1

CULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND PROTECTION OF VALUE SYSTEM THROUGH

TELEVISION IN PAKISTAN

BY

ABDUL WAHEED RANA

Taxila Institute of Asian Civilization Quaid-i-Azam University

Islamabad, Pakistan

2004

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CULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND

PROTECTION OF VALUE SYSTEM THROUGH

TELEVISION IN PAKISTAN

BY

ABDUL WAHEED RANA

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the

Quaid-i-Azam University

Islamabad, Pakistan

Taxila Institute of Asian Civilization

Supervisor: Professor Ahmed Hassan Dani

Professor emeritus

2004

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CULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND

PROTECTION OF VALUE SYSTEM THROUGH

TELEVISION IN PAKISTAN

BY

ABDUL WAHEED RANA

4

Dedicated

To

Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad

Where I first learnt the meanings of love and dreams

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I intend to acknowledge every single individual who came across me during

the course of my research. Without having any intention to leave out, there are scores of

people whose names and generosities would remain unrecorded but definitely not

unacknowledged. I apologize to all of them.

I am greatly indebted to my teacher and mentor Professor Ahmed Hassan Dani who

encouraged me to pursue this Ph.D program and with profound patience went through the

manuscripts and provided time to debate many of the issues concerning my topic. Professor

Dani’s critical reactions as supervisor on most part of this research helped me reshape

many of the ideas I had kept with me for long.

This dissertation would not have been possible without the active, un-exhaustive

and patient support of my friend Dr. Anwar Iqbal of Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad

who is the only cause behind my doing this research. I would like to thank him for being

with me through the difficult times and making this tedious job fun at times. I must admit

and register that Dr. Anwar was the one who not only persuaded me to attempt a Ph.D

venture but was instrumental through and through in providing academic logistic and

moral help.

I am profusely thankful to my friends in Pakistan Television Corporation who during

the last three years have been sparing time to discuss academic and professional issues

with me besides providing rich and invaluable data which I would not have been able to

collect otherwise. Among those, I owe special thanks to Malik Mazhar Hussain Director

Finance PTV and Mr. Akhtar Mehmood Dad Director Engineering PTV for their persistent

cooperation and love. My deepest thanks are due to media professionals, journalists,

Writers and Intellectuals for their willingness to discuss with me the issues of media

operation in-depth. I have been fortunate to have the friendship and support of a large

number of media men who made my research authentic and current.

I will remain indebted forever to my teachers at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad

where I developed my first and perhaps the last love for Anthropology. I have no hesitation

to declare that Anthropology has been a beacon which showed me the path to life. All my

endeavors in research and academicia are the offshoots of my association with this rich

discipline. A long-standing obligation is due to my teachers at university of Ottawa Canada

and university of Oslo Norway who inculcated in me an inquisitive heart for research.

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I owe a very special thanks to my wife Shahida who has been a permanent support

for me. She provided me all that mental comfort at home which was needed during this

research. I owe special thanks to my children Adnan, Sarah and Nauman who unknowingly

have been keen always to see their father pursue a Ph.D. They have also been my key

informants as well as critics on various TV programs.

I am also thankful to a large number of respondents in urban and rural settings of

Pakistan whose ideas have been the primary ingredient of my research. Their names are

imprinted in my memory but to mention them all needs many pages. My colleagues in

Planning Commission have been a great support and help to me; during these tiring years

they allowed me to concentrate on my Ph.D activities with open heart. I am especially

thankful to former chief of mass media Mr. Imdad Ahmed Mian and my colleagues in the

planning commission for their continuous support and invaluable professional guidance

during this period.

My special thanks are for Dr. Hafeez-ur-Rehman, Chairman Department of

Anthropology, Quaid-i-Azam University, where I have studied and now teaching media for

the last two years. The Vice Chancellor Mr. U. A. G. Esani with great kindness allowed me

to participate in their research project on Cable TV, sponsored by Higher Education

Commission, as research associate and to use the project data in my dissertation. Without

this facility I would perhaps not have been able to finance field research throughout

Pakistan.

I reserve great appreciation for Mr. Irfan Khan Malik for his professional computer

and typing skills. He typed the manuscript a number of times, prepared tables and did

programming for statistical data. The dissertation in present shape is the result of his

untiring efforts.

I, at this stage, am unfortunate of not having my best friend - my father, alive. He

had always wished me a success and mental satisfaction but is not with me to see how

satisfied I am after accomplishing this task. I believe he can see me remembering him from

the heavens.

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CONTENTS Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 01

MASS COMMUNICATION AND PEOPLE 02

TELEVISION IN PAKISTAN 03 RATIONALE OF RESEARCH 07

QUESTION ADDRESSED THROUGH THE RESEARCH 09 HYPOTHESIS 09 LOCALE OF THE STUDY 10

METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH 10 Sample Selection 11 Sample Design 12

Statistical Data 12 In-depth Interviews 13

Focus Group Discussion 14 Case Studies 15 Source of Data 16

Stages of Research 17 The Operational Tools 18

Chapter 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 19

SURVEY OF LITERATURE 19

WHAT IS A CULTURE? 20 DEFINING MASS COMMUNICATION 23

INTERDEPENDENCE OF CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION 25 CULTURAL COMMUNICATION 25 MASS MEDIA AND CULTURE – THE RELATIONSHIP 29

THE BEGINNING OF MASS MEDIA 30 BROADCASTING 32

HISTORY OF TELEVISION 34 TELEVISION THEORY: READING THE TEXT 39 THE WORKS OF RAYMOND WILLIAMS ON CULTURE

AND TELEVISION 42 RAYMOND WILLIAMS AND TELEVISION 46 STUART HALL, MASS COMMUNICATION,

HEGEMONY AND IDEOLOGY 48 FREEDOM VERSUS CONTROL 52

THE ALTERNATIVE MODELS 56 The Broadcasting Model 56

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NEW DRIVING FORCES: TECHNOLOGY AND MONEY AS BIG PLAYERS 57

THE THESIS OF CULTURAL IMPERIALISM 59 THE DEPENDENCY PARADIGM 62

Chapter 3

TELEVISION – THE REGIONAL BACKGROUND 70

THE WORLD SCENARIO 70

MEDIA SCENARIO IN SOUTH ASIA 74 A REGIONAL VIEW 79

The Electronic Media in India 79 The Electronic Media in Bangladesh 83 Television in Sri Lanka 85

The Media in Nepal 88

DEVELOPMENT OF PRESS AND BROADCASTING IN PAKISTAN 91 Brief Early History 91 Developments Since 1945 94

Press 94 Radio Broadcasting 99 Television 101

Objectives of PTV 106

CABLE TV IN PAKISTAN 112 The Satellite Invasion 112 The Distribution in Pakistan 115

Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) 116

Chapter 4

AUDIENCE REACTION ON STATE TELEVISION (PTV) 122

Availability of Channels 123

THE VIEWING INDEX (VI) 123 AREA OF PERFORMANCE 125

News (Khabranama) 125 PTV – GEO Comparison in News Credibility 129 Current Affairs 132

Sports Programs 134 Drama 137

Music Programs 139 Watching of Religious Programs 141 Science Programs 142

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English Programs (Drama and Feature Film) 142 Attitude towards Restrictions 145

Social Problems and Their projection on TV 146 Impacts of Television Programs 149

Chapter 5

DIMENSIONS OF IMPACT 150

TELEVISION IN PAKISTANI SOCIETY 150 The Arrival 150 Television Discourse in Pakistan 152

The Effects of Television Programs 157 Tele-Visual Texts 161 The Historical Perspective of TV Programming 163

FOUR ETHNOGRAPHIC CASE STUDIES 170

Case Study – 1 171 Case Study – 2 175 Case Study – 3 179

Case Study – 4 182

PROFESSIONAL VIEW ON PTV PROGRAMS 186 The Culture of Modernity 186 Television Creating a Modern Nations 187

He Heydays 189 Viewers Speak Out 193 PTV News and Current Affairs 197

ROLE OF CIVIL AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT 207

Chapter 6

THE ARRIVAL OF SATELLITE TV 214

PAKISTAN ENTERS SATELLITE ERA 215

CABLE CHANNELS AND THE ENGLISH SPEAKING ARISTOCRACY 221

THE BIRTH OF A NEW CULTURE 223 SATELLITE SOAP OPERA 227 THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW LANGUAGE 229

THE NEW FASHION TRENDS 231 CHILDREN THE VICTIMS 235

WOMEN IN CABLE CAGE 239 ARE AUDIENCE CONSERVATIVE? 243

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Chapter 7

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 252 Conclusion 260

BIBLIOGRAPHY 268

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

The words culture, communication and mass Media have been in use

for the last two decades so frequently that their conceptual understanding

has almost diminished and lost validity. Television on top of that is yet

another phenomenon which has occupied our daily life very strongly. It is

the largest carrier of culture and has the monopoly over our thought

patterns, beliefs and social relationship in the society. Under this scenario,

any serious effort to study the intellectually fashionable currents of culture

and associated issues, which have sprung from media explosion across the

globe, becomes difficult and cumbersome. A small prelude is essentially

required before describing the scope of the study.

We are living in a ‘mediated society’ where many of our thought

patterns, and values are shaped by the media, which produces versions of

events and issues in their own style and under their own social, cultural

and political agenda. The influence of media is strong both on individual

and society. It reaches a large number of people but in different ways. Media

messages are designed for large number of people but the impact and

consumption is different because the people are different and their political,

social, cultural, and educational background are different. At the same time,

like culture, media products or texts are shared; they are popular and thus

become part of our common culture. Media in general and television in

particular is the largest producer of popular culture which is also creating

electronic communities worldwide who share at least a mentionable number

of universal cultural traits.

For some, media is yet a threat to local cultures and beliefs. The texts

and contents of modern mass media is challenging the generations old

customs, traditions and religious beliefs, which are sacred and not

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compromise-able. The custodians of cultures in Press, academics and

intellectual circles are continuously involved in the debate on; how to create

safety valves around the cultural frontiers of their societies. Governments in

their own political agendas put this mission on top of other cultural

priorities. The religious, social and cultural opposition is thus increasing

with same zeal as the media itself is strengthening and expanding.

MASS COMMUNICATION AND PEOPLE

In Pakistan, television broadcasting has established an intrinsic

relation with the public. On the one hand State television lack research on

the audience to uncover its viewing tastes and preferences, while on the

other, both public and private means of organizing television feed back on a

global, national and regional issues, through drama and entertainment, and

the political information necessary for the functioning of democracy is

absent. The notion of a specifically nationally defined public service is being

undermined by less professional state television. The conception of public

service broadcasting, coined in UK by BBC in 1920s, was originally based

on the principles of universality and equality of access, as well as the desire

to educate the populace while binding them together in a nationally

imagined community through a blend of information, education and

entertainment. It is a common saying that the Pakistanis were a family with

the wrong people in charge. The Pakistanis, it seemed, were bound together

by their inability to adopt other cultures, denial of artistic expressions and

hatred of new thoughts. It is unlikely that any serious attempt could be

made today to claim that the nation has a culture in common. The

migration of peoples to other continents and the influence of a global

culture has shattered national cohesion, although it remains part of a wider

nostalgia. But it also gives rise to pessimism, as the market driven multi-

channel universe is likely to be based upon low production costs and a

conglomerate dominance of news and entertainment. Public service's most

recent response is the potential development of more regional programming

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(PTV National channel for example). The decentralization of programme pro-

duction and content away from the national center has both pluralist and

democratic pretensions. There are also profound dangers if regional

broadcasting becomes merely a reaction to globalising processes and only

offers a platform for local forms of parochialism. One of the principal

features of public service broadcasting is that it allows the nation to enter

into conversation with itself. Cable, Satellite Television with more specialist

channels would not only fail to provide a plurality of 'quality programming'

but could further atomize the audience.

At global level, a policy of 'Television without Frontiers' has been

adopted along with certain minimal forms of regulation in respect to

pornography, violence and racism (Siune and Treutzschler, 1992). This

enables nation states to curb the transmission of offensive material. As yet

there has been no concerted attempt to regulate the concentration of cross-

media, multiple ownership world-wide. Surprisingly, Pakistan has allowed

cross-media ownership in the year 2003. This still leaves us with the

problem of Pakistan. The most pressing issue here is that culturally and

politically Pakistan is very difficult to define. The State itself has recently

been struggling to assert a cultural identity of its own in the face of

fragmentation and the influx of American culture. Indeed the most

important cultural issue facing Pakistan is the current explosion of tensions

and terrorism witnessed the deeper entrenchment of terrorism and hatred.

These are obviously not problems that can be solved by Mass Media Policy

alone. Although it forms the backcloth of any attempt to rethink its

importance in a national context.

TELEVISION IN PAKISTAN

For most of us, television has become the center of our

communication lives. Its content entertains us, informs us and angers us.

Yet television content is increasingly the only communication experience

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that members of modern society have in common. Indeed, it might be

argued that we spend more time communicating about mass-media content,

particularly television, than about almost any other topic except, perhaps,

ourselves and our relationships with others. Television and other mass

media indicate two significant influences for our communication behavior.

First, television and the other mass media increasingly provide a

common point of reference, a common orientation to a vicarious world

frequently more attractive and typically more exciting than our own. We

may not have much else to talk about with our neighbor, but we surely can

talk about the cricket that we saw on television the night before, a scene in

our favorite serial, the commentary on the evening newscast. This

realization of the importance of media in our lives has another consequence:

we witness more people and institutions adept at manipulating the media,

gaining exposure, and engaging in controversy in order to take advantage of

the status that media recognition confers.

Second, however, and perhaps of greater importance, the latter half of

the twentieth century is witnessing the emergence of the vicarious lifestyle.

Communication behavior in which interaction between cultures and people

occurs via television, or via the newspaper, without any chance for our

participation in or verification of that mediated reality has become more

common. We have become dependent upon the media to inform us of other

realities. But, the increasing sophistication of the media has made the man

obsolete as a storage medium. We become increasingly knowledgeable about

the world and yet less in touch with its feel, smell, and presence. We might

speculate that a whole generation of children raised on "Sesame Street"

learn a style of image-processing and information-processing. This has

made them familiar with pattern, recognition snatching the ability of

content recognition. Perhaps recent declines in verbal and quantitative

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general knowledge suggest the need for a new concept of "literacy" and a

new model for evaluating human ability.

In Pakistan people value television very high and associate themselves

with its discourses very keenly. It has multiple historical social and

economic reasons: the foremost being absence of any other leisure time

activity for youth, women and low income groups with decrease in economic

opportunities changing lifestyles, less out of home entertainment

opportunities, and tradition of staying at home with family under the four

walls. The dependence on television has enormously increased and

deteriorating law and order situation has compelled people to stay at home

in many parts of the country including small villages. The picture tube has

replaced traditional autaq in Sindh, Chopal in Punjab, bethak in NWFP and

Baluchistan and small tea shops and Thara (a sitting place in front of shops

and houses) in urban centers. In the words of Hall (1994), a new public

sphere has emerged in the form of television. Pakistani society during the

last thirty years has gradually undergone an aesthetic transformation

replacing all other entertainments with a singular choice for TV. Radio due

to its orthodoxy in content and form, centralized broadcasting and acuate

lack of professionalism is no more a leisure time activity. Cinema with all its

promiscuity and old styled theatrical presentation with no charming faces

and impulse touching music, has shrunk to an unlimited audience mostly

laborers and out of home bachelors. Parks and public places are not there

to offer a fresh breath to entertainment starved populace. Family gatherings

and visiting friend and relatives is again an old story. In this scenario the

entire responsibility of entertaining, involving, informing and refreshing a

melancholous population rests on a small box we call TV. In such complex

situation the role and responsibility of Television and Television producers

and media managers has increased manifold and the expectation level has

equally expanded enormously. Everybody wants TV to behave like a leader,

a reformist, a friend and above all a catharsis chamber. With multiplicity of

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ethnic, religious, economic and social differences television is expected to

meet the demands of a variety of stubborn population groups, which have

their own totem and taboos not reconciling with each other.

State in one hand is strong custodian of electronic media operations;

it provides finances, employs media managers and producers, formulate

policies, impose regulations and expect wide publicity of its developing

programmes and political activities. Ministry of Information and

Broadcasting is responsible for keeping the media on track: no deviance is

permissible what so ever.

On the other, the print media overwhelmingly in private sector, enjoys

greater freedom. The number of newspapers in Urdu and English languages

has increased with state of the art publishing industry. Satellite

broadcasters have entered into the arena of competition with their all

necessary information and entertainment cosmetics and contents.

International broadcasters are there to challenge the news aired by state TV,

spontaneously providing people access to live coverage of happenings inside

and around the globe.

This too is not the whole story. The penetration of satellite

broadcasters through cable is limited to urban centers with a tiny outreach

of only less then 20% population. The rural areas and those living in

scattered localities in urban areas where cable has not reached are still

dependent on PTV broadcasts. But the impact is indirectly reaching them

through socialization with others. The impact is also reflected on print

media which is available but to literates only. This is a very complex and

intricate situation which has covert and overt dimensions. It also elaborates

the difficulty in conducting a research on television broadcasting in relation

to cultural needs of the people.

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RATIONALE OF RESEARCH

Since the introduction of television in Pakistan in 1964, no concrete

empirical research has been undertaken on television as a cultural industry

and powerful medium of information. Television has been used and misused

and enjoyed tremendously but its operations have never been

institutionalized culturally. The emphasis so far has been on the

infrastructure development and expansion, setting aside its cultural role.

The potential, power and out-reach of this vast medium needs a thorough

evaluation on intellectual, academic and scientific grounds.

Television as a cultural industry and tremendous source of information

has affected the lives of Pakistani people in diverse ways. In a society with

low rate of literacy and per capital income, under-development in various

fields, absence of organization, in-stable political system and very high

population growth rate, the Mass Media and Television in particular has to

take on the responsibility of an entertainer, educator and mediator

(awareness raising among cross cultural groups). TV has always been under

heated debate over its role and has been a victim of severe criticism from

various segments of the society. In Pakistani cultural system where the

values and tradition have a strong role in social conduct, the television has

been stoned harshly. It has been vulnerable to social change and incapable

to meet the needs of multi-ethnic and linguistic groups. These are some

extreme beliefs held by the people regarding television in Pakistan:

Television is responsible for creating economic depression, violence

and obscenity in the society. It has cultural biases and disrespect for

the value system.

Television is a panacea of development and has the primary duty to

project the government policies and programmes.

It has to adopt a middle of the road approach to satisfy a cross

cultural and economic groups. It needs to be liberal and non-partisan

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so as to make itself capable of surviving in a highly competitive global

media environment.

In Pakistan, the true role of television has yet to be defined. Since

television occupies a regular place as family member in most Pakistani

households in urban centers and a sizeable households in rural and semi-

rural areas, its role cannot be undermined. It has to be studied in true

perspective within the ambit of religion, ethnicity, lifestyle and value system.

The most pressing question such as the role of television in the protection of

value system, creation of cultural harmony, providing information,

education and entertainment, are therefore still unanswered.

My research has focused on the TV discourses in totality with their

cultural significance. The study is not a purely media research nor is a

study of culture in the crudest sense. Broadly two areas of investigation

have been focused i.e. the television as a medium, its mode of working in

Pakistan, its impact on the society in terms of people‘s perception as well as

its role in satisfying people’s cultural needs and the expectations and

demands of the society from it’s discourses. The areas of investigation are

broad and complex. Television has been studied as an institution mainly

owned and controlled by the state, its historical background in relation to

worldwide developments and also under the regional scenario, has been

recorded in addition to the type of programs it provides to the audience. The

arrival of satellite TV is an additional area of investigation, without which

the impact of National (Public Sector) broadcaster is hard to understand.

This also provides answers to the questions like; why national TV fails to

satisfy a diverse population and enjoys low credibility, what it lacks in terms

of content and technological outreach and what makes satellite TV more

popular and successful despite a large criticism from within the society and

strong opposition from the self- styled custodians of religious, cultural and

political morals.

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QUESTION ADDRESSED THROUGH THE RESEARCH

I listed the following questions before designing the research tools and

operational methodology:

1. What are the existing mass media patterns in Pakistan?

2. What are the cultural needs of Pakistani people in terms of

communication?

3. What is the scope of TV broadcasting and its impact on people?

4. Does TV understands the cultural needs of people?

5. Who dominates TV contents?

6. What are the effects of TV programmes and "newsocracy" on people

(various groups)?

7. Is TV an exhibitor of Pakistani life?

8. Are values of TV always the values of society (Pakistani society)?

9. Is TV an efficient and effective carrier of cultural traits, values and

social aspirations?

10. Does TV need redirection and who and how should it be done?

11. What cultural traits and values need protection and why they are

sacred?

12. How international satellite channels are affecting Pakistani culture?

13. How state (national) TV is responding to this effect?

14. why satellite TV is enjoying greater popularity and credibility despite

strong opposition

HYPOTHESIS

A suggestive set of hypothesis was developed on pre-conceived

knowledge of the subject which was partly based on general observations and

common beliefs held by the people in one hand and on the basis of

preliminary secondary data on the other. These hypothesis were put to test in

the research:

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1. TV has replaced the role of cultural institutions in the society. People

shape their ethics from TV messages.

2. A free and financially independent television is a better option for

Pakistan for promoting nationalism, cohesion and accelerating

development as compared to a controlled TV. Television cannot act as a

panacea of social and economic development.

3. People rate state television very low as a credible medium and the

following are the main causes of TV’s low credibility:-

i) Government’s financial and administrative control.

ii) Religious intolerance in the society.

iii) Bureaucratic involvement in the operation and administration of

media (Television).

iv) Non compromising attitude of ruling class towards their own ideas

and ideologies.

v) Confusion over the state and government bifurcation. Both are

considered by the politicians in the government as synonyms.

vi) Non professionalism in TV production and presentation.

vii) Media Manager’s incorrect perception. They expect credibility

without being truthful and fair.

viii) Lack of balance between entertainment and information.

ix) Availability of international Channels and Internet has exposed the

unfair attitude of national TV.

LOCALE OF THE STUDY

The entire country (Pakistan) was the Locale.

METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH

The research is an extension in the comparatively less attended area

of Anthropology of Media focusing on television as an institution in a ‘society

in transition’. It is in fact not a purely media study nor is the attempt to

record the cultural traits of a society at a given period of time, as all or most

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Anthropologists do; it is a blend of both. I have tried to document the role

played by TV (with emphasis on state controlled TV) in Pakistan. I dare to

call it a study on Anthropology of Television in Pakistan. I applied partly

anthropological and partly survey method for data collection, but the main

emphasis and thrust was on in-depth non-formal research techniques. A

number of sources were used; some for direct data collection and some for

in-depth qualitative research.

Sample Selection

The main tool was cross-sectional sampling of the population at a

single point in time. This covered a broad sample of people of different ages,

educational and income levels, officials of Government, community leaders

and NGOs. Since a wide sample of population, variant geographically was to

be studied, partly a survey method was employed as well. This sampling

method needs some elaboration.

i) First, the target population comprises only those who watch TV.

ii) Secondly, the entire population (all categories).

iii) Thirdly, the people directly involved in TV operations and

cultural activities.

In 3rd case the specific type of people directly involve in any capacity,

such as professors, officials etc., were covered but representative cross-

sectional sample had to be developed for an empirical generalization. In

second case, the target population to be addressed by policy planners was

investigated. This was widely a representative sample, based on the

selection of various groups and institutions.

Such classification can be made and studied on purely

anthropological parameters. The tools were formal and informal but not

necessarily each information was gathered through direct methods.

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The targeted population was selected through stratified sampling

technique. The entire population was the sample frame while the broad

classification was on the basis of gender within which quota was allotted to

rural and urban segments. I was conscious of the fact that it would be

unfair if a uniform category of respondents is interviewed through

structured and unstructured tools. It was established in the very beginning

that all representative groups of Pakistani society are covered. No quota was

initially allotted to the target population on the basis of their income level,

education level and age. However, for in-depth interviews and focus group

discussions, different segments of society were selected very carefully.

A multi-pronged approach was applied to collect the data under the

principle of strictly self-censored ethical neutrality by:

1) Avoiding value judgment to conduct value-free research

2) Applying categorical and normative style

3) Staying away from reactive research techniques

Sampling design Statistical Data

The research had two broader parts: one was the collection of

statistical data through structured questionnaire and the other were

qualitative in-depth research*.

The in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and case studies

was the second part of the research which went simultaneously with first

part.

* The collection of statistical data in all the four provinces and rural and urban areas was not possible and usually

is not preferred in self sponsored Ph.D researches. But this was made possible through the courteousy of department of Anthropology, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad who involved me in one of their research project on impact of Satellite TV in Pakistan. The project took off during the 2nd year of my Ph. D program. I was

associated with it as research fellow. During this research the relevant information was added to the scope on my request with permission to use it exclusively in my Ph.D thesis in addition to using some of the unpublished statistics. This was a great opportunity which practically enabled me to visit the country and interview people at various places. For this purpose three questionnaires were prepared for three different target groups and results

are part of this thesis as Chapter No. 4.

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Table – A

Sampling Design (General Public)

Gender Classification on the basis of Age N = 1000

AGE

Male (600) Female (400)

Total Rural (N=250) Urban (N=350) Rural (N=175) Urban (N=25)

15 – 20 36 52 15 31 134

21 – 25 35 58 32 53 178

26 – 30 52 61 41 39 193

31 – 40 53 59 33 57 202

41 – 50 45 50 21 37 153

51 + 29 70 33 08 140

Total 250 350 175 225 1000

Table – B

Distribution of Sample Population on the

Basis of Education and Sex N = 1000

Male Female Total

Illiterate 68 47 115

Non-Matric 98 77 175

Matric /FA 158 72 230

Graduate 148 102 250

Post Graduate 107 93 200

Ph. D 21 9 30

Total 600 400 1000

In-depth Interviews

I held in-depth interviews and organized focus group discussions with

following categories of population:

i) PTV personnel

ii) Satellite Broadcasters based in Pakistan

iii) Official bodies involved in TV operations

iv) Private sector TV production houses

v) General public. (Women + Children + Teenagers)

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vi) Cultural, economic, social and religious groups

vii) Foreign broadcasters

viii) Cable operators

ix) Cultural bodies

x) Writers on culture

xi) Artists

xii) Students at school to university level

xiii) Individuals

xiv) Individual Families

xv) Human Rights and women activists

The interviews were held with a very select group of people who have a

reputation of being highly informed and very well conversant with their

specialized fields and professions. These individuals were requested to

educate the researcher, instead of informing him in conventional ways. The

interviews spread over several hours and sometime were repeated after a

span of few months. In some cases the professionals associated with official

media put a condition of anonymity because of their official positions, which

has been respected. However the names of such professionals have been

mentioned without directly referring to the information provided by them.

Focus Group Discussions

Focus group discussions were held At Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad,

Rawalpindi Islamabad, Peshawar, Quetta and same small semi-urban

towns. I would invite people from various sections of society to discuss one

particular issue concerning my topic. I would myself open the discussion

and conduct the debate very cautiously staying away from value judgment

and avoiding suggestive questions. I had managed very carefully that the

Focus Groups should comprise of the most relevant people; for example on

TV drama I invited middle class people and housewives and girls, while for

satellite music shows students of urban areas were preferred. Similarly,

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experts and professionals were invited for discussions on policy and writers

and intellectuals were most suitable for analysis on impact. The outcome of

these discussions was reported in writing although I also had the recording

facility. This has formed the most valuable part of my study which is

reflective of true sentiments of the participants. The discussions with expert

groups were more interesting and worthwhile because of the singular fact

that the discussions were heated and open with greater chance to verify and

cross check the dissenting views. The outcome of these discussions was not

recorded statistically as the replies were analytical, not a straight yes or no.

The Focus Group Discussions were largely representative and open in view

of the fact that participants were speaking to their hearts and were

persuaded and prompted by the fellow participants as well.

Case Studies

In the beginning, the idea of preparing case studies looked too

complex and cumbersome but lately it proved to be the most successful

technique of in-depth data collection, due to the fact that I was in a more

comfortable position to compare reactions of my respondents with their

general bahaviour and thinking. It also made easier for me to see how

people connect television discourses with their personal lives and then

ultimately to see the impact of programs over their worldly bahaviours and

thought patters. The case studies also helped in analyzing the responses in

relation to their lifestyles. It was a bit difficult in the beginning to select

vocal, friendly and reactive people. It was again hard task to probe

individuals on certain issues in front of other family members to speak their

hearts. Individual private discussions with family members seemed too

difficult at the out set but lately became easier as the acquaintance

developed. Instead of selecting families randomly, I went for contacting

those having frank relations with me. I picked the cases of my personal

acquaintance which include my relatives, old friends, colleagues, office

workers and families known to me for quite some time. This facilitated in

26

staying with them in their households for longer and even during odd times.

At the start of the research, there was a shyness among the families which

reduced gradually and diminished ultimately. My stay with families for case

studies is the most rewarding part of the research because they provided a

deep insight and detailed and frank reactions on TV programmes. In

addition, it is the most precious qualitative data which is the foundation of

my research. In case studies a true participant observation technique was

applied.

Sources of Data

Primary

The primary data was collected through formal and non-formal ways.

The official documents and literature produced on relevant areas was

collected in the beginning and then it was updated, revised and cross

checked through primarys sources. The primary data comprises:

i) Current structure of TV

ii) Policy making mechanism

iii) Who is the primary decision-maker?

iv) Role of Government

v) Role of Ministry of Information and Broadcasting

vi) Data on cultural practices, perceptions on value system through

(a) literature (b) participant observation (c) structured

questionnaire

vii) Data on program types and priorities set by various channels

viii) Audio & video archives of PTV

Secondary

1) Works done on TV

2) Libraries

3) Internet

27

4) Official material

5) Newspaper articles, comments, critiques

Stages of Research The Research was conducted in three stages:

Stage-I

Information compilation on present structure of PTV and other broadcasters

During this phase the ground work was prepared for the research.

The information on the history and operating structure was gathered from

PTV, cable operators and Satellite Broadcasters. Separate and small profiles

were prepared on TV channels and stations.

Stage-II

The In-depth Study

The actual in-depth study started during this phase when the

preliminary information gathered earlier was verified, cross checked and

registered.

Stage-III

Analysis and dissertation writing

In this phase, the information collected was computerized, cleaned,

cross checked and analyzed. The actual writing of dissertation started then.

Unit of analysis

Unit of analysis was individuals. The sample frame, however, was the

entire population. Basically, it was a non- probability sample, based

partially on quota sampling. By this, it is meant that it was decided which

strata of the community may be relevant for the study. Then I set a quota

for each stratum that is to some extent proportionate to its representation in

28

the entire population. For example, number of group or sub-group were

selected on the basis of their representation in the community.

The Operational Tools

Profiles of the Target Groups/Institutions/Channels

The profiles of the target groups and TV channels were prepared for

initiating the actual field work and in-depth study.

29

Chapter 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

SURVEY OF LITERATURE

The effects of communication on culture and social structure are many

and diverse. They may be short term and long term. They may operate on

opinions, values, information, skills and behaviour. The question of the

impact of mass media of communication brings about heated debate

because all societies including Pakistani society are affected by its power.

This debate is focused on as to how the culture should be protected by

state institutions and how to create safety valves around the

technological threats and intrusion of foreign cultural traits into local

cultures. In Pakistan where the rate of literacy is disparately low and

culture and religion are highly sensitive areas, media of communication

must have a well-defined role. We still need to single out the threats

posed to our culture by the ever expanding electronic media -TV in

particular, what are our communication needs and what do we mean by

safeguarding our culture and value system? An in-depth analysis is

required on these areas. Although a lot has been written and discussed

in generalistic way, no academically supported strong research on the

relationship, interdependence, impact and role of culture and mass

media on people's lives has been undertaken so far. Television, claimed

by many as a cultural carrier, should be looked into under a variety of

notions and dimensions. It is an intrinsic interplay of a bunch of

characters and components which define the cultural role of television or

the role of culture in shaping the discourses of television. A number of

factors ranging from value system, political configuration of society,

power and control, ownership, structure of media in the society,

competition, media policy and regulations, position of a particular media

in global setting, different media models, recent changes in global media

30

environment and media economics to the question of cultural identity,

need to be understood theoretically before touching upon the

communication aspects of television in Pakistan.

WHAT IS A CULTURE?

In anthropological literature culture has been defined as the way of

life of a people. It consists of conventional patterns of thought and

behaviour, including values, beliefs, rules of conduct, political organization,

economic activity and the like, which are passed on from one generation to

the next by learning -and not by biological inheritance. The concept of

culture is an idea of single importance, for it provides a set of principles for

explaining and understanding human behaviour. It is one of the

distinguishing elements of modern social thought, and may be one of the

most important achievements of modern social science, and in particular of

anthropology.

The term culture has been an important part of the anthropologists

vocabulary since about the mid-1800s, yet the meaning of the term

underwent an important change at around the turn of this century. The

nineteenth-century usage, which characterized the works of such Victorian

anthropologists as Sir Edward B. Tyior and Lewis Henry Morgan, viewed

culture or civilization as the conscious creation of rational minds for the

purpose of improving the lives of society's members. For example, moral

values were thought to have been invented to promote human happiness.

Past experiences with laziness, thriftlessness, unchastity, and the like,

prompted the establishment of Victorian values about sex, work, and

'proper' behaviour in general. Similarly, the parliamentary form of

government, monogamy, capitalism, modem clothing styles, and so on, were

thought to have arisen as a result of rational reflections upon human

experiences and needs.

31

The modern concept of culture emerged at about the turn of the

century, and it did so largely in opposition to the Victorian concept. A

number of people contributed to these changes, perhaps the most

significant being Franz Boas, a German scientist who emigrated to the

United States in the 1880s and eventually became the dean of American

anthropology. A main thrust of these writers was that culture is governed by

its own principles and not by the raw intellect, and that the differences

among peoples do not reflect differences in levels of intelligence. With the

development of the modern culture concept it was now seen to be largely

constituted by culture. It was now understood that people acquire the ideas,

beliefs, values, and the like, of their society, and that these cultural features

provide the basic materials by which they think and perceive. Most social

scientists today employ some variation of the modem culture concept in

their research, and while they agree about the essential features of culture,

they still disagree fundamentally about how culture works, the factors

governing it, and the full extent of its influence on behaviour, thought and

perception.

It is no accident that anthropologists were the first social scientists to

develop clearly the concept of "culture" but there is still some confusion

on technical use of the term "culture" and a more popular usage. Culture

in its broadest sense is a cultivated behavior, that is, the totality of man's

learned, accumulated experience which is socially transmitted, or more

briefly, behavior acquired through social learning. This seems simple and

matter of fact enough. Actually there are numerous problems connected

with the scientific use or "operation" of this term, as with so many other

scientific concepts. Some widely accepted classical definitions are

summarized below:

32

i. That complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals,

law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a

member of society. — Tylor (1871)

ii. The sum total of the knowledge, attitudes and habitual behavior

patterns shared and transmitted by the members of a particular society. —

Linton (1940)

iii .[All the] historically created designs for living, explicit and implicit,

rational, irrational, and non-rational, which exist at any given time as

potential guides for the behavior of men. —Kluckhohn and Kelly (1945)

iv. The mass of learned and transmitted motor reactions, habits,

techniques, ideas, and values—and the behavior they induce. —Kroeber

(1948)

v. The man-made part of the environment. —Herskovits (1955)

Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) have uncovered over one hundred and

sixty different definitions of the term "culture" by anthropologists and

others.

Dr. Mohammad Yousuf Abbasi in his book "Pakistani Culture" has

pointed to a difficulty, which arose from the delimitation of culture and

civilization. He says, ‘there is a subtle difference, civilization comprehends

the ways of living and portrays the stages in the steady march of man from

the Paleolithic age, embracing different phases of development, to the

modern age of automation. Material progress is a fascinating study of the

interaction of man and his environment and his struggle for the fulfillment

of his material needs exemplified by agriculture, trade, industry and towns

etc. But culture pertains to the ways of thinking enshrined in religion,

philosophy, sciences and fine arts. Hence, culture reflects a different area of

33

emphasis. Since civilization and culture are so inseparably intertwined

together, no definite and foolproof definition may be possible.” (Abbasi 1992)

Referring to Polish Anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1944),

satisfaction of organic and basic needs of a man and of the race is a

minimum set of conditions imposed on each culture. They are solved by the

construction of a new, secondary, or artificial environment. Cultural

traditions have to be transmitted from one generation to the next. Methods

and mechanism of communication, sharing of ideas and interaction must

exist in every culture. The material aspect of culture has to be renewed and

maintained in working order. All the primary problems of human beings are

solved by artifacts, organizations and by the development of knowledge. The

basic needs and their cultural satisfactions are tied together in all societies.

In nutshell, the analysis in which we attempt to define the relation between

cultural performance and human needs - basic or derived may be termed

functional. Malinowski proposed that culture and its effects should be

studied through a methodological system.

DEFINING MASS COMMUNICATION

The broadest definition of communication was provided by Peterson

and Jensen (1991) who said, "It is a process by which a person influences

another and influenced by him". They elaborate, "Communication is the

carrier of social process. It makes interactions between human kinds

possible and enables man to become and remain social being".

If communication is considered in its broader sense, it is a

collective activity and its main functions are information,

socialization, motivation, debate and discussion, education,

entertainment, integration and cultural promotion. The

communication functions are linked to people's needs, both material

and non-material. People want to add aspiration toward human growth

34

to the satisfaction of material needs. Self-reliance, cultural identity,

freedom, independence, respects for human dignity and participation

in the re-shaping of environment are non-material aspirations which

man seeks through communication.

The term 'mass communication', which was coined at the end of the

1930s, has too many connotations to allow a simple agreed definition. The

word mass is itself value laden and controversial, and the term

'communication' still has no agreed definition. Nevertheless, there is

sufficient commonality in widely held common sense' perceptions to provide

a working definition and a general characterization. The term 'mass' denotes

great volume, range or extent (of people or production), while

'communication' refers to the giving and taking of meaning, the

transmission and reception of messages. One early definition (Janowitz,

1968) reads as follows: "mass communications comprise the institutions

and techniques by which specialized groups employ technological devices

(press, radio, films, etc.) to disseminate symbolic content to large,

heterogeneous and widely dispersed audiences'. In this and similar

definitions, the word 'communication.' is really equated with 'transmission',

as viewed by the sender, rather than in the fuller meaning of the term,

which includes the notions of response, sharing and interaction. The

process of ‘mass communication’ is not synonymous with the "mass media'

(the organized technologies which make mass communication possible).

There are other uses of the same technologies and other kinds of

relationships mediated through the same networks.

Everyday experience with mass communication is extremely varied. It

is voluntary and usually shaped by culture and by the requirements of one's

social environment. The notion of mass communication experience is

abstract and hypothetical. On occasions, it does seem to be a reality, the

causes are more likely to be found in particular conditions of social life than

35

in the media technology or contents. The diversity of technology-mediated

communication relationship is increasing as a result of new technology and

new applications. The general implication of these remarks is that mass

communication was, from the beginning, more of and than a reality. The

term stands for a condition and a process, which is theoretical, possible but

rarely found in any pure form.

INTERDEPENDENCE OF CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION

The Interdependence of culture and communication is even more

pronounced. The term culture is used to mean all that man has added to

nature. Communication between people is a major component of way of life

in all cultures. The media of communication are cultural instruments,

which serve to promote or influence attitude, to motivate, to foster the

spread of behaviour patterns and to bring about social integration. They

play a major role in implementing cultural policies and bringing about

cultural harmony.

CULTURAL COMMUNICATION The cultural communication refers to the process of communication,

which satisfies cultural needs of people i.e. right to speak, share and

exchange ideas. Broadly, it covers intellectual interaction through spoken

and written word to entertainment and information. Cultural

communication in one hand is a process of dissemination of ideas and a

definite assurance to get feedback within a society and with outside world.

The assimilation, diffusion, borrowing, influence and social control are all

offshoots of cultural communication. The cultural experts, anthropologists

in particular, are still entangled with the question: our media (Television in

particular) is flourishing which culture, a highbrow, middlebrow or

lowbrow? Cultural communication is a complex human practice that

encompasses two interrelated aspects of social life. The first aspect is

culturally distinctive ways of communicating—the use of particular means

36

and meanings of communication that can be found in particular times,

places, and social milieus. In this sense, cultural communication is com-

municative conduct that is infused with the particulars of cultures. The

second aspect is the role of communication in performing the cultural, or

communal, function—the workings of communication in constituting the

communal life of a community and in providing individuals the opportunity

to participate, identify and negotiate that life. In this sense, cultural

communication is the work that people do in coming to terms with the

communicative demands of their life worlds. When people use the term

cultural communication, what do they mean? I begin with a consideration of

three early, undefined uses of the term, and then turn to a later, pro-

grammatic use of it, to provide a basis for establishing a working definition

of cultural communication.

An early use of cultural communication in anthropology suggests a

reference to communication as a process through which cultural difference

is expressed and constructed. Schwartz (1980) used the title Socialization as

Cultural Communication: Development of a Theme in the Work of Margaret

Mead, for an edited collection of works by the anthropologist Margaret

Mead. Hanson (1982) makes a similar use of the term in his edited volume

of essay dedicated to the memory of Gregory Bateson; Studies in Symbolism

and Cultural Communication. The theme that both of these collections

develop is that humans grow up not to be just any human, but rather,

through a process of communication, become socialized into a particularly

cultural version of a human being. Schwartz and Hanson, and by

implication Mead and Bateson, think of cultural communication in terms of

differences in conduct across societies and of the mediating role of

communication in socializing individuals into a particular cultural way.

In "The Problem of Speech Genres," first published in Russia in 1953,

the Russian literary scholar Bakhtin (1953/1986) used an expression that

37

was later translated as "cultural communication." In that essay, Bakhtin

refers to "highly developed and organized cultural communication (primarily

written), complex cultural communication, complexly organized cultural

communication (scientific and artistic), and cultural communication. He

juxtaposes "cultural communication" in apparent contrast to "active speech

communication" and to "various primary (simple) genres that have taken

form in unmediated communication." He also integrates secondary and

primary genres into one inter animating system of communicative practices.

In this usage, cultural communication refers to those speech genres of a

society that manifest its public, relatively permanent, widely distributed

forms and ways of communicating, but ways and forms that are interde-

pendent with the everyday speech habits of individuals in that society.

Writing in the field of communication studies, in an essay about

communication systems, Cushman and Craig (1976) articulated the basic

functions, typical structures, and typical processes of cultural, social-

organizational, and interpersonal communication systems. For cultural

communication systems, Cushman and Craig proposed that consensus

about institution is the basic function. The basic structures of cultural

communication are, to Cushman and Craig, networks (nation, culture, class,

subculture, region, community, and family) and codes (Language, dialect,

and accent). Typical processes are diffusion, especially via mass media, and

customs and rituals. In this usage, cultural communication refers to a

process of activity in which individuals in a society act so as to produce and

regulate shared understandings about social life that will serve as a warrant

for shared meaning and coordinated activity among the members of that

society. Each of these early uses of cultural communication emphases a

particular aspect of cultural communication, but they all have two features

in common as well. First, each is concerned with the distinctiveness of

communication in particular societies and cultures. Second, each treats

communication as a site and resource for establishing, sustaining, and

38

negotiating a community’s sense of membership and identification with a

community.

The three early uses of cultural communication mentioned above can

be seen, in retrospect, as having set the stage for an explicit formulation of

cultural communication as a programmatic enterprise in the field of

communication. Cultural communication, as a named field of study, was

proposed by Philipsen in an essay titled “the prospect for cultural

communication,” which was first circulated in 1981 but not published until

1987. At the time of the writing of the prospect for cultural communication,

there were (in the communication studies discipline) several important lines

of research and pedagogy that treated communication from a cultural

standpoint. The ethnography of communication was a call for and realization

of a program of descriptive comparative study of cultural ways of speaking

(see Hymes, 1962; Philipsen, 1975; Murray 1993).

Philipsen (1981, 1987) proposed cultural communication as a

distinctive approach to the study of culturally situated communication,

Cultural communication, as proposed by Philipsen, brought together two

important strands of earlier research on culture and communication. These

two strands are (1) differences across groups in terms of communicative

practices and (2) the role of communication as a resource in managing

discursively the individual communal dialectics.

I have discussed cultural communication, first, by interpreting what

the term cultural communication means. I have proposed that cultural

communication refers to that communicative conduct that is infused with

cultural particulars of the means and meanings of communicative conduct.

Furthermore, I have proposed that cultural communication refers to the

activity, through which a community and the people construct, enact, and

negotiate a communal sense of communicative conduct. Thus, the term

39

refers to a structural aspect of all communicative conducts. And it refers to

a functional aspect of communicative conduct as well. It is a resource

through which communities and the individuals come to terms with their

cultures.

Although the research conducted under the name of cultural

communication does not argue against universals in communicative

conduct, it does provide substantial evidence of the universality of cultural

particulars. These particulars can be observed at two levels. One is the

particular communicative means that are deployed in a particular milieu.

The second level is the meanings of these means to those who use and

experience them. The empirical record documents considerable variety

across and within communal conversations in what those means are and in

what significance they have for those who partake of them.

MASS MEDIA AND CULTURE – THE RELATIONSHIP The term 'mass media' is shorthand to describe means of

communication that operate on a large scale, reaching and involving

virtually everyone in a society to a greater or lesser degree. It refers to a

number of media that are now long-established and familiar, such as

newspapers, magazines, film, radio, television and the phonograph

(recorded music). It has an uncertain frontier with a number of new kinds of

media that differ mainly in being more individual, diversified and interactive

and of which the Internet is the leading example. Despite the rapid and

continuing growth of these 'new media' there is little sign that the "mass

media' are actually declining, according to any criterion. Rather, they are

being supplemented, extended and also challenged to adapt to the

newcomers to the scene. While this review does consider the emerging

theory for new media, it focuses on the ongoing phenomenon of 'mass

communication', whose significance stems from the very fact of its near

40

universality of reach, great popularity and public character. The mass

media are now regarded as an integral part of “Cultural industries”.

These features have consequences for the political organization and

cultural life of contemporary societies. In respect of politics, the mass media

have gradually become: an essential element in the process of democratic

politics by providing an arena and channel for debate, for making

candidates for office widely known and for distributing diverse information

and opinion. It has also a means of exercising power by virtue of the

relatively privileged access that politicians and agents of government can

generally claim from the media as a legitimate right. In respect of culture,

the mass media constitute a primary source of definitions and images of

social reality and expression of shared identity. Mass Media are the largest

focus of leisure time interest, providing the shared cultural environment for

more people than any other single institution. In addition, the media are

steadily increasing in economic significance, as media industries grow,

diversify and consolidate their power in the market.

If these claims are accepted, it is not difficult to understand the great

attention, which the mass media have attracted since their early days. The

conduct of democratic (or undemocratic) politics, depends more and more

on mass media, and there are few significant social issues, which are

addressed without some consideration of the role of the mass media,

whether for good or ill. The most fundamental questions of society

concerning the distribution and exercise of power, the management of

problems and the processes of integration and change are the newer

domains of mass media. This is especially true of the messages carried by

the public means of communication, whether in the form of information,

opinion, stories or entertainment.

THE BEGINNING OF MASS MEDIA

41

The term 'mass media' refers to the organized means for

communicating openly and at a distance to many receivers within a short

span of time. These criteria are relative, since the earliest forms of mass

media (the printed book or pamphlet) were limited to the minority of a

society that happened to be literate and relatively close to the place of

publication. There has been a continuous line of development of

technologies since the earliest forms of media (rock paintings) to the latest

digital forms that have expanded the capacity, speed and efficiency of

transmission.

I have distinguished already between a process of mass

communication and the actual media that make it possible. It is important

to underline that the idea of communicating publicly over time and at

distance is much older than are the mass media now. This process was

integral to the organization of early societies, carried out especially within

religious, political and educational institutions. Even the element of large-

scale (mass) dissemination of ideas was present at an early point in time, in

the sharing of political and religious awareness and obligations. By the early

Middle Ages, the Church had elaborate and effective means in place to

ensure transmission to everyone without exception. This can be called mass

communication, although it was largely independent of mass media.

Nevertheless, it means that the connection was easy to make between the

two. It was certainly made by authorities of church and state that reacted

with alarm at the potential loss of control represented by printing, and it

was also made by authors seeking to disseminate new ideas. The bitter

propaganda struggles of the Reformation and Counter-reformation, during

the 16th century are evidence enough. It was the historical moment when

the link between the technology for mass communication irrevocably

acquired a particular social and cultural definition.

42

In recounting the history of mass media, we deal with three main

elements that produce distinctive configurations of application and of

significance in the wider life of society. These are:

certain communicative purposes, needs, or uses, for instance

informing, entertaining, cultural expression, education.

technologies for communicating publicly to many at a distance;

forms of social organization that provide the skills and frameworks for

deploying the technologies within the wider social context.

In practice, the way communication technologies are used depends

very much on the circumstances of the time and place. It is hard to predict

after the event why some developments have been of revolutionary

significance. It is hard to assign any unique or essential attribute to any of

the separate mass media that we identify. The combinations of the above

elements that actually occur are usually dependent on intangible features of

the social and cultural climate. Even so, it seems clear that a certain

measure of freedom of thought, expression and action has been a necessary

condition for the rise of print and other media. In general, the more open the

society, the more inclination there has been to develop communication

technology to its fullest potential. More closed or repressive regimes either

limit development or set strict boundaries to the use of technology. Each

medium dealt with can be identified in respect of its technology and material

form, typical formats and genres, perceived uses and its institutional

setting.

BROADCASTING

Radio and television have, respectively, a seventy-plus- and a forty-

plus-year history as mass media, and both grew out of pre-existing

technologies, telephone, telegraph, moving and still photography, and sound

recording. Despite their obvious differences, now wide in content and use,

43

radio and television can be treated together. Radio seems to have been a

technology looking for a use, rather than a response to a demand for a new

kind of service or content, and much the same is true of television.

According to Williams (1975: 25), "Unlike all previous communications

technologies, radio and television were systems primarily designed for

transmission and reception as abstract processes, with little or no definition

of preceding content'. Both came to borrow from existing media, and most of

the popular content forms of both are derivatives from film, music, stories,

news and sport.

A distinctive feature of radio and television has been their high degree

of regulation, control or licensing by public authority - initially out of

technical necessity, later from a mixture of democratic choice, state self-

interest, economic convenience and sheer institutional custom. A second

and related feature of radio and television media has been their center-

periphery pattern of distribution and the association of national television

with political life and the power centers of society. Because of this closeness

to power, radio and television have hardly anywhere acquired, as of right,

the same freedom that the press enjoys, to express views and act with

political independence.

Television has been continuously evolving, and it would be difficult to

summarize its features in terms of communicative purposes and effects.

Initially the main genre innovation of television stemmed from its capacity to

transmit many pictures and sound live and thus act as a 'window on the

world' in real time. Even studio productions were live broadcasts before the

days of efficient video recording. This capacity of simultaneity has been

retained for some kinds of content, including sporting events, some news

casting, and certain kinds of show. What Dayan and Katz (1992)

characterize as "media events' are often likely to have significant live

44

coverage. Most TV content is not live, although it often aims to create an

illusion of ongoing reality.

The status of television as the most 'massive' of the media in terms of

reach, time spent and popularity has barely changed over the years and it

adds all the time to its global audience. Despite the fact that it has been

denied an openly political role and is primarily considered a medium of

entertainment, it is believed by many that television has a vital role in

modern politics. It is considered to be the main source of news and

information for most people and as the main channel of communication

between politicians and citizens, especially at election times. In this

informally allocated role as source of public information, television has

generally remained credible and trusted. Another role is that of educator -

for children at school and adults at home. It is also the largest single

channel of advertising in nearly all countries, and this has helped to confirm

its mass entertainment function. So far, many predictions that mass

television would fragment into many different channels, along the model of

the magazine, have not been realized, despite the proliferation of channels

on cable and satellite. It even seems as if for many people the appeal of

television lies in the very fact that it is a medium for everyone.

HISTORY OF TELEVISION

The night of April 23, 1896 was a milestone in the history as it was

the evidence of Thomas Edison's latest invention, the Vitascope, a machine

which actually projected moving pictures onto a screen large enough for

everybody in the theatre to view them at once. People were fascinated with

the illusion of motion. The earliest films were only snippets of action; people

watched them because of their novelty effects. Later on, novelty films were

replaced by narrative films that told a story. With the popularity of narrative

films, moviemaking became dominated by big business and movie stars.

Later on money came into the movie making business and people started

45

investing in it. Silent films like Charlie Chaplin vanished quickly after the

coming of sound.

In the 1920s, the film industry continued its move towards

consolidation and growth. After the World War, the prosperity boom

exploded in Hollywood with more force than in any other business sector.

The filmmakers believed that the more they spend the more profit they are

likely to earn. So the concept of investment became popular. The costs of

film started soaring with each passing day. Between 1914 and 1924, there

was 1500 percent increase in the cost of a feature film. Costumes, props, set

designs, salaries of actors and best sellers all contributed to the

mushrooming costs of films. By the 1930s the industry had improved the

technical resources for reproducing sound; the camera and microphone

could be moved together and more effective relation between picture and

sound emerged. The production of sound films cost the Hollywood industry

millions of dollars in investment in new equipment, new technicians, and

new creative talent. The improvement in the sound quality and the camera

techniques gave further boast to the film industry.

The twenty years from the 1930 to 1950 were studio years, with

MGM, 20th century Fox, ARKO, Warner Brothers, Paramount, Universal,

Columbia, and United Artists dominating the industry. Different studios left

their imprint on the films of the period as certain film products took on a

distinct personality. For example, during this period the Warner Brothers

became best known for their gangster films; 20th Century Fox for its

historical adventure films; and MGM for its lavish, star-studded musicals.

Since music was easier and cheaper to put on film than dialogue, musical

films quickly became popular among Hollywood producers and directors. As

the 1930s wore on, films blending romance with light comedy arising from

the situation became increasingly popular. However at the end of this

46

decade, the potential of suspense and mystery dramas was exploited by a

notable British director, Alfred Hitchcock.

When the 2nd World War broke out, it did not take Hollywood long to

turn out a number of patriotic films. Although several focused on fighting

overseas, the most successful films were those portraying the lifestyles and

cultural values that the United States was trying to preserve. In that era of

Depression, the financial backing and diverse holding of studio system

helped the film industry to survive. During the 1940s going to a movie was

just a part of American life. In fact all time peak for film going was 1946,

when average weekly attendance reached over 90 million.

Introduction of Sound During the 1920s, when the film industry was experimenting with the

addition of sound to pictures, some inventors were busy working on ways to

add pictures to sound. The two people with the early development of early

television, Philo Fransworth and Vladimir Zworykin, could not have been two

different individuals. However, Fransworth's hard work paid off in 1930

when he got a patent for his TV system. Television might have gotten off a

faster start, but the Depression slowed down its growth as well as that of

the film industry.

Improvement in the Picture Quality

Picture quality on the early television system was poor, but the

technical development during the 1930s indicated that improvement was

possible. NBC, owned by RCA, gave a public demonstration of Television at

the 1939 New York World Fair with regular two-hour broadcasts. After the

fair opened, RCA had TV sets with 5-inch picture tubes on display in

departmental stores. However, filmmakers did not take the new invention

seriously. Just like radio in infancy, early TV was looked upon as a toy

something that would never amount to much. Because of the adverse affects

47

of the 2nd World War, TV faced times of uncertainty. The FCC put a freeze on

new TV stations, and most efforts were redirected away from TV to radar.

When peace returned in 1945, however, the new technology developed

during the war was soon applied to the television industry New picture

tubes required drastically less light to perform; microwaves and coaxial

cables were used to link stations into networks and big screen television

sets were being manufactured in large quantities. In 1945, there were 8

stations on the air and by the end of 1950, there were 98. Only 8000 homes

had TV in 1946 and ten years later, almost 35 million households had TV

sets.

Introduction of Color Television

Another technological break through took place in 1950 with the

introduction of color television. In 1960, three networks were broadcasting

about two to three hours of color programming per day. NBC and the CBS

were two networks that usually dominated the TV ratings while ABC trailed

behind. In the early days of TV, most network prime-time programs were

produced by advertising agencies that retained control over their content.

Later on the networks began to assert control over programming. June 25,

1951 was a milestone in the history of television when on this very day, the

Columbia Broadcasting System made the first commercial color broadcast.

Cable TV

Cable television first came into existence in Mahoney City. Pennsylvania,

in 1948 or Astoria, Oregon, in 1949 as Community Antenna Television

(CATV) as a means of improving the reception of broadcast signals in

poor reception areas (Crandall & Furchtgott-Roth, 1996). Enormous

antennas brought in signals for geographic areas which could not receive

good reception. It made economic sense to build a single huge antenna to

serve many television viewers, the signals being distributed by wire from

the antenna to viewers' homes (Lubar. 1993). Since the middle of the

48

1960s when cable television got into telecommunication business as an

alternative to the three existing commercial networks, cable television

has become a major competitor to the networks claiming viewer's

attention, and time (Beckcr, Dunwoodv & Ratacli. 1993). As a

consequence, it has changed the pattern of the audience's television

consuming behavior.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s cable became a true multi-

channel medium with basic and premium services provided via satellites,

thus making cable attractive to urban areas in addition to rural areas with

bad reception. In 1975 cable operators began to receive programming from

communication satellites, Increasing the number of viewing options, the

communication satellite delivered the broadcast signals to further

geographic areas and led to the creation of advertiser-supported cable

networks such as the Cable News Network (CNN), Super Stations, and ESPN

in 1979 (Bradury, 1990). By 1991 there were more than 10,000 cable

systems, and with approximately 60 million homes receiving cable services,

the cable television business had become a $20 billion-a-year industry

(Lubar, 1993).

Evolution of the Television Industry:

Television is now in the second half-century of existence and one

thing and many changes have been accrued since the time of its existence.

In the first place, the word itself has changed its meaning. It was not so long

that "television" meant the few program choices that were available on a

rather bulky piece of furniture that sat in the corner of the living room.

These days, the television set has become smaller, more mobile, and is likely

to be in several rooms of the house. Furthermore, the television set might

not even be hooked up to what used to be called "television". Instead the

wires from the back of the set might lead to a computer keyboard,

videogame, VCR or video camera.

49

The change in television programming has been equally dramatic.

Instead of having to choose among shows offered by a few networks and

possibly one or two independent or public broadcasting stations, today's

viewer is faced with the plethora of choices: many networks and

independent stations, public stations, cable systems that provides more

channels of TV, pay services that provides recently released theatrical

movies and other special events, home made video tapes, videogames, and

special interactive programs that allow the viewer to become part of the

action.

TELEVISION THEORY: READING THE TEXT

This new global economy of meaning has become an important topic

in the anthropological study of commodities and consumerism. Goods are

also re-contextualized and reinterpreted at their locus of consumption

(Friedman 1990; Lofgren 1990; McCracken 1988; Arnould and Wilk 1984;

Wilk 1990; Belk 1988). I think we need to apply these same critical insights

to the study of television in the Third World. Just as a McDonald's

hamburger means something very different in Moscow from what it means

in London, so the drama of Dallas has been found to convey very different

meanings to Israelis, Algerians, and Italians (Katz and Liebes 1984, 1986;

Silj et al. 1988). Australian aborigines interpret television dramas in ways

that would be unintelligible to those who produced the drama in the first

place (Michaels 1988). Fiske (1986) argues that even in the countries where

they are produced, television programs are open texts subject to a variety of

interpretations. The very popularity of television rests on polysemy and

ambiguity, on the ability of different groups to find different things in the

same program.

Existing studies of the television audience have some very important

ramifications for our understanding of the global traffic in objects and

meanings of the process whereby the global becomes localized. One finding

50

is that the message of television is interpreted and absorbed socially, rather

than individually. Television messages are mediated in the social context of

talk about television. For example, violent programs do not make children

prone to or inured to violence when their parents and friends talk about

television violence with disapproval [Drummond and Paterson 1988].

Studies consistently find that conversation is an essential part of television

watching; the meaning of the program acquires cultural and social relevance

through interpretive discourse (Katz and Liebes 1984, 1986; Lee and Cho

1990; Miller 1990).

In asking about the impact of television on families around the world,

Lull (1988) finds the most universal change is that television creates a new

genre of "television talk" within existing family interaction.

But what does this genre of talk do to the messages from the box?

Most theorists agree that television talk allows viewers to negotiate different

poses, or distances in relation to the program. The various classifications of

these poses can be combined into a set of three (based on works by Hall

1981; Livingstone 1990; Morley 1980, 1988; Ang 1985; and Katz and Liebes

1984, 1986):

1. A viewer who is dominated, places no distance between himself and

the program, identifying closely with the characters and situation in a

completely uncritical way (Hall 1981). Katz and Liebes (1984, 1986)

focus on the emotional fix of the viewer on the program, while Ang

(1985) sees an element of fantasy that Livingstone (1990) would call

"romantic." The viewer confuses the program with reality, relating to

the characters as real people, sometimes as even more real than the

mundane. This implies that dominated viewers uncritically absorb

and internalize the hegemonic messages from the box, accepting and

integrating them into their lives.

51

2. At the other extreme is Hall's (1981) oppositional stance, where the

viewer has a critical distance from the program that allows judgment

about truth, the motives of its producers, and the impact of the

medium itself. The position has been labeled "ironic" (Ang 1985),

"cynical" (Livingstone 1990), and "moralistic" (Katz and Liebes 1984,

1986). Viewers perceive a message in the box and reject it, or they

extract a meaning from the program that was not intentionally coded

there, for example that Dallas is about the evils of patriarchy, or of

capitalism.

3. In between there is a negotiated position, where the viewer does not

dispute the meaning of the program, but interprets and adapts it in

light of his own experience and interest. This "pragmatic" (Katz and

Liebes 1984) and "realistic" (Ang 1985) position allows the viewers to

relate the events in the program to their own lives. They accept the

program as a fantasy, but one that resonates and reflects;they are

willing to identify with some things and reject others in a creative

process of engaged participation. The way they use and reintegrate

meanings has been likened to "poaching" [Silj et al. 1988].

If these three options cover a real range of relationships to television,

how can they be mapped onto the local and global audience? Most tempting

are transpositions onto social or geographical maps. A proponent of cultural

imperialism can argue that viewers in the metropole have critical distance

while those on the periphery are dominated and deceived. Some studies in

Britain have argued that for specific program categories, gender is the best

predictor of reading; women are dominated by soap opera, while men are

more distanced (Morley 1988). Katz and Liebes (1984, 1986) found cultural

differences that explain viewers' readings of Dallas; Israeli Arabs were

moralistic and distanced, while Moroccan Jews were pragmatic, and

American Jews were engaged (Silj 1988).

52

Another tempting map links types of reading to social rank; the

educated upper classes are capable of critical distance, while the poor have

a direct and uncritical relationship to the program that leads to their

domination (Fachel and Oliven 1988; Ang 1985; Leal 1990). This hypothesis

can be supported by several studies, including Kottak's in Brazil, that find

greater criticism of television at higher income and educational levels as well

as with longer length of exposure to the medium [Kottak 1990: 140-2]).

The idea that the poor are dominated while the rich and educated have

critical distance is a folk model of television consumption that is often

heard in Pakistan. Middle and upper class people are worried about the

effects of television on the gullible poor, whose close, uncritical

involvement was going to lead to dire cultural effects. The commonly

voiced fear was that the poor were taking television "too literally," that

they mistook entertainment for reality. Even many of the poor and

uneducated people, I interviewed, said that their neighbors and children

were taking television too seriously, were believing what they saw and

were emotionally affected. Government officials see themselves as stuck

between critical elite who want the media controlled, and an engaged,

dominated populace interested only in more entertainment.

THE WORKS OF RAYMOND WILLIAMS ON CULTURE AND TELEVISION

The work of Raymond Williams remains one of the richest sources of

cultural criticism available within British Marxism. His writings contain

substantial contributions to literary and cultural criticism and political

theory, as well as mass communications. In this, Williams is part of a wider

change evident within Left thinking in postwar society. Along with other

writers on the New Left, Williams is aware that the economism evident

within Marxist thought inadequately accounts for the growth in the

importance of democratic and commercial cultures. In addition, artistic

practice severed from the social conditions of its production and reception

by traditional criticism, was thought to contain a certain critical imma-

53

nence. These concerns prompted a lifelong project that would seek to form

an understanding of ordinary and aesthetic cultures, and in turn their

relationship with social institutions.

His first major work, Culture and Society (1961), probably remains his

best known. The term 'culture', within Williams's presentation, is discussed

by a historically sequenced collection of writers ranging from Burke to

Orwell. Williams aims to argue, by critically tracing through a predomi-

nantly Romantic tradition around 'culture', that the term potentially retains

both immanent and critical uses. Williams in effect merges what might be

called an anthropological and an artistic definition of culture. For Williams,

'culture' signified the dual meaning of a 'way of life' (Williams, 1961: 137)

and notions of human perfection that provide a critical court of appeal

(Williams, 1961: 65-84). Williams writes:

“A culture has two aspects; the known meanings and

directions, which its members are trained to; the new

observations and meanings, which are offered and tested. We

use the ward culture in these two senses; to mean a whole way

of life -the common meanings; to mean the arts and learning -

the special process of discovery and creative effort”. (Williams,

1988: 4)

Williams’s book, The Long Revolution (1965), develops a more insti-

tutionally grounded approach to cultural transformations, while retaining

some of his earlier leanings. The Long Revolution refers to the slow historical

unfolding of three interrelated changes taking place in the economic,

political and cultural spheres since the industrial revolution. The gradual

broadening of access to the education system, along with the growth of the

reading public, the popular press, and the use of standard English, provides

the backcloth for a culture in common. The dialectic of The Long Revolution

is constituted through the contradiction between the forces of production

54

that had been liberated by capitalism and the communicative nature of

human beings. The social reproduction of dominating social relations

between capital and labour prevents cultural forms from being utilized in an

emancipatory fashion. The realization of the essentially learning and

creative nature of the people could only be captured through a socialist

transformation of society (William, 1965: 118). The problem Williams faced

was that the labour movement, whom he had identified as the central

agency for change, had become incorporated into the capitalist system.

Williams offers an ideal type of free communication when he writes:

“A good society depends upon the free availability of facts

and opinions, and on the growth of vision and consciousness –

the articulation of what men have actually seen and known and

felt. Any restriction of the freedom of individual contribution is

actually a restriction of the resources of society. (Williams,

1962; 124-5)”

Williams outlines four brief models against which this ideal type is to

be tested: (1) authoritarian, (2) paternal, (3) commercial and (4) democratic.

An authoritarian communicative institution simply transmits the

instructions of ruling groups. Williams has in mind the mass

communication systems of actually existing socialism’. The transmission of

electronically coded messages and the print media were largely centrally

controlled by the state, which tightly restricted the expression of dissent

within civil society. Any radical democratic politics worth the name,

Williams insisted, would have to protect the free circulation of information

from state surveillance.

Paternal social structures, on the other hand, are oriented around the

desire to protect and guide, rather than the assertion of the right to rule.

For example, the BBC was build upon the ideal of the maintenance of high

55

standards, which largely reflected the ethos and taste of England’s

dominant social groups. Lord Reith, the first Director General of the BBC

(British Broadcasting Corporation), defended this approach by arguing that

a more democratic media would inevitably lead to lower standards.

According to Williams, the Reithian public service model had an inbuilt

tendency to view the people as masses (Williams, 1962: 108). The

expression the masses are used to signify a way of thinking about the

people that denies their cultural plurality. Reith’s view of public service

sought to educate the people into a rich, high culture away from

homogeneous Americanized popular culture.

Commercial cultural industries offer a certain amount of freedom in

that a plurality of cultural forms can be bought and sold in the market

place. But, as Williams, (1980) makes clear in an essay on capitalism and

advertising, commercial systems often obscure the distinction between

human wants for goods and services and the need for democratic self

government. Advertising is able to play this particular ideological trick by

offering magical solutions to the more authentic problems of death,

loneliness, frustration, the need for identity and respect’ (Williams, 1980:

190). In addition, commercial structures promote a further illusion in that

certain exclusions are built into capitalistic methods of cultural distribution.

That is, commercial forms of cultural dissemination inevitably exclude

works unlikely to sell quickly and reap a profitable return.

The democratic model of cultural production has much in common

with the commercial system outlined above, given its emphasis upon free

communication. However, according to Williams, certain rights of free

communication should be insulated and protected from the dominance of

capital in the market place. Williams proposes that the media of mass

communications be taken out of the control of commercial and paternal

institutions, such as those underwritten by capital and the state, and both

56

democratized and decentralized. Once institutionally separate from the

government and the market this would provide cultural contributors with

the social context for free expression. The utopia of free communication,

Williams believed, would undoubtedly promote stronger community

relations and bonds. The reform of the national system of communication

would also allow a democratic public forum for the presentation of

previously excluded experiences and perspectives.

Williams’s writing can be described as democratic realism not only

because of his commitment to the institutional changes outlined in the

long revolution, but also because of his defense of a realist aesthetic.

However, Williams does not argue that the society should be represented

as though it were a reflection in a mirror (Jameson, 1977). For Williams,

artistic practices do not reflect reality, but actively produce it through

material and symbolic forms.

RAYMOND WILLIAMS AND TELEVISION

For Williams, the primary question is how did television come to

inhabit a central part of our cultural lives? This cannot be adequately

answered through a technological paradigm. For instance, one

unsatisfactory response to Williams’s question would be to concentrate on

the scientific research that invented television. This way of viewing

technology abstracts the spread of television from social needs, purposes

and practices. In Williams account the growth of mass television can be said

to be over determined by the economy, the state and what he calls mobile

privatism (Williams, 1974). Of the multiplicity of causes analyzed by

Williams the most crucial remains private capital, whose interests dominate

the development of communication technology. The cultural form of

television, had to be adapted for a market that was shaped by a home based

consumerism. In other words, television technology had to fit the needs of

57

the private conditions of reception, while being small enough to be easily

transportable. The first television sets were often enclosed within pieces of

furniture designed to fit comfortably into people’s front rooms. This

condition, which Williams often referred to as mobile privatism was to some

extent was counterbalanced by the state’s policy of public broadcasting. The

steering mechanisms shaping the development of television in Britain

(although the same could not be said of the USA) were both public and

private. While the commercialization of television meant that it would be

consumed in private, its public regulation provided the state with a means

to promote its own legitimacy. The idea of public service broadcasting,

which can be either paternal or democratic, grew out of a state defined

national culture. However, since the 1950s the most important development

within broadcasting systems has been the expansion of American

communications. There has been a transformation from national and state

controlled broadcasting to global and commercial forms of television. This

situation has created a world market in film, television and video. Williams

argues that the development of culturally emergent satellite and cable

systems should be viewed dialectically. The capitalist world market in

cultural production, which has eroded the dominance of the British state,

will, through the dumping of cheap television, prohibit the making of local

products. Alternatively, a more socialized approach to new communicative

systems could seek to undermine the dominance of large scale capital and

nation states, through more local forms of control. Public service

broadcasting, while maintaining links to the national and the international,

would thereby become progressively localized and democratized.

Williams addresses the experience of watching television by looking at

the distribution of television programmes across networks and what he calls

television flow. A content analysis of commercial and public television

reveals that the latter provides programs of a more social and educative

nature. But, what both types of television have in common is that

58

programming is organized into a sequential flow in an attempt to capture an

audience for an evening’s entertainment. Ien Ang describes flow as ‘a

coming and going of programs without their individuality leaving any

specifically deep impression’ (Ang, 1985: 22). This phenomenon is best

captured through the experience of passively watching television rather than

critically engaging with a specific program. That television has become a

medium of privatized relaxation is a missed opportunity. Instead, Williams

proposes that the opening up of the channels of communication could

provide a critical forum for a more robust form of public discourse.

Much of the audience research reviewed by Williams was based on

assumptions. This research paradigm, at the time of writing, had become

dominated by the search for scientifically isolated effects. Also, the

oversimplified models of cause and effect, assumes that the institutional

organization of television is not worth studying. While Williams thought that

audience research could be further developed, these issues did not have the

political importance in the social organization of mass communication

(Williams, 1974: 123).

STUART HALL, MASS COMMUNICATION, HEGEMONY AND IDEOLOGY

Stuart Hall is best known as a founder member of the Birmingham

Center for Cultural Studies and for his writing on Thatcherism (Harris,

1992; Turner, 1991). Like Williams, despite belonging to a younger

generation, Hall was a prominent figure in the re-emergence of the British

Left in the 1960s and 1970s. His theoretical writing is closely bound up with

the themes of culture, ideology and identity. While he offers a sophisticated

reinterpretation of some of the central thinkers within post-structuralism,

his main intellectual touchstone remains Antonio Gramsci. In mass

communication research, Hall's specific contribution has been to link

ideologically coded cultural forms to the decoding strategies of the audience.

He has carried this through while simultaneously attending to the shifting

59

political context of media signs and messages. For Hall the ideologically

coded text remains the primary level of determination. His most recent

writing has displayed an increasing awareness of the discursive openness of

the popular codes. Hall represents a more sophisticated level of analysis,

despite focus on the theme of ideology. His over-concentration on the theme

of ideology means that other determinant levels, such as the ownership and

control of the mass media, drop out of the analysis. While Williams forges a

fruitful dialectic between communicative structures and democratic theory,

Hall has little of substance to contribute in this respect.

Hall (1982) characterizes American media analysis of the 1940s and

the 1950s as belonging to the 'effects' school. The aim of this research was

to establish the measurable impact of the media of mass communication on

human behaviour, and its conclusion was that the media is often relatively

harmless, reinforcing the norms and values held by a pluralist society. The

rediscovery of ideology in media studies, however, has reintroduced a notion

of power and more critically addressed the construction of the real. The

most important intellectual and theoretical resource in the turn to ideology

is structuralism. Of particular importance here is the work of Louis

Althusser, whose writing on ideology profoundly shaped the dominant form

of cultural studies in Britain, although it did meet with spirited resistance in

some quarters (Thompson, 1978). Althusser's influence can be traced across

a wide range of cultural and political studies, including literature, film,

psychoanalysis and political theory (Elliott, 1987). His critical concern is to

investigate the means by which capitalist society reproduces dominant

institutional relationships. The production and reproduction of ideology

provides the key to this question. In his famous essay on the subject,

Althusser (1984) makes the distinction between Ideological State

Apparatuses (ISAs) and Repressive State Apparatuses (RSAs). Both RSAs

and ISAs are social practices that have an ideological function. They are

distinguishable in that RSAs (military, police) operate mainly through force,

60

where as the ISAs (media, education) ensure the ideological dominance of

the ruling class. The production of ideology, in Althusser's formulation, has

perhaps two distinctive characteristics. First, while ideology was tied to an

institutional analysis, it could not be conceived of as the inversion or

reflection of the real. Rather ideology, in Althusser's memorable words,

'represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions

of existence' (1984: 36). Secondly, ideology not only constitutes our symbolic

relation with the real, but converts human beings into subjects. Ideology

lets individuals mistakenly recognize themselves as self-determining agents,

whereas in fact subjects are formed through linguistic and psychic

processes. Althusser's emphasis upon the formation of the self through

ideological discourses had a formative impact on Hall. For Hall,

structuralism opens up two main fields of research for mass

communication: (1) an analysis of dominant discourses that exclude other

alternative explanations; and (2) an analysis of how the media institutions

themselves serve to offer only a limited range of meanings. Let us take each

of these levels of analysis in turn.

Hall (1977) argues that the mass media form the main ideological

institution of contemporary capitalism. This can be asserted as the

communication system provides the main symbolic realm through which

the manufacture of the dominant consensus is forged. The media of mass

communication, according to Hall, operate through the production of

hegemonic codes that cement the social together.

Hall's (1988b) later writing becomes increasingly aware of the charges

of functionalism that have been leveled at Althusser. In Althusser's original

thesis, as we saw, the ISAs, transmit ideological forms of misrecognition of

the real relations of domination. In this way, Althusser argues, ideology

binds individuals to the social structure- Hence the mystifying effects of

ideology ensure the reproduction of class society. For Hall, Althusser’s

61

emphasis on ideology as materialized in concrete practices and rituals

remains a definite advance. His own analysis of Thatcherism is an investi-

gation of the various discursive strategies employed by the popular press,

television interviews and right-wing think-tanks. In contrast to the attention

he grants to mediated messages, Hall has comparatively little to say about

institutions of mass communication. In his complex consideration of

Thatcherism he offers only the most limited discussion of the structurating

impact of the state and capital. In fact Hall often goes so far as to suggest

that what is far more significant than this relation is the limited framework

of interpretations within which journalists operate (Hall, 1972a: 10). What is

apparent is that the intersection of the cultural context of Journalism and

the semiotic content of media messages remains determinant for Hall

(1972a, 1975; Hall el al, 1978). Hall's level of expertise is in the

interpretation of media messages, which eventually leads him to open up

questions of audience response neglected by Williams.

In the production of media messages Hall makes a basic distinction

between encoders and decoders. He identifies a radical break between

the frameworks of knowledge, relations of production and technical

infrastructure that facilitate the encoding and decoding of meaning

structures- The encoding of a media text is dependent upon certain

professional norms and procedures, institutional relations and technical

equipment (television cameras, videotapes, microphones, tape recorders,

etc.). Once the message has been symbolically encoded it is open to the

reading strategies employed by the audience. The reception of the

audience is dependent upon cultural and political dispositions, their

relationship to wider frameworks of power and access to mass-produced

technology (radio, television, video recorder, compact disc player, etc.).

There are three main ways in which a symbolically coded text can be

62

read. A dominant hegemonic reading interprets the text in terms of the

preferred meaning suggested by the message.

In the course of examining the views of Raymond Williams, and Stuart

Hall, I have essentially set out an argument for two main areas of inquiry.

First I have argued that mass communications research should articulate a

political economy of the cultural industries. I have also argued that the

concepts of hegemony and ideology remain essential for an understanding of

the information age. While the writings of Stuart Hall are important

contributions to the ideology debate. Common to the writings of Williams,

and Hall is a certain tendency to overstate the incorporating power of

ideology.

FREEDOM VERSUS CONTROL

Relations between media and society usually have both a political

dimension and a normative or social-cultural aspect. Central to the political

dimension is the question of freedom and control.

The various new media some using cable or telecommunications

networks for distribution, still await clear definitions of their appropriate

degree of political freedom. Freedom from control may be claimed on the

grounds of privacy or the fact that these are not media of indiscriminate

mass distribution but directed to specific users. They are so-called

'common-carriers' that generally lack control over their content. They also

increasingly share the same communicative tasks as media with established

editorial autonomy. The question remains in dispute for a number of

reasons, among them the need for regulation for technical reasons or to

prevent abuse of monopoly power.

The normative dimension of control operates according to the same

general principles, although sometimes with different consequences for

particular media. For instance, film, which has generally escaped direct

63

political control, has often been subject to control of its content, on grounds

of its potential moral impact on the young and impressionable (especially in

matters of violence, crime or sex). The widespread restrictions applied to

television in matters of culture and morals stem from the same tacit

assumptions. These are that media that are very popular and have a

potentially strong emotional impact on many people need to be supervised

in 'the public interest'.

Supervision includes positive support for 'desirable' cultural

communication objectives as well as for restrictions on the undesirable.

The more communication activities can be defined as either educational

or 'serious' in purpose or, alternatively, as artistic and creative, the more

freedom from normative restrictions can usually be claimed. There are

complex reasons for this, but it is also a fact that 'art' and content of

higher moral seriousness do not usually reach large numbers and are

seen as marginal to power relations.

The degree of control of media by state or society may depend on the

feasibility of applying it. The most regulated media have typically been

those whose distribution is most easily supervised, such as centralized

national radio or television broadcasting or cinema distribution.

Television, despite the many changes and extensions relating to

production, transmission and reception, remains primarily a medium of

entertainment (Morley, 1986), even if the family is less likely to be

viewing together. It is still a focus of public interest and a shared

experience in societies. It has both a domestic and a collective character

that seems to endure. Television is typically shared, domestic and public.

For understanding of media structure the question of ownership and

how the powers of ownership are exercised is fundamental. The belief that

ownership ultimately determines the nature of media is not just a Marxist

theory but virtually a common-sense axiom summed up in Altschull's (1984)

64

'second law of Journalism': 'the contents of the media always reflect the

interests of those who finance them'. Not surprisingly, there are several

different forms of ownership of different media, and the powers of ownership

can be exercised in different ways.

As implied by Altschull's remark, it is not just ownership that counts,

it is a wider question of who actually pays for the media product. Although

there are media whose owners do personally pay for the privilege of

influencing content, most owners just want profit, and most media are

financed from different sources. These include a range of private investors

(among them other media companies), advertisers, consumers, various

public or private subsidy-givers, and governments. It follows that the line of

influence from ownership is often indirect and complex - and it is rarely the

only line of influence.

Most media belong to one of three categories of ownership:

commercial companies, private non-profit bodies and the public sector.

However, within each of these three there are significant divisions. For

media ownership it will be relevant whether a company is public or private,

a large media chain or conglomerate or a small independent. It may also

matter whether or not a media enterprise is owned by a so-called 'media

tycoon' or 'mogul', typified as wanting to take a personal interest in editorial

policy (Tunstall and Palmer, 1991). Non-profit bodies can be neutral trusts,

designed to safeguard independence of operations, or bodies with a special

cultural or social task such as political parties, churches, etc. Public

ownership also comes in many different forms ranging from direct state

administration to elaborate and diversified constructions designed to

maximize independence of decision-making about content.

The role of public policy (in effect, politics) in relation to media change

is ambiguous, sometimes seeking to hold back or firmly manage change,

sometimes to encourage it for economic or ideological reasons. The history

65

of broadcasting in Western Europe since about 1980 is illustrative of this

(McQuail and Siune, 1998). Until that point in time, for half a century the

development of radio and television had been kept firmly in the hands of

national governments and under conditions of legal monopoly. The

broadcast media were deemed too important to society to be left to the

marketplace, and the intrinsically monopolistic character of broadcasting

was thought to need strong public control to protect consumers.

These political arrangements were fundamentally undermined by four

main kinds of change which were largely outside the control of European

national governments. Technological advances in the means of

transmission (satellite and cable) made the original justification of

monopoly (shortage of airwaves and channels) obsolete and made it

physically very difficult to maintain the system of national monopoly.

There arose powerful economic arguments for opening up the market to

encourage industrial development of new communication technology.

Moves towards European integration, political as well as economic, also

implied trans-border freedom of communication and worked against tight

national control. Fourthly, the public service character of the 'old order'

of broadcasting was inconsistent with a rising tide of free-market

ideology.

The results can be seen in the ending of public broadcasting

monopolies in Europe, the opening of frontiers to transnational television,

the multiplication of television channels and the appearance of strong

commercial competition for the public television and radio channels.

Broadcast institutions have been radically adapted, and a new phase of (still

limited) competition is under way, with further change to be expected, as

the financial basis of public television is further undermined. In Central and

Eastern Europe, for different reasons, there have been parallel movements

from public to commercial arrangements.

66

The European case is illustrative both of the continuing strength and

of the ultimate limits of public policy for managing media change. Richer

societies with the will to do so can keep their media under national and

public control, but only so far as technology and the wider political

environment allow. The economically dependent countries of the Third

World are much more exposed to external forces outside their control.

Salvaggio (1985) developed a model in which he compared four

different types of society in relation to their communication policy goals and

potential for implementation. The four types are: competitive, free-market;

public utility (the mixed or social-market economies of Western Europe);

communist (as in China or the former Soviet Union); and Third World (most

developing countries). Salvaggio argues that the same general factors govern

policy in all four types of society, but that each society will have a more or

less constant guideline of its own (the Ideology of the society, such as

'development' or 'free enterprise'), while at least one other variable factor will

exert a dominant influence on what is done to promote or control change. In

the case of free-market societies, this will be economic forces', and in the

case of developing countries, it is external forces outside the control of the

national society.

THE ALTERNATIVE MODELS

For reasons that have been explained, mass media institutions carry a

heavy weight of rules, regulation and scrutiny. The shape and rationale of

media regulation can only be sketched here. The simplest way of describing

media regulation is in terms of three basic models (Pool, 1983), which apply,

approximately and respectively, to the newspaper press, to radio and

television broadcasting and to telecommunication. Here I take only the

broadcasting model.

The Broadcasting Model

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Radio and television broadcasting have been subject to high levels of

restriction and direction, often involving direct public ownership. The initial

reasons for regulation of broadcasting were mainly technical or to ensure

the fair allocation of scarce resources and control of monopoly. However,

regulation became deeply institutionalized, at least until the 1980s when

new technologies and a new climate of opinion reversed the trend.

The general concept of public service lies at the core of the

broadcasting model, although there are several variants, as well as weaker,

as in the USA or stronger forms, as in Europe. Public service broadcasting

in a fully developed form (such as in Britain) generally has several main

features, supported by policy and regulation. The broadcasting model can

involve many different kinds of regulation. Usually, there are specific media

laws to regulate the industry and often some form of public service

bureaucracy to implement the law. Quite often, the services of production

and distribution may be undertaken by private enterprise concerns,

operating concessions from the government and following some legally

enforceable supervisory guidelines.

The decline in strength of the broadcasting model has been marked by

increasing tendencies towards 'privatization' and 'commercialization' of

broadcasting, especially in Europe (McQuail and Siune, 1998). This has

involved, most notably, the transfer of media channels and operation from

public to private ownership, increased levels of financing from advertising

and the franchising of new commercial competitors for public broadcasting

channels. Despite its relative decline, however, the broadcasting model

shows no sign of being abandoned, for reasons related to the presumed

communicative power of audiovisual media and broader public interest

concerns.

NEW DRIVING FORCES: TECHNOLOGY AND MONEY AS BIG PLAYERS

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Technology has given a powerful push to the globalization of television.

The arrival of television satellites in the late 1970s broke the principle of

national sovereignty of broadcasting space and made it difficult and

ultimately impossible to offer effective resistance to television

transmission from outside the national territory. But the extent to which

satellites reach global audiences directly is often exaggerated. There are

other means of diffusion that work in the same direction - for instance by

connecting cable systems and simply by physically transporting

cassettes. But the main route is by exports channelled through

nationally based media.

While technology has been a necessary condition of extensive

globalization, and the truly global medium of the Internet illustrates this

most clearly, the most immediate and enduring driving forces behind

globalization have been economic. Television was established on the model

of radio broadcasting, as a continuous service at least during the evening,

later during the day and ultimately on a continuous basis. The cost of filling

broadcasting time with original or domestic material has always strained the

capacity of production organizations, even in wealthy countries. It is

virtually impossible without great repetition or extensive importing. This

pressure has operated on public systems as well as commercial

organizations, but more especially on the latter.

The expansion of television since the 1980s, made possible by new

efficient and low-cost transmission technologies, has been driven by

commercial motives and has fuelled demand for imports. It has also

stimulated new audio visual production industries in many countries that

look, in their turn, for new markets. The main beneficiary and the main

exporter has been the United States, which has a large and surplus

production of popular entertainment and an entree into many markets

secured by the cultural familiarity of its products mainly as a result of

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decades of American films. The English language is an added advantage but

not decisive, since most TV exports have always been dubbed or subtitled

when transmitted.

An important component of international mass communication is

advertising, linked to the globalization of many product markets and

reflecting the international character of many advertising agencies and the

dominance of the market by a small number of firms. One outcome is the

appearance of the same advertising message in different countries, but there

is also an indirect internationalizing effect on the media that carry the

advertising. Advertising also often carries images of other countries and

parts of the world, usually in a way that reinforces stereotypes, albeit

mainly positive ones.

THE THESIS OF CULTURAL IMPERIALISM Most of the issues surrounding global mass communication have a

direct or indirect connection with the thesis of 'cultural imperialism', or the

more limited notion of 'media imperialism'. Both concepts imply a deliberate

attempt to dominate, invade or subvert the 'cultural space' of others and

suggest a degree of coercion in the relationship. It is certainly a very

unequal relationship in terms of power. It also implies some kind of overall

cultural or ideological pattern in what is transmitted, which has often been

interpreted in terms of 'Western values', especially those of individualism,

secularism, materialism. It has a political as well as a cultural content,

however, in the first case essentially a submission to the global project of

American capitalism (Schiller, 1969). In the case of relations with Latin

America noted already, the idea of an American 'imperialist' project for the

hemisphere, certainly in the 1960s and 1970s was not fanciful (Dorfman

and Mattelart, 1975). Critical theorists have not always agreed on whether it

was the economic aims of global market control or the cultural and political

aims of 'Westernization' that took precedence, although the two aspects are

70

obviously connected. The (critical) political economy theorists emphasize the

economic dynamics of global media markets that work blindly to shape the

flows of media commodities. Not surprisingly, such dynamics favour the free

market model and in general promote capitalism.

The critics of global media imperialism have generally been countered

by a mixed set of supporters of the free market or just pragmatists who see

the imbalance of flow as a normal feature of the media market. In their view

it has benefits for all and is not necessarily problematic (e.g. Pool, 1974;

Noam, 1991; Hoskins and Mirus, 1988). It may even be temporary or

reversed under some circumstances. Biltereyst (1995) has described these

as two dominant and opposed paradigms under the heading of dependency

and free-flow. In his view both paradigms rest on somewhat weak grounds

empirically. The critical dependency model is based very largely on evidence

of quantity of flow and some limited interpretation of ideological tendencies

of content. There is little or no research on the posited effects. The free-flow

theorists tend to assume minimal effects on the grounds that the audience

is voluntary, and they make large assumptions about the cultural neutrality

and ideological innocence of the globally traded content. It is also quite

possible to view the ongoing globalization of media as having no ultimate

goal or purpose and no real effect. It is simply an unplanned outcome of

current political, cultural and technological changes.

The cultural imperialism thesis has been largely abandoned in the

more recent tendency to frame many of the same issues in terms of

'globalization' (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1996; Golding and Harris, 1998: 4).

There has been a strong challenge to the critique of popular mass media

and its general cultural pessimism. This has also affected thinking about

the effects of global cultural exchange, although perhaps not about the

global flow of news. Certainly, we quite often encounter positive, even

celebratory views of the global inclusiveness brought about by mass media.

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The shared symbolic space can be extended, and the constraints of place

and time that are associated with nationally compartmentalized media

systems can be evaded. Globalization of culture can even look good

compared with the ethnocentrism, nationalism and even xenophobia that

has characterized some national media systems. The new era of

international peace ('New World Order') that was supposed to have been

ushered in by the end of the Cold War could be thought to require a

significant presence of internationalist media (Ferguson, 1992).

The negative bias of the theory literature concerning international

media flows may be viewed as a reflection of an earlier tradition in media

research that dealt with mass media primarily in terms of problems for

society. But it was also the result of the mixing of several lines of critique

relating to national identity and integrity, global capitalism and Third World

dependency (Tomlinson, 1991). Sreberny-Mohammadi (1996) suggests that

the 'cultural imperialism' model 'was based on a situation of comparative

global media scarcity, limited global media players and embryonic media

systems in much of the Third World'. These conditions have changed in

some degree, and in any case the situation is much more complex than it

was twenty or more years ago.

Most of the propositions arising from the media imperialism thesis

also tend to frame global mass communication as a process of cause and

effect, as if the media were 'transmitting' ideas, meaning, cultural forms

from place to place, sender to receiver. To that extent, the critics use much

the same language as the original 'theorists of development'. There is a

general consensus that this 'transportation' model of how media work is not

very appropriate outside certain cases of planned communication. If nothing

else, we need to take much more account of the active participation of the

audience in shaping any 'meaning' that is taken from mass media (Liebes

and Katz, 1990).

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This revised and more positive perspective on globalization rests on

the observation that the international flow of media generally responds to

demand, and has to be understood in terms of the wants and needs of

receivers and not Just the actual or supposed motives of the suppliers. This

fact does not in itself invalidate the media imperialist critique, given the

constraints in the global media market. Nor does the 'new revisionism'

satisfy many critics who see only a new ideology or mythology in the

contemporary euphoria about the global (Ferguson, 1992). Many features of

the world media situation attest to the even more powerful grip of the

capitalist apparatus and ethos on media nearly everywhere, with no place to

hide (not even a Soviet Union).

THE DEPENDENCY PARADIGM

It is a well- and long-established fact that a few countries, with the

USA most prominent, do dominate the global trade in news and

entertainment. The other countries are often dependent not only for the

supply of media content, but in economic terms as well. According to

dependency theorists, a necessary condition for throwing off dependent

relations is to have some self-sufficiency in the realm of information,

ideas and culture. Mowlana (1985) has analysed all forms of international

communication and proposed a model in which two dimensions are the

most important determinants of the degree of dependence or autonomy.

These are the technology axis (hardware versus software) and the

communication axis (production versus distribution). The main features of

the model are shown in Figure 1.

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Figure 1

International communication dependency (Mowlana, 1985): each stage of the mass communication process can be identified as having hardware and a software aspect of potential dependency.

The model represents a now familiar sequence from sender (1) to

receiver (2), mediated by a technologically based production (3) and

distribution (4) system. In international communication, contrary to the

typical national media situation the four stages of origination, production,

distribution and reception can be (and often are) spatially, organizationally

and culturally separated from each other. Media products from one country

are typically imported and incorporated into a quite different distribution

system and reach audiences for which they were not originally intended.

Quite commonly, especially in respect of film and television, the entire

origination and production of products occurs in one country and the

distribution in another. This is how the 'North' is often related to the 'South'

in media terms.

This typically extended and discontinuous process is cross-cut by the

technology axis, which reminds us that each stage is dependent on two

kinds of expertise (and also of property), one relating to hardware, the other

Production

stage

Distribution

stage

1 source 2. Message

Communication hardware

Communication

software

3. Distribution 4. Destination

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to software. Production hardware includes cameras, studios, printing

plants, computers, etc. Production software includes not only actual content

items but also performance rights, management, professional norms and

routine operating practices of media organizations (know-how). Distribution

hardware refers to transmitters, satellite links, transportation, home

receivers, recorders, etc. Distribution software includes publicity,

management, marketing and research. Both production and distribution

stages are affected by 'extra-' as well as 'intra'-media variables - on the

production side by circumstances of ownership and the cultural and social

context, and on the distribution side by the economics of the particular

media market.

The model thus portrays conditions of multiple dependency in the

flow of communication from more to less developed countries. The latter are

often dependent in respect of all four main types of hardware and software,

and each may be controlled by the originating country. Self-sufficiency in

media terms is virtually impossible, but there can be extreme degrees of

insufficiency, and it is never possible to truly 'catchup'. As Golding (1977)

first pointed out, the potential influence that goes with media dependency is

not confined to cultural or ideological messages in content, it is also

embedded in professional standards and practices, including journalistic

ethics and news values.

Galtung (in Mowlana, 1985) has explained the global media pattern in

terms of a 'centre-periphery' model, according to which the world nations

can be classified as either central and dominant or peripheral and

dependent, with a predominant flow from the former towards the latter.

Certain larger, more 'central' countries originate news and other media

content and distribute it to their own 'satellites'. In general, it is the United

States and the larger countries of Western Europe (France, Britain, Italy,

Germany, Spain) that are more 'central' and have media satellites in tow.

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But China and Japan have their own 'satellites' and the Arab world its own

small galaxy. The former Soviet Union was another 'central' media power

whose influence has been dissipated. The particular configuration changes

with time and differs somewhat from medium to medium (press, television,

music, film). A feature of this model is that there is only limited flow

between the peripheral countries themselves, although there are regional

and language-based patterns of exchange, which are probably growing

rather than diminishing in significance.

The limited interchange at the periphery has been held to increase

dependency by preventing the development of any common cause or

collective action in relation to richer countries. The centre-periphery model

does not rest on the idea of there being one single centre, and the

complexities of media development and opening of opportunities for

intercommunication undermine the view that there is a rigid and well-

organized system of domination in the relations between states. However,

the project for the development of a global telecommunications and media

infrastructure that will connect individuals everywhere suggests that we

may be entering a new phase where the older dependency models are

inadequate to the task (Baldwin et al., 1996; Sussman, 1997).

In the emerging and still unclear 'system' of global communication

flows, it is probable that the nation state will be less significant as a unit of

analysis. It is more difficult to assign information and culture to a country

of origin. Multinational production and marketing in the control of large

corporations and multilateral media flows will establish their own patterns

of dominance and dependency.

The televising of news has accelerated the cross-cultural appeal of

news by telling the story in pictures to which can be added words in any

language or with any 'angle5. Television news film agencies followed in the

footsteps of the print news agencies. The picture may well tell a story but

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the words pin down the intended meaning. Television news film, like print

news, has been based on the principle of journalistic 'objectivity' that is

designed to guarantee the reliability and credibility of accounts of events. In

some ways it is easier to export purely verbal news because of the greater

ambiguity of pictures. While earlier international 'foreign' news concentrated

on politics, war, diplomacy and trade, there has been an enormous

expansion of the scope for international news, with particular reference to

sport, the world of media and entertainment, finance, tourism, fashion and

much more.

The original debate about the unbalanced global flow of news echoed

the terms of the dependency debate as discussed above. One of the earliest

empirical studies of news imbalance (Schramm, 1964) showed that the news

media in all 'developing' countries were heavy importers of news, while news

audiences in developed countries were largely supplied with home-produced

news, even when it was about foreign events. It was argued that the lack of

autonomy in news production limited national cultural development

(especially, for example, in new nations, often ex-colonies) and limited their

full independence and sovereignty.

The fundamental reasons for news dependency were thought to lie in

insufficient resources plus the ease of supply of the surplus news product of

richer countries, mainly by way of international news agencies. At the same

time the countries that were self-sufficient in news could be seen as

restricted in their own view of the world. Not only was the supply of news

reaching audiences in the developed world very selective and incomplete, it

also involved seeing the rest of the work only through the perspective of

domestic concerns.

The debate over news imbalance that raged for much of the 1970s did

not bring the contesting parties much closer together, since they were

separated by quite different interests and commitments. One of the parties

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was the news industry itself, generally opposed to anything that might

hinder the press or the news market from continuing to operate as always,

in the name of press freedom. There is evidence to suggest that this self-

interest colored reporting of the issue in the UNESCO context (Giffard,

1989). Another party consisted of the news-dependent countries who

wanted at the very least to change the terms of international news reporting

by establishing some normative guidelines (the 1978 UNESCO Mass Media

Declaration). They also claimed some rights to control reporting within their

own frontiers in the national interest and in the name of equity. The Cold

War provided two parties. One was the Soviet bloc claiming the right to keep

its news space clear of unwanted foreign influence, in the name of

sovereignty. Another was the American or Western bloc that wanted

unlimited 'free flow', safe in the knowledge that this would work in its own

political and commercial interest. The goal of a New World Information and

Communication Order (NWICO) that would replace the inequity of the free

market in news was eventually abandoned in the aftermath of UNESCO's

defeat. The McBride Report (1980) that made recommendations for

implementing the new principles was largely ignored. According to Hamelink

(1998), the failure of the McBride Committee was at least partly due to its

inadequate understanding of social reality.

Along the way, however, much light was shed by research and by the

public debate on the actual structure of news flow and the underlying

dynamics of the global news industry. It was repeatedly confirmed that news

(whether press or TV) in more developed countries did not typically give a

great deal of space to foreign news (except in specialist or elite publications).

Foreign news was largely devoted to events in other countries that were

large, nearby and rich, or connected by language and culture. It was also

narrowly focused on the interests of the receiving country. Most foreign

news could often be accounted for by attention to a small number of

ongoing crises (e.g. conflict in the Middle East or in South East Asia) of

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relevance to the developed world. Large areas of the physical world were

found to be systematically absent or miniscule on the implied 'map' of the

world represented by the universe of news event locations (e.g. Gerbner and

Marvanyi, 1977; Womack, 1981). In particular, developing countries were

only likely to enter the news frame of developed countries when some events

there were threatening to the economic or strategic interests of the 'great

powers'. Alternatively, news was made when problems and disasters

reached a scale so as to interest audiences in distant and safer lands.

These findings suggest that international news communication in

action is less likely to be an independent cause of change than some

theories of mass communication imply. It is more likely to reflect the world

as it is and to reinforce rather than change existing global relationships.

This conclusion diminishes the claim that media are themselves a potent

force for globalization. However, we should keep in mind that most studies

of news have concentrated on 'serious' (i.e. political and economic) content

and hard news. Less attention has been given to areas that may be

quantitatively and in other ways more significant, in particular material

about sport, music, entertainment, gossip and other human interest

matters, which may easily find itself into the 'news'.

I conclude by saying that Global mass communication is a reality, and

during the second half of the century there has almost certainly been a

steady strengthening of the conditions that allow the media audience to

receive information and cultural content from other countries and parts of

the world. The main conditions are: the existence of a free market in media

products; the existence and respect for an effective 'right to information',

thus political freedom and freedom of speech; the technologies that can offer

fast, capacious and low-cost channels of transmission across borders and

large distances. Nevertheless, the real chances for global sending or

receiving and the probability of it taking place depend on more mundane

79

matters, especially those relating to the national media system and its

degree of connectedness to other systems.

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Chapter 3

TELEVISION – THE REGIONAL BACKGROUND THE WORLD SCENARIO

Television as medium of mass-communication had existed in the

developed world and even some developing countries much before it was

ushered into Pakistan in 1964. Broadcasting is a major component of mass

media in most countries. Because of their technological similarities, radio

and television are often run on similar lines, frequently by the same people.

In the United ‘States, for example, the major television networks developed

out of the major radio networks. They are still involved in radio but

diversification of that medium has muted their pre-eminence. Both radio

and television in the US are regulated by the federal Communications

Commission under the same broadcasting statutes.

Three important developments have taken place during the last two

decades, which are the demise of communism, the increasing integration of

world markets and very rapid advances in communications technology.

After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, free trade and the free flow of

information became the dominant philosophies of the late twentieth

century, with the United States the chief protagonist of both. Economic

barriers broken, state control of the public sector was rolled back and

liberalization opened up world trade on market terms. Most states, in some

cases with reluctance, put their signatures to plans to dismantle

protectionist barriers as outlined in the negotiations to set up the World

Trade Organization in 1995.

The end of communism speeded up the process of economic

globalization, by the 1980s, many multinational companies had become

global economic forces. The balance of power between nation states and

transnational interests had begun to shift. In this process, improved

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communications played a commanding role. The pace of progress in

telecommunications, satellite and computer technology changed the nature

of international communication and opened up new commercial

opportunities. The Internet has proved its potential for personal

communication; its relationship with electronic media are still unfolding.

The convergence of these technologies is advancing.

For the world media, these advances have brought new opportunities

for the projection of a global presence. Television could not go global until

the commercial development of satellite communications removed its

previous dependence on terrestrial transmissions. Since the late 1980s,

however, television has developed into a global industry and a key factor in

the integration of world markets. Within a very short period, there has been

a consolidation of television interests in terms of production and

distribution the markets where their services were previously unknown, are

now under their domain.

Herman and McChesney (1997) have charted the growth of media

consortia into multi-billion dollar enterprises with global ambitions.2 They

have also shown how the same process is evident in the growing

concentration of ownership of advertising and market research companies.

Improved communications have made it possible for the same television

programmes to be watched at the same time all over the globe and for the

same advertisements to project global brands. To this extent, technology,

the media and advertising are collaborators in the growing globalization of

trade. Page & Crawley have given an interesting account of this process.

By the late 1990s, a number of multi-billion dollar companies, most of

them American in origin, had come to dominate the global media. The

largest of these was Time Warner, publisher of Time magazine, owner of

Warner Brothers film studios and Home Box Office, the largest cable

network in the world. In 1996, Time Warner purchased Turner broadcasting,

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owner of CNN, which had nearly 100 million subscribers, and the Cartoon

Network. In early 2000, Time Warner joined forces with America On-line in

what was described as the world's 'biggest-ever' company merger. It brought

together the world's leading Internet Company with one of the world's

leading content providers in a union aimed at exploiting the rapid

convergence of communication technologies. At a combined value of US$

335 billion, the category of Media Company acquired a new dimension.

After Time Warner, the next largest conglomerate was Disney, which

had earlier transformed its structure and purpose to face similar challenges.

Previously primarily a content provider, Disney's purchase in 1995 of the

ABC TV and radio network made it a media giant in its own right. That

network included two ESPN sports channels, providing 24-hour sports in

twenty-one languages to 165 countries. Sony, well known as one of the

world's leading hardware companies, acquired formidable television

expertise when it bought the American news provider CBS. Its plans to

exploit the Sony brand in global television included the launch of new

services for India. Viacom, which owns Paramount film studios, MTV, the

RCA record label, Macmillan, the publisher, and Blockbuster, the world's

largest video chain, was also in the top league with a market capitalization

of US$ 37.2 billion.

Finally, as far as Asia is concerned, there was Rupert Murdoch's News

Corporation, which had a controlling interest in Star TV. From his origins in

Australia, Murdoch extended his media empire first to the UK, then to the

USA, and next to Asia. Over 80 percent of News Corporation's revenues

came from the USA and Europe, but it had invested heavily in the Chinese

and Indian markets. Other global companies were also trying to exploit the

growing prosperity of Asian markets. Time Warner, Disney and Viacom all

hoped that Asia would contribute over 40 per cent of corporate profits by

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2000, though the East Asian economic crisis of 1997 made that unrealistic

(Page & Crawley 2001).

TIMELINE OF MEDIA DEVELOPMENT

Year Media – Related Event

100 Papermaking develops in China and Spreads Through Asia and the Arab world

by the year 600

700 Arabs carry Chinese techniques for papermaking to the west

1000 Movable type made of Clay is used in China

1400 Movable metal types is developed in Asia

1450 Gutenberg perfects movable metal type and hand press in Germany; the Bible

is printed, 1456

1600 First “Newspapers” appear in Germany, France, and Belgium

1702 London’s Daily Courant is first daily newspaper

1833 Mass-circulation media begin with the first “penny press” newspapers, The

New York Sun

1837 Telegraph is first demonstrated

1839 A practical method of photography is developed by Daguerre

1844 Samuel Morse sets up telegraph link between Washington and Baltimore

1876 First Telephone message sent by Alexander Graham Bell

1877 Edison Develops first phonograph

1879 Edison patents the electric light

1884 Eastman perfects the roll film

1895 Motion pictures are invented, and the first films are shown to the public

Radio messages are transmitted by Marconi

1903 Great Train Robbery becomes model for storytelling with film.

1920 First Regularly scheduled radio broadcasting, by KDKA in Pittsburgh

1927 The Jazz Singer is first feature-length film with synchronized speech.

1933 TV is demonstrated by RCA

1937 First digital computer is created from telephone parts

1941 First Commercial TV is broadcast

1946 Fist mainframe computer is invented at the university of Pennsylvania.

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Year Media – Related Event

1947 First transistor is developed by Bell Labs as alternative to vacuum tubes

1948 Long-playing (LP) records, which rotate at 33 ⅓ rpm, are introduced.

1949 Network TV begins in the United States

1956 Videotape recording (VTR) is invented

1957 Sputnik, World’s first communication satellite, is launched by the Soviet Union

1961 San Diego cable operator is first to import television signals from another city

(Los Angeles) for distribution to subscribers

1969 First nodes of the computer internet are created in Pentagon plan to establish

a decentralized communications systems that can withstand nuclear attack.

1970 Early (and expensive) videocassette recorder (VCRs) are introduced.

1971 Invention of the microprocessor

1975 First microcomputer is marketed

Fiber optics transmission begins

HBO begins transmitting programming to cable TV Systems by Satellite.

1977 Qube, the first interactive cable system, begins in Columbus, Ohio

200,000 VCRs sold; more affordable machines enter the market and sales

boom.

1990 World Wide Web (www) started as simple user interface for wide variety of data

types.

1997 Digital video discs (DVD) first introduced.

1998 Digital television broadcasting begins.

Source: David Croteau and William Hoynes, eds., Media Society: Industries, Images and Audiences, 2nd, Edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2000. MEDIA SCENARIO IN SOUTH ASIA

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc introduced

diplomatic and economic changes in South Asian region. India, Pakistan

and Bangladesh conversion to a program of economic liberalization, which

accelerated considerably after 1991, was a reflection of these new realities.

Economic reforms introduced at that time opened up a very large new

market for foreign capital and consumer goods, which quickly attracted

multinational interest. As a result, foreign trade and investment increased

85

substantially over the next few years. All this seemed highly improbable in

the 1970s and 1980s, when India's close relationship with the Soviet Union

set the tone for many of its foreign and economic policies.

Satellite television played a role in alerting international business to

the size and potential of the Indian market, which is now seen as one of the

most promising in the world. Star TV, the first in the field with a range of

different programs, initially targeted the Pacific-rim economies, and then

spread to whole region. Efforts to attract audiences by broadcasting

English-language programming from the United States, Britain and

elsewhere initially led to accusations of a 'cultural invasion'. But before

long, commercial attention was focused on the middle class, with Zee TV

emerging very quickly as the most popular and profitable channel. By the

mid-1990s, international channels targeting the South Asia market were

competing both in the North and the South with flourishing channels run

by Indian entrepreneurs.

The nature of the new satellite media makes earlier notions of western

cultural domination look very oversimplified. Schiller's view, expressed first

in the late 1960s, that the media would spread American lifestyles around

the world and that a homogeneous globalized culture would gradually

replace other local and regional cultures plainly does not fit the facts.

Barriers of language and the political and economic empowerment of a

growing middle class over the past thirty years have stood in the way of

such a scenario. Even in former British colonies, the English speaking elite,

though still influential in the professions, is no longer politically or

economically dominant. (Schiller 1969)

The satellite revolution enables the international media to speak to

the English-knowing middle class in one language and the greater middle

class in others. The program preferences of these audiences may not overlap

very much—though there are some indications that the overlap is

86

increasing—but the fact that these audiences watch programs in different

languages does not prevent them from being targeted with similar products

and lifestyles. For the advertiser, whether national or multinational, the

language is a means to reach the audience. To this extent, the development

of programs in Hindi by Star TV or of popular soap operas by Zee TV is

assisting the integration of India into the global consumer economy.

Advertising agencies have the most demonstrable claim to be the

midwives of satellite television. Television advertising has helped to create

whole new markets in South Asia, both for new products and for the re-

branding of a range of consumer goods. But while advertisers have been

targeting the market, they have created audiences across South Asia in

general and in the Gulf as well. The westernized middle class in Colombo or

Karachi now watch the same English-language programs on CNN or BBC,

Star News or Cartoon Network. Pakistanis watch programs made for India,

particularly the Hindi entertainment channels. Tamils in Sri Lanka have

access to satellite channels in their language aimed at South India. Bengali

satellite channels have audiences in both Bangladesh and West Bengal.

Much of this communication is still one way—from India outwards—but it

has already affected the nature of relationships between states and peoples.

As far as the media penetration is concerned, no country in South

Asia has reached a daily newspaper circulation rate of 10 copies per 100

people that UNESCO recommended in 1962 as a minimum goal. Only two

countries in Southeast Asia, Singapore and Malaysia, had reached that goal.

All countries in East Asia, except China and Mongolia, have exceeded that

target. A basic standard of five radio receivers per 100 people had been set

by UNESCO in 1962. Every country in Asia, except Bhutan and Nepal, has

achieved this target. Radio penetration was highest in Sri Lanka in South

Asia, Singapore in Southeast Asia, and South Korea in East Asia. Sri Lanka

has the highest TV penetration in South Asia, Brunei in Southeast Asia, and

87

Japan in East Asia. All Asian countries, except Bangladesh, Bhutan, Laos,

Myanmar, and Nepal, have exceeded the UNESCO minimum standard of

two TV receivers per 100 people.

Table 1

Asia: Demographic and Media Indicators

Demographic Indicator Media indicators per 100 peoples

Country

GNP

per capita in US$

Popul-

ation (in million)

Adult

literacy rate1

Urban

Popu-lation %

Tertia

ry Enroll-ment as %

of age group

Daily

News-paper circu-lation

Radio2

recei-vers

TV3

recei-vers

Main

Tele-phone lines3

Internet

hosts4 per 10,000 January

1998 1998 1998 1998 1995 1996 1996 1997 1998 1999

South Asia Maldives Sri Lanka Pakistan

Bhutan India Bangladesh Nepal

Southeast Asia Singapore Brunei

Malaysia Thailand Philippines Indonesia

Myanmar Laos Cambodia Vietnam

East Asia

Japan Hong Kong

Macau Taiwan Korea (S) Korea (n)*

China Mongolia

World

1167 827 492

450 436 289 225

21828 20400

3092 1850 907 460

765 258 270 310

33340 24716

16054 12040 6810 900

783 396

5,180

0.3

19.0 136.8

0.8 989.2 130.0 23.4

3.2 0.3

22.7 62.1 74.7

207.7

48.8 5.3

10.9 79.4

126.5 6.8

0.4 22.0 46.9 22.9

1268.7 2.5

5,820

92.6 89.3 37.8

42.2 52.1 38.1 27.5

93.1 89.2

93.7 93.8 94.0 84.4

82.0 56.6 37.8 91.9

100.0 92.2

74.8 93.2 97.4 N/A

81.5 95.0

78.0

32 23 35

7 28 20 14

100 67

56 36 57 38

27 22 22 21

79 95

94 58 84 61

35 62

46

5.1 3.4

0.2 6.4 6.1 4.8

33.7 6.6

11.0 20.1 27.9 11.3

5.7 1.6 1.6 4.1

41.4 25.7

27.8 46.0 52.0

5.7 17.0

1.8 2.9 2.1

3.1 0.9 1.1

32.4 6.9

16.3 6.5 8.2 2.3

1.0 0.4 0.1 0.4

58.0 80.0

44.0

39.4 20.0

4.2 2.7

12.2 21.0 9.2

1.9 10.5 5.0 3.7

73.9 30.0

43.2 20.4 15.9 15.5

8.9 13.9 12.7 10.6

95.7 69.5

35.2 40.1

103.7 14.7

19.5 13.9

3.9 9.2 6.5

1.9 6.9 0.7 0.4

29.2 41.7

16.6 23.4 10.6 9.7

0.7 0.4

12.3 18.0

70.6 41.2

28.9 32.7 34.2 11.5

27.0 5.9

6.58 2.84 1.85

1.04 1.85 0.26 0.77

54.29 24.68

19.49 8.02 2.87 2.70

0.48 0.55 0.18 2.07

47.86 56.08

40.91 49.96 44.40 4.82

5.62 3.66

4.00 0.29 0.22

0.58 0.78 0.00 0.07

259.84 38.98

30.21 7.25 3.00 1.97

0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00

133.64 356.67

3.41 142.75 60.47 0.00

0.84 0.08

Source: 1. Asia Week (The Bottom Line), December 17, 1999 http://www.pathfinder.com/asiawek/99/1217/bottom.html

2. UNESCO, 1999, Statistical year book, World Development Indicators, 1999 www.world.bank.org

3. ITU Telecommunication Indicators http://www.itu.int/ti/industryoverview/index.htm

4. Network Wizards http://www.nw.com/zine/WWW/dist-bynum.html. ITU, 1999

* APT yearbook, 1998, 1999.

88

Table 2

Structural View of Asia

Share of Asia’s Portion of World trade 1996 (%)

Per capita GNP (US$) 1996

Press Restriction score 1998

Center Japan

Semi-periphery 1 Hong Kong

China Korea (S)

Singapore Taiwan

Semi-Periphery 2 Malaysia

Thailand Indonesia India

Philippines Periphery

Pakistan Vietnam

Sri Lanka Bangladesh Brunei

Macau Nepal

Myanmar Mongolia Cambodia

Laos Maldives Bhutan

Korea (N)

29.3

13.5

10.4 9.5

9.5 8.1

5.5

4.3 3.4 2.4

1.8

0.7 0.4

0.3 0.2 0.2

0.1 0.1

0.0 0.0 0.0

0.0 0.0 0.0

[0.0] 100

40940

24290

750 10610

30550 [12240]

4370

2960 1080 380

1160

480 290

740 260

[17556]

[17542] 210

[765] 590 300

400 1080 390

[900]

19

N/A

81 28

66 25

66

30 53 37

30

60 71

58 59 74

N/A 59

97 30 62

66 66 80

100

Source: WTO, 1997; World Bank, 1998; Sussman, 1999.

89

A REGIONAL VIEW

Electronic Media in India

Television was first launched in India in the late 1950s and, though it

did not become a mass medium until the 1980s. India, the first to introduce

the new medium, put development first and entertainment last. Indian

Prime Minister Nehru was against the introduction of television because he

felt that it was a luxury, which would only be enjoyed by the middle class.

In Nehru’s view, radio was more appropriate for India’s stage of

development.

When Indian television began in 1959, on an experimental basis in

the Delhi region, the programmes reflected India’s development priorities.

The first systematic television service, funded by UNESCO, was principally

aimed at the rural areas around Delhi and was designed to increase

understanding of the responsibilities of citizenship, Later, there were

experiments in educational TV, with sets being provided for secondary

schools in the Delhi area. These early ventures were the subject of much

analysis, but the broadcasts did not catch on and the government did not

increase its investment. India acquired a second TV station in Bombay.

Indian television in its infancy was managed by All India Radio, which may

have been an impediment to its natural development.

India went through the 1971 war with the sensitive border areas of

Punjab and Kashmir within range of Pakistan’s stations at Rawalpindi and

Lahore and with no means of counter-attack. As a. result, Mrs. Gandhi

began to take television more seriously. The Bombay station opened in

1972, followed the next year by stations at Amritsar and Srinagar, to

counter Pakistani propaganda in those strategically important regions. In

Kashmir, community sets were provided by the government to hundreds of

villages to support this project.

90

By this stage, both Pakistani Prime Minister Mr. Bhutto and Indian

Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi were embarking on new and more populist

policies. Both saw television as an important new means of communication

with the masses and set in train significant television building programmes.

In Pakistan, shortly after Bhutto assumed charge as president, he made

Aslam Azhar managing director of television and asked him to put up two

new television stations—in Peshawar and Quetta. Mr. Azhar told that this

would probably take twelve to fourteen months; Bhutto apparently replied: ‘I

am not asking you to build me a couple of nuclear reactors; all I want is two

television stations. I’m giving you three months!’ In India, after the

expansion provoked by the war, the next spurt came with Mrs. Gandhi’s

declaration of the Emergency. The Calcutta, Madras and Lucknow stations

all opened within six months in 1975 and the following year television was

finally separated from All India Radio and given its own director general. In

1976, to make TV more popular, the government reduced excise duties on

cheaper sets, and local manufacture began to take off. In 1969, when the

first Indian television factory opened at Kanpur, only 1250 sets were

manufactured, but by 1977, forty manufacturers were producing nearly a

quarter of a million sets a year. (Page + Crawley, 2001)

Despite this rapid development under Mrs. Gandhi, Indian TV

remained an urban phenomenon confined to the well to do. It did not

become a mass medium until the 1980s, when Rajiv Gandhi’s interest in

technology provoked a quantum leap in all communications, whether TV,

telephones or computers. In the case of TV, the fillip came with the Asian

Games held in Delhi in 1982, which Indira Gandhi saw as an opportunity

for India to showcase its achievements to the wider world. A decision was

made to go for colour TV, new equipment was imported, and an early phase

of economic liberalisation saw duties reduced on a wide range of electronic

imports. Changes were also made in the manufacturing regime. From the

1960s, as a matter of policy, many Indian TV sets had been made by small

91

factories, but from the early 1980s, in the run up to the Asian Games,

multinationals and large Indian consortia were allowed into the field and

import restrictions on colour TV components were relaxed. By 1986, India

was producing over 3 million sets a year, including 700,000 colour sets.

This change in manufacturing practice was accompanied by a

massive transmitter-building programme. From eighteen television

transmitters in 1979, the number rose to forty in 1982 and 176 in 1985, by

which stage 81 per cent of the urban population and 50 per cent of the rural

population were covered (Page + Crawley 2001). By the mid-1980s, India

had become a television society and due to the development of indigenous

satellite technology, Doordarshan became capable of broadcasting national

programmes for the first time. This paved the way for the creation of a

national market for television advertising, which brought powerful new

commercial influences to bear on the production of programmes. As the

Congress and its Hindu nationalist rival, the Bharatiya Janata Party,

battled it out for the votes of the burgeoning middle class in north India,

television became a vehicle not just for a new consumerism but also for a

broader political appeal to Hindu values. The broadcasting on Doordarshan

of major television serials based on the great Hindu epics—the Ramayana

and the Mahabharata—drew millions of Hindu Indians to television for the

first time and signalled its appropriation for a new kind of popular culture.

Before the arrival of satellite competition, Doordarshan had already staked

out the ground for future commercial competition.

All India Radio had grown, by 1997, into a major network of almost

200 radio stations and 389 transmitters covering about 90 percent of the

area of the country and 97 percent of the population." The 1999 UNESCO

statistical yearbook estimated that India had 116 million radio receivers in

1997—a density of 12 sets per 100 people.

92

The public TV broadcasting network, Doordarshan, has 19 channels

with programs produced from about 40 different centers. Its more than 900

transmitters of varying power cover about 70 percent of the geographical

area and about 87 percent of the population. The 1999 ITU Yearbook of

statistics gives the following data on India for 1997: 66 million TV receivers,

63 million TV households, and 18 million cable-TV subscribers. UNESCO's

Statistical yearbook for 1999 says that India had 63 million TV receivers in

1997, a density of 6.5 per 100 people.

In India both cable and satellite channels emerged in the mid 1980s.

Murdoch's Satellite Television Asia Region (STAR TV) network, CNN,

BBC, Discovery, TNT/Cartoon, and MTV, among others, have entered the

Country on their own or with the help of local partners (McDowell, 1997;

Xavier & Eashwer, 1998).

Twenty-four hour broadcasting of news, sports, business, music,

movies, and cartoons is no longer the exception. Programs of Zee TV (1993),

and Indian-owned news and entertainment channel, are among the top 10

in India. The other channels include ABNi, Asianet, ATN, Cable, CNBC,

Channel V, Eenadu TV, ESPN, Gemini TV, Home TV, Music Asia, National

Geographic, Punjabi World, RaJ TV, Sony TV, Star Movies, Star Plus, Star

Sports, Star News, Surya TV, Sun TV, TVI, Udaya TV, and Vijay TV, (Via

Media, 1999, http://www.mudra.com/wnew_con,htm).

Competition, particularly in southern India, has lately emerged from

such channels as Sun TV, Raj TV, and Vijay TV, which televise in Tamil;

Eenadu and Gemini TV in Telugu; Udaya in Kannada; and Asia net in

Malayalam. National and international media companies also collaborate to

produce programming in India (Sharma, 1998).

93

The government's latest telecom policy allows media companies (with

at least 80 percent of Indian equity) direct satellite uplink of their programs

instead of making them go through the current government monopoly,

Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd (VSNL).

Cable television entered as a closed circuit television in skyscraper

apartments in the middle- and lower middle-class localities, which were

wired to central control rooms. Video players transmitted Indian and foreign

films and programs taped abroad. Cable networks expanded to 10 million in

2000. National surveys show that the number of households with cable and

satellite TV expanded from zero households in 1990 (before the introduction

of Cable TV) to almost 35 percent of the TV households by 2000

(Balasubramanian, 2000). Most large villages have cable connections.

Given the popularity and growth of local and satellite TV channels,

major media conglomerates have diversified into program production,

supplying programs to both public and private channels. The more

prominent producers include Times Television (TTV), Hindustan Television

from the Hindustan Times group, Television Bazar from the Ananda Bazar

group, Eenadu Television (ETV) from the Ushodaya group. Plus Channel,

Durga Khote Productions, United Television (UTV), and Cinevista

Communications.

The Electronic Media in Bangladesh

In the creation of Bangladesh, radio played a more influential role

than television. In March 1971, there was a period of more than two weeks

when both television and radio were virtually free and the staff was making

programmes in support of the Awami League. But on 25 March, the army

took over Dhaka TV and radio stations and it was then left to radio outside

Dhaka to support the cause of the Awami League. A Chittagong radio

station, known as Swadin Bangia Beiar Kendro (Independent Bangla Radio

94

Station), became a symbol of separatists movement. It later moved its

operations to Calcutta, where it was run by former staff from the Chittagong

and’ Rajshahi stations, with support from Indian broadcasters.

Once Bangladesh was created, media management reverted to the

practices of earlier times. One of the first acts of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s

government was to end television’s status as a public corporation under

direct political control. When Sheikh Mujib responded to growing economic

and political opposition in 1974 by declaring the country a one party state,

radio and television became mouthpieces of his new authoritarianism.

During the military regimes of General Zia ur Rahman and General

Ershad, the two leaders skilfully used the media, particularly television, to

project their own personalities and the role of the army in national life,

whether in digging canals or rescuing the victims of perennial floods. This

reinforced the process of centralization and politicization of the media,

which had begun earlier. In fact, for much of the 1980s, Bangladesh seemed

very much a mirror image of Pakistan, the state from which it had broken

away. These were not the circumstances for establishing new media

conventions and it was only after 1991, when the country returned to

democracy, that the future of the electronic media became a subject for

political debate.

What the emergence of Bangladesh did bring, however, was important

new cultural policies. During the Pakistan period, the Dhaka station of

Radio Pakistan was perceived as ‘His Master’s Voice’. It projected Urdu as

the national language and the Bengali language it used was laced with Urdu

words. Mr. Jinnah’s efforts to enforce Urdu in East Pakistan, in which Radio

Pakistan played its part, illustrated at an early stage for the Bengalis the

problem of unequal access which was a feature of rule from West Pakistan.

As one commentator puts it: "There was a sense that they were imposing

their culture on us’. This was particularly the case after the 1965 war when

95

the poetry and music of Rabindranath Tagore were banned on Radio

Pakistan. This provoked an outcry and helped to fuel the development of

Bengali linguistic nationalism.

After 1971, the Urdu-speaking elite within Bangladesh, which had

been influential in cementing ties with West Pakistan, was finally eclipsed.

The Bengali-speaking middle class assumed a dominant role and the

electronic media became vehicles for a renaissance of Bengali language and

literature. Tagore’s poetry and songs were once more heard on the airwaves.

Television in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka was not the market leader in television as it had been in

commercial radio. In the 1960s, Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake thought

it would do more harm than good. His successor, Mrs. Sirimavo

Bandaranaike, who headed a left wing coalition for much of the 1970s,

attempted to find refuge from Sri Lanka’s growing economic problems in a

siege economy. In her days, the atmosphere was hostile to international

business and to technical innovation. With the election of J.R. Jayawardene

in 1977, Sri Lanka reversed these policies, attempting to model itself on

Singapore’s successful open economy. Under Jayawardene, Sri Lanka

became the first South Asian country to introduce economic liberalisation,

which involved rolling back state control, promoting competition -as the

engine of growth and encouraging foreign investment. This new approach

also resulted in increased competition in the media. In 1979, Jayawardene,

who had long been an advocate of television, sanctioned an experiment by

the private sector and in 1982, with Japanese aid and technical assistance,

established a public broadcasting system.

The man chosen to set up Rupavahini was M.J. Perera, who had also

been the first Sri Lankan director general of radio. Perera appointed a

number of radio professionals to key posts and followed many radio

96

precedents. As on radio, there were news bulletins in English, Sinhala and

Tamil, all based on a central text, televised at different times during the

evening. Maintaining a strict balance of other programs was more difficult.

The cost of television and the existence of only one channel meant that there

were fewer Tamil programs on television than on radio. Sinhala programmes

tended to dominate the schedules, with Sinhala drama a particular

favourite. The other problem was that the television signal was not received

well in the north of the island, which may have increased the sense of

alienation among the Jaffna Tamils.

The coincidence of the launching of TV and the outbreak of Sri

Lanka’s prolonged Tamil insurgency in Jaffna makes the country a test case

for the role of the media in conflict situations. In 1983, the killing of

seventeen soldiers in a landmine explosion was followed by a politically

directed pogrom against Tamils in Colombo. Prime Minister Fremadasa’s

television broadcast after these events came so close to defending communal

victimisation that M.J. Perera refused to repeat it and was ultimately

supported by President Jayawardene in that action. The incident illustrated

the rapid politicization of the media under the pressure of war and

insurgency. In 1988 and 1989, during the JVP insurgency in the south,

radio and television were taken over by officers of the armed forces and the

stations run like barracks under siege to maintain an essential service.

The retirement of Jayawardene and the election of President

Premadasa brought what M.J. Ferera calls ‘the worst period of

politicisation’. Jayawardene monitored-TV and radio closely but he very

rarely intervened. Premadasa, on the other hand, saw television as a vehicle

for his own glorification. According to M.J.Perera: ‘He used to go round the

country making speeches and all that had to be broadcast on the radio and

TV... so much so that I gave up listening to the news—’ One measure of this

greater control was the opening of an office for the minister of information,

97

AJ, Ranasinghe, in the Rupavahini building. The minister made regular

visits, ‘...giving orders to the chairman and others—and appointed his own

people to various jobs..., It was a very sad period.’ (Gunaratne 2000)

Despite the political crisis in the country, economic liberalization

continued and within strict limits brought growing competition in the media

field. The first private television company, ITN, which was set up in 1979 by

the president’s nephew Shan Wickreme-singhe, folded after only a few

months and was taken over by the government and run as a second

channel. But by 1992, television had attracted sufficient advertising for

another channel to be set up. A license was given to the Maharaja group,

which was run by Colombo Tamil businessmen close to President

Fremadasa. The Maharajas had no previous media experience, but with

technical assistance from Singapore and elsewhere, Maharaja TV soon

became commercially viable. This encouragement of private sector

television, though slow and halting at first, marked Sri Lanka out from other

South Asian countries, which had retained control in government hands. By

the mid-1990s, the country had proved that television could be pluralized

successfully even in a small country with a limited advertising market.

The government-run SLRC and ITN dominate television broadcasting

in the country. Six ministerial appointees constitute the SLRC, including

one representing the SLBC and another representing the National Film

Corporation. SLRC started a second channel in mid-1999to tap into the TV

advertising market.

The government relaxed its television monopoly in 1992. Since then

four private companies have introduced six television channels—MTV and

MTV News vision, Swarnavahini, ETV, TNL and Dynavision, the country's

first stereo TV broadcast station- (Sirasa TV, which replaced the MTV

channel in June 1998, became the first nationwide private sector TV

channel. It planned to televise 18 hours a day. MTV itself replaced the MTV

98

Newsvision channel to concentrate primarily on greater Colombo and

Kandy.) In 1999, the Sri Lanka Telecommunications Authority allowed two

other private TV services: Comet Cable TV run "by Ruhuna 2001 Multi-

vision, a subsidiary of Vancouver-based Rystar; and Channel 9, the

country's first direct-to-home pay TV service, operated by TV and Radio (Pvt)

Ltd, a joint Sri Lanka-Australia venture in late 1999, it planned to introduce

digital television linked to satellite communication for the benefit of

expatriate Sri Lankans (Sunday Observer, August 8, 1999).

The Media in Nepal

Nepal was slow to introduce both radio and television. The successful

diplomacy of the Ranas had protected Nepal from the direct impact of

British colonialism but left it with a lot of catching up to do once its leaders

chose to tread the same path of development as its neighbours. Under the

Ranas, it was not permitted to own a radio until 1945 and Radio Nepal was

only set up in 1951 once Rana rule had been brought to an end. Modern

communications were introduced at the same time as a fledgling democracy,

but as democracy faltered and King Mahendra reasserted the powers of a

restored monarchy, radio became the voice of his government.

Radio offered a chance to link up different communities and to spread

the message of development. But the Nepalese monarchy proved wary of

technical innovation; even as late as the 1980s large areas of the country,

particularly in the west, were outside the range of radio transmitters. Radio

did play a part in promoting Nepali as the country’s national language. King

Mahendra believed that the Nepali language was the key to national

integration; so much so that for nearly forty years Radio Nepal did not

broadcast any other language, despite the extraordinary linguistic plurality

of the country. As a result, many Nepalis spent much of their time listening

to All India Radio in Hindi and other languages.

99

Nepalese TV started in 1985, much later than in India or Pakistan.

According to Neer Shah, the first general manager, the project was viewed

with hostility in official circles and was not properly planned or funded. It

was only after the first experimental broadcast during King Birendra’s visit

to Australia that the palace began to realise that television could be a

powerful means of projecting the government and the monarchy. The

objective was ‘to promote national integrity, Nepali arts, culture and

education’, which had become more urgent because of the rapid

development of Indian TV. By the mid-1980s, Doordarshan had begun to

attract Nepali audiences even in Kathmandu and there was talk of a

‘cultural invasion from India’. Despite the huge costs involved for a small

and relatively poor country, the new medium had become a necessary tool

in the battle for cultural influence within Nepal itself. In this sense, Nepal

had already experienced something very similar to the satellite revolution

before it started. (Rao + Koirala, 2000)

In the media, as in much else in Nepal, it was the ‘People’s Movement’

of 1990 which ushered in the most radical change. After many years in the

wilderness, the Nepali Congress and its communist allies forced the king to

surrender his absolute powers and to introduce a form of parliamentary

democracy. One plank of their joint program was the liberalization of the

media. After these changes, Radio Nepal became, for a time, more critical of

government, more open-to different viewpoints and to public access, more

investigative, more satirical and more entertaining. Within a few years, it

reverted to the prevalent South Asian model of ‘party in power’ control. But

the liberalization of politics and economics did have important

repercussions. The state monopoly ended and state radio and television

were step by step forced to compete with the private sector.

The government owned and operated the broadcast media—one radio

station and one TV station—until 1997. Radio Nepal, which the government

100

established as a department under the Ministry of Information and

Broadcasting, never had a legal framework. In the 1980s, the government

turned Radio Nepal into a semi-autonomous body called the Broadcasting

Development Service in an attempt to give it credibility. Even so, no official

charter regulated broadcasting. Radio Nepal operates as a semi-autonomous

broadcasting authority with its own board of directors and its own sources

of income. It has the authority to broadcast both commercial and public

service programs. However, it is the government which appoints its director

and members of the governing board. The board chairman is the secretary

to the Ministry of Information and Communication. Recently, the

government granted licenses to six other groups to operate FM stations.

With the exception of the Madan Pokhara community radio and the

Kathmandu Municipality radio, all the rest are commercial stations.

A board of directors and a a general manager appointed by the

government run Nepal Television (NTV), as in the case of Radio Nepal. The

chairman is a political appointee representing the ruling party. Nepal

Television broadcasts for about four hours every evening and for a few hours

on Saturday afternoons. It also broadcasts for a few hours in the morning.

Although some say that Nepal Television has become bolder in reporting the

government's shortcomings or any misuse by it, it still functions as the

mouthpiece of the government and the parties in power. The government

has given permission to private companies to establish networks or to buy

air-time from Nepal Television. Currently, Image Channel, a private

company, broadcasts one-and-a-half hours in the morning. Two cable

companies are also in operation—Space-time Network, which uses cables to

serve a network of several thousand customers in Kathmandu and several

other towns; and Shangri-la Channel, which uses a broadcast network to

supply satellite channels to its clients in the Kathmandu Valley, Nepal

Television claims to reach about 40 percent of the population in the capital,

the main cities and the southern plains of the Terai- It covers an estimated

101

28 percent of the geographical area. Nepal being a mountainous country,

the reach of television is very limited. In recent months, the government has

been considering the use of communication satellites to make Nepal

Television accessible to the entire population. However, considering the high

level of poverty, only very few can afford a TV receiver. Another obstacle is

that only 15 percent of the population has electricity (Rao& Koirala,2000).

DEVELOPMENT OF PRESS AND BROADCASTING IN PAKISTAN

Brief Early History

The origin of the Pakistani press, Al Mujahid (1982) points out, was

"enmeshed in sub-continental journalism" (p. 481) that began in 1780 when

James Augustus Hicky published the Bengal Gazette. Al Mujahid identified

three principal strands of the press in colonial India—the Anglo-Indian

press, the nationalist press, and the Muslim press. The press and

persecution went hand in hand during British rule. Thus, Niazi (1986)

traces the genesis of Pakistan's intolerance of the press to the colonial

period.2

The Anglo-Indian papers adopted a pattern similar to that of British

newspapers and developed into the most professional, financially stable,

and influential segment of the Indian press- Their influence continued until

the independence of India and Pakistan, The harsh attitude of the British

East India Company towards the first newspaper, the Bengal Gazette, set

the example for the future. When the newspaper attacked officials of the

Company, including the governor-general and his wife, the authorities

retaliated, first by denying postal services to the paper and, later, by

imprisoning Hicky and seizing his paper (Ali, 1969; Shamsuddin, 1986),

2 For more details on the development of the Pakistan mass media, see AL-Mujahid,

1978, 1982, 1991, and 1994; and Khurshid, 1971.

102

The nationalist press, mostly Hindu-owned, emerged in the 1820s in

several vernacular languages. The first vernacular paper, started in 1822,

was the Persian-Urdu Jaam-e-Jahan Numah published under the

supervision of the East India Company by editor Lala Suda Sukh and

printer William Hope King (Shamsuddin, 1986). In the early 20th century,

the Hindu-owned press became closely aligned with the Indian National

Congress and came to be called the "nationalist" press, which stood for

independence from British rule and for a united India.

The subcontinent's Muslim press, which marks the origin of the

Pakistani press, emerged in 1836, with the publication of Maulvi

Muhammed Baqar's Urdu Akhbar, It began as a literary paper in Delhi, but

as relations between the local population and the British deteriorated, it

became political and highly critical of British rule. The number of Muslim-

owned papers grew rapidly until the uprising of 1857, when the Muslim

press came out openly against the British occupation of India.

The British authorities closed all but two Muslim-owned publications,

hanged Baqar, and treated the other editors harshly (Haider, 1990)- After

the uprising, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan tried to promote a reconciliation

between Muslims and the British rulers. In 1866, he founded the Scientific

Society Magazine, a bilingual publication in Urdu and English. In 1870, he

started the Urdu Tehzibul Akhlaq on the pattern of the “The Toiler” and “The

Spectator”. These publications set a new standard of independent and

critical thinking among Muslims.

The turning point for Indian Muslims was the creation of the All India

Muslim League in 1906 for the promotion of Muslim interests. This

awakening was also reflected in a number of Muslim papers started during

the first quarter of the 20th century. By 1925, the Muslim press comprised

220 papers in nine languages, including Urdu (120), English (18), and

103

Bengali (14) (Kurian, 1982). Most of these papers had a precarious existence

because of poor circulation and meager revenues, but a few became

influential among Muslims. These included Maulana Hasrat Mohani's Urdu-

e-Moalla\ Maulana Abu) Kalam Azad's Al-Hilal and Al-Balagh, Maulana

Mohammed All's Comrade in English and Hamdard in Urdu; and Maulana

Zafar Ali Khan's Zamindar. Leading political figures edited them and they

served as a means of communicating with the people and the government.

They faced many hardships, including imprisonment and heavy fines,

because they fearlessly criticized British policies inimical to Muslim

interests.

When the Muslims began their struggle for a separate homeland, they

faced the hostility of both the Hindu owned nationalist press and the

British-owned press. Therefore, in the late 1930s and the 1940s,

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, then president of the Muslim League, and later the

first governor general of Pakistan, encouraged the establishment of

newspapers to project the aspirations of Indian Muslims.

Jinnah helped establish the English weekly Dawn in late 1930s. It

became a daily in 1942. By the mid-1940s, Muslim papers appeared in

every province of India. The most influential Muslim papers included Azad,

The Star of India, and Morning News of Calcutta; Manshoor and Anjam of

Delhi; Nawa-e- Waqt, The Pakistan Times, and Eastern Times of Lahore; The

Weekly Observer of Allahabad; Sind Times of Karachi; New Life of Patna;

and Khyber Mail of Peshawar. Many provincial governments controlled by

nationalists opposed the demand for Pakistan and confiscated a number of

Muslim newspapers, including the Star, New Life, and Zamindar (Kurian,

1982).

104

Table 3

PAKISTAN AT A GLANCE

Province Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan Capital Islamabad

Total

Population (Million)

73.621 (55.62)**

30.440 (23.00)

20.920 (15.81)

6.566 (4.96)

0.805 (0.61)

132.352*

(100)

Area (Sq KM)

205.345 (25.8)

140.914 (17.7)

107.741 (11.8)

347.190 (43.6)

(0.1)

796.069 (100)

Capital

Lahore Karachi Peshawar Quetta National Capital

----

* The total population in 2004 stood at 149.03 million ** Percentage Share in parentheses Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2003-2004.

Table 4

CULTURAL CONFIGURATION OF SOCIETY

Province Language Spoken Literacy rate (%)

Male Female Total

Punjab Punjabi, Urdu, Saraiki 55.6 31.2 43.8

Sindh Sindi, Urdu, Saraiki 53.8 32.0 43.6

NWFP Pushto, Hindko 48.7 15.1 32.1

Balochistan Pushto, Brahui,

Punjabi

33.3 11.8 30.7

Islamabad Urdu, English, and all

regional languages

79.8 58.3 70.2

Total ---- 53.4 28.5 41.5

Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2003 – 2004

105

Developments Since 1945

Press

The press was weak in those areas of India that became Pakistan. Not

a single daily was published in East Pakistan (Khurshid, 1971) or

Balochistan at the time of independence.* The NWFP had two daily papers,

but they were financially unstable. Lahore was the most prominent

newspaper center of Pakistan, followed by Karachi. However, even in these

cities, a majority of journalists and publishers were Hindus or Sikhs who

had migrated to India after the creation of Pakistan (Shamsuddin, 1986).

Those Muslim newspapers that moved from India to Pakistan filled

the void only partially. Dawn shifted to Karachi after its Delhi offices were

burnt in August 1947. Jang and Anjam, the leading Urdu papers of Delhi,

also relocated to Karachi. The Bengali daily Azad and the English Morning

News transferred their operations from Calcutta to Dhaka in East Pakistan.

In 1953, Morning News also started publishing from Karachi. Many

newspapers that moved to Pakistan, including Anjam, could not survive the

drastic change in the political, economic and competitive environment.

However, some papers including Dawn, Jang, and Nawa-e-Waqt have not

only survived but have developed into the country's major media groups (Al-

Mujahid, 1991).

The post-independence period (1947-58): The newly independent

Pakistan inherited a number of laws for controlling and regulating the

press. Some of the more important laws relating to the press (Al – Mujahid,

1991; Pakistan, 1959) in force at the time of independence included:

The Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867

The Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931

* However, two dailies—the Daily Purbo Pakistan and the Paigam—began publication

in East Pakistan in 1947.

106

The States (Protection Against Disaffection) Act, 1922

The Foreign Relations Act, 1932

The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1932

The States (Protection) Act, 1934

The Post Office Act, 1898

The Official Secrets Act, 1923

The Telegraph Act, 1885, and

The Sea Customs Act, 1885.

Because of the hostility between Pakistan and India, which led to a

war in Kashmir in 1949, the early governments believed that a completely

free press could threaten the country's security. The authorities in Pakistan,

therefore, not only retained the colonial laws, but also added further

constraints on the press. In 1949, they re-imposed the Public Safety Act,

which the British had enacted during World War II, for one year and

renamed it Public Safety Ordinance. The other restrictive law, enacted in

1952, was the Security of Pakistan Act. This law curtailed the right of

professional secrecy and opened the possibility of press censorship (Al –

Mujahid, 1991). During the first seven years of Pakistan's existence, the

government banned 33 newspapers in Punjab alone: 15 for one year, 9 for

six months, and the rest for lesser periods. Another 15 had to furnish heavy

security deposits (Napoli.1991).

In spite of restrictions on press freedom, rapid growth occurred in

both the number and the circulation of newspapers and magazines.

Between 1947 and 1958, the number of periodicals nearly doubled from 556

to 1,106; and the number of dailies increased threefold from 34 to 103. The

increase in circulation was even more dramatic. During the seven years

beginning 1947, the circulation of daily papers increased from 125,000 to

716,000 (Shamsuddin, 1986). With the exception of the period just after the

107

first imposition of martial law in 1958, and more recently in the mid-1990s,

the growth of the Pakistani press has continued.

The authoritarian period (1958-85): The strongest, most sustained

and most damaging attacks on press freedom occurred during the rule of

Field Marshal Ayub Khan, who came to power in 195 8. The Ayub regime set

the pattern of press censorship and imposed the system of legally binding

"press advice," which gave government officials the power to dictate what

could or could not be published. Gunaratne (1970) points out that Ayub

was "not the man responsible for initiating obnoxious press laws.... He

started out as a dictator amply taking advantage of the precedents

established by the so-called democratic governments that preceded him" (p.

41). The restrictive press environment of this period caused the number of

dailies to decline from 102 in 1959 to 74 in 1960, and that of weeklies and

biweeklies from 379 in 1958 to 260 in 1969 (Khurshid, 1971).

In 1959, the government took over Lahore's Progressive Papers Ltd,

publishers of the leading English newspaper Pakistan Times and the Urdu

daily Imroze. The government then took over (in 1961), the Associated Press

of Pakistan, one of the two news agencies in the country. In 1964, the

government created the National Press Trust, which took over the PPL

papers and acquired Morning News, as well as several other newspapers.

The Ayub government was also responsible for the imposition of the

infamous Press and Publication (Amendment) Ordinance of 1963, The PPO,

which Niazi (1986) describes as "the blackest of the black laws" (p. 98), gave

the government absolute powers to grant or deny permission for new

publications and to prohibit reporting on a wide range of subjects. The

second war with India, in 1965, led to the declaration of a state of

emergency and the imposition of the draconian Defense of Pakistan Rules

(DPR). The emergency and the DPR remained in force for 20 years, and

108

successive governments used them to ban papers, seize printing presses,

and jail journalists,

In 1969, when Ayub was forced to resign because of countrywide civil

unrest, he handed over power to the Army Chief Gen. Yahya Khan, who also

imposed martial law and became president. Yahya Khan imposed press

censorship during the civil war in East Pakistan, keeping the people of the

western wing ignorant of the scale of atrocities being committed there.

After the secession of East Pakistan in December 1971, Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto assumed power as the president and chief martial law

administrator. Despite his liberal rhetoric, Bhutto, who subsequently

assumed the position of prime minister, continued the repressive policies

against the press, including censorship, "press advice," banning of papers

and use of threats, physical assaults, and arrests of journalists. He brought

the NPT papers under his direct control; and his regime also engaged in

extra-legal actions against journalists and media organizations, including

the forcible transfer of Pakistan Press International, the country's

independent news agency, to a member of the ruling Pakistan People's

Party. Bhutto initiated large-scale nationalization of heavy industries,

banking, and insurance, which gave the government control over a large

proportion of the country's advertising expenditures. The Bhutto

government routinely used the allocation of advertising and newsprint

quotas as tools to punish uncooperative newspapers and magazines and to

reward the compliant ones.

Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq removed Bhutto from power in July 1977

following widespread civil unrest over the rigging of the elections. However,

Zia-ul-Haq continued past practices against the press and went a step

further when, in 1978, four journalists were whipped for their opposition to

the government.

109

The post-martial law period (1985-present): The transformation

towards a freer political environment began at the end of 1985 with the

withdrawal of martial law and the state of emergency. The Defense of

Pakistan Rules lapsed automatically. Following the death of Zia-ul-Haq, the

caretaker government repealed the PPO in 1988. This was another positive

development. Earlier, in April 1984, the Shariat Court had ruled in Tamseel

Javed vs. the Federation of Pakistan that some sections of the PPO were

repugnant to Islam. The court asserted that Islam laid "great emphasis on

freedom of expression and human dignity" and not only gave "people the

right of dissent but [also made] it obligatory on them to protest against

tyranny, injustice and oppression" (Jabbar & Isa, 1997, p. 780). The court

recommended changes in the procedures for issuing declarations, fixing a

time limit for pending applications and ruled that appeals be allowed

against refusal. The Zia-ul-Haq government appealed against the judgement

(Bhatti, 1993). However, the caretaker government, instead of pursuing the

appeal, decided to repeal the PPO and introduce a milder Registration of

Printing Presses and Publications Ordinance (RPPPO) in 1988. The RPPPO

continued to be promulgated as an ordinance until it lapsed in 1997. Both

the PPO and the RPPPO had their legal effect through promulgation and not

through the legislative process.

In 1990, the government of Benazir Bhutto ended its monopoly over

the import and distribution of newsprint. A sustained struggle by journalists

and pressure from national and international media organizations have

paved the way for a gradual return to democracy and a freer press in

Pakistan.

Radio Broadcasting Peshawar was the first city in areas now comprising Pakistan to have

a radio station. Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, who had gone to London to

participate in the round table negotiations among the Muslims, Hindus, and

110

the British, made the request for a radio station to Marconi, inventor of the

radio- Marconi, who also sent 30 receiving sets to Sardar Qayyum,

personally designed the, transmitter. In 1936, Peshawar became the second

city in India, after Delhi, to have a radio station. In 1942, the Peshawar

radio station shifted to a new building with a 10-kilo watt transmitter ((Page

& Crawley, 2001). Two years after the Peshawar station went on air, on

December 26, 1938, a 5kW station started operating from the YMCA

building in Lahore. The colonial government used radio as a propaganda

organ with little emphasis on entertainment. With the start of World War II,

the propaganda role of radio was magnified, as there was great interest in

news about the war. Gradually, however, drama, music, and literary

programs began to be broadcast.

At the time of partition in 1947, India and Pakistan divided the assets

of All India Radio, and Pakistan inherited three low-powered radio stations

at Lahore, Dhaka, and Peshawar. A year later, Karachi, the then federal

capital, acquired a medium wave transmitter station, which added two

50kW transmitters soon afterwards (Al Mujahid, 1978; Siddiqui, 1991). In

August 1949, Radio Pakistan formally inaugurated five external services

from Karachi. Rawalpindi came on the air in 1950. Within a decade,

Hyderabad and Quetta also had radio stations. In 1974, Pakistan set up its

first earth satellite station at Deh Mandro, north of Karachi (Al Mujahid,

1978).

Until recently, the government had a monopoly over radio

broadcasting—the only true mass medium in Pakistan because of the

country's low literacy rate. In 1995, however, the Benazir Bhutto

government allowed the introduction of private sector FM broadcasting in

Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad. The private FM service, identified as

FM100, broadcasts popular music and listener call-in programs (Akif &

Siddiqui, 1998). Gilani (1998) says that the private FM channel has an

111

audience of roughly four million adults. Allegations exist that the exclusive

permits to establish these stations were awarded to a close friend of the

Bhutto family (Jabbar & Isa, 1997, p. 124).

Television

In October 1963, the government took the decision to establish a

general-purpose television service with the participation of private capital

under the general supervision of the government. Subsequently, the

government signed an agreement with Japan's Nippon Electronic Co.,

allowing it to operate two pilot stations in Pakistan. The first of these

stations went on air in Lahore on November 26,1964.

A formal code of television policy was formulated to achieve the

following objectives;

— Instruction and enlightenment;

— Enrichment of knowledge and information;

— Wholesome entertainment, and

— Promotion of national outlook and integration.

In 1965, after the experimental phase, the government set up a

private limited company named Television Promoters Co., which later

became a fully government-owned public limited company called Pakistan

Television Corporation Ltd in 1997 (Akif & Siddiqui, 1998).

Pakistan TV established television centers in Karachi and

Rawalpindi/Islamabad in 1967, and in Peshawar and Quetta in 1974. It

began satellite transmission in December 1972, and started using the

national microwave link in 1975. PTV transmission switched over from

black and white to color in December 1976. In November 1992, with a grant

from Japan, PTV established an additional channel, PTV-2, mainly to

112

televise educational programs. In January 1994, it began beaming its

programs through Asia Sat, the first pan-Asian commercial satellite system,

to 38 countries, and started another satellite channel called PTV World in

1998, to enable overseas Pakistanis in Asia to see its news and

entertainment programs. It also started Prime TV to transmit PTV programs

for Pakistanis living in Europe (The News International, November, 1998, p.

8). In February 1999, PTV launched the Mid-East Channel for the large

number of Pakistanis living in the Middle East (The Nation, February 26,

1999).

In 1989, the first Benazir Bhutto government authorized Shalimar

Recording Co. Ltd, in which the government held 54 percent shares, to

establish the country's second TV channel under the name People's

Television Network—later changed to Shalimar Television Network (STN).

The new channel had sought to establish transmitting stations in 22 cities

(Tahir, 1996). STN started its transmission in 12 cities: Islamabad, Karachi,

Lahore, Faisalabad, Peshawar, Quetta, Larkana, Bahawalpur, Multan, and

Hyderabad and Sialkot. The "monopolistic contract" required STN to

transmit the PTV news bulletins (Jabbar & Isa, 1997, p. 121) PTV in 1999

hired STN Transmitters and planned to convert the channel into a news and

current affairs channel. But due to change in government in October, 1999

the plan was put in abeyance and the STN as a channel was opened to

private sector entertainment programs. The educational channel was

subsequently used partially as news and current affairs channel. Currently

PTV-1 is general purpose Channel, PTV-2 (ETV) established with Japanese

grant is working as news and current affairs channel under the umbrella of

PTV World and STN is working as channel-3, sill with an undecided future.

Currently, PTV has taken charge of all educational programming, violating

the initial agreement singed with Japanese government for grant. In 1996,

the second Bhutto government granted a license to Shaheen Pay TV, a

private company with 50 percent foreign equity, to establish the country's

113

first pay-TV channel using the "wireless" MMDS technology. Allegations

have surfaced that this permit also belonged to the same party that received

the exclusive permit to run the FM stations though under a different

corporate identity (Jabbar & Isa, 1997, p. 124).

Table No. 5

PTV INFRASTRUCTURE

S. No. PTV – 1 PTV – 2 Total

1. No. of Production Studios 13 1 14

2. No. of Live/Transmission Studios 6 1 7

3. No. of Rebroadcast Stations 47 29 76

4. No. of Transmitters 2 1 3

5. Population Coverage (%age) 88.34 78.24 --

6. Area Coverage (%age) 39.25 33.76 --

7. Total TV License Holders (Million) 1.84 -- 1.84

8. Total No. of TV Sets (Licensed & Un-Licensed)

3.7 -- 3.7

9. Total Staff 5352 330 5682

10. No. of Program Producers 169 19 188

11. No. of News Producer 86 0 86

12. Total PTV Assets (Million Rs.)

4063.561 858.401 4921.96

13. No. of News Readers 43 --- 43

14. Income from Licence fee (2002-03) (Million Rs.)

577.228 --- 577.228

15. Income from Ads. (Million Rs.)

1870.321 283.258 2153.579

16. Total Annual Income (Million Rs.)

2664.730 325.506 2990.236

17. Annual Budget (Non-development) (Million Rs.)

2872.888 345.112 3218.00

18. Annual Profit (Net) 140.650

(Loses) -

111.993 28.657

19. Govt. Share in PTV (%age) 100 100 100

114

S. No. PTV – 1 PTV – 2 Total

20. Mini out broadcast Vans 8 --- 8

Source: PTV Headquarters, Islamabad

Table 6

Population and Area Coverage in Chronological Order (PTV – 1)

Population Base Area Base

Year Percentage covered Year Percentage covered

1964 9.32 1964 1.00

1967 14.98 1967 2.29

1969 27.08 1969 7.64

1973 47.54 1973 16.01

1974 47.92 1974 16.33

1975 47.92 1975 18.07

1977 65.66 1977 24.03

1978 68.83 1978 27.60

1979 72.49 1979 30.19

1980 77.55 1980 31.35

1981 77.92 1981 31.92

1982 80.72 1982 32.34

1983 80.72 1983 34.24

1984 80.74 1984 34.24

1985 81.77 1985 34.61

1986 81.98 1986 34.62

1987 82.20 1987 34.64

1988 85.79 1988 35.47

1989 85.90 1989 35.50

1990 86.00 1990 36.00

1991 86.00 1991 36.30

1992 86.00 1992 37.54

115

Population Base Area Base

Year Percentage covered Year Percentage covered

1993 86.00 1993 37.90

1994 86.44 1994 38

1995 86.44 1995 38

1996 86.44 1996 38

To date 92.00 To date 45

In Pakistan, a conscious decision was made at the very outset not to

make radio Pakistan the midwife of television on the grounds that it ‘did not

have either the expertise or the potential to manage it’. Instead, a tender

was floated and the Nippon Electric Company of Japan was asked to set up

two experimental stations at Lahore and Dhaka and was given three months

to show that the experiment would work. Through their local associates,

they gave the program responsibility at Lahore to Aslam Azhar, who later

became the director general of PTV. He was completely new to television

himself; he had made his name in amateur theatre in Karachi. But under

his leadership, the early days of TV in Pakistan acquired some of the same

excitement and creativity as the early days of radio. He recognized that it

was no good looking to radio as a model; he took some talented radio people

but he recruited others from the performing arts and photography In those

early days, live TV performances alternated with imported BBC

documentaries and comedies and it was the spirit of the theatre which

dominated, as different acts prepared to go live while the film sequences

ran. It was this early experience which led to Pakistan TV’s excellence in the

field of drama. Aslam Azhar says he ‘resisted consciously from day one

getting in anyone from the film industry because the state of the film

Industry was deplorable to put it very politely...and the result was that our

cultural level was far higher than the film industry had ever achieved or has

116

achieved....’ In India, where the film industry was much more commercially

successful, such a deliberate act of policy would have been more difficult to

pursue, though in Aslam Azhar’s opinion ‘Indian cinema has set a very bad

example for Indian television’.

As Pakistan television grew, with new stations established at

Islamabad and Karachi and microwave links to provide coordinated national

coverage, Pakistan’s military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, was excited

over its potential as ‘a major instrument of national integration’. Aslam

Azhar had not been aware of any government objectives in setting up

television; he had a free hand to develop it according to his own

understanding and will.

But there was definitely a clear political purpose. In 1968, Aslam

Azhar was asked to develop programs to celebrate Ayub’s ‘decade of

development’. It was the first instance of television being used in South Asia

for propaganda purposes and it backfired badly. According to Aslam Azhar,

it filled people with disgust at government control of the medium and

contributed to Ayub’s growing unpopularity,

Pakistan Television also provided the first TV election coverage in

South Asia after Ayub’s demise, when General Yahya Khan held Pakistan’s

first and probably fairest national elections. Aslam Azhar describes that

period as ‘our finest hour in current affairs’. But the ensuing crisis in East

Pakistan, which led to the emergence of Bangladesh, brought a re-

imposition of the old controls. These also continued under the new Prime

Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who maintained emergency rule for several

years.

117

OBJECTIVES of PTV

Former Director of PTV news Burhanuddin Hasan narrates an

interesting story, how TV was launched in Pakistan. Here are extracts from

his accounts:

“One day before the inauguration of the first pilot TV station

at Lahore, Altaf Gauhar explained the aims and objects of the

national television. He said television would provide a major

breakthrough and help solve educational and social problems and

weld the people into a strong unified and enlightened nation

inspired by a common outlook on life. Television however, would

not be used for political purposes or transmit political programs.

The Information Secretary further said that introduction of

television in Pakistan had been conceived by government as a

means of promoting moral values, civic consciousness, pride and

faith in the nation, and an appreciation of the cultural heritage

based on the ideology of Pakistan”. (Hasan 2000)

On 26 November 1964, on inaugurating TV in Pakistan, President

Ayub in his message said:

"The introduction of television in the country is a significant event. It

provides yet another medium for enlarging the area of knowledge and

understanding of our people and for promoting in them an awareness of

social and civic values essential to good citizenship. I trust that with the

passage of time, as more television stations are set up, the range of this new

medium would cover a wider field enabling more and more people to benefit

from its educative and instructional potentialities. First there is immediate

need for national integration, and the other is the need for developing our

country in every sphere and in every walk of life. Our national objectives are

national integration and the building up of our country. I maintain that

118

every activity that takes place in Pakistan must help in the implementation

of our national objectives, so that we reach our goal in the shortest possible

time. Television is the surest and the most effective means of reaching the

people. Not only does one reach the people through their sense of hearing

but also, much more effectively, through their sense of seeing. And the

combination of these two immeasurably helps in the process of fresh

thinking and understanding of problems. Government came to the

conclusion that although television is an expensive hobby, it is far more

important that we do all we can to stimulate the interest of the people and

make them conscious of the requirements of a new life. Hence we embarked

on this project. Take countries like the United States and Japan where any

major policy matter can be explained to the whole population in a matter of

minutes and seconds! That brings about national integration, national

cohesion, national understanding and national support for national aims

and objectives. I hope that we, too, shall be in that happy position in due

course of time. The agenda set for TV as the time of this introduction and

the current state of TV in Pakistan, need no deep evaluation” (Hasan 2000).

Table 7

Estimated Mass Media Penetration in Pakistan

Radio receivers TV receivers Daily newspapers

Number (000s)

Per 100 people

Number (‘000s)

Per 100 People

Number Circula’n (‘000s)

Per 100 people

1980

1985

1990

1995

1996

5500

8500

10650

12500

12900

6.4

8.4

8.9

9.2

9.2

938

1304

1989

(2900)*

2680

(6500)*

3000

1.1

1.3

1.7

(2.6)*

2.0

(5.0)*

2.1

106

118

398

223

264

1032

1149

1826

2800

---

1.2

1.1

1.5

2.1

---

119

1997

1998

2002

13500

15500

16000

9.4

----

9.4

(7600)*

3100

(9000)*

(12500)*

(15000)

(5.7)*

2.2

(6.5)*

(8.8)*

9.4

271**

303**

370

1499**

---

1530

1.1**

---

1.2

Source: UNESCO, 1999, * ITU, 2001; ** WAN, 1998, 1999, 2003.

120

Table 8

TV Viewership by Age and Educational Attainment in Cities (Pakistan)

N = 375 Channel Age Group (%) Educational Qualification

15-19 25-34 35-44 45+ Illiterates SSC/HSC Graduate

Post-Graduate

PTV

Geo

Star Plus

Star

Sports

ESPN

CNN

BBC

Discovery

Cartoon

Network

ARY

ZEE

MTV

Channel V

72.9

26.8

9.1

10.8

4.8

0.5

2.3

5.3

3.9

23.9

18.3

1.6

2.3

65.0

25.0

8.2

8.6

3.7

0.6

3.0

4.6

2.4

21.0

15

1.2

1.5

66.0

24.0

5.8

6.4

2.5

0.6

2.5

3.9

1.7

18.0

12.0

0.6

0.8

58.0

21.0

5.2

4.9

1.8

0.5

2.8

3.6

1.1

15.0

9.9

0.5

0.6

41.0

11.6

0.4

0.5

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.2

0.1

5.3

3.9

0.1

0.1

77.0

30.8

11.3

13.6

5.5

0.7

4.1

7.4

3.7

28.7

20.3

1.8

2.4

79.4

36.1

20.5

19.2

8.8

1.9

10.5

12.3

5.1

39.4

27.3

2.9

4.1

Note: SSC/HSE in Pakistan is the secondary school level and junior college level.

** The statistics are out of 1000 sample population in rural and urban

areas.

121

Table 9

TV Viewership by Occupation in Cities (Pakistan)

N = 375

Channel Officer/

Executive Petty

Traders Shop

Owner Clerical/ Salaried

Skilled Unskilled Student No

Work

PTV Geo Star Plus Star Sports ESPN CNN BBC Discovery

Cartoon Network ARY Zee MTV Channel V

74.8 34.8 22.3 21.4 9.9 2.4

21.2 14.1

5.2

22.5 40.2 3.4 4.4

53.8 17.0 3.9 4.9 2.2 0.3 3.7 1.9

1.1

8.7 13.7 0.4 0.6

70.5 24.2 9.7

13.3 5.7 0.5 4.0 5.2

2.5

18.7 28.2 1.6 2.1

79.0 32.8 13.3 14.7 6.3 0.8 5.7 7.9

3.3

19.0 28.1 1.7 2.1

64.1 23.7 5.4 8.1 3.0 0.4 1.6 3.5

1.4

9.7 15.0 0.9 0.8

48.9 15.8 2.1 2.9 1.0 0.2 0.5 1.5

0.4

5.8 8.0 0.3 0.4

80.8 33.2 14.1 12.4 7.7 1.0 4.7 8.4

5.4

24.2 40.2 7.7 4.0

63.2 23.0 5.2 4.8 1.7 5.0 1.8 3.3

1.8

12.8 17.7 0.6 0.8

Table 9-A

TV Channels of Pakistan Television Corporation

1. PTV General Purpose

2. PTV World News and Current Affairs

3. STN Undecided

4. PTV Regional Regional Programs (on Cable only)

5. AJK TV For Azad Jammu and Kashmir

Recently the information Minister of Pakistan Sheikh Rasheed Ahmad

announced the Pakistan government’s decision to launch some twenty-five

new Television Channels and at least 100 radio stations. In a speech at a

seminar concerning development of electronic media in Pakistan, he said

the authorities had curtailed the license fee from 5 million to 2.5 million

while the fee for cable operators had been reduced to 10 thousands from 50

thousands. The government would give a grant worth 2 billion to help

improve the progress of Pakistan Television. According to a press report,

Rasheed said the government had already extended some 650 million

122

rupees to PTV to help improve the quality of its programs, saying about 13

channels were in the pipeline. Although the government would accept all the

demands of cable operators, he said, however it would not allow them to air

Indian channels, adding that "we don't want Indian channels to unleash

vulgarity and obscenity through their programmes rather government would

only permit those channels to operate producing such programmes which

could be jointly viewed by all members of the family." (News, September, 09,

2003)

In Asia an estimated 70-80% countries which are mainly the under

developed countries, have cable TV network. Special mention can be given

to India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, where dramatic changes have been

observed in the last 10-15 with reference to cable TV operation. Almost a

decade earlier, the cable business was an illegal one in these countries, and

first of all India took the lead and regulated this business. After India,

Bangladesh and Pakistan took steps in this regard to regulate their cable

business. But the important part of this change was that India since be-

ginning had adopted this approach that they wanted to give such facilities

to the people that more and more people could be involved in this business.

However, unfortunately in Pakistan people are not given the facilities. At the

time of regularization of the business, all those people were involved in this

business who were already running this business illegally. Their

professional approach, their vocational background, their technical

expertise and other such important things were not taken into con-

sideration. Due to this reason a lot of complexities were created for the

government and after some time the problem aggravated to the point where

it seemed difficult, if not impossible, to solve these problems in a more

streamlined manner. The cable operation in Pakistan and Bangladesh, Sri

Lanka and Nepal in particular and in India in general is working on highly

non-professional grounds. The operators and their agents are running the

cable business like they have been renting out VCRs to the people in the

123

recent past. One major reason as described by the Director of Engineering

PTV, Akhtar Dad, is lack of initial training facilities for the people who

intend to run the business and absence of proper infrastructure for laying of

cables in these countries.

Table 10

Urban Penetration of TV/ Cable TV in South Asia

Country TV Homes (in millions)

TV Sets Per 1000

Radio Sets

(in millions)

Radio Sets

Per 1000

C & S Homes

(in millions)

India Pakistan

Bangladesh Sri Lanka Nepal

63.20 9.00

1.50 2.25 0.10

67.00 68.00

13.46 125.00

5.42

111.00 6.00

4.30 0.5+ 2.2+

120.00 50.00

38.67

NA

110.00

18.40 0.80

0.38 --

-

0.07 Total 76.05 --- 124.00 --- 19.65

+ Licensed sets only Sources: India: Doordarshan Audience Research Unit (1998)

Pakistan: Gallup Pakistan (PAS 97) Bangladesh: National Media Survey OMQ (1998). Sri Lanka: SRL Fact File (1998). Nepal: ORG-MARG MSA Project Estimates; Asian communication Handbook (1998). Nepal: ORG – MARG MSA Project Estimates; Asian Communication Handbook (1998). (Also for India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka).

CABLE TV IN PAKISTAN

The satellite Invasion

Satellite channels first landed in Pakistan in 1992 and an era of direct

satellite transmission began. The viewers now have access through their

dish receivers to over 50 international channels. Of these, ten to twelve

Indian channels are watched by Pakistani viewers of all ages. PTV, which

was expected to chart its own course of excellence to face the fierce

competition from Indian channels has unfortunately itself fallen into their

mould. The majority of programs on PTV are crude copies of the trivial film

based material dished out by the Indian channels. Even the Urdu language

124

has been unnecessarily polluted with English words like in India. PTV is

also following the Indian pattern of over-commercializing TV for monetary

gains much to the detriment of their ethical and cultural values and the

basic agenda set for PTV.

Commenting on the performance of India's state-owned TV

Doordarshan, prominent Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyer says, "The real

problem is that populism has the better of ethical considerations. It is sad to

see that Doordarshan is going the same way. The entire setup has touched

a sordid level in the name of popular response. The Indian information

minister's statement that the government is losing money, shows that he is

counting the rupees and not bothering about the standard which the

public-funded media should have. He should know that commercialization

cannot replace social obligations. Nearly 80 per cent of Indians, flung far

and wide, depend solely on Doordarshan. They seek information and look

for such programs which identify their cultural ethos. There is no channel

to speak to them in their mother tongue. What they get is either propaganda

or pontification." (Dawn July, 05, 2003)

A Pakistani intellectual Dr. Eqbal Ahmad has a similar comment to

offer about PTV;

"Despite promises, no government has taken even the first step

towards allowing a modicum of autonomy to the electronic media. Dish

endowed viewers switch to foreign, especially Indian, channels. The burden

of providing information and perspective on problems facing the state and

society falls on the press. It is quite lively but given the low rate of

functional literacy it reaches less than 10 percent of the population. One

would think that the officials will be satisfied with this state of affairs,

entirely in their favour. But no, the democratic spirit has not grown even to

this degree." (Ahmed 2002)

125

In its 1998 report, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)

has, among other matters, recorded at some length the government's

antipathy to the press. The minister of information promptly questioned its

accuracy, and, by so doing, helped publicize the report. In its reply the

HRCP communiqué said:

"Information Minister Mushahid Hussain's criticism of the

report was extensively covered by the electronic media he controls.

On the other hand, the same media had not considered the report

itself worth a word of mention before that. As always the audience

of radio and television get to know of any criticism of the

government only from the response the government gives to it".

(Nation May 07, 1998)

The privately owned Indian Channels STAR and ZTV which have

gained their freedom to report news more professionally and discuss

political social and economic issues freely with obvious bias have put PTV in

the dock. It is simulating their low and trivial programming patterns, but

not their freedom of expression and their democratic right to criticize the

government's performance. Now that TV viewers in Pakistan have not only

Indian channels but also BBC and CNN available to them, why in all

fairness should they bother to watch PTV news bulletins which carry no

news barring monopolistic and self-serving propaganda of the government

in power.” (Sahir Saood, Ummat, Oct 15, 2002)

A recent survey carried out by Freedom House, a New York based

monitor of civil and political rights worldwide, has rated the measure of the

extent to which freedom of expression has been protected in each of the

seven SAARC countries. According to the survey which rates countries on a

sliding scale of 0 to 100, with 0 representing the most free and 100 the least

free, India scored 48, Pakistan 60, Bangladesh 49, Sri Lanka 46, Nepal 52,

Bhutan 62 and the Maldives 68. None of these countries qualified as free.

126

Five, i.e. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal were

characterized as partly free, while the remaining two fell in the category of

not free. (Freedom House Survey 1999)

The Distribution in Pakistan

Estimates of the number of people watching television in Pakistan

have until recently been largely informed guesswork. Although Pakistan,

unlike India, retains a system of licensing for television sets, the number of

licenses is not even an approximate guide to the number of households with

sets or the number of viewers who have access to them, so official statistics

are little help. The number of television licenses is only 1.84 million,

whereas on the basis of surveys up to 1999 the Pakistani affiliate of Gallup

International estimates between 8 and 10 million sets.

The overall reach of television is considerably lower than in India. But

access to satellite TV, which Gallup estimates at 13 per cent of the adult

population or 8.5 million adults, is on par with the Indian experience.

Because of Pakistan's geographical location, dishes are smaller and cheaper

than further south—in India and Sri Lanka— and affordable by a wider

section of the population.

According to Ijaz Gilani of Gallup, in terms of actual numbers, viewing

is 'about the same in rural and urban Pakistan', A greater proportion of

urban Pakistanis watch satellite TV. Moreover, by early 1999, the growth

rate in urban areas appeared to be slowing down, while in rural areas the

novelty of satellite had not yet worn off and the number of dishes was still

increasing."

It is in Pakistan's largest metropolitan city, Karachi, that satellite

television is viewed most intensively. Karachi is the only Pakistani city with

developed cable systems, which can compare with those in India. Some of

127

these were set up in the 1970s, Since the arrival of satellite, however, cable

systems have spread to most of the lower middle class and working class

areas. The cabling of more prosperous, suburbs has lagged behind poorer

localities and has been developed by larger commercial concerns. Apartment

buildings in Karachi's Clifton, Defense, Gulshan and other areas are now

receiving cable television. But most of these services are operated without

official sanction and no figures are forthcoming.

Cable television in Pakistan is notionally subject to strict controls, but

until early 2000, when the government began to address the issue of

licensing cable operators, there was no separate cable law or regulatory

authority; cable operators lived in the some kind of legal limbo. By 2000,

cable systems had begun to spread to Lahore and Islamabad but not on a

scale to rival the appeal of direct transmissions. Until that time, the only

legal satellite TV distribution system in Pakistan was a pay-TV system run

by Javaid Pasha's Shaheen Pay TV Company. The pay TV system used a

microwave system similar to that installed in Kathmandu. It gives excellent

quality, but only fewer channels were available. Now the system has been

upgraded and a good number of international channels are available

through shaheen pay TV(renamed as Sun TV), but in addition to an

expensive decoder, there is a charge for the service as well.

Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA)

(A Review of PEMRA Rules and Regulations)

Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) was

established in March 2002 with a multi-purpose strategy to regulate

electronic media by inducting private sector, provide quality information and

entertainment to the people of Pakistan, access to common citizen to mass

media and ensure accountability and transparency in the country.

128

Through an Ordinance, the Authority has been mandated to improve

the standards of information, education and entertainment, enlarging the

choice available to the people of Pakistan in the media for news, current

affairs, religious knowledge, art, culture, science, technology, economic

development, social sector concerns, music, sports, drama and other

subjects of public and national interest.

By book the regulations of PEMRA reveals that the major objective of

these rules is to encourage those private TV channels, radio operators and

cable operators to broadcast quality programs without hurting anybody's

sentiments, promote brotherhood, harmony, national spirit and education.

In another development, the country has allowed cross media ownership in

2003. The Information Minister Sheikh Rasheed has announced to

withdraw a restrict on those applicants for TV channel which are already

operating cable TV or publishing a newspaper or magazine or advertising

agency. According to a PEMRA official, the draft for the amendment in

existing rules and regulations of the Authority specifically Rule 23 (b) which

discourages monopolies in the media has been sent to the Cabinet Division

for taking necessary action. He said that PEMRA has received no complaints

regarding any rule or regulation from any quarter except Rule 23 (b).

By June 2003, PEMRA received 16 applications for private TV

channels, while it had already granted licenses to more than 950 cable TV

operators and issued 28 licenses for radio stations all over Pakistan, four of

them in Karachi. As much as 263 cable TV operators are working in Karachi

alone. It is interesting to note that about seven of the applicants for private

TV channels are already either operating cable TV or publishing newspapers

and magazines.

PEMRA is consisted of nine members and a chairman. Out of nine

members, one is a senior official of federal government while five are

eminent citizens chosen from different fields including films, media, law,

129

human rights and social service. Two members of PEMRA are women while

Secretary, Ministry of Information and Media Development, Secretary,

Interior Division and Chairman, Pakistan Telecommunication Authority

(PTA) are the ex-officio members.

Under the procedure, the Authority will process each application in

accordance with prescribed criteria and shall hold public hearings either in

the relevant provincial capital or in Islamabad, if deemed necessary before

granting or refusing the license. To check the quality and nature of the

program being broadcast by the private radio station, TV channels and

cable TV network, PEMRA has incorporated the creation of Councils of

Complaints to take complaints from general public against any aspect of the

programs. These councils may recommend to the Authority appropriate ac-

tion of censure, fine against a broadcast or CTV station or licensee for

violation of the codes of program content and advertisements as approved

by the Authority as may be prescribed.

The PEMRA on such recommendations can prohibit or suspend and

seize any broadcaster or CTV operator from broadcasting or re-broadcasting

any particular program which in its opinion is likely to create hatred among

the people or is prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order or likely to

disturb public peace and tranquility or endangers national security or is

pornographic or is offensive to commonly accepted standards of decency.

The Authority can also take such measures or steps for closing down or

sealing the premises where the illegal operation is being carried out or can

impose a fine. The person aggrieved by any decision or order of the

Authority on the ground can within thirty days of the receipt of such

decision or order, appeal to the High Court in the manner prescribed by the

High Court, for filing the first appeal before the Court against an

interlocutory order of a Civil Court.

130

Table No 10-A

TIME SLOTS ALLOCATED FOR VARIOUS PROGRAMMES BY PTV

PARTICULARS PTV (Yearly basis)

Hours %AGE

Announcement 1880 5.19%

Commercial 1441 3.98%

Drama 861 2.38%

Music 693 1.91%

Religious 3099 8.55%

Local Sports 2267 6.26%

Off- Sports 4401 12.14%

Documentary 102 0.28%

Features 588 1.62%

Stage Show 667 1.84%

Festivals 49 0.14%

Anniversaries 61 0.17%

Literary Programs 208 0.58%

News 2676 7.39%

Current Affairs 6520 17.99%

Local Purchased Program 00 0.00%

Repeat 4933 13.61%

Children 335 0.92%

Youth 04 0.01%

Women 1132 2.85%

PTV-World/PTV-2 1302 3.59%

Time Sale 3116 8.60%

Total 36247 100. %

131

Annexure – 1

PAKISTAN TELEVISION CORPORATION, ISLAMABAD

GENERAL INFORMATION 1. Name

2. Registered Office

3. Legal Status

4. Date of incorporation

5. Location of assets

6. Authorized Capital

7. Paid up capital

8. Owner ship

9. Board of Directors: Secretary Information and Chairman Managing Director Director General PBC/Director PTV Deputy Managing Director Director Education Television

Finance Director Director Admn. & Personnel/Sale Director PTV Academy Director Progammes Director International Relations Director Sports Director Engineering Director News

Pakistan Television Corporation Islamabad, A public company limited by Share (unquoted) June 27, 1967 Five production centers at Peshawar, Islamabad (including head office), Lahore, Karachi, and Quetta and a Number of transmitting stations across the country. Rs. Two Thousand million; divided equal into “A” & “B” Class shares

(Rs. In million) A class shares Rs. 173.940 A class bonus shares Rs. 643.705 A class shares Rs. 711.705 Deposit for B Class Shares. Rs. 62.737 Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Information and broadcasting.

132

Annexure – 2 Major Dates in Television Broadcasting in Pakistan

A chronology

1964 Television service in Monochrome started at Lahore and Dacca.

1967 TV Center at Karachi commissioned.

1968 Permanent Lahore TV Center commissioned.

1972 First transmission through Satellite from Karachi TV Center.

1973 National Micro Network commissioned.

1974 Quetta/Peshawar Pilot Centers commissioned.

1976 Colour transmission started.

1982 Permanent Peshawar TV Center commissioned.

1985 Permanent Quetta TV Center commissioned.

1987 Federal TV Center at Islamabad commissioned.

1989 First Private Channel (PTN) now called STN was introduced.

1992 Educational Television- PTV Channel-2, was inaugurated.

1996 BBC television was introduced through STAR by STN

1996 Regional broadcasts started in four areas

1997 PTV + STN + PTV-2 (PTV World) under Ministry of Information and

Broadcasting.

2003 PTV National (The regional channels was introduced on satellite through cable)

2004 Inauguration of Azad Jammu and Kashmir TV (AJKTV)

133

CHAPTER 4

AUDIENCE REACTION ON STATE TELEVISION (PTV)

There are many ways of looking at television viewing behaviour and

monitoring the types of expectations from this medium. We may track the

number of people who are watching? When are they watching, and who is

watching? However, the people studying TV’s impact are interested in

knowing more about peoples' actual reactions to the performances they

have seen. For all T.V. programs, especially for a service based on public

service goals of providing entertainment and education, there is a constant

endeavor to devise ways and means of going beyond numbers, and actually

determining whether the people are "moved" by a particular T.V. experience

or not. Qualitative rating and experience measures are attempts to gauge

peoples' opinion, attitudes and reactions to a particular program and

expectations from the programs they watch.

The percentage of target population is not a dependable indicator of

the representative sample. Though the sample size was quite small, it was

representative in the broader sense of coverage by different sections of the

society. Thus the focus was qualitative analysis. The trends reflected by a

carefully selected 1000 respondents could be applied to the whole country

at large though cautiously. These opinions were crosschecked through a

number of panel discussions held with media managers, professionals,

writers, critics and general audience. They were further verified by a strict

comparison with newspaper writings and views expressed by the people on

various fora, including national media seminars organized by intellectual

non-governmental bodies. The reaction of audience covers only the state TV

(called PTV), Programmes; it includes all the channels of PTV.

134

Availability of Channels

Availability of channels is another area which determines the reason

for variation in preferences. As stated earlier, cable is available to a small

portion of the society, and the same is true to dish. The target population

enjoying a single channel was 40.0 percent. The people having access to two

channels constituted 35.0 percent, and the percentage of those to whom a

three-channel facility was available was only 25.0 (Table 11). The

respondents with cable facility were 20 percent.

Table – 11

Availability of TV channels to Target Population (Country Wide)

Number of channels Frequency Percent

1 400 40.0

2 350 35.0

3 250 25.0

50 through cable 200* 20.00

Total 1000 100

THE VIEWING INDEX (VI)

Table 12 lists the viewing indices (Vls) for various T.V. program types

over one quarter of a year. The Vls are not absolute and all time measures of

preferences but rather relative scales of reactions to programs in terms of

people's average level of enjoyment. Similarly, there is no direct correlation

of Vls with the size of the audience. Usually programs with higher audience

have higher Vls, although many programs with small absolute numbers

watching have recorded among the highest Vls. In the same manner, one

program in another quarter may gain considerably.

* Not included in the total because of overlapping of PTV channels and cable at the same time.

135

Table – 12

Type of programs liked most (Country Wide)

Programs Frequency Percent

No Choice 28 2.8

Drama 455 45.5

Current Affairs 64 6.4

News 155 15.5

Sports 273 27.3

Music 18 1.8

Children Show 4 0.4

Religious Programs 3 0.3

Total 1000 100

By and large, Urdu drama is ranked the highest by 45.5 percent

audience. Sports stands second (27.3%), followed by news 15.5 percent. It is

interesting to note that music programs are enjoyed only by 1.8 percent of

the respondents. Children shows and religious programs stand at the

bottom with a very slight margin. It may be kept in mind that Table 12 does

not reflect the watching percentage, but comparative preference, for various

types of programs. City-wise option for various programs varies greatly,

mainly because of different educational and socio-cultural levels. The Cities

with higher literacy level have shown greater inclination towards the news.

In Karachi and Islamabad 48.1 and 46.4 percent of the respondents,

respectively, prefer drama, while in Lahore and Peshawar the ratio is much

higher (more than 50 percent). Only 21.6 percent Karachites and 15.1

percent respondents in Islamabad like the news. In Lahore and Peshawar,

this trend is around 10 percent. However, in small towns the news is liked

by 17.9 percent respondents, for the obvious reason that there exist very

few other sources of information. An interesting aspect is that among all

groups interviewed the most potential TV viewers are the salaried classes,

students and children under 15. Businessmen and professional groups

stand at the lowest. A sizeable clientele for morning shows comes from the

136

educated classes and females. Similarly, late-night presentations are also

watched by the educated and salaried classes.

AREAS OF PERFORMANCE

Aside from special preference for various programs by different

groups, drama stands unanimously as the top choice of all the groups. As

shown in Table (12) earlier, 455 respondents termed drama as the most

liked program. Sports, as usual, comes second, liked by 273 respondents.

News was selected by 155 respondents, which is a choice by compulsion, as

discussed earlier. Religious and children's programs get the lowest share

(0.4 and 03 percent, respectively). Music gets a slightly better response (1.8

percent) and current affairs a little better (6.4 percent). There are a number

of program areas which generally do not draw large audience, but where

PTV make a commitment to provide quality programs.

News (Khabarnama)

PTV's news programs are produced in four main locations, beamed

across the country through the Central News Bureau at Islamabad. At 9

p.m. sharp all T.V. stations are connected to national network for an half-

hour Khabarnama.

Table-13

Satisfied with Khabarnama (Country wide)

Response s Frequency Percent

No Opinion 17 1.7

Yes 392 39.2

No 591 59.1

Total 1000 100

The level of satisfaction with Khabarnama, however, shows a very

discouraging picture. The percentage of population satisfied with

Khabarnama is only 39.2%. This shows that a large majority of 59.1 percent

137

respondents is not happy with what they are shown. It is difficult to draw a

line of demarcation between the most satisfied and unsatisfied groups, but

the trends definitely are correlated with age, occupation, and education.

There was a mixed trend of satisfaction towards Khabarnama among

different age groups as shown in Table 14

Table-14

Satisfied With Khabarnama by Age Group

AGE Yes No

Row Total Percent % %

Less then 15 25.0 75.0 28 2.8

15-19 42.9 57.1 84 8.4

23-24 33.1 66.9 257 25.7

25-29 41.4 58.6 285 28.5

30-34 51.8 48.2 141 14.1

34-39 42.1 57.9 76 7.6

40-44 41.0 59.0 61 6.1

45-50 53.6 50.0 28 2.6

More than 50 45.0 60.0 40 4.2

Total 40.9 59.1 1000 100

But many young audience were relatively more unhappy with

Khabarnama. Interestingly, teachers and housewives largely expressed their

satisfaction over Khabarnama, whereas the business class and salaried

people were found quite unhappy. Similarly, students who account for 17.7

percent of the total respondents, were dissatisfied with T.V. broadcasts in

Khabarnama. Educational level is the only prominent yardstick which

points to a clear change in trend with the increase in the level of education

(Table 15)

138

Table 15

Satisfied with Khabarnama by Educational level

Educational Level Missing Yes No Row

Total

Percent % % %

Missing 30.0 20.0 50 10 1

Informal 0 52.6 47.4 19 1.9

Primary 1.9 48.1 50.0 43 4.3

Matric 2.3 41.9 55.8 160 16

FA 1.1 42.0 56.9 181 18.1

BA 1.3 42.3 58.2 371 37.1

MA 1.6 27.7 70.7 184 18.4

Others 0 9.4 90.6 32 3.2

Total 1.7 39.2 59.1 1000 100

Out of 184 respondents, having post graduate degrees, only 27.7

percent were satisfied with Khabarnama. Whereas people with a B.A. degree

account for 42.3 percent, 48 percent were having a high school education,

and 48.1 percent with primary education. This shows a very vivid trend of

increase in dissatisfaction with the increase in educational level. Similarly,

the people up to an income level of Rs. 25,000 per month show an

increasing trend towards dissatisfaction (Table 16).

Table 16

Satisfied with Khabarnama by Income Group

Income No Response Yes No Row

Total

Percent

% % %

No Income 3.7 34.8 61.6 164 16.4

3000 – 7000 0.6 44.5 54.9 355 35.5

8000 – 15000 1.3 38.9 59.7 303 30.3

16000 – 25000 2.1 27.9 70.0 140 14

25,000 + 5.3 52.6 42.1 38 3.8

Total 1.7 39.2 59.1 1000 100

This trend suddenly moves upward when the income level crosses the

limit of Rs. 25,000 plus. This very small segment of the overall population is

139

happy with the Khabarnama, partly because of their indifferent attitude

towards the common national problems.

Table-17

Main Reason for Liking Khabarnama

Reasons Frequency Percent

Did not mention 613 61.3

Knowledge 2.4 20.4

Informative 162 16.2

News caster 17 1.7

Others 4 0.4

Total 1000 100

Table 17 shows the main reasons of liking Khabarnama. The vast

majority of 61.3 percent respondents could not mention the reason as to

why they liked Khabarnama. A small proportion of 20.4 percent

respondents liked it for being knowledgeable, and 16.2 percent for

information seeking. Only 1.7 percent are attracted towards Khabarnama by

the newscaster.

Table 18

Main Reason for NOT liking Khabarnama

Reasons Frequency Percent

Concentrated on few issues 270 27.0

Does no cover opposition 200 20.0

Too much government Projection 250 25.0

Black out International coverage 50 5.0

Lack of National events 60 6.0

Repetition of same events 84 8.4

Disinformation 65 6.5

Repetition of News 80 8.0

Total 1000 100

Table 18 shows that a good number of those who do not like

Khabarnama (59.1 percent) attribute the main reason of their

140

dissatisfaction to the lack of opposition's coverage, concentration on few

issues, and too much projection of the government. The other reason,

including repetition of news and lack of national and international coverage,

are also mentioned by a sizeable proportion. The reason of dissatisfaction

were largely shared by all segments of the society.

PTV- GEO comparison in news credibility

PTV night-time Khabarnama is profusely watched by all sections of

T.V viewers. In the absence of any other news show, Khabarnama was the

unchallenged monopoly area of PTV. The other prominent news broadcaster

in the arena is the GEO which is available through cable and covers only a

small population in cities. The timings of GEO News at present are the

same. Though GEO is a genuine competitor of Khabarnama, but due to its

limited coverage, watching is very small. It however, has affected

Khabarnama in many other ways, which will be discussed in the chapter 5

and 6. Still, the GEO with all its great limitations is regarded as more

credible than the PTV. This reaction is also shared by those who never

watch GEO at all, but consider it reliable after the failure of their

expectations from PTV Khabarnama.

Table-19

Preference in Credibility by Education (who is credible?)

Percentage

Educational Level None PTV GEO

No Opinion 0.5 0.2 0.3

Informal 0.2 62.0 48.0

Primary 1.9 61.0 49.0

Matric 4.2 41.0 59.0

F.A 4.1 32.0 68.0

B.A 10.4 29.0 71.0

M.A 5.6 19.0 81.0

Others 0.9 23.0 67.0

Total 6.7 40.1 53.2

141

The ratio of preferring GEO in credibility remains below 10 percent,

till the level of high-school education but gets a rise after college education

level where the credibility of GEO goes much above the PTV Khabarnama.

The penetration of GEO city wise also shows a similar trend. Respondents in

Rawalpindi-Islamabad and Karachi (the cities with higher literacy level) give

a better credibility level to GEO as compared to the people in Lahore,

Peshawar and semi-urban areas (table 20).

Table-20

Preference in Credibility by Cities percentage

City None PTV GEO

Rawalpindi/Islamabad 5.1 24 64

Lahore 1.8 37 63

Karachi 0.1 31 69

Peshawar 14.2 57 43

Semi Urban/Rural 6.6 62 38

Total 6.7 40.1 53.2

Respondents in Peshawar give least marks to GEO, partly because it

has an unfamiliar style. However, a sizeable population preferred it. The

main reasons of liking the GEO are given in Table 21, which shows that the

primary justification was still not provided by the respondents.

Table-21

Reason for Liking GEO in the Country (First Preference)

Reasons Frequency Percent

Did Not Mention 8 0.4

International Coverage 43 21.5

Documentaries 22 11.0

Whole Day Broadcast 19 9.5

Variety 51 25.5

Unbiased 57 28.5

Total 200 100

142

Those who could give a reason, liked it for international coverage,

variety of news and documentaries.

Table-22

Preference of PTV over GEO by the Readers of English Newspaper

Response Frequency Percent

Yes 48 35.2

No 88 64.7

Total 136 100

Table-23

Preference of PTV over GEO by the Readers of Urdu Newspaper

Response Frequency Percent

PTV 52 26.00

GEO 148 74.00

Total 200 100

Out of 190 respondents who read English newspapers, 35.2 percent

preferred PTV over GEO, whereas among 200 Urdu newspaper readers, only

26 percent preferred PTV Khabarnama. This shows a better trend of liking

the PTV, by the readers of English newspapers. The reason can be

attributed to the fact that English newspapers give more coverage to

international news and are less sensational. Thus the readers are

comparatively more exposed to the world outside and like sobriety.

Additionally this group of respondents can understand English news of PTV

more comfortably. The margin between the two groups is not very wide,

which implies that a good number of Urdu newspaper readers are educated,

and also read an English newspaper as a secondary newspaper reading

habit. However, in nut shell both categories ranked GEO much higher than

PTV.

143

Current Affairs

The share of Current Affairs Programs in the overall broadcasting

hours is not more than 6.79 percent. The programs are shown usually after

10 p.m. or, occasionally, at 7:15 p.m. On the credibility scale they stand,

however, at the bottom. Only 21.9 percent audience mentioned that they

watched these programs (Table 26).

Table-24

Frequency of Watching Current Affairs Programs in the Country

Response Frequency Percent

Yes 219 21.9

No 781 78.1

Total 1000 100

Salaried people, teachers and advocates are the best clients of current

affairs programs, businessmen and housewives are the least interested

groups (Table 25).

Table-25

Watch Current Affairs Programs by Occupation

Occupational Level Yes No

Business Man 2.6 16.0

Private Employee 2.0 8.0

Govt. Employee 8.8 25.3

Student 3.4 14.2

Doctors/ Advocate 0.8 1.7

Teacher 2.0 5.5

Unemployed 0.4 1.6

House wife 0.6 5.2

Total 20.6 78.1

Like other-news oriented programs current affairs has a

predominantly masculine audience (Table 26).

144

Table-26

Watch Current Affairs Programs by Sex (Percent)

Sex Yes No

Female 18.0 60.3

Male 2.6 17.1

Total 20.6 78.1

Table 27 shows that the viewership is the maximum at higher level

educational background, giving 32 percent share to postgraduates. The

general consensus was that current affairs programs are not watched by a

majority of all groups. Not a single group gave more weight to a "yes".

Table-27

Watch Current Affairs Programs by Education

Educational Level Yes No

Informal 0.2 --

Primary 0.1 4.2

Metric 1.0 11.9

F.A 2.7 15.2

B.A 9.1 28.2

M.A 5.2 12.9

Others 0.6 2.6

Total 20.6 78.1

The reasons for disliking the current affairs program are given in

Table 28. Only two prominent reasons were given as boring and not suiting

the watching time.

Table-28

Reason for not Watching Current Affairs

Reasons Frequency Percent

Did not mention 343 34.3

Time factor 239 23.9

Boring 418 41.8

Total 1000 100

145

Sports Programs

Penetration of sports programs was 61.5 percent which brings the total

to 79.9 percent, if 18.4 percent occasional viewing of national sports

events is also included (Table 29).

Table-29

Frequency of Watching Sports Program in the Country

Reasons Frequency Percent

Yes 615 61.5

No 201 20.1

Only when National teams are playing 184 18.4

Total 1000 100

The share of sports programs in the total broadcasting hours is 10

percent. This includes national as well as international sports events. The

international competitions are shown generally at late hours in the night.

However, the national news bulletins give appropriate time to sports

activities inside and outside the country. The number of respondents who

watch sports program is quite high, but it does not reflect a concentrated

and regular viewing. The number of viewers over the various quarters vary

depending upon the type of sports events shown on T.V. The maximum

clients of sports programs are from age groups 15-34 years.

Table-30

Watch Sports Programs by Age

AGE Yes No

Only When National Teams Play Row

Total Percent

% % %

Less than 15 87.4 12.6 - 28 2.8

15-19 63.1 15.5 21.4 84 8.4

20-24 64.2 19.5 16.3 257 25.7

25-29 64.9 15.1 20.0 285 28.5

30-34 70.9 13.5 15.6 141 14.1

146

AGE Yes No

Only When National

Teams Play Row

Total Percent

% % %

35-39 55.3 21.1 23.7 76 7.6

40-44 59.0 29.5 11.5 61 6.1

45-50 46.2 23.1 30.8 26 2.6

More than 50 27.6 62.9 9.5 42 4.2

Total 62.1 19.5 18.4 1000 100

It decreases after 35 and goes to lowest after the age of 50. Those who

never watch sports programs are in minority in all age groups.

Salaried people and students are more inclined towards sports

programs (Table 31). Businessmen and housewives are attracted only when

the national teams are playing.

Table-31

Watch Sports Programs by Occupation

Occupational Status

Yes NO Only national

events Row Total Percent

% % %

Un employed 55.6 44.4 0.0 9 0.9

Business Man 58.2 15.9 25.9 189 18.9

Private Employee 74.5 13.7 11.8 102 10.2

Govt. Employee 64.9 18.7 16.4 342 34.2

Student 62.1 15.3 22.6 177 17.7

Doctors/ Advocate 50.0 34.6 15.4 26 2.6

Teacher 57.1 31.2 11.7 77 7.7

Unemployed 85.0 5.0 10.0 20 2

House wife 41.4 37.9 20.7 58 5.8

Total 62.1 19.5 18.4 1000 100

Table 32 also indicates that ratio of female audience increases,

substantially when national teams are playing.

147

Table-32

Watch Sports Programs by Sex N = 1000

Sex Yes No Only national events

Male 52.9 12.7 13.3

Female 5.2 81.8 13

Table-33

Watch Sports Programs by Education

Educational Level Yes No

Only national

events Percentage

% % %

Informal 0.8 0.3 0.1 1.2

Primary 1.5 1.4 1.4 4.3

Metric 9.3 3.8 2.9 16.0

FA 10.8 4.0 3.2 18.1

BA 25.0 6.3 6.3 37.8

MA 11.9 3.3 3.2 18.4

Others 1.9 0.2 1.1 3.2

Total 61.5 19.5 18.4 100

Data in Table 33 show that sports programs are more liked by

educated people and the interest increases as the level of education goes up.

The less educated groups are only attracted on special events particularly

cricket matches. The main reason indicated by the respondents for liking

sports programs was national sports (Table 34).

Table-34

Reason for Watching Sports Programs (First Option)

Sports Programs Frequency Percentage

Missing 395 39.5

National Sports 324 32.4

International Sports 211 21.1

Wrestling 68 6.8

Others 2 0.2

Total 1000 100

148

The other main reason for watching sports programs was

international sports, watched by 21.1 percent respondents. American

wrestling programs were described as another reason for watching sports

programs by 6.8 percent of the people. 39.5 percent respondents did not

elaborate any specific reason for liking sports programs.

Drama

Television in Pakistan takes pride and exhibits high professional

excellence in drama production. It attracts maximum viewership in this one

single area. TV drama has gained remarkable appreciation not only inside

the country, but also across the border, in countries where Urdu language

is understood and has bagged considerable admiration. As shown in Table

(12) 45.5 percent of the respondents rate drama as their most favorite

program on television, which is much higher a percentage than any other

single program. This percentage is in terms of rating, not the viewership,

which should be much more. This also is reflected through Tables 35 and

38, which show that maximum viewership (58.1 percent) on television is at

8-9:30 p.m., which is PTV's "Drama hour" and news hour.

Table 35

Time for Watching T.V

Time Frequency Percent

No response 15 1.5

Morning 125 12.5

4.00 to 6.00 P.M 13 1.3

6.00 to 8.00 P.M 155 15.5

8.00 to 9.30 P.M 581 58.1

9.30 to 11.00 P.M 89 8.9

Full Time 22 2.2

Total 1000 100

149

Table-36

Time for Watching T.V by Age

AGE

No Response

Morning 4-6 P.M

6-8 PM

8-9.30 PM

9.30-11 PM

Full Time Row

Total Percent

% % % % % % %

Less than 15 7.9 5.3 26.3 5.3 47.4 7.9 0.0 38 3.8

15-19 0.0 12.5 1.3 17.5 57.5 10.0 1.3 80 8

20-24 0.0 11.1 1.6 13.4 61.7 8.7 3.6 253 25.3

25-29 1.4 14.1 0.0 13.4 60.4 8.8 1.8 283 28.3

30-34 5.0 9.2 0.0 18.4 56.7 7.1 3.5 141 14.1

35-39 0.0 17.1 0.0 10.5 65.8 5.3 1.3 76 7.6

40-44 1.6 14.8 0.0 27.9 39.3 16.4 0.0 61 6.1

45-50 0.0 15.4 3.8 11.5 61.5 7.7 0.0 26 2.6

More than 50 0.0 14.3 2.4 21.4 47.6 11.9 2.4 42 4.2

Total 1.5 12.5 1.7 15.1 58.1 8.9 2.2 1000 100

Again this trend is strengthened through Table 36 which says that 62

percent viewers believe that TV drama portrays main social problems more

than other programs. The supportive arguments in favor of drama reflect

that the people like this program and know more about it. Since, maximum

entertainment is available in drama, naturally it is valued accordingly. The

viewership of drama as reflected in Tables 36 and 37 does not vary greatly

in terms of age and sex.

Table 37

Time for Watching TV by Sex

Time

No response

Male Female Row Total

Percent

% % %

Don't Watch 16.7 66.7 16.7 18 1.8

Morning 0.0 71.2 28.8 125 12.5

4:00 to 6:00 0.0 61.5 38.5 13 1.3

6:00 to 8:00 0.6 70.3 29.0 155 15.5

8:00 to 9:30 0.5 82.0 17.5 578 57.8

9:30 to 11:00 4.5 89.9 5.6 89 8.9

Full Time 0.0 90.9 9.1 22 2.2

Total 1.1 79.2 19.7 1000 100

150

Music program

Music on PTV is not the most popular type of programming for the population as a whole. Of 1000

respondents, only 18 described music as their first choice. These music lovers are predominantly under

the age of 34. People over 40 did not mention music as their first priority (Table 38).

Table 38

Type of Programs Liked Most by Age

Occupation <15 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-50 50>

% % % % % % % % %

Don’t Watch 14.3 7.1 0.0 39.3 25.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 10.7

Sports 1.5 9.9 28.1 30.8 15.4 4.8 5.5 2.6 1.3

Current Affairs 1.6 0.0 31.3 26.6 10.9 7.8 6.3 3.1 12.5

News 4.5 1.9 15.5 27.1 16.8 9.7 9.7 3.9 11.0

Drama 3.3 11.4 28.6 24.5 10.3 11.4 5.5 2.2 2.9

Music 0.0 11.1 33.3 33.3 16.7 0.0 5.6 0.0 0.0

Children show 0.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Religious prog. 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 66.7 0.0 0.0 0.0

Column 2.8 8.4 25.7 28.5 14.1 7.6 6.1 2.6 4.2

150

Generally, the music programs, though staying at a lower priority, are

watched widely, if broadcast at or close to Prime Time. The response

towards music program was negative. More than 50 percent respondents

were not happy with the music programs. The most unhappy groups were

above 45, with a graduate or post graduate degree. The most satisfied

segment was the age group between 15 to 24 and students having an

under-graduate educational level (Table 39 and 40).

Table-39

Happy with Music Programs by Age

AGE Yes No

Row Total Percent % %

Less than 15 32.1 67.9 28 2.8

15-19 46.4 53.6 84 8.4

20-24 45.1 54.9 257 25.7

25-29 41.8 58.2 285 28.5

30-34 48.2 51.8 141 14.1

35-39 43.4 56.6 76 7.6

40-44 32.8 67.2 61 4.2

45-50 30.8 69.2 26 2.6

More than 50 42.9 57.1 42 6.1

Total 43.0 57.0 1000 100

Table-40

Happy with Music Programs by Education

AGE Yes No

Row Total Percent % %

Informal 81.8 18.2 22 2.2

Primary 39.5 60.5 43 4.3

Matriculate 49.1 50.9 160 16

F.A 53.0 47.0 181 18.1

B.A 38.6 61.4 378 37.8

M.A 43.5 56.5 184 18.4

Others 6.3 93.8 32 3.2

Total 43 57 1000 100

151

Watching of Religious Programs

Religious programs are watched more during special religious days

and months. Those who watch sometime were 11 percent and regular

watchers were only 7 percent. Those were however 21 percent who do not

watch religious programs at all.

Table-41

Frequency of Watching Religious Programs in the Country

Response Frequency Percent

Don’t Watch 210 21.0

Only watch during Ramzan or Muharram 510 51.0

Regularly Watch 70 7.0

Watch sometime 110 11.0

Total 1000 100

One main reason described for watching the religious programs by a

fairly broad sample of the population was that they were informative and

knowledgeable. A sizeable number of respondents called it a religious duty

to watch religious programs as "They talk about God, Prophet and the Holy

Book". To them switching to another channel while a religious program was

on air is " a sin " and reflects that "One is avoiding religion".

Table – 42

Reasons of not watching Religious Programs Regularly

Reason Frequency

Number Percent

They are controversial 109 15.1

They address non issues 140 19.4

They confuse on simple things 218 30.2

Presenters are typical maulvis (clerics) 132 18.3

Do not educate on day to day affairs 121 16.8

Total 720 100

152

Science programs

Science programs are the most neglected production area of PTV.

These programs are mostly imported from the USA and the UK, and sent on

air at odd hours, mostly at late night and on holidays, in morning time. In

recent years, television has made a slight change in these programs by

telecasting them with Urdu dubbing. This has increased viewership to some

extent. Still 22.8 percent respondents did not know whether there was a

science program on television. A good number of 325 (32.5) respondent did

not watch them.

In routine, the potential viewers of science programs are in age groups

below 30, the viewership decreases as the age limit grows (table 42).

Table 43

Like science Programs by Age

AGE Watch

sometime Watch

Don’t Watch

Don’t Know

Row Total

Percent

Less then 15 10.7 35.7 35.7 17.9 28 2.8

15-19 2.4 53.6 34.5 9.5 84 8.4

20-24 2.3 48.6 31.9 17.1 257 25.7

25-29 2.8 38.6 30.9 27.7 285 28.5

30-34 5.0 39.7 31.2 24.1 141 14.1

35-39 1.3 35.5 28.9 34.2 76 7.6

40-44 6.6 39.3 34.4 19.7 61 6.1

45-50 0.0 26.9 50.0 23.1 26 2.6

More than 50 4.8 23.8 38.1 33.3 42 4.2

Total 3.3 41.4 32.5 22.8 1000 100

There is a direct connection of watching science programs with

educational level. The viewers are slightly more, however, at intermediate

education background because of the reasons that they comprise mostly

youngsters and students.

153

English Programs (Drama and Feature Film)

Though the foreign content on PTV has decreased a great deal over

the years, GEO has maintained a balance between its own imported English

programs and local Urdu productions. The number of viewers attracted

towards English programs is still very high. These programs occupy main

areas of entertainment, feature films and drama. The viewers of these

programs account for 48.3 percent. The bulk of these viewers came from age

group 15 - 29, and clientele goes to lowest at age 50 and above (Table 44).

Table-44 Watch English Film /Drama by Age Group

Age Yes NO Row

Total Percent

% %

Less than 15 70.0 30.0 28 2.8

15-19 61.9 38.1 84 8.4

20-24 77.8 22.2 257 25.7

25-29 66.7 33.3 285 28.5

30-34 63.8 36.2 141 14.1

35-39 60.5 39.5 76 7.6

40-44 41.5 58.5 61 6.1

45-50 36.2 63.8 26 2.6

More than 50 32.7 67.3 42 4.2

Total 48.3 51.7 1000 100

Table-45

Watch English Films/Dramas by Education

Education Yes No

Row Total Percent % %

No response 50.0 50.0 10 1

Informal 25.0 75.0 12 1.2

Primary 37.2 62.8 43 4.3

Matriculate 57.5 42.5 160 16

F.A 57.5 42.5 181 18.1

B.A 74.3 25.7 378 37.8

M.A 71.2 28.8 184 18.4

Others 81.3 18.8 32 3.2

Total 48.3 51.7 1000 100

154

Table 46, describes the main reasons of watching these programs as

entertainment (41.2 percent) and other attractions usually associated with

English Drama and films like action, suspense and good presentation.

Table-46

Reasons for Liking English Drama/Films

Frequency Frequency Percent

Did Not Mention 364 36.4

Entertainment 412 41.2

Presentation 52 5.2

Information 23 2.3

Acting 47 4.7

Suspense 67 6.7

Action 35 3.5

Total 1000 100

Commercials

Commercial presentation is the pride area of television and

advertisers in general. With all restrictions on women and fashion,

magnificent commercials were prepared using children as the obvious

substitute for women during Zia period. They stood at the equal popularity

level of regular TV programs and some are awaited anxiously. Their music

was loved by a large number of people. Table 47 shows that even today 52

percent respondents like commercials for the two main reasons; information

on general commodities and good presentation.

Table-47

Reasons for Liking Commercials on PTV

Reasons Frequency Percent

Missing 19 1.9

No 249 45.9

Provide Good Information 296 29.6

Presentation 226 22.6

Total 1000 100

155

The potential clientele is again below the age 30. They find

commercials a better substitute for over-restricted programs like drama and

music.

Table-48

Reasons for Liking Commercials by Age

Age No

Provide good information

Presentation Row

Total Percent

% % %

Less than 15 35.7 50.0 14.3 28 2.8

15-19 44.0 28.6 27.4 84 8.4

20-24 40.9 29.2 30.0 257 25.7

25-29 46.7 29.8 23.5 285 28.5

30-34 56.7 22.0 21.3 141 14.1

35-39 60.5 35.5 3.9 76 7.6

40-44 37.7 36.1 26.2 61 6.1

45 50 57.7 26.9 15.4 26 2.6

More than 50 69.0 26.2 4.8 42 4.2

Total 47.8 29.6 22.6 1000 100

Attitude towards Restrictions

In some circles televisions is regarded as the most orthodox medium

in Pakistan. It is believed that the restrictions, particularly on women and

fashion, are an offshoot of government's policies imposed from time to time

during the last 25 years since 1980s. The latest one is “Dupatta Policy”

(veiling of head by the women). It is alleged that imposition of this restriction

introduced under a verdict of the Islamic ideology council is a step towards

Islamizing the media. The reaction on overall restrictions on television in

terms of exposing women and exhibiting latest fashions beyond certain

limits were most interesting. Those who appreciated restrictions on

television account for 38.4 percent. They gave a straight reply in support of

censorship on general programs watched with families inside households.

The only group giving a negative reaction were students and women under

30.

156

Teachers and government employees support restrictions with a

moderate majority, but housewives want more restricted media. The

relationship of educational level with appreciation of restriction on T.V. is

reflected in Table 49.

Table-49

Appreciate Restrictions on TV by Education

Educational Level No Yes Row

Total Percent

% %

Missing 50.0 50.0 10 1.0

In formal 75.0 25.0 12 1.2

Primary 65.1 34.9 43 4.3

Matriculate 66.9 33.1 160 16

F.A 65.2 34.8 181 18.1

B.A 60.1 39.9 378 37.8

M.A 58.7 41.3 184 18.4

Others 50.0 50.0 32 3.2

Total 61.6 38.4 1000 100

Table-50

Appreciate Restrictions on TV by SEX

Sex No Yes

Row Total Percent % %

No response 54.5 45.5 11 1.1

Male 33.0 67.0 792 79.2

Female 59.9 40.1 197 19.7

Total 61.6 38.4 1000 100

Naturally the male segment of the society (Table 50 above) is more in

support of restrictions for obvious reasons. The reaction towards restrictions

between the two gender groups was sharply different.

157

Social Problems and Their Projection on T.V

Table 51 shows a consensus among respondents that Health,

illiteracy Corruption and unemployment are the most crucial problems of

the society.

Table-51

Main Social Problems of the Country Indicated by the Respondents

Social Problems Frequency Percent

Did Not Mention 27 2.7

Health 200 20.0

Illiteracy 227 22.7

Unemployment 287 28.7

Poverty 67 6.7

Political Unrest 57 5.7

Corruption 44 4.4

Population 91 9.1

Total 1000 100

The other problems indicated were poverty, political unrest and

population, In terms of projection of social problems, the response was

greatly negative, 76 percent respondents were of the view that these

problems were either never projected on television, or projected a little and

half-heartedly.

Table-52

Does PTV Project Social Problems (Age wise)

AGE Yes No A little Row

Total Percent

% % %

Less than 15 14.3 42.9 42.9 28 2.8

15-19 34.5 31.0 34.5 84 8.4

20-24 28.0 32.7 39.3 257 25.7

25-29 23.5 34.4 42.1 285 28.5

3034 21.3 39.7 39.0 141 14.1

3539 19.7 35.5 44.7 76 7.6

40-44 21.3 42.6 36.1 61 6.1

45-50 11.5 57.7 30.8 26 2.6

More than 50 16.7 35.7 47.6 42 4.2

158

Total 24.0 35.9 40.1 1000 100

Tables 52 above shows that as the age increases the response towards

projection of social problems on TV become further negative. It is lowest at

age below 19 and highest after 40-44. A cross tabulation of all categories

reflects that there is an agreement that TV had failed in projecting their

genuine problems. Table 53 show that the people with higher educational

level are more disappointed with TV than other groups.

Table-53

Projection of Social Problems by T.V (Educational Level)

Educational Level

Yes No A Little Row Total

Percent % % %

Missing 40.0 20.0 40.0 10 1.0

Informal 25.0 16.7 58.3 12 1.2

Primary 11.6 44.2 44.2 43 4.3

Matriculate 21.9 29.4 48.8 160 16.0

F.A 28.7 34.8 36.5 181 18.1

B.A 25.9 37.0 37.0 378 37.8

M.A 19.6 40.8 39.7 184 18.4

Others 21.9 34.4 43.8 32 3.2

Total 24.0 35.9 40.1 1000 100

Same is true of people with primary education. Respondents with

middle educational level were slightly more of the view that TV projected

their problems a little.

Table-54

Program in which Social Problems are reflected

Response Frequency Percent

Drama 620 62.0

News 60 6.0

Documentaries 20 2.0

Discussions 100 10.0

Others 200 20.0

Total 1000 100

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Table 54, shows that 62 percent respondents described drama as

portraying and highlighting social problems more than the other programs.

Discussions came number 2 and news number 3.

Impacts of Television Programs The respondents portrayed clear opinion on the negative impact of

Television mentioning an increased trend of overspending, fashions,

children's education and psychological complexes associated with television

programs (Table 55)

Table-55

Impacts of TV Programs indicated by the Respondents

Positive Impact Frequency Percent

Provide Some Entertainment 688 68.8

Women Education 53 5.3

Children’s Education 50 5.0

Children Outlook 60 6.0

More Information About Society 140 14.0

Others 9 0.9

Total 1000 100

Negative Impact Frequency Percent

Overspending 297 29.7

Psychological Complex 99 99.9

Brings Fashion Trends 150 15.0

Children poor school performance 103 10-3

Negative impact on youth 137 13.7

Others 214 21.4

Total 1000 100

On the positive impacts of television, 68.8 percent could only say that

it provided some entertainment: 14 percent were of the view that television

provided information on the society and a small percentages of 5 and 6

percent described TV programs as having positive impacts on women and

children's education.

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Chapter 5

DIMENSIONS OF IMPACT

TELEVISION IN PAKISTANI SOCIETY

In this chapter I will discuss that the connection between TV and

society is less direct, and that television cannot be understood without

studying the peoples reaction towards its contents. Recent work in

communications and mass media studies tells us that we cannot

understand television as a medium without considering this discourse.

Watching television and talking about television are inseparable parts of a

single activity. Accordingly, the viewing experience should be seen as a

social activity. I have applied an anthropological approach to look at

discourse about television to understand the place of the medium in social

process at a local scale. Television transforms social discourse, which is

important for its psychological influence, informational content, and its dis-

placement of other forms of social interaction. I have discussed that TV has

changed social discourse in Pakistan. The method applied to register the

views was a usual ‘Participant Observation’ technique.

The Arrival

Television was a medium held strictly in the hands of the

governments of Pakistan for several years before private broadcasting began.

During this time there was no hue and cry or alarm raised about its impact.

It started only when private entrepreneurs began to rebroadcast pirated

satellite signals in December of 1989 and newspapers and magazines

announced the beginnings of ‘Television Mania’ and ‘The Cultural Invasion’.

One writer said ‘The 'tube' has hit Pakistan like a heady wine’ (Qasmi

Ahmad Nadeem, Jang 22 November, 1992).

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Controversy followed, as Pakistan debated both the cultural and

political ramifications of the medium. The government cautiously tried to

regulate the new industry, under pressure from the political and religious

groups. The government took stronger steps to control television, and began

to raise alarms about its cultural impact. The then Minister of Information

proclaimed that television was more dangerous than an invading army of

India. There has been no such restriction, and today there are at least one

thousand cable networks and four private sector channels mostly providing

US, Indian and European programming direct from satellites.

Shortly after the television invasion, another invasion began, this time

of media scholars and experts. Most of their work followed a diffusionary

paradigm, portraying Pakistan as a victim of cultural imperialism and the

neocolonial world information order. They studied the impact of the new

medium on politics, social organization, psychology, consumption patterns

and migration.

By the year 1995, much of the initial furor had died down, and the

media scholars had moved on to newer pastures. But the local debate about

television continued; everyone had an opinion about television. I should

mention that my fieldwork was not focused specifically on television, it was

the structure and relationship that people enjoy with TV. It has now

become clear that in four decades of broadcasting, television has become

important in the ways Pakistanis define themselves and their relationships

to each other and to the outside world.

This part is based mostly on conversations and interviews, on some

survey responses, and on printed discussion of television in newspapers,

magazines, and government publications. Rather than joining in the debate

about television's direct impact on the country, I would like to examine the

social and political consequences of the debate itself.

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Television Discourse in Pakistan

In Pakistan, in the context of the family, dominated and negotiated

distances seem to be most common. In the small café, barbershop and the

workplace, negotiation and critical distance appear in conversation about

television. I collected ethnographic data on these areas; and moralistic and

cultural issues were the focus.

To describe this type of debate, I will start with the print media, based

on 12 months of clippings from five weekly newspapers. Pakistani

newspapers represent different constituencies. In general, papers

supporting the conservative, pro-American Muslim League and Liberal pro-

American Pakistan Peoples Party and a group of independent papers are

uncritical of television, and stress its positive educational value and its role

in promoting free political debate and democracy. These newspapers see

television primarily as a source of information, and if Americanization and

Indianization results, that is not seen as such a bad thing. They express

some mild misgivings about depictions of drugs and violence, but see this as

a matter for parents to control, or for self-censorship by broadcasters.

In contrast a newspaper controlled by the right-wing Jamaat-e- Islami

is much more critical of television. Jasarat reflects the position that foreign

television is a danger to national culture and identity that must be

controlled. Television increases foreign domination of the economy by

developing tastes for foreign goods, and by promoting a vision of the ‘good

life’ in material terms, making Pakistanis dissatisfied with their country and

culture. Television seduces Pakistanis into ‘an alien way of life.’ On the

positive side, television makes Pakistanis more politically sophisticated and,

by showing people how poor they are: it makes them want better.

Government organs frequently call for more local television production, and

more educational television to further the development process, but little

practical action has resulted.

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The one politically semi-independent newspaper, Nawa- e- waqt and

its English version the Nation tends to be right of the center and strongly

critical. It has been openly and vocally critical of television for the last five

years. The commentary in Nawa- e- waqt comes from both middle- and

working-class sources. Middle-class commentators try for objective balance,

arguing for both positive and negative effects of television. The positive

include making Pakistanis more educated and sophisticated, especially

about the outside world, and providing positive models of family life of

health, democracy, art, and patriotism.

The editor of nawa- e- waqt, Majeed Nizami- a veteran Journalist with

pro-Islamic thoughts, told that by exposing viewers to a wider and more

sophisticated world, television had helped Pakistanis to feel more confident,

less isolated and backward. They have become more sophisticated

consumers, less likely to be cheated. Because Pakistanis see the problems

of the USA on television the drugs and violence, they know better what to

expect if they migrate. (Nizami, 2003)

But the negative influences are even stronger. In various columns

television has been blamed for rampant Americanism and Indianism in

fashion, music, speech, and even body language. Pakistan is losing its

culture as television undercuts local institutions and communications. This

‘cultural colonialism’ and consumerism lead to greater frustration, less

appreciation for education, and the glorification of drugs, sex, and violence.

Television shows ‘people all dressed up in silk lounging on luxurious

furniture in air conditioned comfort, driving expensive cars on smooth

highways and dining the nights away in expensive restaurants frequented

by movie actors, drug dons and the beautiful people’ (Nation , 5/4/2002).

Several feminist columnists add that television is leading to greater

child neglect and a lower social position for women. It is invoked as the

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culprit in discussions of poor school performance by children, low

participation in local sporting events, and increasing crime and gang

membership. Television is also blamed for increasing racism, sex, adultery,

and youthful promiscuity. An editorial claims, ‘ Cable Television has become

a cancer for our children who are not in school, because they are not

sophisticated enough to filter out the filth and enjoy that which is

entertaining. With American television and its emphasis on sex and violence

replacing the sports programs in Pakistani Cities, the outlet for the excess

energies of our delinquent young has become involvement in what sex and

violence they can find or create, hence the youth are roaming the streets.’ In

the editor's view, West has become decadent and Pakistanis want to copy

that decadence, a situation he finds both comic and tragic. In a macabre

exchange, the USA gave television entertainment, but took ownership of the

country's land and resources. (News, 10/2/2002)

Letters to the editor, and the columns by a working-class

commentator, give few positive opinions about television. Instead, they focus

on the effects of television on children, especially the decline in studying

and poor school performance. They accuse the parents of being so involved

in television, they don't have time for their children anymore. This focus on

youth extends to the activities of a working-class ‘concerned parents’ group,

who blame television for ‘disrespect, destructiveness, rebelliousness, and

lawlessness’ (Jang 12/3/2002).

Jamal Haider also makes some more subtle points about television

influence on Pakistan. ‘Because people are so concerned with the imaginary

world of soap operas’, he says, ‘they have lost their work ethic, their concern

for local issues, and the social conscience that once made them help their

poor and homeless neighbors. ‘Most of you align yourselves with Days of

Our Lives and filthy Santa Barbara... living in another world. They forget

that our street people are their problems’ (Jang 27-7-2003). ‘We must stop

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believing what we hear on television. Soap Operas are filthy - you should be

reading a good book. They keep your brains filled with filth so you cannot

think about anything else. Children follow in your footsteps instead of going

to school’ (Jang 12/8/2003).

Television thus becomes a cultural and historical watershed, allowing

people to create a new and mythical past when children respected their

parents, and social justice and good morals were the rule. Television has

given Pakistanis a temporal fix, a spot to mark the beginning of modernity

and the passing of the old.

Interviews with Pakistanis found a similar range of positive and

negative commentary. Some people stressed the destructive influences of

television. An Imam of Mosque (priest) in capital city Islamabad told that

television was the primary cause of immorality in his locality: ‘it filled

children's heads with ‘filth,’ made them disrespectful, and led to rampant

sex, drugs, crime, loud music, and organized crime’. ‘Worst of all’, he said,

‘children lost their capacity to dream, to imagine a future for themselves -

all they could see ahead was the image of America on the screen’. One could

hear this same sermon in Mosques all over the country almost every Friday.

Television is a malign force, allied with other kinds of evils that are

hastening the coming of Qiamat- the Day of Judgment.

Meanwhile, some of those same youth who are becoming so

degenerate told that television had made them more aware of the dangers of

drugs and crime, more conscious of the poverty and social decay of the

West. They argued that for most people, television was harmless

entertainment that kept them off the streets and out of trouble. Preaching

about the dangers of television belonged in Mosques, along with moral

condemnations of the other things that most people do - fornicate, drink,

and get into trouble.

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In two surveys of working-class television viewers, a similar

differences of opinion about the positive and negative effects of television

was found. The following represent the range of effects:

Table – 56

Effects of Television Percentage

POSITIVE

Middle

Class N=132

Lower Middle Class

N=102

Working

Class N=98

People know more about the world today; 70 43 39

there is better access to preachers and

religious programs; 23 47 51

You learn a lot from watching; 60 41 32

It is entertaining and fun, something to do

with friends; 68 35 31

It is a good alternative to going out, which

can cause trouble; 57 43 39

news tells you what is going on in the

world; 77 51 38

NEGATIVE

children watch instead of studying; 70 80 81

shows are often dumb and uninteresting; 59 49 83

Programs are too ‘wordly’ (instead of

Islamic); 42 31 51

you do not know what to believe in the

advertisements; 59 42 57

children learn the wrong things. 63 52 69

* The answers provide multiple choices

While the working class tends to criticize the moral content of

programs and the direct effect of viewing on their children, the middle class

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is more likely to see negative social and cultural effects. They speak of

cultural dependence and American imperialism, of consumerism, street

violence, and disrespect to moral values. The middle class has had television

longer and, unlike the poor, for whom viewing is a social event, they now

complain that television decreases social interaction and isolates people (as

Kottak 1990: 145 found in Brazil).

To summarize, a profound ambivalence about television was found at

every level of society, in every context. This ambivalence allows a space for

moral issues to enter.

Rightist politicians and journalists tend to be more critical, while

those of the left are much less so. Middle-class critics tend to focus on

national and cultural issues, while working-class people were more

concerned about their children and community. The middle class blames

more problems on television, but they also saw more benefits. Everyone

seemed capable of both engaged enjoyment of the medium and critical

distance, though lower middle class people spoke more frequently and

enthusiastically about the pleasures of watching. And more importantly,

everyone seemed to agree on what television was doing to Pakistan -

changing the country profoundly; the disagreement was merely over

whether this was a good or a bad thing.

The Effects of Television programs

My next question was, has the debate about television changed

Pakistani society? Television discourse has certainly changed some aspects

of political behavior. Politicians are wary of making statements about the

medium these days because television is seen as a populist issue. Being

perceived as ‘anti-television’ now means being an Orthodox. So their

positions during the 2002 campaigns were limited to accusations of

censorship and bias, and pious statements about the need to improve

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television and make it better serve national interests. Television is now part

of a long-standing debate about Pakistan's economic and cultural

relationship with the World, and about the dangers or attractions of cultural

imperialism. The issue is not one-sided, since many people admire the

influx of new cultural traits.

The debate about country’s autonomy and dependence has its roots

in the anti-US nationalist movement of post 9-11 scenario (which was led by

the present religious opposition parties). Pro- and anti-television arguments

are based on the political positions taken by the religious and ruling

factions during that time. The religious parties built their political power on

a coalition between the leftist Peoples Party and Islamist Parties of right

wing – an alliance that was formed to overthrow military rule. One issue was

that the educated middle class regarded television as a danger to their

political and cultural power, and sought to control it. The poor wanted

television and so resisted that control.

Among the rural and urban poor and working classes, in mosques

and to a lesser extent among educators, television has become part of a

general moral discourse that existed long before the television invasion.

Television takes its place as one of the many external factors that are

corrupting and destroying Pakistani families, explaining cultural changes

that many perceive as destructive. Television enters moral discourse

because its message contradicts or supports ethical positions about what is

right, and about what ‘should be.’ It opens up options that explicitly and

implicitly challenge the moral order. It also enters moral discourse because

it is conveniently exogenous, and could therefore be kept out. Television

provides an explanation for the source of evil, and is classified with existing

sources of evil like the West, the devil, money, sex, and drugs.

While television could be seen as merely adding new fuel to old fires,

the new linkage between these old discourses about morality and politics is

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important. Television brings political and moral issues together in a new

and powerful way, widening the field of discourse and involving people from

different factions, classes, and ethnic groups in a common debate. Where

religion was once concerned mostly with the individual and the community,

it now speaks to issues of Pakistani cultural identity and influence from the

West. The table below provides reactions quantified after informal lengthy

discussions with opinion leaders.

Table – 57

Cause

Political

Instability

Against Moral

Values

Is Destructive and Evil

Politicians in Opposition (N=11)

7 2 -

Religious Leaders in Politics (N=9)

8 7 2

Religious Leaders in Mosque (N=7)

2 6 4

Educators (N=13) 5 8 -

In blurring the distinction between political and religious discourse,

television has imbued political debate with a new moral content, and has

taken traditionally moral issues and secularized them. In the process it has

taken many issues that were once seen as Pakistani, local and even familial,

and moved them into a global context. The problems of youth, social

welfare, ethnicity, and gender roles, for example, are now cast in a global

context, Now that television has presented Pakistanis with an objectified

‘other,’ the problem of defining the self has a new dimension. There is now

more and visible standard of comparison.

In a real sense, many of the differences have faded away. Pakistan is

still a multiethnic and multilingual country with great disparities in wealth

and education. But television has proven a unifying force in two ways. At

the level of content, all Pakistanis with television now share access to some

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of the same sources of news and entertainment, even if those sources are

CNN and BBC, Star or National Geographic. Now all Pakistanis have a

common conversation about Cricket, International football, car races and

Hard Talk and Larry King live. At a second level, television has engaged

Pakistanis in a common debate about the impact of television on the

country, and in the process has made everyone aware of ‘the local and the

global’ as a matter of concern.

The concept of unity should not be overemphasized irrationally. The

country remains highly factionalized and divided in terms of their internal

affairs ranging from politics, entertainment, and human and civil rights to

religion. But television discourse has also changed existing social divisions

and factionalism. For example, religious organizations, which used to have a

very close relationship with political conservatives, now find themselves

sharing important common ground with the leftist parties. Both are

concerned about the danger of foreign influence. The religious schools

(madrissas) and the nationalists have a new shared agenda; the control of

foreign influence. The old nationalist program of building local cultural

institutions now finds a much broader constituency.

Another important effect of television discourse among these new

coalitions is that it changes the terms of the debate about local and foreign.

Instead of being concerned about political autonomy from the US, or about

local economic development, debate is now carried out in cultural and

religious terms, which are now used synonymously. In Pakistan after

television, people talk about ‘culture’ constantly, in ways that were not

possible before. Television has made Pakistanis focus on the autonomy of

local culture - on music, cooking, and language - rather than on political or

economic autonomy. Forty years ago when Pakistanis spoke about Britain,

they talked about the Empire, about wealth and power. Today when they

talk about America, they talk about culture and fashion. So while Pakistanis

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make different moral judgments about what is good and bad on television,

they share a common language when they debate those moral issues.

One of the most lasting effects of television in Pakistan, then, is a

particular form of what Miller (1987) has called ‘objectification’ .The intimate

awareness of otherness, presented by the image of America on television,

has led Pakistanis to objectify a new concept of culture. Once culture was

color, ethnicity, and class. Today Pakistanis have recast the concept of

culture in other terms, beyond immediate division of society. It has not only

enlarged the concept itself but also submerged older notions.

Television has become a social, cultural, and political issue that is

integrating with ongoing discourse, and is being used by existing groups to

further their own positions and agendas. In the process, ‘television talk’

subtly transforms that discourse. It creates new coalitions of common

interest. Most importantly, television affects the ideas about time and

cultural distance. This powerful medium has created a new identity of

Pakistani culture. Paradoxically, television imperialism may do more to

create a national culture and national consciousness in Pakistan than

hundred years of independence struggle and fifty-six years of independence

itself.

Tele-visual Texts

Recent trends in anthropology reflect an increasing acknowledgment

of the significance of mass media to processes of identity formation. In the

following case studies I have analyzed the ways in which men and women in

Islamabad actively engage with and interpret Pakistan television, and I

explore the place of their interpretations in national and gendered subjects.

Given the tendency of some scholars to depict audiences of mass media as

passive consumers and, in the case of women who live in the ‘Third World’

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as helpless victims of a totalizing patriarchal ‘system,’ I have tried to probe

into the matter empirically.

However, in the analysis that follows, I have ethnographically

examined viewers' variable and active interpretations of tele-visual texts. I

have highlighted the fact that meaning is unstable and is frequently

contested by viewers, rather than positioned by any single text. The

questions addressed here are, what is the place of television in the

construction of viewers as national and gendered subjects? How do

audiences, historically and spatially are located in the texts produced by a

hegemonic state apparatus such as PTV? By examining viewers' active

interaction with television's texts, we can envision popular culture as a site

of struggle and not simply of domination. The analysis of television enables

us to situate viewers in particular socio historical contexts, to demonstrate

that subject positions vary according to the conjunctures in which viewers

are interpreted, and to show how class, community, gender, age, and

household position mediate people's interactions with televisual texts. I have

focused here on the ways in which viewers interpret specific themes and

images. I am concerned with relationships between the narratives of

television and those that viewers knit of themselves, between popular

culture and the viewers' perceptions of themselves as Pakistani men and

women. Thus I have analyzed the manner in which men and women living

in Islamabad interpret serials on Pakistan television, in particular those

reflecting and reconstructing discourses of gender and nationhood. This

constellation of discourses is of crucial significance because Pakistan as a

state has attempted to use television to construct a pan-Pakistan culture. In

particular, I have examined the consequences of the state's projects of

national integration and development for the constitution of notions of

‘Pakistani Nationalism’.

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The Historical Perspective of T.V. Programming

In this section I outline the contexts in which television's discourses

were produced and received by the people. The historical and political

specificity of television as a medium of mass communication and

implications of the state's programming policies for the production of

culture in post-independence Pakistan are the central issues. I have

sociologically located the core of Pakistan television's target audience, the

expanding middle class, and attempt to describe the immediate context in

which the viewers interpreted their favorite serials: the city and

neighborhoods in which they lived, their class positions, and the household

politics that framed their understandings.

Television neither simply ‘reflects’ nor ‘reinforces’ discourses: it is, in

and of itself, a ‘cultural form’ and must be analyzed as part of a larger

discursive field. Outlining the history of television in Pakistan enables us to

better understand the politics of representation underlying constructions of

gender and nationhood in a post-independence context. Pakistan television

(officially and popularly known as PTV) is state-owned and state-controlled.

It was first introduced in 1964 as an experimental service for the city of

Lahore and the immediate vicinity of Lahore. The only station was the

Lahore (Center), which broadcast programs for a couple of hours a day on

one channel. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (under whose

aegis television continues to function) next began expanding the reach of

television to Dacca, Karachi, Peshawar, Islamabad and Quetta.

Concurrently, transmission times were lengthened, and the telecasting of

entertainment programs increased. But for the most part television was,

and continues to be, primarily geared to what the Pakistan nation-state

clearly sees as a major objective of mass media: the project of nation

building (Hasan, 2000). Thus, the major themes , as proclaimed by PTV in

most television programs today include communal harmony and national

integration (as in serials such as Aik muhabbat so Afsanay and so on),

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national development (exemplified by the countless public information spots

promoting family planning or public health education), the reconstruction of

Pakistan Movement themes (as with serials like special plays on National

days), but the need to improve the status of women is a recent

phenomenon.

The cricket World Cup 1987, when teams from different nations

assembled in Lahore for the event, functioned as a major public relations

exercise for Pakistan, both within and outside the country. This marked a

turning point in the history of Pakistan television. The country wanted to

capitalize on the pomp and pageantry of the Games; to enable wide

reception, it relaxed import restrictions not just on television sets for

individuals but, more important, on television technology kits for

manufacturers. Television sets appeared in countless homes across the

country, and the skylines of Pakistani cities were soon filled with the

antennas. The setting up of low-power transmitters in various parts of the

country to relay programs beamed from metropolitan centers by satellite

dramatically increased both the reach of television and the hours of

transmission. Today, over 90 percent of the population is ‘covered’ by

television. Further, whereas audiences in the early years could watch

television for two hours in the evening, audiences in many parts of the

country can now watch at least three channels round the clock

Until the advent of commercial sponsorship in 1990, most programs

were produced by employees of government-owned television centers. Media

critics, producers, and indeed television officials often contended that the

introduction of private production and sponsorship promoted artistic

‘freedom’ and generated the financial resources required for the production

of entertainment serials. At the same time, public discourse on television

repeatedly emphasized that a poor country like Pakistan could not afford

the luxury of ‘pure’ entertainment, that what it needed, instead, were

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programs such as soap operas harnessed to the (modernist) project of

national development (see, for example, Government of Pakistan 1988). The

first Managing Director of PTV, Aslam Azhar, disclosed in a lengthy

interview ‘In keeping with the Pakistan government's Pro-Islamic, Anti-Israel

and strong pro- America stance, the source of Pakistan soaps was not the

United States or Europe but indigenous writings and themes which

entertained as well as educated people about the benefits of family planning,

education, and the Islamic and Pakistani Values. From this paradigm of

‘social change through entertainment’ was born the new, hybridized form of

the Pakistan television serials.

Today, despite the fact that many serials are privately produced,

state-appointed selection and screening committees play a powerful role in

the formulation of television's discourses. Discourses about nation building

and national integration are directly incorporated into and, in fact, underlie

the structuring of transmissions (Hasan, 2000). Prime-time segments (from

7.00 to 11:00 every evening) are all part of what is known as the ‘National

Program.’ The National Program is beamed by satellite to small towns,

district headquarters, and villages with electricity. About 90 percent of its

programs are in Urdu; the remainder are in English and regional languages.

Variations exist only where regional protests have been loud. For example,

in provinces, there is regional news for a very short duration and music and

drama is only at 5.30 to 6.00 pm and attempt to increase this time have

failed, a relatively large number of serials and music and discussion in

regional languages are now shown on PTV National- a new regional satellite

channel introduced in June 2003 by the government. Very few

entertainment programs (a maximum of two or three per week) are

imported. Some local programs produced in metropolitan centers are in

regional languages. But all programs are seen during prime time - when

people are home from work - and an overwhelming majority of the serials

are part of the National Program and in Urdu. A politician sitting on

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opposition benches in the Parliament said ‘The National Program is a major

component of the effort to construct a pan-Pakistan ‘national culture,’ and

at present, when relations between the government, politicians and civil

society are particularly turbulent, it is part of an attempt to exert hegemonic

control over media’.

In this part I have focused on tele-serials shown during prime time -

that is, as part of the National Program - from July 2002 through October

2003. PTV Urdu soap operas speak the ‘meta-language’ of the popular Urdu

film (evident, for instance, in the types of sets, dialogue, costumes, and

music used) while they resemble western soaps in terms of audience

engagement and narrative structure: multiple plots, the deferment of narra-

tive closure, and the build-up of suspense. Further, like the audiences of

American soaps, those of Pakistani serials deeply identify with characters on

the screen; unlike their more distant (although still passionate) attachment

to film heroes and heroines. However, because most serials are telecast in

the evenings rather than the afternoons, they are targeted not exclusively at

women or at people who stay at home but at families. The family, then, is

the basic viewing unit, a fact evident from the design of advertisements and

confirmed by the observations and by what was inferred from conversations

with television officials and the directors of serials.

The Serials have ranged in genre from the Patriotic (Aziz Bhatti,

Rashid Minhas,) and the epic

Tipu Sultan to the comic Do Kunwaray. Many serials, such as

,Mohabbatain,Mhandi and Bulandian, resemble the Urdu film genre known

as ‘the social’ in their use of melodrama and social realism.

Most serials on Pakistan television have explicit ‘social messages,’

with themes related to family planning, national integration, and the status

of women woven into the narratives. And at any given moment, more than

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half of the eight to ten serials shown per week during prime time deal

explicitly or implicitly with Social and Nationalistic themes. Although the

social messages woven into the narratives have varied according to political

contingencies (such as particular national crises or the needs of a ruling

party), an astonishing number continue to deal centrally with women's

issues. More important, even where gender is not an overt theme, it features

prominently as a critical subtext. In nationalist serials the nationalist

narrative is reinforced by its appropriation of discourses on gender.

From 2002 to 2003, I conducted numerous interviews with viewers

living in two sectors of capital city Islamabad: F/6 and G/6. Talking with

urban women in multi- class localities enabled me to see how reactions to

nationalist discourses were mediated by the ways people negotiate and

construct their identities in such contexts. Moreover, Islamabad was a

particularly appropriate setting for the study of nationalism: the presence of

the state is more overwhelming there than in any other Pakistani city. The

state is a major employer in Islamabad. The city's landscape is dotted with

government buildings, government housing colonies, ministerial bungalows,

and other reminders of the nation-state. And, like Washington, DC,

Islamabad does not belong to a regional state; it therefore has no regional

roots of its own and its population is composed largely of migrants. People

from ‘Old Lahore’ characterize themselves as laid-back, courteous, and

cultured in comparison with the allegedly brash, rude, aggressive residents

of Islamabad. Old Lahore, they say, has ‘tradition’; Islamabad is a place

where everything is in disarray. Islamabad's identity ultimately issues from

its role as the capital of the country. For all these reasons, it has the

ambience of a ‘national’ city.

Nationalism has been characterized as a middle-class phenomenon

and the relationship between ‘middle-classiness’ and nationalism is a

fundamental one. Personal observations and conversations with PTV

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officials and media critics have led me to conclude that the middle and lower

middle classes form the core of the target audience for Pakistan television.

The past three decades have witnessed a dramatic expansion of the

Pakistan’s middle classes: they now constitute over 20 percent of the

population. This demographic change has created an enormous market for

consumer goods. The new middle classes that once invested in bicycles,

motor cycles, and refrigerators now want to buy color television sets.

As mentioned above, the relaxation of restrictions on the import of

television technology around the time of the Cricket World CUP 1987,

promoted an enormous rise in the production and purchase of television

sets. This change in policy reflected a major shift in the allocation of

financial and technical resources. Programming priorities changed

accordingly, from the dissemination of development information to enter-

tainment (although sustained efforts are still made to weave social messages

into serials). The expansion of television thus indicated the power of the

growing middle classes, a power also evidenced by the launching of color

television in 1982, the introduction of advertisements and commercial

sponsorship (whereby private companies finance the production of

entertainment programs), and the subsequent establishment of a second

channel in 1989.

The interpretations provided by the lower middle and upwardly mobile

working classes are also significant because of those groups' comparatively

fluid location in the society. The people felt they were struggling to cross the

threshold of ‘middle-classness.’ They were acutely aware of their vulnerable

position, and financial insecurity was a major part of their discursive

consciousness.

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The Ethnography of Viewership

Karachi Company is a lower-middle-class government ‘colony’ that

houses Naib Qasids (office attendants) junior clerks and stenographers

occupying the lowest rungs of the state bureaucracy. Each flat in Karachi

Company consists of two 8' by 10' rooms, and an even tinier kitchen and

bathroom and latrine. Like many other government colonies, Karachi

Company, was forced to coexist with middle-class neighborhoods. Much

poorer than their middle-class neighbors, they all sublet tiny rooms. Non of

them were upwardly mobile and many of the older generation were

employed as household help in adjacent upper’ middle-class neighborhoods

and selling fruits on the road side, most of the younger men and women as

office attendants or clerks in government offices and private shops and

offices. Unlike upper-middle-class viewing groups, these lower-middle-class

and working-class viewing groups, just a generation away from poverty,

were fairly homogeneous in terms of class composition.

The family watches television together, sometime including the

children of neighbors too. A number of houses have now cable connections,

most of the serials were telecast on PTV channels as part of the National

Program. Age and gender influenced people's preferences- Women

particularly enjoyed the serials, and even though the men also watched the

serials with great relish. They told me that they made it a point to watch the

news. Indeed, watching the news was considered an adult, usually male

activity. Most schoolchildren I met would try to watch as many television

programs as the demands of homework and the reprimand of parents would

permit. Parents often tried to keep away their children, particularly their

young daughters, from watching Indian Movies: they made sure the

youngsters were asleep before the late-night film, usually an Indian one with

relatively explicit ‘love scenes’.

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In general, gender, household position, and age were the crucial

factors influencing viewers' styles of interaction with what they watched.

Power relations within families were sometimes reflected in how people

arranged themselves around the television set: the older generation (usually

men but sometimes older women as well) would be seated on the few chairs;

the children would squat on the floor. Very seldom did I see women,

especially daughters-in-law, sitting with the rest of the family: not only was

it considered inappropriate for them to sit with the men (particularly in

Pakistani families with rural background) but more important, they were the

ones responsible for the housework. The men of the household were

usually the most avid viewers because they could afford not to be distracted

by household tasks, which kept the women busy in the evenings when

dinner was being prepared and served or on Sunday mornings when the

house had to be cleaned, clothes washed. While the men and children kept

up a running commentary on the show, the women were usually silent,

instead discussing it among themselves the next day.

Most women I worked with did not have the luxury of sitting ‘glued to

the television set’; the following analyses are therefore predicated on the

premise that notions of ‘viewing’ have to encompass more than the visual

act of watching television. Further, the cultural and political significance of

viewing has to be seen in terms of its restructuring of social relations within

the family.

What role did the viewers' intense engagement with television play in

their constitution as national and gendered subjects? Was the primary

question behind studying the viewing habits and style of Karachi Company.

FOUR ETHNOGRAPHIC CASE STUDIES

Discussions with viewers helped to obtain a glimpse of their

engagement with the ideologies of nationalism and gender inscribed in

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everyday discourses on ‘appropriate behavior’ for Pakistani women: on

women’s place in the family, their relationship with men, and, most

powerfully, their duties to the nation.

Case Study- 1

Notions of Pakistani Womanhood

Ashraf and his wife, Saira, came from Skardu. Ashraf worked as a

junior clerk with an army intelligence organization. Tall and broad-

shouldered, he had a bushy, somewhat theatrical, military moustache. He

loved to talk and was one of the warmest- most articulate person. Like many

Pakistanis raised in the North, Ashraf spoke very filmi Urdu (a somewhat

melodramatic Language imbibed from Urdu films). He often made rude

comments about his wife in her presence, but I was told that he spent days

and nights nursing her when she was sick (which was quite often). Saira

was tall and skinny. She was usually silent when her husband was present

but when she was alone with my female co-researcher, she would talk.

Ashraf's favorite serial was Tipu Sultan: he felt it showed ‘real story’ of a man

who died for his country. Hence, he said, viewers could see what ‘real

patriotism’ and sacrifice were all about. He continued: ‘Young people who

see this program can know that instead of wasting their energies, they can

do things that will prove they are worthy of the wombs of their mothers.’

One morning soon after a repeat telecast of old epic drama Wafa Kay

Putlay (creatures of loyalty) had ended, I asked Ashraf what he thought of

the heroine's courage in persuading her reluctant husband to go to the

battlefront on the morning after their wedding night. Ashraf had been

impressed by her. ‘But,’ he went on to say, ‘Pakistani women are not all like

that. If all women were like that, no one would be able to look

disrespectfully at Pakistan [koi bhi aankh utha kar nahi dekh sakta}.’ His

statements reveal an imperceptible slide from ‘mother’ to ‘motherland’:

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women are ‘subjectified’ as mothers and held responsible for inspiring their

children to safeguard Pakistan's honor’. At the same time, Pakistan is

feminized as the mother has been made the object of protectionist

discourse.

How did these notions affect Ashraf's behavior toward his wife? I

found that he seemed to apply similar standards to her. In one episode of

wafa kay putlay the mother of the hero, Abdul Hamid, persuades his father

to get him married by saying, ‘Put a ring through the bull's nose. That will

prevent him from roaming around.’ I had been deeply offended by this

metaphor and, while the episode was still on, asked both Ashraf and Saira

(Saira was sitting quietly after serving us tea) what they thought of it ?

Ashraf replied that he agreed with Hamid's mother: ‘Women these days cling

to their husbands' feet and don't allow them to go anywhere. My wife even

stops me from going by bus these days, let alone allows me to go to war.’

I silently turned to Saira, willing her to reply. She did not contradict

her husband directly. Instead she pointed out that Hamid's wife, despite all

her fears, had run after him to bid him farewell. ‘When he was so keen to

go, what could she do? She had to submit to his wishes,’ she replied, her

voice heavy with resignation. But both Abdul Hamid's mother and Ashraf

saw women (more specifically wives) as sources of constraint. Ashraf seemed

to feel that men had to curb their ‘courageous’ impulses because of women's

cowardly fears for their safety. In both cases, women were conceived as

obstacles to masculine heroism.

Ashraf felt that plays like Tipu Sultan and wafa kay putlay might have

a beneficial effect on women because after watching it, they might also

become ‘brave’ {bahadur} and encourage their husbands to fight and

sacrifice for the country. ‘Don't you think there are already women who are

brave, women who themselves do brave things?’ 1 persisted. He replied that

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there were, how they are very rare. He gave an example of a soldier's wife in

Rawalpindi whose husband had died in Siachin. When the government

organized a function to honor him and presented her with a cheque, she

returned it, saying that her husband’s sacrifice for his country was

compensation enough for her. And what was more, he continued, she had

insisted that her husband may not be called as dead (marhoom). According

to Ashraf, she had said, ‘My husband is not dead, he is a martyr [shaheed].’

Ashraf was so moved by this sentiment that he repeated the sentence at

least three times. Then, after keeping quiet for a few seconds, he shook his

head and said, ‘Pakistani women are great.’

I asked him if he blamed women for worrying about their husbands

and sons going to war? When he replied that he would be proud to admit

his son into the army, 1 turned to his wife and asked her what she thought

of that. She smiled and put her son's head against her chest (he was sitting

between his parents on the bed), and started to stroke his hair. For a

minute she was silent. Then after pausing a while, she turned to me and

said: ‘He is my only child. How can I put him in the army?’

Ashraf burst out laughing. ‘See!’ he said ‘See how cowardly [buzdil]

she is! If all mothers start getting scared like this, who will protect

Pakistan?’

I felt horrible that I had exposed Saira to her husband. It was all right

for men, whose position in society was relatively secure, to be ‘brave,’ but

how could he blame women, who were so socially vulnerable. Referring

particularly to the plight of women whose husbands die in war, 1 asked if

their fear was unfounded given the low status of widows in Pakistani

society. He replied that while it was true that widows had a hard time in

Pakistan, if one conducted herself ‘properly’ {sahi tarah), even criminals

{goondas} would fold their hands and call her ‘sister’ (Behen).

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I then asked him what he thought of television's depiction of Pakistani

women in general. His answer was off-track. He said that one day, while

going somewhere by bus, he had seen a girl wearing a ‘very short’ shirt and

low neck. Some men were teasing her. ‘Now, how can you blame boys for

teasing her?’ he asked, continuing; ‘being modern is all right, but there are

some rules [taqazay] in this culture. This is not the way Pakistan women

should dress.... Look at what happens with foreign women. They divorce

five, six times. What is the meaning of marriage then? What happens to the

children, to the family, then? If there is no family, where is society?

Pakistani women have different rules’.

He insisted that the most important ‘duty’ (farz) of a Pakistan woman

to her country was to protect her family and ‘see that it never falls apart.’

‘But what happens if the man is bad, if he ill-treats her?, I asked. ‘Should

she still stay with him? Everything is in the wife's hands,’ he replied. ‘If she

wants, she can save him, she can put him on the right path [sahi raaste

par]. It is her responsibility to do so.’

In Ashraf's view, clearly, women's place in the nation is analogous to

their place in the family: it is their duty to protect and to sacrifice for the

family. But in this scheme women do more than play a supporting role: it

falls to them to protect the integrity of family and nation and to do so by

inspiring and, if necessary, inciting their men to fight for the motherland.

And women alone have the strength to do so. Indeed, this is why only heroic

sons can be ‘worthy of the wombs’ of their mother and motherland.

The conception of Pakistan Womanhood in terms of heroic

motherhood is evident both in Ashraf's discourse and in that of epic serials,

which dwells on the motive of women inspiring their sons to fight for the

motherland. Leaders during war with India spoke of how the motherland

was threatened by the enemy (attackers), but Ashraf and many other

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viewers appeared to have picked up a major theme of the TV message that

of the motherland threatened by hostile neighbors. The purported heroism

of the ideal Pakistani Woman is thus measured by her capacity to incite or

inspire her children to fight for their country, and not simply by her ability

to bear patriotic sons.

Case study-2

The Limits of Modernity and Liberalism

Discussions about popular female characters also revealed a

fascinating convergence between discourses of gender and those of her

obligations. During 1997-98, a public controversy over the portrayal of

women was high. Everyone, from vegetable vendors and taxi drivers to

upper-class intellectuals who usually dismissed television serials, was

discussing this aspect. A leading newsmagazine ran a poll to ask which

aspect of Pakistani women be shown on TV- an educated, liberal and

confident person or an obedient, submissive and dependent housewife. It

asked which of the two better represented ‘the modern Pakistan Woman.’

Many comparisons and contrasts were drawn between the two: one who

symbolizes devotion and patience, and the other, noted for her intelligence

and fiery strength. Historically, both have served as symbols of Pakistani

Womanhood. For instance, modern liberal and educated urban class have

appropriated both.

Conversations with women of different ages were particularly

interesting because they illustrated how notions of Pakistan Womanhood

were being reconstituted (rather than radically transformed) across

generations. Rabia lived in satellite town Rawalpindi. Her father was a

retired clerk, and her mother, Habiba, worked as a stenographer in a

government department. Rabia had just got a job as a secretary in a Multi-

National Company, where she felt out of place because most of the other

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employees came from much wealthier families. This sense of alienation did

nothing to strengthen her fragile self-confidence. While my conversations

with all others were in Urdu, she and I spoke English heavily laced with

Urdu. This was the time when a serial Hawwa kay naam ( eve)sponsored by

the Human Rights project was on air . It was a story of a brave women

lawyer who is married to the son of a feudal landlord and fights for poor

girls who become victim of male brutality in cities and villages. She comes

across a beautiful village girl who has run away from home after the death

of her father because her uncle wants to snatch property and wealth she

should inherit.

One Sunday morning a couple of weeks after the serial Hawwa kay

naam had come to an end, Rabia and I were sitting on her veranda. Rabia

talked of how, as a young woman from a poor family, she felt isolated by her

wealthier colleagues. She felt she wasn't assertive enough. We soon began

talking about the depiction of a Lawyer in the serial. Rabia had just started

comparing the lawyer with the village girl when her mother joined our

conversation. This excerpt from the exchange between Rabia and Habiba

illustrates the change and continuity inherent in their notions of suffering,

and strength, and it clearly shows the intimate relationship between

ideologies of cultural nationalism and of gender:

Rabia: I liked Lawyer better than Village girl. Village girl

was a complete washout....

Habiba: Why is that? 1 liked Village girl more. I liked her

more because she did not have as much glamour. She was

simple. You could see devotion more clearly in Village girl, at

every step.

Rabia: But why did she submit at every step. But this was

not so in the case of Lawyer.... They did not show her loyal to

her husband just for the sake of loyalty. In this era there is no

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absolute loyalty. There can't be as much as there was in Village

girl's time. I don't know, where will this loyalty take us

Pakistani women today? Aren't American women where they are

today because they are more independent than we are?

According to Habiba, Village girl was much stronger than

Lawyer. Her strength, her loyalty came from her capacity to

suffer for her family that is her duty towards her husband. But

Rabia disagreed. She felt that modern times required an

awareness more akin to Lawyer's rage. And Pakistani women,

she seemed to say, were essentially different from American

women, who were more independent.

Another young woman with whom I spoke went so far as

to claim that Lawyer seemed ‘less Pakistani’ than Village girl:

when I tried to probe her meaning, I discovered that she felt

Lawyer was ''''Westernized’ because the heroine questioned and

challenged her elders on the propriety of their actions. Ideal

Pakistani Womanhood is constructed in terms of values deemed

fundamentally womanly, essentially Pakistani modesty,

patience, and, above all, a strong sense of duty towards the

family, the community, and the nation.

The convergence between cultural and gender became clearer when,

several months later, Rabia compared Pakistani women with ‘foreign’ or

‘Western’ women. Rabia and 1 usually watched together. In another serial

the heroine is forced into an arranged marriage. After a couple of years of

trying to make a go of it, she asks her husband for a divorce so that she can

reunite with her lover. This was the time when colleague Hina had joined

discussion. Once, just as that episode was drawing to a close, Rabia

responded with bewilderment outrage:

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Rabia: It's not possible to get a divorce that easily in Pakistan. In

Pakistan a divorce means that it's a very free wheeling lady. I don't think

there are many women who do that. Okay, the number has increased, but

Pakistani women are still not so keen on divorce.

Hina: Why is that?

Rabia: I think it's because of our culture. Because marriage means it's

forever; it's not as if you can get a divorce that easily. The thought doesn't

come into our minds.

Hina: You think this is more true of Pakistani marriages and

Pakistani women?

Rabia: Very much so, very much so.

Rabia firmly believed that the heroine was at fault because she had

not tried hard enough to save her marriage:

Rabia: I still feel she didn't try to make the marriage a success. I

didn't like that. Why doesn't she make an effort to make a go of the

marriage? She's got married, now she should try that the marriage stays

safe. It seems to me that she was very casual about it all. That's not how it

happens.

Hina: What do you mean?

Rabia: Well, you know, it's very unbecoming for a Pakistani woman.

It was plain that she strongly disapproved of the heroine's actions

because she deemed them inappropriate for Pakistani women and felt that

they had no place in what she called ‘our culture.’ Rabia, like some other

young women with whom I spoke, seemed to be caught between two sets of

beliefs about women's independence. She felt that it was ‘unbecoming’ for

Pakistan women to divorce their husbands - women's independence should

never be allowed to break up an unhappy marriage. Yet in an earlier

conversation she had argued that as a young woman she was better off

emulating the ‘independence’ of ‘American women’. Like Ashraf, Rabia

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invoked idealized notions of Pakistani Womanhood in comparing Pakistani

and Western women.

In serials and in popular discourse in general, Pakistan Womanhood

is now beginning to be conceived in terms of useful citizenship, productive

labor, and selfless social activism; in short, the ideal Pakistani Woman is

one whose energies are harnessed to the task of promoting social and

national progress in various and multiple ways.

Case study-3

Impact of TV programs on Real Life

Shahnaz was a middle-aged Punjabi woman. She had never been to

school, and said that she had learnt a lot from observing people. 1 know she

thought that I, for all my ‘foreign’ education, was extremely naive about

‘what really goes on in families’, in spite - or perhaps because - of being a

silent witness to her husband's and son's brutalization of her young

daughter-in-law. Shahnaz felt that television was powerful because one

could learn from it. When she was growing up, she said, women were not

allowed to go to the cinema. Even though she had been living in Lahore, she

never got to watch films until she started to see them on television. In many

ways, she told me, television was her window on the rest of the world.

However, she insisted, not everyone could learn from watching television:

‘One had to have a particular (Ehsas) ‘feeling’ or ‘emotion’; neither of

these words quite captures the meaning of Ehsas in one's heart. One

morning a couple of days after the last episode of her favorite serial, Hawwa

kay naam, had been aired, I asked her what she thought of it. She replied:

‘When you read Quran, you should read it with a certain Ehsas in your

heart. It's the same thing when you watch something on television.’

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But what was this Ehsas? I pressed her. Did it reside in the heart,

only to surface when one watched something touching? Or was it an

experience of seeing something emotional unfold on the screen? If that were

the case, wouldn't everyone learn something, the same thing perhaps, from

a particular serial? But Ehsas, Shahnaz replied, was not quite so simple.

She explained it with reference to her experience:

‘The first time 1 watched an Urdu film nothing much happened. But

then I saw a second, then a third, then a fourth. Then one day as I watched,

Ehsas came to me {Ehsas aa gaya].... By then 1 too had a family. I was

watching this film called Dewar Bhabhi (the story of the lady and her

husbands younger brother, who in Pakistani society is considered as son or

like real brother). It was all about how this young woman suffers after she

gets married. It was all about how you suffer in the world. How much the

bhabhi [brother's wife] suffers! I just couldn't stop crying. I thought, suppose

I have to face what she is going through, what will happen?’

This encounter taught Shahnaz how to watch films and television

serials. According to her, one had to surrender to the mood of what was

being watched, to learn from it, one had to be part of the happening on the

screen. And one had to be at a point in life where what was watched made

sense personally. This mode of watching, and interacting, became clearer

when Shahnaz recounted what had happened to her daughter Surayya

when she saw a scene in which the village girl is publicly disrobed in the

court:

‘My daughter, when she saw (what happened], cried and cried. She

cried all morning. Imagine what happened to the girl! And in public, in front

of her relatives! A feeling came to my daughter {Ehsas aa gaya}: What will

happen to me when I get married and go to my in-laws' home? Isn't this

what happens?’

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According to Shahnaz, we learn about life from the emotions {Ehsas}

television's discourses arouse in us. As Shahnaz explained to me, one has to

acquire the ability to learn from what is watched, and this ability comes

from, among other things, frequent exposure. The film Dewar Bhahhi would

not have aroused Ehsas in her had she watched it before she was married.

She also insisted that not just anyone could learn: only those who, in her

words, had an ability to ‘enter the soul’ of what they watched could do so.

However, it is important to emphasize that Ehsas do not emerge in a

vacuum, a result of a text's ‘impact’ on an isolated viewer; we have to

foreground the socio-cultural bases of these experiences. Shahnaz was

socially '''habituated’ to read Quran and to watch the TV with a particular

Ehsas in her heart. Her unmarried daughter's tears at Village girls disrobing

reinforced a fear when she saw how other daughters-in-laws (including the

one in her family) were treated. These Ehsas, these feelings and emotions,

were products of the social relations in which they were embedded. In other

words, emotions are ‘social practices organized by stories that we both enact

and tell,’ and ‘persons are constructed in a particular cultural milieu’ of

experiences, meanings, relationships, and images, all of which are socially

mediated (Rosaldo 1984: 143, 138). I have shown that some experiences,

‘stories,’ and representations involve interactions between viewers, located

in particular socio-cultural contexts, and the texts of television. Many

emotions are themselves produced by the social practices that television's

narratives mediate and create.

But are we to think that everyone who watches serials will

automatically assume the subject positions created by the discourses of

television? I found that even as they deeply identified with characters on

television, many viewers were simultaneously able to stand back and

criticize what they watched. Neither they nor I saw any contradiction

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between these two apparently divergent modes of viewing. Viewers loved to

critique the acting ability of the cast or the competence of the director.

Similarly, they would often comment that, for example, a particular set was

‘stagey’ or the ‘photographer’ had done a ‘boring job’.

Case Study– 4

Redefining the Class Positions and Political Awareness

Many viewers had definite opinions about what television ‘ought to’

depict – that is, about appropriate or inappropriate subject matter. Jamil

khan worked as an unskilled employee in a garment factory. An

accomplished storyteller, he would narrate the sagas of serials (and of his

life) in intricate detail and with great flourish. He had a stormy relationship

with his wife, a junior clerk in the Education Ministry, and often said that

watching television was one of the few ways in which he could calm her.

But, he complained, some serials encouraged people's ‘superstitions.’ He felt

that there was no place for ‘this sort of thing in serials because ‘superstition’

(Twaham parasti} was ‘wrong’. He thought television producers were

sometimes very careless about how they constructed stories: ‘You know how

they make serials - they pull from here, cut from there, try to patch a story

together somehow.’

His thoughts on the appropriate subject matter for television were

based on a theory of the relationship between reception and class, a belief

that television could lead ‘certain types’ of people astray. For he went on to

say:

‘People shouldn't believe everything they see on TV, but they often

do.... Because people are uneducated they believe everything they hear.

People should not be guided. Imagine if village men and women who live in

Kachi Abadi (Slums in the shantytown some 200 yards from his house) see

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all this! They will believe every word.... Someone has to guide them, to

explain to them that this is not how things really are.’

Himself only a matriculate and precariously lower middle class, Jamil

was conscious of what he clearly perceived as the privileges of his wife’s

class position, which, he felt, gave him a critical awareness that poorer people

lacked. Further, Jamil, like many other men I spoke to, had definite ideas

about style and plot, especially the resolution of narrative tensions and

conflicts. What he disliked most were the conclusions of many serials. He

insisted that they concluded too abruptly that nothing seemed to be

resolved (koi faisla hi nahi hota); one never got a sense of ‘what really

happened’ in the end. He speculated that perhaps most of the time they

ended before ‘the original story’ (that is, the script) had concluded.

More importantly, most people I talked with were acutely conscious

that the serials they watched had been selected, censored, and shaped by

the state. They often commented that when terrorists threatened the

integrity of the country, there would be a series of serials dealing with

national harmony. One young man complained that although she enjoyed

the stories, he was getting tired of the same old themes. Some people saw

even more direct connections between the plots of serials and the political

motivations of the ruling party. When I asked one viewer if he enjoyed

watching serials, he replied that he had enjoyed them until a few years ago

but that ever since Benazir and Nawaz Sharif had come to power one by one

and now General Musharraf, the programs had deteriorated. ‘All they show

now,’ he complained, ‘is girls and boys in love and their problems.’ The

prime minister, Mir Zafar ullah Jamali was then making statements about a

need to create awareness on ‘the real Pakistan,’ that is, ‘Revival of Pakistan

movement spirit.’ This viewer, along with countless others who pointed out

the same thing, was quite astute in grasping why audiences were suddenly

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being subjected to a number of hastily produced serials prepared on the

subject with less creativity and sincerity.

Television watching, is gradually becoming an opportunity for people

to sit around and complain about the power and, very often, the ‘stupidity’,

‘they must be very stupid [bewaqoof] to think we're this gullible of the

government’. However, we need to be extremely cautious about concluding

that this critical awareness signifies that people are somehow ‘outside’ the

reach of the state or that they simply ‘resist’ dominant discourses received

through television. Viewers' responses to what they watch cannot be

encompassed by categories such as ‘resistance’ and ‘submission.’

Oppositions! readings, as I hope to demonstrate, are a great deal more

complex and slippery.

For instance, the viewers I interviewed would often ‘submit’ to one of

the multiple discourses constituting a serial but would appropriate another

to criticize the government. One of my conversations with Jamil Khan began

with his recapitulation of an emotional episode of Jinnah sey Quaid, (the

father of the nation). The main theme of that episode, according to not just

Jamil Khan but also the others present, was the loyalty and honesty of

Jinnah. Jamil Khan used the episode to contrast Jinnah with present-day

politicians who betrayed their supporters. He launched into a detailed

description of the joy experienced by Jinnah and his friends and likeminded

people when they reunited after several years, and he pointed out that when

he became Governor General, Jinnah remembered to fulfill his promises. He

exclaimed: ‘Jinnah never betrayed his people (AWAM); he bridged the huge

divide between himself and them.’ Jamil Khan summarized the story thus:

‘This story is about a leader and his people, about poor people and a ruler’.

Jamil Khan continued: ‘Isn't that the way it should be? Not as it is in our

country now. Whether it's a leader or a P.M., they're only interested in

keeping their seat their treasury. The people can starve to death, but they

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don't care. Who cares about the people? When it's time for the election,

politicians come with their hands folded and say, we'll do this for you, we'll

do that for you. What will you [they; that is, politicians] do [Kya karoge tum],

You only come to us when you need us. Otherwise who asks about us? Now

look, we have to pay Rs. 10 a kilo for onions. Imagine, how are people like

us to manage? It's true that the government has increased pay scales. But it

doesn't make any difference. I would be rather happy if they kept prices

down.’ Thus, the people were found extremely aware of the power of state

and manipulation of power through television discourses, overtly or covertly.

My objectives in this interpretation through case studies have been

twofold: to analyze the place of television in the constitution of cultural,

national and gendered subjects and, thus, to arrive at an understanding of

how popular texts can be conceptualized. I have tried to argue that culture

and gender are inherently linked. Discourses on gender seem to crystallize

most clearly in discussions centered on the qualities of particular types of

women, Pakistani women. Similarly, as evident in the responses of viewers

to various serials like Hawwa, tipu sultan and Jinnah Say Quaid, culture is

intrinsically both gendered and engendering, creating specific subject

positions for men and for women. But, as we have seen, viewers interpret,

appropriate, resist, and negotiate these subject positions. Discourses of

culture and nationhood regulate those of gender and vice versa. I have tried

to draw attention both to the multiplicity of interpretations and to the

parameters within which those interpretations are made.

Hence, although television plays a critical role in the constitution of

discursive practices, its cultural and political significance cannot be

understood simply in terms of a clear-cut division between the hegemonic

text and the passive viewer. Through viewers' interpretations, we can

conceive of popular culture as a site for resistance as well as domination.

And by studying the different ways in which viewers actively engage with

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what they watch, we can break away from theories of popular culture that

foreclose the process of interpretation in the production of meaning.

The viewer is positioned not simply by the text but also by a whole

range of other discourses, with those of gender and culture being dominant

in Pakistan television; viewers' deep emotional engagement with television,

the Ehsas that a text arouses in them, enables them to discuss about

themselves and their lives. For better or for worse, they learn through Ehsas

about their place in the world. Rabia's apparently confused views on

women's independence, Ashraf's ambivalence about women's ability to be

‘patriotic citizens,’ and Jamil Khan's ‘submission’ to and appropriation of

Tipu Sultan and Jinnah sey Quaid to criticize the contemporary Pakistani

politics indicate that television often offers people contradictory subject

positions. Thus, there is a two-way relationship between viewers' lives and

the narratives in TV serials: what people watch is mediated by and at the

same time helps illuminate developments in their lives. It is important to

note, how frequently viewers linked their favorite serials with their lives: it

seemed to be the easiest way for many of them to discuss not just what they

watched but also their own experiences. Indeed, in many of our

conversations the boundaries between texts and lives often blurred so I

found it hard to separate whether we were talking about a television

character or about the viewer.

PROFESSIONAL VIEW ON PTV PROGRAMS The culture of modernity

In countries like Pakistan, Egypt, India and China with major

television production capabilities of their own, the more pressing question

may be how the internal cultural politics of government-controlled media

articulate with contested visions of modernity. An anthropologist interested

in Pakistan would want to ask what sorts of differences Pakistani television

actually reveals to its audiences and what difference this makes to those

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exposed to it. What, in fact, is the relationship between television and

modernity?

More than any other form of mass media, especially in a place where

many remain non-literate, television brings a variety of vivid experiences of

the non-local into the most local of situations – the home. So when someone

like famous writer Intizar Hussain laments the decline of the Lahore’s Pak

Tea House (a place where intellectuals and writers used to sit and discuss in

the evening), explaining 'People used to go the Pak Tea House to listen to

great writers and poets’. These events filled the role played by television

serials today but he forgets that this older form of entertainment, with the

imaginary non-local worlds it conjured up, was only available to men.

Television gives women, the young, and the rural as much access as urban

men to stories of other worlds.

In Pakistan, a concerned group of culture-industry professionals have

considered these women, youths and rural people an inferior object in need

of enlightenment. They consider themselves as guides to modernity and

assume the responsibility of producing, through their television programs,

the virtuous modern citizen. Especially in the dramatic serials, which are

Pakistan's most popular television fare; they seek to 'educate' their public.

Their faith in the impact of television is spurred by the debates their serials

provoke among critics and other parts of the urban intelligentsia. The

nationalist message is broadcast into a complex social space where the very

local and the transnational both exert their power.

Television creating a modern Nation

Television producer and director Yawar Hayyat describing the

beginnings of Pakistani television, noted that in a general atmosphere of

national advancement, the government had a plan for using media and art

to change people's views on political participation and life. Films and serials

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of the 1970s were based on literary works in order 'to educate people,

enlighten them, and draw them into the policy of the new revolution in

transforming Pakistani society from a feudal, capitalist society into a liberal

and modern one’. In the same breath, he added that many serials were

based on novels by Pakistan's great writers 'to help the uneducated

Pakistani youth in rural areas, the provinces, and in cities other than

Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi, (who had no concern with culture) to

become acquainted with those great writers'.

This professed interest in educating and 'culturing' the poor and those

outside the urban capitals was echoed by Athar Viqar Azim, one of

Pakistan's foremost television directors and a senior officer in PTV, who

argued that television in a developing country plagued not just by illiteracy

but by cultural illiteracy should not simply entertain; it has to work to

eliminate this cultural illiteracy. Linking culture and social responsibility,

he defined culture, as familiarity with the news, appreciation of art and a

taste for art, music, theatre. Culture is the concern of the individual, which

comes from knowledge. Azim concluded that since drama was the most

loved form, it had to be exploited to teach people.

The television entertainment as serious art is socially or politically

uplifting in contrast with commercial entertainment. Azim distinguished

between serials people enjoyed watching and those whose effects carried on

long. He criticized colleagues for making pumpkinseed serials - serials that

were fun to watch, like love affairs of teenagers but gave no real

nourishment. He defended government policy regarding television in the

1970s claiming that it enabled television to produce a common national

dream, not only inside Pakistan but in the whole South Asia. It made people

enthusiastic and optimistic. He contrasted this to what had happened since

the mid-1990s when private companies began producing programmes, their

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only interest being to entertain people and their hands being tied by the

necessity of selling their programmes.

This contest between the idealistic vision of television drama as the

producer of a modern cultured citizen with a national consciousness and

the competing tendency of Pakistan television to present 'cheap'

entertainment was dramatically played out during 1993. In Pakistan,

cartoons in a weekly magazine showed a government minister on the

telephone noting that the best time to raise prices on goods without anyone

protesting was between 8.oo and 9.oo p.m., the time the soap was being

aired.

The Heydays In the year 1985 people had been emotionally riveted by a brilliant

Pakistani television serial Waris written by Amjad Islam Amjad. This was

the quintessential non-pumpkin-seed serial. Called Ptv drama, it followed

the fortunes and relationships of a group of characters from the traditional

Lahore neighbourhood , taking them from the late 1960s, when Pakistan

was under the rule of General Ayub Khan, up to the coming of another

general. Although many Pakistani television serials have captured large

audiences and generated discussion and affection, and the local

productions are generally more popular than foreign imports, the broadcast

of this unusually long and high-quality serial was a national cultural event.

Its popularity was not confined to the millions who regularly followed the

evening serials but extended to the intelligentsia who were provoked by its

political messages. The merits of the serial were debated in newspapers and

magazines and a leading intellectual, Ahmad saleem, even used it as a

metaphor for 'Pakistan's real abilities'. In a brief essay in a major weekly

magazine, Afro Asia, he contrasted the successful serial, with its excellent

text, capable director, talented and devoted actors, and involved audience

with the failures of current political activity in Pakistan, suggesting that

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what Pakistan needed was a better political text to guide its director (the

President), more respect for its citizens, and the introduction of new political

actors.

With little daytime television and a state-controlled television industry

until recently only minimally supported through advertising, there never

developed in Pakistan an equivalent of the US daytime soap opera. Instead,

since the late 1980s, the form of the evening dramatic serial (Afshan)

consisting of anywhere from fifteen to thirty episodes broadcast once a

week, had dominated Pakistani television entertainment. Although as

television critics have noted, the strict definition of television genres is

becoming increasingly problematic, serials are distinguishable from daytime

or prime-time soap operas in being finite and self-contained, offering viewers

some sort of dramatic resolution by the final episode. Like soap operas,

however, most Pakistani serials are set in the domestic space, using limited

and familiar sets; more importantly, their plots revolve around unfolding

personal relationships often presented melodramatically. Much like the USA

and British prime-time soaps of the 1980s (e.g. Dallas, Dynasty and East-

Enders) that have deliberately sought wider audiences, Pakistani serials are

believed to have women as their primary audiences while reaching out

successfully to whole families including men and children.

Today’s PTV drama, more than most Pakistani serials, seems to be a

hybrid product. Although its talented writers denied in print that they had

given audiences a Pakistani Falcon Crest (an American prime-time soap that

had aired several years earlier), there are numerous aspects of PTV drama in

which the influence of such American programs can be detected. If the

prime-time soap opera can be defined by its peculiar mixing of the

aesthetics of melodrama, realism and light entertainment, then PTV drama

fits the description. Strong on emotional drama, the serials focus on the

faces and feelings of its characters and intensifies its effects through

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dramatic music. As in other Pakistani serials tears are plentiful, if balanced

by laughter and anger. Like the British soap operas (and unlike the

American) that take realism more seriously, the serial is set in particular

neighbourhoods and attempts to depict class differences.

What makes today PTV drama seem most like American prime-time

soaps is that it consumes element of spectacle. The costumes are lavish, the

sets sumptuous, and at least some of the women characters extravagantly

glamorous and fashionable. The aristocratic central characters move

elegantly among their villas and luxurious apartments, the key woman

character elaborately made up and dressed in a different outfit for each of

well over a fifteen episodes.

Though by definition serials differ from soap operas in having

resolutions, some serials were unusual in deferring their resolution for so

long. PTV drama allowed for the development of the kind of attachment to

characters that soap-opera audiences relish. Analysts have noted that

among the distinguishing features of the soap-opera genre is the centrality

of strong women characters. This does not apply to PTV drama with its weak

women figures in each generation. American soap operas have been

characterized as a women's genre because they privilege the personal,

depicting even the non-domestic work scenes in terms of personal

relationships. The Pakistani serials on the contrary portrayed the personal

lives of individuals, had the moral themes of loyalty, betrayal, corruption,

thwarted desires and tragic errors embedded in an historical narrative that

tied individual lives to Pakistani national political events. It did what no

American soap would ever do: it provided an explicit social and political

commentary on contemporary Pakistani life.

The question if PTV drama promoted the theme of national unity? Is

still unanswered. Agha Nasir, a noted playwright and former director of PTV

claims ‘with the exception of a very few truly evil characters, the characters

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of different classes and political persuasions were shown to be basically

good and patriotic. Our hearts went out to them as many were led astray,

reacting to romantic and political blows. But in the end, they saw the errors

of their ways, prevented by their love of Pakistan from pursuing the

materialistic, immoral or corrupt paths they had taken. Even the young

religious extremist (the first to be depicted in a Pakistani television serial)

was sympathetically portrayed as part of a generation that had been led

astray by the lack of national spirit.Ptv drama sought to teach and

enlighten’.

Jalil Aali a poet and professor of Sociology in Rawalpindi says:

‘PTV drama failed to inform millions of ordinary Pakistanis about their

country's modern history. Its characters do not participate in such activities

as anti-social movements, the nationalization of factories during Bhutto’s

era, the wars with India, political crack-downs in a police state, the so called

rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the scams of the political looters.

People’s lives were deeply affected by the economic liberalization of 'open

door' policies, the increase in heroin addiction and drug trafficking, and the

policies of state are never discussed by our TV’.

The debates in the press focused on the political perspective

presented. As the headline of an article in the centre-right newspaper Jang

bluntly asked, 'Do the Authors and directors of PTV drama have the right to

write history from the government’s Viewpoint?' (Jang, 22 July, 2003). The

serials then provided the occasion for setting the public straight. In the

same newspaper, Ashfaq ahmad the leading establishment writer defended

himself for not criticizing the PTV, noting that PTV drama was excellent

drama, important for raising cultural standards in Pakistan.

PTV was criticized from other political perspectives as well. In the

Liberal newspaper Dawn, the TV people were asked why they make the rich

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and influential such a sympathetic characters and ignore the everyday

problems of ordinary people. In Pakistan, another opposition newspaper

that now presents the viewpoint of the Muslim Brotherhood, the paper's

editor Zia Shahid, defended PTV’s right to free expression. He praised the

new programming for depicting everyday religiosity, noting that he had

earlier criticized PTV, like all television Channels, for never showing Islamic

religious practices as part of daily life.

Viewers speak out

Viewers were selective in their appreciation of the messages of the TV

programs. They could disagree with the politics; they could marvel at and

take pleasure in the defiant characters who lived as they could not. They

accepted the moral stances presented only when they identified with their

worlds. This was clearest in poor women's positive responses to the moral

conservatism about family and a mother's role promoted by TV programs

generally and PTV drama in particular.

The villagers of Central Punjab with whom I have worked are familiar

with television. Every household in the village near Lahore where I have

been working had a television set. Many were simple black and white sets

with poor reception. Only on rare evenings would the television be silent; if

there had been a death in the neighborhood or among one's kin, if someone

was ill at home and receiving visitors. The most common reason for

televisions to be silent was loss of electricity, something that happened for a

few minutes almost every day and occasionally for long frustrating hours.

And precisely because electric power in the village was so weak, children

often had to do their homework by the light of the television sets.

For one thing, like their urban counterparts, villagers I knew were

capable of selective readings of dramas. This was often necessary since the

distance between the 'realities' dramatized in the serials and the lives lived

in the village was vast. The fashionable blonde stars of TV drama in their

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plush offices and grand mansions are most obviously far from these

hardworking people in mudbrick single-storey homes with wooden doors

wide enough to allow the donkeys, sheep and buffaloes to pass through into

the pens inside; but the characters portrayed in Pakistani PTV drama are

hardly much closer. Most Pakistani serials are set in urban locations and

deal with urban, often upper class problems.

An anecdote about watching television in a relatively poor household

can illustrate the gulf between local and television lives and the selective

ways women interpret what they watch. One evening, Aamna, the vivacious

but exhausted mother of the family, was preparing dinner with the help of

her sister when the serial, Mahandi came on. Her sister had been there all

day helping this overworked woman who had bread to bake and children to

be watched when she went off to get fodder for the animals. The family was

miserable that night -between the fever of the eldest son, the measles that

had struck all four of the little girls, the three boys' end-of-year exams, the

expenses and fatigue of a recent trip to a hospital in search of a cure for the

chain-smoking father's asthmatic cough, and the government's

announcement the previous day that the price of flour was to be raised, they

wondered how they would cope. Yet the serial they watched centered on a

wealthy diplomat's family and included characters like woman doctors,

journalists and charming personalities with business problems.

As Aamna cooked, her sister, wrapped in the white cloak (chaddar

women wear when they go visiting), shouted out a summary of the plot for

her. She focused on the family dynamics that are the regular stuff of their

own forms of telling life stories in the village. She also picked up the moral

message of the serial about women and family - the importance of the

mother's role in raising her children and the ill consequences for their

children of mothers who abandon them or put themselves or their careers

first.

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However, many of the 'women's issues' in this serial, (Mehndi) written

and directed by one of Pakistan's few women directors, were constructed in

psycho-social terms that were foreign to these women: 'psychological'

problems like psychosomatic paralysis that love could heal, men unable to

commit themselves to marry for fear of losing their freedom, mothers who

cried because their children were not emotionally open with them, and

psychiatrists treating drug addiction among the wealthy and educated. The

women simply ignored in their discussions these aspects of the serial that

were not part of their experience.

From my ethnographic work in the villages, I would also suggest that

the villagers make elusive targets for the cultural elite's modernizing

messages for a more complex reason: Although Television has created its

own world, one that was for the villagers only part of their daily lives. What

they experienced through television was added but did not displace

whatever else already existed. They treated the television world not as a

fantasy escape but as a separate sphere. Adolescents often had an

encyclopedic knowledge of Pakistani films and serials and people knew a

staggering amount about the private lives and previous roles of actors and

actresses who starred in the serials. The young people read magazines but

everyone had access to this knowledge through hours of viewing and the

glorification of stars promoted by Pakistan television itself through interview

programs and celebrity game shows.

In the villagers' attitudes toward the stars is a clue to the larger

question of how television programs affect them. The villagers spoke 'about

these stars as 'ours', somehow belonging to them as viewers, but not as 'us'.

The same mix of entitlement and distance applied to the serials. They are for

'our' pleasure but they depict the lives of others who have different

problems, follow different rules, and do not belong to the local moral

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community. What these others do, then, has little bearing on what we do or

how we conduct our lives.

This is not to say that television in general has not transformed social

life; there are at least three areas in which careful ethnographic work might

reveal significant transformations. First, in social life: there is less visiting

among households in the evenings since families stay home to watch

television. More important, television may have increased the number of

'experiences' shared across generation and gender. Television brings families

together in the evening and makes it more likely that man and women will

socialize together as they sit around the single television set in the house.

The focus of attention is the evening serial but families converse with each

other while waiting for it, as when the start of the serial is delayed by

government ministers droning on during the televised press conferences and

state addresses. Conflicts also arise, though, between generations and

genders about which programs to watch, just as exposure to television

differs by generation.

Second, television may have changed the nature of experience itself.

Some Pakistani professionals rationalized to me viewers' pleasures using a

discourse of continuity, suggesting, for example, that the serials are like 'the

stories a grandmother tells her grandchildren to send them to sleep', or 'like

The Thousand and One Nights where the story-teller would stop at the most

exciting moment to attract the audience to listen to him the next day'.

The third area where television in general may be transforming

experience is in its facilitation of new identifications and affiliations. Do the

people feel part of an imagined community of citizens or consumers because

they know they are watching the same programs at the same time and being

offered the same goods as people across the country or globe?

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Two factors conspire to undermine the impact of TV programs. First,

of course, the serials appear only as part of the flow of programming,

sandwiched between films, pumpkin-seed serials, advertising, religious

programmes, children's programmes, sports, news, and countless talking-

head shows. More important, their messages are evaluated from within, and

hence often balanced or even contradicted by the powerful everyday realities

within which villagers, like poor workingwomen in Lahore suburbs, move.

These realities are both resolutely local and transnational.

The people are folded into Pakistani modernity in a different way. The

children who sing every morning the national anthem and memorize

countless other nationalist songs from government schoolbooks may be

somewhat receptive to the nationalist messages of television programs. The

unity of rich and poor in national endeavors that PTV drama idealizes is

undermined by their knowledge of how the wealthy buy their way out of the

army and around all regulations. For urban women who are the exploited

supports of a modern class system, solving the twin demands of work and

respectability through 'Islamic' conjunctions.

The problem, finally, is that the kind of modernity these television

programs depict as a vision for Pakistan depends on class position and the

availability of certain kinds of educational and career opportunity. The

'uneducated public' at whom these serials are directed participates in the

more common form of modernity in the postcolonial world: the modernity of

poverty, consumer desires, underemployment, ill health and religious

nationalism.

PTV News and Current Affairs

McQuail (2000) has defined news as: the main form in which current

information about public events is carried by media. Its characteristics are

timelessness, relevance, and reliability (truth value).

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Rayner, Wall and Kruger (2001) have defined it: News is information

about contemporary happenings. It is way of attracting audience of people

keen to be informed about the events taking place in the world they live.

For Television news presentation Rayner and Wall (2001) describe:

there are a number of other prompts that suggest that news is important

and has to be taken seriously. This includes type of signature music, the

nature and status of newsreaders and the way in which the studio has been

designed. It has a greater importance that use of phrases and presentation

by newsreaders suggests that the world we have been shown is the only way

in which it can be seen.

News construction and presentation is called the backache of PTV

producers and newsmen which causes headache to audience but still PTV

Khabarnama (National News Bulletin aired at 9 pm on network in Urdu

language) is the most watched program. Former director News PTV

Burhanudin Hasan (2000) who coined the name Khabarnama now calls it

‘most controversial and notoriously incorrigible item on PTV’. He continues

saying, over 20 managing directors and several director of news and

probably as many information secretaries and ministers as well as heads of

states and governments failed to reform Khabarnama. He admits that it is a

‘non-news junk’. Presentation of news on PTV today seems to be just

opposite of the lofty objectives laid down in the basic policy framework of the

corporation (PTV). It has both historical and technical reason. First

technical: the entire terrestrial network is owned by PTV as the pioneer

broadcaster and no other rival broadcaster was allowed to air news bulletin

until recently, in addition to the fact that satellite and private channels

through cable are available to only less than 20 percent population which

too in urban areas. Then historically: PTV has been a monopoly broadcaster

and a blue eyed of the political and military governments for its mastery in

repeating the same episodes of a singular event round the clock. With the

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changes in governments, those who at one point of time were harsh critics

of its role as ‘mouth piece of the government’ on coming to power became

addicts of its tranquilizing news stories. It has been labeled for narrow

casting and niche marketing by the professionals. This was a perpetual

historical cycle which made PTV news the most ridiculous piece of

presentation and it became a wonderful recipe for cooking political and

social jokes. But before going further I would deliberate a little on the

history of PTV news department first.

Television in Pakistan was started by a military government in 1964

through the professional support of radio and theatre people. Its first

managing director was a non-professional bureaucrat with no experience

and training of TV production. Similarly the people trained on radio news

desk took their places in TV news desk. The old tradition of censorship and

orthodoxy in presentation thus snailed into TV. Ministry of Information and

Broadcasting was the patron and off the camera director of entire

happenings. It was not realized at the very beginning that TV as a new and

most powerful medium of mass communication should run on professional

grounds with proper training and professional approach. In news

department, radio producers and news editors were put on news desk and

semi literate newsreaders were placed in front of camera. This was the start

of their own tradition which is continuing. Even the heads of PTV as an

institution and heads of news department except some brief periods were

nonprofessional blue-eyeds of the governments and the ministry of

information. PTV took off with a peculiar style of its own not matching the

international criteria, standards and norms in news presentation. This

made the government’s job easier. These innocent people were not aware of

what they were doing. During the last 40-year of its operation very few

newsmen have undergone training inside and abroad. Most of them are even

today not aware of modern news presentation and media operations.

Excepts a few privileged ones none have undergone training in international

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media institutions. A more striking aspect of PTV news department is that a

number of its key members were not even university graduates. This

concern at one point was raised in the national parliament in early 90s. In

the same way the crop of national newsreaders in Khabarnama has been

marginally educated, some even not having a college degree.

Table – 58

Level of professionalism in PTV

Univer-

sity

Degree

Local

Formal

Training

in TV

News Production

Foreign

Training

Ability

to

inter-

view

people live

Ability

to

Handle

Camera

in the field

Ability

to

Handle

Studio

Equip-ments

On

Camera

Present-

ation

Skill

Ability

to draft

stories

indepen-dently

TV News Producers

13 10 13 Non 2 Non 3 Non 4

News

Editorial staff 14

11 10 Non Non Non Non Non 7

News Controllers

5 3 5 1 1 Non Non Non 3

News Readers (Khabarnama)

55

7 -- Non Non Non Non --- Non

The above table shows that PTV News department at central news

bureau in Islamabad desperately lacks that required skill without which

modern television broadcasting is not possible. This aspect was realized and

people sitting on PTV news desk confided with me that the environment and

working of newsroom is not different from a typical government office. A

former secretary ministry of information and broadcasting with a very grim

heart told during an interview in Islamabad that despite his best efforts he

could not bring about the change. ‘I was not in a position to change the

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government policy regarding news coverage and undue publicity of the state

machinery. But I tried to introduce some fresh ideas regarding style of

presentation, language, accent and the coverage of international and social

events. It was all-futile; I could not change the culture. It was like

challenging the interests of those sitting inside’ he disclosed. He continued

saying ‘the government policy and control is one aspect, it is not the end of

the world. I believe that the news is not bad because it is one sided, it is

unbearable due to its poor presentation’.

In a group discussion some former PTV employees and news men

outburst with the disclosure that PTV is called family channel because it

has the monopoly of few families. One outspoken former news editor said

‘half a dozen female newsreaders are the wives of PTV officers. They get

undue bookings and special treatment’. I was told by a senior news editor

on news desk one evening that one news reader is even not a matriculate,

‘he has some clandestine activities. The man performs some off camera

functions, for producers and senior officials including supply of alcohol

(which is prohibited in Pakistan). During my days at news desk in PTV

newsroom, I was told on many occasions and it came to my personal

observation that newsreaders have some special relations with top

management. They could get junior producers transferred, and punished in

case they object to their performance and try to correct their wrong

pronunciations. I was told by a well-educated female newsreader that she

had to avoid socializing with people because of bad reputation of other girls.

She secretly told me that the ‘walls of the building have microphones and

cameras and I am afraid’.

During a detailed interview, a former director of news admitted that

selection criteria for newsreaders was not fair. But it was due to some

compulsions. He said ‘the remuneration is so low that properly educated

people do not come or if come do not stay long’. Another director in PTV had

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the opposite version ‘due to their long association with submissive, semi-

literate and socially weak people, the news people feel uncomfortable with

properly educated, smart guys; obviously for the plain reason that a reader

well conversant with current affairs and news not only is confident and

enjoys self respect but at times also corrects these poor news editors and

producers’. He continued telling me a joke that during a foreign visit of the

prime minister when somebody asked a news reporter the name of French

foreign minister he replied innocently ‘I don’t know because I am in news

department of PTV’. During my stay in PTV newsroom, I observed that on

most occasions outside people were booked for asking simple questions

from experts or ministers on special events. When asked why can’t this be

done by news people themselves, I was told that this was the policy. As such

no policy was there. I saw people at higher level in news department badly

embarrassed in case of emergency interviews with outsiders during a

bulletin. I tried to probe the controller of news on the issue of proper

training for newsmen but she could only say ‘outside training is not our

policy. News desk is the biggest trainer; we all learnt here, why can’t they?’ I

was surprised to know that majority of the news producers, editors and

reporters had never faced a microphone or camera at all during their entire

stay in the news department. They willingly had been avoiding such

ventures mainly because of their internal shyness and absence of

persuasion from the seniors.

I noticed and then it was verified by the people inside newsroom that

a sizeable number of news producers, editors and reporters lacked basic

writing skills. They joined TV news without any zeal for the profession. It

was like any other job for them. One of them told me very honestly that he

wanted to become an officer in some government ministry but ‘the member

of parliament from my area who was the minister of information at that

time, put me here’. ‘I do not enjoy this job at all. It is for the journalists not

for the people like me’. When asked as to what was wrong with the job, he

213

said ‘you have to work hard without any reward. In news department you

cannot oblige people. You cannot offer booking to your favorites. It is in the

hands of seniors who pick girls from here and there and we have to obey

both seniors and their girlfriends’. He continued sadly ‘in program side a

producer can book anybody with his personal choice. They are enjoying the

life’.

I observed during these days that most of the workload was shared by

select few who had a better hand in writing. I observed a number of

producers without any assignments.

In the sister department of current affairs the situation was more or

less the same except that the presenters (anchors) were comparatively

educated but still without any professional edge. The bookings were

assignment based for individual programs. Out of seven producers, five had

virtually no assignment in hand during two consecutive months. Small jobs

like writing intro-lines were done by outsiders on payment. The anchors

were again select few enjoying personal friendship of directors or the

secretary and minister for information. One morning, I asked the director of

current affairs ‘why the same faces are repeated for each occasion when a

number of experts are available in the town?’ He gave a very intriguing reply

saying ‘we have their contact numbers available and they live nearby’. When

I asked about the criteria of selecting the anchors, he gave contradicting

justifications, ranging from good looks, voice quality, confidence, good

pronunciation and knowledge to mastery on the subject. One senior

producer commented on his reply (after my meeting) ‘he is right because for

interviewing a scientist, they prefer good looks and for conducting a

discussion on current affairs, they look for voice quality and above all for

covering a flower show they prefer knowledge of the current affairs’.

Now I will turn to the real issue which to some is the basic cause of

contention and conflict. There are many repercussions of state control and

214

the ruling juntas hegemonic use of electronic media especially the television.

The control of TV by the state and TV’s own internal shortfalls have

interdependent consequence. First the ministry of information is un

challenged pattern of state TV and uses this medium under her on whim to

the delight of the prime minister and the president. The interesting fact that

the minister and the secretary of ministry of information have their

permanent parallel office in PTV station in Islamabad Shows that how close

the government want to remain with media. The ministry dictates to TV the

rule of the game and uses airtime under her free will. It happens so

frequently that the Prime minister and president’s ‘official visits and

addresses are shown on state TV during peak hours halting all commercials

and draining out a big chunk of committed revenues. This phenomena of

control has multiplier affects with chain of similar happenings even beyond

the control of ministry of information. This prompts ministers sitting in

other ministries to join this publicity ‘Cat Walk’. This stretches further to

the members of the parliament at national level, members of provincial

assemblies in the provinces where the chief ministers, governors and the

ministers call the local head of TV stations for the coverage of their minor

local level activities. In the end of the day the spots pile up in the central

news desk and the decision of editing becomes impossible. This leaves no

slot vacant for the coverage of opposition, genuine national events,

international happenings and the stories of social and civic interest. The

government is the singular financer of state TV operations for capital and

recurring expenditures; adding to that is the political appointments in the

TV at policy level. The management is least worried about fund generation,

because the shortfalls are always met through national exchequer. The

board of Director of Pakistan TV Comprises of sitting government servants

without any participation from outside. The net result is that on one hand

ruling parties demand list keeps expanding while on the other the politically

appointed management is all out to express personal loyalties in a highly

non-professional fashion. There was a consensus during a group discuss

215

that PTV news has bad presentation and presenters, have orthodox

scripting and ending with ‘he said’ lot of verbal commentaries, less visuals

and absolutely in sufficient on the spot coverage and absence of stories of

human and social interest.

This complicated arrangement and one sided command of the media

affairs (TV on top of it) by the government has rigged the faith and trust of

the people on their own media. Isolated reactions are always voiced without

buying an ear of the government but parallel to that is the reality that the

system has crushed credibility of state TV. Lowering of credibility has again

a snowball impact: the governments have bought in return a harsh and

cruel defamation. The table–59 shows that during 57 years of independence

and 40 years of the TV, all governments (military, elected or a mix of both)

have used state media under their own whims. Hasan (2000) and Niazi

(1999) have unanimous views over the unintelligent use of state media by

the governments. Hasan calls it ‘no news junk’ and Niazi labels it with

‘media in chains’. Hasan has a strong opinion as former director of PTV

news that television has borrowed less goodies from the government and

returned much more evils in the form of discredit, defame and hatred

among the people. He has given a long account of the methods by which

state TV was misused by the successive military and non-military

governments. He has a strong contention that the entire destruction was

caused by the state control. Niazi has seconded his views though

independently. Jabbar (2001) has the similar opinion despite the reality that

he himself had enjoyed the armchair comforts in the ministry of information

as minister and could do nothing except following the tradition of his

predecessors. My personal observation and information do not conform to

their views. I have agreement with them on the basis of my interviews and

indepth discussions with a number of people that state TV has played a

vitally cruel role in defaming the governments. It was a consensus opinion

among all the intellectual circle and independent media professionals that

216

excessive publicity and unreasonable appearance on TV spoils and damages

the image of heads of state. Still people refer to General Zia-ul-Haq as ‘the

man in the box’ because of his extreme love for his own face on TV screen.

The excessive publicity also damaged the image of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto

inspite of his great personal charm and appeal. The successors learnt no

lesson and were drowned in the same pond. I was told by a retired

government officer in Islamabad that he was admirer of general Zia-ul-Haq

in his initial days but ‘his repeated appearance on TV made me sick of his

face and personality’. He said ‘first I started hating his persona and then his

entire policies; the television exposed him’. A number of people had the

opinion that when TV shows somebody so repeatedly people start disliking

him and end up with acute hatred. A senior media manager during Z.A

Bhutto’s period and now a consultant in a media firm was honest enough to

admit ‘we could do no good to Bhutto by playing his personality on TV

without limits’. With a dismal experience of three decades people have built

a strong opinion that what TV shows and tells is wrong without question. A

small survey carried out during the study suggested that the cable channels

enjoy much higher viewership and credibility than PTV. Wherever Urdu

channels are available through cable in urban areas people never switch to

PTV Khabarnama and current affairs discussions; even the government

ministers and the members of the parliament prefer to express their views

on GEO and ARY simply because the opinion making segment of the society

rarely watches PTV Khabarnama and current affairs programs. The

situation is alarming for state media; in one hand its credibility is at lowest

ebb while on the other the audience is taking flights to other channels.

My data and observations during the last so many years suggest

clearly that still state control is not the only cause of deterioration and

collapse. PTV’s internal structure, its self imposed internal policies, lack of

professionalism and monopoly of unskilled disinterested staff are equally

responsible for the current situation. There are areas where government

217

intervention is overwhelming but TV’s lack of professionalism has widened

the gulf between audience and the media. PTV has failed on many fronts to

produce good programs of general interest only because of its professional

inability.

ROLE OF CIVIL AND MILITARY GOVERNMENTS

Now I will discuss democracy vs military rule and their role in shaping

the broadcasting culture in Pakistan. The word democracy has been used as

a misnomer to refer to good or bad broadcasting. Some professionals have

tried to follow the American tradition of democratic media; the biggest

exponent of which have been Marshal McLuhan during 70s and Everett

Rogers in our time in late 1999 as opposed to the British school lead by Hall

and Raymond Williams and the Frankfort School. In Pakistan the

fashionable circles try to derive a correlation between democracy and elected

governments to make a case in favour of their own intellectual consumption.

They have described the role of media in relation to elected governments and

non elected governments or to say military governments. They always forget

in their intellectual discourses that democracy has its own definition in

Pakistani context. They deliberately avoid to put forth the reality that

democracy in Pakistan is not the exact antonym of military rule or

dictatorship; but as a matter of fact is another system of government by the

same people. It may look surprising to many thinkers that democracy and

military rule are synonymous in Pakistan. I would not argue if democracy as

a concept is put as an opposite to dictatorship or authoritarian rule. But in

relation to the system of government in Pakistan the words have entirely

different meanings in practice. Without going into political debate on the

democratic practice and system of election and representation of people in

the affairs of state, I would concentrate on the role of media and use of

media during military governments and the elected governments which were

there turn by turn. Television came to Pakistan much after the imposition of

press laws which were dictatorial in nature but framed by the elected

218

governments and practiced and strengthened by the successive

parliamentary and presidential rules in Pakistan. Radio broadcasting faced

first centralized control in the era of so-called democracy in early 50s.

Television though was introduced during the military rule but its worst use

was seen in 70s when the first undisputed elections were held and Pakistan

People’s Party of Z. A. Bhutto came to power. During the six years rule of

Mr. Bhutto all the black press laws were protected and electronic media

including television was used for personal image building of party members

with worst type of defamation campaigns against the opponents. During

three years period of Muslim League (Muhammad Khan Junajo) television

followed the same tradition. Benazir Bhutto from 1988 to 1990 and then

1993 to 1996 used electronic media following the tradition of her father and

his successors. Muhamad Nawaz Sharif from 1990 to 1993 and 1997 to

1999 used television for personal image building maintaining a complete

black out of his opponents. The military rulers had been equally

authoritarian and hegemonic in the use of television but the history has

some grace points for them. The first and fair elections in the history of

Pakistan were held in 1970 during a military rule and the media provided

proper coverage to all political parties without bias. Onward 1999 Pakistan

has witnessed a fresh air in the media environment when a number of

private channels were allowed to operate and cable networks were licensed.

Keeping aside the reality that military governments did not allow PTV to

turn unbiased but equally true is the fact that during these years people

have the opportunity of listening to outside voices through international

broadcasters. The table-59 shows that elected and military governments

have the similar track record in terms of media exploitation. It has been

recorded by a scores of media writers that press freedom has been in better

shape during military rules. More journalists were sent behind the bars

during Liaquat Ali, Bhutto, Benazir and Nawaz Sharif period then during

authoritarian rules by military. It also had been the tradition of elected

governments in Pakistan to put non-professional management in TV and in

219

overall media, though military had the same attitude. This account of

electronic media during various governments does not suggest that media

was in better health during the period of elected governments. It also does

not help imply that for a free media the country needs an elected rule. It is

the attitude of ruling groups, military or civil, which makes media free. Now

the question remains unanswered as to why elected governments never

allowed media to operate freely and groom independently. The answer has

roots in the history which tells how various civil governments were founded

and what made them responsible for country’s affairs. The western

philosophy of democratic media under democratic governments thus is

invalid in Pakistani context both historically and genetically. The other

major issue is public service broadcasting which is put parallel to public

sector broadcasting in Pakistan by default. The concept of public sector

broadcasting (PSB) was adopted in UK in 1920s, the most obvious example

of which is British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) – founded in 1926.

Theoretically the concept of PSB is to create an organization to serve the

nation not to make money from the nation, financed by a license fee and is

available to all. PTV has the similar mandate which promises to provide best

entertainment, information, and education without running after the profit.

The factual position is that PTV has been a broadcaster in public sector

running on government money not making enough profit due to its internal

faults. Further to that is the hard fact that onward years 1990, PTV has

been running after profit still failing to provide entertainment, information

and education to people. After the influx of international broadcasters in

Pakistan all commercial entrepreneurs joined hands lead by advertising

companies in the demand for converting PTV into a commercial organization

in private sector. This extreme view was a reaction against the one sided

and non-professional use of television. What these people seem unable to

realize is that this extra-ordinary powerful medium must work for a greater

purpose of nation building both economically and culturally. Private

broadcaster should remain in the arena of competition but PTV as a

220

national public service broadcaster should safeguard the political social and

cultural needs of the country. Pakistani cultural setting demands a

television for all which is possible through public sector broadcasting only,

as opposed to a free TV which may have dominant cultural aspects but

without ethical content. This is needed in view of the fact that only a true

national television can constitute modern identities because it has the

capacity to organize generational experience, shared memories and

articulate a common destiny. The time is still not ripe for a universal

democratic media, floating on the tides of commercial market interests

because market is not owned by the nation but by ‘others’. The television

still respecting the commercial aspects must have financial support of the

state at the time of hard choices which are too often in today’s market

driven media environment.

221

Table – 59

MEDIA UNDER VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS

S.

No Period Years Category

Media Status Press Radio TV

1. Muhammad Ali Jinnah 15 Aug 1947 - 11 Sep 1948 01 Elected Free Govt. Controlled

--

2. Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din 14 Sep 1948 - 17 Oct 1951 03 Nominated Free Govt. Controlled

--

3. Malik Ghulam Muhammad 19 Oct 1951 - 05 Oct 1955 04 Nominated Free Govt. Controlled

--

4. Maj. Gen Sikandar Mirza 06 Oct 1955 - 22 Mar 1956 0.5 Military Controlled Govt. Controlled

--

PRESIDENT

1. Maj. Gen Sikandar Mirza 23 Mar 1956 - 27 Mar 1958 02 Military Censor Govt. Controlled

--

2. Gen Muhammad Ayub 27 Oct 1958 - 25 Mar 1969 10.5 Military Censor Govt. Controlled

Govt. Controlled

3. Gen Muhammad Yahya Khan 25 Mar 1969 - 20 Dec 1971 02 Military Censor Govt. Controlled

Govt. Controlled

4. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 20 Dec 1971 - 13 Aug 1973 02 Elected Censor Govt. Controlled

Govt. Controlled

5. Ch. Fazal Ellahi 14 Aug 1973 - 16 Sep 1978 05 Elected Censor Govt. Controlled

Govt. Controlled

6. Gen. Zia-ul-Haq 16 Sep 1978 - 17 Aug 1988 10 Military Censor Govt. Controlled

Govt. Controlled

7. Ghulam Ishaq Khan 18 Aug 1988 – 07 Jul 1993 05 Elected Free Govt. Controlled

Govt. Controlled

8. Waseem Sajjad 08 Jul 1993 - 13 Nov 1993 0.5 Elected Free Govt. Controlled

Govt. Controlled

9. Sardar Farooq Laghari 13 Nov 1993 - 02 Dec 1997 04 Elected Free Govt. Controlled

Govt. Control

222

S.

No Period Years Category

Media Status Press Radio TV

Partial Freedom

10. Muhammad Rafiq Tarrar 02 Jan 1998 - 20 Jun 2001 03 Elected Free Govt. Controlled

Govt. Control Partial

Freedom

11. Gen. Pervaz Musharaf 20 Jun 2001 - Onward Military Free Govt. Controlled

Partially

Controlled Private

Channels Allowed

PRIME MINISTER

1. Liaquat Ali Khan 15 Aug 1947 - 16 Oct 1951 04 Elected Free Govt. Controlled

--

2. Kawaja Nazim-ud-Din 17 Oct 1951 - 07 Apr 1953 1.5 Elected Free Govt. Controlled

--

3. Muhammad Ali Bogra 17 Apr 1953 - 11 Aug 1955 2.5 Elected Free Govt. Controlled

--

4. Ch. Muhammad Ali 11 Aug 1955 - 12 Sep 1956 01 Elected Free Govt. Controlled

--

5. Hussain Shaeed Saharwardi 12 Sep 1956 - 18 Oct 1957 01 Elected Free Govt. Controlled

--

6. Ibrahim Ismaeel Chandragar 18 Oct 1957 - 16 Des 1957 0.5 Elected Free Govt. Controlled

--

7. Malik Feroz Khan Noon 18 Dec 1957 - 07 Oct 1958 01 Elected Censor Govt. Controlled

--

8. Noor-ul-Amin 07 Des 1971 - 20 Dec 1971 13 Days Nominated Censor Govt. Controlled

Govt. Control

9. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 14 Aug 1973 - 05 Jul 1977 04 Elected Censor Govt. Govt.

223

S.

No Period Years Category

Media Status Press Radio TV

Controlled Control

10. Muhammad Khan Junejo 23 Mar 1985 - 29 May 1988 03 Elected Free Govt. Controlled

Govt. Control

11. Benazir Bhutto 02 Dec 1988 - 06 Aug 1990 02 Elected Free Govt. Controlled

Govt. Control

12. Ghulam Mustafa Jatuai 06 Aug 1990 - 06 Nov 1990 02 Care Taker

Nominated

Free Govt.

Controlled

Govt.

Control

13. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif 06 Nov 1990 - 18 Apr 1993 2.5 Elected Free Govt. Controlled

Govt. Control

14. Balgh Sher Mizari 18 Apr 1993 - 26 May 1993 01 Month Care Taker

Nominated

Free Govt. Controlled

Govt. Control

15. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif 26 May 1993 - 08 Jul 1993 02 Month Elected Free Govt. Controlled

Govt. Control

16. Moeen Qureshi 08 July 1993 - 19 Oct 1993 0.5 Care Taker

Nominated

Free Govt. Controlled

Govt. Control

17. Benazir Bhutto 19 Oct 1993 - 05 Nov 1996 03 Elected Free Govt. Controlled

Govt. Control

18. Malik Meraj Khalid 06 Nov 1996 - 03 Feb 1997 0.5 Care Taker

Nominated

Free Govt. Controlled

Govt. Control

19. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif 17 Feb 1997 - 12 Oct 1999 2.5 Elected Free Govt. Controlled

Govt. Control

20. Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali Nov 2002 - Onward 01 Elected Free Govt. Controlled

Partially Controlled

Private Channels Allowed

1

CHAPTER 6

THE ARRIVAL OF SATELLITE TV

In this chapter I would look at the kind of satellite programs available

in Pakistan and public and professional reactions to them. Many of the

programs, particularly English language programs, are made for global

audiences and watched in Pakistan largely by the English speaking elite. My

main focus, however, is on reactions to programs made specifically for

Pakistani audiences, particularly on popular entertainment channels like

Geo, ARY (3 channels), Indus Vision, Zee, Sony, Star, CNN, BBC and others

which are watched not just in the metropolitan centers but over a much

wider area. Have these programs helped to create a new Pakistani popular

culture, which transcends national barriers or not?, is the question I

attempt to answer?

The evidence comes from a range of different interviews, discussion

groups and survey, which were carried out in the five main Pakistani cities

and some small towns and villages over a twelve-month period in 2002 and

2003. The picture it paints is impressionistic, but it is sufficient to show

that new electronic communities have been created and that many of the

issues raised by the satellite media are shared across a cross section of

population. These include the propagation of new visions of society, the

growth of consumerism, the targeting of children and controversies

provoked by programs and shows including movies, which offer new role

models for Pakistanis.

In asking the question ‘WHO PORTRAYS PAKISTANI CULTURE?’ I

attempt to probe the ideas and objectives of those making and funding the

programs, whether through advertising or sponsorship. I also examine the

interconnectedness of advertising and program making and its implications

2

for diversity of choices. In analyzing satellite programs which successfully

appeal to the new Pakistani middle class, I explore the terms on which the

global and the local meet in finding a new vision of society.

My interviews and discussions illustrate the difficulty of disentangling

the influence of the satellite media from the growth of television as a mass

medium. For many interviewees, the satellite media are part of a general

process. The entry of Pakistan into the television age is having an impact on

how people spend their leisure, how they eat their meals, how they relate to

each other in families. What my interviews and discussion groups have

produced, therefore, are not just reactions to particular programs or types of

programs but also broader reflections on the state of the electronic media in

general.

I begin the chapter with an overview of satellite television, what it

offers to the urban middle class and how it differs from the programs and

traditions established by PTV. The rest of the chapter looks at different

aspects of the new satellite culture and its reception in all parts of Pakistan.

PAKISTAN ENTERS SATELLITE ERA

After years of state monopoly, the arrival of the satellite channels was

like a breath of fresh air for Pakistan's middle class. Those with cable and

satellite connections were suddenly liberated from PTV's paternalistic

programming and were offered access first to a wide range of international

channels and soon afterward to popular commercial programming specially

made for Pakistani audiences. The first beneficiaries were the English

language-knowing audiences in the large cities. Though only approximately

3 per cent of the population, they are nonetheless an economically and

politically influential audience. But the main target of the popular channels

has been the expanding Pakistani middle class with Urdu as its lingua

franca. As I discussed in Chapter-3, the prospect of selling products to over

3

140 million consumers has been the main motivation of Pakistan's rapidly

growing advertising and media industries which have attempted to tap this

market with a new mix of programs. This has included more regular access

to films, new kinds of tele-serials, quizzes, fashion shows, game shows,

popular music, showbiz and sports.

The new popular satellite channels have been powerful agents of a

new consumerism. Unlike PTV, which has traditionally propagated the

political and development ideology of Pakistan, the satellite channels appeal

to the viewer as a consumer in a liberalized Pakistan where personal choice

has become a new ideology. With no inherited obligations to the country or

to existing standards, they have questioned old social and cultural

traditions, explored new fusions of east and west, and put materialism

much higher up the agenda. Geo TV, in particular, has been the flag bearer

of a new vision for middle class Pakistan in which money and good looks are

the hallmarks of success.

One of the most sophisticated interpreters of these trends, marketing

consultant Zohra Abbas, argues that liberalization of the Pakistan economy

was a macro-event which involved a major transformation of Pakistani

cultural attitudes. She says the move to 'freedom of choice' and a

philosophy of 'survival of the fittest' constituted 'a whole new way of living'

which would gradually become the new culture of Pakistan. In an article

written with two British market analysts at the beginning of the satellite

revolution and using a system of cultural classification developed by them,

Zohra divides Pakistan since independence into three age groups—the first,

those who brought independence, the second, 'the Benazir age group, and

the third, 'the post-liberalization age group: tomorrow's consumer. She

accepts that 'outer-directed culture', by which is meant the new world of

consumer choice, changes much faster than 'inner-directed culture', which

relates to the home and family and long-established beliefs. In the new

4

world, people will tap into two or more cultures and will have to cope with

the contrasts and conflicts between them. But Zohra argues that the

'genetic coding of Pakistani society', which she defines as 'acceptance and

adaptability, will ensure that 'Pakistan's cultural response to liberalization,

and the resultant invasion of foreign culture through branded goods and

services will be positive.

Translating this vision into programs which will sell new products to

the Pakistani middle class has been the job of advertising agencies, who

have worked closely with television companies to achieve this purpose. The

culture which has emerged from this collaboration is a mixture of mutually

reinforcing lifestyles and commodities, with branded goods. According to

Zohra: 'Liberalization of the mind has occurred alongside liberalization, of

the market.... The average consumer is now truly beginning to see what

brand choice is?

Satellite programs are being watched by all sections of the urban

community, from the students of elite colleges to labourers in cities like

Lahore and Karachi. But urban youth are a key target group which have

been offered a new image of themselves. Satellite music channels,ARY

Musik, MTV and Channel V, have played an important role in putting

pleasure and consumption much higher up the agenda than in the past.

A new emphasis on personal appearance is also fed by Indian and

Pakistani soap operas and encouraged by a growing cosmetics industry.

Sociologist Dr Iqbal Saif (2002) says, ‘TV has contributed to the culture of

packaging oneself. This comes in the form of middle class girls coming into

the profession as models and modeling being considered respectable’.

Many critics and artists use the term 'packaging' disapprovingly; they

see it as characteristic of new trends in art and culture. Columnist Ata ul

Haq Qasmi says ‘money now dominates everything’. Even our contemporary

5

architecture has to show itself. Theatre is showing this trend. Hyping

everything. Sohail Ahmad a theatre director and television actor, makes the

same point. ‘There was a time when ‘sponsored by’ would be tucked in the

corner of the advertisement.... It was an embarrassment. Today it is a sign

of success.... It is linked to the consumerist way of thinking; packaging is

the most important thing.’

In keeping with the emphasis on individualism, many satellite

channels have created a new environment in which audiences feel more

empowered than before. They discarded PTV's serious discussion programs

with politicians and intellectuals; instead, they brought the viewers into the

studios and used them to call politicians and intellectuals to account. The

vogue for seriousness was replaced by showmanship. But with it came a far

greater sense of public participation, as evidenced in the huge popularity of

musical talent shows like Gae Gee Dunya Geet Mere or political debates with

studio participation like Jawabdeh and Pachas minute, both on Geo TV.

This sense that the individual viewer counts is part of the new

populism of satellite TV which is having an effect throughout society. Since

satellite TV ended PTV's monopoly, TV talent spotting competitions and

shows encouraging audience participation have developed very large

audiences all over Pakistan, particularly among the young. These influences

have gone right down to the district levels in Pakistan. The principal of a

college in Lahore told that 'shows like Gae Gee Dunya Geet Mere have

created an urge in the minds of the young to learn music. Some students

expressed desire to appear on these music shows.'

There is some evidence, however, that the promotion of consumer

products is also promoting social equality. This is also the view of Dr.

Anwar Iqbal who has researched the effect of television commercials. He

discovered, contrary to his own expectations, that the audience's

6

relationship with commercials was helping to create 'a secular kind of world

where consumption patterns were shared'.

At the same time, the new vogue for branded goods has generated

cottage industries all over Pakistan producing surrogate versions for those

who cannot afford the real thing. Television is promoting a fake culture...',

said a working class man in Karachi. 'There is no item that cannot be faked.

Nobody sells genuine items. I know the hotels here sell fake Pepsi.... Most

things advertised on TV are so expensive and out of reach of people like us

that there are cheaper, sub-standard versions of everything available in the

markets.' Another said, ‘There is a vast disparity between our leaders and

people, we are given nothing, no health package, no educational facilities

and yet we are talking about entering the twenty-first century. What are we

going on-a donkey cart?’

Another contribution of satellite TV and its talk shows has been to

promote far greater openness about issues like human rights, women's

rights, questions of choice and career, sexuality and relations with others.

Nigar Tariq of the Aurat Foundation says: 'There was nothing like that

available when I was growing up: no opportunity to talk about what men

think about women, what they want, what women want from their lives.

Half the things that people invited to TV studios say is pure garbage but it

does not matter; the fact is that they have a platform and an opportunity to

think about these issues.' Academic Rukhsana Aslam agrees: ‘The best

thing about satellite TV is that it has allowed a lot of people to express

opinions.... The last two years' debates on women's issues on talk shows

would have been unimaginable before satellite TV.

New ideas about sexuality have also been a key element in a new

generation of TV soap operas which are one of the main battlegrounds

between PTV and its satellite rivals. PTV still addresses far larger audiences

than any of the satellite channels, but since it began the metro channel to

7

build a national urban audience to counter the appeal of its satellite rivals,

it has been competing directly with them for advertisements aimed at the

Pakistani middle class. As a result, as broadcaster Sarwat Ateeq predicted,

satellite television has had a cloning effect on PTV, which ‘affects even those

who only view domestic channels’.

In the pre-satellite era, PTV's own strategy for building a mass

audience took a very different form. In the late 1980s, it had begun to

broadcast what are known as 'spiritual'— serials which dramatize some of

the great religious traditions of Pakistan. The first two of these, which were

based on the great Muslim epics, the Tipu Sultan and Mohammad Bin

Qasim were watched by hundreds of millions of viewers and were seen by

many of them not just as entertainment but as a national-cum-religious

experience. For PTV, these serials were a source of professional pride and

formidable new revenues, but they also attracted considerable controversy

because they were widely believed to have underplayed the great heroes. In

terms of Pakistani popular culture, however, they showed the powerful role

that television could play in appealing to the emerging middle class market

in religious, and particularly in terms of Muslim nationalism.

The emergence of three main religious political parties in the National

Parliament as dominant religio-political pressure groups and their influence

at the national level and in Punjab, NWFP and Balochistan in the mid-

1980s contributed to the emergence of a more conservative cultural

atmosphere. The popular satellite channels have invested heavily in religion;

examples are Geo, Indus and ARY , where they are engaged in more direct

competition with PTV for a mass audience. But still these Urdu satellite

channels have been aiming at different audiences and offering different

visions of modernity. PTV, despite its new dependence on market forces,

represents a tradition of state control, paternalism, and conservative

morality, whereas the popular satellite channels are pursuing an agenda

8

centered far more on personal choice and consumption. If liberalization

involves major changes in outlook and philosophy, as Zohra Abbas has

argued—'from isolation to interaction with the rest of the world, from

ideology to rationality, from curbing consumption to stimulating demand,

from obeying authority to freedom of choice, from protectionism to survival

of the fittest' -the satellite channels are very much more at the cutting edge

of change than PTV. For PTV, the pursuits of commercial competition have

involved a crisis of identity which has still not been resolved. In many parts

of Pakistan, it is losing urban audiences and finding it difficult to win them

back.

CABLE CHANNELS AND THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING ARISTOCRACY

As far as Pakistan's English-speaking elites are concerned, it is often

said that they have more in common with each other than with their own

compatriots. English language education has always enjoyed an official

patronage in the post-independence period. The professional job market has

continued to value English and middle class parents have seen it as vital to

their children's advancement, whether at home or abroad. In this sense,

globalization is not a new thing; it is an old phenomenon which is becoming

more powerful as a result of improved technology and communication.

Among the English-educated middle class, there is wide appreciation

of the extension of choice which the satellite revolution has brought.

Whether one is talking to intellectuals in capital cities or teachers in district

towns, everyone acknowledges that their access to information and

entertainment has improved. Young adults, particularly males, welcome the

new access to international news and international sports coverage. There is

appreciation for the professionalism of many satellite productions and for

better quality documentaries and wildlife programs. But there are also

concerns about the ruthless commercialism of the entertainment channels,

9

the morality implicit in some of the serials, the effect of consumerism on

children and the lack of serious programming about Pakistan.

The other striking finding of my Focus Group Discussions is the

dramatic decline in viewing of PTV programs in cable and satellite

households. PTV features infrequently in the lists of favorite programs, not

only among English-knowing middle class groups but also among Sindhi,

Punjabi, Pushto and Urdu speakers. Many middle class viewers have

switched to GEO, ARY, Indus, BBC and CNN for news and current affairs, to

Zee or Sony for entertainment, to Star and ESPN for sports, and to

Discovery for science, environment and wildlife. PTV may be holding its

own, where its reach is unrivalled, but in the urban areas it is not doing

well, except with the older generation and staunch religious groups.

Discussions held among English-speaking middle class groups in

Karachi indicate that satellite TV has been a means of reinforcing their

existing preferences. Young middle class professionals working for

multinational employers in Karachi watched very little television; they

worked long hours and returned home late. A majority said, they preferred

reading to watching TV. What they wanted from television was news and

business updates and 'something light' for relaxation. Channel preferences

included Geo, Ary, Star News, Star Movies, CNN and BBC. There seemed to

be no following for PTV. In many ways, this kind of group looks outside

Pakistan for its role models. Asked about Pakistani culture on television,

one discussant said: 'I am not interested in the past.'

Girls and boys of 12 or 13 years of age going to the elite Lahore

Cathedral school showed a similar preference for international programs.

They liked British comedies, sports, particularly football matches, news and

the Discovery Channel. They preferred English horror movies like The X-

files, saying 'PTV programs don't look real'.

10

Employees of a Pakistan bank in Lahore were contemptuous of PTV

and Urdu soaps. No one with cable watched PTV; they thought the

programs and presentation were too poor. One called PTV ‘the pits; a second

said: ‘They just don't care.’ Mostly in their 30s, they watched cable TV for

news, current affairs, sports and the occasional film. A surprising trend was

witnessed and recorded in Islamabad where participants of a focus group

discussion and senior government officers showed similar trends.

Among a largely professional group interviewed in Rawalpindi, Geo

news was the most regularly watched program. ‘They have managed to

capture the culture, I live in’, said one discussant. But another criticized

Geo news—and much of satellite TV—for being centered in the West. ‘The

basic orientation of TV here is not Pakistan’, he said. ‘I am watching more

about the USA and UK, not about Karachi and Peshawar, and I want to

know why we are obsessed with the West’.

Though these illustrations come from major cities of Punjab and

Karachi metropolitan, they can be reproduced among English speaking

elites in other provinces of the country. Sindh indicates a similar divide in

viewing habits between elite or upper class, which follows English language

programs, and the middle class which is happier with Local colour. As

Ghazala Erum puts it: 'The upper class has always felt that alienation from

local culture was a sign of privilege, a status symbol. In that way, there is

continuity in the perception of their own culture.... Children of the elite

regularly request songs on MTV and Channel V. The middle class children

only watch, but they prefer Urdu channels. They also can't afford calls to

Dubai. But those who get to watch ‘serious’ channels have a higher level of

knowledge than their parents.'

11

THE BIRTH OF A NEW CULTURE

It is among the college and university populations of Pakistan that

satellite television has made its greatest impact because this group is most

affected by new trends in language, fashion or behavior. Earlier, the

incorporation of elites into the international community took place in a more

subtle and limited way. Now satellite television is thrusting the commercial

face of Western industrial civilization into almost every metropolitan

household and helping to create a new global middle class ethos which

affects far larger numbers of people. 'Given certain socio-economic

characteristics', said a Pakistani advertising executive, 'we are looking at the

same kinds of markets. And advertisements are market driven. So the

foundation of a shared culture is already laid. Earlier, the gap between the

elite and the rest of the middle class was very wide. Now television is playing

a part in leveling those differences, particularly among college students in

metropolitan cities’. As the same executive put it, 'The children of the middle

class, with their demand for Nike shoes and Docker Levis Jeans and Calvin

Klein T-shirts, look much the same wherever they live’.

MTV started off on the Star platform offering Western pop music to

Indian and Pakistani audiences and being widely criticized as culturally

invasive. After Rupert Murdoch took over Star, MTV was dropped and

replaced by Channel V, with more Indian and Pakistani VJs and more Urdu

pop music. It was a program mix of Indianization and Pakistanisation,

which brought immediate rewards. Channel V began to grow at 25 per cent

per year, helped by the popularity of its road shows, which reached out to

college students in the big Pakistani cities and made its VJs Popular figures.

In late 1996, MTV, re-launched itself with a much more Indian profile,

playing much more Urdu (Indian Mostly) film music. The style of

presentation was the same but the content changed dramatically. What had

begun as a largely western music channel appealing to students of elite

colleges changed to one carrying 70 per cent Urdu popular music. According

12

to MTV, 1997 brought a doubling of turnover and an increase in penetration

from 4 million to over 8 million homes in South Asia. The following year, the

channel was no longer aiming at a metropolitan audience but at over a

hundred cities in India and Pakistan.

A discussion group among 17- and 18-year old students from the elite

Beacon House school and college in Islamabad revealed that most of them

spoke English in the school (some at home too) and watched English

language television programs. None of the group watched PTV and neither

did their parents. VJs from the music channels were definite reference

points for style and fashion in music and dress, though most of it was

western. There was a strong following for English language soaps on Star

World. The vulnerable and comically indecisive lawyer Ally McBeal was a

particular favourite: 'I like Ally McBeal a lot. I can relate to her very well',

said one. 'Some of the episodes are really silly but many of them really show

the way a girl thinks', said another.

Outside the elite groups in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi, the

middle class even in same cities and other large cities like Peshawar or

Faisalabad, the music channels were less popular and more controversial.

In these cities, traditional values are still well respected and students

displayed more resistance to western role models and morals. Among middle

class Pushto-speaking students in Peshawar, the boys expressed a

preference for news, sports and quizzes, while girls favoured mythological

and Urdu satellite serials. However, the girls were openly enthusiastic about

TV fashions. ‘That is what I am watching each time', said one young woman,

'... the hairstyle, the shoes, the clothes.... I watch the music channels only

for that’.

A similar University students group in Faisalabad expressed worries

and some frustration at the moral values reflected in satellite programs. One

participant said, 'I get an inferiority complex—when I see all these serials....

13

People are having sex at our age.... Why can't I if they can?' The group also

differed over the music channels and the role of VJs. Several of them

watched the music channels, but one said, 'The VJs are the most irritating

souls on earth. They talk rubbish, wear stupid clothes.' Others said, 'They

are copying foreign values. They are not even imitating. They are aping.'

MTV and Channel V offer young people a vision of a freer, more

fashionable world, the promise of more gratification and an entertaining

escape from parental and cultural pressures. Dr Anwar Iqbal-a sociologist

who studied the influence of television in Pakistan found that 'there is a

moral panic among parents with satellite channels, especially Channel V

and MTV, Zee and Sony and even local Urdu channels, in the lower middle

class, where parents say they are afraid to leave the home and go away

because children will turn to these channels.'

The scale of the culture shock which the music channels have caused

has also prompted some heart-searching among those involved in marketing

the new visions. 'The question that worries me', said one of them, 'is that

because of the high aspirations and media floating around...are we going to

see class wars? ...When will the servant's son turn around and say, ‘Why

the hell not me?’

Ansa Akhrtar believes it is the promise of a different kind of sexuality

for the next generation that has caused anxiety. She says, 'There is nothing

else that is bothering nice middle class people, including myself, more than

talk of sexuality and aspirations. Behind the facade of criticizing the media

for creating aspirations and for not addressing real issues is the fear that

our children will have a sexuality and aspirations that I will not be able to

address.'

The same music channels also have a following in the metropolitan

centers of other South Asian countries; among college students in Dhaka or

14

Colombo or Katmandu, where public opposition to Western influences is

more marked (Page & Crawley, 2001). According to Huma Haque (2001), a

social scientist at Quaid-i-Azam University, 'preference for MTV is based on

the English-medium school culture', which is already preparing the children

of the professional class to absorb western influences. She says 'the germs

of western preferences, individualism and materialism are already present

in the youth of this class.' A discussion among students attending colleges

in Islamabad produced much praise for the Urdu channels like GEO, Indus

and ARY and many criticisms of PTV. These channels have good numbers,

good beat, one can enjoy them.... The Pakistani programs are very dull', said

Hina, a recent matriculate. In General, however, much of this enthusiasm is

privately relished and expressed; it has not given rise to the same degree of

public activity or display as in Karachi or Islamabad because of social

pressures within the society.

In all, MTV and Channel V are more popular in the big cities than in

the small towns. 'In urban areas, the culture is being taken over by

something that is not Pakistani', said one student. 'TV has introduced a

‘punk’ culture. From childhood, kids have taken to wear earrings and

singing pop songs. These are the negative effects of TV, said another. Most

young Pakistanis deny any disloyalty to their culture or disrespect for their

parents. But they acknowledge the power of the new influences. 'Pakistan

TV should also go on satellite’, said one student. ‘That way other people will

also know something of our country... It also means that just like Zee, Sony

and MTV have a strong impact on our society, similarly Pakistan TV can

promote Pakistani culture elsewhere.'

SATELLITE SOAP OPERA

Satellite TV has created its greatest ethical and cultural impacts as a

result of a new series of soap operas which offered the public bolder themes,

franker treatment of personal relations, and fewer happy endings. The

15

Pakistani cinema, went beyond the taboos of class and community, and

redeemed relationships that would not have been condoned in traditional

society. But, Pakistani cinema too failed to broaden and democratize ideas

of nationhood and to play its own part in the project of building an

independent country. At the same time it did little to challenge the extended

family or the values it enshrined. Many soap operas on Urdu satellite

television have broken this trend, modeling themselves on the sexual

openness of American soap operas and offering new role models to Pakistani

audiences. One major reason for this is satellite TV's more segmented

audience.

The special and peculiar themes were the hallmarks of satellite

television initially, but by the mid-1990s, PTV serials were also exploring

similar relationships. PTV had pioneered soap opera in the late 1970s and

1980s with Afshan, Waris, Khuda ki basti, andheray Ujalay which carried a

message of modernity centering on the family and clan relationship. That

was the time when television intended to serve the development goals of the

state. Later, in the same decade, PTV also broadcast a number of soap

operas offering women new role models and exploring their rights. One of

these, Kiran Kahani, about a woman's efforts to become an independent

person by challenging the highhandedness of her in-laws, proved extremely

popular. By contrast, satellite TV soap operas of the 2000 were tailored

more to the demands of the advertisers than to those of the society.

Anwar Iqbal and Rana, who have studied the Changing discourses of

Pakistani cinema and television (Anwar & Rana, Television in Pakistan,

IDRC Research Monographs, 1993: updated 2002) point out that in its

earlier incarnation 'serious, domesticated, educative' PTV was seen as 'a

counterpoint to popular cinema', which offered 'an escape into a fantastic

larger than life world'. Now, PTV is occupying similar ground to the

Pakistani cinema, while satellite TV Zee is offering 'imaginary spectator

16

positions' which violate its norms. They point out that in Pakistani cinema

anything but the monogamous and the heterosexual tends to be disallowed.

'If there is, for example, a love triangle, one of the characters conveniently

gets killed towards the end of the film, leaving behind a monogamous,

reassuring residue!' But the satellite TV soaps 'with their endless round of

extramarital and pre-marital relationships, replete with children born out of

wedlock, offer a sharp contrast....' With all this, they say, 'the moral

landscape of urban popular culture has become far more complex and

problematic, engendering resistance of various kinds. Anwar & Rana’s

reference is obviously Indian channel ZEE, because the study was

conducted before the arrival of GEO, ARY and Indus Vision.

THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW LANGUAGE

The new satellite culture has also challenged the linguistic

phenomenon of Pakistan by producing its own lingua franca which mixes

English and Urdu. This new language, pioneered by Zee TV and later

followed by Geo, ARY, and innumerable FM radio Stations throughout

Pakistan has come to be known as ‘Unglish’ and sometimes ‘Minglish’, has

caught on with the urban young all over Pakistani metropolis and has

become a point of controversy with others. One of the reasons for its

popularity is its complete break with the style and preoccupations of the

national broadcasters. ‘TV always reflected the best and refined type of

language', says Aslam Azhar, former managing Director of PTV. ‘Zee entered

and changed that, the others followed. It distoted the ethics and beauty of

language'.

My research in Pakistan confirm that television has produced 'a

perceptible change in the usage of language'. In Pakistani urban centers,

‘higher classes' are reported to be using more Urdu and English words in

everyday language. The 'educated middle classes’ are trying to retain the

17

Persian flavor of their language by using 'either pure Urdu or elite English

words'.

There are both hostile and pragmatic responses to this pervasive new

fashion. Mansha Yaad, a writer and Playwright in Islamabad, told me that

'the most corrupting language is of Zee and Star news. The Zee language

neither contributes to Urdu nor to the English language. I am not against

using English words in Urdu. But the words should not be like pieces of

stone in rice.’ Others see a more relaxed approach to language as a

necessary response to fast-changing times. Ejaz Hanif, a lecturer of Urdu in

Islamabad, says that there were no words in this language for many new

products, processes and services. TV has given those words. He says, ‘The

concept of purity of language is humbug. I welcome the new trend. This

language does not make a fetish whether the word is English or Urdu or

Punjabi, as long as it is understood by the majority of listeners.’

Aslam Azhar, former Managing Director of television, ridicules this as

'Minglish' and sees it as part of a deterioration in standards, promoted by

the Urdu satellite channels and imitated by Pakistan's commercial

producers. Others are concerned that children are picking up English words

from television and using them in conversation at the expense of their Urdu

vocabulary. To this extent, they see satellite TV as undermining the

distinctiveness of Pakistan's lingua franca.

Professor Fateh Mohammabd Malik, the Chairman of the National

Language Authotrity, believes, ‘some of the changes in approach to language

provoked by satellite competition have improved communication. There has

been a tendency to use fewer loan words from Arabic and Persian to simplify

language in order to speak more directly to viewers. Urdu in its perfect form

is not only under attack from across the border; it is also changing its

character within Pakistan as it is increasingly owned and spoken by

Pakistan's other language groups. Professor Malik says 'No language can

18

remain pure if it is to grow. Fossilised languages cannot live. It is only

insecure societies who are scared to accept new things.’

However, there are concerns that the new style is an urban

phenomenon which reflects the dominance of the upper middle class

English elite in the new media and a lack of seriousness in communicating

with the rest of society, which does not know English. Some see the new

trend as a result of sloppiness— the projection of the linguistic inadequacies

of convent-educated trend setters onto the population as a whole. It is a

criticism made not just of satellite TV but of many of the new FM radio

channels in the big cities. According to radio producer and news editor

Jamal Haider Siddiqui, ‘people with British, American or any other foreign

accent gained preference over those with local accents. Entertainment and

idle talk became hip over the radio while responsibility was grossly

neglected. Investors who were behind these institutions seemed keen to

introduce foreign cultures and commercialism through their radio

programs.’

THE NEW FASHION TRENDS

Though mixtures of English and other languages have become the

norm in addressing urban audiences, Urdu satellite entertainment channels

have ensured their success with the wider public by exploiting the

popularity of less Pakistani and more Indian commercial cinema. The

cinema has always influenced style, language and behaviour and its stars

continue to exercise a huge fascination over Pakistani audiences. Inter-war

American cinema cliches transferred effortlessly into Lahore movies center

(popularly called Lollywood) from the styles of the stunt men and women to

the heavy overcoats and homberg hats of the Chicago gangsters. In the

same way, it is the dress and hairstyles of Indian film stars which are still

sought after at the fashion boutiques and hairdressers of urban Pakistan.

The jacket worn by Salman Khan in the film Maine Pyar Kiya, the hat Aamir

Khan wore in Dil Hai Ke Maanta Nahin or the saris Madhuri Dixit wore in

19

Hum Aapke Hain Kaun were all available in Karachi shops soon after the

films became popular. Such enthusiasm is largely confined to 'middle

Pakistan', but on occasion the upper middle class can also be affected.

Television has never had this kind of impact. Television has created

no single point hero. Not a single hero or heroine has functioned as a trend

setter in fashion or clothing during the past full decade. The nearest

television has come to producing its own cult following is for the VJs on

MTV or Channel V. But the intrusiveness of TV has had an impact at a

different level. Whereas films remain in the realm of fantasy for many

viewers, television projects the stars as human success stories and

stimulates interest in their lifestyle, relationships, wealth, clothing and

personal likes and dislikes. In this sense, stars are an important element in

the commodification of everyday life.

A survey of the impact of satellite television in two big cities in

Pakistan—Lahore and Karachi provided ample evidence that satellite

television serials are stimulating a growing interest in personal appearance

and beautification. Though many of those interviewed denied they were

imitating the styles of the stars, the proprietor of famous Diplex Beauty

Parlour, Musarrat Misbah in Lahore said, her clients specifically demanded

hair styles from famous models as well as those of Krishman kapoor and

Princess Diana. Even in a smaller town of Gujranwala, clients of Rose

Beauty Parlour, requested for the style of famous movie stars and Satellite

TV VJs Its proprietor, Mrs. Zeenat, believes that ‘beauty consciousness is

the contribution of TV shows'. She says in Gujranwala, it has become

normal practice to visit the beautician before attending any celebration and

she believes TV has introduced this trend in a comparatively backward

place'. In Gujranwala, fifty beauty parlours are doing comfortable business.

In Lahore, there are more than 1200 beauty parlours and Karachi over 2500

and a number of these with state-of-the-art equipment.

20

Evidence from dress shops in big cities suggests that there is a

roaring business in dresses popularized in Indian films, with the Karachi

wholesalers dispatching them in volume once the film has become popular.

These Indian movies are available to Pakistani audience through Cable TV.

However, Ruby kiran of Clifton Designs in Karachi told me that whereas

'clients from the middle and lower classes mention clothes worn by

actresses, higher class women—want their own exclusive designs.' She

believes that TV is developing 'fashion literacy'; women are coming into the

shop asking for 'hipsters' and 'tight-fit' fashions and she says sales of

dresses, including evening gowns, are running at 300 a month.

Staff at FM 90- a cosmetics shop in Islamabad, reported that sales of

cosmetics have increased dramatically since the early 1990s, with lipstick

becoming much more fashionable. Equally marked in Lahore is the trend

among the young towards T-shirts and jeans. The proprietor of Alam

Collections, a general dress shop, said that ‘Lahore is changing very fast.

The demand is sometimes based on costumes worn by actors and actresses;

sometimes it is triggered by advertisements.... In the last two or three

years... the turnover of my shop has increased many fold—thanks to TV ads

and serials.’

These new fashions encouraged by TV have provoked some criticism

from traditionalists. The salesperson at FM 90, selling sixty lipsticks a day,

has had to justify her activities to parents who object to her chosen work, 'I

told them that I am doing nothing wrong. Beautifying one's face and body

has a long Pakistani tradition.... The tradition is ancient; only the products

have changed.' The proprietor of Guddi Beauty Parlour, put up the same

defense, 'I do not think I am corrupting the culture of Pakistan. Beautifying

oneself has been a long tradition in Pakistan. Mughal dresses and queens

dresses and cosmetics are a very well told story’.

21

The same programs are also having an impact among the middle class

in Pakistan According to informants in Islamabad, local designers not only

watch Zee's fashion programme (Khoobsurat) they also record it for future

reference. Pakistani channels may also be aiding a comeback for the

trousers, which went into an officially-enforced decline during the days of

General Zia-ul-Haq. Pakistani fashion magazines have been featuring

trousers and pants again and the wearing of pants and short shirts has

become more common on festivals and social occasions. Even in smaller

towns these influences are acknowledged. Professionals in Faisalabad told

me, ‘TV programs are really affecting the way our women perceive

themselves. I can see it in the number of beauty parlours that have come up

after I began getting satellite channels here. These are things that have to be

considered carefully. Women's fashion can lead to a strain in relationships

for the simple reason that I can't afford the kind of fashion shown on TV.'

Film and TV influences on young men centre on Indian film stars like

Shahrukh Khan and cricketers like Wasim Akram, both appear in

advertising campaigns for well-known products. Both have acquired cult

status with the young, not just for their professional acting and playing but

also for their very noticeable wealth. For many young men from unprivileged

backgrounds, cricket and films offer a means of identifying with success and

the fantasy of achieving the same themselves.

Many working class parents in Pakistan were clear that ‘boys were

more influenced than girls' by television serials and films. One mother said,

'My kid watches TV like mad—and he cares less about his studies.... The

kids are obsessed with sports programs and dramas, they copy the songs

and dances. This idolizing of film stars has also brought a new interest in

physical development. In Islamabad and Karachi, I discovered that health

clubs had sprung up, something quite new to the culture of the town. 'The

youths had seen the well built heroes of the films and wanted to imitate

22

them.' Meeting a group of young men in Rawalpindi I noticed that some had

grown their hair long like Indian film star Sanjay Dutt. One boy always

talked like another Indian film actor Salman Khan... He felt he is Salman

khan. I could see that almost everybody was obsessed by films and serials.

The other obsession is cricket, which is now preferred to traditional

games in rural areas. The owner of an Islamabad general stores said that

within three months, he had sold 400 bats marketed in the name of Shahid

Afridi, the well-known cricketer. According to school teachers in Rawalpindi,

‘Instead of gulli danda (a rural and semi urban sport of lower middle class)

they have taken up cricket.. .the students are addicted to viewing one day

cricket matches on the TV.... They know all the cricketers and their records.

They know all the terms used to describe the game’.

In a lively debate on Geo, about the influence of television one man

said, 'The young generation has gone astray because of over exposure to TV

programs. They sing dirty songs, gesticulate in a dirty manner. Their ideals

are not Quaid-i-Azam but Shahrukh Khan and Sanjay Dutt. Another

reported, 'I do not agree with my friend. I find TV a good educational device.

There are lots of informative programs. You will find the level of knowledge

of the younger generation higher than us. It is a thousand times better to

see programs on TV than to loiter around in the streets’.

CHILDREN – THE VICTIMS

The need to protect children as a vulnerable group from exposure to

unsuitable programming is a responsibility which government and

broadcasting authorities take seriously all over the world. Many

broadcasters operate watershed policies which keep programs with adult

story lines or excessive violence off the air until children are supposed to be

in bed. But such policies are only partially effective, even with active

parenting. Another area of concern and one which is more difficult to

23

monitor and control is the targeting of children in advertising. The

exploitation of 'pester power' is becoming increasingly sophisticated and

some marketing companies has now spread 'from sweets and snack foods—

often linked to film or television characters aimed at the under 12s—to CDs,

computer software, and even cars and holidays.

Akram Mughal and Shaukat Qureshi, who studied the impact of

television advertising on children in Pakistan, present a case for real

concern at the profound changes which have taken place in cultural

attitudes among the television generation. According to their research,

young people spend an increasing number of hours watching TV and are

enthralled by it. They say TV is presenting consumerism as a way of life.

Consumer non-durables are the easiest things to sell because they do not

require a big investment. But advertisements for soft drinks and cosmetics

boost the market for a whole range of consumer durables associated with

'modern' lifestyles.

Analyzing children's reaction to television advertisements, Qureshi

and Mughal note that the push to individual consumption on a western

pattern tends to undermine more traditional habits of sharing. Advertising

promotes the nuclear family at the expense of the joint family. They argue

that many children have begun to associate happiness with owning or

possessing a toy or being indulged by their parents. During a discussion

working class groups were in support of the view that parents are under

pressure from their children to buy things. A group of working class women

in Rawalpindi said they were influenced by advertisements, particularly for

cosmetics and toiletries, with their children wanting them to try all sorts of

new products. A small shopkeeper in Rawalpindi said of his son: ‘If he

wants, then he wants. There is no stopping him.' One boy in this group had

even demanded a mobile phone from his father’.

24

Middle class housewives in Rawalpindi raised worries that children

had become addicted to TV. 'If there is an interruption', said one, 'my child

insists to call up the cable guy immediately'. Another mother recounted how

her boy had seen a sweet advertisement at 10 p.m. the previous evening and

demanded one immediately. Akbar', she said, 'my husband had to step out

and buy it so he would stop crying.' Some of this group were using TV as a

means of amusing their children and paying a price for their absorption in

the world of advertisements, which many of them knew by heart. A similar

group in Lahore revealed that in 'many houses the television is on all day,

though viewing is concentrated at particular times. In these families, the

children seemed to control the remote and were 'crazy to try advertised

products’.

Many parents argued that satellite television was playing a dangerous

role in advertising alcohol and cigarettes. Alam Saeed, an academic

psychologist who studies the impact of TV on children says, 'I as parent say

‘learn good things’, but what has been prohibited for generations is

highlighted as fantastic by the media.' In a discussion in Karachi, satellite

TV was blamed for the growing popularity of alcohol among young people,

who were arranging drink parties when parents are away. ‘We cannot leave

young boys alone in vacant houses. TV has given prestige to drinking’, was

the view of this group. In Lahore, a professional said, 'In the old films,

consumption of alcohol was not prestigious.' 'When the character in the film

was not in a normal state of mind he used to consume alcohol, but these

days—alcohol is being taken casually as if it's a cup of tea. This is a very

dangerous thing...in a city like Lahore you will see so many shops selling

Alcohol illegally, although it is strictly prohibited in Pakistan’.

Poor teenagers from a Christian slum area of Islamabad proved to be

very familiar with satellite TV programs. Most of these teenage boys and

girls worked part time or full time; some went to the local government

25

school. Several of them saw satellite TV as a strong aspirational influence.

'They show such goodies that I immediately want to acquire them', said

Nazia, aged 14. 'The only question is where to get the money from...But I

still love watching the advertisements and know by heart the names of all

the items....' 'I like to watch movies and programs that show people rising

from a low to a high position', said Anthony, aged 19. 'I wish they would

show more programs like this which encourage many like us to continue

our struggle.' Bashir, aged 16, said, 'I have learnt that America and England

are the best places to be if you can get a job there. Then you can have

access to all the things like imported jeans, shoes and of course Kentucky

Fried Chicken and Pizza Hut’.

Qureshi and Mughal, in their analysis of TV advertising in Pakistan,

note that in middle class households children also influence their parents'

decisions on the purchase of big items such as refrigerators or cars.

Advertisers know this and use this in their marketing strategy for adult

consumer goods. According to the director of an advertising firm in

Islamabad, 'Children are exposed to advertising of products which have no

connection to them, yet the parents are under mounting pressure to take

their children's opinion into account when making any decision related to

the purchase of goods. The advertising agencies have capitalized on this by

coming up with many more advertisements directed at children’.

With the vast majority of households in Pakistan only having one TV

set, it is not surprising to learn that children spend most of their time

watching programs made for adults. But there is also a shortage of

programs for children, both on PTV and the satellite channels. The only

frequently mentioned children's programme was Ainak Wala Jin(a demon

with spectacles) on PTV, with a central character modelled on Superman.

The satellite channels are best known for their western cartoons, whose

accessibility to Pakistan children has proved a cost effective means of

26

reaching these audiences without commissioning any regionally specific

alternatives. Discussions With parents frequently highlighted this

inadequate provision and there was a strong demand for more children's

programs. Laborers in Rawalpindi regarded many programs shown during

the day as unsuitable for children.

WOMEN IN CABLE CAGE

A great deal of the debate about satellite television has been about its

influence on women. A study of viewing habits by the two Pakiatani social

scientists conducted in 1992 showed that women are more 'regular' in TV

viewing than men and that the lower the income group, whether male or

female, the more regular is the viewing (Anwar & Rana, 1992). Women also

view TV for longer periods than men and they are more likely to make time

to view what they like. They are also heavier consumers of cable television

than men, which means that the 'modern' story lines of the soap operas are

playing to very full houses.

The story lines of satellite TV serials are of special interest because

they project women in different roles from those of wife, mother and home

maker. Serials like Tara or Hasratein on Zee and Umrao jan Ada on ARY and

Thori see Mohabbat on Geo have dealt with issues of working women,

divorce, extra-marital relationships, sexual harassment, rape and abortion

in ways that were unfamiliar in the days of PTV's monopoly. With their

depiction of 'the new bold woman', they have offered a variety of new role

models to the urban middle class and provoked much controversy in the

process.

The evidence from one discussion groups suggested such new role

models have been more influential in the larger cities than elsewhere. A

group of women in Lahore felt that the serials on Zee by and large painted

'an unreal and perverted picture of women'. Two working class women took

27

very strong objection to what they termed 'the misbehaviour of young

women in serials'. They claimed that their day-to-day life and reality was

never shown in the serials or films. To them the women shown on the

screen belonged to a very small affluent section of the Pakistani society,

which is not at all representative.

Among the middle class, there is a definite following for the new soap

operas. Middle class home makers in Lahore expressed distaste for the new

themes but admitted watching Hasratein regularly. 'we are now hooked and

I want to know the end', was one reaction. Another said: 'It is a different

story but such things are taking place in society today.' Middle class

students in Lahore were also watching the serial, though it was clear that

they did not see Savitri as a radical figure, despite her extra-marital

relationship. Asked whether they found Hasratein bold, one of them replied,

'It is bold, but Savitri does not act bold. She is like a traditional wife.' 'I like

Savi', said another. 'She respects everyone and teaches me to respect

everyone.'

Here I will use Raymond Williams' (1974) description of culture as a

series of overlapping ideologies—the residual, the dominant and the

emergent—as a means of interpreting changing reactions among women of

different generations to the impact of the new media. The residual ideology

of self-sacrifice and self-denial, subservience to husband and family,

involves a fatalistic acceptance of the woman's traditional status. In line

with this interpretation, television has played a part in winning acceptability

for the idea of the middle class working woman, even if the numbers have

not grown substantially over the past ten years.

The serials which portray women fighting for their rights rather than

exploring new personal relationships, seem to have developed a committed

following across a broader social spectrum. As one working class woman in

Rawalpindi put it, 'The women are strong and fight injustice—they do not

28

believe they are inferior to the men’. The discussion group also argued that

the portrayal of women in teleserials had had an impact on men. As one

discussant put it, ‘Men have recognized that women can be strong role

models’. Cable TV is full of women who take decisions, who manage, who

matter. Men are beginning to get convinced that women are capable of

much more than they thought. As yet they are not threatened but the future

is not certain.

The franker treatment of sexuality in the satellite TV serials

(particularly on Indian channels) is another related area of debate. Zahida

Hina, a writer and women rights activist in Karachi believes that the new

channels 'are definitely opening up doors of sexuality'. She sees a growing

consciousness of the body and greater concern with one's looks. She says,

'Now, a fully body-conscious Pakistan woman is definitely not unreal.... even

in the serials, the middle aged woman is shown fit, dancing, singing...and

this is not only an upper class phenomenon. Even among the lower classes,

I see older women wearing brighter colored dresses.... There is a definite zeal

about looks and the outer form. This is one area where everybody is

touched. Bano Qudsia an intellectual and writer holds an absolutely

opposite view. She feels that pre-marital sex is portrayed as a symbol of

modernity, but it is insulting to women who keeps her body sacred and is

conscious of men’s wicked desires; and that there is greater awareness of its

ethical consequences.

Shima Kirmani, the Pakistani classical dancer and TV personality,

believes that 'Pakistani women are coming into their own', but that this

greater assurance is not being shown on the screen. She contrasts some

American serials with the general run of Pakistani ones. 'Take fantastic

programs like L. A. Law. You see women equal with men. Not just for sex or

comedy. May be there is a male boss but the women have voices which are

heard. A regular woman with class and taste who disagrees with her

29

husband is automatically bad. Shima is also skeptical about satellite TV's

progressive credentials. She says, 'the major impact of satellite TV has been

on middle class women in terms of day-to-day behavior, dressing and

language. This view is also supported by famous writer and poet Fahmida

Riaz. She says women are getting more visibility, issues are getting more

space, but there is too much stereotypical representation of their problems.

In fact she sees satellite TV as subversive of women's fight for political

emancipation. She says, it is a case of 'give them visibility and kill them' and

she holds that invisibility would have been preferable.

In general the women appreciated the new bold woman, though they

differed considerably over how the boldness was portrayed. An underlying

concern among working women themselves was that their portrayal in the

serials was 'extremely negative and problematic. Many of them even felt that

there was a conspiracy to malign working women and to project them as

home wreckers, divorcees, incompetent parents and often failures as

persons. One conclusion of these discussions was that women's worlds are

not reflected adequately on television and that something needs to be done

to correct the imbalance.

Professional women also voice similar concerns about the failure of

the new media to play a more progressive role. Professionals in Islamabad

wanted programs to show women playing a variety of roles. 'Women are

shown in plays, entertainment and movies and are not much included in

current affairs discussions, economic and political debates', said one

participant. 'Television is not showing what our women are achieving', said

another. 'Women should appear in the media in a diversity of roles, not a

limited and stereotyped one', was a third opinion. According to Huma Haque

of Quaid-i–Azam University, women's issues gained ground in Pakistan

during the 1990s; government and non-governmental organizations gave

more importance to them and they were more discussed on television. But

30

she says, teleserials and plays are still 'perpetuating the same traditional

image of a weak woman living happily within four walls’.

A study on the representation of women on the Pakistan Television

also concluded that during prime time television 'women are represented

primarily in their roles within the family and principally confined to the

domestic sphere'. Its authors, Dr Seema Parvez, Asok Kumar and Yasser

Noman (Parvez, Kumar & Noman, 1998) found this to be particularly true of

teledramas. They say, many of them are 'rampant with gender stereotypes'.

Very few critically consider issues such as oppression of women within the

family or problems of domestic violence. Moreover, the few that do, such as

the popular teledrama, Ajaib Khana which raised the issue of unequal

marriages, fail to resolve them from a progressive angle. The authors also

criticised western films for their 'culture of violence' against women and

their representation as sex objects, ‘they have no positive impact’. Their

report argues that there is a need for 'clear and comprehensive guidelines

on gender and the media, and television needs to promote role models

'founded on achievement and not on appearance' and that there is a need

for more women in television management and more training in gender

issues for media staff.

ARE AUDIENCE CONSERVATIVE?

Many reflections on the impact of television in Pakistan are similar to

those observed in other societies entering the television age. People

comment on the role of the television set in reconstituting family space, its

effect on the taking of meals, its implications for family relationships and

the new problems of choice and control, which have to be negotiated.

The respondents and discussants expressed nostalgia for the loss of

social interaction which was a hallmark of city life in the pre-television age.

Dr. Mirza Hamid Baig, a professor of literature, writer and scholar says, ‘the

city used to be full of small restaurants and sitting places, whereas today

'most people are before TV sets.... The TV has replaced the tea houses’.

31

Discussions in various cities and towns confirm a decline in

socializing. Family gatherings have grown less frequent as programs take

priority and social interaction is often determined by what is on TV. 'I know

I wouldn't want a guest when the drama is on', said one informant. 'Others

won't like it when a countdown show is being shown. I think that is the

biggest change in the last few years.

A common complaint of parents is that children are glued to the

television set and neglect their studies, though the supposed correlation

between addiction to television and poor exam results is not easy to prove.

Some parents have cable TV disconnected as exams approach, though most

teachers argue that television, properly used, has widened children's

horizons and helped them do better. The viewing and reading habits of

parents are (in most cases) more significant determining factors than the

presence or absence of a television set.

In Islamabad, it was not just parents who were complaining. School

children were also annoyed that parents did not bother to sit down with

them when they had difficulty with their homework. They would rather

watch TV than talk to their children. Some of the strongest reactions to the

new consumer culture come from religious leaders who see it undermining

spirituality and with it, their place in society. The Imam of Jamia Masjid in

Islamabad told that 'an attempt is being made to destroy the balance of the

spiritual and the material.... This is a global conspiracy and TV is a part of

it’. Some Ulema (Muslim clerics) are urging their followers to avoid television

entirely, though they know their advice is not generally being accepted. The

Imam of the Faruquia mosque in a middle class locality of Islamabad told,

'In Islam, only devotional music is allowed; no dancing is allowed; no alcohol

is allowed. All this is shown on TV. They show women without purdah on

TV. This is also strongly prohibited in Islam.’ The Imam does not condemn

32

TV outright, but he urges his followers not to see serials and films 'because

they are anti-Islam and corrupting’.

A well-known Aalim (Religious Scholar) Maulana Abdul Rasheed said

'the public has exceeded the limits of religion—almost to the extent that the

clergy can no longer capture the people's interest and imagination. He said

'our culture has been built up over fourteen hundred years since the time of

Holy prophet, and these programs are threatening all this.... I can't place

these commercial objectives on top and forget all else.'

Pakistani parents of almost all backgrounds express worries about the

greater incidence of sex, violence, bad language and bad behaviour on

satellite television. There is concern that violence on the screen is producing

copycat violence on the streets or in the classroom, that sexual gratification

and promiscuity are being encouraged and that certain kinds of more

explicit programs undermine family and traditional values. Parents and

grandparents fear that children are losing their innocence by being exposed

to unsuitable adult programs—especially the vulgarity of Indian Urdu film

songs and the unnecessary violence and frankness of serials.

Family viewing of programs with bolder themes or franker treatment

of sexuality is a source of embarrassment for most parents and some

children. One woman in a working class group discussion in Lahore said

that television had provoked children to ask all sorts of embarrassing

questions, 'Small children ask questions about underclothes, the

menstruation cycle, female sanitary napkins and contraceptive pills and

techniques. I cannot answer them. They shouldn't show such things on the

screen’.

Parents in rural settlement in Faisalabad district, were equally

concerned. 'Sex and violence are things that are not openly discussed in

average Punjabi Muslim families and should not be shown on television’.

33

Speculation about the impact of television is common, though most of

it cannot be confirmed when specific examples are sought. The discussion

groups in Lahore, some participants wanted to blame television for girls

running away with men of different ethnic groups and classes, though

others pointed out that such things had happened before. Others talked of

girls being raped in offices and workplaces, though no one was aware of any

specific examples and the police had no records of such crimes. Such

examples are symptomatic of general concerns about the impact of satellite

television, which is reflecting the fractured world of advanced urban

societies to localities with more conservative traditions.

Discussion groups commonly expressed the view that cable TV is

responsible for growing promiscuity in society. TV is seen as the immediate

culprit because of its visual presence discussing sex or portraying sexuality

related activities. However, as groups examined the issue in more depth,

they would generally modify their verdict, accepting that no media product

alone can be responsible for something as basic as sexual behaviour

patterns.

Satellite television is part of a complex pattern of social change, but a

number of professionals dealing with social and personal problems see it as

a negative influence. Dr. Anwar Iqbal, a social Scientist from Islamabad,

believes that part-time prostitution among college girls has increased, and

sees consumerist pressures driven by TV as deeply corrupting. MA Hashmi,

a social worker from Rawalpindi, who works for an NGO, says 'feelings of

understanding, dependency and mutual trust are increasingly absent in

people now and I see that as a direct result of the images on TV’.

Another worry for parents is the level of violence in Urdu films,

teleserials and cartoons. One worried parent said, 'Even cartoons are no

longer safe. Some of the characters have become so ridiculously violent that

they are losing their suitability for children. Children are learning to kick

34

and punch and use foul language.' A teacher in Islamabad noted that 'the

soft spoken and gentle romantic hero of yesterday has been replaced by the

uncouth, rugged, angry young man. ‘Today, children and youth like to

answer back, be rude and demonstrate aggressive behavior,’ he said.

A discussion group accepted that violence in society had its origins in

economic deprivation and social breakdown and could not be blamed solely

on the media, but many discussants did blame TV for a process of violence.

They held that people are willing to accept a greater degree of violence

because of their exposure to it on TV. Some also believed that TV did

influence the behavior of marginal players; those on the verge of assault or

adultery may risk it under the influence of TV.

There seems to be a class dimension to reactions to media violence.

Working class women in Karachi were more divided on this question than

some middle class groups from the same city. Some of them held TV

responsible for an increase in violence; they believed men were copying what

they saw on the screen. Others believed that TV had had a pacifying

influence on men. Some media commentators also stress these differences

of class perception. For the middle class, the level of violence in films is

outside their normal experience, whereas for the working class it is not

regarded as unusual. Shahzad Ahmad says,’ ‘When you take a clip from a

TV program of violence and abusive behavior and show them, nine times out

of ten they say ‘this is nothing.’ Let me tell you what happened here the

other day... ‘Women in slum areas are not surprised or shocked to see it

portrayed on TV. They are surprised that I am surprised’, he concluded.

Some discussants expressed concern that satellite television, which is

targeting the middle class with expensive products, may be alienating

working class and rural viewers and fuelling social unrest. But my research

among working class families in Lahore and Rawalpindi found more

evidence of prudence than of frustration and anger. These families, with a

35

purchasing power of less than Rs. 3,000 a month, all confront the dilemma

that their children are constantly exposed to advertisements for goods they

cannot afford to buy. They were critical of many of the programs and of the

advertisements, but they followed new products closely and exhibited a high

rate of sampling, whether of soaps, shampoos, biscuits or chocolates.

All the discussions show that people are worried about the impact on

others, not on themselves. The middle class is concerned about other

people's children and about the impact on the working class. The working

class, significantly, is concerned about what it sees as the growth of

corruption in the middle class. A group of Rikshaw drivers and craftsmen

interviewed in Karachi blamed the parents of rich children for conniving at

indecent behaviour. They said, they were afraid that their children would be

affected by rich adolescents. All of them were of the opinion that 'TV is

responsible for the creeping corruption in society, but they also recognised

‘some good effects’ of TV. One said, he thought the dowry system was

vanishing because of media exposure. He said, ‘in my home everyone is

convinced that this system is bad and outdated. I will try to marry my sons

and daughters without dowry. This is the contribution of TV’.

The young are also divided over the new cultural influences, but they

are less nostalgic and more open-minded. A group of students at a private

University in Islamabad told, they enjoyed the new soap operas, 'including

the carefree behavior of young men and women'. They did not find it

culturally degrading, but they said, they would not express this view to their

parents. They felt that their parents belong to the old generation and

naturally would not like their views. At a discussion with students at Punjab

University Lahore, some middle class students were as critical as their

parents of Lollywood programs and MTV, which they characterized as 'bad

and corrupting, but they showed less inclination to romanticize the past.

One said: ‘I have a culture and tradition of joint families. Individualism is

36

not liked by us. Slowly young people are leaving their parents after marriage

and starting to live separately. But this is due to socio-economic changes in

the society and not due to TV.’ A second said, ‘I agree, but TV has helped

this trend, the serials and films on TV show and glorify this trend.' A third

interrupted: 'Look, things are bound to change. We have become a global

village now. We are taking things from western culture. Some are bad but

some are good additions. I think our society is becoming modern’.

My research suggests that most viewers are far from passive in their

reactions. As well as appreciating the entertainment, they have tended to

take up messages of self-improvement, self-confidence, egalitarianism and

participation. They have also been critical of the shortcomings of satellite TV

and its strident commercialism. Many of them, particularly outside the

elites of the big cities, have shown themselves to be much more socially

conservative than some of the Karachi-based market research organizations

anticipated.

Similar conclusions are also being reached by many of the advertising

agencies who have played an important role in shaping the new media

market. A recent survey conducted for Higher Education Commission,

Ministry of Education among 15-34 year olds in Karachi, Lahore,

Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Hyderabad, Peshawar and Quetta showed that the

individualism of Karachi is not reproduced across the country. The survey

indicates that Cable TV has successfully widened its appeal to include the

urban middle class but that it now needs to adjust its profile to

accommodate their more family-oriented view of the world. Over 65 per cent

of the sample said they tried to obey their elders 'even if it hurts, with

Karachi scoring lowest on this question. The majority said their ideal music

channel would consist of 75 per cent Urdu film and pop music and 25 per

cent English music. The conservatism was balanced, however, by relatively

high scores in areas where personal choice has traditionally been limited.

37

well over 60 per cent thought they should only marry someone of their

choice (with Peshawar and Quetta more conservative than other centers)

and 31 per cent thought couples should not meet before marriage, with

females agreeing more strongly than males.

That Pakistan youth is socially more conservative than planners

anticipated is the leading outcome. The problem is that in attempting to

create youth attitudes borrowed from the west, many marketers are

forgetting to reflect that fact which already exists in Pakistani culture.

In terms of theories of globalization, the emergence of new satellite

culture has shown clearly that success in a large market like Pakistan

requires a high degree of localization. The religious programs on Geo, Indus

and ARY and transformation of Star TV and of the music channels is a clear

proof of that. The success of Some regional channels (like Zee TV) has been

copied by GEO , ARY, Indus, and to some extent by PTV. Beyond the evident

success of localization, there are important questions about the form and

character it has taken. New collaborations between international and

national business have generated a culture which follows western-style

consumerism with the popularity of Bollywood and reaches a sizeable

audiences. Its success has raised questions within Pakistan about the

failure of national culture. On the mass entertainment channel like PTV, it

is largely Pakistani culture which is being projected in a Pakistani version of

globalization. Consequently, looking at the cultural impact of the satellite

revolution in neighbouring countries brings into the picture questions not

simply of popular culture but also of inherited political attitudes and

relationships.

It is not Pakistani culture, which is in jeopardy; the entire social and

economic system is facing transformation. People are highly divided at all

levels on the impact of satellite TV. An other striking feature of my research

in that views expressed on the satellite programs represent only less than

38

20 percent population, while 80 percent is still out of their reach. Perhaps

this powerful segment will voice their views too, but not at least in an

immediate future. Thus the other striking outcome of satellite arrival can be

a sharp cultural divide among rural and urban population. The reaction and

response to satellite programs by rural population based on first hand social

experience are still not available.

39

Chapter 7

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

I have attempted to undertake a research on the anthropology of

television in Pakistan which has been extremely fascinating as well as

complicated. I have tried to deal with two fragile areas of investigation i.e.

culture and, television as a cultural career. Both are intertwined and in

current times largely interdependent also. I have used primarily the

anthropological tools to study electronic media (television) and also have

investigated the role of television in shaping the cultural patterns in today’s

Pakistan. I have partially used survey methods for collecting audience

response through structured tools but the main emphasis has been on

qualitative data which was gathered through various techniques such as in-

depth interviews, case studies and focus group discussions; both the

techniques have complimented each other greatly in my research. This

thesis has been divided accordingly into seven chapters which deal with

current theoretical concepts in media studies, historical background of

mass media and television in south Asia and Pakistan, responses of 1000

people on various program types, in-depth analysis of state controlled TV in

Pakistan and the impact of satellite television and the reaction of audience. I

have not done content analysis of various programs broadcast by Pakistan

Television and satellite channels, which is a separate area of investigation

and is beyond the scope of my research. I have concentrated on broader

areas by selecting different chunks of programs and have analyzed the

overall role and impact of television on people’s lives and culture. I have

tried to make the study most representative and current by covering every

possible segment of society ranging from common people, women, youth,

rural and urban population, policy makers, media managers, actors,

producers and directors to politicians and religious scholars. My research is

based on a set of hypotheses which assume that TV is responsible for

shaping the ethics of the society and a free and financially independent

40

television is a better option in Pakistan because people rate state television

very low as credible medium. This proposition was the basis of all the

analysis which has led to a final conclusion.

In chapter 2, I have discussed in detail what is meant by culture in

this study. The culture in the crudest form is not the point of reference but

it does refer to the day-to-day living patterns and those customs, traditions,

ethics and beliefs which are held by the people as most integral part of their

lives; they form the cultural life line of Pakistan. These beliefs and practices

are modern and valid in their own merit. I have discussed the concept of

cultural communication in detail and have deliberated at length the ideology

of British school led by Raymond Williams and Staurt Hall. In this chapter

history and evolution of television industry have also been included. A short

discussion on control mechanism has been added to elaborate the ever-

favorite subjects of modern thinkers – the cultural imperialism and

dependency paradigm.

In Chapter 3, I have given a detailed background of media in South

Asia, with small account of television scenario in South Asian countries

before giving a comprehensive picture of media and television in Pakistan.

All possible aspects of state television (PTV) have been discussed in this

chapter because of the obvious reason that the central thrust of my work is

on PTV as the largest and monopoly TV broadcaster in Pakistan. In this

chapter discussion and data on arrival of cable in Pakistan and subsequent

policy changes by the government have been provided.

Chapter 4 is a statistical account of audience response on various

programs types aired by PTV. In this chapter it has been clarified that PTV

is a choice by compulsion to majority of the population due to the fact that

cable is concentrated to 20 percent of the urban population and that too is

not available to all. The data shows that a cross section of society inclusive

of rural urban, rich and poor, all age groups irrespective of gender

41

differentiation are dissatisfied with PTV programs. Drama and sports are

most liked program types while the national news bulletin (Khabarnama)

was credited very low by all the groups. In this chapter a small comparison

with the biggest cable rival GEO has been included which also shows that

respondents appreciate better coverage by GEO. This survey also indicates

that the majority of respondents do not appreciate restrictions on TV. It was

also revealed by the target population that PTV has failed to project social

problems of the society and the overall impact of TV programs on people’s

lives is not positive. It has less provided information, education and

entertainment and has more adverse effects on middle and lower middle

class families in terms of portrayal of stranger cultures and projection of

affluent classes and the establishment at large.

I have discussed in Chapter 5 through in-depth interviews that

television has been the most favorite medium but highly controversial in the

society from day one in terms of its alien attitude and cultural distance from

the audience. In this chapter I have discussed that the connection between

television and society is less direct and television cannot be understood

without studying the people’s reaction towards TV Programs and watching

and talking about television are inseparable parts of a single social activity.

The conservative section of society including a number of intellectuals has

been dissatisfied with its messages. There was however a realization that

television has helped Pakistanis to feel more confident, less isolated and

backward. They have become better consumers also. A section of society

has been equally critical of its Americanization and also Indianization in

many respects. The feminist writers and groups blame television for

lowering the social position of women. Another powerful segment of society

has the opinion that television is creating a new mythical world ignoring the

current realities. I have discussed that effects of television program are not

direct; they reach people through a multiple socio-psychological channels

and are defined by various people under their own circumstance and

42

positions in the society. I have observed that most of the reactions and

responses are based on individual perceptions created by economic and

social positions. People interpret tele-visual texts under given conditions

and they redefine their interpretations when the conditions change.

However, it was an outcome of my research that a majority of viewers do

also interpret their immediate environment including family members under

the influence of TV texts and also expect a peculiar social behavior from

their family members and friend under the dictates of TV messages. Thus

TV is strongly reinforcing new cultural traits and strengthening and

diminishing the older ones at the same time. This was verified by the

ethnographic case studies conducted at Islamabad, where all the target

families define their relationship under the shadows of TV messages - some

realistic and some irrational. Individual discussions do add to this

phenomena in a slightly different way when people say that TV texts have

created a whimsical attitude in the society where people define the

established cultural practices in a fantasy world. The data strongly suggests

that the full potential of television has not been harnessed in Pakistan as it

did two decades ago through the remarkable presentations during 1970s

and till mid 1980s.

The people could accept moral stances presented only when they

identified with their own worlds, but television has created its own world;

one that was not part of common man’s daily lives; the viewers consider the

television world as a separate sphere. I have concluded that the viewers

treat TV programs as fantasy escape which do not depict their real life and

do not belong to their morals. In this chapter I have also discussed the

credibility in terms of news presentation and have found ample evidence

that Television as a medium do enjoy larger credibility, but PTV stands at

the lowest ebb. It has multiple reasons. PTV as a monopoly broadcaster and

enjoying the largest terrestrial network in control has the largest outreach.

It has a history of long government control and non-professional manpower.

43

PTV from the very beginning was used under the whims of the ruling parties

- military and civil. I have elaborated in detail how PTV has functioned

under various regimes and concluded that the form of government has only

a partial impact on its mode of working because it was highly misused by all

the governments in similar way. I have also mentioned in this chapter that

PTV’s working cannot be evaluated in terms of democracy or military rules:

it has to be examined under a different yardstick which I call credibility. My

result is that PTV has always lacked credibility no matter what type of

government was there and who was ruling? The major contributor in

destroying the credibility of PTV was non-professionalism shown by its

incompetent and bureaucratic manpower which has badly failed to realize

the modern trends and demands. PTV’s current affairs and news have faced

another blow after the arrival of satellite channels and Pakistani private

cable TV broadcasters in Urdu language. PTV is now under a permanent

threat from satellite channels.

I have also discussed in this chapter that PTV was a victim of elected

governments hegemonic attitudes more than the dictatorial control of

military rulers. I have observed during the research that credibility is chiefly

dependent on not only the type of news and the element of truth in it, but

also the presentation style, anchors, gate keeping arrangements and the

visual presentation are equally important. PTV’s agenda setting is not the

result of censorship or state control, it is a free choice, by and large, of the

people taking decision within the organization. Therefore PTV, I have

concluded, will remain equally incredible if run by the private sector due to

it’s inherit weaknesses and structural faults.

After an examination of development of the new television market in

Pakistan, the following chapter examined the cultural influence of satellite

programs in Pakistan. Chapter 6 shows that satellite television has been

instrumental in creating a new popular culture, which has proved both

44

attractive and controversial. The chapter looks at the implications of the

popularity of entertainment channels and tests opinion among Pakistanis

on the programs of these channels.

Because of the centralized character of the nation states, the satellite

revolution in South Asia has been more disruptive and far reaching than in

many other parts of the world. In most South Asian countries, satellite

channels brought the first direct challenge to the state-controlled sector and

its bureaucratic broadcasting culture. The new channels have offered

better-produced and more wide-ranging international news and current

affairs programs and many new entertainment programs. In some South

Asian metropolitan centers, middle class audiences for national

broadcasters have virtually disappeared. In this influential segment of the

community, a key instrument of state cultural control has been made

almost redundant.

In Pakistan the satellite media have given access to new and

articulate voices. Politicians and public figures have been called to account

in programs, which have broken with the deferential tradition of state

broadcasters. Audience participation in debates, discussions and interviews

has added a new dimension to civil society. These welcome improvements in

program choice and quality have come within a framework of market

economics. In its initial phase at least, the market has reinforced the

dominant position of Urdu as the lingua franca of Pakistan and by its very

success and attractiveness has raised questions about the future of other

sub regional cultures. In no province of Pakistan, the satellite channels have

landed with regional flavor and language. PTV still dominates rural areas

through its new regional satellite channel-The National.

Another area in which the satellite media have had remarkable

success is in linking up Pakistan across the globe. The Pakistani living in

the Gulf, Europe or North America can now watch the same programs as

45

their relatives at home. Some of the private satellite channels have actively

developed new market opportunities among the Pakistani Diaspora, while

state broadcasters have seen the importance of registering their presence on

the same screens. Part of the motive—for India and Pakistan especially—has

been propagandist, to ensure that audiences in neighboring countries and

their citizens abroad have access to their own culture. But there is also an

international constituency for Indian films and popular dance, and

Pakistani folk and classical music. The satellite television has helped to

create diasporic public spheres. Satellite television has certainly played a

part in the creation of a new kind of hybridity which is characteristic of

contemporary metropolitan living.

The populism of satellite TV is having strong affect on the society; it

ended PTV’s monopoly, promoted openness, introduced new ideas and

introduced new type of programs which Pakistanis have never seen in the

recent past. I have discussed at the same time those grey areas which are

problematic, challenging and even threatening. Since satellite channels in

the beginning addressed mainly to English speaking aristocracy and

McDonald – MTV generation in urban centers; it designed programs which

were culturally closer to this segments of society. Late in 1990s a number of

Urdu language channels owned by Pakistani tycoons landed in the arena of

competition which changed the media climate altogether. But still the

society could not digest this newness which was strange and alien and still

is. I have discussed that the reaction towards satellite channel programs is

different in different segment of society. My income group and educational

attainment level classification did not hold good in the analysis of this

phenomena. I found a sharp difference of opinion and reaction among rural

and urban segments of society. Most criticism surprisingly came from those

who have a little or no access to cable. Similarly those who lashed out at

some kind of satellite programs mostly referred to Indian Movies and music

and of course to English music channels like MTV or Channel V: thus the

46

overall programming was not the frame of reference for these people. The

rural segment largely had no opinion because of absence of a regular direct

contact with satellite channels. It was however a common belief among the

educated rural class that “this is dangerous and filthy”.

The impact on urban middle class families was immense particularly

on women, children and youth. It was evident that a ray of exposure to

unseen worlds has penetrated in addition to introduction of a number of

culturally undesirable realities. The women had experienced new wave of

independence which has lead to family disputes and maladjustments within

the household. A number of new role models for youth have emerged and a

new lingua franca is in the making which is a mix of English and Urdu or

English and regional languages and dialects. New fashion trends and

consumerism is another result of satellite broadcasts. A non-conforming

children and youth generation is also attributed to satellite channels. The

franker treatment of sexuality in the satellite TV serials and music shows

has alarming impact on children and youth. Though small in number but

highly conscious segment of society was of the opinion that it is a

transitional period when society is passing through new experiences which

are not as devastating as claimed by the conservative section of the society.

I have concluded that a sizeable number of youth and women are not very

comfortable with satellite programs. The concern is based on the fear that

moral values and behavior patterns are under severe threat, which required

serious efforts at national level by national TV or state TV. I have concluded

that large scale welcome to satellite channels in urban centers is not a

consensus view of the entire society, time has yet not come to pass a

judgment because a lot is still in the pipeline. The major area of concern

however is the widening gulf between rural and urban population in terms

of access to media facilities and resultant social and economic disparities

created in the society.

47

Conclusion

I have provided evidence for many of my claims made in the previous

chapters. I have discussed at length the media-state relationship,

particularly under the broader ideologies presented by Raymond Williams

and Staurt Hall. Although I don’t agree with Williams model of public sector

broadcasting in full, but his ideas regarding the state control and

consumerism spread through television are very close to my findings. The

authority structure needs a new type of understanding under a Pakistani

context. The authority patterns are designed in layers which travel from

state to tribe, community, ethnic group and family. At each layer authority

is vested at some point and exercised under a defined code. Any break away

from this defined set of relationship can destroy the entire social structure.

The individual choices are governed by social and economic factors. The role

of state is also interesting in this realm, which is more centered towards

control than support for the citizens. The media-state relationship has

similarly different set of layers in case of electronic media, particularly

television. The state has a monopolistic role, which is manifested in all

broadcasting activities. The public sector broadcasting, I suggest, should be

understood under this authority pattern and the state and government

should be treated as synonyms. In Pakistani context all references made to

state-society relationship are also applicable to the government-society

relationship. For Pakistanis and most third world citizens, government is

not an institution created to run the affairs of the state, but is no different

from state itself. The clear concept of state, therefore, is blurred in the

society. Similarly the functions of state institutions like judiciary

legislature, and army should be understood in this context.

Government policy towards the media in Pakistan has largely been

based on a functionalist approach, in which the media are seen as a causal

influence for continuity, integration and normality in society. The active

engagement of audiences and their skepticism and capacity to resist as well

48

as to accept media messages underlines the autonomy of individual viewers

and listeners. There was a common perception among broadcasters and

policy-makers that television and radio can generate or promote desirable or

undesirable social and cultural trends. It was a shared opinion that

television has an influence in negotiating ideas of modernity in the country.

The peculiar circumstances also call for a re-examination of how the

public interest is defined. Until recently, the concept of public service

broadcasting centered on the nation state and on state-controlled media.

The broadcasters in Pakistan have acted as custodians of national culture;

they have also defined the cultural ethics in their own style.

By the 1980s, broadcasting, as a tool of central government, had

become part of an acute crisis of centre-state relations in Pakistan. The

breakaway of Pakistan’s Eastern wing to form Bangladesh was only the

most dramatic example of a trend which affected almost all countries of the

region. Pakistan governments were faced, over the next two decades, with

insurgency in Baluchistan, an uprising in Sindh and a growing sense of

alienation among the Muhajirs, who had migrated from India to become

citizens of the new state after 1947. Here National broadcasters, TV on top

of that, helped to increase the sense of alienation by acting as propagandists

for ruling parties, by denying space to opposition politicians or critics of

government policy and by neglecting regional cultures and concerns.

Efforts to use broadcasting to reinforce national identity made

broadcasting a focus of attention in the tussle between the center and its

regional opponents. The experience of Pakistan shows that changes of form

are not necessarily significant. The Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation,

established in 1972 and Pakistan Television Corporation established in

1979 were running on similar lines. The new status was supposed to give

more freedom to the broadcasters, but government remained very powerful,

the organization became more bureaucratic and the tradition of drafting

49

senior civil servants into top jobs carried over into the new corporate

existence. By the early 1990s, a number of factors had come together to

challenge the viability of governments’ control of the electronic media.

Among these were the emergence of a democratic consensus, the growth of

a more independent press, the popularity of video, the beginnings of

economic liberalization and the development of a new, extended, urban

middle class in Pakistan.

The country was run as parliamentary democracy. The military regime

gave way to elected government in 1988. Therefore, the absolute government

control of the electronic media made less sense. There was an obvious

mismatch between the practice of democracy and the continued

suppression of important political news on government-controlled TV. A

Pakistani commentator wrote; ‘Our democratic system is based on interplay

of many parties and points of view. However, our electronic media is

working largely on the pattern of one-party dictatorship, for the benefit of

the shortsighted and unprincipled men in power. (Islam Ali, Muslim, 24-07-

1993).

For almost fifty-six years after Independence, Pakistan governments

maintained a monopoly of the airwaves, whether radio or television, and for

the most part used them for petty political purposes. They did so, despite

overwhelming evidence that their news services were not credible and their

audiences demanded more choice. By the 1990s, however, the middle class

in particular had become a massive market, both for consumer goods and

for alternative media services. The governments were locked in a

centralizing mind-set, which apparently prevented them from responding

creatively to these new challenges. But they were about to face a challenge

from the skies, which would threaten the mind-set, the monopoly and the

projection of national cultures which went with them.

50

My thesis argues that Pakistan’s television has served the upper

middle classes first and others afterwards. Satellite television has more

restricted audiences and strictly commercial objectives. In his analyses of

media trends in towards 2000, Raymond Williams envisaged a world pulled

between 'false and frenetic nationalisms and 'reckless and uncontrollable

transnational-isms' (Williams 1985). His fears that the development of

technology would strengthen the hands of the state and of transnational

economic interests has become a much more widely shared anxiety today,

though it is counterbalanced by the opportunities for personal and cultural

expression of middle class through internet.

My research has pointed out two glaring facts: one, state television in

Pakistan has lost its credibility due to excessive control and non-

professional attitude. The other is that satellite channels have greatly

affected Pakistani society both socially and culturally. The state television

has failed to establish an agenda for its programming. It has created

frustration, hunger for entertainment, disappointment, reaction against the

governments and the state, psychological depression and social and cultural

disparities. The state TV (PTV) has worked without a goal and policy for 40

years together, establishing less cultural link with the society. Most of its

targets have been culturally wrong and its attitude has been partisan with

undue thrust on the social portrayal of urban affluent classes. My research

suggests that PTV is a major contributor in creating political frustrations

among the people and have generated negative reactions towards religious

and ethical values through its programs. The cause of national TV’s

downfall lies in the hegemonic use of electronic media by all civil and

military governments. The media managers could not set a vision for a true

national TV. Onward 1990, the satellite invasion has started a process of

repositioning of old standards which were once sacred to Pakistanis. It has

introduced a wave of new ideas, openness and promiscuity in the society. It

has come up with a wave of information on national and international

51

events providing people opportunity to verify and check the truth

spontaneously. One important result of satellite revolution is the

development of a lively contemporary public debate about the role of media.

There is a great deal of media comment, political argument and less

sociological and anthropological analysis in Pakistan. The terms of debate

on issues of democratic representation, national sovereignty, civil society

and cultural identity are perceived to hinge more than before on the

influence of the media, with the print media still paramount but the private

electronic media playing a catalytic role in some fields. The reform of the

national media will depend on the development of a more active public

opinion on media issues and the creation of a new relationship between

media and the civil society.

This wave of change has great impact on political culture of the

society. The old tradition of hiding the facts and distorting the realities is no

more valid although still in practice. Urbanites being fortunate to have

access to satellite TV programs have a different opinion within their own

groups. People are fearful and cautious of the impact satellite channels are

creating on children, youth and women. It has affected the family fabric and

social relations greatly. In short a popular culture with lots of global traits is

in the making. My conclusion is that this new culture is not a threat to

Pakistani culture but is different from the old traditional cultural practices

which are still dear to the society. The people interpret this new culture in a

different way which depends on class position and social placement. The

interpretations are made according to the individual or group

circumstances. Pakistani society which is a complex whole of variety of

social, economic and ethnic subgroups respond to various factors differently

under their own conditions. The changes brought about by the historical

and political process have transformed the society gradually over the years

but abrupt changes introduced by satellite TV are not easy to digest.

Presence of strong religious, cultural, ethnic, linguistic groups does not

52

allow the society to undergo rapid cultural transformation; there is a strong

resistance. The changing role of women, children and youth is not culturally

embedded–it is perceived as a direct off shoot of foreign-alien influence

thrown in by the satellite TV channels. The cultural standards and morality

do not accept sudden restructuring and repositioning. The authority pattern

at the level of central government to provincial governments and down to

family and individual levels is showing cracks under the influence of new

ideas and ideologies.

I have discussed that the state control of media, particularly TV, is yet

not a strange phenomenon. The mode and operation of state TV in Pakistan

may be different but not unique. During the last two decades people have

enjoyed a fresh air of press freedom, abundance of information and a multi-

styled entertainment through various means. A conservative TV in the

hands of government is therefore unacceptable to people. They, not very

satisfied with cable invasion, require a powerful alternative which only the

state TV can provide. Given the peculiar political structure and culture, the

Pakistani society cannot afford to have a national TV in the hands of private

sector promoting acute commercialism. There is always a need to have a TV

with a mandate to satisfy a multi ethnic and multi linguist society with lots

of religious and cultural differences. The state TV requires redesigning and

remodeling which again demands strong political will and long-term vision.

I have discussed through statistical and in-depth empirical data that

the terms of communication between the society and TV are not cultural.

People watch television for entertainment and information seeking and for

consumption of leisure time. The gulf is not between the medium and the

people but between the media messages and the society. It also reflects the

increasing cultural distance between the state and the people. The primary

question, which led me to undertake this research, was; does TV in

Pakistani society represent and negotiate with the people in cultural terms?

53

And whose culture is portrayed on TV? Stretching further, the question also

involves the query; if TV is introducing a new culture? The answer is a no

and yes both. State TV has not been successful in communicating with the

people under the terms of their own culture. It reflects a culture which is

practiced by a very few affluent urbanites ignoring a larger majority of rural

people. My research reveals that the state TV has been underpinning a

culture of orthodoxy and self-denial and has been instrumental in

highlighting the religious and social controversies. To people, the images

and characters on state TV are not “us” but “ours”- a relationship which

shows familiarity without belonging. On the other hand the satellite

broadcasts have developed a new set of relations with Pakistani society,

creating hybridization of popular and conservative cultural norms – mixing

local with global. This has come up with a complex set of new traits which

are not grounded in the social fabric of the society. In this scenario, state TV

has not risen to satellite challenges. It is projecting a close door policy which

has proved redundant in global environment. The moral values are in

jeopardy and need alteration to survive under the new global cultural

agenda. A strong need for a public service TV is still there but under a new

mandate and a fresh vision for future.

Thus my hypothesis that TV is responsible for shaping the ethics of

the society, and a free and financially independent television is a better

option in Pakistan because people rate state television very low as credible

medium, is partially true to the extent that it has a strong impact on

people’s lives. But a free and financially independent television as an

alternate to state controlled TV cannot be a better option because the social

ground is yet not ripe to experience a pure commercial activity at state and

national level, which operates only under certain regulations but without a

true national agenda. My data suggests that people still need a national

broadcaster as parallel to private, purely commercial satellite channels for

true public service in line with the Canada’s CBC, Japans’s NHK, India’s

54

Door Darshan, and to a large extent UK’s BBC, which have survived despite

strong opposition within their own cultures and societies.

As I have referred to in the beginning of this section that state-society

and the state-government relationship are inseparable entities. My findings

suggest that the concept of public service broadcasting needs redefinition in

Pakistani culture. I have also emphasized that the notion of democracy

should be seen under a Pakistani socio-cultural context where the concept

of free democratic choices is different. I have argued that the structure and

composition of elected governments needs to be re-evaluated in historical

perspective which will show that the civil and military governments have

worked under the same traditions and in similar manner. Therefore I

suggest that a democratic media under this scenario will still remain a far

cry.

There are only two players in entire broadcasting activities in

Pakistan; one is the government and the other is global satellite channels

available through cable. Since television is operating in line with the

government policy and government and state are inseparable in Pakistan,

the state society relationship are equally weakening. People don’t identify

their relations with medium but with the content or message, which is not

always desirable. I conclude that the state society links are weakening due

to the government control of electronic media, where people are placed at

the periphery. This is perhaps a very intricate phenomenon which needs

further probe at the level of political analysis and with more thrust on social

currents. I have provided evidence for the presence of a complex

phenomenon in the society but perhaps not provided a solution. However, I

trust that some distance has been covered through this research, which

may take upcoming researchers to reach certain destination.

55

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