Passing the Mantle:A New Leadership for Malaysia

NO. 116 SEPTEMBER 2003

A S I A P R O G R A M S P E C I A L R E P O R T

After more than 22 years in power,Malaysia’s prime minister MohamadMahathir is stepping down. “I was

taught by my mother that when I am in themidst of enjoying my meal, I should stop eat-ing,” he quipped, after his closing remarks to theUMNO party annual general assembly in June.“I’m going,Abdullah [Badawi] is replacing me,and I’m confident the party is secure.”1

When the transition takes place this autumn,the active 77-year-old leader is unlikely to van-ish completely from the scene—though he haspromised not to follow Singapore’s Lee KuanYew in becoming a powerful senior minister.There was a brief point during Malaysia’slargest-ever anti-government rally in September1998 when comparisons to Suharto, ousted bypopular demand, seemed more appropriate. Butnow—as the essays in this Special Report makeclear—Mahathir feels the country is stable andsecure enough to transfer power to his deputy,and a smooth continuation of the status quo isexpected.

All three experts in this Special Reportemphasize continuity. All agree that basic gov-ernmental policies will not change much; forexample, Abdullah Badawi’s seemingly heartfeltpledges to address corruption will probablyfounder in implementation.The contributors tothis Report do predict that Abdullah willimprove upon Mahathir in one area: moderat-ing the potentially destabilizing force of reli-gious extremism.As they point out,Abdullah iswidely admired for his religious knowledge andcredentials, and can confront Islamic radicals (inhis own quiet way) while maintaining respectfrom mainstream society.They also agree thatAbdullah’s personal style—mild, incremental,consensual—will differ from the fiery tone ofhis predecessor, and likely improve relationswith the West. As Karim Raslan points out,Abdullah is “difficult to hate,” and his “dullness”will be a relief after Mahathir’s internationallynotorious vitriol.

Bridget Welsh of the School of AdvancedInternational Studies (SAIS) at Johns HopkinsUniversity describes the intense uncertainty inMalaysian politics as the transition unfolds.During the past year, factional support for key

INSIDE

BRIDGET WELSH

Malaysia's Transition:Elite Contestation,Political Dilemmas andIncremental Change

page 4

KARIM RASLAN

New Leadership, HeavyExpectations

page 9

M. BAKRI MUSA

Post-MahathirMalaysia: CoastingAlong

page 13

ABSTRACT: As Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir prepares to step down after more thantwo decades in power, Malaysians are both anxious and hopeful. Bridget Welsh maintains thatthe political succession has ushered in an era of shifting factions and political uncertainty, as indi-viduals vie for position in the post-Mahathir environment. Karim Raslan discusses the strengthsand weaknesses of Mahathir’s hand-picked successor,Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.He maintains thatAbdullah will do well at moderating the influence of Malaysia’s more radical Islamic leaders, butdoubts whether the new prime minister can live up to the excessive expectations that the polit-ical transition has engendered. M. Bakri Musa expresses hope that Abdullah will succeed where(in his view) Mahathir has failed. For example, he urges the new leadership to revise Malaysia’sthree-decade affirmative action policy and to tackle the problem of corruption.

IntroductionAmy McCreedy

ASIA PROGRAM

Amy McCreedy is program associate in the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program.

leaders within UMNO have shifted constantly.Afterthe political transition, elites will continue jockeyingfor position in the post-Mahathir environment—even, for those who predict a short tenure for thenew leadership, the post-Abdullah environment.The general elections (probably in April 2004) andthe UMNO party elections (next summer) will belively. However, this contestation will take placelargely behind the scenes, and will not involve masspublic mobilization. It is not only UMNO that is influx,Welsh points out. Leadership transitions havealso occurred recently, or are imminent, withinother parties as well. On what will the success ofcontenders be based? In the pragmatic world ofMalaysian politics, rank-and-file politicians arelooking to ride the coattails of leaders with rich per-sonal networks who can provide them with publicpatronage and electoral security.

In the midst of this contestation, AbdullahBadawi has his own particular challenges, the mostimportant of which is living up to the high profileof his predecessor. According to Welsh, the pressureto maintain growth levels on par with the Mahathirera may well prove to be the new leader’s Achilles’heel. Economic legitimacy has taken on moreimportance as the regime has become more author-itarian. Meanwhile, Abdullah will also have torebuild institutions such as UMNO, the bureaucra-cy, and the judiciary.Welsh points out that he willhave to “manage” the continued participation (orinterference) of a retired Mahathir, and helpUMNO fight the challenge of an opposition that

remains robust, especially in Malaysia’s hinterland.Karim Raslan, a lawyer and writer in Kuala

Lumpur, agrees with Welsh on major points, thoughhe predicts more smoothness in Malaysian politicalaffairs over the next few years. He is doubtful thatthe new government will address issues of greatestconcern to him professionally—judicial independ-ence and journalistic freedom. He maintains thatlike most other Malaysians, cosmopolitan liberalssuch as he are eager to be optimistic but bound tobe disappointed by the political transition. How canthe government please so many diverse constituentswho are eager to see the still untested Abdullah as“their man”? Karim sees the current ballooning ofhope on a whole host of controversial issues as amajor challenge for the new leadership.

Karim, a frequent political commentator who ispersonally acquainted with many of Malaysia’s poli-cy makers, gives his impressions of where the newleadership is likely to focus itself. In economic mat-ters, Karim speculates that Abdullah’s team will beless consumed with building things and more con-cerned with cultivating investments in infrastructure.In other words, Abdullah will seek to improveMalaysia’s “software” as well as construct its “hard-ware.” Karim expects to see most change in the areaof religious moral leadership. As noted above,Abdullah has religious credentials that allow him, ifnecessary, to disagree authoritatively with the reli-gious establishment. According to Karim, Abdullahhas a “deep and intuitive” understanding of theQur’an and an admirable knack for deflating poten-tially inflammatory religious controversies with gen-tle deprecation. Karim agrees with Welsh that one ofAbdullah’s biggest challenges will be measuring upto his high-profile predecessor, who has become“the yardstick by which all successive leaders will bejudged.” Meanwhile, the public is uncertain andanxious.The last political succession determined thepolitical landscape for nearly three decades; will thisone do the same?

The third essay in this special report, by M.Bakri Musa, poses a spirited challenge to AbdullahBadawi’s government to undertake a “majorreassessment” of policy in Malaysia. Musa, a physi-cian in California who has written three books onMalaysia, is far more scathing in his appraisal ofMahathir than are the other two contributors to thisSpecial Report. His essay examines Mahathir’s lega-

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ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

THE ASIA PROGRAM

The Wilson Center’s Asia Program is dedicated to the proposi-tion that only those with a sound scholarly grounding can beginto understand contemporary events. One of the Center’s oldestregional programs, the Asia Program seeks to bring historicaland cultural sensitivity to the discussion of Asia in the nation’scapital. In seminars, workshops, briefings, and conferences,prominent scholars of Asia interact with one another and withpolicy practitioners to further understanding of the peoples, tra-ditions, and behaviors of the world’s most populous continent.

Asia Program Staff:Robert M. Hathaway, DirectorGang Lin, Program AssociateAmy McCreedy, Program AssociateWilson Lee, Program AssistantTimothy R. Hildebrandt, Program Assistant

cy from the perspective of “what might have been,”thus pointing to where he thinks the new leadershipshould direct itself.

Bakri Musa highlights the contradiction betweenthe super-efficiency of Mahathir the man (who has a“Pentium V chip compared to his predecessor’s 286”)and what Musa sees as the wasteful corruption ofMalaysia’s centrally directed system. In such a system,entrepreneurs pitch their ideas to the leader ratherthan testing them in the marketplace. According toMusa, the dynamic Mahathir has failed to nourishinnovation in his team or in Malaysia at large; thethree most senior members in Mahathir’s cabinethave served a collective 70 years of “sclerosis andinertia.”While the economy has grown impressivelyover the past few decades, Musa suggests that affir-mative action and cronyism have deprived the coun-try of much potential for growth. And whileMalaysia has escaped the violence of many multi-ethnic nations, the voluntary segregation of today’syoung people does not bode well for social harmony.

Bakri Musa expresses dissatisfaction with theNational Economic Program (NEP), a three-decadeaffirmative action policy to benefit the Malays, whomake up 60 percent of the population. Whileacknowledging the importance of ethnic harmony,Musa maintains that “after a generation of preferen-tial treatment, Malays . . . feel no more competitive.”It is worth noting that while Musa in particularfocuses on the issue of affirmative action, all three

contributors to the Special Report maintain thatNEP abuses are a major challenge for the new gov-ernment. Welsh points out that Abdullah will beinclined to boost efficiency by strengthening meri-tocracy—but at the same time he must maintain thesupport of certain Malays who value affirmativeaction as the cornerstone of their political agenda.As an example of the NEP’s shortcomings, KarimRaslan cites the recent scandal of shoddily con-structed school computer laboratories.

Over the next several years, the extent to whichAbdullah Badawi will change things will partlydepend on Mahathir’s presence. “I have alreadymade it very clear that when I leave, I leave com-pletely,” the prime minister said at a televised newsconference.2 But few believe that after more thantwo decades at the helm of Malaysia’s government,he will truly retreat to write his memoirs. Welshmaintains that unlike Lee Kuan Yew he will involvehimself more in foreign than in domestic affairs. Ifso, the West is likely to see a great deal more ofMahathir, even as Abdullah seeks to steer most poli-cy discussion into quieter waters.

ENDNOTES

1. Michael Vatikiotis,“The Last Hurrah,” Far EasternEconomic Review, July 3, 2003, 12.2. BBC News, World Edition, July 3, 2002,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2083730.stm.

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PASSING THE MANTLE: A NEW LEADERSHIP FOR MALAYSIA

In June 2002, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Dr.Mahathir Mohamad surprised the world byoffering to step down from power. In tears,

Malaysia’s longest serving prime minister offered toturn over the reins to his fourth deputy prime min-ister,Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, affectionately knownas “Pak Lah.” For the past year, Malaysia has been in“transition mode,” as politicians, business people andordinary citizens alike prepare for new leadership.Aspower transitions go, this one is very stable anddrawn out, reflecting the high level of control thatMahathir has managed to consolidate during his 22-year tenure. He stewarded the transition in much thesame manner as he governed Malaysia over the lastfew years, with calculating management.

In assessing the political dynamics in Malaysia, itis important to recognize that a number of parties inboth the governing coalition, the Barisan Nasional,and in the opposition are undergoing leadershipchanges. Besides the United Malay NationalOrganization (UMNO), two major parties, theMalaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Parti-SeIslam Malaysia (PAS) have changed leaders in thepast year, each with different ripple political effectson the system. Another opposition party, Keadilan,has merged with Parti Rakyat to become PartiKeadilan Rakyat.This merger has affected the mid-dle ranks of leadership within the party.This trendof leadership transitions is likely to continue overthe next few years.After all, six of the twenty longestserving party leaders in the world are Malaysian.

GREATER ELITE CONTESTATION WITHIN

UMNO

The focus of this essay, however, is on the change inthe dominant political party, UMNO. This Malayparty, led by Mahathir since July 1981, has been amajor force since independence and the leadingpolitical party since 1970, after the pivotal racialriots of 1969. Below, I argue that the transition has

increased factionalism within UMNO, which isunlikely to resolve itself until the party elections(expected in summer 2004).The political transitionwill play out largely outside of the public eye, inestablished political arenas, and is unlikely to spillover into society at large.This contest will be fierceand fluid, as UMNO elites will jockey for positionwith the aim of placing themselves in line for futureparty leadership in what many, although not all,expect to be a short tenure of Mahathir’s chosensuccessor.

Factionalism in UMNO is not new. During theMahathir years, factionalism deepened as a result ofthe bottleneck in the party hierarchy.Younger elites,who come from the majority of the Malay popula-tion, had limited opportunities to rise through theranks.At the same time, Malaysia’s wealth, often tiedto pivotal and lucrative opportunities of state access,provided party members with increased financialrewards. The combustible combination of moneyand limited advancement fostered competition.

In the early years of the Mahathir era, this tookthe form of a direct challenge to his leadership. In1986-1987 Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, under therubric “Team B” (which incidentally includedAbdullah Badawi) split UMNO and directly chal-

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Malaysia's Transition: Elite Contestation,Political Dilemmas and Incremental Change

BRIDGET WELSH

Bridget Welsh is assistant professor of Southeast Asia studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced InternationalStudies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University.

lenged Mahathir’s leadership. Mahathir survived thecontest by a slim majority of votes in the UMNOparty election. This contest, like the current elitecontestation, had limited societal spillover. In thewake of the split, political tussling occurred mainlyon the party’s lower rungs, particularly among divi-sion chiefs. These contests remained largely eliteaffairs.

It was not until 1998, when Anwar Ibrahim chal-lenged Mahathir in the party elections, that UMNOcontestation mobilized ordinary Malaysians. Underthe rubric of reformasi, Anwar seriously underminedthe ethnic base of the party, as Malays flocked to theopposition in the 1999 polls. It is estimated thatMalay support for UMNO dropped from 61 per-cent to 42 percent in the tenth general elections.The party, however, remained intact, as a popular,although less dynamic, Abdullah Badawi replacedAnwar in the deputy position.

In both these leadership contests, UMNO fac-tionalism was largely shaped by personal loyalties toindividuals, although in each case there were differ-ent views on policy—the level of state involvementin the economy (1986), response to the Asian finan-cial crisis (1998), and the development of UMNOas an institution.

The current scenario does not offer the samedegree of personal loyalties and policy differences,although these factors are present under the surface.Since this is a power transition as opposed to a lead-ership challenge, factionalism within UMNO hasbecome murkier. The current scenario containsmany similarities with the back-door party negotia-tions that characterized the 1976 leadership transi-tion after the illness of the second prime minister,Tun Abdul Razak. In that instance, Tun HusseinOnn won leadership by being the most amenablecontender to party elites. In the current transition,the leadership decision was made almost exclusivelyby Mahathir, who rebuilt UMNO in his shadowafter the 1988 split and emphasized personal loyalty.Many elites are waiting for their opportunity with-in the party to voice their positions and will do soin the next UMNO party elections.

During the last year, as the transition has unfold-ed, the lines of support for key leaders withinUMNO have shifted constantly, as individuals with-in the rank-and-file search for “safe” positions in thepost-Mahathir environment as well as aim to

advance their future positions.The factors that haveshaped factionalism within UMNO have less to dowith personalities and policy than with theresources that provide security for future positions.These include: state patronage, electoral support,personal ties, capable domestic leadership and acredible international persona.

State patronage, or the distribution of funds, tra-ditionally has been a major factor for UMNO partymembers. In the 1970s, the expansion of the publicsector deepened the tie between the bureaucracyand party leaders. The New Economic Policy(NEP), fueled by increased revenue from oil, mas-sively expanded public spending for the Malay com-munity, particularly in education. The boundariesbetween the bureaucracy and party became blurred.Through the 1980s, state distribution remainedimportant, yet the locus moved to the private sector.UMNO became more tied to business and access tostate resources through “rents.” As Edmund TerenceGomez and Jomo K.S. have shown, contracts, licens-es and financial gains from privatization took onmore significance. UMNO elites remain interestedin securing their financial positions. In this regard,ties to ministries and agencies that distribute these“spoils” will be crucial as the elite struggles unfold.

Equally important for UMNO elites is demon-strating strong electoral support. The 1999 pollsdented the political fortunes of rising elites, as Malayvoters abandoned the party in high numbers.Perhaps the hardest hit by the general election wasMinister of Defense Dato’ Sri Najib Tun AbdulRazak, who only squeaked by with a 261 majority,despite winning the most votes in the UMNO partyelection for a vice presidency. The challenge fromPAS remains significant (especially in the Malayrural areas of Kelantan, Teregganu, Pahang, Kedahand Perlis) and UMNO rank-and-file memberswant to ride on the coattails of a strong leadershipteam that will secure their own electoral fortunes.While the recent delineation exercise strengthensUMNO through the creation of more ethnicallymixed constituencies, the party continues to face thechallenge of winning back Malay support, especial-ly among younger voters. Since Abdullah Badawiwill likely have the power to influence the selectionof candidates, the forthcoming general electionswhich may be held as early as December this year(although more likely in the spring of 2004), will be

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PASSING THE MANTLE: A NEW LEADERSHIP FOR MALAYSIA

a major test for his party stewardship and other partyelites.

The factor least understood and appreciated byanalysts of UMNO is the centrality of personal tiesand relationships. Previous party conflicts in 1986-87 and 1998 illustrated the role of personal loyalty,which has long been associated with Malay leader-ship (seen by some analysts as having feudal roots).The issue of personal ties goes beyond loyalty andmoves into more intangible issues of character. Tocoin a phrase from contemporary political science,the UMNO members (both rank-and-file and elite)are assessing leaders for their “social capital,” for therichness of their social networks and those of theirfamily members and staff. Such assessments are facil-itated by the high degree of familiarity amongUMNO members, due in large part to extensivesocial ties, shared education experiences and inter-marriage among families. Popular leaders with richnetworks—often buttressed by connections at thestate (negeri) level and bonds formed within partyyouth organizations—have a strong social base onwhich to build support. Leaders with spouses andfamily members that are popular among other

spouses and with other family members also have anadvantage.

The importance of social capital within UMNOhas been shaped by the character assassinations thathave become more common in Malaysian politics.This practice was famously demonstrated in theAnwar episode, but extends to a broader range ofindividuals, back to the attacks on Tengku RazaleighHamzah after the 1986-1987 party split. Characterand morality matter more politically today than pre-Mahathir, due in part to greater Islamization amongthe Malay community and to the rising electoralchallenge of PAS. Leadership contenders are scruti-nized for perceived “character” flaws, real or imag-ined. One of the strengths of Abdullah Badawi is

that many see him as passing the important “per-sonal” obstacle of the “character” test.

Paralleling assessments of leaders’ social capitallies a deep-seated pragmatism in Malaysian politics.Party members want capable leadership andMahathir himself has set the bar. His leadership hasbeen credited with Malaysia’s impressive economicperformance and the reduction of open ethnic ten-sions. Malaysians, both in and out of UMNO, wantMahathir’s strengths and correctives on his weak-nesses, in areas such as clean government. All thecontenders for positions in UMNO will be judgedon their ability to create and implement policy.Most face the problem of having to come out ofMahathir’s shadow, and many are not credited withachieving specific policy objectives. For the rank-and-file, the issue of capable leadership is tied toelectoral support (particularly among middle classand Chinese voters) and state patronage.

Also important to the outcomes of UMNO’smurky factional contests is the issue of a credibleinternational persona. Mahathir’s strong role in areassuch as the Look East Policy, North-South relationsand recent discussions of terrorism,have accustomedMalaysians to leadership with strong internationalrecognition and presence. Upcoming leaders withinUMNO will be judged as capable partly for theirability to move between domestic and internationalarenas—to be fluent in Malay and English, to beeffective both within the party and among diplo-mats. This criterion, although less significant thanthe others mentioned above, plays a role in shapingloyalties within UMNO.

All of the contenders for leadership positionshave mixed fortunes in these areas.Thus the compe-tition has been in constant flux during the transi-tion, which will continue to unfold during the nextyear.The deputy prime ministership is the key posi-tion, but not the only one. Power will come fromthe contenders’ portfolios in government, not justtheir positions within the party hierarchy. In turn,the portfolios will shape the level of state patronageand translate into other dimensions of power with-in UMNO.

The internal elite contestation will initiallyweaken UMNO, which has already been weakenedin the wake of the beating and arrest of Mahathir’sex-deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998and subsequent loss of Malay support in the 1999

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Character and morality matter morepolitically today than they did pre-Mahathir . . . Leadership contenders arescrutinized for perceived “character”flaws, real or imagined.

polls.The immediate affect of an enfeebled UMNOwill be higher levels of uncertainty in the politicalprocess, which will primarily resonate at the elitelevel.What distinguishes the ongoing contestation isthe common bond—particularly among those withnarrower majorities—to survive the challenge ofPAS and, to a lesser extent, Keadilan. Although theBarisan Nasional has won all but two of the nine by-elections since the 1999 polls, and a loss at thenational level is extremely unlikely due to supportin East Malaysia and among Chinese voters, PAS inparticular poses a real electoral threat in the Malayheartland, where UMNO derives its political legiti-macy. UMNO needs a decisive victory amongMalay voters to relegitimize itself as winner of themajority of Malay support. The new leadership enmasse needs this confirmation, and this commonneed will limit infighting.

Irrespective, UMNO elite contestation willremain central as the transition evolves.The focus ofUMNO elites will remain on consolidating theirposition in domestic politics, particularly within theparty.

POLITICAL DILEMMAS, FUTURE CHALLENGES

As the chosen unelected (by the party) expectedleader of UMNO,Abdullah Badawi will face a litanyof challenges. The ability to meet these challengeswill be shaped by his own leadership style.Abdullahis believed to be personable, thoughtful and consen-sus-oriented. It is these traits that have allowed himto repetitively win party support, even after his deci-sion to join Team B in the 1980s.At the same time,Abdullah is believed to be a slow decision maker.Perhaps more than any other, this feature has fos-tered anxiety among those supporting Mahathir andaccustomed to a decisive leadership style.

While it is clearly far too early to predict histenure, Abdullah will face a set of challenges upontaking power in November.The most significant isthe pressure to maintain growth rates. One ofMahathir’s legacies is an emphasis on economic per-formance. Although the Malaysian economy hasrebounded since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, ithas yet to find a new engine of growth. Economiclegitimacy has taken on more importance as theregime has become more authoritarian, and maybecome Abdullah’s Achilles’ heel. Pressure fromUMNO elites and ordinary Malaysians to perform

economically will be intense—in a period whenhigher deficits limit the use of public expenditure tospur growth and the international climate is lessamenable to investment in Southeast Asia.

At the same time, Abdullah will be expected toaddress perceptions of rising Islamic extremism inMalaysia. As home affairs minister, Abdullah hastaken a hard line on extremism, arresting numerousaccused terrorists. He has not established himself asa supporter of human rights, particularly civil liber-ties. Nevertheless, his image as a moderate withIslamic credentials will work to his advantage.Yet,here too, Abdullah faces the difficult challenge offinding the right balance between tackling extrem-ism, not alienating an increasingly religious Malayelectorate, and dealing with demands for greaterpolitical openness.

In order to illustrate that he is different fromMahathir,Abdullah will also face the need to rebuildinstitutions—particularly UMNO, the bureaucracyand the judiciary—which have weakened underMahathir’s tenure.To a greater degree than his pred-ecessor, he needs the institutions to consolidate hisown authority and thus has an incentive to bringabout changes. Each institution involves uniqueobstacles, but the common areas of reform areincreasing accountability, improving capability,addressing corruption, and promoting regenerationbased on merit rather than on personal loyalty.

Abdullah will have to decide which institutionshe is willing and capable of reforming. Of the three,he is most likely to address the bureaucracy in thearea of meritocracy. Abdullah had his roots in thebureaucracy during a period when meritocracy washighly valued. While Abdullah and his supportershave heralded the fight against corruption (rein-forced by his “Mr. Clean” image), his practical abil-ity to make changes will depend on the politicalspace he secures, which is unlikely to be significantin the short term.

The issue of meritocracy raises another challengefor Abdullah—tackling the legacy of the NewEconomic Policy (NEP), known officially since1990 as the National Development Policy. Therecent debate, largely driven by the need to increaseMalaysia’s economic competitiveness, has called intoquestion some of the NEP’s fundamentals, fromeducation quotas to ownership patterns. Abdullahwill need to maintain the support of the Malaycommunity, many of whom view the NEP as a

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PASSING THE MANTLE: A NEW LEADERSHIP FOR MALAYSIA

political cornerstone of their power, while at thesame time increasing competitiveness among Malaysthrough greater multi-ethnic competition.

Non-Malays, who perceive the policy as ethni-cally discriminatory, would receive favorably achange in the NEP. Chinese Malaysians increasinglybelieve that their political power is being eroded,largely because the number of Malays has growncompared to the other communities. Abdullah, likeMahathir earlier, is an unknown quantity. Abdullahwill need to shore up support among non-Malaysand show a commitment to minority rights withoutupsetting UMNO or the Malay community.

Abdullah’s main political task will be to rebuildMalay electoral support, a challenge that will deter-mine greatly his future within UMNO and credibil-ity as a national Malay leader. After his honeymoonperiod, he will have to address the legacy of theAnwar issue and the problem of weaker supportamong younger Malay voters. Meanwhile, he willhave to build an international profile in his own right.

In facing each of these challenges, Abdullah willhave to manage Mahathir, his predecessor.AlthoughMahathir is highly likely to retire from office, as hehas repetitively announced, he will not necessarilydepart from political life.Tunku Abdul Rahman, theonly other prime minister who passed the mantleduring his lifetime, continued to play a role as a reg-ular newspaper columnist and, in the 1980s, anactive supporter of key UMNO members in partyinfighting. Mahathir will likely play such a role aswell.Though it remains undefined, this role will par-ticularly take place on the international stage, whereMahathir has been increasingly active in the lastthird of his tenure.

EXPECTATIONS AND INCREMENTAL CHANGE

Change will likely occur slowly and incrementally,given the scope of elite contestation, AbdullahBadawi’s style, and the political dilemmas he willinherit. Some Malaysians want a slow pace, otherswill be less satisfied. Each of Abdullah’s predecessors,including Mahathir, established himself gradually.Time and political fortune will tell whetherAbdullah has the political acumen to emerge outfrom Mahathir’s shadow and be elected by UMNOmembers and Malaysians in his own right.

ENDNOTES

1. See A. B. Shamsul, “The Battle Royal: TheUMNO Elections of 1987,” Southeast Asian Affairs1988 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast AsianStudies, 1988), 170-88.“The ‘Battle Royal’: The UMNO Elections of1987,” in Mohammed Ayoob and Ng Chee Yuen(eds), Southeast Asian Affairs, 1988, 170-188.2. See Bridget Welsh, “Real Change?: Elections inthe Reformasi Era,” in Edmund Terence Gomez (ed.),The State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity and Reform(London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 162-193.3. Edmund Terence Gomez and K.S. Jomo, Malay-sia’s Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).4. See Ong Kian Ming and Bridget Welsh, Crisis andReaction: Malaysian Elections under the Microscope,manuscript in progress.5.A.C. Milner, Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on theEve of Colonial Rule (Tucson,Arizona: University ofArizona Press, 1982).

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PASSING THE MANTLE: A NEW LEADERSHIP FOR MALAYSIA

This autumn, Mahathir will step down aftermore than 22 years as prime minister ofMalaysia.The entire nation will look to his

successor Abdullah Ahmad Badawi to build onMahathir’s legacy, correct the mistakes of the past,and make decisions for the future.

For Malaysians my age and younger (I am nearly40), Mahathir is Malaysia. He is our history. In GoreVidal’s novel Duluth, a neon sign atop the tallestcommunications tower proclaims of the bustlingcity, “Love it or loathe it, you can never leave it orlose it.”These words could also refer to Mahathir.He is there wherever we look. The country isshaped by him; there is much to loathe and there’salso much to admire—but what choice do we have?

Certainly, Mahathir is the yardstick by which allsuccessive leaders will be judged. Can they be asfeisty? Can they be as steely and decisive under pres-sure? Can they be as quick? On the other hand, veryfew people realize that Dr. Mahathir is extremelydiffident and thoughtful in person. Those whowould seek to emulate him—his many followers—merely respond to his combativeness and ignore theother aspects of his personality.

Now that Mahathir is stepping down, how doMalaysians feel? There is no easy answer to thisquestion. Most have mixed feelings.They are trou-bled, uncertain and anxious in turns, but alsorelieved. It is time for Malaysia to move on. Thecountry cannot and will not tolerate any more Dr.Mahathir—but that does not mean that people donot acknowledge the extent of his achievements.Still, it is time for him to go, and we are glad that hehas seized the opportunity to leave at a juncturewhen public respect and admiration for him remainsextremely high.

THE WEIGHT OF HOPE

My greatest concern for Malaysia’s new governmentis that Abdullah Badawi is burdened heavily with the

weight of the nation’s expectations. Prominent politi-cians and people from all spectrums of Malaysian life,many of whom dislike one another intensely, havetold me they are pleased that Abdullah is taking over.That Abdullah has managed to persuade so many thathe is their “man” is well and good, at this stage. Butlater he will disappoint, because in Malaysia one cannever please the ulamas, the bureaucracy, the media,the NGOs, the business community and everyoneelse at the same time. It doesn’t happen because suchdiverse constituencies will inevitably be seeking verydifferent policy objectives.

So, what can we expect from the new govern-ment? First, I want to make clear that mine is not amainstream view. My opinions are those of a lawyerand a writer—two professions that are dislikedstrongly by the current prime minister. Moreover,those with a cosmopolitan and international out-look are to a large extent distrusted by Malay andIslamist nationalists (whether in PAS or UMNO),who are growing stronger every day. Viewpointssuch as mine are more or less sidelined withinMalaysia, no matter how much airspace we receiveoutside the country.

New Leadership, Heavy Expectations

KARIM RASLAN

Karim Raslan is a writer and senior partner of Raslan Loong, a leading corporate law firm in Kuala Lumpur.

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To be fair, I must acknowledge that AbdullahBadawi recognizes the important role that journal-ists, writers, and lawyers have to play. Malaysia’sfuture as a great trading nation depends on ourinternational profile, so we are given a bit of space.In fact, Malaysians with a cosmopolitan bent arekeenly awaiting the transition.We are fervently hop-ing that Abdullah will make a positive difference insuch areas as strengthening the judiciary and rule oflaw; loosening restrictions on the media; encourag-ing a more open and tolerant society; reducing cor-ruption; and improving relations with our neighbors(particularly our neighbor to the south; I’ve gone onrecord many times criticizing our dealings withSingapore).We are, perhaps, as guilty as any group ofprojecting onto Abdullah our hopes—of seeing himas “our man.”

Of course, one reason we must curb our expecta-tions is that Mahathir will still be around after heretires, looking after his legacy. Abdullah will notfind it easy to oppose or even alter the stated aimsand views of his predecessor, at least not for sometime. Having said that, it is highly unlikely thatAbdullah would even want to change much ofMahathir’s ambitious development agenda forMalaysia. In short, continuity will be maintained atall costs. I think Abdullah sees himself as the caretak-er of Mahathir’s legacy, tweaking the policies fromtime to time in order to ensure their continuingeffectiveness.

Therefore, Malaysians must realize—as manydo—that compromises are inevitable. Frankly, Ibelieve that the key compromises will be in thoseareas closest to my heart, the judiciary and themedia. It is clear, from the case of Anwar Ibrahimthat the judiciary remains under tight executive

scrutiny.As for the media, I do not expect to see theday when I am free from government control, freefrom constantly editing myself or being edited.

ABDULLAH BADAWI’S STRENGTHS

If I aim to be positive—and sometimes it’s usefulto be positive and not to be forever pushing downexpectations—I would point out that AbdullahBadawi is in many ways more patient and diplomat-ic than his predecessor. Mahathir is passionately fas-cinated with building things, and only thinks laterabout how they should be run and maintained.Abdullah, by comparison, recognizes that Malaysianeeds skills and knowledge to grow the infrastruc-ture investments, to improve Malaysia’s “software”and not just its “hardware.”I see recognition of theimportance of these issues, even among the eco-nomic team, which will be a handover from the pre-vious government.

I am also fairly upbeat on the issue of religion.Abdullah is extremely comfortable in this area. Hehas a deep and intuitive understanding of the HolyQur’an.Therefore, he is able to argue on issues relat-ed to Islam without having to rely on support andadvice from the religious establishment. He confi-dently deals with minor issues that flare up. Forexample, when a Malay girl was picked up forsinging in an establishment that served alcohol, hesimply inquired if all the Malaysia Airlines stew-ardesses would be similarly arrested.Thus, he man-ages to deflate situations through gentle depreca-tion. Of course, the inability of PAS to win over thenon-Muslim communities over the past few yearshas made the government’s position far less chal-lenging.

Abdullah Badawi likes to work for consensus—inthis way he differs from the prime minister. In asense, he will benefit from Mahathir’s havinginspired such vitriol. Mahathir’s combative personal-ity earns him many enemies.Abdullah, by compari-son, is difficult to hate—perhaps because he comesacross as a dull if likeable gentleman. In the arena ofinternational affairs his less abrasive personality willhave a substantial impact on Malaysia’s external rela-tions because, in the world of diplomacy, style is sub-stance. In this respect, dullness works to his advan-tage. But at times his toiling for consensus mayprove to be a liability. For example, he will seek to

That Abdullah has persuaded so manythat he is their “man” is well and good,at this stage. But later he will disappoint,because in Malaysia one can never pleasethe ulamas, the bureaucracy, the media,the NGOs, the business community andeveryone else at the same time.

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PASSING THE MANTLE: A NEW LEADERSHIP FOR MALAYSIA

build consensus in the civil service for his goals. Buteven in the 1980s, when the civil service was morecapable than now, Mahathir found it easier to push itaside and work instead with the private sector.

I am heartened by Abdullah’s talk of revisiting theNational Economic Policy (NEP), of how Malayparticipation in the economy could be reconfig-ured. Indeed, the government would do well to lookbeyond quantitative measures.We should be askingquestions about the qualitative nature of Malay par-ticipation in the economy. Discussing how much ofthe Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange is in Malayhands is a crude way of examining Malay economicachievement.We should probe deeper and ask:Whatother economic engines to growth exist? How canMalays be involved in these sectors? How can theybe equipped to participate fully? Certainly, newideas are being considered in the highest govern-ment circles, though whether they can be imple-mented is still questionable.A recent fiasco involvingshoddy, behind-schedule construction of schoolcomputer labs is only the latest scandal exposing theflaws of current NEP practices, despite the NEP’slaudable goals. I do feel that Abdullah has a slightlylower tolerance level for corruption than his prede-cessor.

What can be expected of new personnel? Therewill be many new faces after next year’s generalelection.To be sure, new faces do not guarantee achange in political culture, and I am not convincedthat the new members of parliament will be betterthan the old.The persistence of the political culturein Malaysia is why we depend on a few key figuresleading the way. If he does tackle corruption,Abdullah will have to set clear lines to keep the newgeneration in line. But having secured his mandate, Ihope he will be able to act.

Finally, the economy.The legitimacy of the gov-ernment and of the Barisan Nasional rides on theability to deliver the goods; that was why the eco-nomic crisis in 1997 was potentially crippling.Abdullah is not as familiar with economic matters ashe is with religious and other socio-political issues,so whether he can tackle corruption and inefficien-cy remains questionable. He will lean heavily onMahathir’s team in this area.

However, the changing international economiclandscape—the rise of China and the decline in for-eign direct investment—has altered the familiar

equation of multinational investments, exports anddramatic economic growth. Recent experiences inThailand have been noted at the highest levels of theMalaysian government, although it remains to beseen whether or not the authorities will adopt thesame set of economic policies with their emphasison stimulating domestic consumption. While thegovernment struggles to formulate a response tothese external changes, it is also faced with having totackle the legacy of the NEP’s heavy tilt towards theMalay/Muslim community and the need to reassessthe attendant inefficiencies.Abdullah will be judgedwith reference to his ability to overcome these twinchallenges.

I believe that Abdullah Badawi will be placing asubstantial emphasis on enhancing Malaysia’s com-petitiveness—addressing issues of corruption andcorporate governance, and also improving efficiencyin both the private and public sectors.The willing-

ness to reassess the once-sacrosanct NEP and con-sider the policy in the light of external cost pressuresis in many ways an extraordinary step forward.

CONCLUSION

As October’s political transition draws nearer,many Malaysians are remembering the passing awayof the second prime minister,Tun Razak. In the daysafter his death, a pact (essentially) was made thatsorted out the political landscape for the next 28years. Now people sense that October’s transitionand Abdullah’s selection of a deputy prime ministerwill determine the landscape for many decades tocome.Thus the elites are jockeying for position. Inmany ways—as Bridget Welsh writes in her essay inthis Special Report—the contestation will largely

One reason we must curb our expectationsis that Mahathir will still be around afterhe retires, looking after his legacy. . . .Frankly, I believe that the key compromis-es will be in those areas closest to myheart, the judiciary and the media.

take place behind the scenes without spilling overinto the public at large. But the public feels a mix ofanxiety, disquiet, relief and hopefulness.

Malaysians can hope for change in many areasthat affect the broader society, especially for leader-ship in issues of religious morality. However, we mayhave to wait a long time for better courts and betternewspapers. As mentioned above, transformation isunlikely to occur in areas where people like myself—lawyers and writers—are active. However, thereare glimmers of hope; to hope too much is demoral-izing, but to hope too little is dispiriting.

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PASSING THE MANTLE: A NEW LEADERSHIP FOR MALAYSIA

Post-Mahathir Malaysia: Coasting Along

M. BAKRI MUSA

M. Bakri Musa is a columnist for Malaysiakini (Malaysia Today).

The recurring refrain from Kuala Lumpurthese days is that there will be no majorshifts in policies with Prime Minister

Mahathir’s retirement in October 2003.This refrainis meant to reassure foreigners and natives alike.However, I feel anything but reassured by the gov-ernment’s clinging to the status quo.

After 23 years of dominant and often domineer-ing leadership, Mahathir’s departure calls for amuch-needed reappraisal of his policies. Insofar asthe policies have been effective, the nation haschanged—should not we therefore need a differentapproach to reflect the new reality? On the otherhand, if policies have failed, then there is all themore reason to jettison them.

To suggest that a major reassessment is unneces-sary is a cop-out, an abrogation of responsibility?anddemonstrates an inability to escape Mahathir’sauthoritarian presence even after his stepping down.

Mahathir has truly been, to use James McGregorBurns’ terminology, a transforming leader.1 Thecountry’s physical transformation is obvious uponlanding at the gleaming new international airport,driving along the smooth undulating freeways, orviewing the capital city’s impressive skyline. Suchachievements are even more remarkable when oneconsiders the generally sorry state of many pluralsocieties, such as Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka.

While Mahathir’s admirers may run out ofsuperlatives to describe his achievements, his detrac-tors do not lack for ammunition either.The judici-ary, once the envy of the region, is today a mereshadow of its former glory. It has been a long timesince any chief justice left the bench with reputationintact, let alone enhanced. Similarly, schools are adisgrace. In the 1970s, Mahathir was hailed as avisionary when he replaced English with Malay inthe schools. Now he is desperately trying to reversethat move, the folly of which has become obvious.2

Perversely, in an Orwellian twist, he is again hailed ahero for his U-turn. He would prefer that we do not

recall his earlier zeal.I will examine Mahathir’s legacy from the per-

spective of “what might have been.” Such a perspec-tive will point to where a post-Mahathir leadershipshould direct itself.

This essay will examine how Mahathir’s promisewas not realized. Just as bright students—not averageones—disappoint a teacher the most, by not reach-ing their potential, so it is with national leaders.Great leaders who do not achieve great heights arethe most disappointing.

Mahathir is the most effective leader in Malaysianhistory, though he had some illustrious predecessors.Yet there he was, on the 20th anniversary of his rule,tearfully lamenting having failed at what he consid-ered his most important mission—to change themental and cultural attitudes of Malays.3 We couldargue that the man may be too hard on himself, as iscommon among high achievers. Nonetheless, in thatpublic confession, the pathos was real. I venture thathe has a keen sense of “what might have been.”

I will explore four areas: his leadership style; hisviews on race; his attitude towards the West, and hisrelationship with the Islamists.

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LEADERSHIP STYLE

When Mahathir became prime minister in 1981, his“clean, trustworthy, and efficient” administrationtook the country by storm. He made a big show ofwearing a nametag and signing in for work everymorning—always early, of course.This was highlysymbolic, for in Malaysia only peons and janitorswore nametags.A more cynical view would be thathe had effectively reduced the chief-executive posi-tion to a nine-to-five timecard job.

He buckled down to serious business immediate-ly, barking out “initiatives a million a minute,” toquote Musa Hitam, his deputy at the time. He had aPentium V chip compared to his predecessor’s 286.

Mahathir’s style is often described as autocraticand dictatorial.To me, it was more a one-man show.He succeeded in turning the whole nation into hisecho chamber, where his every utterance gets rever-berated and amplified, drowning all others. Andtherein lies the problem.

One consequence is that everything he says goes,and nothing gets done without his approval. Hecentralized decision-making under the pretext ofefficiency.The result was a command and controlstructure that even the old Soviet system could envy.

Such tight control spills into the private sector. Inthe United States, an entrepreneur with a promisingproduct or idea first tests it in the marketplace. InMalaysia, you seek an audience with Mahathir. Ifyou can sell it to him, then the doors are wide open.Banks will readily finance you, and you become thegovernment’s favored vendor.

Budding entrepreneurs learn quickly that to suc-ceed they do not need to pay attention to clients orcustomers but must rather suck up to the politicallypowerful.The road to riches is not through creating

and building, but through getting the right contactsand contracts.This is true anywhere, but especiallypervasive in Mahathir’s Malaysia. Mahathir created aclass not of builders and creators, but of rent collec-tors and parasites.

A measure of this pernicious influence is thatduring the economic crisis of 1997, the top tenborrowers hogged a staggering US$36 billion ofthe non-performing loans, with the top two bag-ging a whopping US$20 billion.4 Those borrow-ers were the fortunate few who had Mahathir’simprimatur.

I have observed that the more effective a leaderis, the less well known he is abroad. Conversely, themost incompetent and corrupt leaders regularlymake the headlines. Saddam Hussein is only the lat-est example. Few in the world could name the lead-ers of Taiwan or South Korea; yet they have doneimmense good for their citizens. The West hardlynoticed Mahathir during the first half of his tenure.I’m sure that this was fine with him, for Malaysiathrived under his stewardship. In the less effectivesecond half of his rule, however, just about everyoneabroad heard of him, in keeping with my observa-tion.

Mahathir’s defiance of the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) following the 1997 econom-ic crisis, once ridiculed, is now widely viewed asparticularly prescient.To be praised by economistsmust gratify him greatly.5 But lost amidst the lauda-tory praises is the basic question: How did Malaysiaend up in the mess in the first place?

Mahathir reminds me of a surgeon whose patientfirst suffers a setback before being salvaged skillfully.Everyone is in awe—until someone asks the basicquestion: “Doctor, what brought on the setback?”How could mere currency speculation crippleMalaysia’s economy?

Another consequence of this powerful one-manshow is the “big oak” effect, which overshadowsnew growth. Mahathir once quipped that he wouldlike to be succeeded by his clone. Alas, there is noyoung Mahathir out there.This, more than anythingelse, is the most glaring failure of his leadership.Takea look at Mahathir’s cabinet.The three most seniormembers have served collectively 70 years.To some,this situation reflects solid experience; to me, sclero-sis and inertia. More tellingly, these same three haveless than seven years private-sector experience

Younger leaders—the products of today’ssegregated schools—are strangers toeach other. These leaders aggravateracial polarization. . . .And after a gen-eration of preferential treatment, Malaysfeel no more competitive.

between them, all at very low levels.When AbdullahAhmad Badawi (Mahathir’s successor-to-be) wasoutside the government in 1990, the best he coulddo was to become a travel agent—in his sister-in-law’s company! This was the market valuation of histalent and experience, despite having served as edu-cation, foreign, and defense minister.

The legacy of a parent is a child; of a leader, a suc-cessor. For Mahathir, that legacy is Abdullah Badawi.

While his party UMNO is starved of talent andremains stuck to its tradition-bound feudal ways,Mahathir ironically has successfully transformed thegreater Malaysian society. Nowhere is this changemore dramatically demonstrated than in their atti-tude towards their leaders, much to Mahathir’s cha-grin.

Three decades ago, when the prime ministerstruggled to cope with the aftermath of the 1969race riots, few dared to call for his resignation.Theexception? One young Mahathir, who did it in thedeferential and oblique manner befitting a peasantconfronting his feudal lord.6

Today, reflecting the success of Mahathir’s poli-cies, communications between ruler and ruled areneither formal nor deferential. A few years ago,when Malaysians were outraged over Mahathir’streatment of his erstwhile deputy, Anwar Ibrahim,they were not in the least restrained in expressingtheir displeasure.A young Mahathir would no doubtapprove this new assertiveness, but an elderMahathir feels otherwise.

RACE RELATIONS

Who would have thought that Mahathir, oncetagged an ultra (as in “ultra-chauvinist”) for uncom-promisingly championing Malay rights, would todaycount on non-Malays as his staunchest and mostreliable supporters?

Malaysia is a plural nation.This reality could beleveraged into an asset, or by default it becomes aliability. And what a liability! Rwanda and theBalkans are ghastly reminders. But if we could tapthe richness in the diversity of cultures and lan-guages, then Malaysians would be at a significantcompetitive advantage in this increasingly globalizedworld. Malaysians abroad for example, adapt remark-ably well simply because they are used to culturaldiversity at home.

Two generations after independence, a commonMalaysian identity still eludes the nation.Three fac-tors contribute to this lack of identity: 1) raciallysegregated schools, 2) race-based political parties,and 3) affirmative action.

Malaysian schools today are much more segregat-ed than during British rule. In colonial times, segre-gation was imposed, part of a strategy of “divide andconquer.” Today, however, Malaysians choose toremain apart. The increasing emphasis on Islamicstudies in the national stream since the 1980s droveaway non-Muslim students. Far from bringing theyoung together, today’s schools reinforce ethnicidentity.

Malaysia’s race-based parties have been remark-ably successful in ensuring that no group is political-ly marginalized. This contributes immensely toracial harmony. It is also much more transparent andeffective than the awkward gerrymandering indrawing up U.S. Congressional districts.The successof the Malaysian formula is attributable to strongbonds between senior leaders formed during theirschool and college days. Such bonds ease politicaland other differences. However, younger leaders—products of today’s segregated schools—are strangersto each other.These leaders aggravate racial polar-ization by blatantly pandering to the prejudices oftheir most chauvinistic followers.

Malaysia’s preferential policy also contributes todivisiveness in society. Few would argue with itsnoble intent of reducing inequities, or quibble that itis a drag on the economy. Besides, such inefficiencieswere a necessary price for social stability.The 1969riot was a rude awakening. Moreover, some econo-mists have now shown that gross inequities canimpede economic growth.7

Yet after a generation of preferential treatment,Malays—the primary beneficiaries—feel no morecompetitive. Mahathir himself has declared his dis-satisfaction with the program.To be fair, it has manysuccesses, especially in education, but even thesesuccesses have led to problems. For example, a gen-eration ago any Malay scholarship recipient wasalmost certainly a poor villager, the first in his fami-ly to go to college. Today that probability hasdropped significantly. Unmodified, special privilegesrisk degenerating into a massive entitlement pro-gram instead of reaching the population they weredesigned for.

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PASSING THE MANTLE: A NEW LEADERSHIP FOR MALAYSIA

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Initially, non-Malays supported—or at leastresignedly accepted—preferential policies. Today,they resent such programs,which make them feel lessMalaysian. Many, especially the highly talented, haveemigrated.Their loss is only now being realized.

The challenge is how to enhance the competi-tiveness of all Malaysians, Malays especially.Todayaffirmative action is not the solution; it is the prob-lem. Had the billions squandered on creaky govern-ment corporations in the name of helping Malaysbeen used to improve schools and universities,Malays and Malaysia would definitely be better off.And so too would Mahathir’s legacy.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mahathir had little exposure to the West in hisformative years. His only experience was with colo-nial rulers and British professors in Singapore. Atthat time, British academics tended to be aloof andimperious, only reinforcing Mahathir’s negativeviews. He does not care to hide his anti-Westernprejudices. In his farewell speech at his party’sGeneral Assembly, he unleashed his venom, labelingAnglo-Saxons as “greedy and war-like.”8

The old man’s racial hang-ups are not importantin themselves, but when he expresses them in hiscapacity as leader, it impacts negatively on Malaysia.Mahathir has been especially insufferable sincebeing proven right in defying the IMF. In hiswarped mind this incident confirmed the evil inten-tions of the West, especially of the United States.

The United States is Malaysia’s biggest tradingpartner. Any shrewd businessman knows that youhumor your best customer, yet Malaysian leaderstake perverse pleasure in tweaking America.Amazingly, despite the obvious importance of theUnited States to Malaysia, no local university offers a

program in U.S. studies.At the last UMNO GeneralAssembly, Najib Razak (whom Mahathir openlyfavors to be the next Deputy Prime Minister) sug-gested that Malaysian universities should haveSchools of Occidental Studies, not for the purposeof legitimate academic pursuit but, in his words,“sowe could better understand our enemy.” And thischaracter has the gumption to believe that he is theright man to lead Malaysia!

Malaysia shares much in common with theUnited States. Our Islamic faith shares a commonheritage with Christianity and Judaism. Malaysiareceived its alphabet from the West and demograph-ically is more like America than the ethnicallyhomogenous East Asian countries that Mahathir sofancies. Mahathir’s anti-Western sentiment saddensme for another reason—he and Malaysia could havebeen an effective bridge between the Islamic worldand the West.

The casual foreign observer of the United Stateseasily confuses the aberrant with the norm.Americawith its inkblot messiness is a Rorschach test; whatis viewed as “America” reveals more about theobserver than the observed. Some travel toWashington, D.C. and see only potholes andpornography shops, others the Smithsonian and theNational Institutes of Health.

Abdullah Badawi has even less exposure to theWest and to capitalism. I therefore expect him tocontinue Mahathir’s pattern of seeing the blightrather than the best of the West.

CO-OPTING POLITICAL ISLAM

Mahathir is without doubt the most pious Malaysianleader. His predecessor, the Tunku, gambled at theracetrack, entertained with dancing girls, and openlyadmitted to drinking whisky nightcaps.Yet few crit-icized him. When they did, he pled disarmingly,“Those are my weaknesses!” By contrast, we seeMahathir—who does not even smoke and quotesliberally the Qur’an and Hadith—reviled by theIslamists!

They mock him for his illiteracy in Arabic, thelanguage of Islam. To the Islamists, the more heexpounds on certain Islamic issues, the more ridicu-lous he looks. It is a little as if someone illiterate inEnglish tried to expound on the subtleties ofShakespeare’s characters.

It might well take someone with thereligious pedigree of Abdullah Badawi toshrink the Islamic establishment andmodernize Islamic schools, just as ittook a Nixon to go to China.

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PASSING THE MANTLE: A NEW LEADERSHIP FOR MALAYSIA

When Mahathir enticed Anwar Ibrahim, theMuslim Youth Movement leader, into the govern-ment, many regarded the stroke as a brilliant coup.Alas, the result was not the union of two comple-mentary movements. The two men were merelyirrepressible ideologues bent on political gain.Exploitative relationships, political or personal,rarely endure.

Mahathir’s intent was to blunt the growingIslamist movement by co-opting its most charismat-ic leader.Anwar saw it as his divine mission to rescueUMNO from its infidel ways, and in the processsecure for himself a comfortable government job.The surprise is that their relationship lasted so long.

Mahathir’s mistake was not in failing to separatereligion from politics, as all his wise predecessorsdid, but in arrogantly believing that he could controland tame the Islamist beast, instead of keeping it atbay. He offered bribes to the Islamists—though notovertly as to offend their religiosity. He gave lushgovernment jobs to those willing to toe the partyline. He vastly expanded the religious establishment,which is nothing more than a massive public worksproject for otherwise unemployable Islamic Studiesgraduates.

The more Mahathir feeds the Islamist monster,the more demanding it gets. Now it dictates what itwants, and it wants Mahathir. Interestingly, thegreater Muslim world holds Mahathir in highesteem.

When Mahathir recently terminated funding forIslamic schools in an attempt to curtail the influenceof the Islamists, he played right into their hands. Amore enlightened strategy would have been toincrease the funding, but tie it to modernizing thecurriculum. By doing so, he would be not abandon-ing those precious young minds, but preparing thembetter for the real world, a strategy that would haveendeared him to students, parents and teachers.

Mahathir’s expansion of the religious schools andestablishment had another unintended and undesir-able effect. It diverted scarce Malay talent into thenon-productive pursuit of religious studies, leavingeven fewer to pursue the sciences.

The tasks facing the government are to shrinkthe Islamic establishment and to modernize Islamicschools, so that they become less like seminaries andmore like U.S. Catholic schools and colleges, pro-ducing their share of scientists and professionals.

Such schools would increase Malay competitiveness,in turn enhancing race relations.

It might well take someone with the religiouspedigree of Abdullah Badawi to accomplish thesetasks, just as it took a Nixon to go to China.

A PREVIEW OF PAK ‘LAH’S RULE—NOT REASSURING

Abdullah Badawi has boasted that taking over fromMahathir would be “a piece of cake.” He is eitheroverestimating his talent or too naive to recognizethe challenges.Time will tell, but he has given usample preview.

He bravely talks of the “New Malay Dilemma”—weaning Malays off special privileges9—but seemsblissfully unaware of the difficulties that would entail.The hordes of “entrepreneurs” and rent seekers whoare accustomed to juicy government favors will nottake kindly to any decrease in government munifi-cence.The same goes for the generation hooked onspecial privileges.

A “preview” of Abdullah Badawi’s managementability can be had in the one department under hisjurisdiction—the police, which is consistentlyranked low in public esteem. For example, thepolice’s muzzling of the media frequently backfires,as when Malaysiakini (the Internet publication for

which I write) was raided in January. 10 The govern-ment’s already tenuous credibility that the informa-tion technology sector would be spared censorshiphas been damaged.

On his appointment as home minister in 1999,Abdullah Badawi was asked about the notoriousInternal Security Act (ISA). He raised his right handand solemnly said, “This hand has never signed anorder for the ISA.”That reassured many.Well, thatwas then—today, that hand is soiled.

Recently the Economist printed some mildlyuncomplimentary comments on Mahathir. Someonemust have brought that fact to Abdullah’s attention,

If “Pak ‘Lah” (Uncle Abdullah) is trulyan expression of respect, why does no onecall Dr. Mahathir “Pak ‘Thir”?

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ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

for he immediately orchestrated a protest against thepublication, no doubt to impress his boss. Abdullahmust not have read the original piece. If he had, hewould have noticed that the Economist made evenmore disparaging remarks about him!11

As a former bureaucrat, Abdullah Badawi has anundying faith in the civil service. But today thatinstitution has changed from past years.The declineis clear to anyone reading the daily headlines or,more practically, trying to renew a driver’s license.The civil service is insular, promotes strictly fromwithin, and tends to recruit liberal-arts graduatesfrom local universities with limited English fluencyand abysmal quantitative skills.

Malaysians endearingly refer to Abdullah Badawias “Pak ‘Lah” (Uncle Abdullah). But in a Malay vil-lage, someone is called “Pak” when he is no longerin the loop—when he is included in the conversa-tion merely out of courtesy. If “Pak ‘Lah” is truly anexpression of respect, why does no one call Dr.Mahathir, “Pak Mahathir” or “Pak ‘Thir”? Anyonewho dared do so would get a cold searing glare ashis reply.

To his credit, Abdullah Badawi has not suc-cumbed to the subtle yet intense pressure fromMahathir to name a deputy. If he can break traditionand bypass the next tier of UMNO leaders weanedon money politics, then he will be doing himselfand Malaysia a great service. He would need to casthis net deep and wide. But in truth, I do not see himgoing against tradition.

Mahathir’s departure should, in theory, encouragegreater pluralism, but it also risks greater chaos.Malaysians have yet to learn to disagree agreeably, askill requiring patience and practice that Malaysiansnever had opportunity to develop under Mahathir.Already the warlords in UMNO are emboldened,anticipating his departure. UMNO risks degenerat-ing into an Afghanistan, with Abdullah Badawi itsHamed Karzai, minus the sartorial elegance.

In 1969, fear of UMNO’s losing power triggeredthe nation’s worse race riot. I do not anticipate similarhostilities today because the demographics and racedynamics have changed significantly. However, theIslamic party’s winning of more seats nationally than

UMNO would certainly fracture the Malays severelyand precipitate a calamity of even greater proportions.

Abdullah Badawi’s admirable qualities are hishonesty and humility—scarce commodities inpoliticians anywhere. So when he declares that hewill maintain Mahathir’s policies, I believe him. ButI do hope that he is merely saying that now out ofdeference to “Pak ‘Thir,” and will see things differ-ently when he is his own man. If he does not, thanexpect Malaysia to merely coast along.

ENDNOTES

1. James MacGregor Burns, Transforming Leadership.A New Pursuit of Happiness (New York: AtlanticMonthly Press, 2003).2.“Looking Back to English,” The New Straits Times(Malaysia), May 7, 2002.3. Mahathir, “Malays Forget Easily” (speech toUMNO General Assembly, June 21, 2001),www.pmo.gov.my.4.“Malaysia’s Biggest Borrowers,” www.freemalaysia.com/borrowers_chart.htm 5. Robert J Barro, “Malaysia Could Do No WorseThan This,” Businessweek, November 2, 1998.6. Mahathir bin Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma(Singapore: Donald Moore for Asia Pacific Press,1970).7. Donald R. Snodgrass, Zainal Aznam Yusof, andIshak Shari, Managing Economic Growth Amid EthnicDiversity: Malaysia 1970-1990 (Cambridge: HarvardStudies in International Development, HarvardUniversity Press, 2000).8. Mahathir, “Our Future Threat,” speech to theUMNO General Assembly, June 19, 2003)www.pmo.gov.my.9. Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, “The New MalayDilemma” (speech on Harvard Business SchoolAlumni Club on “Managing Malaysia in the NewGlobal Economy, Kuala Lumpur, February 21.2002)www.pmo.gov.my.10. Steven Gan, “The Day They Took OurComputers,” Malaysiakini, January 28, 2003.11. “The Changing of the Guard,” The Economist,April 3, 2003

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Special Report No. 111 - China’s Economy: Will the Bubble Burse?Charles Wolf Jr., Thomas G. Rawski, Deborah S. Davis, June 2003

Special Report No. 110 - Piety and Pragmatism: Trends in Indonesian Islamic PoliticsR. William Liddle, Mohamad Ihsan Alief, Hidayat Nurwahid and Zulkieflimansyah, April 2003

Special Report No. 109 - Durable Democracy: building the Japanese StateJohn W. Dower, Donald L. Robinson, Franziska Seraphim, March 2003

Special Report No. 108 - Crisis in the Hinterland: Rural Discontent in ChinaJean C. Oi, Xiaobo Lu, Yawei Liu, February 2003

Special Report No. 107 - The Demographic Dilemma: Japan’s Aging SocietyPaul S. Hewitt, John Creighton Campbell, Chikako Usui, January 2003

Special Report No. 106 - Toward Oil and Gas Cooperation in Northeast Asia: New Opportunities for Reducing Dependence on the Middle EastSelig S. Harrison, December 2002

Special Report No. 105 - The 16th CCP Congress and Leadership Transition in ChinaS. Shirk, H. Lyman Miller, G. Lin, L. Dittmer, C. Li, D. Shambaugh, R. Baum, September 2002

Special Report No. 104 - China’s Credibility Gap: Public Opinion and Instability in ChinaMartin King Whyte, Jie Chen, Edward Friedman, Yongming Zhou, August 2002

Special Report No. 103 - China Enters the WTO: The Death Knell for State-Owned Enterprises?Dorothy J. Solinger, Lawrence C. Reardon, June 2002

Special Report No. 102 - Scholars under Siege? Academic and Media Freedom in ChinaPerry Link, Richard Madsen, Chin-Chuan Lee, Yongming Zhou, April 2002

An electronic copy of any publication can be obtained by visiting the Asia Program’s Web site at http://www.wilson-center.org/asia.

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PASSING THE MANTLE: A NEW LEADERSHIP FOR MALAYSIA

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ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

THE WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARSLee H. Hamilton, Director

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