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,dffih, 'd-1,rE:.' ;. ?-\ 'Y&>lt -- 'r+:t\ a2^.,-.1-!Z-:t '?_ow uCIIINA RELATIONS

1960-71

DEPATEMENT OT' INTERNATIONAL RELA'TIONS

s$*^s'd.v

fra PAK-

THESIS SUBMNTED FOR TIIE DIIGITED OI" PN.D

RtrASERCH SUPERVISOR

PROFESSOR DR MAHMOOD ALI SIiAH

RESEARCH SCIIOLAR

TAJ MIIIIAMMAD LASHARI

TH327.519151

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CERTTTICATE

Cdtifrcd that l|{I,Taj Mohaff@d S/O Bafh Ali Lashrri, Arsistdtt hof€ssorin Depdttr! nt of l[i.mario!.I Rdatid! b!3 d@€ bis rrsaatrch wor* on the

bpic 'P!k{'hiDr R.hios 195G77'u .t Ey &4crvLion.

I .n Barildcd wi& bi. ffit ed rcc@ldd fu!.6€sir riry trc fors"edcdfc asscssElt

Aa!^.Mcriffious'Fiof.666 Dr. Md@od Ali Sht\Dcr& Faq ty of Steb SciG, lrnivcBi9 ofBalochi6tan, Qucdr.

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NBWES PAIENS

D.ify D8rn, fkachi.

Drily TGLgiqt, Lddm.

Cuadie, L@do.

Mdring Nowr,Ikachi.

Ncw Yo*Tific,

Ob€a(vaa, Laddq|.

Prtbh Thr,Irbda

PcLiDgMy,

P*iig Rr i.rw.

10. Pcoplca D.ily, (biE"

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N DEDICATIONtln

[rth. e ofAhh AlEigbty (God), ft. h.t dccot,thc Eciftl, who .

I coOtc c o coqlelt lhis xtqL, 66 .lc f el.rhip, fr.e slme I Fs]'ftr

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[l Alod

[l to my bcnig! fi6.r lrb Bagh Ati I$lwi drd lltrclc Moh.Innsd Ali

n Irrhri wtdc lpidtrd guid&lo rd lov! rlm.incd fre mlin sotmr of| | i pinti@! b re, wifrdn thdr lov! od tiL.liogt, I my trlwt ttay€ bcar

n $lG to rchi"vc Ey rrpo.6 ed e.ctE ir liG rd Eicty.

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TAJ MOHAMMAD T^ASIIARI

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I $bh to Dlace on record mv d.epcs grat'tud. to Prof Dl Malmood Ali

\hah, Dean. Faculry ot Slate Sci€rces. Unrverstlv ofBalochistan Quena for

his constant dd genuin€ help lt is a privil€ge for m€ to associate with hirn

dunng ny reseirch studi€s. His aff€ction and nobilitv hav€ alwavs

I am also thankful to Dr.A.R.Malik, the worthy Vice Chancellor of rhis

univeBity. In fact he has geared up bis efforts in promoung the rcsearch

cu1ture ai cmpus. It is a fact that withoul his aclive guidanc€ the prepantion

ofthisihesis would nol have bccn possibl€

I am profoundly indebt€d to Proi Abdullah Pulphoto, Dean, Faculrv ofAris,for his kind co-opdation during my r€search work and conducl of seminars

I would also like to cxpress my d€cp€st fe€lings for Prot Dr' A Maje€d

Clundio, Chairman, Departmcnt of Intcmational Relations, for his valuable

suggesnons and nice co-op€ration to complete my this research studies.

I dink it would be a grcal injustice if th€ name ofmv sist€r Mn Farzand AliShah woDld not app€ar on the horizon. She help€d me in preparation of ihe

work. She is the rcspectablc wifc of my bacher I m€u l€amed Sved

Farzand Ali Shah. His elderly patmnag€ always remined a suide line forme dmugh oul ofny life and, also lny dear fiiends lik€, Saved Noor Sbah

Buhari, Ghulan Mustafa Bulaidi, and all other colleagues of t'ed€parun€nt, who spared lim€ to advise m€ whenever I need€d

To my good wife, I ow€ a. un{epayable debt of gratitude for leuing me

spfld long houB on this work without assening hcr legitimate claims of mv

time. The peace and tsanquility rcquir€d for to carry out lhe research work ofdoclorial desree would hav€ not bcen posribl€ if she *ould not helped me,

in givins n€ every domesbc suppon.

Tai Muhartunad Lashari

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CONTENTS

CHAPTERONE

Pak- china Relations Sonc Special Fcatur€s

. BriefHistory

. ld€oloSical basisof FricndshiP

. Factors ofcood Rclasons

. Pak-China R€lations Ccneral Comments

. Irak$ina Rclalions Bctwe€n 195G60

. The Arrival OfHaj Mi$ion 1959

CHAPTERTWO

E rly Age Of Pak{hina Rclarions 1960{5

. Back Grourd

Pak-China R€lations in 1960

Pak{tin Relrtions in 196l

Pak{hina Relations in I 962

Pak-China Relations in 1963

Border agr€ement b€tw€en China and Pakistan

Pak-Crtin. Relatio$ in 1964

Pak$ina Rclations in 1965

Pag. No

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1-10

7-9

l0-12

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l5-26

26-27

2&30

3l-74

3l-32

12-35

:tt!8

38-44

44-58

59-68

68-71

'7 t-12

'73-14

CHAPTER THREE

1965 WAR & PAK.CHINA RELATIONS

Causcdconditions of War

The Chin sc Dplomacy In The war

lrnpact Ofchina's Stand On War

EventtRcsults ofwat

CHAPTER FOUR

East Pfistan Cris€6 And China's Stipport

Introductron

China's Sut'pon ln The Crisis l9?1.

'15-ll6

'75-79

799r

9t-105

105- 0

I l0.l l3

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I l8-134

r35-139

CHAPTER FIVE

Pak{hina Relations During Z.A Bhuno Era

Bn€f Introducnon

Conc€pt Of Bilaterlism

Coursc Of Pak-China Rclations

Rcfcr€nc€s

140-15+

140-140

140-l4t

141-l5l

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Conclusion

Bibliogaphy

155-188

r't9-I99

INTRODUCTION

PAK- CHrNA RELATTONS (r960.77)

HYPOTHESIS

OBJECTIVES

Has China provcd hers€lf a ftiend in need and a liiend of in d€ed for

Pakistan as a result of Pak-Chi.a relations I 960- l 977.

Uncarthing facton responsibl€ for Pak China r€lations during the penod

ofstudy.

Localing the compromising interests ofPakjstan and China.

Scarching rcasons, factors and ev€nts reqponsible for d€veloping

differ€nces b€twee. India md China.

Cauging Impact of Pak China relations on lhe regional and global

politics. Asscssment oflndo Pak Chna Fio on Asia.

Pakistan a bndge between Cbina and West during the study period.

Pakistan ed China hav€ ideal rclations sinc€ 1960. Thcse relations bave

gone through Inany crhes. differenl evenls and lhrough lhi€k and thjn

p€riods up lo now. Many @sons could b€ h€ld i€sponsibl€ ror tEse

fricndly relations, which arc frequently quoled now on global level-

Th€sc relations originated in sixties- Prior to That China's relations wilh

India were brctherly. Farnous sloSan during this p€riod was "Hind Chini

Bahi Bhai". Many reasons and circumstances brought lhis change. Many

diploma.s played imponant role in th€ formation of these relalions. Now

Pak ( tuna relauons ar€ tested. These relat'onq hrdcr c€rmnted due to , -thc crises of 1965. Wh€n China stood firmly with Paldstan. Thc history,

€venls! situations, and results of rhese rclatjons necd to b€ assessed in

detail. Same will be done in lbis research studi€s. For compreh€nsiv€

study ofresearch program dissenation is divided into six chaprers. Thes€

chapters hrghlight dfT€renr eras and crisis penod.

PAK-CHINA R.ELATIONS SOME SPECIAL FEATURES(Chapter 1)

Pak-China relations hav€ som€ sp€cial md unique f€atures. Th€s€

rclations have gone through inany €xperiences and faced odd conditions

during 1950-60. Cons€quently Pak China rclarioN hav€ develoFd some _sperial featur€s. Which ray b€ out come and resulr of above mention€d

situation. This chaprer wiil cova rhe hisrory of rhe relations, counts

special features. lughlight some unrque exp€riences.

EARLY AGE OF PAK CHINA FRIENDLY RELATIONS(196M5) (Chapter 2)

Pak-China relations nlm€d to b€ friendly duing 1962,65, sone

imporaanl €vents and dcvelopncnts played a basic rolc in shaping up ofthes€ r€lations. Th€se ev€nts include negotialions and demaication of Pak

China border. Contrary to that India developed senous probl€irs with

China to scttle th€ border. Tibitian war beiwe€n India and China was

other important event, which consolidal€d Pak China rclalions b€caus€

India.m€rged as a foc and cornmon enemy of Pakislan and China. China

also devcloped diff€r€nces with USSR du€ to ideological differ€nces and

USSR support to India on bord€r and Tibitian war. This chapt€r will

provide delails of above-mentioned events locate it3 r€asons examine

oulcome and ass€ss lhe impacr of events on cenenting the Pak Cbina

PAK.CHINA R-ELATIONS(CHAPTER 3)

AND wAR OF t96s

The war of 1965 is considered as thc most irportant event of

Pfistm's history ard South As|an rcgior. The war escalat€d ftom the

happeni.s in Kashmjr and tumcd full-fi€dg€d wd when India cro$ed

Intemational boder on 6' Sept. and fi€d to capture khor€. Th€ Westem

allies of SEATO and CENTO put €mbargo 10 supplying ams to India

and Pakistan keeping foe and frierd at par. Russia provid€d all sons of

anns to lndia accoidif,g lo her nc€d- Pakistan felt helplcssness in such a

discouraging and d€pressing situalion, China came to Pakistan's help

with op€n aris, cor€ of h€an and supporliv€ mind. The chapler will

survey in d€pth causes, evenh, and the results of Pak China diplonatic

rElations duinA 1965 war-

EAST PAKISTAN CRISIS AND CHINA'S SUPPORT(CHAPTER 4)

c€n. Moharnmaal Yahya Khan Mounccd aad hcld elections in -

1970 aE a r$ult of thes€ €leclions Muje€b's Awami Leaguc ern€rged as a

majority party by winnins 162 srlts in a housc of300. A$/aini Leagu€

won lh€ cleclions on rhe basis of 6 poinrs Mdifeslo. Larer on Gcn.

Yaiya could not transfq pow€r to Mujecb p€acetully. And staded

mililary crack down on Aqani League and East Pakislan on 25 March

1971. As a r€sult of this happening, hundreds and thousands Easr

Pakistanis crossed to India. India made this inremal problem tluough

conspiracy as an Int€marional problem. Supported East Pakisran reftgesto slan guerrilla war ultimarely lndian army cross€d th€ tnt€marional

border. Consequenrly, Pahslan broke Inro two rturing rhese cnses China

likc crisis of 1965, help€d Pakisran momlty, mar€rialty, and

diplonatically. Though China coutd nor succced ro avoid happ€nings, bur

surely the h€lp of the China, made Pak China Relarions Eustworihy and

mquc in hislory of modeh drplomacy. Thrs Chaprer ot lhe Srudy wrll

highlight the role of drplonucy, hetp errended by lhe China dunng the

crisis of 1971 .

PAK{HINA RELATIONS DURING BHUTTO REGIME(CHAPTER 5)

Lat€ Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto gave a new spint, shap€ and stability to

Pak China r€lations. Of cous€ he was a besr politician of his dme,

revolutionary l€ader of South Asia and archilecl of Pak China relations.

Hc staned b change lhese r€lations ftom 1958 and on vr'ard fust as

minist€r of industries and then as a foreign minister, lastly, as president

and pdrn€ minisler of Pakistan- Bhutto had sp€cial inclination towards

China. He was ex€a y moved by Mau-tz€-lung's p€rsonaliry and political

lerder ship. As slEwd politician, h€ con€ctly asse$ed that China will

provc a sinc€re friend of Pakistan. He paid fi-equent visils to China and

hosted th€m with sarne spirit. Thes€ ftequent visits creatcd commonaliry

in id€ls and int€r€sls. which Droven uetul, h€lptul and encouraging tbr

Pakistan in the €ra of peac€ and in the €vent of crisis Presenl chapter

shall survey the rol€ of Zulfiqar AIi Bhutlo in €siablishing ofbroad€ning

and cem€ndng the relatio$ wi$ China

coNcLUsIoNs (CHAPTER 6)

This chaplei shall pres{t the overall results of the study as outt

Rcsearch as it is defincd as

reinlerpr€tation of an establish€d th€ory

Accmdin8 lo other dcfinition, rcscarch

origination of a theory or

due 1o r€vcaling ofnew facls.

nean putting mind, heart and

action togclhcr. Of curs€ r€s€arch is a iedious work. lts conclusion

cnal€s many diffemces mong lhe r€sqtchers- Howcver. baxinllm

availabte r€scarch sourc€s hav€ bcen utilizcd Thes€ include publish€d -mat€rial, discussions in semina$, debal,es on TV, free and frank

discussion with s.holars and kFwledScable pefson! Spccially, the

institution to whrch I belong iq abode oi late Zulfiqar Ah Bhutlo and ' adominaled by Bhutto fans. Therefor., The rcscarch may have tilt lo$,arG

Bhutto, which may look bia$d but is out com€ of rescarch€rs

:

A considerable and moderate list of bibliogaphy in rhe end will

show fie rcading depfi lo carry on lhis res€arch. Tftis list includes book,

rcsctrch joumals, n€wspap€rs and of lhc record discussions with

knowledgeable persons having different div€rgent vi€ws aboul the lopic.

7

PAK. CHINA RELATIONS SOME SPECIALFEATURES.

Brl€f History

Pakisian and china are neighbour. Tb€ historv ofrelations belween

ih€se lwo aoes back to $e penod wh€n nerchants' pilgnns scholas and

diplomats l.aveled on cameh or hors€s back thrcugh th€ silk route liom

on€ country to an other duing the period of colonialisnr bow ev€r

contacls, belwee. the p€opl€ ofchina and Pakistat were restricled ai both

oticial and non official levels following lhe first aggression against ehina

in 1856 or tlrc opium wai as il is bcuer knoM, China's foundation as

s1a1e was seeped. Consequenlly a chaos as and confusion prevailed in

I hrna fo, lons penod

The most significant and impoaant d€velopmenl in tbe Pak China

fiiendsbi! was military/ slrateSic and commercial point of view wd tie

opening a.d establishment of silk route. linking Xijiarg province of

China wirh Hunza Valley of Pakistan The Kankaram high wav was

slart€djoinily by two countri€s. It is an all weather trad€ routehoad it was

hazardous jab abour 15000 Chines and Pakislanis manpower includng

Engine€rs completed this task in 20 y4re' The 774 K-M long hiSh wav

lhrough 16,072 ft hish mountainous. Il has provided an all-weather and

T

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motor able link bctw€en th€ two counties. '11 gave china 8raler influence

in Pakisen dd access lo the Anbian Sea pon ofKarschi' "'

Tn€ opening of this hjghway boosted trade bet$€en Pakhtan and

China and eslablished imporlet link b€tw€en the lwo counhes. lo bc

used in case of emeryency. The sttalegic i'nportance of this highw.v is \ -very obvious. It links. Xijidg with Tib€t, ttroush fie Aksai China "ln

case of an attack on Pakistatr by Sea, nilitary a'd from china can reach

Pakr(lan rhtough lhr' rourc. '

The Kamkorm road has become an imporlani life line b€tween

Pakislan and China and hclped in the Economic and Social up lift 10 thc

back ward regions, and paved the way for the devclopm€nt of natural

resources in its vicinity by virtu€ of the opening of this mad the bilaleral

Economic cooperation beween Pakistan and C}ina sp€cially betwcen

Xr.jiangand noflhen areas has increased "in current strategic Jargon, this

high way, is temed as Chines window lo wa.ds southem Asit'(r)

l_rom rimes immcmorial, thc area. which now compnses Pakislan!

had coniaci with China. As for back as 1000 B.C according to Pakistan

hisrorians one ofth€ firsl cight embdsies €stablished in china was from

the r€gion which now constilute ihe republic of Pakistan. When

Buddhism was the assenive r€hgion in Candhm vallet crans rnan from

swal were olien comissioned by the Chinese Govemmenr to fabricare

met.ll'c slaafs ofBuddha which 1o this day, adom rh€ Buddhist temple

in chrna. 'The Muslims ruler of rhe indo-Pak sub-continenr the

mai,lrrined diplomatic and commercial relarions wirh china'('r

Right up to ths times tlE tradc flouish belw€cn lh€ two countries.

The Chines mainled has sizeable Muslim population (€- 8) sinking

province of China therc is Muslin inajonty population. Thus there is

hislorical md geognphical basis for fte substanc€s of liiendly relations

betw€en China and Pakisle. There ar€ Muslim in every province of

China i.€. Shcnsi, Shanghai, Kannsu, Ningsia and Manchuia (5)

'lhe historic bonds that existed b€tween CNna and the Muslin

lndian noi sewed with the disppearance of Muslin political power in

the sub-codenl The cultural and comrnercial relations bctw€en dre two

peopl€s continued to lhe British period in India

China is Pakislant pow€rtul n€ighbor' The bord€r of sinking

province of china me€ls norlhefn areas of Patjstan Th€ bo$ countries

hav€ a cornnon bordcr; the boundary line has demarcaled in difficult

mountainous (enain. Th€ borders of China meet with Gilgt and oth€r

nonhem areas. Th€ Pak-China r€latioc arc based on the principl€ of

''Pakistan and China hav€ many common bonds besid€s n€ighbor

trood"(6r Common memories of cultumi contacts ar€ root€d in th€ Past

Chines painling bas left ils permanent mark on th€ PcBim Eaditions,

which influenced the Moghuls. Th€ Tukish languag€ spoken in sinking

is under stood by the peopl€ of no(hem province.

ldeologicrl basis of FriendshiP.

lhe p€opl€s Republic ofchina and Islamic Republic of Pakislan

bolh are ideological states, th€ fomer was proclaimed with soc'alisl

Ideology on Oct 1949 as a result of Chinese civil war. The lat€r came

into being vith an Islamic ldeolosy as result ofPartition ofBritish India \ -into two dominions. which later became. lndia and Pakistan. "The

ldrological gap. Desprtc rhe drflermc. or ldeolog}, has tumed bolh

countries inlo strong adherents lo lheir causes and principles, giung their

lorcign polic'cs a considmbly ldeologist contenr which has mitilat€d

over the years aSainsl easy compromis€ despile lhe heary sacrific€s lhat

lhey had to mak€ in lhe pursuit of $pective aims and objectives'o)

Chinese Relations with Pakisran bave ben proved to be relhble

and lasted fricnd ofPakistan. She has giv€n generous, tim€ly milirary and

econom'c a5sisrance rc Pahsrd '

The Relation betwe€n peoples Republic ofchina and pakisran are

deeply rooted in history, geagiaphy, politics, economy md culture"{r)

Th€ relations 8or strengrh ftom rhc friendly R€tarions berw€en the

two demographic Asian giant and regional super powers. Which

devrloprd. desprte the two counries havrng drtTercnt sociat ordeE and

dr!ergenl FotcrSn Polic) lor grcater pcnod ot rhejr retanonshjp. .fhrs

relalionship is conrinuously being co.sidered by the rwo counrri€s as rhe

comer srone of resional balanc€ of powcr and modet for th€ resl of the

world ro €mulate, bei.g based upon rhe tamous tiv€ principl€ of mutual

p€acetul €o-cxistencc. Thc altitudc of Pakii0n in Iniemational Rclations

is bas€d on thc pnnciples of nonlnteiferenc€ in the int€ml affans ofolhcr $at€s, p€aceful e0-exisacncc, and rcspcct for ihc tenitorial inlegriry

of othcr sov€reign statcs. This is a comnon id€ological featwe which

china had puNued in hcr €xternal policy as nain principle. 'Thus it

invokcs large area ofunder slandrng and cooperahon bet*ern china and

Pakistan" ('o)

Both countri$ had adopled a philosophy of world peace.

F.iendship wilh china ha! be€n a cordial principle of Pak foreiSn policy.

Her rclations wilh chins havc conlinued to cxpand and basd on muhral

trust and conlidence. ll is vital for Pakislan to naintain ftrendly relations

wilh china lor sten$lcn Asian Unity. China has support€d Pakishn's

point ofview on tle bsuc of Kashmir; Chines€ stand is bas€d on right of

self-dctcmina on and call€d seveml tin€s Indis as an aggressor Chinese

people always attached a great value to ttEir fiiendship with Pakistani

peoplc- "lt has been dcvelopcd in thc colrlnon struggl€ against

Imperialist and expmsionist ag$cssion and int€w€ntion". (rr)

The der€lopm€nt of common mutual friendship has developed

lion strenglben to stengthd. Tho Pak-Chim relations rc bascd on thc

principles of fair play andjustice in Intemational R€lations.

ln fact thc relations betwc€n chim snd Pakistsn have b€cn very

amicable for fte la$ tluce decadcs. China has Intirnate relations with

Pakislan as wcll as wirh d|c othcr major powers. 'Ihe ties bet*een two

countries w€re time talt€d End €ver lasting. Th€ geo-graphic changes on

rlre lnt€mational scene had never affecred. Pakistan had laud€d the

Chinese supporr and coopcration in all spheres oflifc. The both powers

adbere differenl social o.ders. "Pakistan and china have a great deal in

Factors of Cood Relations.

The comon faclor snd intercsr betwecn the rwo rraditional friends

is hostilily toward India. Because she holds aggressive desjgns in th€

r.gion as nuclqr gianr. Pakisran dd Chim's conmon antipathy 10 wards

Irdia has k€pt thcir relations inract. Keeping in view of th€ secunly

concem 'n

order to maintain a balance ofpowcr in soulh Asia.

China as nuclear giant in rhe region is not secuity risk forPakistan. On accoont of sDch feature th€re is compl€te understanding

beMeen the two tsadilionat friends.

The S;no Pakistan friendship has been consotidat€d and €nhanc€d

contrnuously despite the changing int.marionat conditions_ Such laslinS

tncndship is resuh of enduring cflorts by rhe two governm€nts and

pcoples. Borh counrrjes altached great impo.rance to the dev€lopnent ofrh€n friendship because it nol onty confirns to th€ regioD as well as jn

. lhe world. Chi.a always pursu€s ,n ind€p€ndenl foreign policy for peace

- and solidariry and co-oper3lion wilh the third world. The saine path and

slance had adopred by pakisran. This factor has kept pak_China

fiicrdshipas more cffective and asse ive.

The PaL'China relations ar€ time tast€d in the evenls of

difficultics. The Pak-China rclations ar€ wortrng in the besl principles of

"a good neighbor, who coniinues full suppon to Pakistan against all

forces ofwar and expansron.

We hav€ stated above lines lhc background ofPak-China R€lations

beside w€ also indical€d Pak-china relations. Indiffereni areas like

military econonic, political and cultural in short. Fudher morc different

factors are also count€d, which provide base for Pal-China friendly

.elanons how ever discussion shall nor be use full, liuit tull and h€lplul

full for funher studics without counting these factors in detail therefor€,

we are djscussing these ar€a of co.pomtion s€parately, chronologically

and in delail io achieve our purpose.

Pak-Cbitra RelatioDs General Comments,

Thc Pak-china r€lations havc along history, because il reMins in

lacr dunng the British p€riod in the fofm of Muslim Indian. The Pak-

China relations are timc rasted in the wen$ of difficuldes. The Pak-

china rclations are working in thc bcst principl€s of friendship, whosc

continles tull suppon pakistan aSainst all forces of war and €xpansion.

The ldeology has provided a bale in thei Int€r.ction. The both powers

hav€ developed m ldentical lntemadonal sbncc by lh€ compulsion of

hard circumstances and well awarc that €ach adheres to diffcrcnt social

The attrtudc of Pakistan in Intemational Relations is bas€d on the

pnnciples of nonLnrerferenc€ in th€ int€nal affairs of olhcr $ales,

peaccful co-existenc€, and r€spect for the teritorial integrity of other

sovereign states. This is a comnon fcatur€ which china had punued m

her extemal tolicy as inain pri.cipl€. "Thus it invokcs larg€ ar€a ofunder

slanding and coopcntion between china and Pakistsn" (rr)

The developmen! of connnon mutual fricndship has developed

fton strenghen lo strength-

Borh countries had adopt€d a phllosophy of world peace.

FrienGhip with china has beetl a cordial pnncipl€ of Pak forcign policy;

her relations with china have conlinued to €xpand and remained based on

mutual trust and confid€nce. China has continuously supponed

Pakislan's Economic polices. The material dd tcchnical aid rhat she

conlrnues to extend it, importanc€ in strengthen Pakistan's security and

It is viral for Pakistan ro naintain friendly rclarions wirh chim

strengthm Asian Unity. Pakist n and chim havc common factor

antjpathy ro wards India.

for

is

On January 4.1950 Pakistan. "Recognized Mao-Tz€-Tung

govemmcnl as dejure Govcmment ofcbina.'The press commu.ique the

funher said thar lh€ Govl. of Pakistan trust friendly and cordial r€latron

between China and Pakistan and hope it will b€ cemenled in all spheres

lo lheir mutual advantage." Pakistan not only R€cognized China but also

made endeavors to persuadc olher nalions to recogniz€ it. On lod may

l95l announcernent of th€ inidation of diPlomatic ties Pakislan's fist

Ambassador Majoi G€neral N.A.M R"za aniv€d in Peking, two months

Laler fte first Chinese ambassador took up r€sidence in Karachi During

rhc carly age of Chine$ cmergence of communisl gi4t United States,

decided to vacal€ American. Consular fton. Communist cbina Pakslan

reacred on the ofAmencan act.

Pak-China Relations betw€en 1950-1960 Establishrnent ofthe rehtions:

ln 1954 Pakistan's till was towtuds Wesl. She infomcd lhe china

the noivaling lirctore and made clcar on lhe eve of Manila confqon c

Pakislan s Ambassador Major Gen€ral Raza siressed Pakslan's wishes

to develop lhe cordial relations with great neishbor China. The se$nd

derelopment for furtheranc€ of rnuiual political relalion's took place in

lhe wake of banduns conf€rence in April 1955. Bo$ leaders had availthc

opportunity to discuss matt€rs pertaining to the region as gen€ral and lhc

Indian factor as sp€cial. On the eve of the confer€nce Pakisbn assured

china LhaL lrcr ilitary alliance wilh west is not againsl china. The post

Banding conferencc paved the way for promo.ed lhe hmony, under

slanding for the coll€cliv€ peace and coop€ration b€tween clina and

The peoples Republic of China assu€d thar rherc was no

conceivable clash of Interesi betw€en lhe lwo conlinues. Which could

hamper lhcir cordial relations. '1:)n 15 June 1956 premier Chou Eli

renrarked about the historic links between the peoples of Pakisran and

china dd rcaffimcd hisdesire for fri€ndly polirical rics with Patjsran'(ra)

Durin8 lh€ I 2 day lons visn of Premier Hussain Suhrawardy to chi.a in

Oclober 1956. lbe chines premior aDounced that pakjstan's nember ship

ol SEA]O should nor be bar ro &i€ndly relarions between th€ two

counlries. At the conclusion of Hussa'n Sbahe€d Saharwardi visit the

borh prim€rs in a joint srarem€nt on Ocr t956. Affirmed a funher

apprec jalion of their r€ceptive problems" (r5)

Two months larer chines premier Chou Enli paid a stale visit toPakislan and he remarked thaf rhere is Do real conflict of Inreres! orhlction and lension between rhe rwo countri€s. On account ofrhese facts

premier Hussain Shaheed SahaNadi in Feb. 1957 told at lhe Nationalass€mbly in Karachi lbat Pakistan soughl rhe friendship ofchina, and lhaldunng the time of any eventuatiry china will supporr io rh€ shape ofassislance. lhe Impondce of rlis ollicial $aremenr no(iced rc! Indjawhose leaders w€re still in thc favor ofstogan Hjndi. chine Bbai_Bhai.

On th€ Kashmir issue in nay 1957 china stood for the setleinent

of Krshnir problem as accordance Unit€d Nations resolution ard

bilareral n€goriarions. Prcmier Choun Emli made cle.r that this is "dImperialist design" Chinese suppon to Pakistan's poini of view on the

issu€ ol nght of selfdet€rmination of the Muslim inajority at JamIru md

Kashmir kas nor shifl in chrnese foreign policy bul as pafl o, her policy

lo support, the national liberat'on movement"( 6) It is also part of Chinese

policy agaist Imp€rialism, colonislisrq Racism and cxparBionism in the

lndian naked illegal, lnmoml occupalion of Kashrnr cmphasis

Pakisran to manage as wcll formulale such policy to gain supprt ftom,

world community. Th€ hisrory Md prov€d that china came to lh€

acc€ptation of Pakistan against stand lndian expansionisrl Kc€ping in

vicw of the Chinese stancc on Kashnir lhe Afro Asian nations has also

€xtend€d unqualified supponed to th€ juslilied causc of rigbt of self-

delerminalion. Chin6e position on th€ Kashmir pmblem h3 contribuled

strength and Justification in Uniled Nations ftgarding Kashmir issue

because her permanent scat at United Nations and in a crpacity as

nenbcr of Secunty Council. Chincse suppon is bascd on th€ poPular

r.m or sovere'Bnry. ttar sovereign people run the stal€ affarrs vrhoui

any ouKide Interf€rencc. Chinesc suppon on fte Kashmir issue is an

lnlegral part of policy of peaceful co-exisi€nc€ and flon-lnterf€renc€ in

th€ affairs of oth€r stalcs. ln Dec 195?, Malik Feroz Khan noon fomed

seventb Govenrm€nt in Pakislan He was kc€n Inl€rested lo maintain

sound pol'tical rclations with china as pr€vious regimc w€re while he was

Inclined to ward w€sl. Addressing Independence Day of Pakislan at

Londonh€r€marked..Paki3ianFriendshipwithunit€dstateandBritain

did not m€an thal it had any animty against comrnDisi countries" (r')

On ?'" octobcr 1958 Martial t w was inposcd in Palistan, the

nlilitary regime announced that new Govemmenl wanted to have cordial,

friendly relations with all peace laving coDntries. Aftcr oct. 1958 th€r€

was no change in lhe political relahons betwe€n china and Pakjstan.

Presido! Ayoub reMked in lhc sirh session of rninisl€rial level

nrcelins of the Baghdad pact 'we shall go on s€eking peaceful

aEangemenls, wiih all Nations of tbe world specially with our

neighbors'r3'

Kccping in view of the above policy slatem€nt it shows rhar rherc is .oany real conflict in Pak-China relatioDs due to changing of any rcgime in

Thc sealing ofchin! in tte wortd body and Pskisrrtr's strnce.

The searing of communisr china in rh€ Unitcd Narions was

significanl issue in intemational polirics. The china represenrs connnunist

ldcology; it was against lhe west. Anerdefcalofrh€ Narionat ct€menls in

china, The nationslist regime of Taiwan was r€pr€scntative in Unil€d

narrons wirh the support of Unir€d Slares of America, which opposed ihe

- cnlry of republic o f china. pakistan stood fimrly in the favor of lv,tao-Tze_'l-unig. Sir Zafarullah Khan Foreign minasler sp€aking in rhe sessio, ofGcneral Assernbly said, ,,cbjna js noi applyins for admission to ftcL,n;ted Nalions.lr is a member staie, a pmanent r€mb€r ofrhe s€curiry

-l

council " in late sixti€s Pakistan oppos€d a 15 member drafl resolution

in rhe general assembly affimed a d€cision lhat proposed to changc lhe

representation of china was an Important Question, acquiring two lhird

At the United Nations it voted in favor of branding North Korea as

fte aggressor but abstained on the r.solunon china as an aggressor rt also

abstained on the resohrlion imposing a. embargo on china. This g€sture

shows an lndcpcndol approach lo cold war hsues pavcd lh€ way for

nrulual fiiendship belw€cn Pakisbn and China.

P.k-China ar.de relatio[s.

Long before th€ .stablishm€nt bf political relation! The trade

relations has bcen d€velopcd as part of Bilat€ral schernc of t emadonal

trade between china and Pakistan. China has actively pursued uade

relations wi$ a numb€r of under d€veloped Nations in Af ica, Asia and

latccD Anrerica, Inciuding Pakistan "The Low tunes are quite visible in

Pak'China trade r€lations but despile it, tradc and cornrnercial relations

conlinue.l developing in view of mitual b€nefif'(N)

ln I 95 I a sizeable trade wd established b€tween the |wo counrnes.

China keen interested in Pakistan cotlon. Purchased ftom July ' Dec

"1952, wonh Rs.97.2 million". Thc shift in Pakistan, For€ign Policy did

nol aff€ct rhc tmde relatioDs betwcen the two counlnes, uP to 1958, lhcre

were eight bi-Lateral trad€ agreements between Pakislan and china 'The

7

dctail is as Dnder one each in 1953, in 1954 and 1955, 1956 and lwo in

1958 ',{'7r)

The lbllowing lable shows the volume ofPakistan's trade liomt952-195',7.

For [asLem SuNe], New York. l95o P.5

'lhe trade Fisures for 1958-59 Dd 1959,60 financial years were.

Expea to Cbina RS S5.nillion and43 million

Pcrcentage ofPakistan-lbralexpons. 2.6 and 2.3

hlport from cbilla lts.558 nillion and 20 nillionPercenlagc ofPakistan'lbtal Inlpo( 1.6 and 0.8

Sorrce: Pakistan trades Krrachi, Ocl. t960 p.i2.

China purchased the coat from

China signed an agreemenr for rleworth nrore than Rs.30 million. Tbe

Pakistan. In May 1958 Pakisran and

purchas€ of 300.000 tons of coal

trade relations b€tween china and

Pakislan developed positively. On l0 Octob€r 1959 a parcel post servtce

to thc china was staned. China attended lh€ Intemational lndust_ral fair in

Decca, which op€ncd on 3l Jan 1960. It was third time that china

parti€ipated in such €xhibitions in Pa,ldstan "Pajdstan reccrv€d

machinery for lextile milts and sugar factories, cement factories railwavs

sleel tracks. coaches and wagons. Chinese coop€rative anitxde in trade

was quite favorable to Pakislan. Thc basic character ofchin€se trade was

to be without polidcal strings. Thc purPose of China's maintaincd of

economic and trades relations with Pakistsn were fo. fte economic uplift

and Industrial buih. The instance of the is the heavv mechanical conplex

ln $c early sixli€s Pakistan irnporcd &om Chnu melal and steel

product, coal, cemenl machinery, chemicals and Raw rnaterial ln order

to run lhe d€velopm€nt Projcci! in Pakislsf, \Mile china was to impon

lrom Pakislan raw Jule, raw cotlon, Jute manufactures, I€ather, cotton

textiles co|loD Yom, spons goods, surgical Instrumcnls' and n€wsprint'

The exchmS€ delegalioc by two countries bave b€cn cited 4 an

€vidence of the conlinued good will gesture China €m€rg€d as Pakrstan's

dependabl€ partner in trade. Pak_China trade r€lations expanded in

vanous ficlds for cconomic self'rclianl and stablc economic position for

Pakistan. There had been a con$ant giowlh in volume of trade; a vanetv

of cornnodities have b€en exchanged. The tradc b€twc€n china and

I'akrsrn sas ba'ed on rnulual benefit and equalrlv

Crltuml R€lations.

I'akistaD and china have mmy comnon bonds b€sides neighbor

hood. Comon nemones of cultural conracls are rooled in fte ancient

past can be traced dotrn to the beginning of Islam. Historical Chinese

pajnring has left the positivc effecl on Pakistan because lhe Chines€

painting was mod€l of Persian culture dd an. Thc reiations between

turkey Language spoken in sinking province and urdu had been Intimate

irr the past Evan ioday Urd! cm b€ panly under stood, thcre. Cultural

iotemction between the lwo couriries developed smoothly in 1954 all

china Democralic women's federation Invired Pakistdi, women to

panicipale in (he 5rr anniversary ofpeoples Republic ofchina. Atlend€d

china in the Scpr. 76 same ycar. Pakistan Ans council Lahore organizcs a

Chinese tuts and craft show sponsored by the Embassy ofchina in Apnl

1955. For promotinS betler atmosphere of cultural lnter course betwem

rhe rwo cou.rries in 1958 a scv€n men tean of Pakistan's Labour leaders,

atrend chrna lor three week rrip on the Inviralion ofall china trad€ unron

f:deraton in Apnl may 1958. On the Invihtion ofall Pakistan women

associalion a dclegation ofchines wom€n came to Pakislan. In the same

year radio Peking aDounccd the fomaiion of Chin.s€, Pakistan

iricndship association for lhc prinr objecr for promoti.g lhe cuttural

inleraction belween the two countnes. All Chinese Joumalist association

invited sixte€n Pakistani editore. Spcaking on.eception Chines€ Liu"ping

said "Fnendly relation berwcen china md Pakistan have ent€rcd a new

13

In June 1959 a t€n ntcmb€r parliamcntary d€leFtion lefl for chita

on tbr.e-we€k good will tour. On the ev€ of lour Pa,Listani delegale

l@d€rs addr€.ssing the people congress of china" p€ople of Pakistan

resard€d china as $mbol of peacetul human achievcmenls" Mr' Liu

Shao chairrnan of lhe congrEss rcmarked thar w€ th€ Chines. pmplc

hdve always treasured our tnendship wrth p€ople of Paktstan Because

tlis is nol only in ke€ping in view with fte lnterest of people of ouJ two

counrrics but it h also beneficial to the cause of p€ace in Asia and p€acc

The fr€quenr exchange of cultural visits by leaders and good \till

delegalions rell€ct€d the close and liiendly relaaions betwe€n Palistan

The basic ldea for th€ cultural exchanS€ betwecn th€ two countries

was to strengthen their murual under standing and cooperation for

bet(erment of peoples of two sides. The cultural relations have not be€n

effect by polilical chang€s between 1wo neighbours. The cuhuat

interacrion tunher providsd support and encourag.rcnt for ftlendlv

relations in tbc fi€ld of mss mcdia, conlacls lik€ Joumalist Boaid

casring, television and film Institutionoflhe two counlnes.

Evcnls oftension developed beawe€n the two counlrl€s.

The pro'w€st military allianc€s and Induction ofPakislan in 1954_

1959 Pakisbn became a party of military alliances, which wer.

compl€tely pro" w€st in nature. The pnmc object of such, mihhry

allianc€ was against conmunism and to stop the wave ofcomnunisn in

Asia gen€ral and south East Asia parlicule- Such d€signs of

auiances/pacts were against china, More over Pakistan's tilt was lo west

and to countcr dd check the g.owing Influence of radical @mmunisn

and to get military aid from west asainst the Indian expansionism. Since

1954-59 china supporr€d the policy ofnon aligned India having a lrack

record ofantr-lmpair list and against aligned Pakistan. The nse ofchjna

on lhe horizon of Asia 4 comunisi gidt posed a serious set back in

Economic and political rnterest in souih Asia. "In th€ early fifli€s United

Slates of Anrcrica staned looking for allies in Asia, wbo could stand up

and bc counled with her in cold war."('ar

Pakistan inclined to weslem secu.ity allianc€s and changed here

policy ofnon align€d and pursued the path of security anangemenls i.e.

SEA'lO and CENTO.

Thcre werc ftanifold reasons forjoining ofpro west alliances.

Security dueat posed by Lrdia

Economrc ard trom west

Military aid from west for tbe protection of tenirorial int€grity and

political independ€nce.

Pakistan's admissiorVinduction in the pro westem oriented pac6

, w€re clcar change in its foreign policy conduct. tn years 1954-55 such

dramatic chang€ paved lhc way in lhc ninds of chines auihoriliB as

reachon ,garnst Pakistan, china rcmarked aboui these aliances as

''Aggressive' and "Hosrile' ..The chines F€mier Mr. Chau_enlai foud

the sole ob.Jectiv€s of cstablishing

power and ensure the s€ning up

the organialions as to oblain

a new milibry spring boads and

Tb€ chines lead€rs also r€garded lhese abov€ menlioned pacts

agarnsl lhc secunry oflndra and other Asran staEs. A famous daily;ews

paper "peopl€s daily referred " Th€ United States and ils follow€rs have

also put foNa.ded a new ids ftal resistanc€ to any direct or indirect

aggression" includes non communist aggression". This clearly shows that

these pacts are direcled not only against thc socialist coutrica blt are in

lhe fiLsl place also threat !o such independcnt h€igbboring countries as

India, china and Afghanislan. Thcse mihary pacls will lhr€aten peace

and security in Asia" ('z() The Peking regime renarked that those Asian

countries that had join€d the njlitary pacts they would only sewe to

lightcn the Unitcd Stales grip on thcm.

Pakislan nlade it clcar rhar h€r €nEics in the military pacls arc not

againsr china and th€r€ is no my aggression from Chinese sid€. ln 1956

Chaou-Enlai was the first premier who visircd to Pakistd. On the eve of

his visit boih sides rcaffimed that lhere is difference in Social ord€r.

Economic syslen but rhcs€ diff€rence should nol sland a gulf for the

mut al and cordial relalions. between th€ two immediate neighbors-

lmpoaance should be giv€n to cortunercial and cultural relations betwc€n

the two friends.

Inspite of differ€nc€ of opinion belwecn china and Pakisian

because of security pacls lhere ernerged no real conflict and their

rclations rcmined cool and nolml.

The Arrival Of Hai Mission 1959.

on lhe eve of arrival of Muslin Haj mission at Kalacli there

tlm€d a low Point and relalions develop€d md rcceived set back b€lw€e.

china and Pakistan. The delegations belong to Taiwan. Clinese regime

reaced and pror€st€d againsr Pakisran har she has supponed fte Chiang

Kishek agents in tlre shape of Muslim. A Chinese representative

retuarkcd . Vicious role played by Pakistani ruting cliquc, ."The

Pakistani arthorities nade clear thal Pakistan Is not invotved in tnt€mal

aflaiGofchina, th€r€ is no ftiss-undersbnding in lheirdealing and duero

the lbmation of securty pac$ rhere emerged a gulf b€twe€n the two

countflcs. The Iritalion on Ha.J delcgarion was caused by Chin€s€

Govenment was due to srayar Karachi, asto create two China..?akisran

expressed surpris€ at this and polnted our that the visit had not in, any

way affccted advcrsely Patistan's, friendly rctations with. China." r??)

The Chinese Covemmenr accused pakislan for interferencc in the

inlemal anhirs of china and shows tack of r€spect for th€ ter roriat

Integrity of china and involved in suppon of Uniled States inrercst in

7

Border Dispute 1959.

In Sept€mb€r 1959 Pakistan receiv€d a Chines€ nap showins

somc parts of Hunza as pan of Chinese ar€a The mountain arca tn

Claciers lay east of 7)% longitude and nonh of 165,0 latiNde Th€

chincs hnes b€gan ar menkita ansd mein Kita Pass b€low the point whcre

the Afghan, Pakislan and china boundari€s met, came to down !o

Shimshal pass, and fi.lm€d Easl to wards Tjbet. Oct. 23'd 1959 Pr€sid€nt

of Pakislan Ayoub Khan amounccd to s€ttl€ th€ border fiiction wiih

china. In 1960 Pakistan changcd her poli@s in favor of seialist Bloc

esp€cially wilh china- In €arly sixties pr€sident Ayoub Klnn visiting

Unired Srares of America announc€d the china have to occupv h€r

posilion in Unitcd Nations. The china was imprcss€d the action of

Pakistan moral suppon for s€tting in Unilcd Nations. Finally thc Border

,grecment was concluded between two neighbours for th€ promotion of

I

I

I

I

r

2.

3.

5.

6.

1.

9.

O. w. Choudhury, Crinas Polrc' to Mrd' Pa,ti"dt. Thc-Allies

Book foundation, Karachi, April 1979, p. l8 I .

Meheru-Nisa Ali Xead,.1g i,t Pa*i,rd,3 foretqn Policv.Oxford

Univ€rsity Pr€ss, Karachi.l998, p.321.

"Peace lf,itiativ€s" Vol.: No. iiivi, May. Dec. I 999, Ncw D€hli,

p.ll6.

Quntbttddin A2iz, f9!9jgL!9!E!_9t PqLjtlg!, The AllicsBok

Foundalion Karachi, 1964, p.?5.

?\hrne d Ali, Mu s I i nC h ha,Pakisranlnstitulcofl nt€mational Affairs,

Karachi, 1950.p. 64. l-

H^tt cd, A. K. Rai,Pak Forcien Poli."v. Aziz Publication Lahore,

1981, p.547.

"Pakislan Horizon", l8 March 1958. Vol.:lII

Dr. MohamnEd Younas Refleztiot on China. Seryices BvJ/!",

CIub, Lahore. 1978, p.128.

''Strat.gic studies", A quarterly Joumal of Vol.: XII No.3,Insrituic

ofStrategic studies, 1989, p.44.

7

| 0. ztttitqar Ni Kn?dl', tubrlsrLfuyi4-eMk4scr,lrd-tutleE sProgressive Publicanons Lahore, Jan 1988, p.53.

ll. "SEalegic Studies", Vol.: lXNo.4,1990, p.19.

t2. Rtsool Bux Rai,E. eLiae!ULPsL!t!aa?9vi9s!l!4!r!:E E[

fu84--849BsE r\og.*ivc Publication, Lahore, 1977, p.15.

13. lbid, p.18.

14. Daily Da*n Jan 05, 1950.

15. "Pakistan Horizon", Karachi, Junc 1956. Fl19.

16. Ibid. Dec. 1956, p-224.

17. "Pakisran Ob6cwcr", Daccr, Fcb. 08, 1968. Vol. (9.

18- Pakistan News Dige$, 0l Scpledb€r tgs8,Karachi.

19. Pakistan Timcs, Lahore 21,Ja 1959.

20. Unitcd. Natiom. Monthly 0?, Dec 1966. Vol-l,l I I p.42.Chronicl€,

21.

1l

(halid Bi& Sarc4clr:rer€,erhttoilt vlrrt Pattt rrl}pgtlcsivc

Book, lrhotr 1970, p253.

"P.kirirn lted."Apdl 1953, p.3o.K,rachi

IIl

IIT

,. tIIt

22.

"For E3steln Survqf, Ncw yott J.n 1959, p.3.

24-

25.

26.

Prli{& N.wr Digas. f960xa!.hi.

H.m.d A.K R i, Opcit !E, 56465.

Parvccz Hrrr@, Prliird' I Ednru, x"blrorr.l(erchi brtiMe ofInlcrnational Afiairs , 195E, p.10.

Raool Bur Rrh, Opcit, p. 8.27-

tT

n

IIl|

III

'II

,-f|

lr

CHAPTER - TWO

Early age ofPak-China relrtions 1960-1965.

2.1 Background

China has never failcd in Paloslan's hour of o€ed History stands

wimcss to rhe trct ofPak-China relaiions. The mutualitv of interests aod

cordiality lhar developed in lhe 1960s has become a permanent feature of

their bilat€ral relations. Thc two countries have demonsmt€d rena*able

undorslanding of €ach othcr's foreign policv objecliv€s and seneratlv

adopred a mutually supportive view towards th€ major rcgional and

intemalional issucs. Mby westem as w€llas local experls havc codectlv

assescd the depth and naNre of Pak-China rcla{ions in ils rruc spirit and

oft€n their irdgm€nts have proven lt is .ecessarv for Pakistan to d€velop

dnd slrcnglhcn ilself against th€ polendal thrcats to i$ securilv Som€

observers also gave the view fiat it may have been dccmed necessary bv

the Chinese in lh€ larger intere$ of their oM secunlv' lo conhnue lo

assist Pakislan in mainlaining a deterre.t againsl Indian hegenonrc

designs. lt was c€nainly a shared strategic Pcrceplion lhat had

contnbut€d to the gowth of this lpecjal r€lationship Since its birlh, lhe

ma.jor focus of Pakistan's interaction with the intemational cor nunrty

has be€n based on two considerations firsl, sccurily against exlemal

chall€nges to its soio-economic progress ln the earlv ycars of rts

independence, Pakistan's teadership had to wotk hard fot cn€uring tlie

sn ival of a virtually unarmed country in the face of recunent threats of

war f.om a much stronger neighbo. I.dia-

since Pakistan's established diplomatic relations with Chrna fte

iclatlonship had always .emained cordial and trouble f.ee. There was

only one issue, the demarcarion of a portion of the Pak-China boundary,

which could have l.d the 1wo comtrics on a conftonlational palh bul thal

issue was rcsolved amicably lbrough ncgotiations in 1963. China's main

problem with its neighbo.s had been the dispuled border terilori€s.

Exccpt with lndia lhis problem wilh other neighbors has almosl been

rcsolved. Besides many olher factors, lhe single most imponant factor

contributing towards th€ sustainabilily in r€lalions has b€en th€ identical

pelceptions of intcmational and r€gional stral€gic milieus.

Prk-China Relations in 1960.

Pakistan's friendship wirh cbina, since the 1960s. has been

primarily al two levels of inle.acrion. One at the polirical €lir€'s level.

Second. at the milirary lev€I. Pakislan has mostly been ruled by military

cliles lbr long periods of tire. The milirary rul€rs includcd Field

Ma6bal Mohmmed Ayoob KIan, ceneral Mohammed Zi. urHaq,

iiom 1958-59, 1969-71 and 1977-88 respectivety. Aftd thc l96os

denocratically el€cted govemment |llled over pakistan onty between

l97l ?7 and until rhe prcsent. tsecause of fte counh-y\ security

compulsrons, Pakistan has ro maintajn a larg€ ,my, which supposedly

guaranlees 'ls

secu.ity dd leEilorial int€gnty. Therefore, over rhe y€ars,

t

llrc amed forces ofPakistan have d€velopcd a cerlarn polilical cloul lhat

has a degec of influenc€ on defense and foreign policy formulation.

The p€ople's Rcpublic of China has a cortununist socio-polirical

and economic strucrure, in which the P€opl€'s Lib€ration Army plays an

imporlant role in rhe formulation of forcign relalions and d€fense co-

opemtion with othcr countries. A major arcna of co-opeEtion, which

become lhe basis ofa clos€ relalionship between China and Pakistan, has

bcen lhe defens s€ctor, in addition io the eonomic and political

collaboralion. Mutually b€nelicial rclations b€twe€n rhe anned lorces ofth€ two countries have s€rved as an unintenupted and sustainable factor

ofcootinuity in dl€ ovcr all bilaleral relarionship.

'lhes€ were lhe lwo crucial d@ades in which China dd pakistan

cemflted th€ir bilateral relaiions. During rhe fi$ balf of th€

60s.Pakistan,s relations with China improved alnosr in diec! proponion

lo th€ detcrioEtion in Sinclndian and unircd States pakisld's rclations.

FIad been sending reminde.s ro rhe West time and again, rhat if tndia

b€came loo powertul, her smaller Asian ncighbors woutd hav€ lo se€k

china' p.oteclion and thar China would rcspond favorabty lo such a

nrove. But it seem€d lhat Pakistan's westem allies wcre more interested

in obliging lndia.

Tluoughout 1960, which was a year ofacute East-west t€nsions

duc to the U-2 inciden! retadons between China and pakislan r€mained

Altiough China was inclined towards Pakistan due to the fact lhat

Cary pow€rs had used the landins facilily in Peshawar whil€ flyins his

ill-i?rted spy ptan€ on its mission of €spionage to Russia, the Chinese

Covemment refrained from making capital out of lhis incidenl at

Pakislan's expcnse. while the soviet Union was against Pakistan atd

lhreatened ir wilh exlinction by.ockets in o$e ofits angry protests, and

the Indian press drew villainous pledur€ oul of Pakistan's

cmbaftassment by magni$1ng th€ part Pakistm had unknowinglv Played

ill the incid€nl, the Chjncse Govemmenl did not Lodge any protest with

rhe Govemnreni of Pakistan (allhough il was rumored that U-2 shad also

visiied sinking ) and the chines Covemment and their press and Radio

gave news against the United stat€ . Carefully avoiding any dircct

indictment of Pakistar.

The signing of the lndus waters reaty in ScPlember I 960. Which

incidentally nrarked lbe end ofPakistan's flexible poslure towards Indla

prompted the Chinese to have scond thoughts about Pakistan offer of

border negotialion. o) But, at the samc time, th€ Chinese had no mind to

compromise rbeir sland on Kashrnir and Pakistan\ occupation of a part

or whole of Kashmir. Pakistani leaders, on knowing the Chinese

susceptibititics, agre€d specifically that lhe sratus of the arca south of the

Chinese ltu€ was, and would r€nain 'undetermined' It was io th€

dctrim€nt of their earlicr assenions before the United Nattons

Conmission fof lndia and Pakistan, and to the provision of their

constitution which lay down that Pakistan, inler alia, consisls of ar€as

under direci administration. (r)

The Pakistani delegation did so in the auturnn session of lhe Urited

Nations Ceneral Asscmbly, aft€r a laps€ of tcn years. Pakistan also

critirized $e w€sl on p€rc€iving china as a secuity threat, ther€by

condemning and isolarins her. ln tbe 1960s among oth€rs, rhree major

developmcnts had trcmendously conrrjbuted to strength€ning the Sino-

Indrd border clash constituled a wabshed in China s anirude loward

India. So far she had vainly hoped that lndia would nake up wilh Peking

on Chinese tenns. Since the widenins of the Sino-soviet ideological

conlicl from 1960 onwards, China had ben on lhe lookout fo. making

up with as many Asian countries as sh€ could.

July 1961, th€ firsr visibl€ chang€ app€ared in Pakisran's China

relalrons during a visit to the United States, Pakisran's prcsid€nt Ayoob

kttan dcclared that Pakistan would vore for the s€atina of the p€optes

Republic ofchina in the Umred Nations.

Pak-china Reletlons In 1961.

The.efore, in May 1961, the cov€mment of pakisran, after

consulting with the pr€sidenl of Arad Kashmir, submiied deiailed

proposal to Peking for rhe denarcarion ofthc Sino-pakisran border. Th€

Cbin€sc Govemmcnt informed Pakistan rhal it would examine rh€

proposals and submit a r€ply in ftc n€ar tuturc. A y€ar €arlier and pribc

Minisler Chou en Lai had floM to New Delhi ro se€k a senlement withPremier N€hru. The rwo primc Minister ordcrcd their officiats to meel

and discuss th€ Sinojndian bord€r.

l6

Demarcation amazingly, the Indian delegation includ€d the border

between sinking and Kashm;, west of lhe Karakorum Pass, (which was

under rhe physical control of Pakistan and fomed pan of the sino-

Pnkisbn bordet in the agenda for discussion and demarcation wilh the

Chines€ officials. The Chinese delegation promptly poinled out thal, as

this area was lhe subject ofdispute belwecn Pakislan and India. And the

Indian aulhonties had no control on this area, the Chinesc side should not

agree ro discuss its dernarcaion with th€ Indian officials and il was

delet€d from the agenda. Early in 1961, Pakistan began striking up a

nrorc indepcnd€nt line in the conducl of its foreign relations. President

Ayoob khan was obvioudy di$ppoinl€d over the lndian Pnme

Minisler's obduracy ov€r Kashmir and the inability of the S€curily

Council to act forcedly on Kashmir.. As soon as Pakistan submitt€d

proposals to Peking for the demarcadon of lhe sino-Pakistm border,

tndia b€gan shouting oul loud protest and laid claim to the area as india.

teMtory, basing ils untenable claim on the figmeni of suzerainty which

the maharaja of Kashmir claimed to cxe.cise ov€r thcse parts beforc

panirion. The Indian Prin€ Ministcr, Pundn Nehru, and his Deianse

ninisler. XJislna Memon, indulged in proPaganda against Patislan. In

Novenbcr 1961, when India gabbed Coa by brute forcc, lb€ advice of

lhe American Presidenr and lhe British Prime Minister, and the S€cunty

Council failed lo censur€ lndia because ofa Soviei vclo, Pal.istd again

becanl€ conscious of India. Ahhough Indja's ruling l€aders and its

newspapc$ invenled the incredible fiction ofPakislan's oonspiracy with

Ponugaljust lo maliSn Pakishn in the Afro-Asian world,lh€ gim lesson

which Pakisran leamr fiom India's seiare ofcoa was lhat the gnbbcr of

Hyderabad, Junagarh and Kashmir would not hesitate to settle by lh€

fo.cc of adls its dispucs wift ils neighbors wift a mjlitant India on its

1ionlie6, it became all the more imporliant for Pakisbn to forge fiendly

relations with a far bigg€r and a mor€ powcrtul neighbor China. One of

Pakistan's first gestures of a ren€wed desir€ for fiiendship with China

wa! ns vot€ in Decembcr 1961 in fsvor of s€atine thc p€ople's Republic

oi Chrna In the Unrrcd Narions. ln proccedmg y€ars, Pakistan had

supponed wcstem-sponsor€d r€solutions for postponing considcration of

the issue of china's rcprcsentation in the Unitcd Nations. Peking no doubr

appr€ciaEd the chang€ in PaLjstan s atlitude. Under th€ st€wardsbip offorcign Ministcr Manzur Qadir, Pakisbn d€voled rhc whol€ of 196l ro

diplomatic negoliations with Peking on its proposals for fte demarcation

of the Sino-Pakisian border. In the mcanrnne, Sino,Indian border

nesotat'ons were complctely deadlocked and clashes b€tween Indian and

Chinese border forc€s were reponed. PaksIan did nor want similar

clashes on its oM bordeB wilh China alrhough W€stem observers

prcdicied that such incidenrs w€rc in rhe making alonS tbe Hunza bordcr.

In January 1961, Pakistan's forcign Minster Manzur Qadir

drclos€d the agreem.nr with thc Chjnese ro conduct negotiarions for the

demarcation of their border with Pa,|isran-occupi€d Kashmir. In May,

Pakillan submitt€d derail€d proposals. Bur again rhde ws no response.

In Dccemb€r 1961, whcn th€ Chincsc Arnbalsador saw prosid€nr Ayoob

and solicited his suppo( for rhe proposition that China's entry inlo the

United Nations should be decidcd on the basis of simple najority nrhcrthan two'lhirds matorily, Pr€sidenr Ayoob tmk up th€ mltcr. I asked

him about our suggestion of dcmarcaring rhe udefined bord€r beh,een

China and Pakistan. He said rhal was a very complicated malier. 1 rold

him that ifborder demarcation was a very complicat€d nutter' China\

admission to the Unite{t Nations wd even more comPlicaled l €xpressed

surpris€ that the proposal to demrcat€ lhe border between China and

Pakislan had evoked no r€sponse. I lhink the Chinese Ambassador was

impressed by what I toid him.{a)

Il was a result of som€ bilateral equation thal Pakisbn in

Decenber 196l swilched o\'er her vote' as against her prevrous sunce, 'n

iavor of admission ofcbina rc lhe United Nations and China agreed to

conducl the border .€goliations After the formal discussions which

staned soon after the expression of ihe growing Pakislan-China cordiality

could be seen in the signing of border ag€€mcnt beMecn the two

countics. Since 1961, the negotiations on the demarcalion of th€ border

b€twe€n Pakistan and China had sho*n some progress' bul aner the

culmnulion of thc Sinolndian war the ncgotiations roceiv€d a$ impelus'

ln 196l when Prcmier Nelm retused to discuss Kasbmir and

scomed ar Presidcnt Ayoob's ofTe. ofjoinl defens€ to India, and Kabul

struck up a belligerent Posturc against Pakisl'an (Oslensibly wrth Soviel

encourag€menl), tbe Govemment of Pai(istan r€alized th€ dangcr ofbeing

surounded by a ring of hostile neiShbours and the rnenace inherent in

having an undefined liontier wilh China.

Pak-China Reletiotrs in 1962.

So for, China bad carefully cultivat€d Pakistan bv negatrve means

Henccfonh began China's positive policy offfiendship towards Pakislan

on May I, 1962, the Covdment of Pakislan and China simultancouslv

announced in Rawalpindi and Pcking that thc two Govemtn€nts had

agreed to demarcat€ the Sino-Pakislan bord€r. However, the ageemenl

would be prcvisioMl dd after lhe setlen€nt of Kashmir issue, lhc

sov€re'gn authoritics conc€mcd would reop€n n€gotiations with the

Chinese to replace this provisional agfeement. It was a major diPlomatic

victory for Pakistan, much lo fie annoyance of India, which was still

feuding, wirh China ov€r th€ und€mzrcated border. The Indian

Govemnent's reaction was pat€ntly violent. On may 10, I 962, India sent

notes ofprot€st lo Peking dd Rawalpindi, challenging Pakiste's claim

to the area whosc demarcation it sought with China and accusing lhe

Chinese Govemmcnr ofduplicity. lndian l€ad€rs and the Press launched

propasanda against Pakistan and China and accusing lhe Chin€s€

Govemrnent rejccted rhe lndian protcst nole and bluntly lold India that it

had no righl to object to the Sino-Pakistan ag/eement to denarcate th€ir

borders. P€king's r€ply chided India for failing to setlle the border

quesrion with China. Pakistd also rcj4t€d dle Indian prot6r. Wh.t was

so str-dn8e about thc Indian protcst was Indian's position in chall€nging

Pakistan\ righl to negotiate cvcn the Gil8it-sinkiang border. lndia's

preposterous claim lhat Gilgit was pan of thc State of Jammu and

Kashmir and, therefore, b€longcd 10 India was provocalively false

becaNe Gilgit had acced€d to Pakistan and the validity of ils acccssion

was uph€ld by J. Korbel, a member ofthe United Nations Commission

for India and Pakistan (UNCIP).

I

Mohanuned Ali, who had resigred as Ambassador to Japan was,

made Foreign Minisler in President Ayoob Klan's n€w cabinet- One of

his firsl acts in offic€ was to rc-post Major General R"za as Pakislar's

Ambassador to Peking. Foreie! Minisler Mohamed Ali was ke€n thal

the delicate negoliation for the demarcation th€ Sino Pakistan border

should be conducred by hirn because b€ had intimate knowledge ofsino-

Paktstan relations and was well krown to the Chinese l€ader. Beside, Mr.

Mohanmed Ali l€aned heavily on Ceneral Raza m advice in Sino-

Pakistan aftans. As soon as .€lations and lhe pac€ of negotiations for the

dcmarcation of the bord€r was accelerared- On Octob€r 12, 1962,

Ambassador Raza commenced in Peking formal negotiations wilh the

Chinese Govemment for the demarcation oflhe border.

On Octobe. 20, 1962, hosrilities broke out on th€ Sinolndian

fronti€r when ftime Ministc! Nehn ordered his troops to driv€ our the

Chinese fron fte leritory. which India claim€d. The Chinese hil back

hard ad the Indian amy suff€r€d on the most shameful defeats jn the

annals ofmililary history. Prime Minist€r Nehru, discarding his rnasks of

non-alignmenr, begg€d rhe west for proteclion and arms to fighr the

(lhincse. Prime Ministq N€hru accused China of invading India. The

Westem powers rushed to lndia's aid withoul prior consultaiions wirh

their ally, Pak'slan. The Govemment ofPakistan rightly protested aSainst

thc supply ofw€slem arins to India. It was also proved that ev€r since lhe

binh of Pakisrd, India had concenrarcd rh€ bulk of irs amy on

Pnkislan's trontiqs. Pakisrd's assessmcnt ofthe siruarion was thar China

would nol undenakc an invasion of India and lhal fte Chinese had

counteFattacked on the border only aller the India and that $e Chinese

had counteFattacked on the bord€r only aft€r the lndians had attack€d

thern ro execute the ordc6 of thcir roljng l€aders 10 "drive oul the lasl

Chinese from Indian tenitory". How correct was Pakistan\ ass€ssment?

was evid€nced by Peking's ordcrs for a unilatcnl c€ase-nre and the

wirhdrawal of the Chincs forces to then oU positions. Pakistan Promptly

communicaled ils ass€ssment b i$ allies in th€ SEATO and CENTO and

explodcd fie Indian charg€ of Chin€se aggr€ssion. The Indian lead€rs

then all€ged that Pakistan had entercd a conspiracy with China lo attack

lndia.

Because of Anglo'American p€rsuasion, Pakislan agreed 10 enler

MinisErial-level negotiadons with lndia over lhe Kashmir dispute. Tlte

Uniled Shtes and Brilain lhoughi that if Pakistan and India were engaged

in ncgoiiations, the possibiliry of any unilat€ral arm€d action by Pakistan

in Kashmir would b€ r€mot€ af,d the negotiations mighl, after an, result

in a seltlement of the Kashmir dispul€ ard il may enabl€ the two

counrics to work out a pain oi joinl defense of tbe sub-continent.

Pakistan s Foreign Secrebry, Mr. S. K. how€vcr, publicly said tlat

Prkistan would nor renew its r€jecred offer ofjointd€fense to India.

In spite of India's $btle nachinations lo sabolagc lh€ Sino-

Pakistan borde. ncgotiatjons which were in pro8ress in Peking, Pakjsrd

border negotiations which were in progress in Peking, Pakistan and

China successtully completed lhcir ralks, and on Decemb€r 26, 1962, rh€

lwo Covcmmenl announced that they had reached agreement in pnnciple

on the alignment of their common border. Th€ amouncement was hailed

in PakisbD should have Aozen its negotiations with China while lhe

lndo-Pakistan talks on Kashmir were in progress. Tbe failure ofthe Indo-

Pakistan Ministaial-lcvcl talk on Kashmir six monlbs lat€r

demonsralcd the wisdom of Pakistan's finalization of ils border

demarcalion agreement with ChiM.

In the United Nations, Pakislan again voled for the seating of lhe

People's Republic of China, which fu her convinced the Chinese

Gov€mmenl of Pakistan's eamestness in seetjng accord with P€king.

Govemment of Pakistan and China simullaneously arnounc€d on

3rd May 1962 their desire to demarcale "the boundary b€lween China's

Sinkiang and th€ contiguous ar€as, the defense of which is under the

actual conhol of Pakistan. Apprehending what they wer€ dotng was

illegal and againsl tle intemational law, the announcetudt provded thal

fie agrecmcnt would b€ 'of a provisiof,al naturc," and ilnt the Cbinese

would re-negotiate with the sovereign authority "After lhe settlement of

th€ disputc oler Kdhmir between India and Pakistan. Both China and

Pakisran brushed asidc Indran prot€sl notes as lo the legalily of the

proposed transaction. China however, reit€mled hcr non_involvement in

the Kashmir question. The acnial n€gohations did not com€nce till the

beginning of hostilitics betwccn Ch;na and India in th€ following

autumn, when Pakistan, after inrtial hesitation, came out publicly for

Chjna. It seems thal rhe Chi.€se policy makers al the lime came to some

undeEbnding with lhcir counlcrpans in Pakistan as lo the limited nature

of then militar/ campaign. Her improvement of relalions with lndonesia

jn 196l and border agreements wirh Bunna and Nepal w€re jn tun€ wiih

rbe ncw Chinese stance. In lhc India-Pakistan subcontincnl China

prcfened India. Sincc India leadcrship did not agr€e to plav th€ Chin€s€

game, China had nothing to do but to 8o ahead with Pakistan On third

may 1962 to ncgotiale provincial denarcation tine in the disPuted

tenilory? "This move evolved an enthusiastic respons€ in Pakislan

Tibetan lyar 1962 and Ptkistrn's stand otr th€ issue.

China bas carlier claimed that Nepal; Bhulan, Skim and areas ncar

rhe ftonner of lndia N pan of gre3ter China ln 1950, India had

concluded agr€€mcnts with Bhutan and Skim ofholding a control ofthcir

foreign poiici€s and in case of Skin also d€f€nse. India had aho

agreement with Nepal for nutual consolations for defense in case of

ext€ml threat conftonting on their borders and th€ same tirne lndia

helped the Nepal for Economic aid in ord€r to €xtend to NePal's defensc.

So China felt Indian moves and it was threat for thc territorial jnl€grity

and political Ind€pend€nce of China.

The 17 Oclober 1962 approxirnat€ly 40,00 thousand Chin€s

personak intewened on the land of East Tibct. Tbis slep was only lo

liberare her. The Indian reaction was harsh and it conderuted the action

of China and callcd China ai an aggr€ssor bas.d on expansion in $e

regio.al affairs. The China mad€ il clear lhal no any foreign force will be

roleratcd ro be sulioned at Tibct and further Point€d oul that Indjan

altinrde is based on conftontation and hostile to wards China The

Pal.istan's auitud€ to wd(ls Tib€l problcm, in favor of China was less

critical. Tbe r€ason fior the less cridcal was thal Tibct was also undcr the

Suzeninty of China as legal. Th€ same policy sbnce was quoted by

M.A.H. lshphani Pakistani Ambassador at United States of America

"Pakislan was quiel r€moved frcn Tibet and did not think it would nake

any differflce ifcornnunist China ha! conirol on Tibet. ro)

The Tibelan problen was takcn for d€bate al Unitcd Nations in

oder to conderim the Chines aclion as aggression. The Pakistan's sland

al this momerr was neutral. The reason was Indian hostility and to gam

Cbrn€se support on any mishap in future and for s€curily and Eurvival

Prk-China Rel.tior3 in 1963.

An agreement was sigtd nearly six months ailer the Sinolndian

wd, on March 2, 1963. It is purposed to be provasional in natue md

sdpulabd lhat, an€r the settlem€nt of the Kashmir dispul€ between

Pakisran and India, th€ sovereign authorily concemed would reopen

nesotiations with China. China was able ro peacefully r€solve a bordcr

problem with Pakislan on an issuc, which had caused a conflicl wilh

India. Thus, the only imtant in Sino-Pakisr,n r€lations wrs renoved.

Pakistan on i1s pari effectiv€ly helped ending rhe isolation thar both

the sup€rpowers wished lo imposed on China, by signing an ag.eement

on air trarsport, prouding for Chin€se and Pakislani airlines to operale in

cach otheCs teritory. In 1963, a trade agr€ement. rh€ first such betwe€n

rhe two countries, providing for reciprocal Most-Favored Nation

treatnrenl in malters of commerc€ and hade including shippinS, was

45

Pakistan help€d China in establishing contacls with a numb€r of

countries. B€sides, lhe highest levels of visits were exchanged during

1964-66, bctween thc rwo countries. Pakistan launch€d a diplornalic

canpaign for the s€ating ofchina in the Unitcd Nalions To rcciPrccatc

Pakistan's g€stures, China also chanS€d its s|ance on the Kasbmtr issue

In 1964, when t€nsion betw€en Indian and Pakislan was h€ightened, dr

Chir€s€ Prime Minister on a visil to Pakislan' in a stat€m€nt' abandon€d

China's n€w stmd on Kasnmi. was greadv appreciaied by Pakistan,

because il could hav€ bcen citcd againsl China bv those who advocal€

plebiscite solution oflhe Taiwan issue

The scttlement by neSot'ations of th€ Sino-Pakistan border issuc

greatly inrproved the relalions between rhe lwo coxnlries While China

awaited fi€ anival of Pakistan's Foreign Minster in P€king to formauv

sign the border ag.ecmen! lhe Chincs. Govcmmcnl sot a hiSh_Powered

lrade delegation headed by China\ Vic€ Minhtcr for For€ign Trade' Mr'

Lin Haj Yun, to Karachi to n€gotiate a trade agre€ment b€lween th€ two

counln€s. On January 4, 1963, thc Chin€se Trade Delegation signed the

{irst form.l Sino-Pakislan trade agreerent providins for "most favored

nalions treatm€nt " to each o1h6 in rs?€cl of comerce and irade'

including sbipping. Thc trade agiecm€nt €nvisaged that Paldstan would

imporl f.om China metals, steel products, coal, cement, machinery,

ch€mcals, raw matcnals ald ccrcals while China would import from

Pakistan jute, cotlon, textiles. sports goods, hides and skins. Th€ Chines€

Vice Minisbr for Foreig! Tnde indicated thai China would be willing to

offer long tcm credit to s€tup small and mediurn lndtrstrics in Pakistan.

Tlre agre€ment provided fo. filnher anegements over a leriod of ycars

46

for stepping up Smo-Pakisian tradc. Under the trade agreement' Pakhtm

secur€d some very favorable terms, Pakislan hopes to implem€nr a par oi

its program of diversificalion of lrade as its answer to lhe restncl

ramilications of the Europd Common Market That thcrc is

considerable scope for €xpansion ofsino-Pakish tmde is eud€nced bv

rl'e racr rhar rn lc5l-i2, Ille volume of Srno_Pakilran trade wa) vahed al

Rs.275 millions bu. in 1962 it had dwindled lo R! 2? millions ln 1962,

Chi.a had Purchded Pahstani Jut€ and cotton worth $ 2 3 million lt is

also of inter€st lhal baning 1958-60 of trad€ wilh China when lh€ Sino-

Pakistan trade agr€ement was being negotiaied Cbinese ollicials had

hinted that lh€ pres€nt volume ofEade bctween th€ two coun!'ies would

be iDcreased ten tim€s. Pakistan is the only nation. aligned with lhe w€st

in the SEATO dd the CENTO, to which China has agreed to extend ihe

''most favored nation" slatus in Eade and commerce Vice versa, China is

lhe only communist nstion to which Pakistan has agreed lo gtve

reciprocal siatus. The age€ment promises a substantial boost to the

volumc of tnde belween the two couf,tri€s. One Pakistan n€wsPaPer

called this age€menl "a historic accord" while anolher commentcd. 'The

agreement will be welcome fervently by our people for reasons polilical

as weU as €conomic. Th€ people hopc and pray that it will be followcd by

mady otho agr€emenrs in various sphercs and prov€ the btrbinger of m

era of fratemal friendship b€tween Pakistan and China. (')

Anolher newspaper wmt€: "The imporlance of the Sino-Pakistan

trade agreeme.t is to be viewed in the contest of our balance of trade

position, which is obviously unfavorable. Britajn's d€cision to restict

imports of cotton yam liom Pakistan ud the Europ€an Common

Markct's unwitlingness to m€.t cven capacity of forcign exchang€

eamings and sou econonic devclopment. Pakistan musl, thereforc' for

ils vcry survival, s€ek n€w rnarkcts for the quick disposal on favorabl€

lerms of its raw and manufactured gooals. I1 should b€ noted that in the

wake of lhis ageement Sino-Palistan hade increased sreatlv and in

rgol-04 China becam€ lhe largesr imponer of Pakrslanr colbn Lrnrng

49,299 lons valu€d at RS. 125,467,000 out of tolal exports of 158,766

ronsoflh€ value of Rs. 340,054,000.

Thc first anicl€ of the "Thc Sino-Pakistan s€n€s \tas relatcd bv

the Govemment oflndia on January 10, 1963, a we€k before the s€cond

round of Indo-Pakistan Minist€rial level lalk on Kashmir in N€w Delhi

Th€ senes contained a whole of prot€sts, which the Indian Govcmm€nt

had made against the SinePakislan border reSonanons over lhc past lwo

years. Onc of Indra's protests to Pcking i.corpomled in thc fitlt amcle of

New Dclhi's officially-written "Sino-Patistan SerieJ' and published in

the lndian p.ess on *le ev€ ofthe second me€ting between th€ Minsters

of India and Pakistan for talks on Kasbmir, contain€d the lollowing rnoral

encoumS€m€nt to 4 a88ressor statc and prejudicing the prosp€cts of a

peacetul sed€ment of the Kashrnir dispute between Indian and PaHslan".

Aftcr the Chin6€ had humbl€d India's inflat€d pride on $e badefield,

the Sino-Pakistan boder aF$ment was China's diplornatrc slap on

India's mangled face. The agreernent is also an eloqu€nt t€stimony to the

dynami€ l€adership and brilliant slat€smanship of President Ayoob Khan

and a r€sounding drplomatic victory for lhe Govemmenl that he heads.

Foreign Minister Bhuito had received a tremendous welcome in

China. His mectings with ihe Chinese leaders, includinS Presidenr Liu

Shao Chi. communist Party Chaiman Mao Tse Tung and Prime Minislef

Chou en Lai was long, ftank and friendly. ln the meetings of lhe SEATO

and rhe CENTO during rhe first halfof 1961, Pakistan r€solutely held thc

vrew (har China had nol comrruncd aggession against India and lhal

China had no dcsigns to invade lndia. Addressing Afto-Asianjournalists,

includins those from Pakistan, in Peking on May 17, 1963, prime

Minisler Chou cn Lai warmly appr€ciat€d the bold shnd lak€n by

Pakista in rhe meetinss of the SEATO and CENTO and declaed China

now had a b€uer undersianding of Pakistan's associat'ors with these

alliances. China, he said, wrs now explaining 10 ils " fratemal fri€nds"

(the olherCommunist counti€s) Pakislan's position Vis ils allidces with

the wesl- Obviously, Foreign Ministcr Bhutto had succe€ded is dispelling

fiom the mind of rhe Chinese Prime Minister nany of lhose misgivings

which had piled up in.ec€nt years about Pakistm's foreign policies.

Soon after For€ign Ministcr Bhutto's retum forn Peking,

delesarions ot Pakistani busmessmen and joumalists visit€d China. In

these talk with the del€garions, rh€ Chinese Prime Minsr€r reileraled his

desire for sirengthening, Sino-Pakistan tade. The Managing Djrector of

the Pakistan Int€mational A ines, Air Comodore Nur Khan, also

vjsited Peking late in May 1963 following indicarions ofchin€s keenncss

lo have .ommercial air links with Pakislan. Tbe covemment of Sirkiang,

Saitudding Aziz, had suggested to visiting d€legation of Pakistari edilors

that there should be a direct commercial a; service betw€en China and

Wee Pahstan via Sinkidg to cur rhc th€n fling tim€ by some l8 hours.

A modem jetlin€r would covcr the distance belween Kashghar and

Rawalpindi in l€ss lhan ud hour's tim€. The suggeslron was uen

examinod by lhe PIA bul slrategrc and secu.ity consideEtion prevent€d

futh€r a6tion. An air service b€tw€en SinkiarS and Wesi Pakistm would

prcvide thc nced for pasrengen to ny rcugh lndian and Hong Kong for

geltrng lo Pelong). ln Augusl 1963. China and Pakisran sign€d an an

agreement in Karachi envisaging lhe operation of a direct conmercial air

sewic€ bclwem ihe two coutries.

Enlightened self-interest demands that Pakists should majnlai.

ffendly r€lations with th€ People's Republic of China, particulady when

the Chinese Pnm€ Minislcr hold the view that Pakistan's m€mbcrshiP for

th€ SEATO and fie CENTO is no bar to Sino-Pakistan friendship Tle

long as thc Kashmir dispute siumers, dEre cBn b€ no dwable fiiendship

beiween lndia aid Pakislan, and dhtrust and rivalry will continue lo lhcir

relations. Pakstan, therefore, cannot afford esFangetnent with China

Th€ nEssive military build up in India will probably encouage its

ambitious l€aders !o scttle scores wilh the Chines€ along the border. It

will b€ to India\ advantage to keep trouble br€wing on th€ Sitolndian

tonti€. b€cause feuding wilh China wil ensur€ the conlinuos flow of

Am€rican a$ns and cconomic aid !o India. The acuetion of military

strength will apparortly €mboldcn India to bully ils small€r n€ighbors.

All tlrough rhe past li0e6 yea$, India has kcpt the bulk of irs dealings

with Pakistan. Pakistan's fears thar lndia rnay use W€stcm arms to

intimidatc her are, thcrefore, not unjusti{icd. The physical undoing of

Pakistar has b€en lhe cherishcd dr.am of Hindu fanatics in India. Thcy

will- equipp€d arny ofa nillion man which India is now busy nising,

mostly with w€stem nnlilary assistance, can be a dang€rous tnstumenl m

the hands of militant Hindus M1o night sone day asain conhol over lh€

India Govemment. Rathcr lhan nsk a global war by undertaking a major

showdown with ChiE, India's goal miaht fien b€ fte elimjnation of,

what appears lo its fanatics, the cyesor€ Pakistan. India's miltbry

sna(egrsG Trghl demand passage tor then armres or mrlrtary 'upphe\

through East Pakisian to Assm. In case, self rcsp€cting Pakista retuses

lo accede lo this demand, Indja mighl not hesitate to undertak€ "Police

Acrion" a patenlly Indian per{idious taclic of intemal subversion

followed up by amed inEwention in the us€ of whicb lndia's

chauvinistic leaders havc become specialisis whiie d€aUng with weak

neighbors. On lhc contmry, China, which is anval to India for leadership

in Asia. would, wet a ftiendly Pakistan. Tlre conlinuanc€ ofPakistan as

a free and sovereign state is to China's advantage b€cause iflndia ever

succ.eds in grabbing Pakislan, it would give India trern€ndous polilical

pr€stige and boosl ils nilitary strcngth in its tussl€ wilh China for

domif,ation in Asia. It is, therefore, t an+denlly cled lhat so long as

Sino'Indian rivelri€s continue and th€re se€ms to be no end to it in ihe

lbresceable tuture China would b€ opposed to any Indian at(empt at

making Pakistan the viclih ofits aggrandizement. This line ofreasoninS

tuay have been one of the factors responsible for the remarkable patience

and restrainr, which Peking has shoen jr irs relarions wilh Pakisran over

the past thi een yeals. The Chinese Prine Minislei's declarations thal

Pakislan's associadon whh Wst€h m'hary allidces is no be !o Sino-

Pakislan amity and that lher€ is no real conflicl of interesr betw€en rhe

lwo countries sbows that China no longer objects to Pakistan's

memb€Bhip of SEATO and CENTO. Ther€ is no provision in lhe

allianccs to prev€nt Pakistan Aon having frifldly relations with China. tf

Britain one ofth€ kingpins in lhe Western military bloc and a memb€r for

the SEATO and thc CENTO, can maintain fri4dlv felations with

Pakslan and conduct a subsEntiat volume of trad€ wilb China' there is

.o reason why Pakistan should bave the slightest conscicnce or hesilalion

in befnending and uading wilh its great Asie neiShbour' Chna

Since China stood for raising fir€s in anticipation of world

revolution. Pakistan's hostility towards India stood her in Sood sl€ad'

China t.ied lo aclivat€ this hostility by two Proccsses. One, sbc ag€cd to

unden/rit€ Pakistan's s€curity vis-A-vis India, and too she modifi€d her

views o' th€ Kashmir question, in the process shomng her own desrgns

in the region wilhou! l€fting Pakisbn snell lhe foul plav.

west€m arms aiit 1o India and lhe growth in India's defcnse forccs.

early in 1963, rnade Pakisran look for som€ altemative source of support,

becausc Pakistan had ceas€d to have confidence in th€ W€st Pakistan

anxiously look€d to China's willingness to underscore Pakislan's anxicty

prov€d a heady wine. Foreign Minist€r Bhutio told the Pakishn Nalional

Assembly on l7 July 1963.

"Ood forbid, if th€re was to be a clash wilh India th€ inlemational

situation is such today thal Pakislan would nol be alonc in thal conflici

That conflicr do€s not involve Pakistan alon€ An attack by India on

Pakistan involves thc ieritorial integnty and secunty of lhe largest Stat€

in Asia and, therefore, this ncw element and this new faclor brought in

fte situation is a very imporlant elemenl and a very imponant hctor'

lvould not, at ths stage, lime to €lucidate any fuiher on this nutler".

Chou En-tai told a visiting Pakisld delogation tbat China would

defend Pakistan throuchout thc world as Pakistan def€ndcd China in the

CENTO and SEATO. (3)

In Sept€mber 1963, President Ayoob, in ar interview with selig S.

Harrison, the Washington Post conespondcnt in Karachi, said that ifLdia grows menacingly sbong. Pakislan might f€el comp€lled to €nt€r a

military pact with China. With a view to ensure lbat the border

nesorialions would be conducted in a friendly spirit. Pakistan r€-

appointed G€neral Raza as Ambassador ao China. Raza hes€nted his

oedentials on I SQt€mber, when he said thar his Govemment had

charging a boundary agreement. And of slrenglh€ning sritl further the

clos€ fnendly relations that already exist so happily berween us. In mrd,

Oclober it was dnounced in Peking that "in pursuance ofthe decisjon ofthe Govemmenl of the People's republic of China and pakisnn loconduct negoiiations throuSh diplomatic cham€h rhe repr€sentativ€s ofChina and Paktstan b€gan talks inPekinson Ocrober 12, 1962_(e)

On 26 Nov€mber Zulifqe Ali Bttutro rhen Ministcr for industries,

strted in rhe Narional Assembty that ..we bave the greatest feeling ofIiiendship for ihe geat people of Chtna,' and ..it is rhe tu.dam€ntal

pnncipl€ ofour foreign policy'. to bc friendly with ir_ He atso said thar

Pakisran's lriendship with China was .\rncondjtional., ard that .,we wilnor baner or bargain ir away for anyrhing, and lhal on t0 December in a

5l

n inlervi€ws with S€li8 H3rrison, Bhulto stated that China deserved

Pakistan's friendship as "a chanpion of Asie s€lf'r€spect alld self_

rcliance Widcly admircd in Pakistan

On 28 Dec€rnbd Pakistan and Chitra annomced "b agre€Mt in

Drinciple on th€ location and alignm€nt of lh€ boundary actuallv existing

b€twc€n the two countrics. The Chines€ press wamly wclcomed the

annoucement. Jan Min Jih Pao, comm€nting €ditoriallv, *tote on lhe

fotlowina day the r€aching of th€ agle€menl in principle on lhe locatrcn

of ihe toundary confonn3 to th€ intcr€$s of th€ Chinese and Pakishnr

Dcooles and to th€ inr@srs ofpeace i. Asia. w€ beli€ve lhat following

this agreement lhc traditional friendship b€twc€n th€ Chines€ and

Pakistani peoples will rise cven h'ghcr ftan fie snovr'capp€d Knakoram

and grow immens€ly lhe annoNcement was €qually welcom€ in Pakstan

and a Lahore newspaper conmentcd the news will bc widclv welcom€

Th€ agreern€nt is th€ ftuil of fiiendly negotiations conducled lhrough

normal diplonatic channels and fullv safcSuar& th€ legtnmat€ intercsls

ofboth countnes in a highly stat€gic and s.nsitive ar€a ('0r

In January 1963, at the invitation of Pakistan, China sent a trade

delesation, hearled by the Vice- Minister of Forcign Trade, Lin Hai-Yun

wilhin thr€e days of its anival, lhe delcgation signed an agre€ment

providing for most- favored nation treatm€nt a trade facililies.

including shipping, b€tween lhe two countries. The ag€emenr also

provided thai Pakistan wjll impon m€tal and ste€l products, coal c€ftent!

machinery chemicals, raw rnat€rials, and ccreals and dpon jute md jute

8oods, cotton and conon textiles, leaiher sporls goods, surgical

54

instnments chome ore and newsprint One Pakislan newspaper called

this ag.eem€nt "a bistoric accord" whil€ anotlEr coninenled th€

asrcement would be weLcome by orr People for reasons political as will

as economic. The people bope and Pray that il will be followed by nmy

olher agrecments in various spher€s and prove tbe hdbinger of and era of

iratemat friendship b€tween Pakisbn and ch,na ('')

Anolher newspaper wrote lhc imponance of the Sino-Pakislan

rlade ag.eement is to be viewed in lhe conlexl of our balance of trade

position, which is obviously unfavombl€. Brilain's decision to rcstrict

import ofcotton yam liom Pakistan and the European Common Markefs

unwillngness to meet even the ninimm dernnnds of Pabstan will

adversely aff€ct our capacity of forcign exchange €amings and sour

economrc development. Pakislan musr therefore for iis very survival seek

ncw narkets for the quick disposal on favorable lerms of its raw and

manufactured goods. lt should bc noted that in ilre wake of this

agr€ement Sino-Pakistm trade incrcased greatly ed in 1963-64 Chjna

become the larg€sl imponer of Pakisrani colton. lifting 49.299 tons

valued al Rs. 125,467,000 our oftorat€xporr of 158,766lons ofrhe value

of Rs. 340,054,000.

The exchang€ of visits by prominent persons of rwo counrries js

indication of lhc state of their relaiiotrhip, by the sutuner of 1963

Pakistan and Cbina had developed very close and friendly reladons.

Early in May, at lh€ invitation oflh€ Chin€sc covemmenl, a del€garron

oileadjng Pakistani indnstrialists a.d businessmen drawn ftom almost all

lhe leading business houses went ro china to witness thc exporl

comodiry fair at cafton. Th€ delcgation lalcr anivcd in Peking and wA

received by Chou En-lai on 16 May . in th€ saf,e nonth a five-m€mber

dclegatioo of Pakislan joumalists anived in china to attmd th. Afro-

Asian joumalisis Confercnce. the delegation tour€d seve.al parts of

china. On 17 May Chou Enlai r.ceived |his delcsanon and, as wA

revealed lat€r by its l€adcr Asrar Ahmcd Assured th€ menber that

China would defcnd Pakistan. Same dlne a five -member Chinese

pilgrims delegation anived in Pakistan ard Zulifiqar Ali Bhulto, who bad

b€cn appointed foreign Minister in January, presenled to the Chinese

Ambassador 500 copi€s ofthe Holy Quran and 63 coPies ofthe work of

pocr-phitosopher Muhamrnad lqbal- (r2)

What is gendatly bclieved to hav€ led to vcry geal unlappiness

amongst $e Amcricds was thc mov€ for d air link, as mentioned

earlier, Al lhe €nd of May the Chaitman of th€ Pakistan Inlemalional

Airlines, Air Marshal Nur Khan, visited China His hosts warlllv

welconed Nur Khan, and Chairma$ Mao Tse-tung hims€lf rec€iv€d hin

on I Junc. In mid August, at the invrtaiion of Pakistan, 3 Chinesc civil

aviatio. d€legation cam€ to Pakislan dd was received by th€ Foreigt

Minister on 23 August. Torvarals the end of the month thc lwo countn6

sjgned an agreemcnt lnd€r which th€ national airlincs of the two nations

werc Frmitled lo oPe.are in €ach oth€r's teEitory' Pakistan was giv€n

traffic nghts at Canton and Shangahi in cxchang€ for nghb for China at

Karachi and Dacca. This was the Iirst air agreern€nl signed by China wilh

any non"socialist count v Pakistan had therefore good r€asons 10 be

plcased with it. But it was m€rely a business proposition for Pakistan.

China was happy with thc air accord for her own reasons. She was then

engaged in a campa'8n to wm

a8ainst Indian on lhe border

welcome to h€r inasmuch

over th€ afto-Asian countri€s in he. stand

clash. The Pakistani Airlines tlights were

as ilese provid€d a quick means of

tmnsportarion betwcen China and many cou.tries in thc Middl€ &sl and

Meanwhile. on 17 Jnly 1963. Bhutto nade his famous statemeni in

the National Ass€mbly in which he said. "God forbid. lf th€re was io be a

clash, iflndian in her tusiratjon tumcd her guns againsl Pakistan alonc.

An attack from lndia on Pakistan is no longer co.fined to th€ s€cuily

and leritorial intcgrify of Pakistan. (lt also) involves the renitorial

inrcgrity and s€curily of th€ larg€sr srate in Asia dd, therefore, lhis new

elcment and a very important facror. I would not at this srage lik€ to

elucidate any turth€r on this matt€r, bDt suflice (iI) !o say that the national

inlerest of anoth€. Slate itself is involvcd in an atack on Pakistan"- (rr)

Tbis was a very unfortunate statem€nt for seve.al r€asons. Il l€d to

much speculation in America. In fact, this author feels that Bhu(o's

pronounc€ment, rathff than the a; accord, as is g€nerally said, was the

iumi.g point in Pakisran-American relations- Ir was also bound to

anbSonizc lndia a.nd suggest to hcr leaders rh€ desirabiliry of furrher

strength€ning $eii coDtry's defenses. It must as well have pur China in

a very embanassing Position.

China, howeve., do€s not s€em to bave allowed h€r relarionship

with Pakistan to be influenced by what Bhutio had said and further

measuJes were tak€n to promore cooperation betw@n me rwo coutncs.

57

In Mid- Septcmber a direct mdiophone aid photogaph service belwe€n

PekinS md Karachi was inauguratcd. At the end of thc month, the two

countries enter€d into a baner agreement, under which Pakistan-China

fieDdship Associaiion, Hatim Alvi, whilc lhe othcr was headed bv lhe

welt known East Pakistani l€ader, Moulana Abdul Harnmcd Klran

Bhasham, and rcprescnted Pakislan at China's Nadonal Day celebrations

Bhashani, in particular, Chairman Mao tse-tung Chairman of lhe pcopl€'s

Republic Liu Shao'chi, and Chou En-lai otertaincd him more lhan once

Mao Ts€-ung is evcn rcPoned b have suSg€stcd to Bhahani that h€

should not oppos€ Ayoob khan\ Government. ('o)

Al*nugh Pakistan had come very close to china md th€ close

retationship had rcsulted on Pakistan's sid€ ftom h€r f€ar of India's

growing nililary sh€ngth, Ayoob Khan lhoughl therc was noihrng

unusual about this d€velopment. In an addrcs to lhe Pakislani pcopl€ on

I November he said "Lasl month, I spoke about the normaliation of our

relations with our gr€at neighbot, China There has been c'ilicisn and

disapprov.l ofii in certain countries oflhc world l am glad to l€am thal

in thc sarn€ counti€s, there is now a move for ih€ nomalization oftheir

own relations with China. Thc Ncw Ydk Times has urg€d it The Unit€d

Stares President has admitted that th€re will be no teal world

disarmament unless China is a patty to it and I s€e in some Ammcan

newspapers lhat thc state hpanmcnt ha! aPProv€d that the west coasl

businessrnen should d€velop trade relalions with china. Ml. Harry S

Trur n has Mitten an article thal America should supplv fiee wheat to

China. we are doing jusl that, so, where is ihe cause for suspicion rbout

58

Whatev€r might hav€ b€en of th€ dinking of Anericans about rhe

relaiions of lheir own country with China, the Unil€d States Govemment

was th€n not prepared to Pakishn's fiiendly r€lations with China.

Consequ€ntly, Pakistan's improved reiations with Chira very adversely

affeckd Pakisian Aftqicm relations.

Pak-China relaiions lumed from foe to lri€nd in the sixties many

cvents shaped up thcse relations. Th€ problem of Borde. demarcation

could be called beginning Counlry that seltlemcnt of Border betw€cn

India and China played posiriv€ role in the established of these ideal

relations. Tib.lan war of 1962 between India and China provided a

golden chance to Pakistan to support Chinese stand on the issue. Dunng

ihese cvenls westem powers and USSR supponed China thcoretically

and practically. This support of weslem powers/alli€s ofPahstan b India

exa88€rated lhe anxiety of the Pakistd. Such siluation played a come.

slon€ role for the fornation of thes€ r€larions. Political Hislory of th€

world is replet€ with exampl€ of bouodary disputes leading to war

b€twecn sovereign srates as ako their setrlcmenr ar time, facitiratiDg ih€

development of cordial relahons. "Stability of the boundaries on lhe

desire ability on the both sides to maintain balance"{r5r

As result of unstabl€ boundary the bilat€rat r€lations b€rw€en rhe

n€ighbonng states tumed into hostile ro worso. Therefore hremarional

boundaries ar€ as much a political problcm as histonc, geog.aphic, and

social. Th€ stability of boundary depends as nuch on politjcal condjnons

al parncuh time as on the ratioDal delimjiation and d€marcarion.

The Border rgreement b€tween Chitra and Plkistan.

The Sino-Pak bomdary rcnain€d stable and fiction free for above

d€cad€ since lhe €mergence of communist Cbrlra because of no

conc€ivable clash of interest betw€cn the n€ighbo$ How ever wilh the

assumption of power by Ayoob Kha Octobd 1958, lhc relationi uder

went a down ward trend b€caus€ of the dorn€stic condition in Pakistan

and increascd United States infl cnce in Pakisran's policy making Thc

slrand md hostil€ Pak-Cbina relations found in border t€nsioo in 1959'

Howcvcr rclatively less div€rgent relations charact€rized bv discrect

silence rhoughout the end 1960, and 1961, had beanng on therr'

boundaries which rernajned quiet and normal? In 1962' the up ward trend

of Pak-China rclations was significant step whcre bv ChiM agreed to

seftle the boundary probl€m in Pakistar in order to naintain th€ friendlv

r€Iatiols betwcen the two clos€ n€ighbols, on tltc basis lo forge a closer

ries in lheir national interest

The Sino lndian war produced a leadins srep

the entire satisfachon on of bolh countrics

developnent of cordial lics which have conlnu.d

ups and down not worth standings". ('6)

In Seotembe. I 959. the Covemm€nt of Paki$an r€ceiv€d Chinese

map 1o showing some pads of Hunza a Chines€ tcEitory. This moutain

area a boundaries in glacie6, Lay East of 75% d€g€e longitude and

nonh of 3.650 Latitude. The Chin€s€ line besan at Miniikia pass below

''rhis facilitated the

till to day, some mner

On October 23, 1959 President Ayoob Khd airounced the

willingness of his Govemenl to deal thc boider problem wilh Cbina.

The cbina paid little atl€ntion lo Pakisbni proposal for botder

demdcation because of the reason that Chinese leaders did not like

Pakistd s continued advocacy ofjoint defense wilh India. Both panies

wift view to ensuring peace in the r€eion and developing co-operative

r€lations realized the depth and $avity oi the problem and could be

resolv€d in p€acc fitll ranner by negotiations.

The Chines€ gesture willbe r€c€ived deep appreciation allover th€

county Pakistan will rcadily gapes Ihe hand of friendship extcnd€d by

his greal neighbo.. The 1963 border agre€m€nt not only worsencd lndo-

Pak relations but also worricd Wahington md Moscow. The United

States of America resent€d not so muc} tbe agreement coDtents as its

rmplicalions ofnew Pekins oriented trend in Pakistan foreign policy

the point where the Afghan, Pakstan and Chinese boundaries met, came

down io Shimsshal pass and tumed to wards Tibei "The Pakislan

Foreign Office did nol show hast€ and took lhe maP very simply in thc

conducr of actusl business".

"hnpartial foreign authors agreed that Pakislan was the gainer ib

the 1963 bord€r ag.eem€nt. (r7)

Though th€ Sino-Pakistani border accord was the firs1 major

agr€ement betwc€n thc two coutrics, rheir cordiality had began lo grow

while th€ negation were still in progress. Tbe reason of coNe was thal

both necded new ftiends. China's alliances with the Soviel Union

deterioratcd evm €dli€r thcn here frien&hip with lndia.

Sllienr f€eture3 of the border rgrcem€trc

The agr€ement singed by Ch€n yi Chinese foreign Minisl€r

Zulifiqar Ali Bhuuo Pak-Forcign Minisler Mdch 2d 1963 in Beijing's

great Hall of th€ pcoples in thc presenc€ lo Chairrnan of lhe p€ople

fepublic ofchina Liushaoqui and premier Zhou E lai.

The prime obj€cl of lhis agreement is to cr€at€ atmosph€r€ of

tranquility on th€ borders and io Pronoie th€ friendly relations between

the two n€ighbours. An und€fined UN-demarcaled border could have

caused of conftontation and fiaction as in lhe cas€ of Sinolndian borde'

sewe thc cause of possiblc tusl€ rather thcn th€ growlh of the mutuallv

benefichl relations, the panicularly when such progress of relalions

initiated opposition from sup€r pow€rs and lndiaAlike

Both the powers staned ralks at diPlomatic lev€ls, whrch w6rc

keep th€ ncgotiations, s€crct and fr€e fton any public

over difierence. As rcsult of Pak-China boundrry d'sPule

goneration con{ictual r€lations acted n€w phase of friendly

relations between the two neighbors.

ARTTCLE-T

Keeping in vicw of rhe fact ftat lhe boundary betw€cn china

sinking md the contiguous ar€a thc defensive of which und€r the real

conlrol of Pakistan has never be€n fomally delimrted, ro parties agiee to

d€al limit in the basis of Eadihonal custonrary boundary line including

lhe nalural features and spiril ofnutual b€nefit and friendly cooperation.

Beginning fron nonh westem €xtrernrty at peak's 630 mclers

approxinulely lantude 74 degre€ 34 mi.ul€s €ast and latirude 74 degrce

three minutes nonh the boundary line runs generally eastward and rhe

southward stricdy along the niain waler shed berween rributaries of rhe

Hunza nver of the Indus nvcr syslem on rhe other band passing rhrough

lh€ Kilik Dabove and the Parpik pass and read thcm and Ktunjrab pass

and read th€.n and Khunjrab pass.

After passins th€ Khunjrab rhe boundary lin€s ru.s generally sourh

word along to abovc pass where it lcaves the main walershed follow lhe

ARIICLE.2

In according with principal menrioned ifl anicle one of the

agreement which lwo parties have fixed as fo ows rhe atignment oflheentire boundary bcrw.€n Chines Sinkyoing and rhe contiguous d€a ofdefe.se w€re actually under fte controt of pakisran. According to the

map of China the boundary lin€ after leaving rhe sourheastern of this

Espec runs atong small ponion of the niddl€ linc of lhc bad of the

Kclmansu to reach it with thc Elcchain Rivcr. According to the map of

thc Paki$an the boundary sft€r lhc leaving the soudEas&m extreiniry of

this spur reache,s thc sharp bend of thc Muzlaghrivd

From lhe aforesaid point, th. boundary linc runs up th€ Kelcchin

riv€r along the middle linc of its b€d apProxirnatcly 76 degr€e two

minut$ €ast an latinde 36 dcgr€.26 minutcs North with Shorbulk Daria.

ARTICLE.]

the bound.ry li€s, middle line

of the riverbed shall be the

The two parties

of the nverbed shall

Wherever th€ ftonti€r passes ttmugh p3ss the water parting the

line they re ofshall be the boundary line.

ARTICLE-4

Tt'e bolh contradicting parti€s have decidcd rhat as soon as

possible a joint boundary dernarcatins commission. Each sid€ wilappoint as chaimn and advisory board and technical staff

The following responsibility have been assign for rhe conrmission

To conduct lh€ necessary surveys boundary area and maps_

]b desisn and draft a protocol selring $e ahgnm€nr of entire

boundarf. Prepd€ and get p;nted retat€d naps.

ARTICLE 5

The both concemed sides have pt.cipalty agreed rhar any disputed

which my aris€ afler rhe demarcation after boundary line acrually existing

between tie two counrri€s, shall b€ settted doM amicably in ftiendly

ARTICLE.6

Th€ bolh parties hav€ ag€ed aft€r the

bctween lndia and Pakistan, th€ sov€reign

s€ttlenent of Kashmir lssue

authority will reopen talks

shall cainc into force date of signature, written

second day ofMarch 1963 in the English and

draft is b€ing equally authentic

with China on rh€ boundary demarcrlion as decid€d in anicl€s-2

ARTICLE.T

The pr€sent accord

in duplicate in P€king on

tbe Chines languag€s- Th€

Crltical asressmenht of the border .ccord

By signing this mutual accord Pakistan a€hi€ved the following

b€nefits.

Under lhis ageem€nt Pakistan obtained ll50 m'l€s which were

aciually in Chin€s contol and adminrstialion

China with drew the claimofHunza.

Th€ meniion€d accord succ€ssfully prel€nted lhe bittemess'

friction and hosnlity betwcen tltc two closcd neighborrs. li promot€d a

conductivc atmosphde in ord€r to promot€ rcsionat peace and goodwill.

Th€ newly acquired ar€a saf€guarded Pakistant inlerest such as

sah Mines three quaner of K.2 and water of Indus R'ver sysl€m.

rl was mod€st mlerest.

lo this accord in the

So far economic objectives are concemed,

ln .€sard political and diplonalic asp€cl, du€

corrnunily ofNations. Kashmir was recognized as disputed tcrritory.

"The agreement was complete conformity wilh the provision oflhe

Unit€d Nalions charter and positive contribution to th€ cause of p€ace in

Marshal Ch€n ii the Chines representative bighlighted accord "as

ncw slage of d€velopment of fii€ndly relarionship berween two counries

and imporlant contribution lo the cause of Afro Asian Soljdarity.

Mr. Z.A. Bhutto bricfed lo th€ Nalional Assembly of pakistan in

July 1973 in the menrioned Wo s.

"lr is matter of greal imponance lhar tlrough the agreemenr we

have remov€d any possibiliry of ftacnoD on otlI comon bordcr wirh

China we hav€ etiminated whar mighl have b€come a source ofmisunderstanding and tuture rroubt€s,'.

On the de of si8ning of the agreemenl Mr. Z.A. Bhuno poinled

out and €laborated the agr€em€nr as "as symbolic of rh€ sprit offriendship and mulual cooperation"

This agreemcnt on ttorder dcmarcaaioo was first step in evolutron

of relations betwe€n China and Pakistan dir€ct€d and inniated bv

uohammcd Ayoob Khan (rt)

The border clash b€twcn lndia and China compell€d the China to

sign th€ agre€ment with Pakistan Becausc of the fact China €ould nor

afford lo kccp h€r bordm opcn to dang€$

TIIE INDIAN STANCE ON SICNINC PAX.CHINA BORDERAGRf,EMf,NT.

As €xpecled, Indian MinisB of Foreign affairs proiested and

dectar€d accord with $e sov€r€igntv over the Junmu & Kashnnr'

Because in its version the China has accepted th€ accession of feslrmir to

lndia tuthcr alleeed that China is exploitinS tho Indo-Pak differences to

ir ad!rnrage and promodng aggressive designs in the region

The govemment of Pakktan rnade clear her vcrsron ano

maintained that thc main purpGe of the bo.der agr€emenl was remov€

rhe po$ibl€ cause of friotion settlement and p€ac€ful s€ttlenent of the

Kasbmir issue b€tw€€n India and Paki$an. The China r€sponded the

Indian r€aclion and mintain€d that China never acc€lted Indian

soverelgnty over Kast|Inir. China and Pakistan could s€tll€ tbe qu€stion

of rhe acNal present Boundsry b maintain lranquilily on the Borders'

During the negotiations lrdia had declared that it would not accept

any ageefteni which involved Kashmir lenitory occupied bv Pakistan

The Indian proresr against accord tras no base; Pakistan rcjected the

Indian all.gation €ompletely.

The Indian r€presenlativ€ in S€cu.ity council €laboratcd the stance

ofhe country on the accord and defended that "Pakistan had no righr to

dispose property which did nol belong to h€r, wo would not to be bound

by an ageement, they may reach temporarily, permanently or in any

The Indian claim was not jusrified in inletualional opinion to

persuad€ the course of Bou.dary negoriarion. The border accord proved

to be significant st€p in diplornatic and political relarions of pak-China

friendship-

Pak-Chitr, Relations in 1964.

During their visit ro Pakistm in February 1964, rhe Chinese leaders

described ine natue of their retations wirh pakislan as thos€ ofdep€ndable and reliable. Chou En-lai said ar Dacca on 25 Februffy 1964,

"Our liiendship in nor guided by expediency bur is an €vertasting one,

and no one can undcrmine it. In a press conferenc€ the samc day Chou

En-lai pajd handsome rribur€s to hesidenr Ayoob Khan.

I.asnuch as K€nnedy,s India policy had resulted in dislurbing lhe

military balece in the sub-conlinenl to pakisran,s grcat disadvanlage and

had consequ€ntly srrained Pakistan,Am€rican relalions with China.

China's Bponse was favorabte, and s€verat steps wer€ taken to funher

strcngthen the ti€6 betw€€n the two countries. Neit month, shorlly after a

tour of ihc Aliican countries, dE Chinase Prime Minisbr Chou Yi and 48

members, arrived in Pakistan on an eight-day visil' Welcoming the

visitors, Dawn cor ncnted: "No visidnS forciSn dignitdv nas be€n nore

welcome io this country than l,!!ll b€ Predier Chou En-lai and For€lgn

Mrnrster Chen Y' who are due to arive loday rn PatisLan lhev had Ue

honuor ofan earlier visit by the Chin6e Preni€r in 1956 but he comes

rhis time in a diff€rcnt and even in r€vol tiomry historical conlext Now

€eli€r baricrs have falen, prcjudic€s with€led awav and taboos rcvised

\Yhcn thc Chinese l€{dcrs visited East Pakislan' anolher newspaper

\lror€ tbat "tbe Sino-Pakistan ties provide an eloquenl example ofthe fact

rhat inspite of their ideological diffcrdlc€s it is possible for two countries

to live in harmony and peace and coop€rat€ with each other in all

activid€s that contribute to lhc prcspnitv oftheir ?€oples

I1 was during this visil that Chou En-lai inviled Pr€sident Avoob

Khan to visit China. Chou En-lar also expressed gradn'de !o Pakistan for

counteing thc propagdda lhtt Clina is not a peaceloving countryr ''Ihe

Pakistan Govcrnnent and public opinion have right€ously r€fiitcd tl'c

slanders made by the forces hostilc to China and Pointed out that Cbim is

a peace loving counn /. This constitutes a valuablc support lo China' for

which th€ Chin€se Covemmot and p€ople would like to expr€ss therr

sinc€re gratitud€". The Chines€ Pr€nier then described Pakislan's

association with SEATO and CENm as tcf€nsive" ln th€ toint

communiqu6 il was, inter alia, statcd that th€ two leaders "exprcss€d lhe

hop€ thai thc Xrshmi disputc would be rcsolved in accordance wilh lhc

wishes of lhe people of Kashmir, as pledged to tbem by India and

Pakislan. This was a marked departure ftom the earlier Chines€ stand,

which mount€d to neuhality.

In Adl t964 wben the inaugural flight of the Pakisran

Inlemational Airlines anived in China, Rennin Ribao, in an editorial

ennlled An Airline of Friendship and Peac€" wror€ since rhe

eslablishment ofdiplomatic relarions and especially in fie last few years,

fnendship and c€pcration hav€ rade renarkable progress on the basis

ofthe Pnncjples oflhe Bundong Conference. The frcquent exchange ofvisits, the cver gowing trad€, economic and cutrural int€rflow berween

the two countnes had made it nec€ssary to shorten rhe physical distance

by m€ans of modem r@sport so ftar existing lies of fri€ndship can b€

madc still closer. Hence, th€ opening of rhis new air route, which is in

accord witl the common aspirations and inrerests ofour two peoples.

Early in July 1964 a g-mernber delesation of pakistan businessmen

visited ChDa to explore th€ posribitiry of expanding trade b€tween the

two countn€s. About the middle of this month pakisrd's Commerce

Minister wabiduzziman arived in pekrng. Chairman Mao Tsermg, who

than lhank€d Pakistan for her sbnd about China,s seat in the UnitedNations, r€ccived him. Laler in ihe monrh China off€red to pakislan ujnrerest-fi€€ loan of $60 njltion, rcpayable in pakisrani goods over a

period of twenry years, for lhe purchase of indusr.ial €quipmeDr and

The t€rms of ihis loan were gr€atly apprecial€d in Pakistan A 7

man Pakistani dcl€galion lcd by ft€ fifie€nth anivcrsarv c€l€brations of

the Pcopl€'s R€public of China in Oc.ob€r, Shortly aft€r a l0-member

delegation led by the D€puty Chaiman of th€ Pakistan Planning

Conmission went to Chim to examine the scope of Chinese aid in

various Palistani Proj€cts. In tate Octob.r 1964 during a slopover in

Karachi, the Chinese Foreign Minister said that he favored a plebiscit€ in

Kashhir. In Dcccmb€r 1964 ii was announced ihat a regular Pakislan'

China shipping servic€ would start in lhree months tim€ Also in th€

san€ monlhs Ayoob Khan dcscribcd Cbina's first nucled test as a most

impressive achicv€m€nt" of the Chinese gov€mmenl and the Chinese

p€ople. Ayoob Khan also said thal Pakisbn considcred it necessary to

associate china witi atl disarmamen! efforls and to restore Peking "its

le8ltimate rigbts iD th€ United Naions.

Pak-China Relrtions itr 1965.

Early in Mrch 1965 Ayoob Knan visited Chim and r€ceived a

rousing welcomc. New China Ncws Asency report€d fiom Pcking on 2

March 1965 "Eag€r to reciprocate lhe €nthusiastic w€lcome accord€d bv

th€ Pakistani p€opl€ to Prcmier Chou En-lai duing his Pakislan tou lasl

spring, the people of Peking have created at ujor intersections along lhc

amval route huge porEails of Presid€nt Ayoob Khan. Th€ city was

adomed with national nags of the two countries in addition to numerous

colortul bamers and slogd-b€aing streamers. A liv€ly, teslivc

amosphere reigned tlToughout the civ' Ayoob Khan then declared lbat

"fiiendship with ChiDa is for us a longrem policy and not a matter of

expedi€ncy- In the joint cornmudqu{ Ayoob (nan supportcd china's

stand on Taiwan and" two pani€s noted with concem that thc Kashmir

dispule rcrnains llmsolv€n and consider€d its continued existencc a

tbrear to p€ac€ and s€curily in lhe region.

Premier cane to give fiendly advicc io the Pakistlni ft€sident

about Pakistan-sovier relations. On 2 June 1965 Chou En-lai cam€ lo

Rawalpindi again. At that time the Chinese leader stated that "in r€cent

y€ars, ftiendship b€tw€en our two p€oples has undergone a remarkable

dovelopm€nt and the cooperation betwe€n our two cowtries has been

exccedingly fruittu.

Later in the month Ayoob Kian and Chu En-lai met in Cairo about

the proposed second Afto-Asian conference-

In bn€f China precisely wanled ofPakisran nothing particular than

unity against aggression. This is the basis ofth€ friendship b€rween two

countries and provides guarantee for irs faturc cooperation and

2.

t.

L

5.

J,

8.

9. For

Latif Ahmcd Sh€rwa , Fo/eim Policv ofPakEta att analvsd

'lhe Allies Book Corpontion, Katachi 1964, p.86

Saryat Sln$f3lU!A!LEUsjg!-29!9y e!--!2p!sisal,F afiail

Publisher, Lahore, p.l I I .

R.L. Sham\The Koshnn Sb'r, Bombay I 966,p 67.

4 Mohammed Ayoob KIan, Ftiend: not Master!

York,l967, p.162.

The Pakistan Times, La]rcrc October 15, 1959.

The Pakistan Time3. May 1963.

ObseNer, London, 21 July 1963.

M.B.Naqvi, our Foreign Policy, Assumption, Motives and

Frustration. Pakistan Obs€ryer, 14 Auglst 1966

L^nf Ahn:,ed Sh€'\tar,r,, pa*ittaL Chira and Anerica.Co\ cll

Pakistan Siudi€s Karachi, I 980, p. 124.

10. "Peking Revi€w" No.2841,l8 October 1962,p.33.

Pakislan Times, Editorial, 28 D€cember 1962.

12. The c'vilmd Milirary Caze e. T January. 1961.

ll.

13. Ibid.lS January 1961.

t7.

t5.

16.

Gurnan Singh , Srno-Pat i€idrrioa. Tre ,{}go, t'a Cur! Nanak

U.ivcrsity Amurstd, p. I18.

lbid. p. 123.

18.

19.

20.

Ras'rtl B\x L.^is,C hina - Pa kE tan A P o I i ti co I A nal'\) s i s o IMutual Relations.Prost.ssiye Publication Lahorc, December

1977.p.115.

G. W. Cho\trtvy, India. Pakistan. Banelode:h and Maior powe6.

Macnillan Publication London, 1975, p. I 12

Rasool Bux Rais , oprir, p. 35.

National Ass€mbly ofPakistan Debares, 17July I963,p. 166.

Taiq Ali, Militan Rule or Peopte's po\reLlondon, t970,p. 140.

CHAPTER- THREE

1965 WAR AIID PAK-CHINA RELATIONS

Introd uction

In August 1965 int€nsiv€ liShtins broke out b€tw€en lndia md

Pakistan n Kastmn. In the moming of September 6, 1965 the Indian

army attack€d west Pakistan, Ficd its atiack at khor€, the provincial,

capital l@aled about fift€cn milcs ftom thc border, ard regarded by

many, including its own two million citizens, as the "hearl" of Pakisian

As ir is custoinary on such occasions, many govenncnt lead€rs deplored

the fighting and €xpr€ss€d the hope thal il would shortly erd. Some took

sides. Of Paki$an's allies, Ir.n and Tukey suppodcd her v'gorously, as

did Jordan. Saudi Arabia Indonesia, and some oth€rs that were not formal

allies. Butofall ofPakistan's supponers, China spoke oPoly.

The China played a sisnilicant role dwing th€ Indo Pa&istan

conflict is senerally conceded. But not €qually apparent are fte impact of

Chjnese policy had on th€ course ofevents, the obiectives that lay behind

it, and the extdl to which thcse w€re rcalized. China 8av€ Pakislan

unqualified moral suppod and! at th€ same time threat€ned lndra wrth

"grave consequenc€s" for allegedly violating its t€rritorial integrily along

th€ sikkim bord€r. P€king's policy created widespread aPprehension of a

general war in Aia. By linling the Sinolndim and the Indo-Pakislan

conflicts, the Chinese fost€r€d among thc gleai Pow€rs a sense of

ugency about t€rminaiing the Indo-Pakjstan war.

Chines€ diplomacy produced various significam resulrs lt inhibited

some of the geat powels. especially lhe soviet Union, from sidrng openly

with India dd liom putting as much pressurc upon Pakislan as they

niighi othewise have been inclined to dor contribul€d inlentionally or

inadvenendy, to bringing aboul a cede-fir. on t.rms acceptable to

Pakislan: and made a deep and longlasting impression on Pakislani

publi. op'nion, giving it a disti.ctly pfo-Chines€ disposition. However,

there ls some grou.d also for lhe view that, by overacting in the Indo-

Pakislan crisis, the Chi.ese may have repelled the govement (though

not the '!ublic") of Pakisran to some d€gree, instead of axaching

Pakistan more closely to th€mselves.

The Chinese position toward rhe lndo-pakislan conllict was

Th€ Chines€ govemmen. deemed tndia the aggressor and held her

solely r€sponsible for the auiho. ofconflict. It supported rhe Kashmir\rigbt of self determinarion which it mainrained the Indian covemmenl

had perfidiously Usurped it accused rhe Unircd Narions ofacling, under

Soviel-Anerican dircclion, ro rhe d€rrimol of pakisran on the Kashmir

NSDe, rl chdged Sovier-American .collusion" encouraging th€ lndjan

attack on Pakistan dd, subsequently, in a|empling to force pakista roacquiesce in India's possession ofthe pan of Kasbrnir already under her

control, and it assened that tndia's atrack on pakisran and her

''intrusionj' tnto Chinese rerilory w€r€ all parr ofthe sane Indian design

of aggression and exprnsionism.

On Sept€nb€r 4. l%5. while the lndo-Palist.r 68ndng was sl'll

conlined to Kashmir, the Chin€sc Foreign Minist.r, Marshal Chcn Yi,

stopped at Karachi on his way to Mali. At a news conference lhat

cvening, he condcrl|Il€d India's "provocative violations" of lhe cease-fir€

Iine in Kasl|Inir, supponed Pah$an's 'Just" actron in rep€lling $e lndian

atlacks, and naintained lhar lndia's "ouel and r€pGsivo" rule in

Kashmir had produced the cunent struggl€ of the fteedom fighters there.

The Kashmir problem he said ought to be solv€d according to the wishes

of the Kahmiries and th€ commitmentr mad€ to thcm in this regard by

both India and Pakish- c)

The following day, the p€ople's Daily advirci India '1o stop irr

dominating and arbiFary plactic. of bullying i6 ncighbol'. It jusrifi€d

Patjstan's countcratiack on Indian positions in Kashmir. In d ofiicial

stat€m€nt issucd on September 7, the Chines€ govemmenr denounccd the

Indian attack on Lahore as an "naked aggression", by which Indian

action, generals wd rhe Irdian action it add€d. Nor only is a crude

violation of all principl.s guiding inlemational relations, bur aho

consfinrles a grav€ th.real lo peace in rhis part of Asia. Tle chin€s€

Govennnent sten y condemns India for its c[iminal asgrcssion;

.xpr€sses firm suppmts for Pfistan in it! just sruggle against agSrcssion

and solemnly wams rhe Indian cov€mment rhar it mu$ b€ar

responsibility for all the consequcnces of jis cnminal and €xrended

Speaking al a Nonh Korean reception two days laler, Pr€mier

Chou Enlai r€pealed lhe substanc€ ofihe abore statements He add€d

that by nol naming India as the aggressor. and by professing to be neuiral

as betw€en lhc conl€stanls, the Unncd States md the Sovi€l Union were,

as usual, confounding the distinction b€lween nght and wrong, and

"aggr€ssion". The Indian leactionaries" \r€re "outriSht aggrcssors borh

in the local conflict in Kashmir atd in the general conilicl between lndia

Vic€-Pr€micr Hsieh Fu-Chih exprcss€n sinilar s€nlimenil at a

rally in Lhasa on the same day. On Septembs il an editonal in th€

People's Daily declared that India alone had provoked the conflict

Indian ass€nions that Pakislat had scnl '\nfiltrators" across tb€ ceas€-fi.e

line and had "invaded" Indid-hcld r.ashmir 't ere "absurd" A senuine

popular uprising had occured on thc Indian side as a rcaction to lndian

oppression. Prime Minister Cast€r's claim that in atlacking Laho.e India

was only tak;ng "defcnsive m€asur€s was a l)?ical example oi gdssrer

logic which the lndians had leamed "entirely fton Uniled States

imperialisn". The people's Daily declared-

In short it was nor Pakistan but India lhal firs1 crossed the cease'

fire line in Kashmir. 11 was not Pakisbn bul Indian its air force into

action ed bomb€d peac€fuIcities of the Pakistan. Il was not Pakistan but

India that first crossed th€ int€mational border. So, lndia is in €very case

the aggressor and Pakistan its victim. {5)

Similar expr€ssions of suppon for Pakistaa and condemrtions of

India continued to issue ftom P€king until well afrer th€ cee_fir€

Causes/cotrdltlons of 1965 con0lct,

The Chinese wamed that Pakislanis and Kashniri€s shoutd not

expect justic€ from the United Nalions, which had a "bad r€putation' in

fie matter ofKashmir. For €ighcen years ii had Pernitted India !o act

"lawlessly'' without "lifting a fing€r" to r€strain her. On this, as o, olher

issues, it has shown itself to be "a tool of United Stales imp€rialism and

its pdhers". An editorial in th€ P€oplc's Daily not€d that on August 14,

1965 th€ Indians had cmssed thc ces€-firc lin€ and occupied the Kargil

ds, on August 25 thc Tithwal ar€a, and on Augusl 28 the Uri-Poonch

area, all on the Pakistan sidc. Bul on none of these occasions had the

Uniied Nation S€curity Coucil uttcrcd a 'hinel€ word ofdisapFoval". It

became active only wh€n Pakistan rclaliale on Sept€mber lsl and the

Indie roops found thcmselvcs in difiicultics". Who U Tbafs report al

th€ Council session of S€prcmbcr 4 refened to armed men, rot in

unifor4 crossing the cease-fire line from th€ Pakistabi side. he gave

India a mrch-needed justificalion for h€r own breaches of ihe c€ase-fire

line. Laier, wh€n India attacked Pakislan, tb€ Secunty Council, inst€ad of

condeming India as an aggrebsor, spoke m€rely of the "extension of the

fighting," thus bluning the distinction between th€ aggressor and the

All this shows th3t the United Nalion's partiahly for India has a

long history. Th€ Uniled Nations, coruisEndy reversing right and wong

and calling black white, has always served the interests of agg.esso.

To.lay, it is again sidlng with thc aggessor oo |h€ Kahmir issue and the

Indo-P?kistan conflict and has bccome a sanctuary fo. th€ Indian

Peking advanced the view thal the united Stal€s and the Soviet Union

were inclined towank India than toward Pakistan. o)

For many yea$ lhe two had cooperation each o1h€r in Siving lndja

mo!€y and ams. GreaGpower comp€tition for lheir good will had

enrboldened the lndians inio rhinking that they could do whatever th€y

desn€d. Hence their "dominating adlud€" loward then n€ighbors. Tle

two great powers. Who trested th€ pr€sent Indim leadeBhip as 'lheir

ddling child"? Support€d it in irs war against Pakisran, which they had

erlier iNtigated. Of lat. the Unit€d States had shoM increasing

irritation with Pakjst .'s'' indcpendent lorcign policy and had dec'ded

cut doM her size. Through th€ nililary aggression launched by tlle

lndian reactionanes". Washington, had suspended military aid to both

India md Pakistan even while admitting lhis would make Pakislsn

weaker still in relarions 10 India. (3)

The Chines€ likewisc placcd an uncharitable inter?reladon on

Sovi€t efforts to resolve the Indo-Pakistan conflict. lhey pointed oul lh3t

as aar back as 1955 Khrushch€v bad declared Kashmir to be an inresral

pan of India. Thus, th€ Sovict Union had also assjsred India in

"sabotaging" intemalional agccments on Kashmir and amexing it.

Wnen the Indians, after first attacking Pakistan, met fim resistance and

b€gan to suffer rev€rs€s, the Sovi€t Union cam€ up with an off€r of

"good officcs" io €nd th€ war. "what thc Sovi€l lcadcrs intend to do is in

the name of good officcs, to aid ih€ Indian aggression to force Pakistan lo

acceptlndia'sannexation of Kashmiras l6gilimatc" {e)

Peking also chaBcd thar India had anacked Azad Kashmir and

laier west Pakisian with dle prior knowlcdgc and approval of rhc Unit€d

Sracs. On Scptcmber 9, Prehier Chou En-lai, in his sp.rch at thc Norrh

Korcan cmbassy declar€d 0rat thc Indian govemment could not hav€

cDsasc in such serics military adv.ntur€ without th€ conscnt and support

of thc Unitcd Slates". (ro)

ft is intcrcsting to not€ that in a fcw days thc Chincsc connunists

founds suppon for th€ir thcsis in a front pagc .€pon, splashcd in bamer

headlines, in thc Sct'tcnbcr 13 issu€ oflondon's cons€rvanve pap€r, lhe

daily Telegraph. Thc r€poncf victor Ansnt, who had flown olt of D€lhi

to note the India censors! lugg€stcd that rhc Unitcd Stat€s Central

Intelligence Ag€ncy, having worked for a time at sscuring the overthrow

of Prcsidcnt Ayub'E govcmmcnt, had comc to belicve that a coup wa!

imminent and had so advised the India govcmnEnt. H€ also implied thal

thc unitcd stalcs know of and possibly connivcd at, thc imp€nding Indian

Thc Chincs€ propositions notcd abovc fully coincid€d, by

happ€nstancc or contrivrnc., wift thc corrcsponding Pakist ni vicws and

inlerpr€iations. Considcr, for inslance, rhe edilorial comrn€nts in Dawn ofSeptcnber l7 and 19. Aftcr dngging its fc€t on thc Kashmir issue for

eighteen years, said Datm, ihe Secunty Council was waking up lo it only

aft€r Pakisran had begun to teach the Indians a "fitting lesson" but evm

so the Council tended to "equate the aggressor with tbe aggr€ssed". The

qu€stion before it b€ing on€ of "frc€dom against oppression, right against

wrong" n ru$ nane India th€ aggr€ssor if it wrnted to restore p€ace in

the subcontinent. Pakisian would have lo rcconsider its future relations

wirh rhe unired Nahons should rhe la €r once a$in insread ofmaking an

honest and realistic approach 10 lhe menace of rndia's aggression allow

itselfto b€ an instrum€nt ofth€ selfish d€signs of lhos€ who have adopl

India as their "Sacred Cow" and who would smn€r let fteedom and

justic€ go by th€ board rhan do or suggesl anlhing at which lndia rnay

Thc editorial of SAteinber 19 was even more explicit and

cmphalic. Cornmenting on U Tbafs suggcstior\ contained in his five"

point plan submitted to the Securiry Council on Sepr€mber 17, rhai

Ayoob and Shastri neel in a ihird country to discuss tt€ crot situation

and the "problems underlying it, Dawn protcsr€d and wmle.

"Th€ phras€oloS/ chos€n by the secretary,gen€ral shows how

much at pains he has b€en to evade the vcry bdrion of Kasbmir. Ir is

obvious that the vaguen€ss of ihe phrasing and the refusal €v€n to

m€ntion Kahmir are lhe dir€cr r€sulrs of the Big Powe. pressure on the

secrelary-gderal U That is trying ro do under pBasure is ro com€ ro rhc

aid of the Indid aggressot and not only bail him our of his difficulties

but inflict from United Nadons headquaneN in New york a milirary

defeal on Pakistan which th€ Westem srooScs in Indja th€melves cannot

do. Irt not th€ enenies of Pakistan and then Fiends and allies in

washington, New York and els€wh€r€ sufiq fion the d€lusion thal the

Covcmmcnr of Pakistan can bc browbeaten inlo accepting lhe cease'fire

on terms which would mounl 10 virlual and unconditional suE€nder to

the aggi€ssion who is on the Ev€r since th€ Sino-lndian conflicl in 1962,

the Chinese had periodically accuscd India of a variety of "provocadve"

acts. including transgressions of thcir lditory. The pung€ncy and

frcqucncy of th€se complaints msc sharply during th€ lndo-Pakistan wm.

Beginiing with a not€ datcd Septenb€r 8, Peking addressed variors

prolests to New D€lhi, charging thal Indian arn€d forces had r€peatedly

interven€d into Chinese ienitory, built milikry structures on it, fired on

Chinese persomel, kidnapped Chines€ citiz€ns, and stolen caltle. Each of

thcsc notes threatened 'lrave conscquenccs ', and one, thal of September

16, wenr forth d an ultinntun YanS Kungsu, a deputy ducctor in rh€

Chincse forcign offic€, swon€d lhe Indian Charged Afairs in Peking

to his office, sunmoned lhe Indian Charg€d Afiarn in Peking to his

oflice al l: a.m. on disrnantlc wirhin three days h€r "aggressivc military

works" built on the Chinese side of the Sino-Sikkim border retum rhe

kidnapp€d men and she€p and yaks, and 'bledg€ to refrain from any

more harassing Eids across the boundary". (r'?)

Other *rs€, responsibility for lhe cons€quences, once again

"grave"' would be €ntirely on lndian. Cbinese conrmwication to India

during September md October of 1965 represented both Pakistan and

China as victims of India's aggressive €xpansionism. Sent protest to

lndia's all€g€d violations of Chincse sover€ignty, they ako contained

digrcssioN on India's policies in Ka3hmir dd h€r alack on Pakistan.

Indeed, one inevitably r€ceive th€ irnpression that India's actions vrs-'-

vis Pakislan w€re as much respo.sible for occasioning lhe protest as any

injuries that Cbina might herself have sustained ar Indian hands. This

linkage of Sinolndo-Pakistan conllicts was €vident in almost every nole

that the Chin€se gov€mment addrcsscd to India dlnng this period. The

Chinese also found occasion to ass€rt in th€se noles that, come what

might. they would nor b€ stoPped from suppoding Pakislan's light

agajnst lndian aggr€ssion.

Th€ Chincs€ ultimatum of Satember 16 Il consists oflittle more

lhan on€ thousand wotds of which more than thr€€ hundr€d are devot€d

to an exposirion of th€ Indo-Pakislan conflici. Il acclrsed lhe Indian

govemnent of followjns the logic that tl€ terilories lhcy hav€ seized

belong to tb€m. The Chinese govemment, it goes on lo say, pursues a

policy of'non-involvement ' in the Kashmir dispute in nninlaiting that il

shoold b€ setlled by the Kashrnir\ thems€lvos.

But non-involvem€nt absolutcly do6 Dot mean failure lo

distinglish betw€€n right od wrongr it absolutely does not mean lhat

Chioa can approve of d€pnving the Kashmir p€ople of their risht of self-

det€mination or that she can approve of Indian aggression against

Pakistan. So long as rhe Inda Govcmment p€rsists in il s unbndled

aggression against Pakistan, China will nol cease supporting Pakislan.

This sbnd of our will never chang€, how€ver many help€rs you may

hav€. such as the United Srares, th€ mod€m revisionisls and rhe Unites

States controll€d United Nations. lLr)

The s€cond ultimatum to India, dated Scptcrnber 19, contained a

simil& version, as did ihe prolesi notes of Scptemb€r 8 and 16, and

oflicial statem€nt on Septmber 7 and 9. The Cbin€se gov.mment kept

up the presswe on India. A notc, dated Septcmb€r 20, followinS within

hours the s€cond ultinatur4 prot€sted fresh Indian violations of Chinese

territory. The day after the Indo-Pakslan cease-fire, a goup of lndian

dcmonstraton, shouting thal China wanled to stan a world war over a

few sh€ep md yaks, tri€d ro dctiver 800 sheep at th€ Chinesc Embassy in

Delhiby way ofa settlement. (ra)

This occalioned still anorhcr Chinese prorest on Sepcmber 26,

stating lhat wbil€ thc kidnappod mcn, she€p and yaks must b€ retumed

"Every single one of then" there were other malters also. India's

"subvenive acdvnies" in Tibet, h€r occupation of nor€ than 92,000

squar€ kilometers of Chinese tcmtory, ed constlnt amed provocation's

and rnEusons. All these'ac(oun6 musr br s€rll€d

Th€ govemmcnl and the press in Pakisbn did not acloowlcdge

thal fie Chinese allegations against India had anything to do with tbe

Indo-Pakistd conflict. In fact, they bied to disenlangl€ the two

situations. In an editorial on Scptenbd 21, Dawn iBisr€d that 'thc

Chinese move has nothing whatever to do wilh Pakistan's defensiv€ war

with Indit'. Yet lhcre was recognition on bolh sjdes that China had

indeed played a significant rol€. The Chin€se protest to India on

Seplembn 26 madc the usual digr€ssion from its main subjeq to

announce tbat "The whole world now s€es that it was India which

launched a war of aggr€ssion against Pfistan and it was Chjna and other

justice-upholding counri€s which by

punctured your agSiessive arrogance".

In an €ditonal on Septembei 2?, Da\rn, after advo.ating China's

pre$rce in lhe United Nations, obs€ned. China is the geatest power of

ihis coniin€ni dd no issue ofwd ud pcac€ cd be decided witbout ils

paniciparron and dehberalions. The role rhat this gr€al country plaled

r€cenlly during Inthars aggression against Pakistan helped irnmensely lh€

caus of p€ac€ and justic€ in this parl of tbe world.

Keeping in vi€w of lhe Cltrna's role. The Indian govemmcnt and

the press alleg€d "collusion' betw€€n Pahstan and China. The Chinese

Refuted rhe Indian allegatiois as a "fantasiic tal€", and Pakislati

spokesmen described lhem as she€r propasmda d€signed 10 agitaled

c€nain sectioN of opinion in tbe Unired States. ('6)

In a television inreryi€w with lhe American Broadcasling

Corporation, Pakistan's ambassador in Washington declared thal "there

have been no promis€s, no ag€em€nts, no collusion of any kind between

my govemment and China". (r?)

American commenialors supplying their own analyses and quoting

officials in Wdhinglon, the Uniled Nations, dd impondt world capitals

tended to reject the "collusion" lheory. (1o

their firm anli-aggressjvc srand

Some doubted lhal there could ever be any rcally deep

collaboration b€tween the Chinec dd Pakisran Aovcmments as cunen y

constituted. In this view fie latter happened to be "the kind of

consewative, sEong-man r€gime that the chinese comunisls would

37

overtum at the first opportuniry, cooperation b€twe€n the 1wo can be

given only warily and with munral suspicion. (r')

The Chines€ lhr€ats ro India did caus€ concem jn many quaners,

including, it would s.Gm in Pfistan. To what €xtent werc thes€ threals

credibtc il is cl€ar rhar during thc firsl {eek or so of Lhe Indo-Palishn

conflicl lhey were not taken seriously. Th€ Tim€s of London disniss€d

th€ Chin€se note of Satemb€r 8 to India as a "war of nerves" that mighi

not even bc r€lateal ro lhe war b€twefl hdia and Pakistd. {'o)

Victor Zorza ofthe Manchest€r Gua ran saw it as routine affairs,

no mor€ m€nacing than doztns ofprevious Chines€ nol€s to India or their

tlrcats ofaction in Viet Nam. Pr)

Thc Indians werc reportcd 'latted" bul not unduly alarmed.

Washinglon ofiicials and aialysts, familiar with th€ "strident" vocabulary

of Chincsc diplomacy, detecled no iminent danger of Chines€ mililary

action against India. Th€y believed that while th€ Chinesc w€r€ watching

lhe situation closely, lh€y would not risk for Pakistan what they had been

unwilling to nsk for Norih Vict Nan. Their suppon to Pakistan would

continu€ to be ldgely political. e'z)

The Soviels, apparcntly, wer€ nore appreh€nsive, as indicated by

th€ strong languag€ of their $alement of Septq4ber 13, thcy inviled fte

whole world to join them in condenning "certain powers" ftal sousht to

aggravatc thc Indo-Pakistan conflict by naking "incendiary" stat€ftents.

They wamed also that ifthe Chincs€ intervened, nany statcs mighl find

themselves dra$n into the conflict one by one.

Thc Chines. ultimtum of S€ptember | 6 commaoded a somewhal

higher degee of credibiliry than did the pr€vious ftreats. But €ven so, the

reaction was mixed. Indian o{frcials on fte one hmd, claimed that the

a hines were about ro do somerhng. CS .Ha. lndran l'orergn Secrelary.

declaring that a "fatetul moment in hislory" had ariv€d, observ€d that

rhe Chinese meant to humble India. In Washington and Moscow rhe

Indian ambassadors sought public declarations of support in the event of

Chinese a|tack. Back home in D6lhi on the olh€r hdd lhey viewed the

ultnmlum chiefly as a Chines€ efforl to encourage Palistan, at th€ lndian

Defos€ minisEy obsewers foud a caln ud 'tomplac€nt" disposition

'rrndoubtedly eenuine if not quile logical. The Indians did not seem to

oxpecl any s€rious lrouble on their border wilh China, in the wesl sotre

observeB w€re inclined ro de,emphasize the Chin€se rhrear. Newsweek

quoted a "leading Sinologist" as saying thar 'China will make a loi ofnois€ in order 10 kcep ihc India$ gucssing but, so far as direcr action is

concemed, il will most likely remain rminvolyed . Some officials inWashington vicwed the ulrimalum more 6 a ..psychological garnbn,' to

unnerve lndia and to embanass rhe tinired States and lhe Soviet Union

thm a military threal.

YeI noe ofthese observers and analysts, official and ofier, corlld

say confide.tly thar ih€ Chinese were onty bluffing. The Chjn€se had

made a "clming move" wrote th€ Chrislian Science Monilor, ,.catculated

to reap the rna,'(imum dividends e/ith the ininirnum effort'. They had

been astute also in choosing the locatio. of their rhrearened action.

Crossing the Sikkin border in a swift maneuver, they could cut off

Assam ftorn lh€ rest of India in a matter of hours Thev m€ant to show

Sikldm, which had long wart€d th€ status of a sover€ign stalc' thal India

could not protect it. Thc consensus s€em€d to be that whilc lhe Clhines€

did not contemplale a major attack on lndia, thev would probablv amount

an action s€rious enough to trouble the Indians but not large enough lo

€voke United Stales milibry intervention. Even if thev confincd

thcmelves to laking a few Indian Post6, India would ei6er have lo Iight

on two ionts or suffcr anoth€r grcat humiliation. To win its victones

China need nol conquer. lt is enough to humiliate More'over, Utited

Slat€s officials €xplained, with only a small €ffon the Chinese could pin

doM a substantial numb€r of Indian lroops, thus arding Paldstan. This

woul.t put Pakislan in debt to the Chinese, Siving th€m a new "l€verag€

in lhe tanglcd affaiE of lh€ sub'continent'. China's impact on the conflict

issued precisely ftom th€ UN-ccnainty sunounding her intentions No

one knew what. ifanything: she was aboul lo do Som€ courses ofaction'

misht be considered unlikcly: nonc could b€ ruled out. This Prsated thc

Uniled States and th€ Soviet Union wilh a €xce€dingly paintul dilemma

If China launched a major atack on lndra; th€ result might be world war'

lf she rnadc only srnall, pinpdck advances, and tle two great powers did

norgo lo lndia's aid, they would llienale Delhi And ifth€v did aid lndia,

they would alienatc Pakistan and Push h€r closer toward China. Ttle

Indo-Pakistan war had bc€n a nuisancs it now becamc an intolerablc

situarion. It must b€ tminated. This heightened concem was appar€nl ln

thc statements of high officials and the colurns of influcntial joumals

The Bnlish Foreign Secretary, Micha€l Stewar. Des.ribcd the Chinese

ultimtum as a 'terious, ind€ed, dang€ros dev€lopm€nt". At lhe United

9{

Nations, Ambassador Goldb€rg 'ramed that 'hew and serious

developrnent" had enldg€d th€ tlucai to pcace. He urg€d Indra dd

Pakish to ftalize the "overiding:' reasons for sccepting a cease-fire and

avoid "truly disastrous consequ€nc€sr" A Ncw York Tim€s edilonal

callcd fo. a cease-fir€, waming thtt.

li is inporiant most of all bccaus€ Communist China is op€nly

int€dening with all its sinister influence in lhe from of proPaganda,

ultimal€ ed political lhreats loday but qulte possibly wilh nilitary force

tomorow Until a cease-fire is in efect, China will obviously be

encouraSed to condnu€ blackrailing tactics against India, with

consequences that could be caiasliophic not only in Asia but throughout

At th€ United Nations on Sept6mber, If,dia md Pakistd finally

a$e€d to a cease-fire which went into effect al 3.00 am th€ following

day. Commmling on the Chin6. innuenc€ on the cours€ of ev€nts, rh€

The paradox of rhc cease-fir€ in a sense, is th€ fact rhai China is

perhaps the power responsible for it. Wrlat ever Chinat in&ntions may

have beo md wc shall probably ncver IooM it was the sp€cr€r of direcr

Chin€se demonshated once aging that rhey know how io put on and rake

off,lhc Fessure, the timing was excellenr and rhe acrion gor r€sutts. And

il is a bil dimcult to imagine that cease-firc was not part of China,s

intentions ftom the outset, Chinese diplomacy des not often produce

"accidental' results. In this instance, ev€n Pakisran may have b€en

noved lo accepl th€ c€ase fir€ in parl b€caus€ of its unccrrainty over what

the chinese might do.

The Nation would s€em to bc 6nect in suggesting $at ihe

Pakistan govemm€nt. Too, was troubled ll could nol have regaided with

equanirnity the prosP€cl of a sencrd war' The effect of such a war on

Pakistan, regardless of what it mrght do l'o India, nusl havc been

urpl€asant to contemplatc Mor€ov€r' having China as a milibry ally in a

r€al war, entailing lhe prcsencc of Chinese Foops on Kalhmiries and

Pakistani soil, reprsented a possible tum of ev€nts lhat Alub Khm's

govemmcnt could nol have welcom€' If,dian Propaaeda

notwithstandmg.

The chin€se Diplomacy In The war

Chin€se motivadons are usually diflicull lo discov€r, and in lhis

instance most cor$n€ntatoN w€re i€duced to speculation Tbere were.

som€ simple €xplanations. Manv Pakistanis consider€d that China otlv

waoted to be helptul to lhem in th€ir ho of need Bul some Pakistani

obscwers r€cognizeal that there was more to Chinese suppon ihan simplc

altruism. In the west, the pessimisls susp€cled lhal Cbina wished to

prolong the indo-Pakistan conflict and to pmmote other uP heavics in the

world. Others, including son€ Indian obscrv€rs, suggested that China

actually want€d to bring about a ccas€-fire, and th't her ultimat€ to Indja

were int€nded to s€cur€ lhe b€st possibl€ terms for Pakistd by putttng

pressure on all conc€mcd, esp€ciaUy the g!€at powers in th€ Security

Couocil. The Tin€s (London) tend€d lo the view that lhe Chinese

p.essure on lndia had no nore than a p€riph€ral connection wilh fie

Indo-Pakistan conflict. Sikkim, il poinl€d out, was once associated with

Tiber and China, and th€ Chinese had never reconciled themselves lo ilirs inclusion in th€ British, and then India, sphere of inllD€nce. In the

sam€ paper, another writer advaiccd the view thal China's inler€sls were

largely doctrinal. She wanted io prove that her view of the world's

division imperialisrs, revisionists and lheir lackeys on one side, China

and the fieedom and justice-loving Alio-Asjans on the oth€r was conect.

There s€emed 10 b€ fairly g€ne.al agr€emcnt that China wanled to reap

populdity in Pakistan. Help Pakistm by pointing down the lndian forces

stalion€d along th€ Sino,Indim border.Qr) Humiliare India. Sikkim &dBhulan away from India by demonstraling that lndia could not prot€ct

lher! and forc€ the United Srates and ihe Soviet Union to dectare in

favor of India md .hus 10 "LE" Pakistan away ftom lhem.

To what extent wer€ rhe Chinese objecliv€s tulfilted? China's

contibution to lhe outcome on rhe fietd of batrte must be rated as

negligible or nil. Even ifrh€ Chinese were abte ro imobilizeas nany as

six Indian divisions, India srill had more than fifre€n to fight plkistan"

five or six. More imporrantly, the wat was inuch too bri€f ro have

pemited a Chinese milirary impact. The Chin€s urnmarum was nor

delivered uril lhe moming of Sept€mber t7 fivc days larer India and

Pakistan agreed 10 a c€ase-fire. Consider also that Indjans would hav€

kept some divisions on lh€ Sinotndie border in any case even ir fieChlnese had remained enrifely quiescent during the conflic1.

There can b€ no doubt, however, that Chin$€ theat had a

significant impacl on *E political and diplomalic ftoni Both lhe United

Slates ard th€ Soviet UDion would havc pEfeE€d to cone doM stronglv

on India's side. Had lhey b€€n uncncumb€ied by the Chincsc factor' they

would havc fclt fr€e not only to aid lndia but also to put a gr€at deal more

pressue on Pakishn than lh€y wcrc actually abl€ to do ln that event,

Pakistan would hav€ lost face, and, beyond ihat, she might hav€ had lo

senlc, in tcrritorial terins, for soiEthing less lhan lh€ s|an]s quo mte

beltn As it tumcd ou! lhc two gr€at powers, loalh to see Pakisian drift

closer to Crhina, found thern inhibiLd.

Funher assessm€nt of China's contibution to Pakistan's cause

would dcpcnd on on€'s assessment of which nation won the war- lfPakistan's claim that she wa3 winning ih€ wd is accQtcd, Chinese help

must be assigned only a pcnph€ml rcle. If India's claim that she was

wiming. And that with ihe pa3sagc oftine tbe margin ofhcr victory was

going lo expand, is accQted, the Chinese to the €xtenl that ihey we.e

influ€niial in bnnging about s c€ase -fir€ could be regarded as having

extricat€d Pakistan from an unfavorable situation. But if on€ takes lhe

view, as many obswers did, $ai ncith€r side was winning and lhat afld

the first week or so a stalemate had b€en reach€d, the Chinese

contribution would lEv€ to be scen priffiily 6 a boosting of Pakistant

The matier of inoeaied Chines€ populariry in Pakistan is also

mor€ complcxes than it miSht app.ar at fiBt sight. Th€ wafm ftiendl€ss

and glatitud€ of the Paktutani 'bublio" toward the Chincs€ did not

accurately r€flect rhe attilude in high official quaner. From lalking witt

hundreds of Pakistanis of vanoN occupations, inler€sts and predilcclions,

th€ writer can ass€n that the vast najority of p€opl€ in Pakisian deeply

appreciated that chines€ suppon-

Karachi students, carrying hugc porhaits of Chou Enlai and Ch€n

Yi, called on th€ Chinese anbassador to thank him. Som€ Rawalpindi

lawyers sent offa tel€gram io Chou Enlai rhanking him a',d d€clanng.

"Friendship of Pakistan and the great Chines€ nation and their conunon

struggl€ against lndian aggession, which has been €ncourased and aided

by the impdialists, is a gDmtee for the final triumph of the pe&e'

loving peoples of the world.@)

Kashmiri€s residins in Karachi dahed off a similar telegram to

Chou. Po€ll wote laudaiory v€rscs aboul China and Indonesja. The war

literatur€, including "histori€s" ofthe wa. ihat enlerprising publishers got

off the pr€ss within w€eks afler lhe cease-fir€, prais€d China in glowing

tems. Sh€ was represented as a mighty pow€r devoted to the

maintenance ofp€ace and justice in Asia. (5)

In a poem Broad Cost ftom Radio Pakisla. Habib Jalib well known Urdu

May you liv€ on, O China and lndon€sia, Because of you is peace

sustained in Asia? With geat sincerity you have giv€n us succor, the

truth is you hav€ redoubled oul vigor, dE call of fiiendship you have

May you live on, O China and Indonesia.

Becausc ofu is p€ace sustained in Asia.With gfcat sincerity you have grven us successor,

The rruth is U have redoublcd ow vigor.Th€ call of fiicndship you have answcred $'cll.May U live on O China and Indonesia.

From reading this lit€ratur. lhe "av€rage" Pakistani fior whom il

was mainly inl€nded, b€ing in ih€ vcmacular r€ceived a rather

€xaggerated ass€ssm€nt of the Chin€s€ impact on lh€ course of events

Westcm and Indian leadcrs wer€ sccn as f€venshlv seekins a ceasejirc,

having been r€duced to a state of utter constemation bv the threat of

Chincse interv€ntion.

ln r€ciprocil)', Pakstanrs condenn€d fie all€ged Indian

provocalion to China. Both China dd Pakishn wrot' Darn on

Sept€mbs 8, were victim oflndia's "inp€rialist d€si8ns". ln an edlbnal

on Sept€mb€r 21, it praised th€ Chin€se l€adeN as men "sleep€d in the

ssdom of the sages. Peking's demand that India vacates hcr aggress'on

was thc 'hatural response of any sov€reign counlrv whose t€ritory has

b€en transgressed". It want on to sav tiat during the several p.oc€eding

weeks Pakistanis had come to cenait important conclusions as to who

lhen fricn4 and fo€s i/crc. "Our grcal n€ighbor China and our b.otherlv

nations of Indon€sia have stood out foremost in ften supporl to

Pakisran". President Aruba Khan s€nta mcasag€ of thanks to lhc Chincse

President. In an address !o Uniled Nations General Assemblv on

September 28, Zulifqar Ali Bhudo, Pakisbn's For€i8n MmBler at the

tim€, thanked a number ofrlations, including Chita " who gave us full

moral suppon, and rising abov€ ideological differences, upheld the cause

96

of righl,eousness to condemn the war of aggression launch€d againsl us

by India". (I)

It is noteworthy that official spokesmen and the najor English-

languaa€ newspap€B in the coutry were inclin€d to be cautious in

expression gridlines and gratitude toward China. They lended lo

undeutale popular sennmenr on rhe subject. Rarely, if ever, drd rey

singl€ out China when acknowledging h€lp Pakistan had reccived tiom

abroad. They nentioned China along wilh Indonesia, Iran, Turkey and

othe . Wlile China was referred to as "our great neighbol', terms ofeffection such a! "fiat€mal" ard "brotberll' was reserved for Indonesia

and other Muslim counties.

China reaped enormous sood will amonS the urban masses oiPakistan i! undoubtediy true. Bul so far as r€lations with ihe govemmenl

in Rawalpindi are concemed, she way well has ended up with an adversc,

mlher lhan a favorable, balance. For obvious reasons of domestic and

lorcign politics, Pakistai olicials would prcfer nor to acloowtedge ftatthey werc in any measurc discorcerred by rhe excessiv€ vigor of th€

Chin€se role dunng rhelr conflict wirh hdia. However, some obs€rvers

reporting ftom Rawalpindi, London and Washington suggested that

policyrDakers in Pakisbn were indeed annoyed and embarassed. Chinese

''over-reaction'r had encouraged the ..cotlusion.' theory and t€nded to

darrage what r€nuined of Pakisbn s good relarions witb rhe Unilcd

Slates. Then. insofar as the "average,, Pakistani reserv€d the imp.ession

of all oul Chinese suppon for Pakisran against India, it became diflicuhfor the gov€mmenl to acc€pl a settlement that might fall short of rhe

ideal. China, p€rhaps unwiningly, crealed the appearanc€ of wanting to

curb Pr€sident Ayub Khan's fiecdom of action and to takc into h€r own

hhds tlle making of Pakisrani d€cisions on the vital issues of war and

peace. Consider this int€restits dispatch from Rawalpindi bv a New

York Timcs con€spondmt.

The timing of th€ Chinete ullimatum to India has inevitably rais€d

the question of whether Pakislan and China are in collusior. Th€

coNensus is that China is acting on h€r own This b not lo say thal

ordinary Pakistanis, cven mid-lcvel civil scrvani! and officers, arc noi

delighted that China has chosen this nme lo theaten lndia with possible

war on a second front. It is b€li€ved, howevcr, that s€nior govemment

leadels are more ftan a little concemed that any Chinese move against

Irdia at lhis tim€ might als irrevocably cut off Pakislan liom United

Stales and oth€r Weslem economic aid.

As some observeis have lut it, China's response to Pakishn's

gen€ml appeal for hclp is mch morc powertul thd Pakistan weled lt is

seen as a Chin€se effon rc delay ofpossibly prevent a cease-Iire sincc, as

has been wid€ly discuss€d in rec€nt days in th€ highest Pakistani circles'

onty China stands to gain if India and Pakislan Srnd up each othcr's

limit€d s'rpplies of modem weapons and wr€ck their economies jn a

slalemted war. A s€cond rcason advanccd her for China's "over-

respons€" was that it was an effon to block any possibilily ofresloring

the formerly wam relations betw€en the United States and Pakrstan

Other obs€rv€rs report€d that thc Palislrn govement was inc.easinglv

concemed by the drift ofevents lhat seemed lo Plac€ it jn cl6e aliStment

with China. The orosDect ofchinese intervention evoked "little cheer" in

Rawalpindi. The- Times London summarized thal whil€ Presdent A) rb

had acknowl€d8ed Chines€ "synpalhy", he "must hav€ been more

cmb@ssed than help€d by the anlics m th€ Skim bordet" In the same

when it has been suggested that fte Presidenl moved to conect the

"balance of fiiendships" when h€ called upon Pr€sident Johnson to lake a

hand in resolving the Indo"Pakislan dispute. At a well atlended press

confermce in Rawalpindi on Septemb€r 15, more than a day before the

first Chinese ultimahrm to India, th€ Presid€nt declared: "Quite ftankly,

th€ Unit€d States America has a rcl€ to play in ihis pan of thc world and

th€y ought to piay it more positiv€Iy". He added: "After all, if the United

Slales .eally wants this subcontinenl to be soiled, thcn the essence of thai

's r€ally und€rstanding betw€€n India and Pakisi.an". H€ thoughl the

United Srates could hav€ broughl about lhis udersranding in 1962 and

could still do so. According to Dawn ofseptember 16, he obsewed also

lhat by exercising her jnfluence in th€ right measure, rhe Unired Srares

could further its o\rn inrerest of having a strong Indo-Pakistan

subcontincnf'- And, "if only," he larnent€d, .lndia would realize how

much she is losing ftom not having a workhg armng€ment wirh

Pakistan'. A),ub Khan is r€ported to havc added rhat pakistan did nol

aspire to pla'.rng the sm€ role in world affairs ofwhich India might be

capabl€. But the Indim lead€B musi r€aliz€ that ..rhey could nor play

their duc role uless they s€cur€d the h€lp ofPakisran for it,'

Th€ Chinese could not have foud much conforr in Ayub Khan,s

obseryations. He was rnaking concitiarory geshres to rndia, and jnviting

the United States ro play a various rol€, not untikc thar of a ward leader

or a village eider, in fi€ affairs ofrhe subconrinent. Some commentarors

iorerpret€d lhes€ s€ntiments as "a virtual slap at china", which had all

along €ndeavotcd to exp€l Amencsn influence ftom Asia The chincse

must have pondercd als the Pr€sident's approving .€liraces to th€

American interest in strenethening the subcontinenl and to that "due rol€"

India was to play with Pakjstan's helP They musl know thal a major

t€nant of United Stat€s policy is to rnak€ the Indian subcontinent inlo a 'bulwark against them. They may have been reminded of Alub Khan's

€arli€r p.oposats for an Indo-Pakishn arrangcment of joint def€nse

against the 'heighbor to the north Pcking's ullimatun to India came.)ust

, li le rnore lhan a day altet thc Presid€rfs conferenc€. lt would se€m

that tlte Chinesc decided to seize th€ initiative after the United Slates

Presideni had disdaintully declined Presid€nt A)tb Khan's invitations

Even bcfor€ lndo-PakisBn l..sions €ruPt€d into war, SiDo_

Pakistan relations had stabilizcd into mold of mutuallv advmtagcous

trade, relatively hrml€ss cuituml €xchanges, and political cooperation in

cenain selectiv€ fields that did not b€ar diectly on eilhe. side's vital

intcresb. Afto-Asian solidarity, opposition to impenalisrn and

colonialism including the Indi! variety, wheiner to hold or not to hold a

second Bandung conference, and th€ like. China did not object to

Pakistan s position on Kashmir, afld Pakislan advocaied Chim's presence

at the United Nations. China did nol object to Pakislan's membership i.Unit€d Srares sponsorcd allianccs (CENTO and SEATO), Th€ United

Stat€s was able to dmw lhe line beyoRd which Pakistan's rapprochenent

could pr@€ed only at the cost of Uniied States economic md mililary

aid. Pattem of Sino-Pakisian relanons renains largely unimpaired.

Pakistan buys a verity of good! including heavy machinery ftom China,

100

while China takes Pakistan's surpluses ofjute and cotton. China has

assured Pakistan of continued suppon on th€ Kashrir issu€. On his

retum hip from Rumania, Pr€mi€r Chou Enlai sioppcd at Rawalpindi for

a visit with Presidmt Ayub Khe. A Chinese gultural d€leganon bu.ed

East Pakisran for a week last June. Evcn the Chin€sc '\ u!a" (Muslin

religious scholars) have pul in an app€arance.

In sum, then, thc Chinese diplomatic intewention in the Indo

Pakislan war last year has nol brought lhe lwo countries any closer than

they w€re before. China's standing with the any clos€r rhan they w€r€

before. China's standing with th€ Pakistani public has risen, but hcr stock

with the policlnak€rs rnay have fall€n. It is evid€nl that Alub Knan has

called a halt to the "escalatioo" of friendliness in Pakistam-Chinese

relations. Allegedly und€r Unired States pressurc. He sent Zulifiqar AliBhutto one of the principal aubors of Pakistant "norrnalizarion" ofFlarions *irh China and rhe Sovrel Unron away. as on a prevrous

occasion. Allegedly under Amencar prcssuie, he had shifted Forcisn

Secrehry S- K. Dehlavi to a posl abroad.

There arc limitations to this process of "dc-escalation"; one ofthcsc is the prechin€se s€ntiment offte Pakistmi public. The opposirion

in lhe Natonal Ass€mbly has charged that Bhulro's depaiture from rhe

cabiner signifies that the gov€mment has decided to acc€pt aid with

"strings" from the Unitcd States and is conlemplating a chang€ in itsfomerly indepodent foreian policy. covemnr spok€snen havc found

it necessary to inatch the oppositions vehemence wirh come of iheh oM_

They would not €ven "look at any amounr of aid" to which strings werc

aihchcd, not !o spcak of acc€pting ir, declarcd thc law Ministcr' S M'

Zafar. He add€d, to applause in lh€ National Ass€mbly' "Pakislsn shall

stand by its frie s who srood with us in iim€ of need" He assured lhe

House that Pakistan's r€lations with China would r€rnain friendly

Public opinion is notoriously ficklc, dd m onc can sav how lons the

Pakistani Public will r€nain kindly dispos€d ro ward China. A fair suess

would be at l€ast a! long as thc lndo-Pakistan dispute over Kaslmir

remains unresolv€d. And that rcsolution is not likclv to occur m ih€ near

The chin€sc did not s€curc their other objectives. If India was

humiliated, not many p€ople are aware of it lndia's hold ov€r her

protectorates, Sikkim and Bhutan, is no seek€r than before. Neither has

Pakistan been away ftom the Uni0ed StalB Evcn before ihc Indo_

Pakistan conflict bcgan, cenain coolness had dev€loped in Pakrstan-

United States r€lations as a r€sult of Unitcd States objections lo

Pakislan's ties with Chim. But Pakistan had forged thes. nes

delib€ratelr she had not b€cn "s€duced" into them bv China U-S.

€conomic assistance to Pakistan. halt€d during the Indo-Pakishn conflict'

has b€gun to flow again. Pakistan, on h€r part, has attempt€d lo improve

hcr rclations with lhc Unted Statcs- If U-S. policy toward Pakislan is

under reappraisal, lhe credit or blame for lhal catnot b€ pirned on the

Chinese rol€ in lhe Indo-Pakistan conllict

Pakista nccds China as a countdpoise |o India, count€F Poises

thal rhe United stales and th€ Soviet Union. Thus, a pow€rful community

of int€rests exists betwen thc two Asid counli€s The Pakirtanis

rcgarded the war as one involving lheir national survival, their penonal

lives, lib€fty, possessions ud honor. tn this wd the grcal pow€rs

remained neu!"l, but favorably disposed and inclined lowards lDdia.

Chjna was fte only najor power ttal tlrew her diplomatic weiSht

unequivocally on Pakistan's side. Yet, the ti€s belween the two counries

have not becn strGnglh€ned as on€ might have expecled. This is due irpart to Pakistan's ne€d for foreign economic asshtance. But €ven more

than that, il points up thc ideological bari€rs thar prescribe rarher nmow

limils to th€ 'fiendship" that can €xist berw€en the cons€rvative

leadeBhip ofa nadon that is serious about ih own wary of life and tl€

fiercely zealous leadership of a largc cornrnunist counfy. The exc€ssive

ideolo8ical z€al of the Chinese and fteir vchemenr denunciation of the

oppos,tion (mai.ly the United Stares and rh€ Sovier Union) make

Pakistani leaders relucrant to alraw closer to P€king. China s appeal

abroad would be realty enhmced ifshe were abtc to proJect an image ofreasonablen€ss and did not seern so conlentious and quan€lsome. wh€n

asitated about colonialism dd imp€rialisr\ public opinion in some

coutres may find rh€ chines posrure heroic. Bur govemmenB thar musr

address themselv€s to the practical problens ofrunning a counlry ae less

likely to be impressed.

Govmm€nts of dev€loping coun.rjes,like ajl other, wil fighr lhe

wds thar involve thei. vitat i.terests. Bur wilt not be inctined to join

crusad€s-Chin€se any more than American- rhat appears ro rhem

exrravagant dd obsessivo. Tbe rather meager advantaSe rhat the chin€sedenved Fom their rolc in the Indo-pakisran conflict md !h.i. failure loov€rcom€ Pakistani rcservarions €ven during rhis tiine of crisis coincid€

wilh the pattem of recent Chinese revdses els€where in Asia and Atrica

It would seem to confirm th€ old insighl tha! finds virtue in moderation

China had tully supported Pakista, in the 1965 war and alles€d thar the

Indian provoked-armed cooflict was d altcmpt by lhe Indian

Covcmment to occupy this dispuled teritory by forc€ The Chin€s

Govement issued a statement lhat Indid aggessions is concem all her

ncighbols and China ]vas str€ngthening h€r def€nses atrd h€ishtening her

alcrtncss along the borders. A sp€cial knd of r€lalionship between

Pakislan and China had nev€nhel€ss, b€en forged providing yet onc more

illustralion of lhc plain Euth that community of interesls creates a for

shonger between nations than scraps of paper called tr€aties Many

responsible Pakisiani sincerely bclieved that, wher€as th€ US had not

b.cn awe to Pakistan being taudt s bitler l€sson by India, China would

have come to Pakislanis aid physically, ifshe had r€ally desired it.

China also supplied war rnatenal to Pakisbn, including T-59 tank

lnd MIG 19 fight€r plan€s. Thcs€ wq€ display€d in the national Dav

military parad€ at Rawalpindi 9 on 23 March 1966, bui had €videnllv

arived too late for usc in the Scpt€rnb€r wai.

Pekins's ass€nion should Pakistan b€ subj€ct€d to aggression in

the feature and if Pakistan needs Chma's support, the Chin€se

gov€mment and p.ople will surcly sland on the side of Pakistd and help

to def€at the aggressor eD. Undcrlined tne Pakistani exp€caalions. No

doubt China's assenion nas designcd to neutralize lh€ Soviet influ€nce in

Pakistan as result of the Tashkent d€cel€ration and also keep the two

South Asian neigbbors at loggerheads. E rlier dunng the Indo-Pakslan

war of 1965 Chinese protests and ultinanims coincided with Pakistan's

convinced. Even th€ Chinese protests of 27 August 1965, before the

besinnins of the Indo-Pakislan wa{ was the r€sult of Zulifqar Ali

Bhutto's two visits to Peking when war between Irdia and Pakistan had

be come imrninent. After India launched an offensiv€, the Chinese

Sovemment came out wilh tull lhrcared spporr ro Pakistan to drive back

lndian aggression and thlearfled India wnh dire consequences for ns

crimnal act. Chinese leadeB upheld rhe jusr cause of Pakisran and

aUeged rhat she had be€n subjecred to Indian expansion at ihc behesr ofrmpenalsric and revisionists! Unircd Srares and Russia. China indicared

her determination to give moml and malerial supporr ro pakistan.G3)

Drring the visit of the Chincse leaders rcit€rated rh€ir suppon ro pakistan

in her struggle to defend National independenr and resists fore'gn

aggression. I1 was because of fiis rhat in rhe words of Chen-yi .,a

protbund and Mutual frjendship'had been forsed bew€€n China and

Pakistan. Liu Shao,Chi and Chen-Yi nad a number of sratements to

come to assBtance ol Pakistin incase she was aracked again. Tne

Chinese people also resolurely supportedjust sriuggl€ in lhc past, in thc

f€ature should the aggr€ssor dare ro a(ack again, th€ Chinese peopte wiu

like wise support your resistance ro aggr€ssion without any hesiralion.

The Pakistan p€opl€ can .€sr assurcd rhar when pakistan r€solurely fighrs

against foreign aggression in defense of irs national ind€pendent,

soverergnty md t€nitonal inteeiry the 650. Mi ion Chincsc pcople willgrve them support and assistance. China precisely want€d of patisran

was nothing panicular rheD unity against aggression. This is the basis of

lhe ftiendship b€tween two countn€s and guarante€ for its feature

Th€ threat of Chinese intervennon set th€ cat among the

'ligeons".(") Kosygin rote to AFrb dd Shallri on 20 August ursing

$em nol to do anfhing that would l€ad to major conflict On S€ptember

4 he app€al€d for a cease-tue ard off€red sovict good offic€s, and on the

lTlb wrote again to propose a peace confereo in Tashkent under soviel

auspices. The United Stals told Pakistan, the Chinese uhimatum makes

it imp€ralive lhat th€ lDdo-Pakistsn conflict be stopped.

Impact ofChin$e stend on war 1965'

Th€ Indian authorities and Indian prcss blamed the sccr€l alliance

against India. Thc Chinese Govemrnent describ€d Indian charser as

'Tanlastic tal€" and Pakistan €laborated a balc l€ss propaganda d€sign lo

please some secrion ofopinion rn uniled Slates. In a TV Inlervrew wirh

Anencan Broad casting corporation, Pakislan's mbassador in

Washington declared lhal 'LlEre bav€ been' prornrses, no arangenenl,

any collusion of any kind.

Th€ Chinese ultirnat€ was not d€livered until the mohing l?th

September fiv€ days laler India and PaListan agre€d to a c€ase-fire lin€.

There can be no doubt, that Chines€ tkeat had also significant impact on

th€ political md diplomatic ftoni. Both th€ unit€d Slalcs dd Soviet

Union would have prefered to come down slrongly on lndian side. Such

attitudc of rhe two gre3t powers to s€ek Pakislan closer to China. Th€

Chinese $pport to Pakistan on thc world forums was worth and valuable

as it placed b€forc the lntemational community ihal actual and true iac1s

of tndid, asgression a British paper wmt€ undq th€ heading "sarnple ifrrue lii€ndship for Pakistan" that th€ occasion was 54 Nations

synposium being by thc world fed€mtion of scie.tific workers held on

"science for developed cou nes Six time th€ Chines€ and Vietnamese

s€ized the micro phon€ and launch€d an knpression alack on India'. (r0)

China supported to Pfisaan duing the war p€riod developed

mutual confidenc€ the tributes paid to Chin€se ee $e deep€st concem of

hle fiiendship. lt brcughl the neighbor's closer and shenglhened thcir

r€lations. The Chines€ suppo( in war 1965 acc€l€rated polilical suppon

and nade thrcat€nirg mililary geslures against lndia. When Unit€d Slates

stopped th€ support to both Indian and Pakislan, China stood firnly for

the security of Pakistan. In the situation for lhe on€ mlter ate wbtch

Indians gen€ral sc€med to b€ of one mind was their hostility towards

"The Normal Srat€ of afiairs betwc€n Paldslan and India was

hostile by rapproch€n€nt between China and Pakistan by growing

military edge over Pakisran- The Bxlk of Unit€d States and British

mililary aid to India was not r€ally over whelming, but its psycho

political effecl. Th€ Chin€se Diplomatic course in the wd period has nor

brought the two comtries closer they were b€fore. Pakisran needs China

as counter to India. Ther€ exjts a powerfui conmunity of Inr€rest

b€tween China a.d Pakisran. Thcn .egardcd rhe war one involving their

national survival, their personal liv€s, lib€rty, poss€ssion and honor. In

lhis war great powers remained ncutral, bui favonbly disposcd to tndia.

The china was only sole major power tbat thrcw her diplomaiic

veisht on Pakistan sid€. China sbnds fimlv beside Pakistan not onlv out

of ftiel ship but also lor rh€ sak€ of world peace md Chinase

govement made it clear" we must not t€t India's expansionist design

succ€ed. Th€ Chinesc for€ign Minst€r said that Indian ruling class,

emboldened by Soviet Union and United Slate Anerica had believed lhat

it was ftec to purs€ its Limitless ambitions and that it could solve

lndian's intemal contradictions by attiackinA Pakislan. Ch.n I belicved

tbal thoso calculations were wrorg and th€ India was mislaken in

assuming that china would remain silenl on tho ev€ of India-Pakistan

conflict. Hc stated tlEt china would not abandon itl frien& and wodd

support Vietnam as well Pahstan and would not be d€terred even if the

unired Sales Lads ils forces on Chin€se soil China felt that India

purpose in provoking the F€s€nl conflict was lo demonsEale to hc| two

paffons, the United States and Soviet U.ion That china would remains

helpless spccrator in thc cae of attack aaainst Pakiste China a8r€ed

with Palistan inunediat€ objectives of limiting lhe area of the fighting

and preventing genc.al war. Such a Policy was veiy clcar and would be

thc basis of Pakistan victory "you fi8ht but ke€p calm, we havc great

admirarion for your cautim and linited obj€ctives". Throud d€eplv

gratefil for Chincsc in valuablc assistance during the most crucial cris€s

Pakistan had ev€r faced, Pakislan was a*arc of the danger of b€coming

totally dependent on China.

A sp€cial kind of relationship belween Pakistan and china

nev€r lhankless been forged providing yet on€ more illushation of

plain truth that conrnunily of Interests, creates for stongel bonds,

between nations thd sctaps, ofpapercalled lreaties China also supplied

war material to Pakistan, Including T"5 9 tanks and MIG-19 fighler plans.

Th€se were displayed in th€ national day mililary Pamde at Rawalpandi

a.e 23 Maicb 1966 but had evid€ndy arrived tm lale for us€ in the

September war. Zulifqr Ali Bhutto oul lined lhe developm€nls that had

led to the crisis paing that Pakisian had tri€d ev€ry peacetul avenue but

India had retused to negotiate R€tused even shted that a disPute exrst

while the security Council loo had failed to act. When th€ consortium

meeting was post-pond at Uniled State Anerica Forcign Minister,

Zulifqar Ali Bhutto appreciated the effods of China and the Russian

Ambassador also appreciacd the steps of China "China would give

Pakistan what ever ai.t Sh€ could within her capacity. (r'z)

Th€ Chinese Gov€mm€nt and p€ople have always pursued a

peac€ful Foreign Policy and had atways be€n willing to d€velop ftrendly

cooperation with them on the basis of five principl€s. We fiEnly beli€ve

thal no maitcr what complex question rnay have been left fron history

b€tween China and th€se Coutries, Reasonable Solutions ce be found

for lhem all. So long as hiendly consolations are conduced in

accordance wilh the five principles ofp*c€ful co-exislenc€.

Keeping in view of lhe above principles. China has tully supponed

during the war 1965, as per mentioned policy. funher asses$nent of

China s Role to Pakistan cause would d€pend on once assessmcnt ofwhich Mhon won the war. lfPakistanis claim rhar she was winning rhe

war is accepted. Chn€se help nust be assigned as decisive in the

bnnging as cease-fire could bc regarded as having extricated Pakistan

fiom unfavorable situation "Thc Chines. contsibution would have to b'

seen pnrnarily as a boosting of Pakisian morale"- (rr)

Pakistan condcrmed th€ allcScd lndian provocation to China Bolh

China and Paldstan. Dawn Scptcrnber lSth '\^,ere victin of India

Inperils d€sisns" in €diiorial on Sept€mber 2l it praised Chin€se lead€rs

as men sleep€d in wisdorn of the gages. President Ayoob Khan sent a

massage of thants to Chines€ President of address lo fte uniled nations

General assembly on Sept€mbcr 28 Z.A. Bhutto ForeiSn Minister at that

1im€, thanks a member of Nations in including China. ",trho 8av€ full

moral support and rising abovc id€ological differenc€s, up held the caus€

of ridt to condernn the war of aggrassion Launchen by India".

China's attitudc during the connid was crystal clear, china stood

for in support of Pakbtan, in ord€r lo secur€ and prot€ct th€ nahonal

s@urity of Pakistan". (ri)

Wtile conrmenting on the Chin€se assistance during tlte war Mr.

Zuli&ar Ali Bhutro declar€ that " A pow€rtul country gave a tull suppon

on ?th September 1965 China Covcmmenl in Stalement Stated that

lndian aggression aSainst any of its neighbor concem all its neighbon the

regular support fron the gr€ai tower with population (a1 thal tine) ?000

million people was source for lnspiradon and encouragement ro.

Thc reacdon as for as china's assislanc€ and suppon ls concemeq

was favorablc fo. Pakistan. The China has emerged as powertul fti€nd'

The developing firrrn€ss of Chioes€ statemenls has ilomlly €ncouraged

the mss€s wilh hoPe that arms and oth€r r€lated n2rerial with wd wiu

not be shon or lacking. Mr' Z. A Bhu$o Pakjstm's for€ign Mmrster al

the time appreciateal the g€stur€ of moralilv comnitted by Chinese

govemmcnt. The ove gr€ar neighbor to lhe no'th, lbe Peoples of r€plblic

of China provided us tull moml suppon and risins abovc id€ological

differdccs up held the cause of rightnes to condem the war of

aggression launched by againsr us bv lndia The Chin€se suppon ror

Pakisian durinS the crisis of 1965, accelerated the links wi$ pecking

Dunng th€ crisis China exlended Pakistan finl Polilical supPort and 1t

made clcar military war against lndia Wben dre United Slels of Amenca

Stamp€des the tnilihry aid for Pakistan, China finnly stood in bclping rn

case of arms help for Pakislan. Pakistan appr€ciated th€ timely supPon

dunng hour of ne€d.

The meantime China Lauded th€ just cause ofKashmiries p€ople

as.Just and right caus€ in order to dccide th€ir tunue- Keeping in view of

the suppon of Chim during hour of need, Pakistan supponed the Chin€se

Gov€mment to bc in the United Natioos.

Ovents/Result of the war 1965,

The lmmediate and Ultimate design of India was in the

was ro abso.b Kashmir into the Indian Union on 8lh

.evoludonary radio, stanon, describing self as sad.€_Krshmir

war 1965,

Kashmir) announced a war ofliberation against India. The Indian alleged

thal the mcntiotr€d station is localed at Pakistan Otr tTth May Iidian

forces a bathlion strenglh had crosred the ceas+firc linc and captuted th€

rhere eith€r counEy hrd violat€d thc ccas€-fire lin€ and captur€d the $fte

This was the first incident since 1949 that either country had

violated thc cease-fire line and occupi€d the teritory of olh€r sido. Thus

the Indian forces wft now at lcst Twenty-fivc miles within Pakislani

hetd Kashmir. It wd at that junctuc, on lst S€plenber 1965 an official

staremcnt from Rawalpindi announced that due to funher aggr€ssion by

Indian troops Azd Kasllrni forces supported by Pakislani Amy.

India ihrew hs air forc€ into batde. At 3 am on 6th September,

with out a fomtal declaration of war India crossed the Int€mational

Border of West Pakistan and launched a lher€ pronged ofiensive against

Lahore. Two days later an olher attack was mount€d in fte Sialkol sector

and third ftoni wrs op€n in Rajisan.

Thc India leveled their all€gation against guerilla the begm to

lnfiltralc into Indid sopicd firshmir. India had forgottcn and violated

the cease"fire line eaiy in August.

Pakistan did not d€ny that amed Inflators had crossed rhe cease,

fire line ftom A2ad Kdhmir but rcfut€d that Indian allegation rhar rhey

belong to special Unit ofPakistan Army narned cir€ltor forc€s "Pakjstani

Spokcs man said Iiflators were Azad Kalhrnir war v€temns".

l12

As For€ign Minisler Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto stated lhal InfiltraloB

carne out sidc. The c€as€_fire line is an arbitrary line thal divides that

same p€ople and thes€ p€ople are Kash'nir who have same blood' same

cuhue, same language, same stock and vou can not inliltrate m you own

people ? you can only lib€rale your own peoples"

Thoush 1965 war was timited in its nature, each side claimed her

victory. Ceneral Muhamtnad M*sa, .ommander in Chiefof the PaL.islan

Amy believ€d thal thqe w€re fou fold aims oflndia. (16)

To captur€ the cnt[€ Azad Kal'nur.

To def€at the Pakistani a{my and dictate humiliating ten])s to

Pakistan- Pakistan become victon of war and defended her temiory,

political independence aDd ld€ology aginst Indiu aggrcssron and

Tenitorial, maierial and human losses as published bv Defense

Ministri€s of Pakistan and India arc as under'

(l) Temtory Pakiste's Govcmmmt

Estimates

A. lndian T€rritory captured by Pakistan (S.q:Milet l6l7* 2lG+

B. Pakistan T€nitory captured by India (S q.Milet 446* 740+

Sowcc Pakistani Cov€mm€nts Estimat€s of 24th Septemb€r 1965 Da*n

Kaachi 6th Octobcr t965.

Souce Indian Govement's slatem€nt of 7 Oct. 1965 k€ssing

cont€mporary Archivcs.

Pakisian's Govemment

Mar killed

Tanks lost

4',75

4802 l.tl

B.

475 128

165

Sources stal€ment of MOD Pakistan 4th December I 965, Dawn Karachi

lndian souce India Defimce Minislrv 25ft scptember 1965 Keesmg s

Conlemponry Archrvcs P l08 O(robtr la65

Despite its four fold .umerical advantages, the Indian Almy was qu'ckly

Slalled in its oifensive ud suffered scverepunrhmenr

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lt

Rdoretrcaa:

l. Syad Atrws' l|ll!ri!, Otiia dd Palats Dipldnaa, olhlattz.OrtuLh lriigPrcss Lodc,! l94p.ll0.

Tft. lroming Now8 kr.chi Argult 1965.

D5ily, Dawr, Kx.chi, S?t d$cr 1965.

Tc.fhg Rrvicc/' S.pt€obar 10, 1965.

Ibid S€ptanb.r 17, 1965. p.10.

Ibirl, !p.12- l3

Pcoplcs,Ihily, Scpt mbcr ld 1965.

Ncw Yo*, Tincs, ScpGnb€r 8, 1965.

Pcakitr& Rcvidq S.prcd.r 24, 1965.

Itid. pp. 1415.

Drily T€lcaeh Ocrotcr I I, 1965.

Ibid. p. 16,18 Novmbcr 1965.

ll.

20.

2t.

t7.

18.

19.

22.

Ibid. p. 25,28, November 1965.

official Repon stat€nent of s.M. z3far Law

1965.

Minrster July 21,

15. Daily Dawn, Scptenber 14,1965.

16. Ncw York Time SeDtembd Ir.1965.

21. Guardian S€pt€mber 14, 1965.

Christian Scienc€, Sept€mbd I1.1965. Monitor

TheGrardian Septenber9, 1965. p. 281.

N€w York Tim€s Septsnbcr I I 1 965.

Guardian Scptcmber 14, I 965.

Chdstian Scicnce, Seplenb€. 18,1965. Monitor.

New York Time Septernb€r 19,1965.

24. News w€ek SQlember 20,

Daily Dawn Septernbcr 13,

1965_

25. 1965.

)6.

28.

27.

lL.

'12.

l5_

Sangal

Lahore,

Iqbal

Ibid Seplemb€r 30, 1965.

S.M.R\rkE, Pakistat Forcisi Policv, Oxfo.d Unive'silv Press' Elv

House, London, 1971, P.34?.

K. Arif. Pakista s Foreipn Poticv lndian Denoective y^n g\ rd

book limited, 1984, Lahore. P 281-

29.

10.

1s77, P.l t8.

Lkhmd, MEMOIRS OF A RY STANDER Oxford Unrversjty

Karachi, 1997, p.98.

Syed:Pl\tssai'n Anwa\ China and Pokistan DiDlonacv of Entente-

op-cit.P.l12.

Ibid, page l12.

ll. Daily Daq, 27 Septemb€r 1965

The Swday Timcs, London October 3 1965.

Iqbal Akhund ,"Meno''ier ofrv rlandel' Opcit, P 80

S.M.R\\*e "P,qtriltgLl jb!9jE!J9!icy" op-cit. Page 346

14.

16.

CHAPTER-FOUR

EAST PAKISTAN CRISES AND CIIINA'SSUPPORT

Introduction.

In l9?l Crises which ultimately dded in th€ dismemberment of

Pakistan and crcation of Bdglad€sh are most important global evcnt of

rhi! cmtlry. This war wa! noi only fought in the war field but it was

contesled in lhc conidoF of tlN, on the foreign desks of every county's

foreign ministry. Every najor and super power played its rol€ during

these crises. The rol€ of USA. China and USSR was crucial importanl

and d€cisive. Though China could not succeed€d to stop the

dism.mbemnt of Pal.istar bur it play€d very positive role during l97l

crisis. The sndy of Pak-China reladons during these cnses is a unique

chapter of diplonutic history. China's role and diplomacy during these

criscs shall bc highlight€d in deprh and detail.

The ouibrcak of the Easl Pakistan crisi, in Mar€h 1971 gave rise ro

some political issuer of intdrational imponance such as separatisi! East

Pakislani displac€d p€lsolls, for€ign intw€ntion, ed extcmal armed

aggrcssion. Thesc issues becaNe of iheir senous natue and extent of

China's support to Pakistan, are being discussed sepdarely in the light ofthcse issues and lhc relativc Chincsc stance lowards them.

Chinr's support oflhe crisis 197I.

The Chinese official alhlude towards the crisis and th€ issues

adsing oul of it, was made public for lhe first time on 12 Apnl, in a

mcssage (r) By Mr. Chou Enlai to Prcsidcnt Yahya Khan. Altentiv€ study

of this lelter shows the Chinese point ofview regarding the crisis. china

consid€red th€ happ€nings in Pakistan as a purely i.temal affair's to be

seftled by the principle of non-intcrvotion. Same is also apparent

China's prot€st note lo India of 6 Apd 1971. China oPposed the

separatisls, which was reflect€d in the exPression regarding the

unificarion of Pakistan. As regards $e means for settlina the problem,

China pref€n€d by these negotiations, matl€rs, could €asily sellled

between govemmcnt and opposilions panies. Taking note of lhe 8rcss

intqferoce by lndia in the affairs of Pakistan, China considered the

USSR and the US guilly ofcollusion with tndia. In ill protest nole of6

April China also had accused India of flagrantly interfering in lhe inl€mal

afaires of Pakiscan. Therefor€, China's firm suppo.t lo Pakistan was

assured if the Indian expdrsionisls dare to launch agg€ssion agarnst

'Ihe messag€ made no rn€ntion of rh€ retugee problem as

€nphasizd by India. In April rhroughout the period of tbe crisis md the

€nsuing Indo-Pakistan war, China consistently followed the policy it had

adoptcd. The principlcs of this policy were r€iterabd dd the pledge of

suppon to Pakistan was reafiim€d again in November wh€n Mr. Bhulto

visired Peking as the personal representative of President Yahya Khan.

East Pakistan bord€r had cr€ated an alarming situation for

Pakistan, th€ gu€rillas who were aided, hained, and arined bv India(r)

Had st€pped up thcir activities. Exchang€ of fire b€tween the Indid and

Pakisrani Eoops and shelling of bord€r towns in E3st Pakslan had

increased lhe danger of direct mnfiontation bctween tle iwo After

signrng rh€ Bealy wirh India in Augu5l lo?1. USSR had incr€ased lhe

To India lndian Prime Minister, Mrs. Oandhi's tour of westem

counfies to mobilize move, io rally its friends. The US d€cision lo slop

lhe supply ofarm! to Pakisran, with effecl frorn 25 March l97l, and the

revocation on 8 Novotrib€. of liccns€s for th€ €xport of $3.6 million

worth of military equipnent, while rnassive Russian arms supply to

India. tn thai situation Pakistan was in n€ed of strong diplomatic admilitary aid. China seened to be the only country which was able to

provid€ il and to whom Pakistm could tum with confidence. China djd

nol disappoint Pakistan although no joint coNnunique was issu€d at the

cnd ofML Bhuno's visit, which mighr b€ duc to dtc fact thar Mr. Bhu$o

was not at &at rime holding an official post in rhc govemment. However,

Mr. Chi Pens-f€i, Aciing Foroign Minister, which wa lat r endors€d by

Premier Chou Enlai, stat€d rhe Chinese vi€wpoint regarding rhe crisis in

a spcech. China r€iterated its pr€vious plcdgc that should Pakistan be

subjecl€d to foreign aggession. China would r€solut€ly suppon the

Pakistan Govemment and p€ople in their just struggle to dcfend iheir

State sov€reignty and national indepcndence. rr)

Th€ vi€w lhat ihe s€.essionisis in East Pakislan w€re a handfirl of

p€rsons wss cxpress€d by chi Pcng-li€ who also asserted that the large

majority of East Pakistan are patriot and want to prolect the national

unity and oppose int€mal splil and outside int€rf€rence China

emphasized thar disputes betwe€n States should always be settled

through consultation and not by usiog force. (d)

Interference dd subversivc activities by lndia in East Pakislan

wer€ ended on th€ basis of China's adherenc€ to lhe principle of

nonintcwertion into the affairs of other countries. This time China

discr€etly avoided r€peating the allegalion of the United Siates

understanding with India, which was in vi€w of Presidenl Nixon's

intended visit to Peking in F€bruary. Th€ visil was d€scrib€d a complcte

success and it was clarmed ihat mor€ tangible and concrete results would

follow which would be det€rrcnt to aggression (1- Both Prsident Yahya

and Mr. Bhutlo indicaled tle possibility ofChina's interveotion (3)

lo cas€ ofan Indian invasion ofPakistm

only a distant possibiliry because practical

heavily against intervention was nol g€nerally

That this was at that time

consid€rations w€ighing

i€al;ed in Pakisbn. In

fact, China had not pledged morc than condnu€d diplomtic and military

suppon ro Pakistan and had given no assurance of physicall int€wcning

or resorting to div€rsionary aclion, (').

On rhe Sinolndian border. During lhe Indo-Pakistm war, which

began on 22 November, when the Indian army crossed into East Pakislan,

Chin! r€main€d in consta coniact wilh the Sovemment of Pakislan,

r€affirming its support to Pakista$ and dcnouncing India and the Soviet

union on various ccasioru, such as at the re@Ptions on the Albanian

Ind€pendmc€ Day, on thc Tanznian National Day, the bdquel in honor

ofth6 Sudrnese del€gation and th€ UN forum. Aner *te outtreak of lhe

w&, the Chinese criricism of lndia and lhc Sovi€t Union becane sharper.

This was because of Indra's admission ol crossing the East Pati$an and

commilting. China's obj€ction to thc Soviet Union's rol€ stemmed nol

meroly form its differenc€s wiih Mosoow, bul also fom its opposition to

the bit lower's inleifercnc€ and diplornatic expansion in Asia The Soviei

Unio, was, for th€ fir3t time, singlcd out as th€ pow€r fming the flames

in the subcontinenl by supponins and encoumgins Indian subversive

actiuties md miliiary provocation againsl Pakistan. (r0)

When Bdgla Desh was recognized by India, Peking denounced it

as a New Delhi farce and a puppct rcgime forcibly intpos€d upon thc East

Pahstani pcople by India and a handftl of bad €lem€nts of Pakistan. (r r)

Th€ Sovi€t Unior was accused of bcing th€ real dir€ctor of the 'Bangla

China's support to Pakistan and $e denunciation of Indo-Soviet

collusion became more pronounced during lhe war. This was apparent

also from the aecchcs madc in th€ Unil€d Nations. while extending

support to Pfi$an. China consislently emphasized the principles lo

which it adher€d. At the same time China r€peatedly r€call€d whal the

Soviet Union had donc in czcchoslovakia, and Iidia in Tibel and

Kashmir. The debate h€ld in thc Security Coucil dd the G€neral

Assembly on the Indo-Pakistsn conllict also reveal€d the gmwing Sino-

Soviet vcrbal dual between th€ Sovjct and the Chinese reprcscntatives

and their charges and countd-charges againsl each other but thcsc did not

h€lp to irnprov€ lhe situation. Of coulse, their hostilitv to each other

incapacitated the S€cudty Council, but il is h'rd to bold China

responsib)c for this. China at l€ast had monl justification for condemnrng

the cynicism of invoking the right of sclf'delennination for th€ B€ngaUs

and ofrcfusing lhe same nght io the pcople ofcz€choslovakia (!r)

On tle other hd4 Moscow was actively encoMging New D€lhi

io occupy th€ l€Fitory of anothcr Stale.(r4) And to that end U S.S R, had

repeatedly used the velo 1o give India line to presenr th€ world rvilh a fail

accompli and occupied East Pakistan. (rr)

Prcsumably, one of China's motives in condemins and exposmg

th€ sovict Union in the UN, was to lower Moscow's pr€stige in lhe lhird

world nations which was a dangerous preccdent in the dismembermcnl of

China's suppon to Palistan was not confine to verbal criticism of

th€ Indo-Soviet role but was also praclically demonslrated. If, th€ ttN

china moved a dEft r€soluiion (which it late wilhdraw) which

condcmcd India, ask€d dle waning pani€s lo $ti&aw their ioops, and

call€d upon all States to suppon Pakistan in its struggle to resist Indian

aggrcssion. ('u)

China voted foi the Oenerd Assembly resolubon of 7 December

and $c Security Council r€solution of 2l Dec€mb€r calling for a ccas€-

12\

fire and withdrawal of troops- How€vcr, it expressed its dissatisfaction

wifi the resolution in that it did not condern India and suppon Pakistan

against the Indian aggression (!t)

It exF€sscd its solidarity with Pakisran bv stronglv opposmg the

Soviet proposal to inviie a 'gangla Desh' representative to take part in

the lN debale and by veloing thc Sovi€t r€solution that called for a

c€ase-fire withoul withdrawal Had China not been a penrhfll member

of the Securily Council, th€ Soviet r€solution of 5 Decemb€r' which

secured two affimtive vot€s of Moscow and Poland with twelve

absientions, would hav€ bcen passcd. Thus Chita's presence in thc UN

proved a souce of sttengrh for Pakistan.

It is Ivorth noting that aficr thc outb'r€ak of6e war t]ter€ was, a

grcat dear of identity of views and coopcrstion betw€€n China and the

United States, on the lndo-Pakistan conflict. It was a result of their

comon appr€hension of the Slowing Soviet influflce in Asia and due lo

Presidml Nixon's desir€ not to risk his coming visit to Peking Like

china, dre US also accused India of aggression (rB) And Moscow of

blocking intemational action unlil fte capture of East Pakistan wa! fair

Anerica b€licvcd that ihc t€aty with the Soviets had ocouraged

India in its aggr€,ssive desiSns against Pakistan and that with support

from India a guenilta novement dcvclop€d in Ealt Paljstan. The US also

noted the'3trat€gic expansion of Sovi€t powe.' Both vote for the same

resolutions in the Gcn€ral Asscmbly and the S€cudry Council. In [teir

ioi communiqud issued on 27 February in P€king' both had called for

the observance and implementation of the S€curity Comcil resoluion of

2l December. So far, have not recogniz€d "Bangta Desh" Howcver' the

use of the lerm "East Bengal" for Easl Pakistan in the Foreign Policy

Report and thc alsertion thal th€ US had nev€r b€€n against the alpjrafion

of East Pakistan p€opl€ cl€arlv show€d the direction of the wind in fte

days ah€ad. Similarly, ChiG in th€ said joini communiqu€ suppoded

Pakistan's sovereig y and ind€pendcnc€ obseNing a discreet silcnc€ on

th€ t€rdtorial idcgrityof Pakisln.

Thc last imponant oflicial stat€ment made by cbina on the Indo-

Pakistan war cam€ on 16 December. Ahbough it was issued on the dav

on which the Pakistan forces surcndcrcd in East Pakistan' from the

€xpfession that lhe tndia's Gov€mnmt is moving mssive Eoops lo press

on the capital of Frst Pakisian, Dhaka' it app€ars tut at the timc of

issuing the sbtemenl china djd not know about the sun€nder'

China's stand on the basic issues invoived ie non'int€rvention'

lndian aggression, and th€ Soviet rol€ in th€ w&' remained the same

That thcrc werc some significani poinis p€naining to the si$ation in lhe

staremcnt. "BenSla Desh" was consider€d a puPpcl r€gtme-

manufactured and ins€ned into East Pakistm by India with the help of

forcc. But there was also recognidon, on the patt of China of the

existence ofa nationality probtem in East Pakisran, for which the Chines€

said Pakistan was willins to seek a pohical soluiion in lhe spint of

underslanding and coopemtion. China, firsi tirne offcially took note of

the E3st Pakistan retug@ P.obl.m and asserted that the probl€n

However, the chinese r€presentalive in the uN had linled the problern

with ti€ Tibetd fttugee probl€n! which have arisen out of the Irdian

intdf€rence in Pakistan's affairs. In contrast with tle prcvioDs

statemenls, now it was openly dcclarcd that China was not oDlv

supporting the Pahstani p€oplc politically but lhat il would continue lo

give ften naterial assistance. Th€r€ was also a waming to India aboul

th€ tuture cons€quenc€s of its aggrcssion th€ siat€m€nt said 'Hencefonh

there will b€ no tranquiliiy on thc south Asia subcontinent'. The Indian

expansionists will surely eat the birlor fruit of their olvn making. Anolhci

interesting point to nole in the slatcrnent was China's advice to lhe Soulh

Asim Fnendly countd€s to strcngthen iheil d€f€nse caPabilities so as to

hil back when attack€d. eo)

Chim's rcaction !o ihe occupation of Dbaka by dle lndian army

was reflect€d in Prcmier chou's mcaingtul reinark that the fall of Dhaka

is fte sraring point ol€ndlcss strife on thc South Asian subconlinent and

of th€ir (th€ Indian'sl def€at.('?r) That this was a redsrtion of th€ 16

Decenber sl.at€ment shows how and with what DuDos€ China was

looking at the changed situation in lhe subcontinent

It is €vident ftom th€ sratcrnenr of 16 D€cenber thal China's

suppod was nol only moml and diplonatic but practically it compriscn

material assistance also. After thc suspcnsion of anns supply to Pakisran

by th€ US dd othcr Westcm countri€s, Pakistan had no altemalive bul ro

l€aD heavily on rhc Chinasc sourcc. Sinc€ the US embargo, China had

been Pakistan's main supplicr in th€ period 1966-71, during which it had

provid€d Pakistan with I 13 million dollars wonh of ams. e') . Aft€r the

crisis China supplied all the weapons and ammunition that Pakistan

nee.l€d.er)Not only that, bul also some were suPplied free (:a)

Th€ US Defense Depariment disclos€d on 4 Novemb€r that

Pakistan was about 10 r€ceivc arms shipment fiom China and Rumania.

And the closure of the Nortbem areas bord€ring China on 31

Novenber, shows that the Chinesc arns were pouring into Paktstm

Besides arms deliv€ry, China belped Pakistan in oth€r ways also. It was

disclosed by an rndon€sian mililadly spokesman that China had senl200

instrucrors to Pakistan lo train Pakistani troops in comteFguenjlla

China also ofer€d to equip

ro replace dose s€nt !o East

two divisions bcin8 raised in W€sr Pak,sh

During the lasl days of war in East Pakistan, when it s€emed

certajn that th€ Pakistan army could not bold on for long because of the

difficulr situahon oreated by lhe naval blocked and lack of air protection,

il was reponed. (':3) That China's res€ue ships had been assernbled in th€

Gmges d€lta for the evacuation of Pakistani forces in Easl Pakistan-

While it cannot b€ said for ceriain that rhe Clrincs€ submarines and other

ships were ass€mbled for the purposo of evacuation of Pakistani troops

keeping in view the press reports and Moscow\ advice. (")

India to k€ep olT ftom atlacking the Chinese ships, il cm be

certainly said tlEt tlt€ Chincse amada wa! in dle Bav of Bengal duiins

For instance China's posturc renaincd Fnendlv aft€r tho surrender

of PaListrni forces in the E3st and c€asc-fir€ in the W€sl There were

various friendly gestures. D€spile th€; lctters of Bhastni to Chairman

Mao and Prenier Chou urging lh€m to recognze Bengla Desh and

similar app€als by Mujib. Chinak sil€nce over the rnatter shows Clinese

great good,,lrll for Pakistan. (30)

Sino-Pakjstan joi communique issued on 2 Febnary at the end of

Presidot Bhutto\ visit also lhows [l,at China supports Pakistani's

sovereignty and tenilorial id€gnly. To help Palistan's side over ils

ecorcmic di{Iiculties, China conv€ned four lods into gants and

exle.ded the repayment pcriod of anoth€r loan to twmty yeals. Despite

beine a revolutionary country, champion of ihe right of oppressed people,

supporter of wars of liberation and upholder of lhe righls of lhe lndo-

Cttines€ and the Palestinians, wny did Cbina suppon Pakislan against the

war of liberalion launched by thc pcopl€ of East Pakistan? Tbis qu€stion

has puzzled. The experts of Chinese foreign affairs. The following

analysis night help und€ntand lhc rational€ of th€ Chjnese policy

Th€orelically China\ solidanty with Pal..istan was based on

pnnciples of non-intervention, p€accful cocxistence opposition lo

foreign agg€ssion, and th€ use of force, which were rep€atedly

enphasized in all th€ s(at€me.ts and speech€s made by China in lhjs

regard. The Indo-Pakislrn war was considered a stnrggle between

subversion and anlisubversion- (rr)

It should be recalled here thal China had also condenned Chi-

Guevarist JVP in Ceylon dd declared irs supporr for Mrs. Bmdaranaike

Secondly. The true nature of the war was also revealed by the facl that

those handtul of persons who wanted to sabotage th€ unity of Pakisran.(ri)

Support to Pakistan. however did not mean that China had

approved of nilitary action in East Pakistan. Considering il an intemal

maner, China had n€ver com€nred on it. But a ftiend advicc to the

Pakishn sov€mnent for n€gotiations could be found in all lhe Chinese

statemef,ts. China condemed India b€cause it was violating the Banding

pnnciples, to which China adhded; Mor€over, China had not forgolten

the case ofTibet and th€ border war with India.

As for th€ war of liberation in East Pakistan, two points needed to

bc delemined. Was jt a genuine war? And was il launched by the

majonty of the p€ople of East Pakjslan. China did not endorsc the

liberation war rh€ory about it first, because according to ihe Clinese

standard it was not a genuine gu€rilla wd fought by peasants an workers

of that province. It was a separatisl movenent launched, not by rhe large

population ofEast Pakistan, but by a hedtul of persons who want€d to

sabolage the uniry ofPakistan. (r'?)

h ha! always b€€n the Chin€sc policy dnt gu€rrillas just fight $€ir

oM war vithout th€ aid ofan outsid€ pow€r. Thirdly, Chitra could nol

havc looked approvinsly at fte Awami League's policv and lead..ship

The Awami L€ague stood for improvcd relations with I'dia, and Mujib

was known to be a prc-Am€rican. Thcreforo, it seem€d doubtful thal after

coming into power, th€ parly would work for the workers and p€asants

Finally , it would b€ sT ong for China to suppon seParatist movement m

olher countries who it was secking thc unification ofTaiwan with it self

and opposing the idea ofan independml state for that isla.d-

A Parts from these theoretical cotsidoations there werc some solid

praclical factors that could bav€ influenc€d P€king's attitud€ towards

Pakistan. These factors w€re Problcms wilh the Soviel llnion on lh€ one

hand, and past diffculties wilh India on the other, and detnandcd the

continuance of Chint's Fiendly rclations witr Pakislan. In the wake of:

the pr€vailing Moscow-Delhi cooperation, signing of th€ Indo-soviet

fieaty in prec€ding Augusl camc as a contributing factor confirming

China's support to Pakislan. There is no denlng tbe fact that the trealy

play€d a d€cisiv€ rol€ n hardcning tlte Chinese altitude lowards lndia

and bringing the fomEr closer to Pakrstan- With the flow of Russian

arms ro Delhi in pusuanc€ of thc Fcaty, china's moral ed mtsial help

to Pakislan also b€aame morc pronounced and active.

The reason for china's opposition to Bansladesh is ircreasinsly

becoming a zon€ of Soviet influence h apparenl ftorn th€ presence of

pro4ovi€t €l€m€nts iD its gov€mme$t under the pressure of Moscow and

its r€c€nt agre€ments ccononic and oth€r wilh Moscow. In the wake of

massive Russian rmlitary strength along its north€m borders, China'

logically, camot be pleased with thc €xistence of Sovi€t prol6gd lo Its

soulh Moreov€r, the growing naval presence of the USSR in the Indian

ocean, which is directed mainly against China (")

After securing naval facilities al

cbitagong, rhe ussR would bc able

presencc in the Ocean. That cxpla'ns

Iodian Ocean a peac€ zon€?

rhe pon of visakapaham and

ro firther str€n6hen its naval

why China favors making lhe

Another r€ason for China supporting Pakistan is the border

agreement sign€d in 1963, which is provisional and according to which

Pakistan ceded some 1300 sq. mile, of Azad Kasbmir to China. Pekins

has sincc thcn linled up the old Silk Route Highway fi'om Sinkjang to

Gilgit wiih thc all-wather road running to the northm region of Ladakh

ncar thc cease-fire lin€. Occupation by India of Azad Kashmir, will thus,

make the Chinese moves on thc nonhem highway. The reports about lhc

Chincs€ moves on the northem border-(35) Indicated that some Pakistanis

ar the LIN. (16)Indicated possibilily that China had promised tojoin lhe

fight ifAzad Kashmir was rnenaced.

The fed of Chim's intcrvcntion was thus one of lhe rcasons $at

detened India fiom launching a largc-scale off€nsive against Azld

Kashmir. Not content with v€rbal decla lions, China also mad€ cenain

moves undoubt€dly, lhe alerhess ofchinese lroops in Tib€t. (r?)

The passing of weathcr data for

Sinolndian border and the assuranc€ to

Yahya that within seventy-lwo hours

locations in Tibet and along lhe

Pakislan as r€wlued bY President

they would move towar& the

Created conc€m h lndia, as appare fioln the statcments of its

leaden oe). How*q, in vicw of fie assurancc lo Delhi by Moscow that n

would start a diversionary action in Sinkiang in thc ev€nt of Chinese

intencntion. (o) And Mr. Bhutto's rcmark rcjecting the possibilitv of

Chinese diversionary nove. (ar)

India presumed that China would not inrervenc on Pakislan's

bchalf. lndia acted on that presumption by movins its mountain divisjons

fiom its border with China lo East Patislan. Sinilarly, lhe s€cond prot€st

not€ r'r) was lodged on 2? Dec€mbcr, and the protest was lodged on 16

Dccemb€r, i.e. six days an€r th€ intrusion. Similarly, thc sccond

plotesr.(ar)was lodged on 2? D€cember, twelve days afier the second

bordef violation on 15 Decembcr. The dendd nade in lhe first note lo

immediately stop ihe activilies of intusion into Chinese tenitory was

rcpeated in the second Notc. But in non€ of th€se Nol€s was thcrc a stem

waming to India of srav€ conscqucnc€s, such as was given in | 965, werc

mild in eff€ct. Sevenl questions aris€. w]ly China lukewarm this time? .

Why was ils help limil€d? None othcr than Premier Chou En-lai admited

on 3l January 1972 that China's hetp in the past has r€main€d limited

and that Chjna could not do more. The .ioint app€al made on 14

December by the UCP (Unit€d Coalidon Party) leaders of Pakistan to

China and the US for rrScnt pracdcal h€lp was another indication of

limited Chinese help. Before analyzing lh€ factors that exercis€d a

resEaining influenc€ on China's part in the Indo-Pakislan conflict, it

should be bome in mind ihal nowhcre in iheir involv€m€nt in th€ war

Th€ nujor factor that preve.Fn dircct Chinese involvemenl in rh€ war

was lhe cxislonce of tbe Indo-Sovi€t treaty Anicle 9 of $e treatv

prolrdes for holding nulual consultations and takrng appropnate

effective measures, in case any counFy is ,tlack€d or threatened with

attack. Tle treaty, on the one hand, str€nglhened China's suppon to

Pakistan on the ofter il confimed thc Soviet entry into thc war on lndta's

side, in case of ChDa's intervention. India could not have liberat€d

Bangladesh (without) the trealy of 6 iendship wilh lhe Soviet Union. (a)

China could not help nore actively because it had always opposed

the us€ of forcc to sttle dispules. Evcn ils disputes with lh€ USSR and

the Indo-Pakisian dispute carricd an app€al for neSotialions and ils

peaceful settlernent. When in its own rnatter of Taiwan, China did not

resort to force! how could it b€ €xpected lhat it would cmbark on a

military advennrc in suppoit of Pakistan against India thal was backed

by a mlitary power i.e. the USSR.

Another major det€rre was the feal of Sovie( intewention, th€

possibility of wbich was apparcnt fioln the USSR'S *aming lo oiher

counlri€s to stay out of the conflict, and its assertion thal the Soviet

Union cannol remain indifferent to lhe developments taking place in tle

direcr proximiry of th€ USSR'S borders and therefore, involve the

int€rests of its security- (ar)

|]]

Th€ USSR wrs prcparcd to come to India's help in cas€ ofchina's

€ntry into the war, w.s cvident from lhc rEporls moving ofUSSR toops

on lhe Soviet- Afgbd bordcr and it! promisc to India to stan a

diversionary action in Sinkiang agaitrst lhc Chincse in .N of thc lancr's

intervenlion in kdakh.(6) In d|c north figured proninently in Clunat

cyes as did its own rclativcly wcak dcfoBc capability.

what cver has oficn bccn d€scrib€d a! a factor rcsFaining thc Chin.rc

movem€nt in the nonh? Winlcr snow had closc lhc Himala)"n pa.$ses

But ther€ wcr€ othcr routes .vailablc includinS the all'w€3thcr road

through with thc Chines! supply was r€aching Pakislan.

One olher rcason rcfcncd !o by sone in this regard is thc abs€nce

of a dcfcnse pact bctwcen China and Pakistan Much cannot b€ said

aboul this b€caus€ oflack of infoniation rcgarding the Chinesc vicws on

such a pact. It is not known, at l€ast publicly whethcr thc ide3 of such

pact was rnootcd dunng Mr. Bhutto's visit to Pcking in Novcmber, and ifit was whal the Chin€se reaction was to it? Although it had bccn stat€d

that China had offcred eder into a dcfcNc pact with Pakislan in 1965

and also in Nov.nbcr | 971 , this was how€ver, dcnicd by Mr. Bhulto {'7)

To sum up, ii must h. said that China supportcd Palistan as much

as was possible for il to do so. The €xt.nt and nature of thc suppon vaned

according to thc prcvailing sioation, thc support was fricndly bul

caulious in thc iDitial D.nod of thc crisis, stronger and morc pnctical,

though short ofphysical intcwentid, in i|! final phae. That china will

continuc to b€ a hclptul fii.nd of Paki$an is cvidcnl from thc Sino-

AEi'| joinl omniqu&. WilL lt lddib @ipdio of E$t

P.firt&, thr bahcc ofpo*r h Alia h3 h..d u!€Et CDila Dow ftccs

two .dvEflsicr, to its lortb 6a I,SSR ed io its routh IDdi& ltat ittlc.vily drp.d iDg wm Sovict als !o nrintain ib domineEc in thc

subcontin€nt. ThG USs& moat liltly to w! this dcpdldrncc to .trcirclc

chin4 i! ,ldo nrting mvca to $sdr Tolryo for thi! plspooo nlE wiu

show 6. Chin .c ftacli@ b ttir DGw drvdop.d. It ir Dd witbou

.iificec. tb.t tb.l! hrs h6 ! iMlrs iD 6e rctivitica of b.llwtd to

bc id.ologicrly okh lo lhe Gisa

:llIIIt

:ltItl

'TlIlIIIT

tl

l|

n

R.EFERENCES-

| . Pakisl.an Honzon Ksrachi, Secona Quaner, t SZ t, pP- t Sl-:+

2.

L

5.

9.

10.

lt.

Pcaking Revicw 12 Novcmb€r l97l

Dawn, Klrachi, 8 5nd 9 Novcmb€r 1971.

6.

4. Dawn. Kffachi, 12 D€cenb€r l9l.

Le mondc English Edition, Paris, II D€c l97l,p 13

Pcaking Rcvicw l0 Dcccmbc. l97l .

7. Hung Hua's speech 3l Dcccmbcr l97l. h lhe uN

8. Nixon's Foreign Policy.Usls N.ws Text, Karachi, 9 February

Rcpon 1971, P-II.

Ibid. p.14.

Ibid. p.3.

Prcrnier Chou En-Lai, D.cemb6

Dccembcr 1971.

l97l PeakinS Review 17 ,pcech,

12.

13.

15.

16.

17.

18.

Opoit, USIS New Text l&r.ohi, 9 Feb 1972.

Pl! lh Yayh's, N.,w!w!.L, Ncw Ydtq & Nov. Spc.ch

it6vicw' Itl,p.l9.

tl

IIn

a

l|

In

n

ll

l

'|iiitl

Ii||

fl

n

14. Ibid. p.25.

Sovict Rlvicw Srydffit New Dclbi, l8 Jrf,uryty/2,Rcpdrdu.d in RK J.io (Gd.)vohE I,

Opcit pp.l05-106.

Tb Prjaidat ofPrLi.te,!, F.lsGls2-Rcply b lift. Podgqtry.

G. w' Chodhury, op<it, p.205,

Mdring Ncwt Karehilo Octot r 1970.

"Sbtut ia$cd by tb., U.S Sralc D.pd@f' p.tisrflt

Haiz@ o,pcit p.l,l6. (Ihc Esrt P.kbtm Cdsb)

NcwTiI! q lroscow , No 2 J|m p 10.

Pati.tm lldizm SFcid b.u! Thc Brd Prtirto'r Girb Vohrme

)OCV, Nunbcr 2, l9l, pp,150.152,

Ibid

19.

m-

2t.

22,

23.

24. Richard Nixo', ttrsv Aryrcaches to Pe@ (Third Foreign Policy

Repon, 19 February 1972),Panonma Supplern€nt, Karachi, vol.

XXIV, Numbd 2, 1972, P-13.

25.

)1.

26.

Ibid. p.14.

29. Ke€s'ng s Conlernporary AJchives |9? |-Iq72.p.24.

Ibid. p.15.

Text of the Treaty, op-cit, pp.ll3-ll6.reproduced trl R.K Jain

(ed.)Volune L

28. Pakistan Horizon Volumc XXIV number 4, l9?1, p.169. (Special

Issue The Great Powcrs and Asia)

J0. Pakisran Horizon op-crt. p.l?o.fihe CreaL PoweB n Asia)

IL

32.

Keesins's Contemporary Archives 197 I - 1972. P.24

Ibid. p.26.

33. The Military Balance, I-ondon The Intemational Institule for l97l-

| 972 Sratcgic Studi.E, 197 I , p.46.

SIPRI Year Book l9?2 Slochholm Inlcmational Base R€search

Intitute 1972, pp.l0Gl07.

14.

15. 'TASS Statement' Volum€ XXV, No-I1972, p.62 Pahstan

Honzon (Special Issuc)The lndia- Pakistan war, 197t.

.t6.

37.

DaM 10 December 1971.

Pakistan Horizon, opcit. p.l08,The India-Pakistan w& 1971.

LIN Montl y Clmnicle,Volurn€ IX, number I January 1972,p.7.t8.

19. uN Document S/PV | 606, Statcmcnt rQroduced in f,K- Jain (ed.)

uN Security Council Dlaft, Opcit. pp. 149-150, Resolulion

S/lMl6) Pakistan Horizon (The India-Pakistan war 1971),

UN Secuity Council Draft, Opcit. pp. 139-140, R€solution

5/10416) Pakistan Horizon,(The tndia-Pakislan war 197 I )

4u. UN Secuiry Council Dran, ibid.p.l5l.Resolu||on S/l04lo)

Pakrstan Horizon.(Th€ India-Prkjstan war l97l), UN G€neral

Assembly opcir, pp. l sl-1s2. Resolution 2793 (XXVI).

For General Ass€mbly's deb3oe on India- Patjsran wd se uNMontNy Cluonicle- Vol: IV No: I, l9?2, pp- 89.91

45.

47.

46.

48.

UN s€cudly council lhen, ibid. p.153 Rcsolution s/10446 R€vL

UN Security Council ibi4 p. I5s,Re,solutic'Ir 307 (1971)

tuchard Nrxon. opcrt, p l J.

Sleph€n P.Cohcn, opcit,p.18

CHAPTER - FIVE

Pak-China Relations during Z.A. BhuttoRegime

Brief lntrod uction.

Late Zulifqar Ali Bhuito gave a new sprite shape md stabilitv lo

fie field of foreign relations He had complete grip and in depth

knowledge of global polilics. He redirccted the foreign policv ofPakistan

u.der th€ conception ofBilatemlism. He had lih towards China liom the

very b€siming. He is considered to b€ lhe architect of Pak-Ctuna

relatioG. wlen he look ovcr rh€ powff comPletely ane. l97l cnsis' h€

r€nodels, shaped and formed the pol'cy rcgarding China.

Concept of Bilaterrlism.

As a concepl, the guiding pnnciple of Pakistan's for€ign policy

rhat we call Bilatcralism suffcrs from no contusion or complexiry. \') The

idea of co.ducting and developing our relations with each of coop€ration

with on€ without r€pudiarinS an alliance with anoth€r and thus evolving

an inlemally consisienl and integrated policy requires no justificalion and

implies no moral Feterce. The normal node of maintaining relalions

b€tween any lwo counlri€s, grcal or small is to base lhem on lheir.loinl

perception of their murual intercst. Abstracted from the realities and

pressures ofour turbulent agc, Bilaleralism is not a new fargled notion.

Thc expencnc€, how€v€r, of injecting this Principle into th€ bodv of a

countryls exldlal relations rev€als a certarn organic $owth. I1 unfolds

important implicauom dd corollaries of fte idea. To put the concepl of

Bilatcralism in p€rspectiv€, lhercfore, it is necossary that we r€call the

changes in th€ global environment of Palostant early development and

maturity and review the adjustm€nB thal Pakistan and other Third World

countnes made to th€m. e)

.The cordral principtes ol Bhuno s ,brcign pol'cv wrF

"bilateralim" and p€rsonal diplomacy. He firmlv believed in p€Bonat

diplomacy. And undenook a larger number of forcign tours during lhe

first three yea$ of his govemment than any of the Pakistani lead€rs

PeBonal diplomcy help€d him in establishing p€rsonal contacts and

explaining Pakistan's view abroad. Bilatenlsim envisag€d good relations

wirh all counFies on bilatcral basis. " To avoid mragonizing anvone, the

shat€gy cvolved was to s€t up a bilaleral relationship with ev€ry one of

the three big powers" And Pakistan was, to some ext€nt, successful in its

venturc.(r) After the assunplion of pow€r. Z. A- Bhufto assued an

ind€pcndcnt foreign policy, frec from all prer$res, to his counttlren

Som€ ofthc najor st€ps, indicativc ofreal chmge in the fo.eign policy.

Course of Pek-Chitra Relations.

In Decenber 19? l, when Bhutlo came to power, Pakjsian had been

disintegatcd ard th€ €ntir€ nation was dcnoralized. The Defence pact,

CENTO had failed; poople fell b€tny.n and isolated. Bhudo, th€retbr€,

thought of a D€fence pact wilh China as a morale booslcr. He visiEd

China in January 1972, bu! instead of a Defence pact, retum€d with a

Chinese, advic€ that 'tomon inter€sts" counted more lhm formal

The Chines€ Premi€r Chou enlai lost no time in congratulating

Zuliiikar Ali Bhutto on his b€coming President and jn assuring his

suppon for'hew" Pa*istan. As €arly as 22 De.ember Chou Enlai senr a

messaee 10 Bhurto in which h€ said. "I exrend to you my heanfelt

congratulatrons. We ar€ d€Aly convinced rhat so long as the people ofPakistan uphold uniiy ad p€rsisl in $ruggle, they wilt =cenainty be able

ro ove.come temporary difficulties and final viclory will cerrainly b€tong

to lhe gr€at p€oplc of Pakisian fighting valiantly againsl aggr€ssior. (5) Ar

the end ofJanuary 1972, when Bhuno visit€d China, Chou En-lai voiced

the s€ntiments of Pakstarfs lhcms€lves when he dectared: ,.Using

Pakistan's intcmal nationality problem as a prerexr and r€iying on ftesupport of social-imp€rialisn, the Indim govemment has grossty

interfered in Pakisran's intemal aifairs, and even employ€d massive

troops for arm€d aSgr€ssion, rhc milirary occupaiion Easr pakisran,. Andlh€ forcibl€ dism€mbermenl of Pakisran, lhus crudely trmpling upon lhe

Five Principl€s of Peaceful Coexisrence's, tne United Nation Chaner and

the nonns guiding inremational rclations.(6) In lhe joint comrnuniqu€

rssued on 2 February fte two tcaders ..srrongly condemned lhc nak€d

agSrcsston commirted by India againsr. pakisran and th€ occupation ofPakisbn\ tenitory by her in btatanl defiance of inlemarional law, th€

United Nations Chan€r ,nd the Banding principl€s_o R€alizing rhat

Pakisian was then fac€d lr1th s€rious econornic dimculties, China wmreof the four loans already provid€d amountine to $ ll0 million and

d€fcrr€d foi 20 years paynent ofth€ l9T0loan This aotion mad€ a very

gr€at impression in Pakistan and one newspaper com€nt€d: "lt is indeed

cheering that at this perilous momenl in our history we can also counl on

rhe $mpathy and unlimited asshtance of Asia's mightiest Power' How

far this Asian gimt is pr€parcd lo go to helP u3 is evident also from ils

most fricndly d€cision to writc offpast loans. (o

Early in June it was reported lhat china d€liver€d to Pakislan 60

Mic 19 fighters. 100 tanks and srnall arms. (e) In August china wenl out

of h€r way to support Pakistan by blockine th€ nembership of

Bangladesh to the Unit€d Nations. When the matt€r came up beforc the

security Coun€il cornmiltce on the Admission of New M€mbeN, China

took thc stand that the proposei UN rn€mbershiP of Bangladesh violatcd

thc General Ass€mbly rcsolution of 7 D€c€mb€r which, inter alia, called

upon India and Pakisiatr io withdIaw their forces lo dEn sid.s as wcll a!

the security Council resolulion which, in addihon, dernanded observance

of rhe G€neva Convention as regards the pnson€rs of nar. China

renind€d th€ conrnittee lhat the position of Bdglad€sh conceming lhc

withdrawal of troops and releases of prison€rs of war was in dircct

violation of these r€solutions. Wh€n Irdia th€ soviet Union, the United

Kingdon and Yugoslavia put forward a resolution in sccunry council for

th€ adnission of Bmgladesh, china vcroed.('0) shonly sffer this

develoFnent the Vice-For.ign Minisicr of China Chiao Kuan-hua,

visir.i Pakistan and had talks with Z.A. Bhutio ,Id senior officers of the

Ministry of foreign Affairs.

In January I 971 the Chi€f of SraiT of tte pakistan Amy, c€neral

Tikka Khan visit€d P€king. As a rcsulr ofthis visil, Cbina was reported to

hav€ agre€d to supply more arms to Pakistan. In May it was leamt that

China w6 scnding to Pakistan T-U 16 bomb€r aircrafr. (ri)tn Augusr

Pakistant MinisGr of State for rhc retum of rhe Pakisrani prisoners ofwar wenr to P€king. The Chinese For€ign Minist€r Chi p€ng,fei

welcomed the agreement and said that, as in the past, China vilt firmly

support Pakislan.(r2)In January l9?4 a hgh lev€] Chinese nilitaryd€lesatio., Icd by ceneral Chang Tsai,chien, D€puty Chief of the

people's Libcration Army G€neral Srafl paid a t2-day visit to pakisrar.

DunnS the visit cen€ral Chang said: .'Our fti€ndship has sbod rhe lest in

stoms of slruggle and will continu€ 10 stand any test.( 3)Comrnentjng up

on tlle visit, a ncwspap€r wrote: ,.Perhaps no li-jendship among narions

has mor€ stood (he test oftime than rhat b€rw€en China and pakisran was

founded on more proven gound! ofrrusr and goodwilt. pa&istan ha s€en

some of the worsl crises thal can bcfall a country and China always slood

by it. unremitting in suppon, wherhe, moral or material, polihcal or€conomic.(r4)Abour the sm€ time it was reported that between ttle end ofl97l and lhc b€giming of 1974 China had spplied to pakistan miliraryequryment wonh $ 300 million.

Z.A. Bhutto paid anoth€r visit to China in May 1974. By rhen

Pakistan's major innn€diale probt€ms wirh India s€€med to hav€ be€n

rcsolv€d. China accorded a grcat v/elcome ro Bhuso on this occasion. Jen

Min Jih Pao editorial wrore on I I May with cordial, friendly feelings, the

Chines€ people exrend a warm welcone ro prime MiDisrer Zulilkar AliBhutto, the fricndly envoy of lhe pakistan p€ople pakistan is China,s

close n€ighbor. Prime Minister Zulilikar Ali Bhuito is an outslandins

statesnan of Pahstan and a rcspect€d old fiiend of th€ Chinese people (lJt

Pakisian's D.fence needs was unddtood to hav. becn discussed in

deplh during tbc visit. ln the joint commuiqut it was stated that Z.A.

Bhutto cxprcss€d to Chairman Mao Ts€_tung gadtude for '.china s

.readfasr and principled support on tn€ queslons ofwith-drdwl oi l;rces

ftom fte territories occupied in lhe l97l India-Pakistan war and lhe

unconditionll r€lease and repatriation ofthe Pakistani prisoners of war drequired under lhe It$lutims of th€ United Nations dd the Goeva

Conventions of 1949. "Pakistanis w€le very pl€ased with lhc r€sulls of

th€ visit and a newspap€r wioic: "Pakist n-china fn€ndship has been

almost a mod€l in intemational r€lations {'6) Rarely are bonds b€tween

two countries sronger, $mpa$ies deQer, ed possibiliti€s of suspicion

or misunderstanding remotcr. (rr

Labr in th€ month when India exploded her first nuclear device,

Pakistan sought alsislanc€ fiorn China with sone oth€r sources. In JDe

Pakistan's Foreign Secrelary Agha Shahi went to P€king, in th€ wak€ of

lhis visit, a slaiement was issued which said that China has assur€d

Paki$an of ils resolute suppon iD its just slruSSl€ in Defence of its

Mtional indcp€ndmc€ dd inErfcrenc€, including that against nuclear

threat and nucl€ar blacknail. (r3)

India's annexanon of Sikkim and the Soviet Union's pronpt

approval of it had l€d to nn]ch fcar in Pakistan, morc panicularly about

India's int€ntions about Kashmir. In April 1975, when lhc Chinese Vice-

Premier Li€ Hsicnni€n visited Pakiskn, he reirented that China would

continue to support "th€ struggl€ of the peopl€ of Kashmir for self-

dct.mination" and Pakislan's proposal for a nuclear ftee zone in Soulh

Asia.{re) China's suppon gr@tly r€assured Pakistan and a newspape.

wrote: In South Asia ther€ havc been disturbing dev€lopmenls in

Sikkim and in occupied Kashmir because of Iidia's temtorial ambitions.

Tbey have caus€d concem to th€ snBller n€ighbors of lndia, including

Pakistan. The fordridt stateMts made by the Chinese Vice-Premier on

these issues have been reassu.ing.(t0) h .la"uary 1976 Chou En-lai died.

ln his messase to th€ Chinese Vice-premier Bhulto said that Chou En'

lai's aftachment to principls, bis cl€d com'tment ro Pakisid in irs

hour of trials and tribulatioff can never be forgotten by ou people.er)r ,ir

Pakistan n€wspapcr wrot€: " EiSht hundr€d million Chinese are nor alone

in mouming and honoring this great leader ofour time. The world has

become poorer without him. 1r would h3ve been a very diff€renr placc

with him. lt is nor going to b€ quile lh. same now that he is nor rherc.r'2)

To meel the new Chinese Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto visited

Pcking in May. This visit coincided with the 25'h anniversary of the

establishment of diplomatic relations betwe€n rhe awo counrries.

R€f€ning to this anniversary, rhe new Chin€se Pr€mier Hua Ko-feng

said: 'Th€ past iw€nty fivo years t€stiE/ that our two countri€s are rulyold and good friends. He also saidl' Wlether in ov€rcast wearhcr in

stom our rwo countries have always q,mparhized wirh and suppoded

€ach other. Our fiiendship and cooperarion are mosr sincer€ and serve rhe

interesl of the conrmon cause of unity of the third world against

imperialism and hegemonies, and $erefore, can nor be desaoyed byany

In the context ofz. A Bhuttot r€f€r€nc€ to Kashmir' the Chinese

Prcmier said thal his country $pponed the Kashmir, the Chinese Prcnier

said that his country supponed ftc Kashmiri p.ople "in theitjust shuggle

for the right of self-al€termination.c') Press repo'ts said that talk on

mrlrtary maners beMeen Z A Bhutb and Hua Ko-feng were rn an

advanced stage.ei) The joint cornmuniqu6 stated that the two leaders

"€nphasized ihat th€ rclations among all countri€s in Soulh Asia must

reflect fte principles of sover€ign equalitv of stat€s' larg€ and small'

inviolability of tditorial iniegritv and non-interference in inlemal

affai$.('16) Chaiman Mao Tse-tung, in spit€ of his failing health, r€ceiYed

Z. A. Bhulto, who bccamc thc last foreign dignitary to have met the great

Chinese leader b€fore his de3ih Z A Bhutlo on his pan assured that

Pal.istm would continue to suppon th€ Chin€sc People in their struggle

to libeEte Taiwd vhich is an inalicnablc part of th€ tcEiiorv of the

pople's Republic of China.cT) ln August when the FYesident of

Afghanislan Sardrr Mohanuncd Daoud visiten Pfislan and it was

report€d thar th€ visit had led to improvcmcnt in tll€ rclations between ihe

two coutri€s, Chim felt grcatly satisfied A Chines€ joumal wsle;

"Bolh Pakistan and Afghanistan belong lo lhc third wodd' with a

comon exp€rience in lhe past and now a common goal to achieve Their

mpprochem€nt is conducive i,o th€ fight against fot€ign interf€rence' the

Def€nce of national indepcndenc€ and th€ dev€lopmenl of national

economy.('3) In Satember chairman Mao Tse-tung died ln his

con.lolenc€ mcssage to thc Chincs€ Prcmier Bhutb paid a geat Eibut€ to

th€ tlepan€d lead€r: "Thc peoplc of Pakistan will alwavs ch€rish the

memory of Chairhan Mao Tse'Nng as a uu€ and sinc€re ftiend who

understood th€ir hop€s and aspimlions and staunchly stood by them in

rheir moments of trails and tribulations.(") A Pakistan newspap€r wrote:

"Ther€ ar€ not l]fuy m€n in history who have so fundamentally cha.ged

the lives of so lr@y men as Mao Tsc_tug. The renewal and

transfomation China achievcd undcr his l€adership consiue a b.illiant

chaprer in the hislory of our times. In rousing his people to make

sacrific€s and even to dic' so thal a nation of should become a proud

peopl€, standing uprieht, he mad€ a tremendous impact on the lives oi lhe

oppressed peoples the world over. (r0)

ID 1977 how€ver Z. A. Bhutto's relations with th€ Chinese l€aders

came und€r some sbain. According io Shirin Tahir-KlEli, "In the raging

anti-Amencanism of the lart months of Bhutto's tenure, he had begun to

rely on lhe Soviet ambaisador for informalion and, it was said by

knowledgcable individuls, cvm advicc, which must have bolher€d the

chinese considerably.Gr)

The vital importance, panicularly to comterbalance India, has

been recognized by all Pakistani govemmenls. ZAB claim€d 1o be the

architect ofPak,China iii€ndship.{r?) India introduc€d a newdimension in

lhc g€opolitics of Soulh Asia by lesting a nucled device in 1974, whjch

aggravated Pakistani and Ch'nesc s€cunty concerns alike. This new

dcvelopmeni gave a new inp€tus to the al@dy gowihg military

r€lationsbip b€tween china and Pakbtan. The frequency of high level

military d€lesatioN visiting each other increased. B€tween l97l-78,

China helped Pakistan establish 1wo major projects, namely tbe Heavy

Mcchanical cornpl€x factory for T-59 tar*s and the F-6 Aircrant

Rebuild factory. China also providcd assis.ance tor a number of other

oefencc related projccts.{") patistan atso e*endcd, during th€ long and

mutually beneficial defense collabomtion, naximum assistance 10 china

r€garding the lat€st tcchnological dcvelopmeDB in the field of defense

syst ms. The Chinesc have oftcn urcd Pakistan as a somce for accessing

and understandrng sophisdcated wesrcm technology Palislan under

Zulifquar AIi Bhutto's leadelship anormously expanded its ties wrth th€

Muslim world, ed also provid€d China with a channel through Pakistan

to esbblish links with th€ Muslim world ln thc 1970s India r€r'ained

closc to th€ Soviet Unioq ihough it re-establishcd diplomatic lics with

China in 1976. Pakfulan was abl€ to mtintain its rclalions at cordial level

with the united Statcs and lhe Soviet Union. R€lations with Cbina

continucd to flourish rvith co-opemlion in political, economic and

nilirary fields, along with China's support to Pakistan's sccurilv and

t€niiorial int€grity. As far as th€ pcople's RQublic of China is

conccmed, therc bas b€en a positive response on its pari ft has welcomed

rhis cffort at reglonal co{p@tion and regdds il an imPortant landMk

in Afi'o'Asian solidarity.(!) Pakisisn's foreign policy has becn cxercis€d

on the lines of Bilateralism iluing thc Bhutto era or)

Mr. Bhutto's sltrcwd policy of BilaFralism did rnanage to

improve, to some €xtent, Pakist$t rolations with hq eshang€d

neighbors India and Afghanistan, while geung on a rather even cou$e

wirh th€ Sovi€t Union. During that p€riod, Pakistan lesscned ils

dep€ndence on th. westem allitnce system and developed close and

cordial r€lations wilh China as an altemative source of support against

India.

After becoming th€ President and him€ Minisler of Pakisaan, Mr.

Z. A. Bhutlo gav€ further depth to the relationship- He made three v€ry

impoianr visits to Chim from 1972 ro 1976. Duing his lasr visit, Mr.

Bhutto m€l Chairman Mao Tse-tun8. He was the lasl ibrcign leader 10

me€i lhe Chairman. Aier thal meeting, it was omcially amounced by lhe

Oovemment of China rhal thereaner Chairman Mao Teshmg would no

lonser meet any foreisn leadq- This was a great ad unique Tribure (o

mee! any foieign leader. This was a gr€at and uniqu€ rribute to Mr.

Zulilkar Ali Bhutto and 10 Pakisran. The orhcr retales to d achievemenr

which, ac€ording ro Mr. Bhuuo, surpasses all hiss previous

achrevements, and which in rim€, will qm him the er€mat appreciarion

of lhe prcsent ed future generalions of Pakistan.

In 1977 the relatiod bctween China and pakislan ar€

indeshlclible. Twmty year ago a polirical and psychological walt stood

betw€en the rwo counrri€s. it was a great wall. Thde was anriparhy and

opposrrion, prejudice and fear. It is more difficult ro break symbotic walts

than walls ofbnck and monar. crow in thin air, rfon &e Chinese side

Chairnan Mao Tse-rung and premier Chou-cn,Lai w€re instrumental inforAne this modcl relarionship; surety there musr hav€ been a principal

figure from rhis sid€ to make the reciprocal conrribution? Chairman Mao'Is€iug was all-powertul. There were no insunountable exremal orinlernal hurdl€s in his way to order rhe Chinese coninbulon to the

relationship. On rhe other hdd, rh@ were, se€mingly, remendousmtemal and extemal forces working in pakistan against th€ Chjna policy.These pow€rs did nor evaporat€ by rhe touch Sone leader or leadeB of

the people relationship fion this side of that wall also played un'[ng

role. Without a doubt ihat individual, that lead€r of the p€ople, is nonc

oth€r than Mr. Zulifikar Ali Bhutto For twenty long years of association

with th€ leadershiP of China, he has b6€n the most trticularo and

imnaculate spokesman of Pakistan. He did not build onc b'id8e b t

nany bridg€s beN/€cn lhe Islamic Republic of Pakishn and thc Peoples

R€public of China. His achi€vcments. Bcginning with the Boundary

Agreem€nt to whst hc calls his sinSular achicvement is peed€ss. Without

a doubt, Mr. Zulifik Ali Bhuno has b€en thc innovator and tha Chief

Cransman oflhis geople to people rclationship ftom the sid€ of Pakistan

His mark is stamp€d on €very maJor conlribution in the d€vclopm€nt of

this r€latiorship. Thcsc ee hislorical facts. A leader who opposed all

foms of hegemony, a leader who wa! th€ quinlcssenc€ of lhe true spirit

of the Third World. Can do nothing to nreck a monument h€ has built

with his bl€€ding hands- Vr'€ arc Sraletul to Chairman Mao Tsetung md

to Premier Chou-Bn-Lai for ordering ftis relationship from china side. It

should b€ recognizcd, w n tn€ forcc offt€ sarne logic, ihat thq€ was a

leader of Pfistan who playcd an illustrious role in putting the

r€lationship on th€ pedestal of an unbreakable, people to p€ople' bond

l5t

n

ll

n

|l

ll

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ll

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Rd€relcaa:

9.

5.

6.

7.

8.

2.

3.

lt.

l_

t0.

Z. A. Blrluiro.The '|hi.d |9ord "ev/

Diectio$ ,Qulrier Books

London l9?7,p.31

lbrd, p.32.

Dr. Safdar Mchmoo4 Pztrirtdr. Pol icdl loorr. Development A,H.

Publbhcr hhorr 1994, p.178.

Ibid. p.166.

Survcy ofchina MainLand Pr€ss Janurry 1972,P-72.

Ibid, 14, l8 F€bruary 192, p.47.

Opcit, pp.44, 46

Pakistan Timcs Bditorial, 04 Fcbruary l9?2.

Thc Ncw York Timcs 03 Junc 1972.

Year Book oflJN, N€w y€ar l9?S w- 215-16.

Aian Recording, l97].

Daily Dawn lsepr 1973.12.

ll.

t4.

15.

2t.

21.

Su €y of P€opl€s republic Of China prcss 14 18. Jan I974.

The Pakbbn Tirnos 9 Jan 1974.

Tho Washington Post 2l Jrn 1974.

South Asian Survcy No. 55617 4 n'^J 1914.

Dawn 15 rnay 1974.

16.

t1.

18.

19.

20.

Opcit SPRCP Mry 1974.

The Prkistan tinEs Fditdiai 16 May 1974.

22.

24.

Daily Dewn, 27 Jun 1974.

Sourh Asian R.C.P, May, 1975.

MomingNews Editorial, 28 April 1975.

P€king Review, l6 Jan 1976, p.17.

Thc Pakist|n Tinras, Editorial l0 Janu.ry 1976.

25. SPRC P,ll January 1976,p.40.

26. rbid,196A,178.

27. DrilyDawq May 1976.

28. S P R C P, I I Jm6 No. 61 093- 13,t .7 1l Janu.ry 1976.

29. le{adng Ncw. 3l }rsy 1976.

30. Pcfiog Rryicq 3 S.ftcab.r 195,p.30.

31. lbi4 30 Scpid.t 1976!'.55.

12- Ratn@,Zl. Eth|dro dI P&ittalOxfddlrniv.rlityPrcdrf,.urni.l9fu rt5 l.

P@ toiliv.r VoL No.. n, vl May Dccctnba l9D, p.l?9.

Z A- Ahldb, Paltuat, Fordat P0,//lcv cta66ic Iahr 1975.

p.Il5.

Ay.z Na!!{joJ,tzrra&2ul_M@Ilqps!@tu(EllJsiycPublilh.f, lrlDrr 1989, p-134.

34.

l5a

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IIIiIIIIItl

n

CONCLUSION

This chaptor shall pr€sent lh€ ov€rall r€sults of lhc study as oul

Research as it is d€fined is origination of a theory or

rcinterpretation of an established theorv due to r€vcaling of n€w facls'

According to othcr definition res€dch mean putting mind, hean and

action together. Of cursc r€s.arch is a tedious work lls concluston

creates many diffs€nces among tfte rescarchers However, maximum

available r€s€arch sourc€s have bcdr utili2.d. Th€se includ6 published

material, discussions in seminaN, debates on TV, free and frank

discussion with scholan and lnowledgeable p€rsons speciallv' th€

institudon to which I belong is abod€ of latc Zulfiqd Ali Bhutto and

domina|ed by Bhutto fans. Therefore, Thc research Inay have tilt towards

Bhutto, wbich may look biascd but is oul cone of ftsearchers

A considerable and moderate list of bibliographv in ilE end will

show lhc r€ading deplh to carry on tbls r€s€aich This lisl includes books,

rcsearch joumals, mrd ncwspap.N and of th€ record discussions with

kbwl€dgcable p€rsons having diff€rent div€4ent vi€ws abou the topic

Pakistan and Chha arc nextioor n€ighbors. The history of

r€lations betwe€n thes€ two gocs back to th€ pcnod staris ftom times

inrnemorial. The area, which now cornpris€s Pakistan, had rclations wlrh

China historically Fom 1000 B.C. Accoding to Pakisldi histonans one

oflhe first 8 embassies established in China was from the region. which

now cosstitute Pakistan. In the old days merchants, pilgrirns, scholars

and diplornats haveled on camels and horse back ttrough ihe silk route

from China to Pfistan md vice versa.

Now iho same route is rebuilt and knoM as silk route. lt links

Xijiang Yonk province of China wilh Hunza vatley of Pakistar. It is a

jont vent'!€ of the lwo countries and aU weather routes, which was

cornpleted, by 5000 Chines€ and Pakistani manpow€r in 20 years. The

silk rout€ is 774 Krn long high way, which crosses 16072-il lishmountains. It is call.d a window for China, which

China to Arabian Sca pon through Karachi. Silk roule is used for

purposes including military, economic and culrural purposes.

of

Pakistu China r€lations are rnultidimosional relarions and salienr

Ibalures of these relations are I]Ey. At the top is rhe friendship based on

ideoloSy, because both are id€ological srares .The Chiba is a socialisr

state while Pakistan an Islamic r€public. Thess rwo comrri€s respecl the

ideologies of each oaher. Diff€.enr ideologies have not created any

problcms b€tween the two as it is with otber coutries like India or Israel.

The cultu'al relations and coniacls of Pakislan and China erooted in th€ anci€nt past and traccd down in the history of Gandbm

ciriliation and in th€ beginning of Islam in $e sub continent The

Chi.es€ ancient paintings arc $e model of P€rsian cultu€ and anl

similarly, th€ Urdu, which came tlmugh Pakistani areas, influenc€s the

lalguage spoken in Sinkyong.

Present Pakislan Chim rclahons are unique and quoted as an

exanpl€ in th€ prcsent day world, thc r€asons and factors of above

mentioned relations are many. Al thc lop ar€ th€ heg€monic design of

lndia about which both hav€ connon view Besid€s, both are concemed

about their security and balanc€ of pow€r in South Asia and consider

India a s€cunty nsk for Pskistan. Economic needs are m olher factor,

which has sE€ngthened lhe rclations of Pakistan and China

China has bccone economic joint and needs markets all over lhe

world. Pakistan is a v€ry uscful tna*ct for the puiPoq snnilarlv' China

accommodates Pakistani goods and car€s for ils sound and progressive

economy. All m€ga proj€cts relatcd to milways, Gawadar port etc is the

outcom€ of Chinese well consid€r€d €cononic polici€s and sound

r€lations with Pahslan.

Both lhe countries believc i' th€ principle of nonjnterference in the

inlemal affairs of oth€r states and p€acetul coexistence in respeci for the

tenitorial integriiy of other sover€ign sbtes. Bolh countries bav€ acied

upon thls policy throughout th€ir history of€xistenc€.

r53

China and Pakisran have supponed each other in thcir dispures

wirh other stalcs; for instanc€, China supporrs Pakisbn on Kashmir issuc

helped it during 1965 and l97l crisis on all Intcmationsl forurns.

Similarly, Pakistan suppodcd Ctina on Taiwan issuc, Hons Kong ctaim

and ils pennancnt Sccurity Council seat.

Thc decade starting fiom 1950 to 1960, in th€ diplomaric rclarions

of Pak-China, can bc considered s p.riod to .stablish rclations. Pakistan

rccognizcd China on January 1950 as Dejur€ govcmrnenr of China.

Pakistan's first ambass.dor Maj. cen. Ra4 took his scar in March 1950.

In lhe begimiDg Pakistan tilted towards Wcsr and China towalds India.

The ice was brokcn during Bendong confcrencc in Apnl 1955. Thc

lcadcrs of the both countries availed rh€ opportunity to discuss rhe

mattcrs pcnaining to thc rcgion as g€n€ral aDd lndian factor as a spccial

onc. Pakist ni lc{dcFhip a3$rcd China rhar irs milirary alliancc wirh

W€st was nol against China and irs inrcresrs. In rcspons€, Chinese

assur€d Pakistan dlat there was no conceivablc clash of inrcresB b€twecn

lwo countries- On | 5rh Jun. 1956 Chou En-t.i remarked about rhc historic

link bctw€cn thc people of Pahsrrn and China and rcaffinncd his dcsir€

for fricndly political tics wirh Pakisran.

In Octobcr, 1956 Pakisran' s Princ minisre. Hussain Soherwardi

Shaheed paid a long visir of 12 days and dectar€d during visir thar

CENTO and SEATO should nor b€ an effecring reason on Fiendly

rclations bctween thc rwo counEics and in thc cornrnuniqua sffimcdgood understanding in th€ fuiure. Two monrhs later Chin€s€ Drcmicr

Chou Enlai visited Pakistan and announced that th€re is no conflicr,

friction and tension h€lwe6 the br,o count tes.

In Feb. 1957, Hu$ain Shahid Soherwardi lold lhe National

assembly in Kaiachi that Palistan has sort the friendlhip ofchina, And

China has assur€d th€ suppod to thc Pakistan in any ev€ntuality. This

was a rcal dent on the slogan Hindi Chin€se Bahi Bahi. ln May 196?

China announced the settl€mdr of Kaslnnir problem in accordancc with

th€ Uniled Nations resolution.

In Dec- 1957 Fairoz Khan Noon found the seventh govemment in

Pakistan. He was keen inlercst€d to cstablish soud rclations with China.

As a r€suh addr€ssing a gathcring on hdependence Dly at lrndon. H€

remark€d "Pakistan frien&hip with United Siat€s and Bnlain did nor

mcan lhal it had any emity agaifft comrnunist countries."

On 7 October 1958 Martial law was imposed in Pakhtan. The

rMnial law resime MouDc.d io hav€ cordial dd fricndly relations with

aU counties including China; thcrcfore, no-change occurr€d in rhe policy

towards Cbim. Next year in June 1959 a ten rnernbcrs parliamenrary

delegation paid a good will tour ro China on the eve of tour. Pakistani

leaders addrcssed lhe Peopl€s Congress of China and d€clared China a

symlol of peacetul human achievemenls, in response Mr. Liu Shao.

Chairman of the Congress, rcmarkcd that we Chin€se have always

trcalured our fiiend ship with people of Pakistan and oi_'r rhis view is noi

)

only in th€ interest of two countries but also beneficial for peace in Asia.

In the sam€ y€ar a tension arose betwe€n lhe two countnes on arival of

Haij nission, because Chinese r€gimc considered ihis mission as the

agenl of Chaing Krshek, agents in the shape of Muslim, therefore,

protest€d. In S€pt. Pakistd receive a Chin€se map showing some parts o{

Hunza as pans of Chinese area. Therefore, to seltle lhe problen A)ab

Khan on 23rd October 1959 arnounced to settl€ lhe border friction with

China.

In 1960 Pakistan chang€d hcr polici€s in favor of socialist block

especially with China. In early 60s p'€sidenl AWb Khan, while visiting

Unir€d Srates of America, announc€d rhat China must occupy her

positiofl in Uniled Slates. Th€ China was nnpresed by this monl support

ofPakistan, which influenc€d thc relarions oftwo countri€s positively.

The relatrons berween Chrna and Pakishn lhou8h developed brl b)

bir. And every year cemenkd ftesc relarions bur decade oi 1960 s could

be l€m€d as a mileslone ofthese rclations. The rnutuality of inierests and

cordiality lhat developed in lhe 1960s have be.ome a pcrmanent feature

of th€ir bilatcnl relations. Though it was the tra of Mohamad A}!b

Khan, but lat€ Zulfiqar Ali Bhuuo was the real architecr of rhe!€ relations

firstasaministerofindustri€sandthena3aforeignminister'Hechanged

th€ dir€ction and obj€ctives of the foreisn policy of Pakistan and

e$ablished relations wiri all countries with new €nthusialm and goals.

He paid sp€cial attention to ChiDa dd consliucted relations, which have

become hisbnc and uniqu€ of conlempoEry diplomatic cra. Pakistant

fri€ndship with China established since 1960 has b€€n Pnmarily al two

l€vcls ofinteraction first at political and se.ond at military l€vel.

In Jduary 196l Pfistan foreign ministet Ma@or Qadir

disclosed th€ agrc€m€nt with thc Chin€se to conduct negotiations for lhe

demarcation of thcir border with Pakislan along Kashrur.

The significanl daelopm€nt of th€ year 1960 was th€ signing of

Indus water Treaty belw€en India artd Pakistan. Due lo this trcatv -

Pakist n's r€lations with India rclaxcd. This r€laxation of relations

prompted the chinese to hav€ second thouSht about Pakistan's offer of

border settlemeni. But an oth€r realon which play€d inportant role in

strenglhening lhe Sino-Pakistan r€lations was thc wid€ning of Sino

Soviet ideological conflid which forced China to look out for mking a

sound relations with as nany Asian comtri€s as possible D th€ pnonty

Pakislan was al the top.

In May 196l the govemment ofPakistan after consulting with lhc

president of A2ad Kashmir submitled delailed proposal to the Peking for

thc demarcation of Sino Pakistan bode. The Chinese Govemment in

r€spons€ inforrnod Pakisran that il wotnd exarnine lhe proposal and

subnit a reply in near tuture. India obje.t€d on the proposal submitlcd by

Pakistar for the demarcation of borderline, that area is disputed, and part

of Kashmir. ln July 196l Pakistan's president Ayub Khan dunng a visit

to the United State dalarcd that Palistd eould vote fd the scatini of

t62

P€oples Republic of China in the Unit€d Nations, which could be

considered a step forwarded first visibl€ change, app€ared in Pakistan

China Relations. As a r€sult of this depanure and some other bilaieral

equahons. Pakistan in Dec 196l swirched ovcr her vorc as against her

pr€vious stance in favor ofadmission ofchina ro fte United Nations.

On May 3, 1962 lhe governm€nt of Pakisran and China

simltdcously armounced at Rawalpindi and PekjnS rhat the rwo

governmeDls had agrced to demark th€ S'no Pakisran bord€r, howcver, ilwas decided that the agreement would be provjsional and atler fte

settlemcnt of Kashmir issue th€ sovereign aurhondes concm€d would

reopen n€goriations with the chinese to r€place rhis provisional

asr€ement. Again the asreement could b€ considered a major milesrore

ofPak China relations.

On Oct 12, 1962 anbassador Maj. Raza in pu$uance of bord€r

agre€ment staned, in Peking, fonnal neSorialions with Chinese

govemcnl for deDarcanon ofborder. On Ocr 20, 1962 hostilities brok€

out on rhc Sino IndiaD fronrier when Prime Ministd Nchir order.d his

boops to drive out the Chinese ftom rhe t€ritory which India claimed its

own. The Chines€ hit back hard and tndian amy suffered the most

shameftl dcfeat in rh€ annals ofrnilirary history. The Wesr run fasr ro $€help oflndia without caring the sccunty of pakisran which was rheir allyin CENTO and SEATO dd a bilaterat pact with Anerica. CoBequently

Pakistan came to the conclusion thar China may proof its friend ofne€d

and deed, while wesr will ultirnately so with tndia, simildly, Chinese

-r

also felt that Pakislan can be tlEir lultworrhy r€gional and stralegic ally.

On D.. 26, 1962 d|c two govcffn€nts, China and Pakistan, reachcd

agre€nenr in pdnciplc on alignmcnt.

On March 1963 an a8r€cm€nl was sign€d n€a y six months aflet

Sino Sovi€t war. This border sculenent agrecrent was d€claied as

provisional in naturc and stipulacd that ancr the s€tdemmt of Kashmir

On January 1963 Tmde del€gation sign€d th€ firsl fornal Sino-

PakiBtan lrade agroemcnt, providing most favor nations states io each

other in respect of cornrnerce and trade including shipping. Tbe trad€

agrecrncnt ovisaScd dEt Pfistor wiu inpoir fom China m€tals, steel

products, coal, c€mcnt, machincry, chemicals, raw nat€rials and c€rals

while China would imporl ftom Pakistan Ju!e, cotton, te"'(til€s, sports

goods, hides and skins. Bcsidcs, the Chin€sc vic€ Ministcr for forei8n

tradc indicated $at China would b€ willing to offer lorS lem d€dit Io

small rnd medium industri€s in Pakisran. Th€ agreement also provided

fm funher arrargement ovq a pcriod of onc yca foi stepping up Sino-

Pakistan tradc. Thus by this hadc agreoment Pakistan b€cam€ only nation

allied with the wesi in rhe SEATO and CENTO to be rade Dartner of

China. And held thc position'1rDst favoEd Nation" Statrs in uade and

conrncrce. vice vcrsa, china is rhc only cornmunist comtry to Pakislan

has agreed to give reciprocal stalus. The Pakjstani newspapers

comcnling on lhc agr€erncnl crlleil it a hisloric acroral a$d agreement

that will b€ well come favorably by our peoplc foi political as well as

dispute betw€en Pakisran and India the soverelgn authority concem

reop€n n€gotianons wfth China. This agr€€me r€solved a hrderproblen with Pakistan peacefully, thus, onty jrritanr in Sino-pakistrn

problern was r€moved. In rhe srme year Pakisran a.d China signcd an

agreem€nt on air transport providing Chin€sc and pat jstan airlin€s tooperat€ tn each oth€r tcfrirory, which wd a srep foNdd to stugihen the

r€lations of wo countrics.

Early in May, ar lhc invitation ofchin.sc goverm€nt, a detcgarion

of Pa.kistani indusrrialisrs and busin€ssm€n, draM fiom almost alt rhe

leading business houscs wa to Chim ro witness th€ export fai. ar

Canton. Chou Enlai himself receiv€d rh6 delegarion on l6d may in

Peiking. In the sarn€ modh five-mmber delegation of pakisrani

joumarisb arrived in China lo aftend the Afro-Asian joumatisr

conference. Deleeation rour€d scvcral parts of China. On l7_May Chou

Enlai again received fis d€l€gation p€rsonally_ The l€ader of this

delegation was Israr Alunad who disctosed larer on dnr Chinese assur.d

lhat ftey would def€nd Pakisran in any eventualiry. In rhe same monthChinese pilg.ims adv€d in pakishn Bhutro present them five hundrcdcopies of lhe Holy Quran .nd 63 copies of th€ work of poel phirosophcr

Mohdrnud Iqbal. Bhutto rook ovcr as a foreign miniBt€r in January1963.

Chairnan of rhe pakisran Inrcrnational airlines visired

Jun€ 1963. Chairrlan Maotsi_tung himself rcceived him.Chinese civil aviation delegation camo ro pakjsra do

for€ign minister on 23rd Augult. As a result lhes€ visits, Pakistan was

given baflic rights at canton and Shanghais and PakbBn at Karachi and

DaklB. All thes€ Fcqucnt visitr of Pakisbni and Chinese delcgatioDs of

difierent nalure playcd a vital rol€ in bdnging the lwo counhes closer to

On l?ri, July, 1963 foreign ministcr lat€zulfiqar Ali Bhulto made

his fmous shtement in the National assembly in which h€ said " God

forbid if thcre was lo be a olash and India in her ftustralon tumed her

guns against pakistan then such an attack by India on Pakislan shall nol

be confncd to tlle s€curity and lerritorial integity ofPakistan only ' ln

short, he indicaled b€tween ihc ali€Ils that Chim would involvc an such

an eventuality. At the €nd of the monih th€ two counlries enter jn to

bancr Fade. Hatim Ali led lhc del€gation from Wesl Pakist?rl ard

Mauian Abdul Hameed Bahshani fiom East Pakistan. Mao Tse-ung

Chaiman lushaorhi, and Chou En lai €nbnained dclegation nore than

once. Even Mao Tse-ung sugg€stcd BalBhari nol to oppose A).rb Kban.

Visits continued frEquoily in 1964, first visit of the year occurred

in Feb. 1964. Duing this visit Chinese leadeN describ€ their relalions

with Pakisian as thos. of dep€ndable and rcliablc. Chou En-lai said at

Dahka on 25ri F€b. 19fl " our friendship is not guided by €xp€diency

but is ever lastina on€, and no onc can utr.lelmine it ". Samc day in a

pre.ss confcr€nc€ Chou En-lai paid a handsome tributes to presidenl

ln April, I 964 when the inaugurat flighl of pakisr,an Int€malional

air line anived in Cbina. N€ws paper Re.nm Ribao stated in an edironal

" an air line of friendship and p€ac€" and wot€ r}Iat ftequenl exchange ofvisils ever growing trade, econoixc md cultural internow b€tween the

two countries had mad€ it n€cessny ro short€n rhc physical disrance bymeans of mod€m transport so that exhring ies of a liiendship can be

made still closer. Hence, rhe op€n'ne of fiis new a; roure is in our

coounon aspnarion and in inrel€sr ofour $ocounrries

Early in July 1964 a njne-members delegation of pakistm

busn€ssnen visitcd ChiDa to explore rhe possibitiry of €xpmding tr"de

betwe€n th€ two countsies. Lr rhe middle of the samd inonrh pakistan

commercc irnnislcr Wahecduzarnan aniv€d in peking. Chairman MaoTs€- ung r€ceived him and ftanked pakistan for her siand about Chin€se

seat in thc Unir€d Narions. tn lhc end ofrhe samc monrh China ofered60 million $ interesl fte€ loan repayabte in pakistanr gooos ov€r a penod

of20 years.

In Ocbber I 964 a ?-mernber detegarion atl€nded I 5,i Anniversarycelebration of Peoples repubtics of China. Shonly afi€r rhat, a I0,memb€r dclegation ted by depury chajman of the pakistmi ptanning

corirnssron went to China to cxaninc the scop€ of Chinese aid inva.ious Pakistani projecrs. tn iare Octob€r 1964 during a stopover jn

Karachi the Chincse fo.eign minisrer said that h€ favored a pl€biscit€ inKashmir. In the last month of t964, it was arnounced thar a regular pak

China shipping sewice would stan in ttuee months. pr€sident Ayub Khand€scnb€d China's first nuclear tesr as..most impressiv€ achievemenr,,

IThis is e udmirblc f&t lhat Pak China relations tum fiom fo€ to

friend in the 60s. Of couN€ abov€-m€nlioned €vents shaped up th€se

relations. Denarkation of bordo could bc thought a b€Siming of these

relations and ftequent visits play€d decidrnS role in brinSing these two

countrics nearer io cach othcr.

On June 2, 1965 Chou Enlai camc to Rawalpindi again, during

visit Chinese lcader stat€d that " ln r€cent years F mGhip betw€cn our

rwo pcoples has unddgon€ a remkablc devclopment and th€ co-

operation betwe€n oDr two countries has been exceedingly fruitfiil"

Reciprocal visits of lhe top leaderrhip of two countri€s condnued,

besides, visit of diITeMl sectors of society. In 1965 a first visit of the

year was that of Ayub Khan who visiicd Chita in March 1965. He

r€ceiv€d a rouling well cone. N€w China News Ag€ncy rcponed fton

Peking on 2 March 1965. This well come cager r€ciprocate fte

€nthusiastic well comc ac.orded by Pakistani People to premier Chou

En- lai during his Pakistan lour last sprins. On the olcasion huge

portraits of president Ayub Khan wefe er€cted at major int€rsecno.s

along with miv.l rout€. The city was adomed with national flag oftwo

counbres. Ayub Khan dcclarcd during thc visit, that fii@dship wilh china

is for us a long{cm policy and not a matter of expediency. In lhe joint

communiqu6 Ayub Khrn supportcd China's stand on Taiwan and two

parties noled wilh concem that thc Kaihinir disputc Hnained unresolved

And consider€d it a thr€at 1o pcacr ud security in thc regioD.

Two months later in August 1965, intensive fighring broke out

b€twc€n India and pakisran in Kasbrnir. On 6,h Sep. 1965 Indian Armyattacked Wesl Pakisran wilh int€ntion ro rake over Lahorc, provincialcaprtal ofPunjab, 15 miles away from rhe border_ Many Islamic counriesIike Iran, Turkey, Jordar, Saudi Arabir, rndonesia supporrcd pakisran.

But all of lhese supporrers, China spoke openly. It is gen€ralty conceded

thal Chi.a's role was significanr and decidjng during this confiicr. China

Aave Palistan tmquatified moral suppon, besides, firearen India wilhgrave consequenc€s for allegedty violating ils reritorial jnregriry alongthe siklim border. peking poticy rhough c.eated wide spreadapprehension ofa general war in Asia. Such a policy ofchinese fosteredanong rhe great powere a s€nse of urgency aboul t€rminarinS th€ Indo

Of course Chinese policy during 1965 war nad many side effects.Al top was siding of Soviet Union op€nly wirh India pu|ing aremendous pressure on pakisr4. w€sr also show sympamy wrt! Indiadue to open policy of China. Chi.a d€em€d Indrd as d aggiessor andh€ld her solely respo$ible for rh€ author of .onflict. China alsosupponed Kashmries's righls of self_determimtion besides, accused,United Narions of acting under Soviet American orccrrons. Chjna ahocharged Soviet America, coalition €ncoumging ft€ Indian anack onPakistan.

On Sep. 4. 1965 whcn lndo Pakistan fishting was strll conlined to

Ioshni., The Chines€ forcisn minislcr, Marshal Chcni stoppcd at

Karachi on visit to Mali, at a news conf€rcnce foreign ministcr

condcmed India's provocatrve and violation of the ccis€ fir€ lin€ in

Kashmir and supponed Pakistan's "Just" aclion in rcpelling Indian

atacks. On Sept. 3 Peopl$ Daily Advis€d hdia " to siop ils dominating

and arbitsary practic! of brnlying iil ncidboE and justified Pakistan's

counter altack on Indian pGitions in Kashmir.

On Sep 7, 1965 Chinese gov€rment denounc€d Irdid athck on

Lshore as a naked aggr€ssion. Two days lat€r premicr Chou Enlai

sp€aking at North Kor€5n rec€ipt ion repcated the substance of thc above

stat€renr. Vic€ premier Hsieh Fu-chi oQre$ similar stat€IrHl at a Ially

in Laiasa on the sarne day. on Scpl I Peoples Daily cdibnal rcje.ted

the assenion of Indids all€gadon of infiltralors and called it absurd.

Peoples Daily also stat€d lhat India in cv€ry scnse is thc aggcssor and

Pakisi,an its victim.

Chinese support to Pfislan was blunt and widespread. Chin€sc

charged that India attackcd Azad Kashrnir and ]altr on West Pakistan

with the prior lqowledge and approval of lh€ United Stltes. On Sep. 9

Premi€r Chou En-lai in his sp€cch al NoYlh Korean €mbassy declared

"that thc Indian government could not have engage in such senes of

ftilitary adv€nture without th€ concem and support of thc Unit€d Stat€s".

$me charge of Chinese prov€d wh€n London Daily T€lcsraph in ib 13

Scpt. hsue wotc that United Stat€s hcw of possible Indian anack on

Kashmir and West Pakistan. Chinese also blamed Unil€d Nations for irs

rnactiveness and non-int€rference in soulh Asia. conflict Dtil S€pt l7wlen Pakistan counter a(ackod India. It app€ared in the Daily Dawn's

€ditorialon Sept. 17 and 19.

Chines€ continued and ohance the prcssure dunns thc war, fo.irstance on Sept. 8 Peking addrEssed vdious protesrs ro New Dchti

charging $at India. amed forc€s interven€ into Chincse teritory and

buih nilitary stmcrure on ir, fired on Chin€se pelsonnel, kidnapped

Chinese c'ti2cns and stolen catrle. Thes€ nores rlu€aren€d, grave

consequences and one thal ofs€pr. t6 went forth as an ultimarum. These

notes clcarly indicated that China acted on the policy, come what may,

lhar would nor stopped Chjna &om supponing pakislank fight againsr

Indid aggression. The Chjnese policy contused alnost altlhe diplomaticchannels, for insranc€ pakistanis considered China\ policy as helpful intheir hour ofneeds. According to others Chines€ suppon was more rhusimple altruism. The west suspecled that China wish to prolong tlE IndoPakistm conflict. Th€ Indian opjned that China acrualy wanred to bring aceasefire and h€r ultimaturn was ro provid€ best condirion to pakisran topur prBsure and extract much iom India. The Neurrat observers noredthat China's diplomcy dxrinA war was a doctrinat_

whatevef the true analysis of Chinese poticy, diplomacy andulrmatum ro tndia during tDdo pakistan war. But th€ fac! is thar itsupponed Pakistan in its hour of ne€d. H€tped pakisran to def€nd irst€mtory a.d €€ase-fir€ on be|er leftns_ pakisranis welt came and

)

r'l

appreciated the Chines€ support. Every sector of th€ society wherhcr

stud€nts, lawyers, politicians or n€wspap€rs had high spiritr for China

and feft obligc to lhcm. The best in rhis regird is a poem by Habib Jalib

broadcasled on radio Pakistan" May you live on, O China and

Indonesia". Following arc th€ few vers€sl

May you live on, O, China and Indonesia

B€causc ofyou is peace susiain d in AEia

With gcat sinccrity you have givcn us success

The trulh is you bavc redoubled our vigor

The call of ftiendship you have answered w€ll

May you live on? O, China and Indonesiatr

However, policy nak€r in Pakisian to many extenl were inde€d

annoyed ard embanassed on Chinese over reaction. Obs€rv€rs also

reponed thar Pakist,n s govemmcnl was increasrngly concemed by dnft

of evenis that se€ins to place it in clos€ aliSnmml with Chin4 thcrefor€,

A],ub Khan and najor news papers ndat€d and invitcd the United States

to play rol€ in the South Asia. fi.y also advised India that if it want€d to

play an irnportant role in Wodd afhirs lhen it nccds Pakistan's help.

A)tb Klan, it's €vident has callcd halt to the escalation of fi-iendliness in

Pakistani Chin€se rclations all€g€dly und€r Unit€d Slates pressue. He

sent Zulfiqsr Ali Bhutto one of the principle authors of Pakiscan's

nonDnlizdnon ofrelations wirh Chma and Sovrer Union.

t

Olh€r cnsis, which tcsted lhc might and deplh of pak Chjnar€lations, were rhe E€sr pakistan crisis of t 97l . I

l97l crisis, which uhimatety ended in fte dismemberm€nl ofPakrslan and fiearron ofBangtadesh, are mosr rmponanr gtobat cvenc ofthis ce.tury. This we wd not fought in the war fietd only bur ir wasconlested in the corridors of UN, on the foreign desks of eve.y counrry,sministry. Every rnajor and super power playeri its role dunng rhese crisesbut the role ofUSA, China and USSR was crucial and decisrve. ThoughChina could nol succeed to slot, the disnemberme.t ot pakistan but jtplayed very positive rotc during l97l crisjs. No doub he study of patChina relarions during these crisis is a unique cnaprer ot diptonnlic

Tle out break ofthe Fasr pakisran crisis in march | 971 gave rise rosome political issues of Iir€rn donal imponance such as s€paralism,displaced persons, foreign inieryenrion dd extcma arncd aggession.The Chin€se stanc€ towar.ts thes€ issues was rnatured, pnncipled andmline of Irremational Law. Cbinesc official anitude toward the crisis andIne tssue arising out ofit was made public for th€ first rime on t2 Aprjl,in a message by Mr. Chou En_ Iai to presidenr yahya Knan. The lerterwnnen by Premier Chou En Lai srated rhar happ€nirgs in pakjstan are apurcry Dtemat affarro be *rrtcd by pnncrpte of non_ inrcrvenDon.

t73

Sane vi€w is also appareni ftom protest note !o lndia on 6 April

l9?l as rcgads tllc meen for setling th€ ploblcn China prefcr€d the

seltlement tbrough negotialioN betw€€n the govemment and the

Taking th€ noie of gross interferenc€ by India in (he affairs of

Pakistan. China consider€d th€ USSR and rh€ USA th€ guilty ofcollision

with Indra K€eping in vi€w above assessment China mad€ her mind for

firm support !o Pakiscan and continued thoughout the p€nod of cnsis of

lndia Pakistan war. China r€atrrmed again th€ policy adopt€d in Apnl as

stalcd above in Nov. vhen Mr. Bhutlo visited China as the representativ€

of F€sident Yahyah Knan.

Th€ East Pahstan cris€s were thc outcom€ of l97l's general

el€ctions in which Muje€b's Awari League won the rnajority. Power

could nor be transfcFed duc to hcsitation ofManial law govemment and

complicatioB of couffy's inlemal policies. Awand League and East

Pakistmis Fotesred and agitat€d on this matt€r as a r€sult faced mililary

crack down. To avoid rhe situation Banghdeshis crossed the bordc. ard

went to India. Frcm th€re they started a guerrilla campaign againsl

country's military, which was iilly supported by the India. Guerillas wbo

were added, train€d, and anned by Indra stepped up their activilies as a

result €xchange of fir€ b€tween the Indian and Pakisiani troops md

sh.lling ofborder toMs in East Pakislan incr€as€d- Afler signing a tr€aty

wilh lndia in 1971 USSR jncreased the supply of ams to India. On oticr

hand USA decided to slop rhe supply of ams to Pakisle with effcct

ftom 25 mffch, l97l and revok€d on 8 Nov ljcenses for the €xport of3.6

million. Taking advantage of situation. lndia invaded Pakistan on Nov.

22 Under these condrlons Palisran was rn need of srrong drplonunc

and military aid. Chim looks only couDtry to do this for pakhian. The

chdact€rs play€d by China duinS the crisis indicat€ the China cm€ up

lo lhe hopes and 4spil?lrons of PalisLan.

Both Presidents Yahya and Mr. Bhuto indicated the possibiliry ofChina's int.pention in cale of an Indian invasion on pakistan. Though itwas rn those crr€umstairces onty a disranr possjbility, because pmctical

consrdeBrions w.rc beavity against inlflorron, whrch *eF nolgenerally realized in Pa.kisran. In fact China had no. pledged more than

continued diplomadc and military supporr ro pakistan and had given no

insurarce otphysically rnleNenrng or restoring lo diversronary acnon.

On 22 Nov. when the tndian army crossed inlo Easr pakistan Chinaremarned in constanl contact with govemm€nt ofpakistan and denounc€.t

Indian aggression and Soviet Union support to India on variousoccasions. For Insrance on ri. Atbanian Independsce Day. on rhe

Tanz.nian nationat day, on the bdqu€t in honor of ihe Sudanese

delegation and on rhe UN forunl China sharp€ned criticism of India andSoviet Union aier rhe aggr€ssior on Eas( pakisran. China $arcd throughdiplomatic channels lhat Soviet Union was for the firsl rime naming thesukontinent by supfnnrng and encouragrng Indun subversrve acb\4rresand mililary Fovocation against pakistan. When Bangtadesh wasrecognized by India. Peking denounced ir as a New Delhi farce and

"/

puppet regim€ forcibly enforced upon fte East Pakislan people by lndia

and a handful of bad elenents of Pakislan. China also ac$scd Soviet

Unron ofbeins fi€ re3l direcbr of Bangladesh tarce.

China catl€d Indian aggrccsion on Bangladesh an act ofrepetition

Soviet Union did in Cz€choslovakia and India in Tibbat and Kashftir'

Besides, in thc debate held in S€curity Council and in Cclleral Assernbly

on Indo Pakislan conflict also revealed lhc gowing Sino Soviel verbal

dual betw€cn th€ Soviel Union and the Chin€se rcpres€nbtive and lheir

charges and countcr charges against €ach olher.

China support to Pakisian wr! not co.6ne !o verbal ciocism ofthc

Indo Sovi€t role but was also practically d€monstat€d when in th€ UN

China movcd a draft resolution (which it laler with the drew). wlich

condenmed India ask ihe Waring partics to withdraw th€ir troops and

callcd upon all statcs to support Pakistan in its strugglc lo r€sisl lndian

aggrcssion. China also votcd fo' Ceneral assembly r€solutron of ?rh Dcc

and S€curity Council r€solution of 2l Dec. calling for a cease-fire and

withdrawal of troops. Howevcr, It expressed its dissatisfaction with the

resolurion, which did not condernn India and support Pakistan against lhc

Indian aggression.

China also opposed Sovret proposal to inviie a Bangtadesh

reprcsentativc to take part in ttN debate by vdoing the Soviet resolulion

that caled for a coas€-lir€ wilhout withdrawal. If China had noi h€m a

permanent memb€r of rhe Secunty Council rhe Soviet resotution of 5rh

Dec., which securcd two affnnarive vol€s of Moscow, and poland with.twelve abstentions woutd havc b€en passed. Thus China,s p.esence inuN proved a source of str€ngth for pakislan.

Aiie. rhe our break of rhc war rhe.e was a gcat deal of id€nrity ofviews and co-operation b€twe€n China and Uniied Slates on th€ IndoP?kislan connicr h was a resuh of rheir common appreiensjon of th€giow'ng Soviet intluence in Asia and due ro prcsident Nixon,s d€sire nol10 risk his coming visir 10 peking. Like China USA a$o accused lndia ofaggrcssion and Moscow of btocking inlemationar acho.. Ii looks rhalChina proved a posiliv€ facror for Arn€rica,s stand tn E3st pakisran crisis.th€ last importa.t omcial srat€ment nade by China on rhe Indo pakisranwe came on l6'i Dec. lhc day on which pakisrani forces surrender€d inEast Pahstan.

China's r€action ro rhe occupaion of Dhaka by the lnalian armyreflected in premi€r Chou,s meaningftt renarks rhar th€ tal of Dhaka isrhe starting poinl of endtess slrife on $e Sourh Asnn Subconrinenr andlheir defeat. Chjna's support ro p6,kistan was ror oruy moral eddiplomatic but also material assistance. China since USA embargo hadb€en Pakisbn's nrain supplier durina $e p€riod 1966-71. Dfirg rhispenod China supplied 133 nillion dollars, arns mcruded a weaponsand anllnunirioN ihat pakistan nced€d some of rhen were supplEd freeof cost. China also sends 200 instruclors to pakisran lo trarn pakisraniuoops rn counter suenilta warfare. Bcsides, China also oflered to

t

China's posture remain€d fiendly after the sun€nd€r of Pakistan

forc€s in lhe Eat drd c.Ae-firc in the Wesl. One finds vtrious friendly.,

g€snres for instance despite lhe l€tters ofBahshani to Chairman Mao and

Prcmier Chou urging thcm to recognized Bangladesh and similar app€als

by Muje€b. China remained sil€nt over th€ rnatter this gesture shows a

grcat good will for Pakistan. Pcking 's ahtudc towards Patistan during

l97l crises due to two factors with Soviet Union on the one hand and

past difficulties with India on lhc oth€r. Moscow D€lhi co-op€ration and

Indo Sovict Treaty in August cane as a contributing factor confirming

China's support to Pakistan. An oth€r rcason for th€ suppon ofchina to

Pakistan was border agreement sisn€d in l%3 according to which

Pakistrn c€ded som€ 1300 square nil€s of Azad Kashmir 10 China. To

sum up ir must b€ said thar china support€d Pakisian as much 6 was

possible for il lo do so. The extent and the natur€ of support vari€d

acco.ding to rhc prevailing situation. The supporl was fricndly but

cautious in the inirial p€riod of cnsis, stsong€r a more pmctical though

short ofphysical inteN€ntion in its final phase.

cquipped two military divisions being rais€d in West Pa&istan to replace

lhose s€nd to Easl Pakisian.

ln Dec- l9?l when Bhulto came lo power Pakislan had becn

disintesrated and the entirc nation was denoraliz€. In his first address on

radio Pakist& hc declarcd, " Hc will rnakc a ncw Pakislan and will pick

thc piec€s". To honor his words he farmed new policies. Ofcoune at that

lime duc to thc drsrnegmlion of the country €nlire nalion wa5

demoralizcd. Defens€ packets SEATO, CENTO bad farled as a result

people felt betray€d and isold€d. In such circumstances Bhulo coined a

n€w foreign policy famously known as bitateratism. He aho rhoughr ofadefens pact with China as a moral boosra_

For this purposc he visiled China in January l9?2 bul insr€ad ofadefense pacr. Bhulto came back with a Chinese advice thal conunoniniercsts count€d mofe rhan fomal def.ns€ pacr.

The Chincse prcmier Chou En-Lai tosr no rime in congrarularingZulfiqar Ali Bhuho on his becomins prsident ard assunng hjs supponfor new Pskisran. Earlier on 22 Dec. l97l Cbou En Lai senr a message toBhutlo in which he €xhd€d his heanf€tt corgrarulalrons and hope forth6 unity of the popt. of pakislan. Hc also hopcd rhey wil ov€rcomemelr temporary difficulties. During January vjsir of Bhutto to china,Chou En lai voiced th€ senrim€nrs of p?kisranis, wh€n h€ declarcd, ..

condemn€d gross inte,ference of India in pakisran_s rnt€mal affain,deploymenr of .nassiv€ toops for armed aggr€ssion and rhe militaryoccupatioo of East Pakisra, and forcibl€ dismembc0nent ol p?kistan byvrolating fiveprinciples ofpeacefut co_€xistence and th€ united chaner.,,

Communjqu6 issu€d on 2 February, two teaders stronglycondeftn€d th€ naked aggrcssion conunitted by Indn againsr pakisranand occupalon ofPakisran\ tnitory. On economic front China More offou lons alr€ady provided ofdollars I l0 nilion and postponed I9?0,s

loans for 20 y€ars. lt was appr€cialed by all quaners in pakistan. China

provid€d to Pakistan 60 Mig 19 fiehrels, 100 tar*s and snEll alms as

help in rhe military sector. China also blocked Bangladesh nembership

lo the Unitcd Nations in Augusr 1972. Whcn matrer carne before Sccurity

Council's conmince by v€toing it. China also denandcd for edly release

ofpnsoners ofwar.

In January 1973 cen. Tika Khan Chief of thc Pakisran AJmy

visited Pcking, as a result of this visil Chjna supplied ro Pakisran T-U 16

bonbor aircraft. Ncxt yed that in January 197 4 a high level Chinese

mlilary dclegation lcd by C6n. Changtasi-chicn paid a 12 days visit to

Pfistan and said " Our fri€trdship has srood lh€ test in sions of struggte

and will continue to stand any tesf'. N€xt year that in May 1974 Bhutto

paid other visir to China in May 1974- China accorded a gEr well come

to Bhutto. On this occasion. N€wspap.r of China admitt€d lhat Prime

Minister Zulfiq& Ali Bhutto is an outslanding slales man of Pakisran.

And rest€cled old fri.nd! ofchincs prlplc. Besides, Pakistan's dcfcnse

ne€ds w€re discusscd in deplh and undersrood. Zulliqar Ali Bhuno

thanked for Chines€ suppod for the relcasc of prisoneG of war ddt€Fitorial occupation of 1970 war by India. In later monrh wi€n India

exploded h€r firsl nuclear device. Pakislan sought assistance from China

bcsides other sourccs. In 1975 whcn Chincs€ Vice Prcmier Lie Hsenim

visited Pakistan hc r€peated that China wo d continue support ihe

struagle of Peoples of Krshmi for s€lfdctcmination and pakistan,s

Foposal for a nuclcar zone in Soudr Asia. In January 1976 Cnou En lai

died. In his m€ssag€ to the Chincse vice prcmier Bhutro said !haC, Chou

En lai's a0achment to principl€s

h's clear coomi|m€nr to pakistan

and Pakislanj p€opte shal never forget

in iis hour of trials and rributarion"

In May t976 prime Minisrer Zutfiqar AIi Bhufto visired pekins lomeel new pnme minister. This visir coincidect wiih 25,h anniversary oflhe esbbhshmenr of diptornaric rclarions berwe€n rhe two countrics. Inreference to rhis armiversary rhe new Chin€se prerrue. Hua Ko _ fengsatd, ihe past 25 years t€srify rhar our two coDtries arc huly old andgood liiends. He furher srated \rherher in overcast weathcr or in sto.mour rwo countri€s hav€ always sympathy sjz€d wnn and supported eacholher. olrr cooperation is most sincere and s€pcs the interest of cornmoncause ot uniry of third world againsr imp€rialisq hegemonies andlherefore, ca.nor be d€srroyed by any force on earth. The preruer inrefernce of Bhoro,s Kashmir reference said rhai chma supports juststruSgle for the nght ofKashmiries self_determinarion.

Chairnan Maosti tung in s?ite of his lailing heatrh receiv€dZulfiqar Ali Bhoto who became the last foreign drgrjtary who met thegr€at Chinese tead€r before his death. Z.A Bhuno abo assured Chinesethat Pakisran would conrinue to suppon the Cnrn€se p€opte in rh€irstruggte to tiberatc Taiwan. In Scpt. Chainnan Maosh tung died. In hiscondolence message premier Bhutto paid a great mDute ro fte depanedreader, remembered his sincere friendship wrrh pakistani people,rDdcrslanding of their hopes aDd aspirarions and hts rirm suppon jn ftenmomenrs of trials and tribularions.

In 1977, howcvet Z.A. Bhutio's relations with Chincse leaders

cam€ undq som€ strain. Il $,as, b€caNc Bhutto in his Anh American

attitude, b€gin lo .€ly on Soviet Ambtsedor for infomtion and advice

which, in lhc opinion of loowledgeabl€ indiuduals, have bothered thc

China considerably. Aner r€moval of Bhutto on July 5'', 1977 ftom

power lhe r€lalions of Pal Chha kcpt devcloPing on thcir posilrv. r;Erch.

In short, the relstions of Pak China (1960-77) are an interesling

thought pmvoking and us€fu] study. lt is a study of two modem nations

states. Wlich must b. bas€d on diploinacy and achicvemenl of national

interests. But it l@ks lik€ a fiiendship of two sincere villagers who

saditiccs every thing likc life and p'operty to tulfill the r€quirernents of

friendship. ofcours€ Pak China relations are uniqu€ chapter, novel story,

colortul lail ofEbdm diploMtic history.

Pak China retations are very old, abned iom the silk roule trade

on camels and horses when all scctor of lhe so€icty including traders,

religious lead€rs, visitors, adv€nlulers us€d this route as a gale way lo

Asia. same route is being used even today but now it is a metal one,

considcrcd as on€ of thc wondcrs of thc world and is continued to bc

called silk route built by Pakistani and Chinese as a g€sturc of their

today's' relaiions. Though thes€ iwo counFres dc th€ follower of two

diffcrent idcologies socialism and lslam but thes€ diff€rent and

conaadictory ideologi€s have not effected advers€ly on ih€ir relations.

These relations are vastcr than universe and d€ep than oc€an. These arc

cof,preh€nsive included mililary, €conomic, diplomacyr go tl'rough

!

conferences, seminafs, conidor of UN and die into rh€ heans of common

ln the firsr d€cadc ftat is 1950s fiese relarions rernahed cold andsonr rinr cla5hrng. Incrdmt o, Haj drlegarjon rs innance. Ir was aperiod ofa popular stogan ofHind Chinese Bhai Ahai. pakisran was inWestem camp snting in SET O and CENTO. IlmdonS conference tomch exlenr broke the ice. Thcn &is ice sraned rn€tbng. Lr. Cen. Razafirsl ambassador of pakistm for China piayed nporlant role rn thefonnularion and stengrhcning rhese relarions.

Decade of 1960 wihessed a U tum in pak China retarions.Important factors, which played a role, were tb€ borlndary denarcalion.

:nd'a.and china d€vetoped unbridgeabt€ sape due ro demarcarion ofDoundary while pakistan succeeded in doing so. Tibrtian war was anothermajor evenr which rom apan the Hind chin€epakisranisn€arerandmad€;,"-;;

;;:":inen and brought

. War of 1965 was th€ fi.sr Dajor cruciat and t€stDg €v€nt fo.lhed€le]oejnc relarions of pakisru ,nd china. The conflict b€tween rndjaandlakisran srarted on Kashmir issue. And spread b a fult-n€dsed war

lll1ll.".",":*, border and ried to captu.e Lahore. westem a ies

^menca and orhers kepr foe India and friend pakir

-Bur

china opencd ",

,"." -;;;;,"ffi:i:"tr;:::Pak;tan. China helped pakisran by every means. Whetber Arms,

econonic aid or diplornatic support. It went cvcn to givc ultimatum to

India. Such typ. of h€lp forccd the Pakistanis lo lais€ stogans China

zindabad on roads, strects, and cincna halls and on their fams.

Th€ diplonatic rclatioB of Bhu$o regimc slarting 1970 to t977

wilh Chinais again adiplomric history ofitsown kind. Bhutto of come

was the archit€cr of new Pakistan, most rcspecled l€adcr of third world

and Shewd politician according to West certainly h€ was lhe founder of

Another cvcnt more drngerous, which daimged Pakistan and

broke it into two wer€ th€ crisis of 1970 war. In 1970, General el€clions

we!€ hcld wh€rE Mujcbur Rehman and his Awani l€ague won these

el€ctions on the basis of six points. Military gov€mment could not

succeed to llandover thc pow€r to Easl PaListani l€adership rather cEck

down on thern As a rcsult a gucrrilla *ar staned in East Pakistan wilh

the help and planning of Iidia. Pakistani mililary could no1 face this

sihralion and political leadership could not match the heighls of

diplornacy to save the teritorial inlegrity of thei country. USSR

supponed India fully and openly Arncrica's support to Pakistan was

diplonatic, relucrant and came very late. As for China was conc€m it put

whatevcr was possible to sav€ the Pakistan fiom this iniegntio.. Though

China could not succeeded but history of lhe crisis are witness that China

hclped Pakistan morally, narcnally, militarily, diplonatically, and what

not. Th€s€ lwo evenil of crises of 1965 and 1971 dd during lhe3e th€

h€lp of China and Pakistan's relianco on it havc mdc the Pak China

relations a uniquc and differ€nt story.

Pali China relations. Birth ofpakistan .s present foreiSn policy sbned bymclusion ofBhufto in Sikandar Mnza,s Cabin€r. He first as m Indusrrialnnmster and th€n as a foreign minisrer changed rhe direction and evenpurpos€s of Pakistdl,s for€ign policy with speciatsrress ol relalions withChira.

Wlcn he rook the power in tft he cernented morc broaden€d rh€deplh and made pak China retarions inatimabte. He pad frequenr visitsto China mer wirb ChiDcso t€ad€r and became a la$ iore,gn t€ad6r to s€eMaosti Tung the fomder and mosr .€sp€cred l€ad€r of Chinese pmple.Bhutto was rernoved liom rhe power in July l9?7. But retarions, whichhe establish€d cemenred wiri China, deveioped and shatt develop withme passage of tilne. It is the ind;cation of rhese relations of 40 yearsh'slory. His struggt€ for the nuclcar pow€r for he sacnliced his life gor afull supporr Fom China and shall be $dtt€n dosn as a golden chaple. of

N.turrt rttiss

My researcb studies confirn that pakistur and china are naturalallies- Be€ause ther intercsB weather regional or gobal are compromise_able. PakisraD's onty inr€resr is to face succ€ssfirlty Indian rhre{r andKecp

'is tcnrroriat integiiry inract. While Chinese inr€resi are to become a

Slobal powcr.

Wilc west pla$ to makc India a5 a power to challenge Chin€se

intcnlion to become a global or sup€r pow€r. Sam€ is th€ interest of

India. China on oth€r hand is acling th€ policy to balance India lrrcugh

Pakiskn and Bangl.de$h, so that China should b€ free form regional

politics and play its global role.

Irritrting Flclo.

Ther€ is only on€ irritating factor b€twe€t China and Pakjstan is

zenkrang provincc, having Muslim najority population wher€ separatc

movemenls are continuing ard fundarncntalisn may aris€ But Pakistan

has successfully contain€d $es€ feelings. Pakistan and China as il

appar€nt frorn thcir diplomatic history th€y have nevcr b€€n opposed

€ach oths. Though in lhe begiming their relaliom we.c cold bul not bad.

China and Pa]<islan hav€ dev€loped d€€p rclat'ons on every

political issue weath€r rcgional or global, even Pakistan's allianc€ with

w€st has been digested by China. Pfistan al'rals takes china into

confidence whil€ suworing $€ west. Kashmir which is lifeline of

Pakistan and ils main issuc. China has l00e/" suppon€d on Kashmir issu€

Millt.ry Fi€ld

In rhe field of Military China and Pakistm again hav€ dceP

cooperation, the have sraied rnany joint vcntuB including ALn.Id

iank and S'? jet fightels. On one hand China is fre€ly providing mililary

technology to Pakistan. On other PakisLn is Plalng jts role by putting ils

help through technology, which Pakistan has received from the west. On

the ofter hand India is aming ir self tuough differenr sourccs frorn

France, Gr€at Bdtain, Unitcd State of Amenca. Again hisrory shows lbar

China ha! supponed Pakisran in .very crirical situation. Recent example

's that pllvjding rnany Squadron of S-Z Jet stars dunng lasl year India,

miliraryescalanon on the borden.

f,cononic Field

In lhe €conomic fi€td, which has became very imponant in recenryea$, China is a main supporler and inv€sror in pakisran. Chinese mainlhrust is to boost irs €conomy. Ii's rare of €conomic p.ogress in highertnan any country in lh€ world. B€caus€ China has nupow€r and n)oney.Sourc€ of manpower is Chinese man land. W}liie China is g€rting moneyfrom its population, doing busjness in Far EasL Ther€fore China needs anark€t for inveshnent dd pakiscan is besr m.rker invesrors of WestincludinS Japan are nor satisfied with the prevaiting potr[cal conditionsto i.vest their money.

On orher hand China is .or much wonied about rhese condirions.Therefore investinS in pakistan gen€.ously and in ev€ry iietd for instmceSandak prqefl Cawadd pon. Raitways conLracr eh.

Imq Issue

Ar presenl one buminS question

United Srares ofAme.ica wilt disarm

and specularion is that utlimately

Pakisra. aner setting rhe issue of

Iraq and North Korea" Politics is an ofpossibilitics rh€refore it is difficuh

10 say with tull conlid€nce what will be th€ ultinate position. If lraq is

inwdcd by Unit€d Statc of Amcrica forccs. Howcver if United State of

America at ey time staned b disaBn Prkisre ChiM would fac€ this

situation boldly bccausc P.kisbn's existcnce and strenglh is inporrant of

Chrnese secuily. lhercfore poltdcal Pundirs arc of rhe opinon rhat

China will b€came a bar against thc designs of Uniled stales of Anerica

lo disarm Pakistan.

Though r€lations t'etw€en the countries ar€ always changing a

ftiend of today may become an Enemy of lomonow or vicc-versa. But in

case of Pak'China Elations in my opinion which I have found aft€r my

pres€nt res€arch study shall not ctaSe easily. B€caus€ th€se rclatrons

pr€sent unique example of Ficndly rclations sinc€ World War II. For

instdce on€ finds changing graph of rclations b€tween United Staic of

America md westem allies. China & Russia, China & India, India &:

Unned State of America, Patislan & Unil€d State of America. But Pak

China relations look stalic, sil€nt and withoul anti dn€ction move.

ChitrN ls noa rn exDenrlonist stlte.

China had adapted a path in lhe policy of good n€ighborhood and

also adopted thc policy of p€acc, justicc fair play. Especially Pakislan

never felt rhr€atcned by herpol'ces.

133

ChrDplor of thlrd world ctdp

Cti|rr rcF6.srs th. 3d wld htr tt rr i! &|!tri!.blc .conoihicsy8td and sbc got inprcs.ivc btrcrk though in dcfrmlr teslnolory,

hDltc r.aaor dardot|oe|rt

AccddirS b & dtiriab acdly Z)% @gi Fojec.t al bcbg rurby thc asrirt5r ofchiDcsc eid snd €xp€rtisc.

.

For o(q'lc cewads FG Sitrd.la coopd Fqicct, Ttrr coolPrujod ed Elodcrtrizatim ofp.tish R ilwrys sld in agriculnrc &ctorCtialc booc tb. palcirt&i c|rh cro!. ,!,1 Sivcs rrt to F@t s thcagrioultuc ec4ordins !o rDdem Ei[o& r&f too|$

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L

2.

3.

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"Pakistan Horizon", (Special Is$€ the Easr pakistanh Cri;h

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196

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rlF Iosrir{c & Srtdegic sbdiq l9l.2S. Thc I*iniru Now!, Augusr 1965. Krrachi,

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['

IlttlltIIttIItIttIt

OFNCIAL DOCUMENTS

I Oficial Report, Staiemcnt of S.M. Zafar Law Minister July 23,

l%5.

2. Mxon's For.ign policy Report. USIS Ncws Texl Karachi, 9-February 1971.

3. "Statcm€nt issued by rhc U.S Statc Departrn€nf, pakisran Horizon(The East Pakiscan Crisis).

4. Richrrd Nixon .New Approachcs to peacc" Ghnd Foreign poticy

Report, 19 February 1972), panorama Supptement, Karachi,

volumc XXIV, Numb€r 2, 1972.

5. uN Sccuriry Council Drafl ResolutioD 5/10416) patisran Horizon(Th€ India-Pakistan war 1971.).

6. UN C€n€ral Assembly R€soturion 2793 OOWI), For Ocne.alAssembly's debaie on lrdia- pakisran war, s€e tN MonrhlyChronicl€, votulrlc lV number I, 1972.

7. uN Secudty Council Draft Resolution S/loa4o Rcv l).

8- uN Sccurity Council Rcaolution 302 (197 I ),,

9.

10.

LJN Securily Council Dran Resolution 3/10458)" Pakislan

Horizrn, volume )(XV, numh.r l, 1972.

Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. Protest Note of

the govemment of lhe Peopl€ Republic of China lo th€

Govemment of lndi0 . Pak s|an Horizln. (The lndia-Pakisran war,

l97l)

Thc Civil and Mititary Gazetlc, 7 January, 1963.

National Assembly ofPakistrn Debates, l7 July 1963.

.

t2.

13.

16.

t7.

S.curity Council Official Record 1240 m€oting, 18 Scpt€nber

1965 Presrdcnr Ayoob Khan on the Cns's over Kashmir'

United. Nations. Monthly 07, Dec 1966. Vol-I, ll1. Chonicle,

t5. Prcnier Chou En-Lai sp€cch in 24 Dec€mber l97l Peakng

R€view 17 December 1971.

Z.A. Bhutto, Sp€ech€s Delivcred in National Asscmbly, November

| 965, Departnent of Publications, Govemmenl of Pakistan.

President Yayha's Speech ini€lview, News wc€h New York, 8

Nov 1971.