_ _- - -

p WESTON GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH, INC.

.' { POST OFFICE BOX 364-*/' i- WESTON. MASSACHUSETTS 02193

% AREA CODE elf 894 4030

January 19, 1967|

|Gilbert Associates , Inc.

525 Lancaster AvenueReading, Pennsylvania

Gentlemen:

We herewith submit our report entitled Seismicity and Responsej

Spectra Analysis , Proposed Nuclear Power Plant, Threemile Island, '

Susquehanna River, Pennsylvania .

The preparation and submission of this report took place under*your Purchase Order Number 154720 dated December 29, 1966.

The seismicity analysis was carried out under the direct super-O vision of aeverene ceniel tinehen, S.r. , oirector of weston Oeservet<

The Response Spectra, Part II of this report,was prepared byProfessor Robert V. Whitman, Department of Civil Engineering, Mass-achusetts Institute of Technology.

Sincerely yours ,

WESTON GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH, INC.

/&A*

Richard J. HottRJH:mfEnc.

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SEISMICITY AND RESPONSE SPECTRA ANALYSIS

PROPOSED NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

THREEMILE ISLAND, SUSQUEHANNA RIVER, PENNSYLVANIA

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for

GILBERT ASSOCIATES, INC.

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OPART I SEISMICITY ANALYSIS

Weston Geophysical Research, Inc.

PART II RESPONSE SPECTRAProfessor Robert V. WhitmanConsulting Soil Engineer

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OTABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I SEISMICIlY ANALYSIS

General Geology and Tectonics 2

Seismicity of the Proposed Plant Site 4

Earthquakes Greater Than Fifty Miles from the Site 4

Earthquakes Within Fifty Miles of the Proposed Site 4

Earthquake Intensity Attenuation 6

Earthquake-Tectonic Relationships 7

Conclusions 9

Figures

Figure 1 Tectonic Map of Northeastern United States 10

O Figure 2 Com,ilation of Ear 1houakes PennsylvaniaArea 11

Figure 3 Compilation of Earthquakes SoutheasternPennsylvania Area 12

Figure 4 Mcdified Mercalli Intensity Scale, Rossi-Forel Intensity Scale, and Relation ofIntensity with Ground Acceleration 13

References 14

Bibliography 15

Appendix I 17

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OTABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

PART II RESPONSE SPECTRA

Objective 20

Response Spectra for Nearby Earthquake 20

Effect of Distant Earthquakes 22

Application of Response Spectra to Design 22

Acknowledgement 23

References 23

Figures

Figure 1 Response Spectra for Design 24

Figure 2 Response Spectra for Design 25

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PART I SEISMICITY ANALYSIS

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The proposed nuclear power plant site of Metropolitan Edison

Company is on Threemile Island, in the town of York Haven, Pennsylvania.

Threemite Island is located in the Susquehanna River approximately three

miles south of Middletown, Pennsylvania at latitude 400 09 ' North,

lor.gitude 760 4 4 ' We s t .

GENERAL GEOLOGY AND TECTONICS

Physiographically, the site is located in the Triassic Lowland of

Pennsylvania, one of a series of long narrow basins of Triassic deposits

which extend from the Carolinas to New England. The basins are generally

classed as lowlands because the formations have been more easily eroded

than the surrounding crystalline and older sedimentary rocks . These basins gi

are characterized by resistant ridges of trap rock (diabase) which stand

prominently above the lowlands . The Triassic Lowland is known as the,

Gettysburg Basin in the vicinity of the site.

North and west of the Triassic Lowland are the folded and thrust

faulted Paleozoic rocks which corrprise the Appalachian Mountains. South-

east of the Triassic Lowland is the Piedmont, composed of granites, gneisse

and schists of Pre-Cambrian and Early Paleozoic Age. A tectonic map of the

area is shown in Figure 1.

The Appalachian Mountain System was formed by a great compressici

force from the southeast at the close of the Paleozoic Era. The Triassic Lov

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lands were formed by the Palisades Orogeney during late Triassic Time

(190 million years ago), no orogenic periods have occurred since that

time . The area underwent a minor submergence during Cretaceous Time

(70 to 135 million years ago) and some uplift during Tertiary Time (1 to.

70 million years ago).

The Triassic basins are characteristically bordered on one side

by a major normal fault. The border faulting was a fairly continuous

process during which time sediments act;umulated in the resulting fault

basin. Deepening of the basin by faul'.ing tilted the previously deposited

sediments in the direction of the fau1.c. As the faulting and sedimentation

process became established, basic magmas entered the basin primarily

O along the border faults and spread out into the sediments as dikes andJ

sills and on top of the sediments as lava flows. Continued faulting

provided new avenues for the magma and complicated the basin structure

(Eardley , 1951) .

The Triassic sediments of the Gettysburg Formation in the vicinity

of the site consist of red sbales and sandstones with diabase intrusives.

As is common in all Triassic basins the sediments dip toward the major

border fault which in this case is located about five or six miles north of

the site . The dip at the site is approximately 40 to 45 degrees.

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0SE!SMICITY OF THE PROPOSED PIANT SITE

Based on two hundred years of historical data and forty years of

instrumental data, the Pennsylvania area is relatively inactive seismically

The area is characterized by infrequent earthquakes of low intensity.

Those earthquakes in the greater Pennsylvania area (see Figure 2),

which have or might have affected the site have been studied; their intensi

at the site has been determined based on intensity attenuation of the earth-

quake with distance.

The earthquakes which have affected the proposed site are cate-

gorized by those which have occurred outside a fifty mile radius of the

site and those which have occurred within a fifty mile radius of the site.

OEARTHOUAKES GREATER THAN FIFTY MILES FROM THE SITE

Those earthquakes greater than fifty miles from the site, which

have affected the site, are listed in Appendix I. The distance of the

earthquake epicenters tam the site and the approximate intensities at

the site are included in thit Appendix.

It is sufficient for oi r purposes here to state that the highest

resulting intensity at the si e from any of these distant earthquakes is

between III and IV.

EARTHOUAKES WITHIN FIFTY MILES OF THE PROPOSED SITE

The location of earthquakes which have occurred in southeasterni

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within a fifty mile radius of the site which had an epicentral intensity

of V or greater, only the March 8,1889 earthquake was felt at the site.

All three of these earthquakes are described below.

Pennsylvania Earthouake of March 8.1889.

The earthquake of March 8,1889, was felt over a 4,000 square |

mile area of southeastern Pennsylvania including such cities as York,

Harrisburg, Lancaster, Reading, and Philadelphia (Kershner,1889).

The area of perceptibility was elongated in an east-west direction includ-l

ing most of the Triassic Lowland of Pennsylvania. The United States

Coast and Geodetic Survey has assigned an epicentral intensity o~ V to

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Earthouake in the Sinkinc Sorine Pennsvivania Area

The earthquake of January 7,1954, was felt over an eighty square

mile area from an epicenter near Sinking Spring, Pennsylvania. Based on

reports of minor damage fron the western section of Sinking Spring, this

earthquake has been assigned an epicentral intensity of VI by the United

States Coast and Geodetic Survey. The earthquake intensity was attenu-

ated to IV within a distance of five miles from the epicenter. Nearly

twenty aftershocks were felt in Sinking Spring between January 7th and

17th. An aftershock on Jan'uary 23, 1954, was felt over a ten square

mile area.

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The last earthquake to occur in Sinking Spring area occurred on

January 19, 1955, and was felt over an area of approximately one hundred

square miles, a slightly larger area than the quake of January 7,1954.

The United States Coast and Geodetic Survey has assigned an intensity

of IV to this earthquake since the earthquake was felt butno damage

reported .

Cornwall, Pennsvivania Earthouake of May 12, 1964

This earthquake was reportedly felt only in the immediate vicinity

of Cornwall. The United States Coast and Geodetic Survey has assigned

an epicentral intensity of VI to this earthquake, based on a report that

"a wall cracked and plaster fell". A severe jarring was felt by workers,

in an iron mine 1,200 feet deep.

The instrumentally determined magnitude of this earthquake was

calculated at 4.5 (Richter Scale) by the United States Coast and Geodetic

Survey . According to the relationship between Earthquake Magnitude and

Acceleration published by the United States Atomic Energy Commission in

Nuclear Reactors and Earthcuakes TID 7024 (our Figure 4), the resultant

acceleration from this earthquake would be in the order cf .02g.

EARTHOUAKE INTENSITY ATTENUATION

Nearly all of the above listed earthquakes have been felt over

very limited areas, which are generally elliptical in shape and arc aligned

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Owith the general structural trend of the area. The areas in which the

earthquakes were felt are generally less than 600 square miles and

extend to a maximum distance from the epicenter of sixteen to eighteen

miles along the structural trend; perpendicular to the structural trend,

the maximum extent of perceptibility is ten to twelve miles . The high

attenuation of these earthquakes indicates that their foci must have

been close to the earth's surface.

Isoseismal lines are difitcult to construct for earthquakes in

this area because of a very limited number of observations within the

small zone of perceptibility. An intensity attenuation curve is difficult

to construct because only one or two data points exist for the curve due

O to the high intensity attenuation in a short distance.

EARTHOUAKE-TECTONIC RELATIONSHIPS

The position of earthquake epicenters and the shallow focal depths

at which they occur indicates some correlation of the earthquake activity

of southeastern Pennsylvania with the geolog.c structure in that area.

Most of the earthquakes located in tha southeastern Pennsylvania

and western New Jersey area (north of latitude 400) shown in Figure 3,

have had their epicenters near the borders of the Triassic Lowland. Many

of the epicenters appear to be located in the immediate vicinity of the

Triassic border fault.

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ORecent earthquakes which are on er proximate to the border fault

are listed below:

Sinking Spring, Pennsylvania , January 7,1954, intensity VI

(described above);

Lebanon, New Jersey, March 23, 1957, intensity VI, (Figure

magnitude 4.8 not described because it was not felt at the site.

Cornwall, Pennsylvania, May 12, 1964, intensity VI,

(described above).

An estimation of the maximum expected intensity of an earthquake

i at the site is based on the assumption that the location of earthquake!'

activity which could affect the site will be along the border fault of the

9j Triassic Lowland five to six miles north of the site. The highest intensilj to occur on this fault has been Modified Mercalli VI. If an earthquake o

epicentral intensity VI were to occur on the border fault five or six miles

north of the site, the intensity observed at the site would be V based on

the rapid attenuation of similar earthquakes in the area and along the

| border fault. However, if a future earthquake along tN border fault has

a focal depth greater than past quakes, a conservat.ve assumption woulc

be that the resulting intensity at the site might approach the apicentral

intensity and not be rapidly attenuated.

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CONCLUSIONS

A conservative estimate of the maximum earthquake intensity to

be expected at the proposed site is low intensity VI. Using relationshit

published in Nuclear Reactors and Earthcuakes TID 7024, United States

Atomic Energy Commission (Figure 4 of this report), this intensity corre-

sponds to a ground acceleration of .04g.

Since it appears that the most likely earthquake threat to the

site is from a nearby local event, it can be anticipated that it will be

of short duration and will be characterized by relatively nigh frequency

motion .

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MODIFIED-MERCALLI INTENSITY SCALE, RoSSI-

O roREt INTENSIrY SCatE AND aEtaTION Or ExaTaoUnxE/

INTENSITY WITH GROUND ACCELERATION **

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fAPPENDIX C

The response of the reactor building dose was analyzed for a 200,000 lbaircraft as described hereafter and using the same analytical techniquesas described in Appendix 3. The analysis was based on the followingconditions:

1. 200,000 lb aircraft2. 200 knots i=pset velocity3. A load-time curve as shown on Appendix C, Figure 1h. 19 ft diameter impact area

The load-time curve for the 200,000 lb aircraft is derived frem the geometry,structural characteristics, and = ass distribution of the B-720 type aircraft.The load transferred to the dome at time "t" is a function of the change of=omentum.

The reaction load can be derived as follows:

Linear I= pulse Linear Momentum=

and:-Rat =ytLV-a3-

Rat = pL(aV)+ pX(V)

O a = >'zavT + xt cv)(at/ at)

In the limit: R = yLa + pV

and 31L = M = = ass of uncrushed aircraftthus ytLa = Ma = P3 (the unbalanced force on the uncrushed portion

of aircraft)2therefore: R=P3 + pV

where: R = Total reaction load on rigid surface in poundsP3 = Load in pounds required to crush or defor fuselage

longitudinallyy = = ass of aircraft per unit length (slugs /ft)V = velocity in ft/see of uncrushed portion of aircraft at

any time or distance during the impact

Instrumented data frem a full-scale C-119 aircraft i= pact into a vertical vallindicated that the results given by the above momentum exchange principle fora 3-720 aircraft were of the right order of =agnitude; however, the actual reacload (P ) to the vall by the C-119C aircraft was not recorded. The rate of3change of the aircraft velocity was determined, however, by high speed filmanalysis and compared with the rate of velocity change with the 3-720 airersftas shown in Appendix C, Figure 5. This ecmparison shows that both aircraftdecelerate at approximately the same rate; however, the 3-720 requires more

f ) than twice as =uch crush distance because of its higher initial i= pact velocitym

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OThe reaction load as a function of ti=e is presented in Appendix C, Figure1 for the B-720. Tote that the peak reaction occurs as the ving and fuselageare crushed between the front and rear spars. This is caused by the fact

2that the "pV " is largest at this location (",p" is very high here as shownby the = ass distribution in Appendix C, Figure h). Also note that the fuselagedeceleration is highest when the reaction load is rather lov. This phenc=enais caused by the reduced = ass of the uncrushed portion of the aircraft beingdecelerated by the relatively constant buckling load (F ) acting on the3uncrushed pcrtion. The buckling load (F ) of the fuselage is shown in3Appendix C, Figure 6. The average dia=eter of the fuselage for the 3-720aircraft is 13.3 ft. As can be seen frc= the load-time curve the peak loadoccurs after the vings have i=pacted against the dc=e. Considering thatthe vings constitute a large proportien of the total = ass , it is consideredjustifiable to consider a portion of the vings that is in contact with thedo=e at the peak load cs additional i= pact area. Considering this additionalarea and the load distribution afforded by the concrete to the middle surfaceof the dc=e, the eff ective diameter of the i= pact area is 19 ft.

The analysis indicates that a =aximu= cc=pressive stress of 6h00 psi anddisplacement of 1.h6 inches occurs at the center of the L= pact area.

The displace =ent of the apex of the dc=e as a function of time is shevn inAppendix C, Figure 2. For cc=parison the displace =ent of points at a radiusof 111.6 and 26h inches are also shown. Stresses due to the aircraft i=pinge-=ent and prestress at the apex and at a radius of 86 inches are shown inAppendix C, Figure 3.

.

The =aximu= co=bined cc=pressive stress is approxi=ately 8000 psi. Thisincludes stresses due to aircraft related loads and the prestress loads.However, this stress occurs for a very short period of time and over as=all portion of the impact area. It has long been recognized that thestrain rate has a significant influence on the ultimate strength of concrete.In the range corresponding to the strain rate of the aircraft impact loadingan increase as large as 60 percent has been noted in literature.1,2,3 Ithas also been recognized that biaxial stress conditions , as produced in thereactor building due to crestress, increases the ultimate strength of concretefrc= 25 to 50 percent.h,3,6 Considering that the mini =u= cylinder strengthof the concrete for the reactor building is based upon a 28 day curingti=e, an increase of 20 percent in strength can be justifiedi consideringthat the concrete vill have cured more than two years when the plant is inoperation.

The calculated =axi=u= co=pressive concrete stress of approximately 8000psi is 33 percent greater than the anticipated concrete ec=pressive strengthat the time of initial operation as =easured by standard uniarially leadedconcrete cylinders. Considering the high strain rate and biazial stresscondition the increased cc=pressive stress capability of the concrete abovethat =easured by cylinder strength can be expected to be significantlyin excess of that required.

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' The max'. rum concrete tensile stresses =ay be sufficient to develop flexuralcracks in the concrete. However, in no case vill the stress of the steelliner exceed the yield point even should flexural cracks occur. The maximumaverage shear stress at a distance 12.5 ft from the apex (i.e. at a distance3 0 ft outboard of the periphery of the loaded area) is approximately 500psi. This shear stress is below that permitted by ACI 318-63, Chapter 26.

Therefore the conclusion can be safely drawn that the dome vill not collapse

due to the established loadin6 condition.

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LIST OF LWINCES.

1. C. E. Norris 'et al'. " Structural Design for Dyna =ic Loads,"McGraw Hill, 1959

2. J. N. Cernica and M. J. Charignen: "Ulti= ate Static and I= pulse Loadingof Reinforced Concrete Bea=s." ACI Journal, V 50, No. 9,1963, pp. 1219-1228

3. Walter Cowell: " Dynamic Properties of Plain Portland Cement Concrete."Naval Civil Engin. Lab., Port Huene=a, Calif. Report NCELhh7, 1966.

h. H. Weigler and G. Becker: " Der Bauingenieur," Berlin, Vol. 36, No. 10,1961, pp. 390-396.

5 J. Peter: "Zur Bevehrung von Scheiben und Schalen fiir HauptspannunganSchiefwinklig zur Bevehrungstrichtung, Doctoral Thesis,Technische Hochschule Stuttgart, 1964

6. G. W. D. Vile: " Strength of Concrete Under Short-Time Static BiaxialStress." Procedings of International Conference en StructuralCenerete, London, 1965.

7. Frit: Leonhardt: " Prestressed Concrete Design and Construction" gWilhelm Ernst & Sohn, 196h, pp. 59 w ,'

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/ APPENDIX D

FIRE DETECTICN AND SUFFRESSIONFOLLOWING A HYp0THETICAL AIRCRAFT INCIDENT

In order that the plant can be =aintained in a safe condition following ahypothetical aircraft incident, the criteria as described below has beenestablished.

Ventilation openings will be located to take advantage , wherever possible , ofthe natural shielding from aircraft strikes afforded by other plant structures.Ventilation inlet openings for critical areas except the reactor building villbe provided with passa6es, curbs, fire dampers, and sensing devices for auto-=atically closing dampers to isolate selected areas. Reactor building ventil-ation is normally closed and is isolated with valves.

Ventilation dampers may also be closed =anually by the plant personnel. Thedampers and their controls will prevent ingress of smoke as well as preventthe rapid depletion of oxygen due to a fire located outside the structure.The ventilation systems planned for areas having normal operator attendancevill also be designed for complete recirculation. In addition, personnelvill be provided with, and instructed in, the use of self-contained breathingapparatus. All areas located above designated protected areas as shown onFigure B-1 of Section 3 vill be designed so that any liquids vill drain awayfrom the area rather than either entering the protected area or being collteted

p in confined areas. Piping, conduit, etc. passing through the confines of thedesignated protected areas vill be treated appropriately with seals, curbs, etc'

to prevent the passage of spilled fuel into the protected areas.

The use of multiple air intakes for the control tower complex and auxiliarybuilding in lieu of a single intake was investigated. It is our firmconviction that the use of a single intake with provisions for recirculationduring the postulated airtake incident presents the safest arrangement.Supervisory personnel vill determine when it is safe to transfer from therecirculation = ode to the normal operating mode, following an incident. Thetransfer operation vill be initiated only after having surveyed the extentand nature of the effects of the incident upon plant equipment and/or structure

To remove the threat of fire to personnel and equipment in vital structuresduring and following the hypothetical aircraft incident it is proposed to:

Air Intake Tunnel: Bring air into the vital structures through a tunnelwith a remote intake located approximately 125 feet from the plant. Air j

velocities in the tunnel vill be approxi=ately 1000 feet per minute. |The arrange =ent of the tunnel is shown on Appendix D Figure 1. |

,

The intake opening vill be constructed as shown in more detail in AppendixD Figure 2.

O 0002 251

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|. _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _

.

OThe floor of the tunnel vill be sloped so that water frc= the spray systesvill collect in a su=p beneath the intake.

Protection of F.xhaust Cuenings: The exhaust opening from ventilationsystems, such as the control tower ec= plex, vill be provided with aprotective shield designed to vithstand the i= pact of the aircraft. Theair velocities through these areas vill be approxi=ately 1500 feet perminute. The arrange =ent of the dampers and shield in this area is shownon Appendix D Figure 1.

Vanor Detectors: In the event that liquid fuel and/or vapors are notignited and do enter the intake they vill be detected by ccabustiblevapor detectors capable of detecting approximately 20 percent of thelower explosive limit within 200 milliseconds. This equipment vouldbe similar to that supplied by Johnson-Williams Inc. which utilizes aWheatstone bridge with one exposed platinum vire. This device ispresently used in refineries, mines , and on boats.

Hydrocarbon vapors originating from an aircraf accident but in concentratibelow the lov explosion limit are easily detectable by smell. In this evenmany hours in excess of one watch period are available to take action beforbreathing of fu=es has a toxic effect on the body.

Fire Detectors: In the event that burning fuel enters the intake it willbe detected by any or all of the following:

Ionization type detectors (capable of detecting products ofa. '

combustion and/or smoke in =illiseconds - similar to vapordetector listed above).

b. Infra-red flame detectors and ultra-violet flame detectors(capable of detecting by direct sight any visible fismewith the speed of light).

Rate-of-rise heat detectors (capable of detecting sudden ratec.of te=perature increase - 15 per sinute) .

Reaction Time: Activation of any of the detectors (listed under " VaporDetectors" and " Fire Detectors") vill cause the ventilating fans to stop,fire da=pers to close and deluge water spray systems to operate. Thelength of the tunnel is such that a mini =us ti=e of approximately 7 secondsis available for detection of fuel or fire ingress and actuation of firedampers. This is several times longer than actual requirements. Theactuation of the deluge systes will also be arranged to be in service inthe time available. Final locatiens of detectors vill be studied toassure that; stratification of vapors, gases or flames vill not constitutea safety hazard.

Pining: Piping passing through the top protected level of the auxiliarybuilding vill be protected with a curb approximately 6 in. high. Any

, ,, piping which is not nor= ally valved off (filled with water), such asi t gravpy drains to a collection area, vill be equipped with a loop |seal approximately six feet deep to prevent the passage of aircraft fuel I

in the event of a ruptured line between the area of shut-off valves and|

| 0002 252D-211

_

Othe top level of the protected areas. The depth of concrete afforded bythe top level of protected areas is of sufficient depth to prevent thecomplete removal of the pipe frem the concrete with the impact of thei

hypothetical loadings. The piping presently contemplated as passingthrough the top level of protection in the auxiliary building is in thesi:e range of 3/h in. to 2 in.

Piping passing throu6h the top protected level of the emergency feedpump area vill be protected with a curb approximately 6 in. high.The depth of concrete afforded by the top level of protected areasis of sufficient depth to prevent the complete removal of the pipefrom the concrete with the impact of the hypothetical loadings. In

i the event of aircraft fuel entering vent pipes from the main steamsafety valves, it is considered that the integrity of the line betweenthe safety valve and the top level of the protected area vill remainintact. Any combustion vill take place at the top of the vent pipe.

Additional discussion of fire detection and protection as well as adiscussien of appropriate examples of existing installations is coveredby Combuscion and Explosives Research Inc. data included as Attachment1 to this Appendix. The recommendations outlined by Attachment 1 villbe Lsplemented in the design of the plant.

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COMBUSTION AND EXPLOSIVES RESEARCH, INC.OLIVER B UILDINo PITTs B U Ro H 22, PE N N sYLVA N I A*

tRD LEWISTelephen. 391 363

KARLov!TZ c ble Addeess CCT R.BRINKLEY. fr.

narch 22, 19'

Mr. Carroll H. BittingGilbert Associates, Inc.525 Iancaster AvenueReading, Pennsylvania 19603

Dear Mr. Bitting:

At the meetings on March 19 and 20, 1968 at which explosion hazardsof the 3-m11e Island Nuclear Station were discussed, you requested that wesend you a letter report centsining an analysis and our recommendations forthe protection of the air intake duct serving the control building.

The Yentilation air is carried to the control building by an under-ground concrete tunnel 18' vide x 10' high and 100' long frem an air intaketower which extends vertically about 15' above ground. Air enters the toweren a side vall through a louvered section at a rate of 172,000 CFM. Air isdrawn through the tunnel by bicuers located at the control building. Thebuilding can be isolated frem the duct by a remotely operated d-sper.

In case of an airplane crash a fuel spray of either gasoline or jetfuel may be generated, part of which may enter the sir tunnel through theintake tower. In case of s'tch a crash the air intake system vill be disen-g3ged and ventilation of the control building vill be switched to recircula-tien. Nevertheless, an explosion in the intake tunnel =ust be avoidedbecausa the fire da=per may be damaged and a pressure wave, even of =cdesta=plitude, could affect operations at a critical ti=e.

In a duct of these di=ensicns filled with an explosive mixture andignited at the intake end, a flame would propagate initially at a low speed,a few feet per second, and then accelerate to very high prepagation ratesapproaching sound velocity. The acceleration is caused by turbulence gen-ersted by the flame itself. The slev initial prcpagation rate allevs a timeinterval during which protective measures can be initiated.

A si=ple protective system that is applied frequently in practiceand has been found completely reliable is the introduction of water spraysinto such ducts. As a practical rule one pound of water introduced as afine spray per pound of air vill render any fuel-air mixture ncnflammable.This syste= is used extensively for the protection of jet engine testfacilities, cell and exhaust duct, whsre a flameout vculd instantaneouslyt

fill *he duct with an explcsive mixture.

0002 257

.

O2- -

In the present case, the air velocity in the duct is 16'/sec.Consequently, it would require about 1 second to fill the vercical sectionof the tcuer at the intake with a mixture containing fuel. If water spraysare introduced into the duct within 1 second of a crash the duct vi?' befully protected against an explosion. Deperience has shown that the watersprays are also effective in washing devn the fuel frem the air stream.

The short vertical section of the intake presents a special prob-les since the fuel spray originating from a crash may produc 4 a flammablemixture in this section a.1=ost instantaneously. In a large system such as

this the flame vould require several hundred milliseconds to develop frem,ignition to a rapidly accelerating growth. Since it is impractical to bringwater sprays into full operation in such short time ve prepcse that thefirst 20 to 25 feet of the vertical entrance duct be provided with a fastacting flame extinguisher like the Fenval system. This system senses aflame and actuates within a few milliseconds c. small explosive charge whichdisperses Freon 13B1 as a vapor into the protected volume in approximately100 to 200 milliseconds. Freon 1331 is a very effective extinguishing a6entfor hydrocarbon flames. Its action is essentially to terminate chain reac-tions that are responsible for flame continuation. Ccnsequently, it is muchmore effective than a simple diluent like water or carbon dicxide and it isrequired in much smaller quantity. To protect approximately 4,000 CF ofintake volu=e, four standard 30-11ter units are required. Freon 13B1 is non- htoxic and in any case little, if any, of it would enter the control build-ing.

We understand that a variety of quick-acting detecters will beemployed to sense the presence of flame in the duct. These detectors sreexpected to respond within 200 milliseconds. It vould be advisable to e= ploydetectors outside which would mechanically respond to a crash frem whichfuel spray could be projected into the intake louvers.

Please let us kncv if there are any further questions.

Sincerely yours,

CCtGUSTION AND E'GI4SIVES RESEARCH, INC.t

0 WB41a Karlevit:

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0002 258C.C. - Mr. Jchn J. Head

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-. __ _ _ _ .

Dockst No. 50-Supplement No.March 28, 1968

APPENDIX E

PROBABILITY OF AIRPLANE STRIKES

E-1 SUMMARY

This appendix supplements Section A of Amendment 8. Sections

E-2 and E-3 below deal with the following topics:

.

,Spe; ion Title

E-2 Aircraft Characteristics

E-3 Probability of Strike by Large

Aircraft -- Discussion of Assumptions I

(a) Selection of Aircraft Accident

Statistics,

(b) Assumed Flight Path Angle

Before Impact

(c) Assumed Speed of Impact

(d) Traffic Density

Sections E-4, 5 & 6 deal with aircraft strike probabilities which

are summarized in items 2, 3 and 4 of Table E-1A.

Item 1 of this table, giving probabilities for a large aircraft

strike, is from Section A, Amendment 8. The probabilities shown

in the table are related to traf fic movements (at Olmsted andHarrisburg/ York State Airports) which are about four times the

I

current rate for air carriers and five times the current rate for

OE-1-1

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O |light aircraft. Such movement rates are not expected until

after 1980, as discussed in Section E-3.

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(} TABLE E-1A

APPRJXIMATE PROBABILITIES FOR AIRCRAFT CRASH EFFECTS.

.

ON THE THREE MILE ISLAND PLANT

Approximate ApproximateMean Strike Recurrence

Probability /Yr.(1) Inte rval/ Yrs .

1. Large Aircraf t on Plant 1 x 10-6 y x yg6

(see Section A, Supple-ment 5, p. A-5)

2. Large Aircraft (s200,000 lb)at High Angle ( 60 ) on

surfagg)ofCriticalStruc- 10-9 2 x 108tures 5 x

(see Section E-4)

10-5 2 x 1043. Small Aircraft on Plant 5 x(see Section E-5)

4. Fire from an AircraftStrike on the Plant(see Section E-6)G

~#Small fires(<400 gal. of fuel) 1.4 x 10-5 7 x 10

4

Medium fires(400-3,000 gal. of

10 7 1. 4 x 10 6fuel) 7 x

Large fires(23,000 gal, of

fuel) 3 x 10-7 3 x 10 6

Fuel or fire af fecting

critical gynt11ation 10-8 1.2 x 107openings 8 x

(1) In making these approximations of strike probability, theeffect of overflights has been ignored. In a region ofmedium air traffic overfli ht density this probabilitymay be in the range of 10 g/yr. for light aircraft and 10-8/

() for large aircraft if the same type of assumptions areemployed as in devising the probabilities in this table.

(Cont'd

*0002 261

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_ _ - _ _. __. __ _ ._-

-- _. . _.

OTABLE E-1A (Cont'd.)

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(2) Critical structures are those protected against strikes oflarge aircraft and against crash fires. They are discussedin Section B of Amendment 8 and in the other appendices ofthis report.

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(3) Critical ventilation openings are protected against the ef f ec-of fuel or fire. The probability represents the chance that'

fuel or fire will occur in the immediate vicinity of the !openings.

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OE-2 AIRCRAFF CHARACTERISTICS.,

Tables E-2A and E-2B give pertinent characteristics of typical j

air carrier and general aviation aircraft which are discussed

in the following sections of Appendix E.

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O O OTABLE E-2B

TYPICAL GENEllAL AVI ATION AIItCilAPT CilAItACTEllISTICS(Includes Largest & Smallest of Each Type)

Type Piper Beechcraft Cessna,

Model Cherokee Navajo Bonanza 99 150 421(PA 28-180) (V-35)

__

Weight, lbs. 2400 6200 3400 10,200 1600 6800

Engines - number 1 2 1 2 1 2

Fuel - gallons (max. )50 190 80 374 38 202

- type gas jet gas jet gas jet

{ Speed - cruise 152 224 210 250 123 238b Flaps down stall speed 57 77 63 - 48 87

(1) From Jane 's , All the World's Aircraft, 1967-1968.

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_ -___-_-

OE-3 PROBABILITY OF STRIKE BY LARGE AIRCRAFT - DISCUSSION

OF ASSUMPTIONS

The following discussion explains some of the important assumptic

which underly the estimates of the probability of a large airplan

strike on Three Mile Island. The derivation of these assumptions

is given in Supplement 5 (Amendment 8), Section A.

Selection of Aircraft Accident Statistics

As indicated in Section A of Supplement 5, air carrier accidents

which involved one or more fatalities for the ten year period

1956-65 were chosen as the basis for estimating the probability

of the types of crashes which could have the most serious effect

on the plant. They represent the most serious accidents because

large aircraft are used and because the occurrence of fatalities

is usually due to high deceleration rates and/or large fires soor |lalter impact. These accident data represent large aircraft in |

general (both statistically and physically) because the air

carriors comprise more than 90% of large aircraft movements at

Olmsted and because the accident statistics for other large air-craf t are not dissimilar.

Nonf atal accidents were not included because examination of the

records indicates that those occurring away from the airport usua

1

E-3-1

0002 256

|

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,_ __

|

Ohave some direction and attitude control before impact and are o

the type in which there is a good chance large structures could

have been avoided.

Fatal landing accidents inside the area 1 1/2 mile from the runw

centerline extended were excluded (Fig. A-2). Of the 15 acciden'

in this area, all but perhaps two had enough directional control

to stay on or close to course. One of these might have been

appropriate for inclusion in the statistical base. However, one

which was included might have been lef t cut. It hit a hill in

controlled level flight at about 620' above the field elevation.

Thus, the selection of two accidents as a data base was believed

- to be justified.

Fatal takeoff accidents within a radius of one mile were excludetOf the five in this category, three were caused by immediate and

severe loss of pcwer or near ground turbulence so that they arenot of the type which would affect a target 2-1/2 miles from the

runway. Two others were caused by control system malfunction ancmight have been included. But two were included which might have

been excluded (one hit a hill in controlled level flight at about850' above the field and another probably had enough directionalcontrol to avoid a large structure). ~

'

E-3-2

0(102 267

OFatal accidents outsido a five mile radius were excluded on the

grounds that accidents further out were of a type which would nc

affect the plant. If they had been considered out to six or ter

miles, estimated strike probabilities would have been lower.

f

Random geographic distribution within a four mile radius was

1

assumed for the fatal accidents selected as a data base. Four ;

miles was assumed because all the selected accidents occurred

within or almost w'ithin this radius. Random distribution was

assumed because the actual distribution with respect to a runway

in use appeared to be random for the selected landing accidents(Fig. A-2). Distribution of selected takeof f accidents may show

some statistical bias for a higher frequency within i 30 of theOrunway centerline. But the plant is outside this area and the

assumption of random distribution seemed a reasonable approximat

The geographic pattern of fatal accidents taken from the entire

U.S. was superimposed on the Olmsted Airport (Fig. A-2). Examin

tion of the seven individual accidents selected as a statisticalbase indicates this procedure is reasonable and may be conservat

Two of the seven accidents involved crashes on hills in controlllevel flight at elevations which would be 250 to 480 feet above

the tallest plant structure and would not have hit the plant.Three others were out of control over relatively flat terrain an

probably would have had similar impact positions had they happen

(2):E-3-3

0002 268

. . . . .

Oat Olmsted. The two others were under enough directional contro

so that, had they operated at Olmsted, they prob.bly could haveavoided the plant. Further, local terrain and flight patterns a

Olmsted (including IFR missed approach procedures) are such that

aircraft would tend to stay north of the airport away f rom theplant. The one exception is for an aircraft taking off to the

east which, loses power in its right engines (and yaws to the rig.for this reason) or which has minimum power and turns down the

river to ditch on low ground or in the river. In the first case

there is a good chance there would be enough control to avoid theplant even if a crash ensued. In the second case, if the aircra:

had enough power to turn and reach the vicinity of the plant, itwould have had enough to clear the low hills straight ahead andland on a level area. But if the decision to turn was made, anc

there was enough power to control and execute it, there is a gooc

chance the aircraf t would have enough control to avoid the plant.

The estimates of strike probability are based on statistics forthe probability of a fatal accident per landing or takeoff for titen year period 1956 thru 1965, inclusive. Accident statistics

for the future will probably be different. However, fatal acci-

dent probability per landing and takeoff is expected to decrease

in the future because of expected improvements in aircraft and I

!engine reliability, new aircraft testing, navigation equipment arI

Imethods, pilot training and fire control after impact. Examinati

OE-3-4

0002 269

l

Oof past records indicates this would be consistent with the trer

in the past ten years. Further, Olmsted has a long runway (800(

which should contribute to the safety of landing and takeof f

operations (it is about 1500' longer than the main runway at

Washington National Airport and has a 1000' overrun on each end'

For the reason discussed above, it is probable that the fatal

accident probability chosen for the statistical analysis is

reasonable and may be' conservative.

Assumed Flight Path Angle Before Impact

Assumptions were made concerning vertical flight path angle just

O prior to i=v ct i= oreer to aerive " virtu 1 91==* t r e* re="as discussed in item 1, page A-4, Supplement 5 (Amendment 8). T

angles assumed were, respectively, 10 from the horizontal forUarriving accidents and 45 for departing accidents.

i

Of the two arriving accidents which were assumed to be statistic

significant (the two dots on Fig. A-2, Supplement 5, further tha

z 1/2 mile from the runway centerline extended),the one nearestthe relative plant location hit a hill about 620 above field

i

elevation in controlled level flight, and thus was not taken as

being 2 typical indication of vertical flight path angle for acrash on the plant. The other impacted at 10 Vertical path

angles were investigated for all

E-3-5 0002 270

--

,

Oof the other arrival accidents, shown 6n Fig. A-2,which appeared

be out of control and of the type which could have struck a tar

2-1/2 miles away if the malfunction involved had happened earli

Only two other' accidents of this type were identified. One is

the two mile radius of Fig. A-2 about 1/2 mile to the left of t

runway centerline extended. Its vertical path angle was about

The other was just right of the runway and about 1-1/2 miles ou-

It struck at a shallow angle (<5 ) and may have been due to sud.

disability of the pilot. If the aircraft had been further out .

higher when this happened, it probably would have struck at ah

angle if it remained out of control.

Since the two arriving accidents typical of those types which ci

strike the plant had vertical path angles of 10 and 8 , respec-

tively, the choice of an average of 10 in computing target are

for arrival accidents is believed to be reasonable.

Of the five departing accidents which were assumed to be statis.

tically significant (those outside a one mile radius on Fig. A-:

the one at four mile radius hit a hill at about 850 feet above -airport and is not useful as a check of vertical path angle. O:

! the three where the aircraft were out of control- .us had a ver-path angle of 78 , one of 71 , and the other is unknown. The f:

,

one had an angle of 7 . Thus, the selection of 45 angle for cc

puting vertical target area is believed to be reasonablo.

(|

E-3-6 ;

0002 271 i

i

lm ,..- -

OAssumed Speed of Impact

In estimating the effect of impact on the plant, it has been

assumed that the impact speed is up to 200 knots. Of the seve

crashes used in Section A (Fig. A-2) to estimate crash probabi

ties, two hit hills in controlled level flight at about 620 an

850 feet above field elevation, as indicated above. The speed

impact is not known, but it may have exceeded 200 knots. Thes

two accidents are of the type which would not have affected th

plant. In the other five selected accidents, the following ai '

craft types, impact speeds (as well as weights and impact anglI

were involved:;

,

Lockheed L-1049; 82,000 lb; 10 ; 95 knots (Byrd Field, Va., 11 |

() DC-7-C ; 115,000 lb; 7 ; 178 knots (Miami, Fla., 3/25/5i

DC-3 ; 24,000 lb; ?; 91 knots (Santa Maria, Calif.10/26

Electra ; 98,000 lb; 71 ; 110 knots (Boston, Mass., 10/4

B-707 123B ; 247,000 lb; 78 ; 200 knots (JFK, 3/1/62)

For all other crashes on Fig. A-2 (Supplement 5) impact speeds

where known are less than 200 knots.

The B-707 crash was probably due to rudder malfunction just af-takeoff at full power. The aircraft fell from about 1600 feet

1impacted almost vertically about 2-1/2 miles from the end of t! 1

[ runway at a bearing of about 130 left of the runway centerlinii

OE-3-7

'

0002 272|

|__ _

_

OOf those crashes which might affect the plant (i.e., which are

within two to three miles of the end of a runway), it represent s,

the type of crash by a large jet which would have the highestimpact speed.

A small fraction ( 3%) of current air carrier operations a't Olms

include B-707-331B aircraf t which when fully loaded can be somew

heavier than the fully loaded B-707-123B involved in the crash

described above. In the future, a similar small fraction of

larger aircraft such as the DC-10 or B-747 might operate at Olms

(see Table E-2A). Although these aircraf t are larger, their ope

ating speeds in the region of interest (during final approach,

landing, takeoff, and initial climb) are similar to present largjets like the B-707 Their rates of climb, descent and weight t

drag ratios at low speeds are also similar. Therefore, in the

geographic region of interest (within two to three miles of the

airport) the chances for an impact speed greater than that in th.Boeing 707-1238 crash (i.e., greater than 200 knots) is believed

to be small.

The information set forth above and the fact that the speed limi-in the geographical area of interest (i.e., that on Fig. A-2) is

180 knots indicates that the assumption of a 200 knot impact speiis reasonable.

OE-3-8

.

0002 273

.

_

OTraffic Density

In estimating the probability of an air carrier aircraft strike

it was assumed that air carrier movements at Olmsted were fourtimes the current annual rate (i.e., 80,000 movements per year

a bout one every seven minutes). This is about one-third of the

current rate at Washington National Airport.

.

During the past ten years (1958 to 1967), total air carrier move

ments in the U.S. increased by a factor of about 20%. If the

national increase in the next ten years is like that in the pas-ten and Olmsted increases at twice that national rate, it would

have about 28,000 movements per year by 1977, but would not reat

80,000 during the plant lifetime if movements continued toOincrease by the same increment each year. However, the Olmsted

Airport management is seeking a still faster rate of growth and

may have a target for doubling the movements in five to ten yea 2

If this very fast increase were achieved and sustained, 80,000movements per year could be realized by sometime between 1980 at2000 Since the midpoint of assumed plant life will be about li

the assumption of 80,000 air carrier movements a year on which tbase statistical analysis is believed to be reasonable.

|

O E-3-S 0002 274

- -

OE-4 PROBABILITY OF A STRIKE BY A VERY LARGE AIRCRAFT

( 200,000 LB.) AT A HIGH ANGLE (>60 ) ON A CRITICAL

STRUCTURE

The critical structures referred to in the title of this sectio

are those which are protected from direct strikes of large air-

craft as described in previous parts of this Amendment and in

Part B of Amendment 8.

Very large aircraft are taken as those having gross weights in

excess of 200,000 lbs. during landing or takeoff operations at

Olmsted. Maximum takeof f and landing weights f or typical aircr

involved are shown in Table E-2A. It should be noted on Table

( that while the maximum takeof f weights of the B-720 and the

B-707-120B are more than 200,000 lbs., the maximum allowable

landing weight is less. A lso , if aircraft are departing for a

nearby destination takeoff weights may be substantially less

than the maximum because a full fuel load would not usually be

carried.

It is assumed that very large aircraf t comprise 3% of the total

assumed air carrier movements at Olmsted or .03 x 80,000 = 2400movements / year.

OE-4-1

'

0002 275

__ _ .

, - __ _ -

OFor purposes of approximation, a strike angle of 60 on critic

building surfaces was chosen as a basis for investigation. Str

angles less than this (associated with any given weight, speed

deceleration pattern at impact) would impose loads

less than those derived from assuming a 90 ir, pact such as has

been done in checking structures for the effect of large aircra

strikes.

Flight path angle (relative to the horizontal) was assumed to b

randomly distributed from 0 to 20 for landing accidents and 0

90 for takeoff accidents. The probability of a strike from

selected directional quadrants was assumed to be 40% from a qua.

rant from 300 thru north to 30 ; 40% from a quadrant from 30

120 ; 104 from 120 to 210 ; and 10% from 210 thru 300 .

These percentages were selected by considering the plant locati

with respect to the airport and surrounding terrain. The horiz

angle of approach in any quadrant was assumed to be random.

The strike probability for large aircraf t was taken to be 0.88

10-6/yr. as in Amendment 8, page A-5, which was based on an ass:

virtual target area of 630,000 ft.2 for landing ar.d 185,000 ft. '

for takeoff accidents. About 60% of the strike probability was

due to landing and 40"e due to takeof f accidents.

OE-4-2

0002 276

.

O.

Given the information and assumptions described above, the

probaLility of an aircraf t larger than 200,000 lbs. striking theplant on a critical structure at an angle of greater than 60

relp.tive to the structure surface can be estimated as follows.

For takeoff accidents, the probability of a very large airplanestrike from a given quadrant is:

0. 88 x 10-6 x .03 x .4 x Q L' 1x 10-8 9P =T

and for landing accidents it is:

P = 0.88 x 10-6 x .03 x .6xQ L 1. 6 x 10-0g

where Q represents the fraction of total strikes arriving from agiven directional quadrant.

For takeoff and landing accidents, the probability of such a strhitting a critical building at >60 for landing accidents is:

f*A PTP =

D1.85 x 10

Where f = the fraction of strikes which would impact at greaterthan 60 and A is the " virtual target area" of critical surfaces

which could be hit at 60 Similarly, for landing accidents

O

0002 277 ~ |E-4-3

1

i

l

. - _ _ .

Othe probability is:

fAP gP =

CL 06.3 x 10

Using this method, values of P and P were estimated for str:g CL

on critical vertical surf aces from each quadrant and on critica

horizontal surf aces f rom all quadrants.

/The resu1t indicates that the sum of probabilities from

all quadrants is about 5 x 10-9/yr.

O.

E-4-4

0002 278

,. _ - _ - _ - --

r()E-5 PROBABILITY OF SMALL AIRCRAFT STRIKE

The amount of general aviation movements in the Harrisburg area

has been estimated by reviewing a report (FAA Air Traffic Activi

Fiscal Year 1967) and from information received directly from

airport records. In 1967, there were a total of 70,600 landings

plus takeoffs, or 35,300 landings and 33,300 takeoffs at Harris-

burg area airports. Of these, about 90% is assumed to have

occurred at Harrisburg/ York and 10% at Olmsted. Typical type

of aircraft involved are Beechcraft, piper and Cessna. Charac-

teristics of the largest and smallest of each aircraft of thesel

types are given in Table E-2-B.]:

O Accident data for general aviation operations were obtained fror

the National Transportation Safety Board and are given in TableE-5A. In 1965 and 1966, there were a total of 37,756,000 hoursflown under the category of general aviation. In order to

relate these data to numbers of landit.gs and takeof fs, it is

necessary to make a judgment of the average flight duration.

This is assumed to be one hour. Thus, the assumed total number

6of landings plus takeoffs is 75.5 x 10 for the years 1965 and

1966.

Of the general aviation accidents, only the fatal accidents are

considered because in nonfatal accidents the pilot is assumed

OE-5-1

0002 279

._ _ _ - _ .-

____ _ _ _ .__ __

Oto have enough control to be able to avoid the plant. Some

fatal accidents may also be of this type.

The ranges of interest are two to three miles for Olmsted traf

and seven to eight miles for Harrisburg/ York traffic. From a

smooth curve fitted to the data in Table E-5A, the respective

numbers of accidents are 55 and 20 over the two year period fo

these two ranges.

For Olmsted operations, the probability of there being a fatal

crash within two to three milea is as follows for any landing

takeoff operation:

55p " ~0 6 0.73 x 10 / operation(75.5 x 10 )

The projected number of landing plus takeoff operations at

) Olmsted is 0.1 (70600) - 7060 per year. Thus, the probability

of there being a fatal airplane crash within two to three mile

is:;

10-6 10-2/ year0.73 x x 7060 0.52 x-

The average virtual target area assumed for the plant for land

and takeoff accidents is approximately .015 square miles. Thi

is .95 x 10-3 times the area within two and three mile circles

OE-5-2

0002 280

_ _ _ _ ____ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __________________

O-

Thus, assuming random geographical distribution of the crashes

within the two to three mile radius, the probability that a fa

crash resulting from Olmsted operations would strike the Three

Mile Island plant in any one year is:

P * * * * * I'*#~* * *

O

Similar ly , the probability of a strike by a f atal crash result

from Harrisburg/ York operations is developed as follows:

P 0.26 x 10 / operation~ =H/Y 6(75. 5 x 10 )

The projected number of landings plus takeof fs at Harrisburg/

O vor* i= o 9 (7osoo) - e3.soo per re r- Tau =. the prod bititv

there being a fatal crash between seven and eight .niles of the

airport is:

0.26 x 10-6 10-2/ yearx 63,500 1.65 x=

|

The area between seven and eight mile circles is 47.1 square

miles so that the Three Mile Island plant occupies only 0.32 x

10~3 times this area. Thus, the probability that a fatal cra

resulting f rom Harrisburg/ York operations would strike the Thr

Mile Island plant in any one year is:

1.65 x 10-2 x 0. 32 x 10-3 0.53 x 10-5/ yearP = =H/Y

i O,

i E-5-3

0002 281

._ . ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . -_

<OThe combi-ad probability of the Three Mile Island plant being

;

hit by a f atal crash in any one year is then: |

P P * I * O |Y'**=

O H/Y

The probabilities estimated above are based on the approximate

number of general aviation operations in 1967. If general

aviation operations in the Harrisburg area increase by a factc

of 5 on the average for the period of interest and if the acci

Ident rates remain the same as assumed, the probability would j

\

increase by a similar factor and would be about:

10-5^

5 xP =

s

O

O'

0002 282

E-5-4

. _ , _

_,_ _ -_ . _

|

OTABLE E-5 A

|

GENERAL AVIATION

TOTAL FATAL ACCIDENTS IN CONTINENTAL U.S.1956-1966 Inclusive

.

Distance from Airport Fatal Accidents |

(Miles) I

!!

0-1 315

1-2 83 ,

|2-3 45 |

3-4 47

4-5 19

Beyond 5 549O

Distance unknown or not reported 48

1106

Fire after impact 300

0:

.

0002 283--

_

_ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

()/

E46 PROBABILITY OF FIRE FROM AN AIRCRAFT STRIKE i

1,

!

Small Fires j

As indicated in Table E-5A for general aviation aircraft, about

27% of fatal crashes have pontaccident fires. If this ratio is l

assumed valid for crashes on the plant, then the probability of

crash fires would be about:

5 x 10-5 1.4 x 10-5/ yearp x .27= =,

!

This assumes that the general aviation movement rate is five

times the present rate. Examination of Table E-2B indicates

these crashes will probably involve less than 400 gallons of

fuel and average less than 100 gallons.

Medium Fires

Medium fires are taken to be those wherein more than 400 but lessthan 3,000 gallons of fuel are involved. At the present time,

about 97% of movements at Olmsted involve airplanes with a maximu

fuel capacity of 3,000 gallons, or less. If', however, it is as-

sumed that at the time air carrier movements reach 80,000 per yea70% of the airplanes involved carry less than 3,000 gallons when

landing or taking off, then the probability of a medium fire is

-6p 1 x 10 x . 7 = 7 x 10- /yr-

assuming all air carrier crashes on the plant result in fires.

E-6-

0002 284.

___

O<

Large Fires

Similarly, the probability of large fires (where more than

3,000 gallons of fuel are involved) can be estimated assuming

30% of air carrier operations have more than 3,000 gallons

aboard when landing or departing. Thus:

~ -P= 1 x 10 x .3 - 3 x 10

Improvements in aircraft design, fire prevention systems, and

fuel technology, especially f or large aircraf t , are expected toreduce the probability of postcrash fires in the future. ByOthe time air traffic movement rates reach those assumed in makinthe probability estimates above, significant improvements shouldbe realized. Thus, from this viewpoint, the probability of postcrash fires, especially for large aircraft, should be less thanassumed.

OE-6-2

&

OK)02 285

(} Fuel or Fires Affecting Critical Ventilation Openings7

The probability of fire or fuel from a small airplane cra'sh

af fecting the ver.tilation intake or outlet for the control room

and other protected areas can be approximated by assuming that

the " virtual target" is the area of the opening plus the area

around it which could be hit and cause the opening to be sub-

jected to fire or to liquid fuel or vapors at flamable concen-

trations. The openings will, probably be less than 400 ft .

For a small plane crash carrying an average of about 100 gallons

of fuel, it is assumed the fuel affected area could be about

10 x 50 ft. or 500 ft. This is believed to be a larger.

area than would be affected on the average.

{The " virtual target" area assumed in deriving the probability

for a small plane crash in Section E-5 above was 0.015 mi or

5about 4x 10 ft ,and the probability of a crash (at five times

present traffic density) was 5 x 10-5/ year. The probability of1

a strike on the ventilation openings can be estimated by multi-

plying this probability by the ratio of " virtual target" areas,

!

or:

1

2 |

5 x 10-5 9 x 10x -% 10~ / year |p =

#4 x 10

This neglects the effect of protection afforded to the openings

by structures which could intercept an approaching aircraft.

1

(1)i

E-6-3i

| 0002 286|

|

__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

'i

Consequently, the probability has been taken as being one half

that est'. mated above or 5 x 10-8 ,

To estimate the probability contribution from large aircraft

(air carrier planes) the average amount of fuel carried has bee

assumed to be 5000 gallons assuming that only a very few, if an

very large planes (1. e. , B474 's) will use Olmsted.

The area affected by spread of fuel from the crash of an aircra

carrying 5000 gallons is assumed to be about 25 x 1000 ft or

25,000 ft .

From Amendment 8, page A-5, the probability for arriving and

departing accidents is given as .88 x 10-6 If these are multiO .

plied by the ratio of the " virtual target" area estimated above

to the average virtual target area assumed in deriving the largeplane strike probability, the result is an approximate estimate

of the probability of fuel or fire from a large aircraft crash

affecting critical ventilation openings. Thus:

4.88 x 10-0 .5 x 10x - 5.5 x 10-3p =

04 x 10

This also neglects the effect of protection afforded the venti-

lation openings by structures which could intercept the approaci! aircraft. Consequently, the probability is taken to be about or

half that estimated above or -3 x 10-8 ,

Oi E-6-4 .!

O-

The combined probability for large and small aircraf t crashes

affecting the ventilation opening is:

8 x 10-8P =

.

O

,

|

OE-6-5

0002 2881i

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ - . . = . - - - - _ - .-. _ .-.

,

rO at~taracts:|

I !

! |-

Eardley, A . J. , Structural Geoloav of North America, New Ycrk: Harper &,

Brothers , 1951

Kershner, Jefferson K., "An Earthquake in Pennsylvania," Science, Vol. XNo. 322, April 5,1889.:

!!

i

i

!

|

1, 1

'

; O:,

1,

i

:i

:

I

',

h

O0002 289

-14-

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ - . . - _. _ _. .- . - -

/ BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brooks , J . E. , S.J. , "Part II-Earthquckes of Northeastern United Statesand Eastern Canada," Bulletin of Geochysics Collece Tean-de-Brebeuf,No . 7, 19 6 0, p . 12 -4 0.

Dutton, Capt. Clarence E. , "The Charleston Earthquake of August 31,1886," United States Geolocical Survev, Ninth Annual Recort, 1887-8G,p . 2 09-52 8.

Eardley, A. J., Structural Geoloav of North America, New York: Harper &Brothers , 19 51.

Eppley, R. S. , " Stronger Earthquakes of the United States (Exclusive ofCalifornia and Western Nevada)," Earthcuake Historv of the United States I

Washington: Government Printing Office,1965.

!Fuller, M . L . , "The New Madrid Earthquake , " United States Geolocical;

Survey Bulletin 494, Washington: Government Printing Office,1912.I'Isacks, B. , and Oliver, J. , " Seismic Waves with Frequencies from 1 to

100 Cycles per Second Recorded in a Deep Mine in Northern New Jersey,"

pd Bulletin of the Seismolecical Society of America, Vol. 54, No. 6A,1964,p . 1941-1980. )

Kershner, Jefferson K. , "An Earthquake in Pennsylvania ," Science, Vol. XI:No. 322, April 5,1889.

{Landsberg, H., "The Clover Creek Earthquake of July 15, 1938," Bulletinof the Seismotocical Society of America, Vol. 2 8, No . 4, 1938.

Linehan, Rev. D. , S .J. , and Leet, L.D. , " Earthquakes of NortheasternUnited States and Eastern Canada, 1938, 1939, 1940," Bulletin of theSeismolecical Society of America, Vol. 32, No.1,1942.

MacCarthy, Gerald R. , "A Descriptive List of Virginia Earthquakes Through1960," Tournal of the Elisha Mitchell Scientific Society, Vol. 8, No. 2,December 1964.

Reid, H. F., Unpublished records including card index and newspaperclipping on file at United States Coast and Geodetic Survey, Washington,D.C .

i, ,<

O 0002 290'' ' '

-15-

-.

O

Richter, Charles, Elementary Seismoloev, San Francisco: W. H. FreemanCompany, 1958.

Rockwood, C . G . , Jr. , " Notes on American Earthquakes , " AmericanTournal of Science Third Series, Vol. 29, 1885.

Smith, W. E. T. , " Earthquakes of Eastern Canada and Adjacent Areas ,1534-1927," Canada: Decartmer.t of Mines and Techrical Survevs ,Dominion Observatories , Vol. XXVI, No. 5,1962.

Smith, W. E. T. , " Earthquakes of Eastern Canada and Adjacent Areas,1928-1959," Canada: Decartment of Mines and Technical Survevs.Dominion Observatories . Vol. XXXII, No. 3,1966.

Stone, R. W. , " Earthquake, September 5,1944, Felt in Pennsylvania , "Commonwealth of Pennsvivania . Decartment of Internal Affairs, Vol.12,No . 11. '

Stose, A . J. , and Stose, G . W. , " Geology of the Hanover-York District,Pennsylvania," United States Geolocical Survey Professional Pacer 204,1944. g

W i

United States Atomic Energy Commission, Division of Technical Information.Nuclear Reactors and Earthcuakes TID 7024, Washington: August 1963.

United States Department of Commerce , Coast and Geodetic Survey,Quartertv Seismolecical Recorts , 1925-1927.

United States Department of Commerce, Coast and Geodetic Survey,United States Earthauakes, Washington: Government Printing Office,1928-1964.

I United States Department of Commerce, Coast and Geodetic Survey, DetaileInformation Furnished Concerning Cornwall, Pennsylvania Earthquake ofMay 12,19C4, to Weston Geophysical Research, Inc.

|

0002 291 g, ,

e. . , . . .

-16-

;-.

VO:

APPENDIX I

O

O.

0002 292

.. . ..- .

O DISt^Nr z^arnouaxtS rO ^FrtCr rat Slrr

Felt Area Distance AptDate Location Epicentral (Square From Site In

Intensity Miles) (Miles) z

Nov . 18, 1755 42.9 N, 70.60W VIII 300,000 370East of Cape Ann,Massachusetts

Dec . 16, 1811 3 6.6'N, 89.6 W XII 2,000,000 72 0New Madrid,Missouri

Aug . 10, 1884 4 0. 6'N , 74. 0 W VII 70,000 145New York City

Aug . 31,1886 32.9'N, 80 W X 2,000,000 540Charleston, South

Carolina

May 31,1897 37.3 N, 80.7 W VIII 280,000 290Giles County,

\ Virginia

Fe b . 10, 1914 4 5 . 0'N , 7 6 . 9 W VII 200,000 335West of Lanark,Ontario, Canada

Nov. 1, 193 5 46.8'N, 79.1 W VII 500,000 470Timiskaming , (Mag. 6.25)Canada

Sept. 5,1944 44.9 N, 74.9* W VIII 175,000 340Cornwall, Ontario (Mag. 5.9) in UnitedMassena, New StatesYork

0002 293

mV

-13-

_ __

' o,

|

l

PART II RES?ONSE SPECTRA

I!

Oi

1

,

I

Og r. ., . 0002 294

.. .. ,

. ._ _ - _ . - _ _ _ _ -.

.

O

OBTECTIVE

Part I of this report, Seismicity Analysis, has established the

strongest possible earthquake which might affect the site would be low

intensity VI (Modified Mercalli) occurring along the Triassic border fault

some six miles distant to the site. On the basis of Figure 1.7 in the

Atomic Energy Commission publication Nuclear Reactors and Earthouakes

TID 7024, this intensity corresponds to an acceleration of 0.04g. Larger

earthquakes at greater distances frcm the site would produce an intensity

no larger than III or IV (Modified Mercalli) .

The objective of this part of the report is to establish the response gspectra corresponding to a possible earthquake of low intensity VI (Modified

Mercalli) .

RESPONSE SPECTRA FOR NEARBY EARTHOUAKE

The earthquake which occurred in March 1957 near San Francisco

was very similar although stronger than the maximum probable earthquake

at the present site. This earthquake resulted from a slip at the San Andreas

fault where this fault passes into the ocean just south of San Francisco. Its

magnitude on the Richter scale was 5.3. The depth to the focus of the earth

quake has been estimated at five miles. The epicentral intensity was VII.

| Five good, strong-motion records were obtained within fifteen, miles

of the epicenter. For the present study the most important record was that gw : .b'* 4Ut''' 95

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obtained in Golden Gate Park, approximately seven miles from the

epicenter, where a strong-motion seismograph rested on rock. The

intensity of damage at the vicinity of this station was estimated as a

high VI. The strong portion of the ground motion was of only five seconds

duration .

According to Figure 1.7 in the Atomic Energy Commission publica-

tion Nuclear Reactors and Earthquakes TID 7024, the nominal acceleratior.

corresponding to a high VI intensity should be 0.06g.

Although it is realized that this is higher than the acceleration

established in the first part of this report for a low intensity VI earthquake

O it is felt thet e short duretion neer-by eerthaueke could produce en ec-

celeration of 0.06g. Average smoothed response spectra derived from

the ground motions in Golden Gate Park during the March 1957 earthquake

have been normalized to 0.06g, and are given in Figure 1. The peak in

these response spectra between periods of 0.1 and 0.2 seconds reflects

the high frequency content of the ground motions observed close to a

small earthquake. Because the earthquake was of such short duration,

damping is relatively unimportant.

EFFECT OF DISTANT EARTHOUAKES

The response spectra applicable to ground motions resulting from

distant earthquakes were investigated usmg the scaling procedures

developed by Esteva and Rosenblueth (1964). It was found that the,-.,

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response spectra for these more distant earthquakes was less critical

than those in Figure 1 for periods less than 0.8 seconds.

APPLICATION OF RESPONSE SPECTPA TO DESIGN

The response spectra in Figure 1 are intended to represent the

consequences of the strongest probable earthquake at the site. Accord-

ingly, Type I structures or equipment whose failure might cause a nuclear

incident should be designed according to the following rule or its equivalent

stresses computed using the spectra, when superimposed upon the stresses

resulting from normal operation, must be less than the normally specified

working stresses without an allowance for strength increase due to short-

term loading . Vertical accelerations should be taken as two-thirds of

those indicated by the response spectra of Figure 1.

In addition, the design must be checked for an earthquake having

a response spectra with ordinates twice those in Figure 1. This larger

earthquake represents an earthquake much larger than justified by the

historical record of the site but which might conceivably occur during

the life of the structure. Under this more severe loading condition there

should be no failure that could cause injury or prevent safe shutdown:i

I during or after the earthquake.|

Type II structures, whose failure could cause no nuclear incident,

should be designed in accordance with the provisions of the 1957 Uniform

u s ...

-2 2 -0002 297

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Building Code with the value of the coefficient C applicable to Zone 1.

An alternate form of the response spectra is presented in Figure 2.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Dr. C. A. Cornell of Massachusetts Institute of Technology has

participated with the Consultant in this study.

REFERENCES

Oakeshott, G. B. ,1959: " San Francisco Earthquake of March 1957

Special Report 57, California Division of Mines.

Esteva and Rosenblueth,1964: "Espectros de Temblores a'

Distancias Moderadas y Grandes," Boletin de la Sociedad

Mexicana de Ingenieria Sismica," Vol. II, No.1. The method

will appear in Chapter 7 of Earthquake Engineering by Newmar

and Rosenblueth, to be published by Prentice-Hall.

Hudson, D. E. and G. W. Housner,1958: "An Analysis of the

Strong Motion Accelerometer Data from the San Francisco

Earthquake of March 22, 1957," Bull. of the Seismological

Society of America , Vol. 48, pp. 2 53-268.

O0002 298

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