Many of the basin‟s

land owners are originally foreigners (mostly from the USA) who have leased or borrowed

their land to locals. This in turn is problematic because documentation is oftentimes lacking,

causing for disputes of land rights. Official registration/documentation is also the cause of

land owners entering protected areas. This causes friction between council members in charge

of technically registering pastures through measurements and those in charge of formally

legalizing. In addition to this comes the role of environmental actors, who do not perceive the

same social objectives as others. It is therefore, that the basin is closed for public access as

this should mitigate illegal activities and avoid further development within the basin. The

problem thereby is that the council has no legal power and therefore cannot prohibit the

access to common lands. Collaboration on such a closure should be unanimous and should not

exclude certain actors. Hence, the issue of legality and the issuing of land use certificates

strains the relationships within the council and the larger basin.

Issues of competences exist in many cases in which governance arrangements are restructured

28

and actors need to adjust to their new tasks. The case of the Machángara regards the overuse

of water resulting in problems for all sectors affiliated and the council itself. Although this

happens on a small scale, the council strives to educate and control on the usage of water.

This is done primarily within the basin as the city holds a set percentage of water to be used.

Use in the basin is harder to control and its solution relies on communication and education of

communities. It is evident that there is a trade-off between improving the quantity and quality

of the environment affecting the flow/availability of water and securing equal social

development in line with national laws and targets. These two realms are very evident in

many river basins and will therefore also be studied regarding the river council. Furthermore,

with the entry of the Agencia de Regulación y Control del Agua (ARCA) as stated by the new

water law, a new technical actor is added to the council. Beyond the general problem of the

young age of the law and it still being implemented, communication between the Secretaría

Nacional del Agua (SENAGUA) and its counterpart ARCA is still very weak (Bustamente,

2016). In terms of organization, the new water law needs time to implement and actors to

adjust their new objectives and tasks. However, the law was introduced in 2014 and has thus

given both institutions and actors time to adjust. Therefore, it is debatable what the needed

timeframe of implementing a new law should be. In this case, institutions and actors alike

have had two years to adapt. Strengthening the argument that sufficient time has passed is the

fact that ARCA, until today, does not have a regional office in Azuay and hence lacks the

physical ability to establish important relationships with the council. This responds in very

slow administration of licenses and other processes and creates confusion within the council

regarding tasks (Bustamente, 2016). On the one hand, (as previously established) the

historical context of the Azuay region creates a favourable environment for working

relationships and should therefore aid in the adaptation to the new law. On the other hand,

deep historical ties strengthen governance arrangements but limit its flexibility. Hence, this

analysis will focus on finding both durability and flexibility of cooperation within the basin.

The Machángara river has long been controlled to such an extent that the natural river remains

a mere stream, whereas most of the water is contained within canals. These split according to

their purposes such as irrigation, drinking water and sanitation and hydropower. The drinking

water canals are the biggest and best maintained. Arguably, this can be traced to the financial

means of the energy sector in comparison to others and to the priority of energy within the

law. About 80% of the irrigation canals are at the end of their life but due to lacking financial

means repairs or replacement of them is not planned for the foreseeable future. Some of them

are more than 40 years old, resulting in efficiency losses through leakages or misuse through

tapping (Uyaguari, 2016). Although irrigation holds a strong second position within the

national priorities, local communities must, to a substantial extent, finance the maintenance of

the canals by themselves. The budget stems from local donations, private financiers and some

governmental funds. The discrepancy between these sectors within the institutional setting

seems to refute the third hypothesis of strong sectoral cooperation. However, the technical

problems are mostly dealt with at a local scale, rather than a basin scale, and thus only affect a

small amount of council members at a time. The local users, including its boards,

communities and municipalities are responsible for technical assistance to keeping the water

flow. This implies that the cooperation within the council reaches beyond the technicalities at

the lower governance levels. This aspect will deserve further examination later on.

Although a broader (national/international) view is not is not directly relevant for the case

study, it can serve as a guide for future developments and possibly explain certain regional

endeavours.

29

One factor significantly influencing the sectors of the WEF Nexus is the fact that Ecuador

relies on agricultural and petroleum exports. These account for 30% and 52% respectively of

national income (CEPAL, 2015). Important is that these sectors rely on the functioning of the

water, energy and food sectors. Agricultural output is heavily dependent on water availability

through irrigation and energy through the pumping of groundwater. More importantly, the

importance of petroleum exports shines a different light on the creation of the new water law

in which energy provision ranks last. This is ironic as Ecuador strives to achieve 80% of total

energy production by 2020 to originate from hydropower thus stressing the ability to draw

water by the other sectors (Energia16 website).The recent oil drillings in the Yasuni rainforest

introduce questions regarding the prioritizing of certain sectors and the intention behind the

water law.

What this larger institutional setting shows is that the WEF Nexus is impacted by further

reaching contexts than its immediate surroundings. This creates a new level of complexity,

which this research will no delve into, but remains important to consider.

The three main themes outlined include the new water law with the established priorities, the

new phenomenon of restructuring administrative arrangements through decentralization, and

finally the river council itself and the historical context of the region in which it operates. It

seems likely that the institutional setting has a significant impact on the governance

arrangement in the basin. In fact, it becomes interesting to find out to what extent the actor

setting is influenced by the given setting.

5.2 The actor setting

Knowing the institutional setting, the description of the actors relevant in this research will be

defined. Due to the relative importance of each actor, a detailed description of each will be

necessary. This will be done by presenting a table summarizing the council members and their

respective characteristics, followed by a more detailed and argued description of each and

outlining their ties within the council. This will serve as a basis on which the continuing

results will connect as the relevant actors will be described. In addition, this section outlines

the actors which are deemed missing from the council but which have evident and claimed

ties to it.

30

Actor Purpose Projects Involve

ment

Sector Scale Area of activity Spokesperson

Empresa Pública Municipal de

Teléfonos, Agua Potable y

Alcantarillado (ETAPA)

Municipal public

telecommunications,

potable water, sewer and

sanitation service

company of the city of

Cuenca

Technical support,

Capacity building,

Uncultivated land

Monitoring quality of

water, ecosystem

maintenance,

“conservation and

production”,

90% of lands do not

have paper of official

properties: Legalizing,

Highly involved in

council, Co-founder,

MICPA- conservation,

ARES - research

5 Water City of

Cuenca

Upper and

middle basin

Catalina Díaz –

Technical council

secretary

Paul Vintimilla –

Director of Technical

Council

Fabián Barrera -

Engineer

Empresa Electro Generadora del

Austro (ELECAUSTRO S.A.)

Electricity Generation Company

of the Austro

Two hydroelectric dams

on the river. They

contribute to national

energy production

Reforestation „green

corridor‟, largest

financier, controls entry

to the Machangara area

(even though illegal),

5 Energy Regional Upper basin Diego Idrovo Murillo

Junta General de Usuarios del

Sistema de Riego Machángara

(JGUSRM)

Machángara Water Users Board

Users of the river basin

irrigation sectors.

The Machángara

irrigation channel

capacity: 770 liters per

second and provides

water for the irrigation of

584 hectares, benefiting

2,325 families,

Servicing the canals,

mediating voice for

local users

4 Food Machángara

basin

Middle and

upper parts of

the basin

Angel Uyaguari

31

Secretaria Nacional del Agua

(SENAGUA)

National Secretariat for Water

Supervisory institution

for water resources in

Ecuador: oversee

integrated water

management throughout

the national territory,

through policies,

regulations, monitoring

and decentralized

management.

The new water law Water National Xavier Murillo

Ministerio de Agricultura,

Ganadería, Acuacultura y Pesca

(MAGAP)

Ministry of agricultural

output. Within the

Machángara basin it

mainly concerns itself

with irrigation and

drainage management:

Consolidating and

executing the National

Irrigation and Drainage

Plan through the

establishment of public

policies that contribute to

agricultural development

in order to guarantee food

sovereignty

Irrigation with the

farmers (not the main

stream which is

authority of provincial

government)

Optimization of water

use. Riego = provincial

gob, mixed water matter

= SENAGUA,

3 Food National Carlos Cisneros

Provincial government of Azuay

(GPA)

Promotes and executes

works at the provincial

level: environment,

irrigation and

management of the river

basins and microbasins

Plan de manejo de

cambio climático,

legalization, limiting the

fencing/closing of

properties, 17 climate

goals, map of

4 Food Regional Oscar Sanchez

32

under its jurisdiction vegetation,

Universidad de Cuenca Research activities Domestic animal

education, hydro cycle

analysis, plant research,

GIS mapping,

5 Regional Andres Alvarado

The Ministry of Environment

(MAE)

Enforcing environmental

legislation with regard to

the conservation of flora,

fauna and wildlife

Forestmaintenance,

conservation

volunteering, „socio

bosque‟, environmental

education, soil analysis,

vulnerability analysis,

„Condor‟,

3-4 Water National Upper basin Silvio Cabrera

Table 2: Members of the Machàngara river council

33

ELECAUSTRO

Compañía Electro Generadora del Austro is the regional electricity company. It was founded

in 1999 and provides energy to the national energy grid. Although traditionally a private

company, its largest shareholders are the national ministry of energy and regional

governmental bodies (ELECAUSTRO website, 2016). This aspect is important when looking

at figure 7 (diagram of council structure) where it becomes clear that energy is the only sector

controlled by a sole entity. This point is strengthened by the fact that ELECAUSTRO is the

largest financial contributor to the council. Of interest, as well is that the relationship with

ETAPA and the university of Cuenca is very good. The previous observations are crucial

when analysing the cooperation within the council at a later point. Its activities, like all actors

within the council, range broadly and encompass activities not related to the official business

of providing energy. These include for example reforestation of the conservation area in the

basin or legalizing private properties. The latter is an effort to legitimize the properties within

the basin, which until recently had not been registered by the governmental authority.

Registering these properties requires a legal authority to do so and the technical knowledge to

distinguish properties from the protected and other fragile areas. Like many projects, this is

done in collaboration with many other council members and beyond.

ETAPA

Empresa Pública Municipal de Teléfonos, Agua Potable y Alcantarillado is the municipal

company dealing with phone networks, drinking water and sewage. Its origins are found with

the telecommunications business where after it expanded its services according to the needs of

the city (ETAPA website). Within the council its main purpose is the representation of the

water sector and its importance to the city of Cuenca. Due to its tasks, ETAPA is closely

engaged with local actors, especially in the basin. As table 2 shows, its activities range from

environmental conservation to reforestation and maintenance of canals. It possesses authority

over the main canal in the Machángara basin for which it bears sole responsibility. Unlike the

many other canals in the basin, the purpose is not based on irrigation but drinking water. Like

ELECAUSTRO, ETAPA is a major financial contributor for the council. Related to the

council structure diagram (figure 7) we can see that it shares the water sector with one other

entity only. It therefore embodies an important player of the water sector and can hence acts

accordingly with its activities.

GPA

The provincial government of the Azuay region is the regional embodiment of the

government. Its main tasks involve the environment, irrigation and management of the river

basins and micro basins under its jurisdiction. Its activities represent the managerial angle of

the activities conducted in the basin. These include the provision of a management plan,

legalizing projects, overseeing activities and connecting action to the climate goals (Sánchez,

2016). Its position regarding one of the WEF Nexus sectors is tricky to conclude. The reason

it is indicated in the food sector stems from its main activities relating to irrigation activities

in the basin. The involvement of the GPA is important in most activities of the council since it

takes the role of intermediary body between the state and the local levels as well as between

formal and informal roles within the basin. This means that the GPA legitimizes certain

activities and hence possesses a valuable tool to defend its importance within the council.

MAE

The ministry of environment is a national entity distributed within Ecuador and its regions. It

has smaller and larger offices in each region, whereby in Cuenca it maintains two offices. One

of these contributes within the Machángara council actively. Its main task within the basin is

34

the conservation of the upper basin area (Cabrera, 2016). It does this by enforcing the

environmental laws in effect. Due to its activities focusing on the upper area of the basin, few

projects involve a complex social context and therefore limit the involvement with other

council actors. Nevertheless, the MAE maintains a legal position, which council members

need to consult when activities overlap. For example, the legalization of properties sometimes

reaches into the protected area (moorland) and hence the competence of MAE. The quality of

water is also maintained from the upper basin, setting the importance of environmental

conservation efforts. Reforestation and canal infrastructure as well as the flow of water are

issues which need to be addressed jointly with the MAE. It should also be mentioned that this

actor concludes greater ties outside the council including the World Bank. With such

relationships, it receives funding for its projects and concludes an important actor within the

council in terms of creating a network. However, limited contact is needed with the Council

from the side of MAE, due to its focus on environmental aspects rather than social.

UNIVERSITY OF CUENCA

As one of the four main universities in Cuenca, it stands out due to its involvement within the

council. Its position therein was established when it served as a mediating body between

disputing parties. It is also the only non-aligned actor, meaning it has no direct interest within

the council nor is it politically affiliated. Such an actor is important in keeping balance as its

mediating history has shown. Today, it is heavily involved with technical assistance for

activities and decision making. Its position is unrivaled partly explainable through the fact

that it does not belong to a direct sector within the Nexus. This makes a difference regarding

its purpose and connectedness to the basin. Noticeable is that the extent of its relationships

tends to be limited and more concentrated. This implies that it maintains near to perfect ties

with the core group including ELECAUSTROand ETAPA, but fails to hold ties to the

JGSURM for example. This could serve as a cause of its missing affiliation with a specific

sector. Nevertheless, such discrepancies could also question its neutrality.

MAGAP

The ministry of agriculture was previously represented by INAR (National Irrigation

Institute).This institute oversaw the development of irrigation schemes in the country. It did

so by supporting organizations and entities which are implementing projects on irrigation

improvement. Founded in 2007 it concluded a newer membership within the council but left

in 2014 with the entry of the new water law. MAGAP strives to tackle the same issues, with

the difference that it has multiple objectives beyond irrigation. Its entry also serves as the

official embodiment of the food sector within the council. Like SENAGUA, it holds local

offices and direct contact with local entities. It currently maintains closer ties with the GPA,

JGUSRM and actors involved with irrigation. Therefore, it seems that the entry of an official

governmental body in the agricultural sector was still lacking. Due to its governmental status,

it challenges the dominant role of SENAGUA in the council and on topics regarding water.

As such, its entry could be a step towards a WEF Nexus with balances being created from the

actor setting rather than the larger institutional one. MAGAP is an important actor within

Ecuador as it maintains ties with international institutions such as the World Bank, which

serve as financial beneficiaries for projects. In contrast to most members and affiliates, such

international ties serve as a means of projecting the Azuay region abroad and exchange

knowledge. Historically, the Ecuadorian government has been skeptical of international

cooperation and even expelled certain foreign actors such as the GIZ. This creates dominant

actors within the country and could create deadlocks in governance settings. Hence, it is

important that actors maintain ties outside the country in order to balance power relations and

improve best practices.

35

JGUSRM

Junta General de Usuarios del Sistema de Riego Machángara (Machángara Water Users

Board) is the joint body of mainly farmers and other private residents in the basin. In 1998 the

state granted the basin‟s users to govern the water of the Machángara. However, as a board it

does not have a budget alike the other actors and relies on funding from external sources.

Although receiving consent for its creation, it does not receive governmental funding.

Arguably, this is a reason it maintains good relationships with ETAPA and the GPA. The

JGUSRM is an important actor in connecting the local communities in the basin to the

developments of the council and vice versa. Acting as a mediating body, it is vital for the

cohesion of the council. Its ties to ETAPA are represented not only through the large

financing but also the shared office at the JGUSRM. This collaboration is unique within the

council and yet seems to be neglected under the visible relationships of the core group.

SENAGUA

The national secretariat for water is the institution responsible for overseeing water resources

in Ecuador. It has governmental powers and serves as the executive power for implementing

the law. It does this through policies, regulations, monitoring and decentralized management.

Although steered directly from the government, its decentralized arrangement allows for

regionally adapted policy input. The Azuay office of SENAGUA serves as a mediating body

between regional/local interests and those of the government. It is due to this function that

national laws such as the water law of 2014 are tailored to needs of regions and vice versa.

Being the voice or embodiment of the government in topics related to water resources it

enjoys greater responsibilities and thus influence in the council. It does not finance the council

directly, not does it implement projects within the basin. Nevertheless, its importance stems

from the policy oriented responsibilities such as legalizing or approving projects.

ARCA

This actor has officially entered the council with entry of the new water law in 2014, yet has

not been able to actively take part in its meetings. This is mainly due to its lacking regional

office as well as the slowly developing clarity on tasks. Its main task is to technically aid

SENAGUA and the council in making decision regarding regional as well as local water

policy. As a governmental agency, it does not possess technical capacities of investigation but

collects information and knowledge from local actors and then processes it. Ironically,

effective communication and a functioning relationship with the council is therefore essential.

This also creates problems at the local scale when citizens or companies need to apply for

certificates of water use, in the absence of a physical office (Bustamente, 2016). With the

new-found authority of the state in matters of natural resource management, is it important

that ARCA establishes itself rapidly within the council. If successful, the addition should

facilitate knowledge exchange from local actors to higher levels of governance. As such, this

entity facilitates the strived-for decentralization in which the new water law has been

introduced.

Arguably due to the size of the basin, the Machángara river council composes a rather small

contingency of actors. Officially registered are eight members. Although this size might be

effective for several reasons, external ties will sometimes be inevitable. One reason for this is

the ever-changing composition of governance arrangements, creating new actors and

eliminating others. INAR is one of those actors losing its role within the council to MAGAP

due to the restructured. Another reason is the geographic location of the Machángara river and

its shared source for many of the larger rivers in Ecuador but also the Amazon. The question

remains: which actors do indirectly engage with the council but are not officially part of it?

36

To answer this question, interviewees were asked to outline actors which they felt were

missing in the analysis of this research. Respondents were free to choose actors they felt

contributed directly/indirectly to the processes within the basin.

IP

The industrial park is an important actor within the basin as it uses the water drawn from the

river and contributes to its pollution. However, is it not an official member of the council and

neither does it actively contribute to the activities thereof. This is a unique situation within the

basin as it is a direct user and polluter, yet fails to hold any meaningful ties with the council.

One reason for its lacking involvement could be its highly diverse and ranging composition.

There are about 120 companies from all sorts of sectors contained in the industrial park. The

chamber of commerce of the Azuay region is a potential spokesperson for the park, however,

likewise communication with the council is not evident. ETAPA seems to maintain a dire

relationship with the IP in cases of severe pollution which would affect the drinking water

supply. However, this relationship is not based on long-term visions to improve the pollution

output.

GAD

The municipality of Cuenca is an important partner for many council members but especially

for ETAPA. Due to the downstream location of the city of Cuenca it enjoys a direct flow of

water from the Machángara river. It therefore also controls a significant role in the flow

further downstream. This could carry importance for the future endeavors of the Santiago

basin plans for which the GAD may develop a significant role. However, like many other

administrative or governmental bodies, the GAD does not hold a position within the river

council.

FONAPA/Fondo del Agua

This entity was created in 2008 through eight members. Three of those, namely

ELECAUSTRO, ETAPA and University of Cuenca, are present within the Machángara river

council. These three actors constitute the core group within the river council, thereby

questioning the reasons why this entity is not part of the council. It also maintains ties with

MAE in the endeavour of maintaining the ecological systems through e.g. Reforestation.

Fondo del Agua is an initiative aimed at improving the ecological and hydrological systems of

the Paute river. This river covers a larger area than that of the Machángara but stems from the

same source, namely the Cajas national park. This aspect relates well to the previous

statement, in that the city of Cuenca and the Machángara basin constitute an important

starting point for most hydrological systems downstream. This also raises the importance of

its actors and with that the role of FONAPA. This body shares characteristics with the

Machángara river basin in terms of constituents, tasks and area of activity. Yet, it differs in

the sense that it works internationally and holds various projects in South America. This

stimulates knowledge exchange and funding for projects. Arguably, the relationship with

certain Machángara river council members brings some of that knowledge and funding to the

basin. However, evidence of this is lacking.

SETECI

The Secretaria tecnica de cooperacion internacional strives to improve political and

organizational systems from regional to international levels. Its main goal is to improve

cooperation between entities within governance arrangements. Its absence was constituted by

the GPA representative who claims to have a relatively stable relationship with this actor. In

part, this is due to the capacity building goals which the Azuay region reaches out to in order

37

to improve their administrative and political processes. It might well be a good sign that such

an entity is not necessary to be represented within the council, nevertheless it shows the lack

of capacity building actors therein. Change is coming with the new water law and its

restructuring and thus creates questions as to the flexibility of the council.

Condesan

This NGO maintained relationships with the council (specifically ETAPA) in the past. This

was based on a mutual friendship and encompassed informational exchange as a key activity.

Recently the connection was lost since the contact person at Condesan left the job and hence

broke off communications with ETAPA. Although the cooperation was at a minimum, it did

provide for the promotion of the council abroad. In fact, to such an extent that the website

outlining the Machàngara case study initiated this research. Especially relating to the larger

work and image of the council, it is important to promote such activities through NGO‟s

willing to research and communicate about it. This stimulates knowledge exchange and

potentially pushes for financial incentives.

38

6. Answering the research question

The following section will present the explanatory results which will strive to answer the

respective sub-questions and will be structured accordingly. However, clarity will develop

once the theoretical framework is being connected to the findings in the evaluation chapter

hereafter.

6.1 Horizontal and vertical collaboration

To analyse collaboration in governance arrangements, it is important to regard horizontal and

vertical directions of social interaction. These were outlined in the conceptual framework and

are hereby applied to the case study. The sub-questions 1 and 2: “How do actors collaborate

horizontally across sectors in the Water-Energy-Food Nexus for the Machángara

catchment?“ and “How do actors collaborate vertically across levels in the Water-Energy-

Food Nexus for the Machángara catchment?” will be answered jointly due to their shared use

of findings and their complementary reasoning.

“We work horizontally” claims Catalina Diaz, the technical secretary of the council during the

interview, talking about the council and its ways of working (2016). The technical council

works conjointly and with the people. She states that “we are one of them”, on the issue of

working with locals in implementing projects in the basin (Diaz, 2016).However, the two-

leveled structure of the council includes a director‟s level, which creates plans to be

implemented by the technical council. Hence, the technical council needs to work vertically to

properly implement the tasks from above. Nevertheless, the directors work vertically due to

the necessity of communicating with governments and other relevant levels of governance.

Thus, the overall council works in both vertical and horizontal directions, however, actual

implementation of projects happens through horizontal collaboration by the technical

council.To find out whether this simplified methodology is actually true, the interviews as

well as the management plan of the river council will be used. The management plan gives a

detailed description of the internal functioning of the council through previous analysis

including graphs. The findings give answer to both research questions and therefore the

structure will follow that of the findings rather than the horizontal/vertical division.

Firstly, the plan gives a description of projects, actor and processes, and outlines detailed

social interactions and the effects thereof. For example, a list of prioritized problems is given

with the severity and the specific actors able and responsible of solving that problem. The

council also delineates between competences and authority of its actors in dealing with

objectives. However, most acknowledged problems relate to technical rather than social

solutions. One reason could be the technical capacity of the council; however, the social

aspect is evident in the activities of the actors as presented in the actor description.

Misuse of

water

resources

3 •Lack of resources

for maintenance of

irrigation and

drinking water

systems

•Lack of awareness

and lack of concern

• Train users

• Train system operators

• Technical improvement

of irrigation systems

• Improve Operation and

Maintenance of Water

Systems

•Community board

•Ministry of

Environment

•Community

•Municipality

•GPA

•ETAPA EP

Table 3: Problem description and solution. Source: Plan de Manejo

39

The translated extract from the management plan (table 3) shows the priority, cause, solution

and responsible actors for the problem of water misuse. What sticks out is that the priority of

this problem is rather low considering the consequences for the council. Noticeable is that the

extent to which social causes or solutions are presented is limited. Especially in the

Machángara basin, misuse is mainly attributed to overuse and leakages (Uyaguari, 2016).

Hence, it would be rational to adopt a social solution to this problem especially regarding the

competences of the actors listed. Another interesting feature of this example is that it fails to

perceive SENAGUA as one of the actors with solving capacities. Nevertheless, under the new

law (initiated before the management plan) SENAGUA is to be informed always and should

play a vital role in ensuring good cooperation and legitimacy of all projects. A final remark is

that the solutions tend to follow a top-down approach in which locals are educated on

management and maintenance tasks. This would suggest more vertical methods, however the

actors implementing these solutions tend to be mostly public institutions. Automatically these

have a greater democratic accountability and hence constitute more horizontal processes.

The second aspect of the management plan is the axis diagram (figure 6), which shows all the

actors in the Machángara basin including the council. It allocates the actors on a horizontal

and vertical axis. The horizontal axis represents the technicality of the topic ranging from

social to environmental. The vertical axis shows the level of governance of each actors,

ranging from international to local, whereby the international actors are represented by for

example NGOs. The light blue group clearly represents the council and its immediate

connections. Public entities are colored in brown, communities in green, civil society in

purple and others in pink. Noticeable is that some actors, such as the GAD, are colored as part

of the council even though they do not hold a direct seat therein. A possible explanation could

be the simplification of the coding, taking actors on board which have strong ties to the

council. It is important to consider that the diagram was made in collaboration with the

council, thereby creating a certain bias. The diagram gives a good impression of how complex

both sub-questions are and the inter-linkages they require between vertical and horizontal

processes.

The vertical axis shows the relative level of governance at which the actor is engaging and is

holding connections with, ranging from local to international. Overall, the council aligns more

towards the regional or national levels, shown by most actors placed beneath the center. This

should not be a surprise as the council does not engage with higher levelled actors. Striking is

the position of MAGAP, which seems to be the outlier with a high relation to local levels.

This comes in contradiction to the expectation of the JGUSRM, which is the embodiment of

local landowners and farmers. This could be due to the ties which it holds with for example

the World Bank and thus promotes to a higher ranking on this axis. This argument would

place MAGAP at the local levels due to the regional office in Cuenca only dealing with

agriculture which is limited to the middle and lower parts of the basin. The same can be said

for SENAGUA, which holds the voice of the government. However, their representation is

diffused over the regions in which they conduct their tasks in relative autonomy. The rest of

the council seems to align their level of governance with the tasks conducted. This alignment

benefits collaboration due to the evident hierarchy between actors. This implies that the

council can rely on tasking actors according to their capacities. For example, for reasons of

communication with national entities, the GAD will be a logical institution to approach. They

can voice regional problems and views to national levels.

40

The horizontal axis shows the range of actors according to their sectoral focus, with the left

side showing environmental activity and affiliation. Therefore, it is no surprise to find the

ministry of environment on the far left. In fact, little surprises are visible on this axis, although

the overall expectation was to see all actors of the council leaning towards the environmental

side. Again, the creators of the diagram might have taken the entire range of activities of each

actor into account, whereby ETAPA and ELECAUSTRO will inevitably move more towards

the centre. Hence, the position of the council highlights that most members remain with

subject neutrality due to the overall objective of the institution. This aspect is also important

to the research, as it only focused on the collaboration within the council, which is primarily

concerned with environmental issues and therefore only portrays that aspect of each

institution. This implies that a certain bias exists regarding this axis within this research as it

fails to encompass all activities of each actor. Therefore, it is good to obtain a different and

more balanced view on the relevant actors through this diagram, who engage on a larger range

of topics other than the Machángara river and thus focus of this research. However, looking at

the dependency of certain actors on a healthy ecosystem, it is rather surprising to see that

universities are more environmentally positioned than actors such as ETAPA,

ELECAUSTRO or SENAGUA. Especially the latter should maintain close ties to its objective

by positioning itself for the healthy environment. ETAPA requires good drinking water which

is drawn from a healthy river. It is in its own interest to counter for example soil degradation.

Another important feature of this diagram is that the horizontal axis can be related to the

aspect of sector-crossing collaboration. A wide gap between positions on this axis would

indicate distant objectives and thereby strain efforts of collaboration. Thus, it is important to

see the council actors being positioned closer to each other as this will facilitate collaboration

due to shared or overlapping interests and support the claim made by Diaz regarding

Figure 6: Sociogram of the relevant actors in the Manchàngara river basin. Source: Plan de Manejo

41

horizontal workings. This also explains the difficult position of MAE within the council, as its

objectives solely focus on environmental improvements, which clash with those of more

economically driven actors. Other actors have a wider range of interest which inevitably

causes a diffusion of importance to sectors such as the environment even if the actor is

dependent on for example a healthy river. One important finding is that the environment plays

an important common denominator, which unites the council even if interests differ. This can

be used as an argument for the collaboration between ELECAUSTRO and MAE. These two

immediately don‟t share major similarities beyond the fact that their territories overlap, but

due to a common interest in maintaining water flow, they have to cooperate. Within each

sector, actors might compete more than with external sectors, which would stimulate

hierarchy due to inevitable dominance established. This in turn would relate to a greater use

of vertical collaboration. This is an important finding as it provides an argument for why

horizontal and vertical collaboration within the Nexus is possible and how it functions. The

example of ELECAUSTRO and MAE shows this as the former holds most regional power

and greater public support. However, MAE holds the voice of the government and is in terms

of its level of governance (vertical axis figure 6) more powerful. The aspect of power

becomes an interesting feature of collaboration as actors strive to obtain a more beneficial

position to promote and facilitate their interests (Purdy, 2012).

42

ELECAUSTRO U. Cuenca

MAGAP

MAE ETAPA JGSURM

GPA

SENAGUA

Level within Governance arrangement

National Local Regional

The composition of the Machángara river council

Legend:

= Food Sector

= Water Sector

= Energy Sector

= Undefined Sector

Figure 7: Composition of the river council

43

The diagram above (figure 7) was created based on the interviews as well as the established

information from the management plan. It shows the actors of the council placed on a scale of

governance levels as well as colored in their respective sector. The placement on the scale

was done by looking at the level at which each actor is most active and at which most

influence is exerted. The difference with the vertical axis of the previous figure is that figure 6

includes the number of connections each actor maintains at various levels. Thus, this diagram

(figure 7) takes an external view on the visible level at which the actors engage. Furthermore,

it is meant to show the relationship between levels of governance and the WEF sectors and

thus the collaboration within the river council. Figure 6 displayed the levels of governance but

failed to take the respective sectors into account. Hence, combining the sectoral aspect of the

Nexus and the levels evident in the council, a new angle on the functioning of governance

within the Nexus might arise.

Noticeable in figure 7 is that there are several levels of governance present and each contains

actors of most sectors. Clearly, there is only one actor representing the energy sector, and only

one local entity dealing with food. Another remark should emphasize the stated priorities

within the new water law, which relate to the Water and Food sector receiving remarkably

more importance than energy. This could explain the limited number of actors within the

energy sector but does not explain how the water sector is only governed by two actors, of

which one is a state organ. More importantly, the water of the Machángara basin is not

governed by an actor related to the water sector at the local level. Here it becomes clearer that

water is deemed a far greater importance to larger scales/higher levels than just for the

communities. This also relates to the importance water consumption obtains within the new

water law, making this a state/national issue rather than a local one. Due to these facts, actors

in the water sector enjoy a hierarchical advantage as comparative importance has increased.

This can have crucial impact in times of water shortage, in which this sector will receive

larger shares due to hierarchical power. Through these assumptions the question can be asked

whether the level of governance or the sector of the actor promotes good collaboration.

Favoring the assumption that sectors promote good collaboration is the relationship between

ELECAUSTRO and SENAGUA, which do not share the same governance level, yet maintain

good ties. An explanation could be that the interdependencies of the sectors cause the

necessity to collaborate. ELECAUSTRO controls the flow of water and the access to the basin

but SENAGUA holds the legal priority given to water as well as the administrative power

over ELECAUSTRO. The same argument can be made for any other sector as they each

depend on the functioning of the other sector. Furthermore, the small scale of the basin also

promotes the necessity of collaboration.

The aspect of a ´veto´ within the council is not to be underestimated. As stated,

interdependency creates collaboration but also a certain degree of bargaining power. This

implies that if an actor within the chain of dependency decides to end all relationships, that

this chain would become rather unstable. Although it would not be logical and no examples

exist within the basin, such a power can always be implied. This is mostly evident in politics

were certain actors can use his position to obtain a better bargaining position.

Previously, the importance of the shared dependency of a healthy environment was

introduced. This aspect carries further significance as we see that actors like the university or

ELECAUSTRO are involved with activities improving the ecosystem. This implies that a

shared dependency on the environment also promotes collaboration. In essence the WEF

Nexus could be extended to include the Environment within it.

On the other hand, a shared level of governance also provides for examples of good

collaboration. For example, the core, and thus well collaborating, group consisting of

44

ELECAUSTRO, ETAPA and Universidad Cuenca are present in the similar governance level.

Also, MAE and SENAGUA have a very good relationship, arguably attributable to their

shared level of governance. The shared level of governance could therefore provide breeding

ground for good relationships. Supporting this claim is the fact that actors of a shared level

tend to engage on the same geographic area and hence are oftentimes confronted with each

other. For example, both the GPA and ETAPA mainly conduct activities within the lower and

middle parts of the basin. Another argument could be that a shared level decreases the feeling

of hierarchy, putting more focus on collaboration rather than on the need to clarify

competences.

A possible answer regarding the question on which aspect, level or sector, contribute most to

effective collaboration will be formulated later in this research after having viewed more

angles. However, this short analysis provides the argumentation that collaboration in the

Machángara river basin stems from a complex array of reasons. Besides the levels and

sectors, other influences exist stimulating vertical and horizontal collaboration.

The core group containing ELECAUSTRO, ETAPA and Uni. Cuenca are also the main

donors of projects within the basin. Their spread across the regional level indicates a lack of

funding from national and local levels. Nevertheless, the state actors are obtaining a greater

say in the policy process as the new water law states. The legal power of the higher

governance levels thus surpasses the social power that the regional level possesses. The

tradeoff between legal and social power will become more evident as the investigation

unfolds. Like previously outlined, the council possesses no legal power but authorizes most

activities in the basin. ELECAUSTRO placed physical border which control the access to the

basin and only with permission can external actors enter. This activity is meant to combat

illegal logging and pollution of the basin. However, ELECAUSTRO has neither the legal

permission nor the expertise for this activity. MAE would be a suitable actor to impose such a

restriction as they control the ecosystem and possess national authority. However, the council

and the wider basin accept this situation without questions. This is a case of social power

surpassing legal power, as citizens acknowledge the importance of this restricted access and

stakeholders realize the interdependency of the basin actors. Although this situation is known,

the government does not strive to abolish this situation. Due to the strong local and regional

support, ELECAUSTRO possesses a great social legitimacy. National entities such as MAE

and MAGAP are too distant and do not directly engage with the population through for

example projects. This example aligns with the plans to decentralize authority in Ecuador but

fails to contribute to a solid legal framework in which rules stabilize regional governance

arrangements. This example shows that strong regional control can mitigate weaker national

authority and thus raises questions regarding the flexibility of this arraignment and the

implementation of the new water law.

When analyzing the roles of actors within the influences of a changing institutional setting,

the concept of power becomes visible. The institutional setting is going to change but the

impact on the actor setting is not yet known. The new water law fortifies the position of state

actors in dictating processes regarding the hydrological cycle, with the newly created ARCA

and the foreseen diminishing role of local and regional authority. Furthermore, the divide

between public and private entities will become more dominant as the latter is the main

financial contributor to the council. Acknowledging that certain actors have greater social

rather than legal power, it is important to find a reasonable explanation. The explanation used

in this research will base its reasoning on the visible dominance of the core group of actors

within the council. The argument is that a higher involvement in the council (and thus in the

river basin) allocates more social power to an actor than those less involved. One example is

45

0 1 2 3 4 5

Elecaustro

Etapa

JGSURM

GPA

MAGAP

MAE

Uni Cuenca

Level of involvment (5 highest)

Level of involvement within Council

that MAE possesses the legal power to control the correct implementation of legislative

frameworks. However, many activities in the basin are not reported to this institution or even

involve it. One example is the certification of properties in the basin, which are currently not

registered. This initiative is mainly carried out by ETAPA, ELECAUSTRO and the GPA.

The graph (Figure 8)

shows the level of

involvement each actor

perceives to have within

the council. Involvement

is an important aspect of

analysing collaboration as

it stimulates the creation

of importance or the

perception thereof. This

creates the link towards a

perceived stronger

position within the

council. This is evident

from the food sector,

which is represented by

limited perceived involvement. This could be

connected to a lower level of governance as with the case of MAGAP. Furthermore, all food

sector actors are public. This promotes the image that involvement can only be obtained if the

actor is from the private sector or acts on a higher level of governance. Clearly strong

involvement is felt by the private sector as well as actors on the national levels. Nevertheless,

it is debatable, where to place the private actors, whether with their respective governance

level or their public/private background. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the WEF

Nexus sectors play a role within the involvement of perceived importance. Although

SENAGUA is not represented in the data, other actors have stated its involvement to be rather

high and relationships are very good. Hence, another actor within the water sector would

reach the higher marks of involvement. With this argument, there is a difference of

involvement to be seen regarding WEF sectors. It is unclear whether this beneficial role of the

water sector can be traced back to the new water law, or whether the institutional setting is

still in the process of changing this role.

Another interesting feature is that the public sector seems to be represented in all levels of

governance. This could indicate good administrative division as governmental bodies are

present in all vital levels to obtain the best knowledge exchange and steer policy. This

challenges the idea that the basin is divided according to natural rather than administrative

boundaries. Arguably, a hierarchy exists between the natural boundaries, the governance

levels and the WEF Nexus sectors. The dominant reality would dictate the collaboration

within in the basin by creating favorable or unfavorable conditions. Administrative

boundaries can produce efficient governance, however tend to be less flexible regarding

environmental change due to the potential mismatch with environmental boundaries. This

aspect will be viewed more closely in the next section answering sub-question 3.

Figure 8: Graph showing perceived involvement

46

Concluding on the first two sub-questions regarding horizontal and vertical collaboration

within the WEF Nexus in the Machángara river basin, several findings have been presented. It

seems evident that vertical and horizontal processes within the case study mutually support

each other and thereby give meaning to the complexity of the governance arrangement in the

basin. The council incorporates these levels and processes mainly through its structure. This

implies that vertical and horizontal processes are evident through the collaboration between

directors and the technical council as well as through the activities of the technical council

itself. Such complexity is needed if the council is to fulfill its main duty as mediating body

within the basin, thereby engaging with stakeholder from different sectors and levels.

Figure 6 shows that the council only encompasses a small array of stakeholders compared to

those evident in the whole basin. This relatively small composition raised questions regarding

the standing as well as the representation it is supposed to entail. Evidently important actors

such as the industrial park are not engaging with the council and thereby challenge the

mediating role the council should play. Furthermore, such a composition challenges many of

the councils decisions regarding legitimacy with examples such as the control of access to the

basin. This challenges not only the role of other actors in the basin but foremost the

importance of national legal and social statutes. Implementing the new water law with the

Santiago river council will be challenging if river councils take matters into their own hands.

However, this introduces the aspect of social power, which the council evidently possesses.

This implies that citizens and other actors in the basin accept the activities of the council,

whether they hold legal legitimacy or not. This on the other hand can also serve as an

explanation as to the composition of the council.

Another finding is that both the governance levels and the sectors provide for good

collaboration, without major differences. Furthermore, the interconnectedness of sectors

within the Nexus stimulates the collaboration between them. The joint dependency on a

healthy environment also stimulates collaboration from sectors which do not directly require

such an objective but are drawn into the network of collaboration. This strengthens the

argument that the interdependency of sectors causes collaboration from beyond the immediate

Nexus. This strengthens the internal actor setting but can be disrupted if the institutional

setting changes. The new water law gives priority to the water sector and reduces the

importance of hydropower production. This directly challenges the position of

ELECAUSTRO and creates imbalances within the actor setting in the basin. However, the

slow implementation of the new law benefits the actor setting. Arguably, this is also the

reason that the research did find irregularities within the actor network through for example a

fragile role for ELECAUSTRO. This means that the impact of the institutional setting on the

Machángara basin is remains to be seen.

The management plan shows that oftentimes, the technical solutions are preferred over the

social ones. This can in part be drawn from the complexity such social solutions contain and

the limited governing potential of the river council. Lacking legal and official authority and

requiring self-funding, there is a limited capacity of the council to address governance issues.

Arguably, this is also the reason it relies on historical networks and a familiar structure, which

have proven to stimulate efficient collaboration in the past. The question remains whether this

same structure is flexible enough to deal with change.

47

6.2 Scales of governance

The question“How do the different scales affect the ability of actors to govern natural

resources coherently?”should answer the second part of the multi-level/scale theory.

Furthermore, it serves as another angle other than the horizontal and vertical, to view the

WEF Nexus governance arrangement. Furthermore, when analyzing governance

arrangements, scales become important features that influence the interaction between

institutional and actor settings.

As described in the theoretical

framework, scales can exist in

several manners such as

administrative scales. Scales can

also exist within the WEF Nexus,

as each sector is traced to a certain

region of production. Since the

food produced in the basin is

mainly consumed therein, its scale

is limited to such. The energy

sector produces electricity used for

the national power grid. As such,

there is a hierarchy of importance

between the sectors. The question

is whether these scales actually

influence the collaboration and

functioning of the governance

arrangement. The answer will regard the conclusions of the previous section and elaborate on

them. The scales at which the WEF sectors are evident don‟t influence each other. The food

production does not dictate the scale at which water is to be produced/used. However, the

actors within each sector constitute the interaction between the scales and sectors. The

previous section on the aspect of influence outlined the different scales in which certain actors

hold power. Looking at figure 7 we saw scales working alongside their multiple levels in

governance by viewing their respective sectors within the WEF Nexus. With this diagram, it

becomes visible which actors operate within which sectors and the relevant scale of activity.

Figure 6 also showed the scales at which actors engage, ranging from local to international.

These scales gain importance when the spheres of influence cross them. Hence, there is a

disparity between the governance levels of figure 6 and 7, whereby the former solely takes

into account the level of influence. This changes the importance actors maintain on their given

level. The example of JGSURM shows that, although its network reaches beyond the regional

spheres (figure 6), its actual importance and thus area of activity is limited to the local scale

(figure 7).Thus, one scale is that of the influence each actor maintains within the case study

and beyond.

Another scale that should be taken into account is the geographic and correlated

administrative scale of the case study. Looking at figure 9, a correlation between the area of

the basin and the Azuay and even the smaller Cantòn of Cuenca can be seen. This implies that

the rules and procedures to take into account regarding the activities in the basin are those of

the Azuay region. This shows that beyond the simplified scales in figure 7, several scales exist

even within the regional scale. These influence the complexity of authority, especially

regarding the plans of decentralization and the new water law. Another important aspect to

consider is that the Machángara river stems from the region of Cañar making the basin a

Figure 9: Map showing the river basin within the Azuay region

48

trans-regional one in terms of administration. However, simplifying this administrative

burden is the fact that the origin is within the national park, which holds its own authority in

the form of MAE. In effect, this should not carry additional administrative borders since

national parks don‟t function as a fully fledged region or other administrative scale. Besides

the multitude of scales within the region, the case of the Machàngara basin is drastically

simplified die to the lacking multi-regional/trans-regional administrative scales. Examples

exist where regions are in conflict due to the crossing administrative scales of a river. This

allows the development of a strong governance structure, unchallenged by influences in the

region. The same can be said for the Machàngara river council nexus collaboration. To some

extent, a „scale match‟ exists between the administrative boundaries in the region and the river

basin.

The problems for the region and its governance arrangement arise with the new water law and

the proposed rescaling of the water governance arrangement. Especially the centralizing of the

river councils to fall under a larger Santiago council will challenge this scale match and cause

for high interaction between multiple scales. These scales will stem from municipalities,

communities and regions and provide a significant challenge to the harmony existing in the

Machàngara basin. Furthermore, new authorities will enter the picture and take over the role

of currently dominant actors such as ELECAUSTRO. Consequences of such a change will

inevitably lead to conflict or in the best case demands adaptation from all actors. This will be

a testing time considering the historical, actor relations and scale matches existing in the basin

since 10 years. It will test the flexibility of the governance arrangement and require a

reorganization of the governance arrangement. On the other hand the argument can be made

that such a rescaling to a larger scale will not affect the small basin in the Azuay region. In the

end, the Machàngara is not the only river in the Azuay region. On the other hand, new scales

also cause a shift in roles and power, which inevitable also challenge the role of actors in the

basin.

The link between institutional changes and actor settings becomes clear through the addition

of the multi-scale reality. Different scales are evident such as administrative, geographical and

influential scales. Although complex, a governing structure and logic exists. The influence

ELECAUSTRO is able to maintain is related to the scale at which it functions. On the one

side it represents the largest scaled sector. However, its dominant role is bound to change with

the restructuring planned for with the new water law. Arguably, it is the complexity of scales

that allows flexibility to deal with such challenges. In addition, through complexity arises the

need for structure, which led to the intact formation of roles and spheres of influences in the

region. Even though the council was formed on the basis of a conflict of natural resources, no

conflicts happened since its creation. This argument stimulates the perception that throughout

the years, these scales have adjusted themselves to each other in order to create efficiency.

Helping this situation is the fact that the river only merges with one other region through a

national park, which constitutes no official regional authority. It does raise the question with

regard to the role of MAE as an actor outside the administrative scale of the basin and the

wider Azuay region. The aspect of finding out to what extent the governance arrangement is

flexible to deal with the institutional change will be answered in the next section.

49

AUTORIDADES LOCALES:

JUNTAS PARROQUIALES

PLAN DE MANEJO DE

LA SUBCUENCA DEL

MACHÁNGARA

PLANIFICACIÓN, REGULACIÓN

-CONTROL Y GESTIÓN

PLANES – PROGRAMAS-

PROYECTOS

SOCIEDAD CIVIL

USUARIOS

ACTORES CLAVES

· GAD MUNICIPAL DE

CUENCA

· ETAPA EP

· ELECAUSTRO

· UNIVERSIDADES

JUNTAS DE

REGANTES

JUNTAS DE AGUA

POTABLE

ASOCIACIONES

AGROPECUARIAS

COOPERATIVAS

ENTIDADES

PÚBLICAS:

MAGAP,

MNISTERIO DEL

AMBIENTE,

SENAGUA, GAD

PROVINCIAL,

RIESGOS

6.3 Network analysis

The fourth and final sub-question of this research “To what extent are stakeholder formations

able to adapt the Water-Energy-Food Nexus to current and/or future climate change

impacts?” will use the most complex analytical tool. The question relates to the relative

flexibility or governance arrangements within the Nexus as this will be important in the

stability of the governance arrangement in times of change. As previously described, this

change takes the form of both institutional and natural settings. Hence, this section will

analyse dynamics of social interaction and thereby give meaning to the previous sections. To

do this, visualization tools can aid in simplifying information. Social Network Analysis

(SNA) is a method of visualizing the strength and reach of social relationships, but its use

reaches further into governance analysis.

The management plan (figure 10) shows a

simple social network diagram indicating the

official relationship structure. Noticeable is

that the plan itself is centrally positioned as to

indicate that it dictates and guides the social

processes. Another feature is the quantity of

actors perceived to be influential within the

council‟s processes. Hereby, actors are shown

which haven‟t been mentioned during the

investigation. This could have multiple

reasons which range from simple human error

of forgetting to more complex reasons such as

strategic avoidance to mention. The diagram

seems to suggest that relationships within the council

cannot be free flowing and cannot reach beyond the indicated structure. Accordingly, the

governmental actors are in direct contact with the local communities but fail to hold ties with

the council‟s core actors. These on the other hand do not seem to connect to the management

plan and seem to serve as the mediating role between local communities and the regional

offices. Historically, this is true as the council was established through a dispute over water

allocation. This diagram is a good indication of how social network analysis works and

provides the overall framework for the followed in depth analysis of the river council only.

A SNA diagram helps understand the complex relationship ties within the council and

beyond. This investigation has created its own diagram on the basis of quantitative data from

the interviewees. The color coded members and the outlying non-members are connected

through lines indicating the strength of the relationship. This is done through the thickness of

each line, whereby thicker lines represent a stronger relationship. Due to most relationship

lines going both ways, their thickness is relative to the corresponding link. Hence, if actor A

perceives perfect ties with actor B, who only perceives meagre ties, the line will take the

average size. In addition, the line turns its color towards the actor with the stronger ties.

JGUSRM quantitatively maintains equal relationship strength with all actors but its line with

MAGAP is thicker than the one with University Cuenca. This indicates an ever stronger

returning tie from the side of MAGAP. In this case, the color changes in favour of MAGAP,

indicating the main origin of this strength.

Figure 10: Simple SNA diagram of the council Source: Plan de Manejo, 2014

50

Figure 12: SNA diagram for the river council

Before analysing the detailed networks of each actor, some general remarks on the figure 12.

Noticeable through the thicker lines is the previously outlined core group, composed of

ELECAUSTRO, ETAPA and University of Cuenca. In addition to this core group, it seems

that another trio exists with strong ties, namely that of University of Cuenca, ELECAUSTRO

and SENAGUA. This hasn‟t previously been evident but supports the conclusion of the

public/private debate. The outcome states that strongly tied actors within the council either

come from the private sector or act on a higher level of governance. The following section

will give a more detailed analysis of key actor relationships and evaluate the most interesting

networks. Each actor is visible through the highlighted connections leaving its main hub.

51

Figure 13: SNA diagrams for each of the council members

52

Possibly due to its mediating history within the council and its position as a non-political and

non-sector related actor, the University maintains relatively good relationships with all actors

and even beyond. One argument is its political neutrality, eliminating the importance of its

level within governance. Hence, it serves as a comparative actor for the SNA.

SENAGUA maintains three noticeably weak ties with the local bodies JGUSRM and GPA but

surprisingly also with ETAPA. Visible through the pink color, this weakness stems from

ETAPA indicating a weak relationship. Beyond the public/private or level of governance

debate, this relationship is important for the future of the council as ETAPA and SENAGUA

represent the water sector. Furthermore, ETAPA holds the priority number one under the new

water law, the drinking water. The new law also states that SENAGUA has the authority to

deal with council disputes and should therefore be seen as the new power in the council.

Therefore, this relationship carries significant weight and will be crucial within the

restructuring process of the Santiago council plans. The fragile nature of this relationship

could be an indication that the governance arrangement in the basin is not as stable as

previously presumed.

For MAE the most noticeable aspect are its relatively good relationships with the actors of the

Water sector within the council, namely SENAGUA, ELECAUSTRO and ETAPA. This

should confirm the importance of the national park at the source of the river and its

importance to the flow and quality of water. Arguably, the hierarchy within the council is

partly derived from the geographic location of actors. ELECAUSTRO has significant power

in the basin, partly due to its largely unrivalled geographic location. However, only MAE has

upper control of the river and therefore the only rival for ELECAUSTRO. No other sector

maintains better relationships with MAE than the water sector, indicating the importance of

the flow of water. This argument is supported with the relatively weak ties MAE holds with

actors from the food sector. The new water law, supporting the argument of institutional

influences on actors, complements the theory on geographic hierarchy dictating actor

relationships. On the one hand, ETAPA has legal power to assert control of the river flow and

quality, however, this phenomenon goes paired with a healthy national park at the source of

the river. This brings us back to the finding that the environment is a binding factor for the

river council and to a certain extent, dictates the collaboration between actors.

The GPA holds very weak ties with the higher governance levels and non-food related actors

MAE and SENAGUA. This is a worrying fact as this actor should maintain a central role

within the new water law and the Santiago council and serves as the main representation

organ for the Azuay region. Both MAE and SENAGUA are fortifying their positions and

should hold good ties with structurally important actors in order to implement the new law

effectively. The GPA has often been associated with agricultural topics and is thus concluded

in the food sector of the Nexus. This could be a reason for its limited ties with other actors.

However, this does mean that administrative power does not imply beneficial collaboration in

the Machàngara basin. This is worrying regarding the restructuring of the governance

arrangement with the new water law, requiring greater internal cohesion if the river council is

to obtain a significant role in the new structure.

Surprisingly, MAGAP holds stable relationships with most actors, concluding the best

connected actor for the food sector. Part of this could be attributed to its governmental role

and the corresponding position within the levels of governance. This refutes the previous

analysis, which showed weak promises for this actor, evident through its changing name and

53

tasks. It also shows the importance of using both qualitative and quantitative information to

derive a more complete analysis.

Not surprisingly, ELECAUSTRO holds very good relationships with all actors. Like

previously established, this could be due to its funding capacity as a private actor or its

regional level of governance, maintaining the link to local realities. Thus, it provides a good

example of an actor with high social power and no significant legal power, nevertheless

holding the strongest network. Likewise evident is the core group of actors, University of

Cuenca, ELECAUSTRO and ETAPA, which also conclude the most active members of the

council.

ETAPA seems to be the outlier of the members with the largest network but holding very

weak to very strong ties. Its semi private background as well as its municipal level of

governance makes it an interesting actor to study. Arguably, due to the latter, it holds weak

ties with national actors such as MAE or SENAGUA. It is also the only actor representing a

municipal level, concluding a wicked position within the council. Due to its numerous ties,

ETAPA seems to be the key of a flexible and holistic governance arrangement in the basin.

When looking at the significant restructuring that is supposed to occur, it becomes vital to

speak with a common voice of the river basin in order to find a beneficial role within the new

Santiago council. ETAPA, considering its ties, will be the factor to close the gap between

some actors in the basin.

The JGUSRM dethrones the argument of weak relationships between opposite levels of

governance. Its ties with MAGAP are outstanding, in part due to the returning perception of

MAGAP. This is a key argument for the functioning of collaboration within the Nexus, as

actors within the same sector collaborate more easily. This phenomenon could be

strengthened by the fact that the food sector is witnessing several challenges from both the

institutional and actor setting. The former places unfavourable conditions with the rescaling of

authority, demanding irrigation to be governed from a trans-regional level. However, the

second priority obtained should aid in the establishment of more dominance for the food

sector. The actor setting has proven testing as generally weak ties exist with this sector. This

can be seen with the low perceived involvement and SNA diagram, arguably explainable

through the lower governance levels of those actors. Hereby, the explanation lies with figure

6, in which the council places MAGAP at a lower level than JGSURM due to the ties these

actors have beyond the river basin. In contrast, figure 7 notes that the actual level of

governance at which these actors act is different and sometimes higher. This could state that

the perception that of some of the river council members have on the food sector actors,

seems to be rather critical. For the Machángara river basin this could be related to the

relatively low output which the food sector produces compared to the energy or water sector,

while at the same time obtaining a high priority in the water law. This output can also take the

form of financial strength, which is limited for the food sector.

Answering the fifth research question will draw upon some of the striking findings from the

SNA diagram in combination with the conclusions drawn from previous sections.

The use of the SNA has found its purpose in this analysis, providing a different angle of

reviewing collaboration. Thus, some of the previously deadlocked debates surrounding levels

of governance and sectors become more transparent. The results show that actors of the Food

sector have good ties between them, while being the worst connected sector in the Nexus case

study. This relates to the public/private debate, whereby private actors tend to be better

connected to higher levels of governance than public ones. The JGUSRM provides a

54

counterbalance to this argument by maintaining good ties with most actors, indicating that

sector collaboration is a more dominant issue than governance levels. This returns the focus

onto the WEF Nexus as an instrument of collaboration within a governance arrangement. This

argument is strengthened by the weak ties between ETAPA and SENAGUA, which compose

the water sector actors in the basin. A weak relationship indicates a fragile balance between

the same-sector collaboration and overlapping spheres of influence. A small basin might not

be able to sustain more than one actor of each WEF Nexus sector. This argument can be

carried on by the power ELECAUSTRO possesses and the dispersed authority of the three

food sector actors. Having to share power weakens the individual strength of each actor,

which inevitably leads to the feeling of lesser involvement (figure 8) and unclear task

distribution.

The social versus legal power debate is reignited during this section, especially regarding the

ETAPA and SENAGUA relationship. ETAPA possesses the social power in the basin,

whereas SENAGUA clearly holds the legal power. The new water law and the creation of a

new river council will test the strength of each attribute and conclude on the strength of the

current governance arrangement.

The answer to the question on adaptation to change within the governance arrangement is a

complex task and cannot be concluded in only one SNA. However, it becomes clear that the

actors in the WEF Nexus tend to predominantly function on a horizontal scale. This becomes

clear when looking at the University of Cuenca, which holds good ties with many actors from

different sectors This is important as it shows the lacking pattern, in which higher levels of

governance tend to be better positioned in the basin. Especially when seeing the difference in

level placement between figure 6 and 7, the ambiguity on levels of governance by the council

becomes clear. The reoccurring rescaling happening in Ecuador through programs of

decentralization and the new water law outlines the problems actors face regarding a stable

governance level. The changing institutional setting causes the river council to find stability in

its own ranks. Therefore, when looking at the adaptability of the council to climate change,

one has to regard the horizontal and network methods of collaboration. These seem to be out

of balance when comparing horizontal and vertical dimension, in which the WEF sectors are

unevenly represented and distributed across the levels of governance. However, when looking

at the SNA, it becomes clear that the balance exists within the relationships between actors,

creating a mutually reinforcing spider-web. A weak relationship between two important

bodies such as ETAPA and SENAGUA is circumvented through the mediating body of the

ELECAUSTRO. This informal structure allows the council to adjust to changing patterns of

precipitation by placing certain connections over others. However, within the scope of climate

change, the institutional changes put forth with the new water law, influence these social

balances by creating legal priorities. Here again one can only speculate what the institutional

effect will have on the social powers evident in the basin.

55

7 Discussion

The discussion will try to combine the conclusions of the previous sections and attempt to

clarify the functioning of the WEF Nexus regarding its horizontal, vertical and network

processes. These three elements will be linked to their respective theoretical foundation and

should jointly provide a conclusion in the following section.

The general presumption of going from government to governance is the key to understanding

any governance arrangement and the social interaction therein. The theory dictates that more

has to be done with less and that interconnectedness is crucial. The new water law strives to

decentralize governance by simplifying the structure as witnessed with the Santiago river

council. Involving mediating institutions like the University of Cuenca and creating technical

bodies such as ARCA should conform to the establishment of a neutral and technically-

founded governance arrangement. However, the reality proves more complex. The

institutional setting has significant influence on the actor relationships such as the new

priorities created. In turn, the actor setting contains a delicate yet efficient system of

collaboration. Within this complex environment, horizontal processes support and sometimes

confront vertical processes. The inevitable overlap of jurisdictions provides breeding ground

for more complex methods of governance such as networks. The WEF Nexus finds itself

between these governance methodologies and due to its weak theoretical foundation, allows

for ambiguity. Finding out which processes exist and how they function was the task of this

research. Thus, this section will be structured according to the relevant governance processes

and conclude on the relationship between the case study and the theory.

Regarding collaboration between the horizontal and vertical axis, it is important to relate to

both multi-level and scale theories. The results show that collaboration is facilitated between

actors on the same level of governance. However, a straightforward Type I multi-level

arrangement, with clear delineation between the respective levels is hard to conclude.

Different methods of placing actors in levels (figure 6 and 7) as well as wide-ranging tasks

(e.g. ETAPA) make a theoretical comparison complex. ETAPA represents the example that

Type II multi-level governance is evident through the task specific jurisdictions (table 1). This

would explain the good relationships ETAPA maintains with all kinds of actors within and

outside the council. Besides the described „veto power‟, this actor does not need to relate to

overlapping jurisdictions like the food sector. This limits the presence of „polycentric‟

processes, whereby ETAPA is able to maintain its dominant position. Regarding the task

specific roles of some actors, it is interesting to relate this fact to the division the basin

according to natural features (figure 7). Looking at scales, we can see that natural,

administrative and technical divisions are made within the basin. Hereby, natural divisions

dictate the other division such as administrative, thereby showing the importance of the

environmental aspect within the WEF Nexus. Creating output requires delineation between

administrative (social) and natural features of the area in question and position actors

accordingly. This position of actors happens through the previously mentioned „veto powers‟

or through the influences of the institutional setting.

The horizontal functioning of the council is foremost visible through the collaboration

between actors regardless of their level of governance. Actors engage on the basis of a mutual

dependency on a healthy environment, thereby stimulating collaboration even if personal

objectives lie far apart. One example is the relationship between ELECAUSTRO and

University of Cuenca. The argument that this relationship is based on technical exchange

seems vague due to the proficient capacity thereof within ELECUSTRO. The principle of

collaboration in the Nexus is based upon the cross-sector dependency these actors have to

respect. Unlike the IWRM theory all sectors should be regarded as equal regardless of their

natural availability or social demand. This creates the situation in which actors hold `veto

56

powers´ in order to bargain for certain outcomes. Dependency on the flow of water creates a

strong position for ELECAUSTRO as opposed to the agricultural sector, not only due to its

geographic location but also due to the sole representation of the energy sector. Although the

new priorities set with the water law confront this issue, it remains a tool of actors to mitigate

conflict.

However, there are many factors that influence the horizontal collaboration. The institutional

setting strives to decentralize the region and create a merged river council. This would imply

less governmental control and more autonomous and horizontal resource management. The

same law also created a list of priorities, which help less dominant sectors to gain

significance. The food sector has traditionally shared its influence over several actors, thereby

limiting the individual power. ELECAUSTRO, as a sole representative of the energy sector,

enjoys close to unrivalled access to a water source as well as greater social power.

Furthermore, the research has shown that weak relationships, such as the one between

ETAPA and SENAGUA, cannot be attributed to conflicting economic or sector related

interests. This relationship was weakened by the institutional setting in which SENAGUA

obtained significant power through the new priorities and updated authority to form the

Santiago river council. Both actors engage on different levels of governance and do not

compete for similar resources. Hence, horizontal collaboration between actors is susceptive to

institutional changes, which pull at the vertical dimensions. This introduces the relationship

with the vertical axis of governance.

The vertical processes of collaboration are evident through the levels of governance within the

case study. The Machángara river council works vertically between the technical and directors

levels, however maintains horizontal collaboration within each level. This shows that both

processes are compatible and sometimes necessary. Ecuador has undergone significant

decentralization and hopes to continue this process with the new Santiago council. However,

bottom up approaches (unlike those dictated from above) are not clearly visible (table 3),

causing a hierarchical governance reality. Bottom-up approaches are important for a Type II

multi-governance arrangement, engaging citizens and other non-governmental bodies (see

table 1).

However, vertical processes are needed in order to break certain horizontal governance

deadlocks. The social and legal power discussion showed that with certain hierarchical

differences some actions are more easily implemented. The social power balance in the basin

proves to be vital in order to gain a common understanding amongst all stakeholders and

create a cohesive identity. Practically, the standing of ELECAUSTRO allows it to regulate the

access to the basin and thereby prevents illegal activities that would harm the common good.

It seems that the interplay of public and private actors challenges the need of vertical

processes. Funding is a crucial instrument of power in the council, with ELECAUSTRO and

JGUSRM forming the two opposite extremes. This argument shows that financial and

hierarchical independence can create a more favourable position than actors bound to higher

level consensus and public budgets.

A clear division of tasks between national, regional and local levels should theoretically

benefit administration and thus efficiency. However, the changing institutional setting creates

imbalances, whereby national and regional actors gain administrative power. Yet, they fail to

gain authority in the basin, with SENAGUA holding relatively weak ties with regional actors

and MAGAP and GPA being excluded from the council workings (see figure 8). Thus,

horizontal and network characteristics of the river basin governance arrangement seem to be

coherent enough to allow functioning without greater influence of higher levels of

governance. Arguably, the power of the food sector can only be achieved on a higher level of

57

governance. This is evident through the position of MAGAP which embodies the link

between public actors and their respective level of governance. The involvement of MAGAP

and its sector colleagues is low (figure 10), even though the food sector has gained

importance with the new law. However, the importance of the levels of governance become

relative to the perceived position actors are placed at. Figures 6 and 7 show that a small

difference in measurement can create different conclusions. Within the scope of this research,

horizontal and vertical processes do not give the complete picture within the case study.

Although hierarchical structures are visible but their impact limited, they do not explain how

the arrangement manages to allow for deeper actor collaboration.

Network governance completes the two dimensional picture given by horizontal and vertical

processes and links the results to the theoretical multiplicity approach. Furthermore, network

governance introduces the aspect of flexibility within the governance arrangement of the

Machángara basin. The historical setting and the social hierarchy in the basin have created a

well functioning example of a WEF Nexus case study and presented the cross-sector

collaboration therein. However, the institutional setting is bound to change and further

environmental change is expected with for example changing precipitation patterns. Thus, the

existing structure has to provide a certain degree of flexibility to adapt to this change. Aspects

such as the `veto power´ or social power create structure to which actors abide. However,

these powers tend to be sensitive to change, as witnessed with the MAGAP. Its role changed

with the reorganization of the agricultural ministry to adjust to the decentralization plans and

was renamed from INAR. Currently, it lacks formal tasks and thus holds limited authority.

Ideally, it should envisage the food sector and provide a strong counterbalance to the created

dominance of ELECAUSTRO and ETAPA.

The argument of cross-sector dependency proves to be a simplification of the reality in the

basin. According to the horizontal and vertical processes JGUSRM should encompass a

weaker position in the basin due to its public composition and financial means as well as its

lack of social or legal power. Its position at the lower levels of governance seems to weaken

its influence and the multitude of actors in the food sector gives it a less `veto power´.

However, looking at the SNA, we saw that it holds a broad range as well as a number of

crucial ties. Its broad relationship base allows it to be noticed and well informed. More

importantly, it holds strong relationship with actors who do not share the same strength in

collaboration. Thus, it serves as a mediating actor, mitigating the problems arising with

weaker ties between important actors in the network. A good example is the relationship

between ETAPA and SENAGUA, which should be a problem with the water law priorities

favouring SENAGUA as well as its role in restructuring the governance arrangement. To this

comes its missing physical presence in the basin, which ETAPA fills with ease. However,

both hold strong ties (stated from both sides) with JGUSRM. This argument fills the gaps

explaining collaboration as a result of the two dimensional horizontal/vertical debate. More

importantly, it allows the placement of the network governance theory within the case study.

This implies that a meaningful theoretical explanation to the knowledge gaps in the WEF

Nexus concept can be formulated.

As the task of this research was to fill the void of explanation regarding governance of the

WEF Nexus, it is important to compare the findings to the theories using table 1. In relation to

the hypotheses, the findings will be put into a larger theoretical framework.

Overall, there is a mix of all theories visible in the case study, which somewhat contradicts

the hypotheses, which states a network structure to be evident. Furthermore, the expected top

down approach of a Type I multi level governance arrangement was overshot as the

government puts great emphasis on decentralizing the country. However, in practice this

might look different as the example of the Santiago river council shows. Although a

58

horizontal structure is maintained, with close contact to the citizens, the activities are mostly

steered from the top. This relates well to the Type I and Network theories, which prescribe a

State or other managerial function to lead and thus steer the process of governance.

Furthermore, when looking at the role of government, Type I and network governance seem

to share more similarities than with a Type II setting, as the government takes the role of a

mediator and interest bundler. In terms of structure, the case study shares many similarities

with the network type processes, however the influential institutional setting takes the shape

of a Type I top down approach.

The composition within the governance arrangement aligns more closely to Type II and

network processes. This is visible through the relationship between actors, which hold

overlapping jurisdictions and engage on their interdependencies. Also the characteristics of

the actors share greater similarities with network compositions, including a healthy mix

between public and private actors. Nevertheless, the evident presence of the state limits the

alignment to network governance. In terms of collaboration, the hypotheses expected a

horizontal rather than vertical process. This is generally visible through the technical council

however, vertical processes such as the level of directors are necessary in order to provide

steering. Even within the technical council certain hierarchies exist, which inevitably steer it

in certain directions. If the findings align to the Type II and network structures, the flexibility

of the arrangement should be evident or even high. The results show different view when

including the WEF Nexus dimension. Restructuring the river council will cause certain

sectors to be underrepresented and social power structures will shift. Notably, SENAGUA

will gain greater significance and important actors like ELECAUSTRO will have to redefine

its role in a larger scale of the Santiago council. This contradicting situation could be aided by

the last row in the table showing a relatable example. Here the difference between Type II and

network governance could stem from the scale of the case study. Type II arrangements, with a

flexibility relatable to the Machángara case study, tend to be evident on larger scales.

Network arrangement examples have yet to reach such scales and currently only focus on

local or regional levels. This could be a crucial difference, making the Machángara case study

the largest example of a network arrangement. However, the question of flexibility can hereby

be solved, as a larger scale than that normally evident for a network arrangement, could

indicate less flexibility. Nevertheless, the conclusion is that a significant level of flexibility

remains, leaving open the question on how the council will deal with the coming changes of

the Santiago river council. Clear is that the WEF Nexus has proven to be an instrument of

collaboration within a governance arrangement. More importantly, it proves to be a crucial

addition to the understanding of the theoretical gaps existing between Multi-level and network

governance arrangements. Traditional analysis on administrative functioning is no longer

sufficient in environmental governance and needs to adhere to new aspects.

59

8 Conclusion

This research aimed at answering some of the knowledge gaps regarding governance of the

Water-Energy-Food Nexus. Collaboration between actors as units of analysis were

investigated in the case study of the Machángara river basin council. The research question

was formulated as: “How do actors collaborate across sectors, levels and scales in the Water-

Energy-Food Nexus and to what extent are they able to adapt to new challenges?” Several

methods for answering this question were used such as theoretical multiplicity as well as

empirical findings resulting in specific tools such as the SNA. Due to the complexity of the

research, the results are multiple and wide ranging.

The main direction of processes happens on the horizontal axis, at which actors collaborate

without greater hierarchy. The technical council functions on the basis of interdependencies

on certain the represented sectors. As such are weaker actors within an important sector still

regarded as equals and benefit from a stronger position. The example of the food sector

clearly shows that power is dispersed over several actors; nevertheless, they possess

individual ´veto power´ which can be used to obtain certain benefits. In addition, the joint

dependency on a healthy environment stimulates all actors to actively engage on tasks they

are not normally confronted with. This joint sector holds together the social ties and is thus

vital for the WEF Nexus.

However, vertical processes are evident and somewhat steer the technical council. The

obvious example is the directors level in the council, making the decisions for the wider river

basin. Another example is the role of private actors such as ELECAUSTRO, which hold

greater influence in the basin. In part, this is due to their stronger financial position but is also

derived from its social power by holding vital relationships. SENAGUA, holding legal power,

is not an evident actor in the basin and therefore does not hold the same relationships as other

actors. However, the SNA showed that weak relationships can be balanced through a ´proxy´

relationship with an actor who is connected to that missing link. This aspect relates to the

flexibility of the arrangement, as it seems to be well balanced and thereby mitigates evident

mismatches between actors. It also seems that levels of governance tend to cooperate more

easily on a shared level. This seemingly obvious fact stimulates the horizontal collaboration

theory and allows for better horizontal collaboration on that level. A good example is the role

of the state, which does not have great influence in the basin. Arguably, this is due to the

historical isolation of the region as well as the decentralization measures imposed by it. The

result is an autonomous region, which functions very well on its internal processes. The threat

comes with change in the form of the new Santiago river council and the shift in scales. Most

actors, even governmental, act on a regional scale due to the decentralized structure of

governance in Ecuador. This means that differences between scales are not as grave as they

could be, weakening the importance of vertical processes. Furthermore, the scale dimensions

prove why the collaboration in the Nexus case study functions as it does. A near-to scale

match is visible between the river basin and the region. This implies that trans-regional

collaboration between actors is not needed and thus simplifies the relationship network. In

addition, such a simplification also aids in the establishment of strong networks, which can

endure major changes such as a restructuring of a river basin. The origin of the river is the

only outlier to the scalar match, however being in a national park it falls under different

jurisdictions. Actors can focus their collaboration on MAE, who governs that park and do not

have to go through administrative levels evident from an autonomous region.

60

Theoretical implications

The chosen theoretical multiplicity approach aided in the explanation of missing links in the

empirical findings More importantly, the joint use of explanations from the different theories

helped in bridging some of the gaps between the theoretical boundaries. Surprisingly the case

study did not match with one or the other theory, even though a network governance

arrangement seemed to fit a WEF Nexus. In addition, the differences between the theories are

not as great as they seem at first sight. The analysis showed that the findings can be placed in

several theoretical table. Striking is the aspect of flexibility which aligns more to a Type II

structure and is thus less flexible than a network governance arrangement. The difficulty of

finding this difference stems in the complexity of the topic, which leaves several aspects open

for discussion. Therefore, a clear alignment to one or the other theory is not possible and

neither desired. Important is the lesson learned that typical governance theories do not suffice

in the explanation of environmental governance analysis. Arguably, due to the high

complexity and dynamic setting of the environment, governance theories need to adjust. This

research has shown that typical governance theories are not solely able to explain

environmental governance. Furthermore, a theoretical multiplicity approach helps alleviate

the problem of knowledge gaps, but remains limited in flexibility.

A possible improvement can be made with deeper analysis on theoretical multiplicity

approaches, which should aim to align but also distinguish the detailed characteristics of each

theory. Much like the case study, theories need to be tested with regard to their flexibility of

acknowledging change.

Further research

This research has laid the foundation for continuing progress on the WEF Nexus. Therefore,

the recommendations focus on the expansion of the WEF Nexus concept through further case

study analysis in which different angles should solidify the previous conclusions. This

research has shown that a WEF Nexus can exist and function under certain conditions. It is

these conditions that need to be applied and tested for progress in understanding to develop.

Furthermore, a diverse set of results are needed on the time scale as well in order to

understand change over time. Hence, this research should create the incentive for further

research on this case study, in which the implications of the new Santiago river council are

measured. A practical guide for such a continuation should be the SNA diagram, which also

produces results that change of time.

Further research on the theoretical dimension is also required. In academia, a Water-Energy-

Food-Environment Nexus exists, just like it exists with the addition of Industry. These

additions are important when looking at collaboration. However, it is not clear whether the

addition of the environmental or industry sector to the concept would have the same effect as

it currently has. The Industry has not been represented in this research as it is not an evident

part of the council. Nevertheless, it could play an important role in other Nexus case studies

by being the connecting factor. The Machángara basin is about the conservation and

production, which does include industrial production. This aspect should be regarded in future

research. In addition, this research has failed to obtain information from the industry sector

due to a missing response.

61

Practical implications

The implications for the case study are highly dependent on the developments at the

institutional stage as well as the future composition of the council. Thus, the following

recommendations should be regarded with caution in respect of changes not envisioned in this

research.

Foremost, it is important that the council continues its activities in the basin, whether or not

they belong to a larger river council. This is important for the actor setting but also in terms of

the social balances creates with a functioning council. Citizens require certain stability in

terms of the services needed in the basin.

Secondly, it became evident that the council has not yet agreed on a common position

regarding the changes with the Santiago council. Some have ousted skepticism whereas others

were not even informed. A common position should bring all actors up to speed and also

democratize the whole process. This would benefit the horizontal collaboration in the basin.

Thirdly, the council should strive to be more inclusive and achieve a larger composition than

it currently possesses. Especially the industrial park and NGO´s can bring meaningful

contributions to the basin. NGO´s also have better ties to the international levels, from which

they can attract greater attention and financing for the council´s activities. The river council

should use its position as a WEF Nexus case study more vividly, which can open more doors

for knowledge exchange and even create a more coherent structure, able to fend off unwanted

institutional changes. Financial means are needed to upgrade the old pipeline infrastructure in

the basin as well as aid some of the reforestation projects going on.

62

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doi:10.1002/pam.4050130113

Interviews

Catalina Díaz

Paul Vintimilla

Fabián Barrera

Diego Idrovo Murillo

Angel Uyaguari

Xavier Murillo

Carlos Cisneros

Oscar Sanchez

Andres Alvarado

Silvio Cabrera

66

10. Appendix

Transcriptions (note: not all interviews were recorded)

Interview Claudio Bustamente

is there a new law?

- yes, senagua is keeper of this new law. There are many actors involved in this law but final

authority is senagua. The superior actor.

- based on water only

- This department focuses on irrigation.

- Until now the law isn‟t being implemented correctly. Many aspects still missing. For

example process of responding to a claim for water is very slow and bound by rules

and procedures. so how was it before?

- Sengua still main authority, but had sole power of all aspects. Now ARCA (technical

institution) is taking over the technical aspects of water management.

- Still no good established working manner between senagua and arca. This slows

process and legitimacy. ARCA was established by senagua but independent. Still no

office of ARCA in Cuenca! ARCA is highly rechnical: measurements and analysis of

hydro areas. Creates studies. but do not work well currently

- Also in the machangara the problem with soliciting for water use is evident.

How can ARCA decide or investigate without office?

- “that‟s the problem”

- Many juridical problems with creating new institution

The machangara river council is managing the water distribution well no?

- No: elecaustrois having problems managing the water

- There are problems with quantity of water use. Some institutions carry more some

less. In the end its working fine but discrapencies exist.

- Within extreme climatic occurances, ARCA is going to control the flow of water and

the distribution thereof to the sectors! So new law exists including priorities but

ARCA controls

- The council is consolatory, not technical.

If all actors are working for technical information, what can ARCA contribute?

- Controlling. Without ARCA consultation needs to solve water distribution problem.

ARCA can enforce more with more technical decision base. Council does not have

enforcing powers but how come actions are made?

- ARCA uses knowledge, data and information from the other actors. So one institution

to gather/summarize all information. So process of information exchange can happen a

lot quicker in the future with only one entity.

- The new law states this new change. So implementation has to be followed if

legitimacy of council should prevail. Without legitimacy future projects would lack

enforcement. (issue of changing the name from council to cooperation…)

- Splitting into two institutions is going to be good in the future even though costs are

involved

- Reason for creating ARCA comes also from the limitations of SENAGUA

Name changing of council to adhere/not adhere to law

67

- You cannot operate without concession of law. So even if not taking part officially,

need to cooperate with larger plans. The Santiago council plans show that escape from

law is not possible

- Larger Santiago plans seems slow in progress. Smaller councils formed but haven‟t

cooperated yet

Decentralization?

- In theory yes. All councils have a voice. But final decisions lie with higher

institutions.

- This will help in future. Administration: positive effect in that smaller

communities/councils will align in terms of their policies due to law and not each do

their own thing.Negative side: the smaller scales need to ask for concession from

higher levels. Hereby are processes involved that limit decentralized authority.

Law article of final word lying with president:

- It‟s a political decision/aspect

- Authority lies with SENAGUA as right hand of the president

- SO: new plans will work and seem positive, only drawback is the authority of the

president which could be dangerous since there is no equilibrium to presidents power

Future of council/region machagara:

- The new law is going to benefit the council

- The council has several years of experience and is working well.

- New law should benefit council

Problems with authority?

- Yes, and not only in Cuenca

- Problems with people taking water unauthorized

- But law needs to manifest itself. So if actor is denounced nothing happens if no one

takes initiative. SO: new law needs to be executed actively and does not develop by

itself SENAGUA important for establishing law

Fraud in Cuenca?

- It is easier to have corruption without council than with. This is because many actors

are involved and affected

New actors enter

- SENAGUA is now replacing the dominant position of ELECAUSTRO and ETAPA

- It is highly unclear whether the current composition of the council will continue to

exist in the future

- Unsure on how financing of ARCA and SENAGUA works. Presumably the

government doesn‟t raise budget but merely splits it into two. this is the problem

now, that budget of council didn‟t increase, but plans are being enlarged.

- In general, the new law is created to solve the previous/existing problems.

- But, they exxagurated some aspects of the law: like: in order to get concession you

need agreements and documents with the junta de usarios etc. The council can aid an

actor in the methodological/practical aspect of this process. Before, the council was

the decision taker/maker of actor entries, making it easier for communication. Now

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there are rules and procedures with more external actors (SENAGUA) which cost

more time and money.

- Council only observes and advises but cannot take action

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Interview Andres Alvarado

What are the bigger projects within the council in which the university is involved in?

- Involved in many studies with ELECAUSTRO with hydro studies

- ETAPA as well, signed agreement for students to investigate/internship

- But in general involved with many actors

- Uni is technical actor for creating maps

- Uni is founding member

Santiago council plans?

- Hard to state whether its going to be positive or negative now

- Positive: thinkingprojecst or coordination in geographic scales. Not political

- Negative: level of cooperation within machangara is very high. Not paralleled by other

councils. So larger cooperation will be difficult.

How do national plans reflect/affect the regional targets?

- Hydroelectricity of machangara is just for the region

- Hydroelectricity is more clean than that many of the other rivers

- More capacity for potable water within the basin. Hydroelectricity not sure, but

could be!

Do you perceive working in administrative/political or Nexus sectors?

- University is involved in larger agreements linking to political levels, but also within

machangara working in sectors

- University is not a political actor, so focused more on Nexus sectors (working within

them)

- No perceived problems working with sectors

- Alvarado been active since 3 years within the council

- No political influence or desires!

- New law is too new. So he doesn‟t know what it states and has no opinion on it.

Action plans to prevent drought like in 2009?

- Few years ago there was a initiative from the MAE with world bank to promote

conservation of the basin

- Still in a phase of evaluating and analysing

- There doesn‟t exist a action plan of prevention yet. But there are several initiatives: the

daily activities of the council. Study the effect of climate change

- Cant comment on concrete other initiatives, except active participation in research.

How to prevent overuse by one actor

- Participation in the council? Yes.

- Don‟t witness any problems within the council

- Doesn‟t know junta de usuarios very well…

- University faculty has connections to industrial park

70

Interview Angel Ayaguari

Projects of the Junta

- Provide water for all communities and pators (service of irrigation)

- 1998 the state granted the Usuarios to govern/manage the water

- Irrigation channels are old: 40 years of usage. 80% of canals are out of service.

- Rehabilitation of the canals, working with council, national bank

- Artificial canals

- 17 km of main canals, 35 juntas locales, 2000 users

- Irrigation water, users pay. ETAPA pays for using the canals. Not money from

government!

- SENAGUA doesn‟t provide money for irrigation. Only helps in practical matters like

investigations, controls, administration etc

- Most users are farmers. Some 100%, some only 70%.

- No need for saving water, can be used. So sufficient water available all year round?

Priorities set in in case of drought!?

- Migrants (mainly from US) mostly obtained land through friends in Ecuador. Now

don‟t live there but maintain the land

- 5000dollars budget of usarios comes from funds from irrigation systems, ETAPA,

- Industrial park not involved in council yet. Governmental actors are involved with

them

- Industrial park outside irrigation sphere. Just one company inside, but is involved in

Junta

- The new law states that each company needs to verify with SENAGUA about

usage of water – before they could jointly reach agreement with junta

Larger Santiago basin plans

- Before, actors didn‟t have to do much to use the water. Now each actor individually

has to have a motivation. Sent to SENAGUA. With one permit, 3 or 4 actors could use

water rights

- ARCA will improve organization and management of council.

- Subsecretariade riego y drenaje is INAR in the past

- Neither for or against new law and the powers to the president

- Before everyone took what they wanted and had disputes. Now everything

belongs to the state, making disputes less likely.

- So he is happy that this process will allow more universal access to water

- Some will use the new law, some not. It‟s a political instrument, not a natural one

- MAGAP and juntas parroquiales missing in list

- MAGAP involved in council as part of Riego y drenaje, which is formerly known

as INAR!

- 3 local communities involved, who are out of the council

- Works most with ETAPA, GPA (in constant contact)

- With GPA working towards prioritizing the use of irrigation water

- How to del with droughts: searching for rehabilitation of canals, new studies,

- Two reservoirs provide enough water and electricity.

- The water for electricity is connected to water for irrigation and drinking water!

Nexus? “multipurpose” – angel uyaguari

- no problems with national hydroelectric plans and quantity of water available

- every user has a certain percentage to use. In dry seasons there is less for everyone

71

- there are users that use more these are the local communities – good relationship

with them. 4 on a scale of 5. Network diagram

- the users within the institution are all very close and work closely together.

Facilitated through education and promotion campaigns

- trash is taken up by the local communities. Usuarios

- we are providing a service for the people. We exist because of them.

- No problems viewed with respect to different sectors!

72

Interview Catalina Diaz

Structure of council, ETAPA has three actors and others only 1?

- Directors, subgerente, and technical advisors

- Directors plan, technical council implements

- Before 2008, new water law, the river council was not constitutionally recognized

-

Major actors that helped develop the council since 1998

- The main three, CREA,

- MAE involved because high protected area cover

- We have all a priority of protected natural resources and above all the water resources

- No cooperation with IP but they are on the third priority list in times of shortage of

water. How can this function?

Filling in table of relationships

- With elecaustro: perfect since they have a high agreement on the gestion ambiental!

Conservation effeorts have high cooperation. aswell question of production

- SENAGUA: very good. They want to strengthen the councils position within the

Santiago basin

- All have the same objective but a different level of agreement- for example the

relationship with farmers is very good but not with all and only about basic things like

conservation efforts

- Sometimes its better to have a actor with social knowledge more than one with legal

knowledge! About acceptance

- Within the law, the machangara council doesn‟t exist and doesn‟t have legal powers. It

is part of the 3 big Santiago river system demarcation. Mchangara, samorra, mayo.

- The practical effects of the reorganization do not change but legally the machnagara

council falls under der larger Santiago council and its objectives

- Santiago council knows and has clear plans on how to continue (interview?)

- The council is an executive arm of the Santiago council

- New presidential rights: we don‟t have control over it, all we can do is keep working.

All

- INAR part of MAGAP (ministry of agriculture)

- Management of riego: GPA: general canals etc. INAR/Magap: irrigation on pastures.

- Relationship between INAR and MAGAP complicated due to unclear division of tasks

and authority. SO: irrigation is split among 3 authorities.

- GPA relationship is good. But areas of work are different. GPA works with irrigation

at the lower basin and ETAPA at the middle and upper basin with the protected area.

More a coordination relationship, not so much collaboration

- MAE: very good. Coordination of legalization efforts, protection of forest. In order to

obtain legal paper, all actors are involved in the process.

- Condesan: no relationship. Before with luisa costa.

- PI: only when there is contamination there is a relationship.

WEF working

- We cannot only think in terms of water. First come the people who need water.

- “People are also the ones that give us the power, hence we need to serve them, not our

interests”

- There are products which are flourishing there but are not used. Like mushrooms. So

there are projects to teach a wider range of using products.

73

- “working horizontally” : the council works in vertical structures (director and tech

council) but the technical council works together with the people.Its all about

communication and collaboration. We teach and get taught. “we are another one of

them” also, the council consists of people with equal powers democratically. (power

play?) if another actors (eg. ARCA) enters the council they maintain theyre one vote

power. Within the machangara basin there is a concealed power. So greater Santiago

plans will diminish these powers (Idrovo opposed to new plans)?

- There is a transition with the new plans and ARCA. Its true that they may have the

power to decide on the direction. They will have the legal power but will they have the

social power?

- objectivo 7 del plan nacional del buenvivir national plans and those of council. We

cannot isolate us from the national plans. SENAGUA and ARCA are needed and part

of the council. Each project is evaluated according to the national plan buenvivir on

their potential (but financing comes from within the council?!) with new actors no new

money will come, only be split between more councils

- the government says to implement certain things, the provinces do the work. Cuenca is

then also a forerunner in innovation because they act alone and more cooperatively.

People with visions and motivation. The university under lead of one professor

managed to stimulate the question of the environment, enabling this culture to last

until today

- the national plans also copy a lot of innovation coming from Cuenca, such as a new

method from ETAPA on community soil use (rehabilitation of soil, managing forests

etc. based on participation) which saved the city from water shortage.

- ETAPA works horizonally as it serves its people.

- So does the environmental education/effort come from the council or the education

system or the people themselves? The council stimulates the education system to

environmentally educate.

- Public private difference? ELECAUSTRO and ETAPA used to be private, now public.

(part of greater governmental plans?) BUT cooperation or activism is not about this

but about larger financing institutions creating a budget for environmental action!!

74

Interview Paul Vintimilla

The main projects of ETAPA

- Technical support

- Uncultivated land

- Monitoring quality of water, ecosystem etc

- ETAPA doesn‟t work alone in council, in cooperation with others

- Productivearea: Catalina: “conservacion y produccion”

- 90% of lands do not have paper of oficial properties. Legalizing these is one main

project

- Highly involved in council. Co-founder.

Technical capacity?

- Yes. With ELECAUSTRO the only technical institutions

- ETAPA, ELECAUSTRO and Uni (in that order) are the main actors (for legalizing

projects). With MAE, they authorize projects.Senagua not necessary because MAE is

authority in the park

- University of Cuenca entered as mediator of a dispute between two actors (which two

actors?).

- 75% of machangara basin is inside protected forest area. Hence the importance of

MAE.

- Industrial park is not part of council but does use the water. Why not part of Junta de

Usuarios? – both sides don‟t seek contact. Only if there is a pollution or overuse.

Larger Santiago plans

- It‟s a political plan

- We are part of the system so we take part

- Something is going to change obviously.

- Problem with the name: not a decision of ETAPA only. Decision lies with Directors

Government plans of hydropower etc

- We are only concerned with the sub Cuenca of machangara, protection of environment

etc.

- Hydroelectricity not compentency of ETAPA.

- According to law, hydroelectricity comes third in priorities.

- Hydroelectricity not 100% clean but its brings infrastructure which improves the

natural environment aswell

Working with WEF Nexus or political levels?

- ETAPA works a lot with WEF – project: ETAPA technical and environment,

ELECAUSTRO socializing the importance of protecting the environment, ministry of

agriculture –support from the side of food all within gestion the recursoshidricos

Directors

- Always informed

- Technical council plans and presents plans

- Directors approve,

Action plan for extreme climatic events?

- Not only the machangara basin is affected

75

- Normal activities of council contribute to improving the environmental situation and

prevent disasters? – eg. anti-desertification,

- There are periods of limited rainfall

- Retaining reservoirs created before the drought

- A few of the big actors created a study/analysis of the hydrological system to see what

it would support and what the capacity is to prevent drought.

Council works well?

- More established now

- Always have been political questions which tested the council

- ELECAUSTRO and ETAPA have similar objectives as companies within the

machangara

- Good example of functioning coordination

Multiple actors of each company present

- Each company has more…engineers, sociologists etc. is this the case for all

actors?

76

Email Message to interviewees

Estimado Sr/Sra,

Mi nombre es Marco van Burik y estoy haciendo mi Maestría en Ciencias Ambientales con

una especialización en Gobernanza de Agua en la Universidad de Wageningen en Holanda.

Actualmente estoy desarrollando mi tesis en la cuenca del Río Machángara. Quiero saber

cómo las partes interesadas cooperan a través de los distintos niveles y sectores dentro del

consejo de cuenca del río Machángara. Esta cooperación debe seguir un eje vertical y

horizontal. Vertical para la interacción entre los niveles dentro de los sectores y horizontal

para la cooperación entre los sectores (Water-Energy-Food). Con el fin de probar la

estabilidad de la cooperación quiero saber cómo extremas ocurrencias climáticas afectan a

esta interacción social (como la sequía del 2009).

Con el fin de obtener toda la información relevante de los actores importantes, es más factible

llevar a cabo entrevistas. Éstos deberían definir un conocimiento más profundo de los actores

sobre el tema de investigación y crear una cuenta que no sea interpretado.

Por la presente me gustaría pedirle que participe en esta investigación como usted es un actor

importante dentro de mi ámbito de investigación. No existen riesgos asociados con la

participación. Al ser una participación voluntaria, puede detener la entrevista en cualquier

momento. Si usted tiene alguna pregunta sobre mí, la investigación o la entrevista no dude en

ponerse en contacto conmigo. Con mucho gusto responder a cualquier pregunta.

Soy un investigador independiente y no estoy alineado a ningún partido político, actor privado

u otros intereses. La selección de mi tema y su ubicación fueron basados en preferencias e

intereses personales. Usted me ayudará a responder ciertas preguntas que son de gran

importancia para mi investigación. Toda la información será manejada con cuidado y, de ser

el caso, analizada anónimamente. Si usted escoge responder a esta invitación por favor hágalo

de una manera abierta y honesta ya que solo de esa forma se pueden llegar a conclusiones

validas.

Miro adelante a recibir su respuesta y espero que acepte mi invitación.

Saludos cordiales,

Marco van Burik

WageningenUniversity

Estudiante de Maestría de Ciencias Ambientales

Especialización en la gobernabilidad del agua y la diplomacia desarrollo sostenible

77

Interview Blueprint

Interviewee receives the information sheet before!

Entrevista sobre la collaboracion entre los sectores del Water-Energy-Food Nexus

Soy un investigador independiente y no estoy alineado a ningún partido político, actor privado u otros

intereses. La selección de mi tema y su ubicación fueron basados en preferencias e intereses

personales. Usted me ayudará a responder ciertas preguntas que son de gran importancia para mi

investigación. Toda la información será manejada con cuidado y, de ser el caso, analizada

anónimamente. Si usted escoge responder a esta invitación por favor hágalo de una manera abierta y

honesta ya que solo de esa forma se pueden llegar a conclusiones validas. La entrevista será grabada

con su consentimiento y ayudará a la mejor comprensión de las respuestas dadas.

Se le ha pedido a usted ser parte de esta investigación contestando ciertas preguntas sobre el tema para

poder completar la información. No existe ningún tipo de riesgo o inconveniente al participar en esta

investigación. Al ser voluntaria su participación, usted puede dejar la entrevista cuando guste. Si tiene

alguna pregunta sobre mi investigación o la entrevista siéntase libre de preguntarme. Gustosamente

responderé cualquier inquietud.

Institución y/u organización:

Nombre del Entrevistado:

Cargo que desempeña:

Dirección:

Fecha de la entrevista:

Entrevistador/a:

Terceras personas:

1. Proyectos en ejecución que estén referidos a la Cuenca del Machángara y sus características

brevemente

Nº. Titulo del proyecto Características

1

2

3

4

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5

Cuál de estos proyectos requiere más colaboración con los actores externos?

Elaboración:

2. ¿Qué proyectos han considerado realizar al futuro en relación a la problemática de la Cuenca?

Titulo del

proyecto

Características Problemática

1

2

3

4

5

3. ¿Cuál es el nivel de involucramiento en el Desarrollo de la Cuenca del Río a través de sus

acciones?

Califique 1 2 3 4 5

Exponga las razones:

4. Nivel de relación con otros actores

A = Financiamiento de proyectos

B = Comparte visión y objetivos

C = Mismo sector

Nº. Actores con los que

se relaciona

Intensidad de la relación Razones de la relación y su

intensidad

Ex Mb B Deb C A B C Otras razones

1 Elecaustro

2 Junta General de Usuarios del

Sistema de Riego Machángara

(JGUSRM)

Ex = Excelente

Mb= Muy Buena

B = Buena

Deb = Débil

C = Conflicto

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3 ETAPA

4 Secretaria Nacional del Agua

(SENAGUA)

5 Agricultores

6 Instituto Nacional del Riego

(INAR)

7 Gobierno de la provincia del

Azuay

8 Universidad de Cuenca

9 El Ministerio de Medio Ambiente

10 Condesan

11 Parque Industrial

5. Con quién colaboran / trabajo con la mayoría? ¿Por qué?

6. Hay actores externos al consejo con los que colaboras? Porque?

7. Usted notará que algunos actores tienen más influencia en las discusiones? ¿Por qué? ¿Existe

un equilibrio natural del poder?

8. Are you in agreement with larger Santiago basin council plans?

Yes No

9. How does the council perceive larger climate change goals and national targets?

10. Do you perceive working in sectors or administration levels?

Water, energy food: Community, regional, national:

11. Cómo se comunica con otros actores / sectores? ¿Con qué frecuencia?

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12. Cuál es el nivel de facilidad de comunicación entre los actores?

Califique 1 2 3 4 5

Exponga las razones:

13. Hay una diferencia para la colaboración intersectorial?

Si______________ No_________________

Elaboración:

14. Es la cooperación con otros sectores incluidos en la estrategia de gestión?

15. Funciona Administración reunión más cruzar sectorial de los subgrupos?

16. Cómo se comunica dentro de su organismo más amplio (o tiene competencias únicas)? Si es

así, ¿con qué frecuencia y qué niveles están involucrados?

17. Existen planes de acción de sucesos climáticos extremos? ¿Cómo se crean? ¿Por quién?

(priorities)

18. Si no hay planes, ¿cómo lidiar con los sucesos climáticos extremos? ¿Hay más / menos los

actores involucrados?

19. Conoce sobre el Water-Energy-Food Nexus (Nexo Agua-Energía-Comida)?

Si______________ No_______ __________

En caso afirmativo, ¿qué sabe usted al respecto?

20. Existe un plan para lograr activamente una WEF Nexus?

Si______________ No_________________

En todos casos, ¿podría explicar?

………………………………………….

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Coding of SNA

Vertex 1 Vertex 2 Color Width Style Opacity Visibility Label Label Text Color

Label Font Size

Add Your Own Columns Here

JGUSRM ELECAUSTRO Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show ETAPA ELECAUSTRO Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show

SENAGUA ELECAUSTRO Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show

INAR ELECAUSTRO Yellow 3,0 Solid 100 Show

GPA ELECAUSTRO Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show

Uni Cuenca ELECAUSTRO Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show

MAE ELECAUSTRO Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show

ELECAUSTRO JGUSRM Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show ETAPA JGUSRM Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show SENAGUA JGUSRM Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show INAR JGUSRM Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show GPA JGUSRM Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show Uni Cuenca JGUSRM Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show MAE JGUSRM Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show

ELECAUSTRO ETAPA Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show JGUSRM ETAPA Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show SENAGUA ETAPA Yellow 2,0 Solid 100 Show INAR ETAPA Yellow 3,0 Solid 100 Show GPA ETAPA Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show Uni Cuenca ETAPA Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show MAE ETAPA Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show Industrial

Park Uni Cuenca Yellow 1,0 Dash 100 Show

ELECAUSTRO INAR Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show JGUSRM INAR Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show ETAPA INAR Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show SENAGUA INAR Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show GPA INAR Yellow 3,0 Solid 100 Show Uni Cuenca INAR Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show MAE INAR Yellow 3,0 Solid 100 Show

ELECAUSTRO GPA Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show JGUSRM GPA Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show ETAPA GPA Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show SENAGUA GPA Yellow 2,0 Solid 100 Show

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INAR GPA Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show Uni Cuenca GPA Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show MAE GPA Yellow 2,0 Solid 100 Show

ELECAUSTRO Uni Cuenca Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show JGUSRM Uni Cuenca Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show ETAPA Uni Cuenca Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show SENAGUA Uni Cuenca Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show INAR Uni Cuenca Yellow 0,0 Solid 100 Show GPA Uni Cuenca Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show MAE Uni Cuenca Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show

ELECAUSTRO MAE Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show JGUSRM MAE Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show ETAPA MAE Yellow 3,0 Solid 100 Show SENAGUA MAE Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show INAR MAE Yellow 0,0 Solid 100 Show GPA MAE Yellow 2,0 Solid 100 Show Uni Cuenca MAE Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show

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