SONOMA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS MEETING Infrastructure Recovery Workshop

February 27, 2018

AGENDA

9:15 a.m. EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM • Jim Colangelo, Interim Director, Sonoma County Fire & Emergency Services• Aaron Abbott, Executive Director, REDCOM• Kiergan Pegg, Administrative Services Officer II, Sonoma County Human Services• Graham Kent, Director, University of Nevada Reno Seismology Lab• Chris Godley, Former Emergency Manager for the City of San Jose and Marin County• Kevin Lacefield, GIS Programmer Analyst, County of Sonoma ISD• Renee Domingo, Former Director of Emergency Services and Homeland Security, City of

Oakland• Jason Boaz, Fire Chief, Healdsburg Fire Department• Jim Colangelo, Interim Director, Sonoma County Fire & Emergency Services

11:00 a.m. PREPARING FOR A MORE RESILIENT COUNTY • Sally Ziolkowski, Deputy, FEMA National Preparedness Division• Joel Palmer, Branch Chief, FEMA National Preparedness Division• Michael Brooks, Community Preparedness Officer, FEMA National Preparedness Division• Chris Godley, Former Emergency Manager for the City of San Jose and Marin County• Bijan Karimi, Assistant Deputy Director, San Francisco Emergency Management• Dave Flamm, Deputy Director, Santa Clara Office of Emergency Management• Paul Hess, Emergency Manager, Alameda County Office of Homeland Security and

Emergency Services• Pace Stokes, Captain, Alameda County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency

Services• Neil Bregman, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, Santa Rosa Fire Department• Maggie Lang, Coordinator, Marin County Community Emergency Response Team• Brendan Kearney, UASI Program Manager, Sonoma County Fire & Emergency Services• Jim Colangelo, Interim Director, Sonoma County Fire & Emergency Services

2:30 p.m. FIRE SAFETY AND UTILITY INFRASTRUCTURE • Elizaveta Malashenko, Director – Safety and Enforcement, California Public Utilities

Commission

3:15 p.m. IMPACT OF FIRE ON INFRASTRUCTURE • Joannes Hoevertsz, Director, Department of Transportation and Public Works• Jay Jasperse, Chief Engineer and Director of Groundwater Management, Sonoma County

Water Agency

3:30 p.m. BOARD DISCUSSION AND DIRECTION TOWARDS OUR STRATEGIC RECOVERY PLAN

Sonoma County Board of Supervisors Infrastructure Recovery Workshop February 27, 2018

Workshop Goals:

By hearing from and engaging with a combination of County staff and key partners, the BOS will:

1. Gain consensus on vision and direction for recovery and long-term infrastructure agenda 2. Ensure alignment around strategies for immediate implementation by County departments and

empower staff to pursue and implement such strategies and related projects 3. Solidify what role(s) the BOS and County departments will play – implementer, facilitator,

convener, innovator, etc. 4. Demonstrate to the public and key partners that the County is serious about a bold agenda for

infrastructure; that it fully intends to deepen collaboration with the nine cities while making sure unincorporated “hamlets” also benefit from the agenda; that it recognizes that continuing the status quo use of tools and approaches will no longer serve the interests of the County or its residents.

*Denotes Action Item

TIME TOPIC AREAS TO BE COVERED PRESENTERS 9:15 a.m. – 11:00 a.m. 1. EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM

a) OES Report b) Challenges to Emergency Alerting

c) Types of Detection/Alert Systems*

d) Planning

e) Process for Making Recommendations

to the Board of Supervisors

Jim Colangelo Aaron Abbott Kiergan Pegg Graham Kent Chris Godley Renee Domingo Jason Boaz Jim Colangelo

11:00 a.m. – 12:00 p.m. 1:30 p.m. – 2:30 p.m.

2. PREPARING FOR A MORE RESILIENT COUNTY a) Community Preparedness

b) Emergency Management Models

c) Coordination with Cities

Sally Ziolkowski Joel Palmer Michael Brooks Chris Godley Bijan Karimi Dave Flamm Paul Hess Pace Stokes Jim Colangelo Neil Bregman

d) Community Involvement*

e) COOP/COG

f) Process for Making Recommendations to the BOS

Maggie Lang Brendan Kearney Jim Colangelo

2:30 p.m. – 3:15 p.m. 3. FIRE SAFETY AND UTILITY INFRASTRUCTURE a) Undergrounding Utilities b) Rolling Blackouts c) Vegetation Management d) Hardening of Utilities e) Situational Awareness Roads

Elizaveta Malashenko

3:15 p.m. - 3:30 p.m. 4. IMPACT OF FIRE ON INFRASTRUCTURE a) Roads b) Water Supply/Pressure*

Johannes Hoevertsz Jay Jasperse

3:30 p.m. 5. BOARD DISCUSSION AND DIRECTION TOWARDS OUR STRATEGIC RECOVERY PLAN

Lessons from the North Bay Fires and Alert Fire Camera systems A coalition of universities led by the University of Nevada, Reno, UC San Diego and the University of Oregon have been deploying a new breed of IP (Internet-Protocol)-enabled, early detection fire cameras in and around Lake Tahoe (AlertTahoe), Nevada (BLM Wildland Fire Camera System), San Diego County (Alert SDG&E Cameras)—with expansion now taking place in Oregon and Idaho through BLM. The AlertWildfire system of 50+ HD cameras is built upon a private and hardened microwave-based communications network originally developed to transfer seismic data in real-time. These systems are revolutionizing fire suppression from reactive to proactive, reducing the size, impact, and public costs of wildfires. The AlertWildfire network provides a 21st century solution to this challenge by connecting firefighters and federal/state/local agencies with real-time streaming video of fire activity information across a broad geographical range, enhanced by modern HD and 4K near-infrared cameras with pan-tilt-zoom capability. This system provides high quality, on demand time-lapse imagery through public websites to support both proactive firefighting to help prevent fire outbreaks from reaching a catastrophic size, and keeping the public up-to-date in real-time on the size and scope of fires within the AlertWildfire networks. As an example of use, the AlertTahoe and BLM Wildland networks were involved with 108 fires in 2016 and 207 fires in 2017. AlertSDG&E Cameras spun up this October (2017) have already been involved in 30+ fires in only its first few months, including the Lilac Fire on December 7th. The economic benefit of a comprehensive integrated network of modern high-resolution fire monitoring cameras for remote public lands and near population centers is unquestionable. Rising costs to federal agencies for fire suppression increased to historical levels in 2017, where federal agencies spent a record $2.5+ billion dollars on fire suppression. The 2016 fire suppression costs in California pegs in at a remarkable $1.85 billion dollars. As the pace of fire fighting costs and economic damages continue to dramatically increase over time, early fire detection must be part of the solution to bend the cost curve downward to ensure sustainability. Although fire discovery on the camera system is the gold standard, the greatest benefit thus far is the quick assessment of a fire when called in via 911. Without a camera system, dispatch can launch a spotter

plane, send a truck to a hilltop — or at best an educated guess what to send. Through the AlertWildfire system, a camera is turned and within seconds the size and scope of the fire is known, and reaction can be adjusted upward or downward relative to some base response. A downward adjustment can save up to $100K per incident, whereas an upward adjustment can be critical in knocking down the fire before it gets too large—and makes its run. Thus, the more practical advantage of camera networks, as we have found in working with federal fire agencies in California and Nevada, are “actionable intelligence” and “situational awareness”, often in the early stages of a wildfire. The BLM, USFS, CalFire and local fire districts have provided testimonials, in the media and elsewhere, to the assistance that well placed high-resolution remotely controlled cameras provide, both on the ground for fire fighter safety and for fire management teams at incident command centers making critical decisions to direct fire fighting resources. The public also enjoys access to these capabilities, effectively crowd-sourcing fire observation network-wide. Citizens also use the websites during emergencies to understand their own situational awareness—and the web traffic

North Bay Wildfire Scenario: Under most circumstances, the AlertWildfire system can play a critical role in turning the tables, and help diminish the size of wildfires through early detection/assessment. During high wind events, such as those observed in the North Bay Fires, would this fire camera system been useful? The answer is an unqualified —yes! Although the “ideal” of knocking down every incident during these catastrophic firestorms is not reasonable (given 14 near simultaneous starts), yet early situational awareness afforded by the camera network would have quickly confirmed the magnitude of the event unfolding. Within minutes, time lapse would have confirmed explosive behavior and the immediate need for evacuation. An AlertNorthBay fire camera system would have also been accessible to the public throughout the incident, allowing another opportunity for citizens to make a decision regarding their egress. During a similar event in Tahoe, 2016, a wire slap event started the Emerald Fire (near South Lake Tahoe), quickly becoming a defensive fire fighting action. To make matters worse, an arsonist, lit a fire dead-center on the Angels Roost fire camera already watching the Emerald Fire and that 2nd fire (near hundreds of homes) was hit hard and extinguished quickly during this high wind event. More importantly, a lack of quality, actionable information during a fire storm is, and will always be, a situation further endangering the lives of fire fighters, public servants and the public.

dramatically increases during urban-wildland interface fires (e.g., 2017 Lilac Fire, San Diego County, 360 GB in 24 hours).

Any device. Any time.

www.SoCoAlert.con

707-565-1369

LOCAL ALERTS FOR LOCAL EMERGENCIES

Public Safety Officials create and send emergency

messages to the public through SoCoAlert.

SoCo Alert Registration as of 33 Feb 2018 All Call Data Audit Count: 249,993 - If Sonoma County launched a county-wide all-call today we’d be dialing 249,993 records. Sonoma County’s 2016 est. Census Population is 503,070, the estimated household count would be about 200,000. Total CNE Registration as of 2/22/2018 - This is the citizen opt-in count, 28,509 telephone records, 22,424 text addresses and 12,057 emails Business: 655 Residential: 21,937 Phones: 28,509 Texts: 22,424 Email: 12,057 National Call as of 2/22/2018 - This is the data that we provided the county as part of our service Business: 17,682 Residential: 130,040 Phones: 147,722 Client Supplied as of 2/22/2018 – This is the 911 data that Sonoma County provided us Business: 29,408 Residential:73,730 Phones: 100,708 Total Database as of 2/22/2018 Business: 47,745 Residential: 225,707 Phones: 298,185 Texts: 22,626 Email: 17,351

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500Ap

ril-1

6

April

-16

May

-16

May

-16

June

-16

June

-16

July

-16

July

-16

Augu

st-1

6

Augu

st-1

6

Sept

embe

r-16

Sept

embe

r-16

Oct

ober

-16

Oct

ober

-16

Oct

ober

-16

Nov

embe

r-16

Nov

embe

r-16

Dece

mbe

r-16

Dece

mbe

r-16

Janu

ary-

17

Janu

ary-

17

Febr

uary

-17

Febr

uary

-17

Mar

ch-1

7

Mar

ch-1

7

April

-17

April

-17

April

-17

May

-17

May

-17

June

-17

June

-17

July

-17

July

-17

Augu

st-1

7

Augu

st-1

7

Sept

embe

r-17

Sept

embe

r-17

Sept

embe

r-17

SoCoAlert Enrollments to Date

Sum of Residential per Month Running Total

SoCoAlert Advertising Trial Period

2016 -2017 Winter StormsSawmill Fire;

Preparedness Month

Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office Nixile Registrations

As of October 8, 2017: 31,260 Registrations

As of February 22, 2018: 297,824

Backgroundo fWEAE nhancements

• 2006 – WARN Act passed by Congress• 2008 – Original WEA rules and regulations• 2012 – WEA system operational• 2013 – CSRIC IV review rules, recommend changes– 3 of 31 members from emergency management discipline– Submitted final report to FCC October 2014

• 2015 – CSRIC V recommended additional changes– 10 of 48 members from emergency management discipline– Submitted final report to FCC September 2016

• 2016 – New WEA rules and regulations

1

1

WEAImprovements

• Increase message length from 90 to 360 characters– 2.5 years (May 2019)

• Add new alert category, “Public Safety Messages”– 2.5 years (May 2019)

• Support URLs and phone numbers– 30 days for text URLs and phone numbers (Nov 2016)– 1 year for “clickable” URLs and phone numbers (Nov 2017)

• Spanish language WEA– 2 years (Nov 2018)

• WEA test code– 2.5 years (May 2019)

2

2

FCCFurtherNotice ofProposed Rulemaking(a.k.a. U nderC onsideration) • Defining the Modes of Participation in WEA

– What do “in whole” and “in part” really mean?

• Infrastructure Functionality– Is WEA really available everywhere there’s coverage?

• Alert Message Preservation– Review old messages on the phone

• Earthquake Prioritization– Alert delivery in less than 3 seconds, or your pizza is free

• Disaster Relief Messaging– Many-to-one messaging

• Multimedia Alerting– Cell broadcast images to phones

• Multilingual– Beyond English and Spanish

• Matching the Geographic Area– Reach 100% of phones in targeted area with no more than 0.1 mile overshoot

• WEA on 5G networks

3

3

WhatThisMeansto Y ou

• More detailed alert messages

• Links to images, maps, special information

• Ability to test, determine how much bleed-over is in your area

• Expect changes in your alerting software

• Train and exercise on existing and new capabilities

• Reduced ambiguity in alert content and delivery equals more confidence in sending alerts

4

4

Type of Emergency Severity Notifica

tion Group

Responsib

le for n

otifica

tion

EmailPhone

Socia

l media

Nixle

SoCo Alert

WEA

EASActi

vate Hotlin

e

Earthquake AdvisoryEmergency Catastrophic

Flood AdvisoryWatchWarning

Flashflood/Debris Flow AdvisoryWatchWarning

HAZMAT AdvisoryEmergency Catastrophic

Wildfire Red Flag B Emergency C, FCatastrophic A

Tsunami WatchAdvisoryWarning

Dam Failure AdvisoryEmergency Catastrophic

Terrorism AdvisoryEmergency Catastrophic

Active Shooter AdvisoryEmergency Catastrophic

Notification groups Definitions:A: All Advisory: Conditions next 12-48 hours may become an emergency B: First Responder Agencies in Operational Area Emergency: Event underway or imminent with threat to life/PropertyC: First Responders in Affected Area Catastrophic: Large scale event underway or imminentD: CalOES Red Flag: Wildfire equivilent of AdvisoryE: Neighbor EM Agencies Watch (Flood/Debris Flow): Be prepared to take actionsF: Public in Affected Area Warning (Flood/Debris Flow): Take immediate action Watch (Tsunami): Equivilent of AdvisoryResponsible for notification: Advisory (Tsunami): Equivilent of WatchS: SheriffR: REDCOME: EOCEM: Emergency Management

1st Responder Public Notification

THREAT ASSESSMENT 1: MAJOR EARTHQUAKE

General Situation

The Sonoma Op Area is in the vicinity of several known active and potentially active earthquake faults including the San Andreas and Healdsburg/Rodgers Creek. See Earthquake Fault Lines Map. New faults within the region are continuously being discovered.

A major earthquake occurring in or near this jurisdiction may cause many deaths and casualties, extensive property damage, fires, hazardous material spills and other ensuing hazards. The Rodgers Creek fault is considered the greatest earthquake threat to Sonoma County because of the high probability of rupture and its proximity to the County’s greatest concentration of population, governmental services and infrastructure. The effects could be aggravated by aftershocks and by the secondary effects of fire, hazardous material/chemical accidents and possible failure of waterways and dams. The time of day and season of the year would have a profound effect on the number of dead and injured. Such an earthquake would be catastrophic in its effect upon the population and could exceed the response capabilities of the individual cities, Sonoma County/Op Area and the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services and other state agencies. Damage control and disaster relief support would be required from other local governmental and private organizations, and from the state and federal governments.

Extensive search and rescue operations may be required to assist trapped or injured persons. Injured or displaced persons could require emergency medical care, food and temporary shelter. Identification and burial of many dead persons would pose difficult problems; public health would be a major concern. Mass evacuation may be essential to save lives, particularly in areas downwind from hazardous material releases. Many families would be separated particularly if the earthquake should occur during working hours, and a personal inquiry or locator system could be essential to maintain morale. Emergency operations could be seriously hampered by the loss of communications and damage to transportation routes within, and to and from, the disaster area and by the disruption of public utilities and services.

The economic impact on the Sonoma County/Op Area from a major earthquake would be considerable in terms of loss of employment and loss of tax base. Also, a major earthquake could cause serious damage and/or outage of computer facilities. The loss of such facilities could curtail or seriously disrupt the operations of banks, insurance companies and other elements of the financial community. In turn, this could affect the ability of local government, business and the population to make payments and purchases.

Specific Situation

The potential hazards that the Sonoma Op Area may face in an earthquake include the following:

Ground Shaking

The most significant earthquake action in terms of potential structural damage and loss of life is ground shaking. Ground shaking is the movement of the earth's surface in response to a seismic event. The magnitude of the earthquake, distance from the epicenter, and characteristics of surface geology determine the intensity of the ground shaking and the resultant damages. This hazard is the primary cause of the collapse of buildings and other structures.

Liquefaction Many areas may have buildings destroyed or unusable due to the phenomenon of liquefaction (see Attachment 2). Liquefaction is the loss of shear strength of a soil. The shear strength loss results from the increase of water pressure caused by the rearrangement of soil particles induced by shaking or vibration. Liquefaction has been observed in many earthquakes, usually in soft, poorly graded granular materials (i.e., loose sands), with high water tables. Liquefaction usually occurs in the soil during or shortly after a large earthquake. In effect, the liquefaction soil strata behave as a heavy fluid. Buried tanks may float to the surface and objects above the liquefaction strata may sink. Pipelines passing through liquefaction materials typically sustain a relatively large number of breaks in an earthquake. Damage to Vital Public Services, Systems and Facilities Bed Loss in Hospitals Sonoma County has 8 major medical facilities. Public service agencies and volunteer personnel would be used to assist in the care of the injured. Several of the acute care hospitals in Sonoma County may be lost due to structural damage. In addition, even the most modern hospitals can be incapacitated by non-structural damage. Earthquake shaking can damage sensitive equipment, topple storage units, and dislodge ceilings or light fixtures. Damage to water pipes could flood portions of buildings. Damages can be serious, and it can cause major areas within hospitals to be nonfunctional during the critical hours immediately following a major quake. This will decrease the number of beds available and create the need for alternate treatment facilities or field hospitals. Although a percentage of the remaining beds could be made available by discharging or transferring non-emergency patients, it will probably be necessary to receive an immediate influx of emergency medical aid and/or export some of the seriously injured to out-of-county facilities. Building Survivability An earthquake could shake all parts of Sonoma County. Every building in the County is exposed to high risk of damage in earthquakes by virtue of being located in a seismically active part of the country. Some of these structures face an elevated risk because they are located in high hazard zones, such as near the fault, on liquefiable soils, or on slopes subject to landslides. Other structures face high risk because their construction quality is inadequate to withstand strong shaking, primarily because they were built decades ago before modern building codes were enacted. Some structures house critical County functions, such as emergency response activities, and it is important that these structures remain functional after an earthquake. Communications System failure, overloads, loss of electrical power and possible failure of some alternate power systems will affect telephone and cellular systems. Numerous failures can be expected to occur, and the systems will be overloaded beyond capacity. The anticipated damage could disable up to 80% of the telephone system for one day. In light of this, emergency planners should not expect the use of telephone or cellular systems for the first few days after the event.

The County has a wireless communications network used for public safety and emergency response. The communications network is used by the County and City agencies, public safety officials and emergency responders. The network is comprised of remote mountain top communication sites, consisting of towers and equipment buildings, which provide wireless communications coverage throughout Sonoma County. While the communications system is designed to be functional even after the loss of one or more antennas, a major earthquake impacting multiple sites could significantly reduce communications effectiveness. Dam and Flood Control Channels Based upon current design parameters, construction practices and ongoing programs of review and modification, catastrophic dam failure is considered unlikely. The Warm Springs Dam at Lake Sonoma is of modern construction and is closely monitored by an array of seismic sensors. However, many flood control channels are expected to suffer minor damage. Pumping stations in coastal communities are expected to fail due to liquefaction. Electrical Power Major power plants are expected to sustain some damage due to liquefaction and the intensity of the earthquake. Up to 60% of the system load may be interrupted immediately following the initial shock. According to representatives of PG&E, electrical power may not be rerouted, resulting in wide spread outages for an undefined period of time. A great deal of the imported power is expected to be lost. In areas of greatest shaking, it should be anticipated that some distribution lines, both underground and surface, would be damaged. Much of the affected area may have service restored in days; areas that suffer extensive damage or have underground distribution may require a longer time. Fire Operations Although total collapse of fire stations is not expected, possible disruption of utilities, twisted doors and loss of power can create major problems. Numerous fires due to disruption of power and natural gas networks can be expected. Many connections to major water sources may be damaged and storage facilities would have to be relied on; water pressure and supply could be inadequate to non-existent. First response from fire personnel is expected to be damage assessment and determining resources needed for response and recovery needs. Response could be further complicated and delayed by the disruption of transportation routes. Secondary responses by the fire service will focus on search and rescue of trapped persons. Rescuers should expect loss of power and water, jammed doors, restricted mobility due to debris, possible loss of communications capability and delays in reaching maximum effectiveness due to personnel shortages. Roads, Highways and Bridges Many roads in the county traverse areas subject to liquefaction and landslides. Roadways that experience liquefaction can develop very large cracks that prevent their use, and can develop smaller cracks and sinkholes that impede traffic. Landslides triggered by earthquakes can both block and rip out sections of roads. Numerous roads will be subject to delays and detours. Damage to freeway systems is expected to be major, despite seismic upgrades. Portions of surface streets in the vicinity of freeways may be blocked due to collapsed overpasses. Many surface streets in the older central business districts will be blocked by debris from buildings,

falling electrical wires and pavement damage. Local bridges that have not been seismically retrofitted may experience a high percentage of failure. Natural Gas Particularly in the areas of intense ground shaking, damage to natural gas distribution networks will consist of; (a) isolated breaks in major transmission lines, and (b) numerous breaks in mains and individual service connections within the distribution systems. Numerous leaks in the distribution system will affect a major portion of the urban areas, resulting in a loss of service for extended periods. Fires should be expected at a small percentage of rupture sites both in the transmission lines and the distribution system. Transmission pipelines serving the Santa Rosa plain are most vulnerable to damage caused by liquefaction. Hazardous Materials The County has many sites containing hazardous materials. These sites include drycleaners, gas and service stations, agricultural sites, industrial sites, and high-tech facilities. The majority of the sites of most concern are clustered along U.S. 101 or associated with the Geysers geothermal field. Earthquake shaking can release hazardous materials. There is the potential that trucks or train cars carrying dangerous materials could be tipped over by an earthquake and materials dangerous to health or the environment could be released. Some of these sources may contain gases or liquids that are potentially harmful to human health. Leaking products present a serious fire hazard. Sanitation Systems Many of the wastewater treatment facilities could be disrupted up to 6 months, depending on the severity and intensity of the earthquake and damage caused by liquefaction. There is a limited amount of storage available in the wastewater treatment plants; if the treatment train cannot be restored before the storage is exceeded, wastewater will require discharge with emergency chlorination to reduce health hazards. Overflow of sewage through manholes and from ponds can be expected due to breaks in sewer mains and loss of power. As a result, there may be danger of excessive collection of explosive gas in sewer mains, and flow of untreated sewage in some street gutters. Many house sewer connections will break and plug. Water Supply Several ruptures are anticipated along the water pipelines in the County. A majority of water wells are expected to be disabled by loss of electricity and the lack of backup power sources. In addition, shear forces could render about a third of the wells inoperative for an indefinite period. Water availability and distribution for needed life support, to treat the sick and injured and for fire suppression activities is of major concern to each community.

THREAT ASSESSMENT 3: FLOOD General Situation Floods are generally classed as either slow-rise or flash floods. Slow-rise floods may be preceded by a warning time lasting from hours, to days, or possibly weeks. Evacuation and sandbagging for a slow-rise flood may lessen flood-related damage. Conversely, flash floods are the most difficult to prepare for, due to the extremely short warning time, if any is given at all. Flash flood warnings usually require immediate evacuation within the hour. The National Weather Service issues flash flood watches and warnings. A flash flood WATCH is issued when flash flooding is possible within the designated watch area and close to the watch area, but the occurrence location, and/or timing is still uncertain -- all persons should be alert. A flash flood WARNING is issued when a flash flood has been reported, in progress, imminent, or highly likely -- all persons should take necessary precautions. No area is immune to flash floods. On small streams, especially near the headwaters of river basins, water levels may rise quickly in heavy rainstorms, and flash floods can begin before the rain stops falling. There is little time between the detection of flood conditions and the arrival of the flood crest. Swift action is essential to protect life and property. Flash floods also occur in or near mountainous areas where torrential rains can quickly change a dry watercourse or small brook into raging treacherous torrents of water. All low lying areas, both coastal and inland, are subject to flood conditions. Urban development in flood plain areas are often subject to seasonal inundation. The flood plain is a natural extension of any waterway, although infrequently used. Storm water runoff that exceeds the capabilities of the physical characteristics of stream and drainage channels, results in the natural flooding of a localized area, inundating vehicles and causing considerable damage to infrastructure, residential and industrial properties. Once flooding begins, personnel will be needed to assist in rescuing persons trapped by floodwater, securing utilities, cordoning off flooded areas and controlling traffic. These actions may overtax local agencies, and additional personnel and resources may be required. It is anticipated that existing mutual aid resources would be used as necessary to augment local resources. Specific Situation Sonoma County has the highest repetitive flood damage rate west of the Rocky Mountains. A large percentage of the County may be subject to flooding due to flash flooding, urban flooding (storm drain failure/infrastructure breakdown), river channel overflow, downstream flooding, etc. The County has historically been vulnerable to storm surge inundation associated with hurricanes and tropical storms. The majority of areas subject to flooding in Sonoma County are adjacent to the Russian River in that portion of the western county bordered by Mirabel Park on the east and Duncans Mills on the west. The Petaluma River has also caused significant flood problems historically, causing damage within the City of Petaluma, particularly in the Payran Ranch area. Other areas that flood periodically are low lying lands near the San Antonio, Sonoma, Santa Rosa, Mark West and Lichau Creeks, and the Laguna de Santa Rosa. Coyote and Warm Springs Dams afford an

appreciable level of flood protection from Russian River overflows during the winter and spring months. State and federal weather/river forecasters monitor the Russian River through a series of stations located along the river and its tributaries. The system affords a degree of advance flood warning for emergency responders. Flooding has occurred along the lower and middle reaches of the Russian River on a regular basis throughout the last one hundred years of recorded river history. Serious floods occurred in 1937, 1940, 1955, 1964, 1982, 1986, 1993, 1995 and 2006. Besides this type of flooding, Sonoma County will experience coastal flooding at harbors and inlets, such as Bodega Bay, which are susceptible to storm surges accompanied by wave action. Additionally, tidal flooding occurs along San Pablo Bay. These areas may also be vulnerable to the effects of tsunamis. Emergency Readiness Stages The evolution of an flood related emergency could begin with a minor problem, such as one or two days of heavy rainfall, and culminate in a catastrophic event, such as several weeks of excessive rainfall and emergency dam releases. Emergency preparedness measures will be based on four stages of response actions. These response actions are keyed to Russian River elevations measured at the Hopland, Healdsburg and Guerneville Bridges. These river elevations are intended to be guides for declaring the response stages. The Sonoma County Fire & Emergency Services Department will declare response stages based on a variety of circumstances, including weather forecasts and dam releases. Stage I (Flood Watch Stage) Pre-emergency river level is at 25 feet at the Guerneville Bridge and is forecasted to continue rising. Stage II (Flood Monitoring Stage) Moderate to heavy rain expected for next four (4) to six (6) hours. River level is 18 feet at the Hopland Bridge, 15 feet at the Healdsburg Bridge, and/or 29 feet at the Guerneville Bridge and is forecasted to continue rising. Sonoma County/Op Area Emergency Services on 24-hour alert. Stage III (Flood Stage) Continuation of heavy rain over next six (6) to twelve (12) hours. Identified risk areas should be closed to traffic. Public information to be distributed to residents and businesses in affected areas. River level is 21 feet at the Hopland Bridge, 19 feet at the Healdsburg Bridge, and/or 32 feet at the Guerneville Bridge and is forecasted to continue rising. The Russian River flows over the banks of the main channel at this elevation and several low-lying areas are flooded. Activation of County/Op Area Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is considered. Stage IV (Significant Flood Stage)

Safety/Health threat to private property and persons. Areas subject to flooding should be evacuated. River level is at 36 feet at the Guerneville Bridge and forecasted to continue rising. Full activation of County/Op Area EOC. Russian River Flood Elevation Table Our history has provided us with frequently used reference points in which to estimate the level of flooding. At river elevations measured at the bridges, certain landmarks become flooded which provide clues to decide road closures and areas needing evacuation. The water levels at which these areas are commonly flooded are listed in the Lower Russian River Flood Response Plan.

THREAT ASSESSMENT 4: LANDSLIDE General Situation The rolling hills, coastal ranges, and steep canyons that characterize Sonoma County’s landscape contribute to a widespread landslide hazard. Landslides are described as downward movement of a slope and materials under the force of gravity. In addition to gravity, extended periods of intense rainfall during the winter months is the primary cause of landslides in the County. Landslides can also be triggered by seismic activity. Landslides are a significant secondary hazard to wildland fire, where periods of heavy rainfall on denuded slopes cause landslides and mudslides. The main types of landslide activity that can impact Sonoma County include:

Slides: Mass movements, where there is a distinct zone of weakness that separates the slide material from more stable underlying material. Falls: Abrupt movements of masses of geologic materials, including rocks and boulders, that become detached from steep slopes or cliffs. Debris Flows: Rapid mass movement of a combination of loose soil, rock, organic matter, air, and water that mobilize as a slurry flowing down slope. These are most often caused by heavy precipitation and intense surface water runoff in steep gullies. Mudflows: Earth flow consisting of material that is wet enough to flow rapidly and contains at least 50 percent sand, silt, and clay sized particles. Mudflows can travel at speeds of 35 mph or greater. Creep: Imperceptibly slow, steady, downward movement of slope-forming soil or rock.

The occurrence of landslides is determined by both natural and human factors. Natural factors include the cohesive strength and shrink-well characteristics of the affected minerals, the orientation of joints and planes of weakness between slide material and bedrock, the steepness of slopes, the degree of saturation of ground materials (highly affected by rainfall), and the density of vegetation. Human factors include the oversteepening and overloading of slopes, the removal of natural vegetation, and the addition of water to the soil by watering of lawns and septic system drain fields, and onsite ponding of storm runoff. Specific Situation In Sonoma County, the hillside areas in both the incorporated and unincorporated areas pose a significant landslide risk to property and infrastructure. This makes much of the land area of the County, with the exception of valley areas, highly susceptible to landslide hazards. The hazard is highest in slopes of thirty percent or greater, but can occur on slopes of fifteen percent or less depending on geologic deposits, vegetation, and building patterns, among other issues. Landslides are also likely along coastal cliffs. Historic landslides are perhaps the best indicator of where landslides will occur again, unless the conditions that contributed to the prior landslide have been mitigated. During the 1906 earthquake a large landslide occurred in the Maacama Creek area, 6 miles east of Healdsburg. The winters of 1982, 1983, 1986, and 1998 provided a grim reminder of the degree of hazard from landslides in Sonoma County. An extraordinarily intense storm in late January 1983

saturated the County triggering landslides in the Blucher Valley, Glen Ellen, and north Petaluma areas. The Rio Nido slide of 1998 destroyed 3 homes, and damaged many others resulting in a significant part of the community having to be relocated. Numerous other slides occurred in other areas of the county including Monte Rio, Gold Ridge, Hidden Acres, Blucher Valley and Fitch Mountain. Current County codes protect against placing new structures on known landslide areas. However, existing development on or near steep slopes, much of it constructed to previous codes, is at risk. Communities such as Monte Rio and Rio Nido with histories of damaging landslides remain at risk from future events.

THREAT ASSESSMENT 5: HAZARDOUS MATERIAL INCIDENT General Situation The release of hazardous materials has the potential for adverse impacts upon human health, the environment and property, depending upon the type, location, and quantity of material released. Although hazardous material incidents can happen almost anywhere, certain areas of the County are at higher risk. Jurisdictions near roadways that are frequently used for transporting hazardous materials and jurisdictions with industrial facilities that use, store, or dispose of such materials, all have increased potential for major mishaps. Specific Situation Sonoma County is considered to be a combined suburban and rural area, removed from the multiple risks of hazardous materials emergencies normally associated with a more urbanized environment. With the exception of the Geysers geothermal fields in the northeast corner of the County, the central portion of the County along the U.S. 101 corridor contains the majority of facilities closely associated with hazardous materials. These facilities are generally limited to industrial parks within or near the incorporated cities. The eastern and western portions of the County are primarily rural and most of this area is forested or agricultural. There are moderate concentrations of fertilizers, pesticides, and other related substances in these areas consistent with the agricultural activities of these areas. The County and its nine cities do not have the large industrial complexes normally associated with a high incidence of hazardous material emergencies. However, when a hazardous material emergency does occur, the multiple resources that some urban communities draw upon may not be immediately available to Sonoma County. Consequently, it is estimated that significant out-of-county assistance may be unavailable for a period of two to five hours or longer if the incident were to occur at a peak traffic time. Winter floods have created a unique hazard to certain areas of the County. During a local flood emergency, the Hazardous Materials Division reports to the Operations section of the EOC and carries out its mission in the field where the flooding is occurring. If the emergency escalates to a state or federally declared emergency, OES may be requested to provide additional hazardous materials response resources. Road and Air Spill Potential Sonoma County's highway network includes approximately 320 miles of federal and state highways, 1500 miles of County maintained roads, and 600 miles of city maintained streets and roads. U.S. 101 is the major freeway and runs north to south through the center of the County. It is the most heavily traveled in terms of truck traffic and is the most frequent location of hazardous materials spills that occur on major roads. Geysers Road from the Geysers Geothermal fields to Highway 128 is heavily traveled by trucks carrying hazardous materials to the Geysers power plants and is the scene of frequent spills. Highways 12, 37, 116, 121, 128, and Highway 1, the Pacific Coast Highway, also traverse the County. These routes handle a smaller volume of truck traffic, but historically have been prone to vehicle accidents consistent with heavy traffic on two-lane roadways.

The Sonoma County Airport is located several miles northwest of downtown Santa Rosa. Air transportation of hazardous materials involves the smallest quantity estimates but still poses a potential hazard. Spill history in the County shows most problems occurring in the transportation corridors. Although most of these incidents have been easily handled, the potential still exists for an extreme threat to life, the environment, and property. Illegal Disposal Illegal disposal of hazardous waste into sewer systems, at landfill or transfer sites, and directly into streams, or dumping along roadways is a problem and accounts for a substantial portion of hazardous materials emergency response in the County. Illicit drug manufacturing operations have been uncovered in the County and they do not legally dispose drug laboratory residue and wastes. Several incidents involving residue and byproducts from these illegal drug laboratories have been dumped on roadsides. Industry generally is aware of hazardous materials regulations and appropriate disposal procedures and has acted responsibly. To assist small quantity waste generators, there is a County program sponsored by the Sonoma County Waste Management Agency to provide a means for proper disposal, recycling, or reduction in waste generation. In addition, for household waste and Small Quantity Generators, a Household Toxics Waste Facility is available to residents and local businesses at the Central Disposal Site for disposal of toxic material. Contaminated Waste Sites Federal, State, regional and local agencies have identified contaminated waste sites in Sonoma County that potentially pose a threat to public health. The majority involve disposal prior to the enactment of regulatory controls and from leaking underground storage tanks. The Environmental Health Division of the Sonoma County Department of Health Services maintains a monthly updated list of contaminated underground storage tank sites undergoing clean up and provides it to the Fire & Emergency Services Department, Hazardous Materials Division. Emergency Response Actions Emergency response actions associated with hazardous materials are presented in the Sonoma County/Op Area Hazardous Material Incidents Response Plan.

THREAT ASSESSMENT 7: WILDLAND URBAN/INTERFACE FIRE General Situation The combination of highly flammable fuel, long dry summers and steep slopes creates a significant natural hazard of large wildland fires in many areas of Sonoma County. A wildland fire is a fire in which the primary fuel is natural vegetation. Wildland fires can consume thousands of acres of vegetation, timber and agricultural lands. Fires ignited in wildland areas can quickly spread, if unabated, to areas where residential or commercial structures are intermingled with wildland vegetation. Similarly, fires that start in urbanized areas can grow into wildland fires. Wildland/urban interface fire hazards are especially pronounced in areas of high structure densities adjacent to undeveloped open space areas with dense vegetation. Wildland/urban interface fire results in death, injury, economic loss and a large public investment in fire fighting activities. Wildfire behavior is based on three primary factors: weather, topography and fuel. Wildland fire season in Sonoma County spans the months after the last spring rains have fallen and until the first fall or winter rains occur. The months of August, September and October have the greatest potential for wildland fires as vegetation dries out, humidity levels fall, and off shore winds blow. Specific Situation: Wildland/urban fire hazards are especially pronounced in areas of high structure densities, narrow roads and high vegetative fuel loading. At risk are residential communities such as: Fitch Mountain, The Sea Ranch, Trinity Road/Cavedale, Montecito Heights, and other areas contiguous to the city limits of many incorporated cites within Sonoma County. In these areas are old (pre-building code) structures intermingled with modern designed structures situated on narrow roads with very poor access/egress. Many of these buildings were designed as a summer type home/weekend retreat and are now being used as year around homes. This creates problems with inadequate parking space and severely hinders access by fire apparatus and other emergency vehicles. While the Sonoma County Fire Safe Code addresses new building construction in the unincorporated area, including a residential water supply and fire sprinkler requirement, there are no ordinances that address older buildings and their construction. Older residential areas have a very real danger for hosting a “large and damaging” wildland/urban interface fire. In order to mitigate the potential for a “large and damaging fire” in these areas, FIRESAFE SONOMA has been established. This group of concerned citizens, community leaders, businesses and corporate representatives meet regularly to devise ways to educate homeowners, develop hazard reduction methods and identify ways to fund these activities through grants, donations and other means. The population of tan oak vegetation in various areas of the County has particular risk due to the rise of Sudden Oak Death Syndrome. In specific areas, tan oak proliferation and the rapid encroachment of the disease has created an environment of increased vulnerability to wildland fire. Specific Topographic and Climatic Features

Winds The western portion of the county is heavily influenced by the Pacific Ocean in terms of local climate. In these environs the fire hazard is mitigated by summer fog intrusion and lower temperatures. However, during the two to three weeks of “off-shore” wind events each fall, even the coastal areas become an extreme fire hazard. The 1978 Creighton Ridge Fire near Cazadero burned 11,000 acres and destroyed 56 dwellings, is an example of how these offshore winds can influence local fire behavior. The Russian River has carved out a large channel for winds to migrate form the coast to the inland areas each day. As the land is heated inland and the air rises, replacement air from the coast flows through the Russian River. It is not unusual for the winds to peak in the late afternoon and early evening at around 15-20 miles per hour. Topography The topography in the county is typical of the mountains in the Coastal Range where they abruptly rise upward from the rugged shoreline to elevations of more than 2000 feet. This creates an opportunity for a wildland fire to spread uphill in many directions making it extremely difficult for the firefighters to control a fire in these areas. Adding dwellings into the mix, firefighting efforts become more problematic as attempts to protect structures and stop the spread stretch already limited resources. The topography in the inland areas, although not as steep, can also cause significant fire fighting challenges due to hotter, drier climatic conditions. The higher density of homes and population further complicates fire-fighting efforts. Fire Causes Wildfires can be caused by natural events, such as lightning or high winds. However, most wildland fires are human caused. Campfires, careless smokers, electrical sparks, and arson cause most wildland and wildland/urban interface fires. In Sonoma County, electrical equipment, such as power lines and transformers, has caused numerous fires. An emerging cause for concern is fires started by mowing, use of power equipment and other work around very dry vegetation. The September 2004 Geysers Fire was started by arcing in an electrical circuit box as the result of a faulty splice, and consumed 12,525 acres. Trees growing into power lines have caused large and damaging fires within the county. For example, the Cavedale Fire of 1996 near Sonoma burned 2000 acres and caused 8.1 million dollars damage. Level of Fire Protection Services Much of the County’s unincorporated area is designated by the State Board of Forestry as “State Responsibility Areas” (SRA). California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) provides “primary” wildland fire protection in these areas. While the SRA designation implies that only CAL FIRE provides protection for these areas, local fire districts and Community Services Areas (CSA) also assist with protecting and responding to fires in them. Technically, a fire district/community services area (CSA 40) that has SRA lands within it, is responsible for providing fire protection to structures, and other improvements. In practice, when a wildland fire occurs in SRA, a mutual aid system is in place that immediately responds CAL FIRE resources as well as local fire resources.

Redwood Empire Dispatch Communications Authority (REDCOM) is responsible for notifying local fire resources and CAL FIRE’s Sonoma/Lake/Napa Unit (LNU) Emergency Command Center dispatches CAL FIRE resources. Ground fire resources are augmented by CAL FIREFP’s helicopter stationed at Bogg’s Mountain in Lake County and two air tankers based at the Sonoma Air Attack Base at the Sonoma County Airport. The Sheriff’s Helicopter Unit (Henry One) is equipped with a 150-gallon water-dropping bucket that can also assist in the effort when other resources are not available. Sonoma County’s 40 plus fire agencies have signed a countywide mutual aid agreement to insure that firefighting resources and personnel will be available to combat a wildland/urban interface fire. (See Part Three – Legal References) If these resources are not enough to meet the threat, fire resources from throughout California can be summoned under the State’s Master Mutual Aid Agreement administered by the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services.

THREAT ASSESSMENT 8: DAM FAILURE General Situation Dam inundation is defined as the flooding which occurs as a result of structural failure of a dam. The most common cause of dam failure is overtopping where the water behind the dam flows over the face of the dam and erodes the structure. Structural failure may be caused by seismic activity. Seismic activity may produce inundation by generating a seismically induced wave that overtops the dam without also causing dam failure. This action is referred to as a seiche. Landslides flowing into a reservoir are also a source of potential dam failure or overtopping. Specific Situation Many areas of the Sonoma Op Area are subject to inundation due to dam failure. Though there have been no recent events, the possibility of dam failure exists since there are 44 dams within County boundaries that are large enough to be either state or federally regulated. The two major dams that would have the most significant impact on the Sonoma Op Area in the event of dam failure are Warm Springs in the north/central portion of the County, northwest of Healdsburg, and Coyote Valley, located in Mendocino County, northeast of Ukiah. Failure of either of these two dams is considered very unlikely, even in a severe earthquake. The method of construction used for these dams, their stringent federal standards for maintenance and the stewardship of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), provide an expectation that failure will not occur. However, the other smaller dams may pose a significant threat to specific and limited areas within the Sonoma Op Area. Most of these dams are agricultural with some used for storing drinking or storm water. For purposes of emergency preparedness, potential dam failure inundation areas are mapped as part of the specific Dam Inundation Contingency Plan prepared for each of the dams. These maps are maintained for public viewing at the Sonoma County Permit and Resource Management Department (PRMD).

THREAT ASSESSMENT 10: TERRORISM General Situation Terrorism is the use of force or violence against persons or property in violation of the criminal laws of the United States for purposes of intimidation, coercion or ransom. Terrorists often use threats to create fear among the public, to try to convince citizens that their government is powerless to prevent terrorism, and to get immediate publicity for their causes. Acts of terrorism range from threats of terrorism, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, bomb scares and bombings, cyber attacks (computer-based), to the use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Terrorist activities are an increasing threat to our society, and those attacks have occurred against both the public and private sectors. Attacks have been directed against government and corporate leaders, private individuals, governing bodies and related agencies, police and other public service personnel and their facilities, public utility facilities, financial institutions, communication facilities, etc. In the aftermath of September 11th, the likelihood of terrorist attack against such targets is higher than at any time modern American history. Since September 11th, intelligence gathering capabilities and cooperative working relationships between local, state and federal governments has been enhanced to thwart additional terrorist attacks. Government can, to some extent, prepare for these types of attacks with plans to deter or react to a given scenario. Homeland Security grant funding has provided Sonoma Op Area agencies with many additional first responder capabilities that would be used in such an attack. Working relationships with first responders and specialized response teams have been enhanced and expanded. Since terrorism could occur anywhere in the Sonoma Op Area, plans and/or concepts have been developed on a generalized basis that would have adaptability throughout the county. A terrorist activity emergency has its own unique characteristics and must be dealt with in accordance to its magnitude and with an appropriate level of response. The incident might be handled in a relatively short time period or it might go on for days. Determination of the type of response and overall direction remains the responsibility of local officials, both elected and appointed. Plans and procedures have been created, exercised and revised for both the most likely and worst case scenarios. The Sonoma Op Area may be also be affected by terrorist events originating or occurring in other parts of the Bay Area. Regional events may start or encourage civil unrest in the Sonoma Op Area. Response to such an event is the primary responsibility of law enforcement. However, the Sonoma Op Area emergency management team would also be heavily tasked to provide fire, emergency medical, planning, logistics, traffic control, and public information support. Certain facilities, installations or service centers of both public and private sectors which have been identified as likely targets for attack by individuals or groups, either by fire, bombing, sabotage, looting or a combination thereof. Local law enforcement agencies have identified and evaluated possible targets and threats. Specific Situation

Sonoma County consists of combined urban, suburban and rural areas, and has a mix of various groups with diverse backgrounds, outlooks, interests and objectives. This environment brings together in relative proximity diverse societal groups with a wide spectrum of interests that are not necessarily compatible or of a local nature. Activities occurring throughout the country or world can influence local attitudes. If behavior created by these attitudes becomes a threat to the Sonoma Op Area, Op Area leadership must be prepared to react appropriately. The County's leadership must be sensitive to these changes that may occur on a continuing basis. Developing and using various sources of information that provide indicators of potential disruptive activity are instrumental in preventing a terrorist incident. The threat of a terrorist chemical or biological weapon detonation/dispersal has increased exponentially since the anthrax cases of October 2001. Moreover, just the threat of terrorism can be overwhelming to our first response agencies. The increased public awareness regarding mail-borne chemicals resulted in over 400 calls for service in the Sonoma Op Area alone. These calls caused specific protocols to be developed and practiced locally by the first responder community. Chemical/Biological Intentional release of such weapons would cause considerable damage. If an incident were to occur in a densely populated area, large numbers of casualties could be expected. Still, there are several factors that would determine the scope of such an event. The amount and effectiveness of the selected agent or chemical, method of dispersal, weather conditions, vicinity to population centers, time of day and the expertise of the responding agencies to recognize such an attack would dramatically affect the outcome. Similar to emerging infectious diseases, early detection and control of biological or chemical attacks is vital to the success in limiting the scope of damage. Chemical terrorism acts are likely to be identified by police, fire and EMS because of their immediate and obvious symptoms. The proper action would be similar to the conventional response to acts of violence, hazardous materials incidents and fire. Conversely, attacks with biological agents are liable to be covert, and therefore much more difficult to recognize. Biological agents will not have an immediate impact because of the delay between exposure and the onset of illness (the incubation period), thus compounding the difficulty of early detection. Moreover, the first casualties will probably be identified by physicians or other primary healthcare providers, and most likely be exhibiting signs of an ordinary viral infection. Recognizing that the symptoms are a result of a biological agent will be extremely difficult without prior experience or training, and an awareness of a preceding event. Only a short window of time exists between the identification of the first cases and before a second, larger wave of the populace becomes ill. During this phase, emergency officials will need to determine that an attack has occurred, identify the organism, and enact prevention and prophylactic strategies. Responding to large-scale outbreaks caused by bacterial pathogens will require the speedy mobilization of public health workers, emergency responders, and private health care providers. They will also require rapid procurement and distribution of large quantities of drugs and vaccines, which must be available quickly to prevent successive waves of transmission. Sonoma County Department of Health Services has created, exercised and revised a Public Health Preparedness plan as an annex to this EOP. The primary emphasis of the plan is to

provide for early surveillance and recognition of such an attack or disease outbreak, and mobilization of mass dispensing sites for prophylaxis. Recovery, following a disturbance, will not be instantaneous. The restoration will require a continued effort by all involved departments and agencies and elements of the private sector. Community interaction will include restoration of the area to its former condition by terminating emergency regulations and restrictions, removal of barricades, clean-up of debris, and the restoration of services, utilities, transportation routes, and traffic movement and patterns.

THREAT ASSESSMENT 14: TSUNAMI General Situation A tsunami is a series of traveling ocean waves of extremely long length and period, generated by disturbances associated with earthquakes occurring below or near the ocean floor. As the tsunami crosses the deep ocean, its length from crest to crest may be a hundred miles or more, its height from trough to crest only a few feet. It cannot be felt aboard ships in deep water and cannot be seen from the air, but in deep water, tsunami waves may reach forward speeds exceeding 600 miles per hour. As the tsunami enters the shallow water of coastlines in its path, the velocity of its waves diminishes and wave height increases. It is in these shallow waters that tsunamis become a threat to life and property, for they can crest to heights of more than 100 feet, and strike with devastating force. Most tsunamis come in a series of waves that may last for several hours. This danger is not over until the entire wave-series has passed. All tsunamis, like hurricanes, are potentially dangerous, even though they may not damage every coastline they strike. At present there is no way to determine in advance the amplitude or size of tsunamis in specific locations. A small tsunami at one beach can be a giant a few miles away. In order to generate a giant tsunami, an earthquake must have certain characteristics:

o The earthquake must be underneath or near the ocean. An earthquake removed from the ocean will not cause a tsunami.

o The sea floor must undergo a lift over a large area. This propulsive force displaces water in large enough amounts to cause waves.

o The earthquake must be of gigantic magnitude (> 9.0M) so that it has enough energy to cause changes in the ocean floor over a large area. The focus of the earthquake must be shallow (< 43 miles) so that surface rupture results.

o Fault causes vertical movement of the sea floor (up to several meters) over a large area (up to 35,000 sq miles).

Local or near source tsunamis can be caused by offshore faults or coastal and submarine landslides and have the potential to cause locally greater wave heights than distant origin tsunamis. The largest historic local-source tsunami on the west coast was caused by the 1927 Point Arguello, California, earthquake that produced waves of about 7 feet in the nearby coastal area. Damage Damaging tsunamis are rare but potentially catastrophic events that present a danger to the people of California. Over 80 tsunamis have been observed or recorded along the coast of California in the past 150 years, 9 causing minor damage in ports and harbors and 2 with major impacts. Tsunamis that damaged California’s coast have come from all around the Pacific basin, including South America and Alaska. Four events caused deaths; the worst occurred in 1964 when 12 people died in California from the tsunami generated by the Great Alaska earthquake. On Sunday, December 26, 2004, a strong earthquake of magnitude 9.3 occurred off the coast of northern Sumatra, triggering a giant tsunami that propagated throughout the Indian Ocean Basin, causing massive casualties (in excess of 250,000) and destruction. According to USGS,

the Sumatra-Andaman earthquake is the fourth largest earthquake in the world since 1900 and is the largest since the 1964 Prince William Sound, Alaska earthquake. The great waves of a tsunami may crush buildings, smash vehicles and boats, uproot trees, disrupt vital public services, systems and facilities. The outflow of water back to the sea between waves can cause more damage than the original incoming wave fronts. Their effects may be aggravated by the secondary effects of fire. Efforts may be required to remove debris and clear roadways, reestablish public services and utilities and provide temporary housing for displaced persons. Evacuation It is essential to evacuate persons in low-lying coastal areas and around the rims of bays and harbors, for these areas consistently sustain the greatest damage by tsunamis. Potential danger exists for all areas within one mile of the coast and less than 50 feet above sea level for tsunamis of distant origin, and for all areas within one mile of the coast and less than 100 feet above sea level for tsunamis of local origin. Tsunami Warning System The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce maintain the international Tsunami Warning System. NOAA's Honolulu Observatory (HO) is the center of the system. A 24-hour standby is maintained at HO, waiting for the first reactions of instruments throughout the Pacific. The occurrence of a major earthquake anywhere in the Pacific Ocean area brings an immediate response from the system. Tsunami Watch When an earthquake of sufficient magnitude to generate a tsunami occurs in the Pacific Ocean area, Tsunami Warning System personnel determine the location of the earthquake epicenter (the point on the earth's surface above the subterranean source of the earthquake). If the epicenter is under or near the ocean, tsunami generation is possible. On the basis of seismic evidence, the Warning System issues a TSUNAMI WATCH, which tells participants that an earthquake has occurred, its location, and that the possibility of a tsunami exists. A TSUNAMI WATCH constitutes the System's first alerting action. It corresponds to similar alerts issued by NOAA for tornadoes, hurricanes and other natural hazards. Tsunami Warning The first positive indication of the existence of a tsunami usually comes from tide stations nearest the disturbance. When confirmation is received, the Alaska Tsunami Warning Center issues a TSUNAMI WARNING, alerting participants to the approach of potentially destructive waves. The warning contains estimated time of arrival (ETAs) for Tsunamis at various coastal locations. The Tsunami Warning System does not issue false alarms. When an ocean-wide TSUNAMI WARNING is issued, a tsunami exists. Tsunamis follow no discernible pattern of occurrence. When a TSUNAMI WARNING is received, it must be assumed that a dangerous wave is on its way. The tsunami of May 1960 killed 61 persons in Hilo, Hawaii, primarily because the warning was thought to be a false alarm. Local earthquakes can produce damaging tsunamis that will provide very little warning time. However, there are natural warning signs of tsunamis. Ground shaking felt from a local

earthquake or observing a noticeable rising or falling of coastal ocean water may be a natural warning of approaching tsunami waves and should be heeded by inhabitants of low-lying coastal areas as a warning to move to higher ground. Specific Situation Sonoma County has a long coastline with the Pacific Ocean. The greatest potential damage from a tsunami will occur on the west coast of the County affecting such communities as Sea Ranch, Jenner, and Bodega Bay, and the Sonoma Coast beaches. Areas within San Pablo Bay are not expected to receive large wave impact, but may sustain damage. The Alaska Tsunami Warning Center provides information to California coastal jurisdictions via the National Warning System (NAWAS) and OES, which sends all TSUNAMI WATCH and WARNING messages out on state NAWAS and CLETS Teletype. Sonoma County will receive these messages at the Sheriff's Dispatch Center, which will relay the messages to appropriate agencies. The number of hours available for emergency response will depend upon the location of the earthquake epicenter that has generated the tsunami. There will usually be sufficient warning time for evacuation procedures. The importance of evacuating potential danger areas by all persons, including campers, sightseers, and emergency personnel cannot be overemphasized. Boats should be moved to deep water and vehicles and essential equipment to safe areas. On the west coast of Sonoma County, Highway 1 is the main transportation artery. Post incident response may be hampered and communities may be isolated for a period of time if sections of Highway 1 are rendered impassable as a result of inundation damage, debris, or rock slides. The San Pablo Bay area of Sonoma County will probably have little inundation damage, but the currents generated may cause damage to marinas and yacht harbors, and structures along the shoreline.

NFPA® 1600

Standard on Disaster/Emergency

Management and Business Continuity Programs

2013 Edition

NFPA, 1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02169-7471 An International Codes and Standards Organization

IMPORTANT NOTICES AND DISCLAIMERS CONCERNING NFPA® DOCUMENTSNOTICE AND DISCLAIMER OF LIABILITY CONCERNING THE USE OF NFPA DOCUMENTS

NFPA® codes, standards, recommended practices, and guides (“NFPA Documents”), of which the document contained herein is one, are developed through a consensus standards development process approved by the American National Standards Institute. This process brings together volunteers representing varied viewpoints and interests to achieve consensus on fire and other safety issues. While the NFPA administers the process and establishes rules to promote fairness in the development of consensus, it does not independently test, evaluate, or verify the accuracy of any information or the soundness of any judgments contained in NFPA Documents.

The NFPA disclaims liability for any personal injury, property or other damages of any nature whatsoever, whether special, indirect, consequential or compensatory, directly or indirectly resulting from the publication, use of, or reliance on NFPA Documents. The NFPA also makes no guaranty or warranty as to the accuracy or completeness of any information published herein.

In issuing and making NFPA Documents available, the NFPA is not undertaking to render professional or other services for or on behalf of any person or entity. Nor is the NFPA undertaking to perform any duty owed by any person or entity to someone else. Anyone using this document should rely on his or her own independent judgment or, as appropriate, seek the advice of a competent professional in determining the exercise of reasonable care in any given circumstances.

The NFPA has no power, nor does it undertake, to police or enforce compliance with the contents of NFPA Documents. Nor does the NFPA list, certify, test, or inspect products, designs, or installations for compliance with this document. Any certification or other statement of compliance with the requirements of this document shall not be attributable to the NFPA and is solely the responsibility of the certifier or maker of the statement.

REMINDER: UPDATING OF NFPA DOCUMENTS

Users of NFPA codes, standards, recommended practices, and guides (“NFPA Documents”) should be aware that NFPA Documents may be amended from time to time through the issuance of Tentative Interim Amendments or corrected by Errata. An official NFPA Document at any point in time consists of the current edition of the document together with any Tentative Interim Amendment and any Errata then in effect.

In order to determine whether an NFPA Document has been amended through the issuance of Tentative Interim Amendments or corrected by Errata, visit the Document Information Pages on NFPA’s website. The Document Information Pages provide up-to-date, document specific information including any issued Tentative Interim Amendments and Errata.

To access the Document Information Page for a specific NFPA Document go to http://www.nfpa.org/document for a list of NFPA Documents, and click on the appropriate Document number (e.g., NFPA 101). In addition to posting all existing Tentative Interim Amendments and Errata, the Document Information Page also includes the option to sign-up for an “Alert” feature to receive an email notification when new updates and other information are posted regarding the document.

12 /12ISBN: 978-145590602-4 (Print)ISBN: 978-145590648-2 (PDF)

IMPORTANT NOTICES AND DISCLAIMERS CONCERNING NFPA® DOCUMENTS

ADDITIONAL NOTICES AND DISCLAIMERS

Updating of NFPA Documents Users of NFPA codes, standards, recommended practices, and guides (“NFPA Documents”) should be aware that

these documents may be superseded at any time by the issuance of new editions or may be amended from time to time through the issuance of Tentative Interim Amendments. An official NFPA Document at any point in time consists of the current edition of the document together with any Tentative Interim Amendments and any Errata then in effect. In order to determine whether a given document is the current edition and whether it has been amended through the issuance of Tentative Interim Amendments or corrected through the issuance of Errata, consult appropriate NFPA publications such as the National Fire Codes® Subscription Service, visit the NFPA website at www.nfpa.org, or contact the NFPA at the address listed below.

Interpretations of NFPA Documents A statement, written or oral, that is not processed in accordance with Section 6 of the Regulations Governing

Committee Projects shall not be considered the official position of NFPA or any of its Committees and shall not be considered to be, nor be relied upon as, a Formal Interpretation.

Patents The NFPA does not take any position with respect to the validity of any patent rights referenced in, related to,

or asserted in connection with an NFPA Document. The users of NFPA Documents bear the sole responsibility for determining the validity of any such patent rights, as well as the risk of infringement of such rights, and the NFPA disclaims liability for the infringement of any patent resulting from the use of or reliance on NFPA Documents.

NFPA adheres to the policy of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) regarding the inclusion of patents in American National Standards (“the ANSI Patent Policy”), and hereby gives the following notice pursuant to that policy:

NOTICE: The user’s attention is called to the possibility that compliance with an NFPA Document may require use of an invention covered by patent rights. NFPA takes no position as to the validity of any such patent rights or as to whether such patent rights constitute or include essential patent claims under the ANSI Patent Policy. If, in connection with the ANSI Patent Policy, a patent holder has filed a statement of willingness to grant licenses under these rights on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions to applicants desiring to obtain such a license, copies of such filed statements can be obtained, on request, from NFPA. For further information, contact the NFPA at the address listed below.

Law and Regulations Users of NFPA Documents should consult applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations. NFPA does

not, by the publication of its codes, standards, recommended practices, and guides, intend to urge action that is not in compliance with applicable laws, and these documents may not be construed as doing so.

Copyrights NFPA Documents are copyrighted. They are made available for a wide variety of both public and private uses.

These include both use, by reference, in laws and regulations, and use in private self-regulation, standardization, and the promotion of safe practices and methods. By making these documents available for use and adoption by public authorities and private users, the NFPA does not waive any rights in copyright to these documents.

Use of NFPA Documents for regulatory purposes should be accomplished through adoption by reference. The term “adoption by reference” means the citing of title, edition, and publishing information only. Any deletions, additions, and changes desired by the adopting authority should be noted separately in the adopting instrument. In order to assist NFPA in following the uses made of its documents, adopting authorities are requested to notify the NFPA (Attention: Secretary, Standards Council) in writing of such use. For technical assistance and questions concerning adoption of NFPA Documents, contact NFPA at the address below.

For Further Information All questions or other communications relating to NFPA Documents and all requests for information on NFPA

procedures governing its codes and standards development process, including information on the procedures for requesting Formal Interpretations, for proposing Tentative Interim Amendments, and for proposing revisions to NFPA documents during regular revision cycles, should be sent to NFPA headquarters, addressed to the attention of the Secretary, Standards Council, NFPA, 1 Batterymarch Park, P.O. Box 9101, Quincy, MA 02269-9101; email: stds_admin@nfpa.org

For more information about NFPA, visit the NFPA website at www.nfpa.org.

12/11

1600–1

iBe

1

1pt

DM

ermipiemc

dttpn

tom

feaap

lt

mr

NFPA 1600, NFPA, and Na

Copyright © 2013 National Fire Protection Association®. All Rights Reserved.

NFPA 1600®

Standard on

Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs

2013 Edition

This edition of NFPA 1600, Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continu-ty Programs, was prepared by the Technical Committee on Emergency Management andusiness Continuity. It was issued by the Standards Council on November 27, 2012, with anffective date of December 17, 2012, and supersedes all previous editions.

This edition of NFPA 1600 was approved as an American National Standard on December7, 2012.

Origin and Development of NFPA 1600The NFPA Standards Council established the Disaster Management Committee in January

991. The committee was given the responsibility for developing documents relating to pre-aredness for, response to, and recovery from disasters resulting from natural, human, or

echnological events.The first document that the committee focused on was NFPA 1600, Recommended Practice for

isaster Management. NFPA 1600 was presented to the NFPA membership at the 1995 Annualeeting in Denver, CO. That effort produced the 1995 edition of NFPA 1600.For the 2000 edition, the committee incorporated a “total program approach” for disaster/

mergency management and business continuity programs in its revision of the document from aecommended practice to a standard. They provided a standardized basis for disaster/emergencyanagement planning and business continuity programs in private and public sectors by provid-

ng common program elements, techniques, and processes. The committee provided expandedrovisions for enhanced capabilities for disaster/emergency management and business continu-

ty programs so that the impacts of a disaster would be mitigated, while protecting life and prop-rty. The chapters were expanded to include additional material relating to disaster/emergencyanagement and business continuity programs. The annex material was also expanded to in-

lude additional explanatory material.For the 2004 edition, the committee updated terminology and editorially reformatted the

ocument to follow the 2003 Manual of Style for NFPA Technical Committee Documents; however,he basic features of the standard remained unchanged. In addition, the committee added aable in Annex A that created a crosswalk among FEMA CAR, NFPA 1600, and BCI & DRIIrofessional practices. The committee added significant informational resources to An-exes B, C, D, and E.

The document continues to be developed in cooperation and coordination with represen-atives from FEMA, NEMA, and IAEM. This coordinated effort was reflected in the expansionf the title of the standard for the 2000 edition to include both disaster and emergencyanagement, as well as information on business continuity programs.The 2007 edition incorporated changes to the 2004 edition, expanding the conceptual

ramework for disaster/emergency management and business continuity programs. Previousditions of the standard focused on the four aspects of mitigation, preparedness, response,nd recovery. The 2007 edition identified prevention as a distinct aspect of the program, inddition to the other four. Doing so brought the standard into alignment with related disci-lines and practices of risk management, security, and loss prevention.

The technical committee also expresses its appreciation to the U.S. Department of Home-and Security (DHS), IAEM, and NEMA for their continued support in the development ofhe standard, and for the use of their logos on the cover of the 2007 edition.

The 2010 edition of NFPA 1600 was reordered and expanded. Chapter 4, Program Manage-ent, was expanded to emphasize the importance of leadership and commitment; included new

equirements for defining performance objectives; and included new requirements for records

tional Fire Protection Association are registered trademarks of the National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts 02169.

1600–2 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

2

management. Finance and administration was also moved to the program management chapter. The most noticeablechange from the 2007 edition was the rewriting of Chapter 5 into four chapters addressing planning, implementation,testing and exercises, and program improvement. The ordering of these chapters followed a typical program developmentprocess and is consistent with “plan, do, check, act” or continuous improvement processes. Requirements for businessimpact analysis, which had been previously been covered under the heading of “risk assessment,” became a separate sectionwithin Chapter 5. Chapter 6, Implementation, included a new section on employee assistance and support. Testing andexercising was expanded within the new Chapter 7, and evaluations and corrective action were incorporated into a newChapter 8 on program improvement.

The long list of resources included with the annexes of prior editions was pared down, recognizing the difficulty ofkeeping information up to date in a triennial publication. Annex C included a self-assessment checklist to help usersevaluate conformity with the standard, and Annex D provided a crosswalk between NFPA 1600 and management systemprogram elements.

In November of 2009, NFPA 1600 received designation and certification as anti-terrorism technology under theSAFETY Act. The technical committee extends its appreciation to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security forauthorizing the use of the SAFETY Act Certified™ seal on the cover of the 2010 edition.

The technical committee also expresses its appreciation to the Association of Contingency Planners (ACP), DisasterRecovery Institute International (DRII), and IAEM for their continued support in the development of NFPA 1600, andthe use of their logos on the cover of the 2010 edition.

The 2013 edition has an array of changes. The committee reorganized specific chapters and improved the require-ments for Business Continuity throughout the document. In Chapter 6, the role of the Emergency Operation Center(EOC) is more defined, and the important role that the EOC plays during an emergency is discussed. The committeealso created a section on crisis communication and public information. A chapter on training and education has beenadded (Chapter 7). In Chapter 9, the committee added program maintenance requirements. Readers will notice thatAnnex A has been reorganized, and only supplementary material will be found there; the material that was removedfrom Annex A is now located in five new annexes. One of those new annexes, Annex E, provides a crosswalk betweenNFPA 1600, CSA Z1600, and DRII Professional Practices. Other new annexes include Annex F, Management SystemStandard; Annex G, Maturity Models; Annex H, APELL (Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the LocalLevel), in response to the gas leak in Bhopal, India, in 1984; and Annex I, Family Preparedness.

013 Edition

COMMITTEE PERSONNEL 1600–3

CMRNPWS

ACGMMRDD

DT

GCMCKJ

T

M

S

R

FM

DNJ

C

O

Technical Committee on Emergency Management and Business Continuity

Donald L. Schmidt, Chair

Preparedness, LLC, MA [SE]

harles P. Adams, Medina County Emergencyanagement Agency, OH [E]ichard R. Anderson, Anderson Risk Consultants,J [SE]ete Brewster, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs,V [U]

teven J. Charvat, University of Washington, WA [U]Rep. International Association of Emergency Managers

ndrew E. Cuthbert, Western Digital Corporation,A [U]regory T. Cybulski, Aon Corporation, NJ [I]atthew Devine, Santa Rosa Fire Department, CA [E]ichael J. DuBose, HUB International Limited, NJ [I]oderick J. Fraser, Jr., Boston Fire Department, MA [E]avid Gluckman, Willis Group, NJ [I]avid Halstead, State of Florida, FL [E]

Rep. National Emergency Management Associationavid J. Hiscott, Jr., ConocoPhillips Transportation,X [U]

Rep. American Petroleum Instituteeorge B. Huff, Jr., Administrative Office of the U.S.ourts, VA [U]ichael W. Janko, The Goodyear Tire & Rubberompany, OH [U]enneth Katz, Travelers Insurance Company, NC [I]

ames A. Kelley, The Hartford Financial Services, CT [I]

Alternates

Nonvoting

Tc

Na

Cr

Gunnar J. Kuepper, Emergency & Disaster Management,Inc., CA [SE]Dana C. Lankhorst, MiddleOak, NH [I]Richard J. Larkin, City of Saint Paul, Minnesota, MN [U]

Rep. Emergency Management Accreditation ProgramDean R. Larson, Larson Performance Consulting,IN [SE]Ray S. Lazarus, Emergency Management Ontario,Canada [E]Diane K. Mack, Indiana University, IN [U]Patricia A. Moore, Pat Moore Company, TX [SE]Michael J. Morganti, Disaster Recovery InstituteInternational, FL [SE]

Rep. Disaster Recovery Institute InternationalSusana M. Mueller, Tampa Electric Company/TECOEnergy, Inc., FL [U]Melvyn Musson, Edward Jones Company, MO [U]Ashley E. Newsome, Emergency Response Educators& Consultants, Inc., FL [SE]Daniel Newton, Microsoft Corporation, WA [U]Scott R. Nicoll, Chubb Group of Insurance Companies,NJ [I]Jo Robertson, Arkema Inc., PA [M]Dale J. Romme, Hallmark Cards, Inc., MO [U]

Rep. NFPA Industrial Fire Protection SectionDavid M. Sarabacha, Deloitte & Touché LLP, WA [SE]

Brian Strong, BlueCross BlueShield of Florida, FL [I]

raci Bishop, Microsoft Corporation, WA [U](Alt. to D. Newton)

atthew DeFrain, Deloitte & Touché LLP, IL [SE](Alt. to D. M. Sarabacha)

teve Elliot, Elliot Consulting, FL [SE](Alt.to ACPI Rep.)

obert Gazdik, Travelers Insurance Company, MN [I](Alt. to K. Katz)

rancis E. McCarton, Boston Fire Department,A [E]

(Alt. to R. J. Fraser, Jr.)

John Douglas Nelson, Business Continuity Solutions,Inc., CA [SE]

(Alt. to P. A. Moore)Kelley Okolita, DRI International, FL [SE]

(Alt. to M. J. Morganti)Lorraine E. Webb, Emergency Management Ontario,Canada [E]

(Alt. to R. S. Lazarus)Michael R. Zanotti, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs,WV [U]

(Alt. to P. Brewster)

onald P. Bliss, NI2 Center for Infrastructure Expertise,H [RT]

ohn C. Fannin III, SafePlace Corporation, DE [SE]Rep. TC on Premises Security

arl Anthony Gibson, La Trobe University, Australia [E]

Graeme S. Jannaway, Jannaway Continuity Consulting,Inc., Canada [SE]

Rep. Canadian Standards AssociationGavin J. Love, WorleyParsons Pty Ltd., TX [SE]

rlando P. Hernandez, NFPA Staff Liaison

his list represents the membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the final text of this edition. Since that time,hanges in the membership may have occurred. A key to classifications is found at the back of the document.

OTE: Membership on a committee shall not in and of itself constitute an endorsement of the Association orny document developed by the committee on which the member serves.

ommittee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on preparedness for,esponse to, and recovery from disasters resulting from natural, human, or technological events.

2013 Edition

1600–4 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

Contents

Chapter 1 Administration .............................. 1600– 51.1 Scope ............................................. 1600– 51.2 Purpose .......................................... 1600– 51.3 Application ...................................... 1600– 5

Chapter 2 Referenced Publications ................. 1600– 52.1 General .......................................... 1600– 52.2 NFPA Publications ............................. 1600– 52.3 Other Publications ............................ 1600– 52.4 References for Extracts in Mandatory

Sections .......................................... 1600– 5

Chapter 3 Definitions .................................. 1600– 53.1 General .......................................... 1600– 53.2 NFPA Official Definitions .................... 1600– 53.3 General Definitions ........................... 1600– 5

Chapter 4 Program Management .................... 1600– 64.1 Leadership and Commitment .............. 1600– 64.2 Program Coordinator ........................ 1600– 64.3 Program Committee .......................... 1600– 64.4 Program Administration ..................... 1600– 64.5 Laws and Authorities .......................... 1600– 64.6 Finance and Administration ................ 1600– 64.7 Records Management ........................ 1600– 7

Chapter 5 Planning ..................................... 1600– 75.1 Planning and Design Process ............... 1600– 75.2 Risk Assessment ................................ 1600– 75.3 Business Impact Analysis ..................... 1600– 75.4 Resource Needs Assessment ................. 1600– 85.5 Performance Objectives ...................... 1600– 8

Chapter 6 Implementation ............................ 1600– 86.1 Common Plan Requirements ............... 1600– 86.2 Prevention ....................................... 1600– 86.3 Mitigation ....................................... 1600– 86.4 Crisis Communications and Public

Information ..................................... 1600– 86.5 Warning, Notifications, and

Communications .............................. 1600– 86.6 Operational Procedures ..................... 1600– 86.7 Incident Management ........................ 1600– 96.8 Emergency Operations/Response

Plan ............................................... 1600– 96.9 Business Continuity and Recovery ......... 1600– 96.10 Employee Assistance and Support ......... 1600– 9

2013 Edition

Chapter 7 Training and Education .................. 1600– 97.1 Curriculum ...................................... 1600– 97.2 Goal of Curriculum ........................... 1600– 97.3 Scope and Frequency of Instruction ...... 1600– 97.4 Incident Management System

Training ......................................... 1600– 97.5 Recordkeeping ................................. 1600–107.6 Regulatory and Program

Requirements .................................. 1600–107.7 Public Education .............................. 1600–10

Chapter 8 Exercises and Tests ........................ 1600–108.1 Program Evaluation ........................... 1600–108.2 Exercise and Test Methodology ............ 1600–108.3 Design of Exercises and Tests ............... 1600–108.4 Exercise and Test Evaluation ............... 1600–108.5 Frequency ....................................... 1600–10

Chapter 9 Program Maintenance andImprovement ............................... 1600–10

9.1 Program Reviews ............................... 1600–109.2 Corrective Action .............................. 1600–109.3 Continuous Improvement ................... 1600–10

Annex A Explanatory Material ....................... 1600–10

Annex B Program Development Resources ....... 1600–24

Annex C Self-Assessment for Conformity withNFPA 1600, 2013 Edition ................... 1600–25

Annex D Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) Cycle ....... 1600–39

Annex E Crosswalk Between NFPA 1600, DRII,and CSA Z1600 ............................... 1600–39

Annex F A 2013 Edition asNFP 1600 aManagement System Standard ............ 1600–42

Annex G Maturity Models ............................. 1600–52

Annex H APELL ......................................... 1600–52

Annex I Family Preparedness ......................... 1600–53

Annex J Informational References .................. 1600–55

Index ......................................................... 1600–57

DEFINITIONS 1600–5

NFPA 1600

Standard on

Disaster/Emergency Management andBusiness Continuity Programs

2013 Edition

IMPORTANT NOTE: This NFPA document is made available foruse subject to important notices and legal disclaimers. These noticesand disclaimers appear in all publications containing this documentand may be found under the heading “Important Notices and Dis-claimers Concerning NFPA Documents.” They can also be obtainedon request from NFPA or viewed at www.nfpa.org/disclaimers.

NOTICE: An asterisk (*) following the number or letterdesignating a paragraph indicates that explanatory materialon the paragraph can be found in Annex A.

Changes other than editorial are indicated by a verticalrule beside the paragraph, table, or figure in which thechange occurred. These rules are included as an aid to theuser in identifying changes from the previous edition. Whereone or more complete paragraphs have been deleted, the de-letion is indicated by a bullet (•) between the paragraphs thatremain.

Information on referenced publications can be found inChapter 2 and Annex J.

Chapter 1 Administration

1.1* Scope. This standard shall establish a common set of crite-ria for all hazards disaster/emergency management and businesscontinuity programs, hereinafter referred to as “the program.”

1.2* Purpose. This standard provides the fundamental criteriato develop, implement, assess, and maintain the program for pre-vention, mitigation, preparedness, response, continuity, and re-covery.

1.3* Application. This document shall apply to public, not-for-profit, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and toprivate entities.

Chapter 2 Referenced Publications

2.1 General. The documents or portions thereof listed in thischapter are referenced within this standard and shall be con-sidered part of the requirements of this document.

2.2 NFPA Publications. (Reserved)

2.3 Other Publications.

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th edition, Merriam-Webster, Inc., Springfield, MA, 2003.

2.4 References for Extracts in Mandatory Sections. (Reserved)

Chapter 3 Definitions

3.1 General. The definitions contained in this chapter shallapply to the terms used in this standard. Where terms are notdefined in this chapter or within another chapter, they shallbe defined using their ordinarily accepted meanings withinthe context in which they are used. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate

Dictionary, 11th edition, shall be the source for the ordinarilyaccepted meaning.

3.2 NFPA Official Definitions.

3.2.1* Approved. Acceptable to the authority having jurisdic-tion.

3.2.2* Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ). An organization,office, or individual responsible for enforcing the requirementsof a code or standard, or for approving equipment, materials, aninstallation, or a procedure.

3.2.3 Shall. Indicates a mandatory requirement.

3.2.4 Should. Indicates a recommendation or that which isadvised but not required.

3.2.5 Standard. A document, the main text of which containsonly mandatory provisions using the word “shall” to indicaterequirements and which is in a form generally suitable formandatory reference by another standard or code or for adop-tion into law. Nonmandatory provisions are not to be consid-ered a part of the requirements of a standard and shall belocated in an appendix, annex, footnote, informational note,or other means as permitted in the Manual of Style for NFPATechnical Committee Documents.

3.3 General Definitions.

3.3.1 All-Hazards. An approach for prevention, mitigation,preparedness, response, continuity, and recovery that ad-dresses a full range of threats and hazards, including natural,human-caused, and technology-caused.

3.3.2* Business Continuity. An ongoing process to ensure thatthe necessary steps are taken to identify the impacts of potentiallosses and maintain viable recovery strategies, recovery plans, andcontinuity of services.

3.3.3 Business Impact Analysis. A management level analysisthat identifies, quantifies, and qualifies the impacts resultingfrom interruptions or disruptions of an entity’s resources. Theanalysis may identify time-critical functions, recovery priori-ties, dependencies, and interdependencies so that recoverytime objectives can be established and approved.

3.3.4 Capability. The ability to perform required actions.

3.3.5 Competence. Demonstrated ability to apply knowledgeand skills to achieve intended results.

3.3.6 Continual Improvement. Recurring process of enhanc-ing the management program in order to achieve improvementsin overall performance consistent with the entity’s policy, goals,and objectives.

3.3.7* Continuity. A term that includes business continuity,continuity of operations (COOP), operational continuity, suc-cession planning, continuity of government (COG), whichsupport the resilience of the entity.

3.3.8 Crisis Management. The ability of an entity to manageincidents that have the potential to cause significant security,financial, or reputational impacts.

3.3.9 Damage Assessment. An appraisal or determination ofthe effects of the incident on humans; on physical, operational,economic characteristics; and on the environment.

3.3.10 Disaster/Emergency Management. An ongoing processto prevent, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, maintain continuityduring, and to recover from, an incident that threatens life, prop-erty, operations, or the environment.

2013 Edition

1600–6 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

•

•

3.3.11 Entity. A governmental agency or jurisdiction, private orpublic company, partnership, nonprofit organization, or otherorganization that has emergency management and continuity ofoperations responsibilities.

3.3.12* Exercise. A process to assess, train, practice, and im-prove performance in an organization.

3.3.13 Incident. An event that has the potential to causeinterruption, disruption, loss, emergency, crisis, disaster, orcatastrophe.

3.3.14 Incident Action Plan. A verbal plan, written plan, orcombination of both that is updated throughout the incidentand reflects the overall incident strategy, tactics, risk manage-ment, and member safety requirements developed by the inci-dent commander.

3.3.15* Incident Management System (IMS). The combinationof facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and commu-nications operating within a common organizational structureand designed to aid in the management of resources duringincidents.

3.3.16 Interoperability. The ability of diverse personnel, sys-tems, and organizations to work together seamlessly.

3.3.17 Mitigation. Activities taken to reduce the impact fromhazards.

3.3.18* Mutual Aid/Assistance Agreement. A prearrangedagreement between two or more entities to share resources inresponse to an incident.

3.3.19 Preparedness. Ongoing activities, tasks, and systems todevelop, implement, and maintain the program capabilities.

3.3.20* Prevention. Activities to avoid or stop an incidentfrom occurring.

3.3.21* Recovery. Activities and programs designed to returnconditions to a level that is acceptable to the entity.

3.3.22* Resource Management. A system for identifying avail-able resources to enable timely access to resources needed toprevent, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, maintain continu-ity during, or recover from an incident.

3.3.23* Response. Immediate and ongoing activities, tasks,programs, and systems to manage the effects of an incidentthat threatens life, property, operations, or the environment.

3.3.24 Risk Assessment. The process of hazard identificationand the analysis of probabilities, vulnerabilities, and impacts.

3.3.25 Situation Analysis. The process of collecting, evaluating,and disseminating information related to the incident, includinginformation on the current and forecasted situation and on thestatus of resources for management of the incident.

3.3.26 Test. Procedure for evaluation with a pass or fail result.

3.3.27 Vital Records. Information critical to the continuedoperation or survival of an entity.

Chapter 4 Program Management

4.1* Leadership and Commitment.

4.1.1 The entity leadership shall demonstrate commitmentto the program to prevent, mitigate the consequences of, pre-pare for, respond to, maintain continuity during, and recoverfrom incidents.

2013 Edition

4.1.2 The leadership commitment shall include the following:

(1) Support the development, implementation, and mainte-nance of the program

(2) Provide necessary resources to support the program(3) Ensure the program is reviewed and evaluated as needed

to ensure program effectiveness(4) Support corrective action to address program deficiencies

4.1.3 The entity shall adhere to policies, execute plans, andfollow procedures developed to support the program.

4.2* Program Coordinator. The program coordinator shall beappointed by the entity’s leadership and authorized to develop,implement, administer, evaluate, and maintain the program.

4.3 Program Committee.

4.3.1* A program committee shall be established by the entityin accordance with its policy.

4.3.2 The program committee shall provide input and/or assistin the coordination of the preparation, development, implemen-tation, evaluation, and maintenance of the program.

4.3.3* The program committee shall include the program co-ordinator and others who have the expertise, the knowledgeof the entity, and the capability to identify resources from allkey functional areas within the entity and shall solicit appli-cable external representation.

4.4 Program Administration.

4.4.1 The entity shall have a documented program that in-cludes the following:

(1) Executive policy, including vision, mission statement,roles, and responsibilities, and enabling authority

(2)*Program scope, goals, performance, objectives, and met-rics for program evaluation

(3)*Applicable authorities, legislation, regulations, and indus-try codes of practice as required by Section 4.5

(4) Program budget and schedule, including milestones(5) Program plans and procedures that include the following:

(a) Anticipated cost(b) Priority(c) Resources required

(6) Records management practices as required by Section 4.7(7) Change management process

4.4.2 The program shall include the requirements specified inChapters 4 through 9, the scope of which shall be determinedthrough an “all-hazards” approach and the risk assessment.

4.4.3* Program requirements shall be applicable to prevention,mitigation, preparedness, response, continuity, and recovery.

4.5 Laws and Authorities.

4.5.1 The program shall comply with applicable legislation,policies, regulatory requirements, and directives.

4.5.2 The entity shall establish and maintain a procedure(s)to comply with applicable legislation, policies, regulatory re-quirements, and directives.

4.5.3* The entity shall implement a strategy for addressing theneed for revisions to legislation, regulations, directives, poli-cies, and industry codes of practice.

4.6 Finance and Administration.

4.6.1 The entity shall develop finance and administrativeprocedures to support the program before, during, and af-ter an incident.

PLANNING 1600–7

•

•

•

•

4.6.2* There shall be a responsive finance and administrativeframework that does the following:

(1) Complies with the entity’s program requirements(2) Is uniquely linked to response, continuity, and recovery

operations(3) Provides for maximum flexibility to expeditiously request,

receive, manage, and apply funds in a nonemergency envi-ronment and in emergency situations to ensure the timelydelivery of assistance

4.6.3 Procedures shall be created and maintained for expedit-ing fiscal decisions in accordance with established authorizationlevels, accounting principles, governance requirements, and fis-cal policy.

4.6.4 Finance and administrative procedures shall includethe following:

(1) Responsibilities for program finance authority, includingreporting relationships to the program coordinator

(2)*Program procurement procedures(3) Payroll(4)*Accounting systems to track and document costs(5) Management of funding from external sources(6) Crisis management procedures that coordinate authori-

zation levels and appropriate control measures(7) Documenting financial expenditures incurred as a result

of an incident and for compiling claims for future costrecovery

(8) Identifying and accessing alternative funding sources(9) Managing budgeted and specially appropriated funds

4.7* Records Management.

4.7.1 The entity shall develop, implement, and manage arecords management program to ensure that records areavailable to the entity following an incident.

4.7.2 The program shall include the following:

(1) Identification of records (hard copy or electronic) vital tocontinue the operations of the entity

(2) Backup of records on a frequency necessary to meet pro-gram goals and objectives

(3) Validation of the integrity of records backup(4) Implementation of procedures to store, retrieve, and re-

cover records onsite or offsite(5) Protection of records(6) Implementation of a record review process(7) Procedures coordinating records access

Chapter 5 Planning

5.1 Planning and Design Process.

5.1.1* The program shall follow a planning process that devel-ops strategies, plans, and required capabilities to execute theprogram.

5.1.2 Strategic planning shall define the entity’s vision, mis-sion, and goals of the program.

5.1.3 A risk assessment and a business impact analysis (BIA)shall develop information to prepare prevention and mitiga-tion strategies.

5.1.4 A risk assessment, a BIA, and a resource needs assessmentshall develop information to prepare emergency operations/response, crisis communications, continuity, and recovery plans.

5.1.5 Crisis management planning shall address issues thatthreaten the strategic, reputational, and intangible elements ofthe entity.

5.1.6 The entity shall include key stakeholders in the plan-ning process.

5.2* Risk Assessment.

5.2.1 The entity shall conduct a risk assessment to developrequired strategies and plans.

5.2.2 The entity shall identify hazards and monitor those haz-ards and the likelihood of their occurrence.

5.2.2.1* Hazards to be evaluated shall include the following:

(1) Natural hazards (geologic, meteorologic, and biological)(2) Human-caused events (accidental and intentional)(3) Technology-caused events (accidental and intentional)

5.2.2.2 The vulnerability of people, property, operations, theenvironment, and the entity shall be identified, evaluated, andmonitored.

5.2.3 The entity shall conduct an analysis of the impacts ofthe hazards identified in 5.2.2 on the following:

(1) Health and safety of persons in the affected area(2) Health and safety of personnel responding to the incident(3)*Continuity of operations(4)*Property, facilities, assets, and critical infrastructure(5) Delivery of the entity’s services(6) Supply chain(7) Environment(8)*Economic and financial conditions(9) Regulatory and contractual obligations

(10) Reputation of or confidence in the entity

5.2.4* The analysis shall evaluate the potential effects of re-gional, national, or international incidents that could have cas-cading impacts.

5.2.5 The risk assessment shall evaluate the adequacy of exist-ing prevention and mitigation strategies.

5.3* Business Impact Analysis.

5.3.1 The entity shall conduct a BIA.

5.3.2 The BIA shall evaluate the potential impact resultingfrom interruption or disruption of individual functions, pro-cesses, and applications.

5.3.3* The BIA shall identify those functions, processes, infra-structure, systems, and applications that are critical to the entityand the point in time [recovery time objective (RTO)] when theimpact of the interruption or disruption becomes unacceptableto the entity.

5.3.4 The BIA shall identify dependencies and interdepen-dencies across functions, processes, and applications to deter-mine the potential for compounding impact in the event of aninterruption or disruption.

5.3.5* The BIA shall evaluate the potential loss of informationand the point in time [recovery point objective (RPO)] thatdefines the potential gap between the last backup of informa-tion and the time of the interruption or disruption.

5.3.6* The BIA shall be used in the development of recoverystrategies and plans to support the program.

2013 Edition

1600–8 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

•

5.4 Resource Needs Assessment.

5.4.1* The entity shall conduct a resource needs assessmentbased on the hazards identified in Section 5.2 and the businessimpact analysis in Section 5.3.

5.4.2 The resource needs assessment shall include the fol-lowing:

(1)*Human resources, equipment, training, facilities, funding,expert knowledge, materials, technology, information, intel-ligence, and the time frames within which they will beneeded

(2) Quantity, response time, capability, limitations, cost, andliabilities

5.4.3* The entity shall establish procedures to locate, acquire,store, distribute, maintain, test, and account for services, humanresources, equipment, and materials procured or donated tosupport the program.

5.4.4 Facilities capable of supporting response, continuity,and recovery operations shall be identified.

5.4.5* Agreements. The need for mutual aid/assistance or part-nership agreements shall be determined; if needed, agreementsshall be established and documented.

5.5 Performance Objectives.

5.5.1* The entity shall establish performance objectives forthe program in accordance with Chapter 4 and the elementsin Chapters 5 through 9.

5.5.2 The performance objectives shall address the results ofthe hazard identification, risk assessment, and business im-pacts analysis.

5.5.3 Performance objectives shall be developed by the entityto address both short-term and long-term needs.

5.5.4* The entity shall define the terms short term and long term.

Chapter 6 Implementation

6.1 Common Plan Requirements.

6.1.1* Plans shall address the health and safety of personnel.

6.1.2 Plans shall identify and document the following:

(1) Assumptions made during the planning process(2) Functional roles and responsibilities of internal and external

agencies, organizations, departments, and positions(3) Lines of authority(4) The process for delegation of authority(5) Lines of succession for the entity(6) Liaisons to external entities(7) Logistics support and resource requirements

6.1.3* Plans shall be individual, integrated into a single plandocument, or a combination of the two.

6.1.4* The entity shall make sections of the plans available tothose assigned specific tasks and responsibilities therein andto key stakeholders as required.

6.2 Prevention.

6.2.1* The entity shall develop a strategy to prevent an inci-dent that threatens life, property, and the environment.

2013 Edition

6.2.2* The prevention strategy shall be kept current using theinformation collection and intelligence techniques.

6.2.3 The prevention strategy shall be based on the results ofhazard identification and risk assessment, an analysis of im-pacts, program constraints, operational experience, and acost-benefit analysis.

6.2.4 The entity shall have a process to monitor the identifiedhazards and adjust the level of preventive measures to be com-mensurate with the risk.

6.3 Mitigation.

6.3.1* The entity shall develop and implement a mitigationstrategy that includes measures to be taken to limit or controlthe consequences, extent, or severity of an incident that can-not be prevented.

6.3.2* The mitigation strategy shall be based on the results ofhazard identification and risk assessment, an analysis of im-pact, program constraints, operational experience, and cost-benefit analysis.

6.3.3 The mitigation strategy shall include interim and long-term actions to reduce vulnerabilities.

6.4 Crisis Communications and Public Information.

6.4.1* The entity shall develop a plan and procedures to dis-seminate information to and respond to requests for informa-tion from the following audiences before, during, and after anincident:

(1) Internal audiences, including employees(2) External audiences, including the media, functional needs

populations, and other stakeholders

6.4.2* The entity shall establish and maintain a crisis commu-nications or public information capability that includes thefollowing:

(1)*Central contact facility or communications hub(2) Physical or virtual information center(3) System for gathering, monitoring, and disseminating in-

formation(4) Procedures for developing and delivering coordinated

messages(5) Protocol to clear information for release

6.5 Warning, Notifications, and Communications.

6.5.1* The entity shall determine its warning, notification, andcommunications needs.

6.5.2* Warning, notification, and communications systemsshall be reliable, redundant, and interoperable.

6.5.3* Emergency warning, notification, and communicationsprotocols and procedures shall be developed, tested, and usedto alert stakeholders potentially at risk from an actual or im-pending incident.

6.5.4 Procedures shall include issuing warnings through au-thorized agencies if required by law as well as the use of pre-scripted information bulletins or templates.

6.6 Operational Procedures.

6.6.1 The entity shall develop, coordinate, and implementoperational procedures to support the program.

TRAINING AND EDUCATION 1600–9

•

•

•

•

•

6.6.2 Procedures shall be established and implemented forresponse to and recovery from the impact of hazards identi-fied in 5.2.2.

6.6.3* Procedures shall provide for life safety, property conser-vation, incident stabilization, continuity, and protection of theenvironment under the jurisdiction of the entity.

6.6.4 Procedures shall include the following:

(1) Control of access to the area affected by the incident(2) Identification of personnel engaged in activities at the in-

cident(3) Accounting for personnel engaged in incident activities(4) Mobilization and demobilization of resources

6.6.5 Procedures shall allow for concurrent activities of re-sponse, continuity, recovery, and mitigation.

6.7 Incident Management.

6.7.1* The entity shall develop an incident management sys-tem to direct, control, and coordinate response, continuity,and recovery operations.

6.7.1.1* Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs).

6.7.1.1.1* The entity shall establish primary and alternateEOCs capable of managing response, continuity, and recoveryoperations.

6.7.1.1.2* The EOCs shall be permitted to be physical or virtual.

6.7.1.1.3 On activation of an EOC, communications and co-ordination shall be established between incident commandand the EOC.

6.7.2 The incident management system shall describe spe-cific organizational roles, titles, and responsibilities for eachincident management function.

6.7.3 The entity shall establish procedures and policies forcoordinating mitigation, preparedness, response, continuity,and recovery activities.

6.7.4 The entity shall coordinate the activities specified in6.7.3 with stakeholders.

6.7.5 Procedures shall include a situation analysis that incor-porates a damage assessment and a needs assessment to iden-tify resources to support activities.

6.7.6* Emergency operations/response shall be guided by anincident action plan or management by objectives.

6.7.7 Resource management shall include the following tasks:

(1) Establishing processes for describing, taking inventory of,requesting, and tracking resources

(2) Resource typing or categorizing by size, capacity, capabil-ity, and skill

(3) Mobilizing and demobilizing resources in accordancewith the established IMS

(4) Conducting contingency planning for resource deficiencies

6.7.8 A current inventory of internal and external resourcesshall be maintained.

6.7.9 Donations of human resources, equipment, material,and facilities shall be managed.

6.8 Emergency Operations/Response Plan.

6.8.1* Emergency operations/response plans shall define re-sponsibilities for carrying out specific actions in an emergency.

6.8.2* The plan shall identify actions to be taken to protectpeople, including those with access and functional needs,property, operations, the environment, and the entity.

6.8.3* The plan shall identify actions for incident stabilization.

6.8.4 The plan shall include the following:

(1) Protective actions for life safety in accordance with 6.8.2.(2) Warning, notifications, and communication in accor-

dance with Section 6.5.(3) Crisis communication and public information in accor-

dance with Section 6.4(4) Resource management in accordance with 6.7.7(5) Donation management in accordance with 6.7.9

6.9 Business Continuity and Recovery.

6.9.1* The continuity plan shall include recovery strategies tomaintain critical or time-sensitive functions and processesidentified during the business impact analysis.

6.9.2* The continuity plan shall identify stakeholders thatneed to be notified; critical and time-sensitive applications;alternative work sites; vital records, contact lists, functions,and processes that must be maintained; and personnel, proce-dures, and resources that are needed while the entity is recov-ering.

6.9.3* The recovery plan shall provide for restoration of func-tions, services, resources, facilities, programs, and infrastructure.

6.10 Employee Assistance and Support.

6.10.1* The entity shall develop a strategy for employee assis-tance and support that includes the following:

(1)*Communications procedures(2)*Contact information, including emergency contact out-

side the anticipated hazard area(3) Accounting for persons affected, displaced, or injured by

the incident(4) Temporary, short-term, or long-term housing and feeding

and care of those displaced by an incident(5) Mental health and physical well-being of individuals af-

fected by the incident(6) Pre-incident and post-incident awareness

6.10.2 The strategy shall be flexible for use in all incidents.

6.10.3* The entity shall promote family preparedness educa-tion and training for employees.

Chapter 7 Training and Education

7.1* Curriculum. The entity shall develop and implement acompetency-based training and education curriculum thatsupports all employees who have a role in the program.

7.2 Goal of Curriculum. The goal of the curriculum shall be tocreate awareness and enhance the knowledge, skills, and abilitiesrequired to implement, support, and maintain the program.

7.3 Scope and Frequency of Instruction. The scope of the cur-riculum and the frequency of instruction shall be identified.

7.4 Incident Management System Training. Personnel shallbe trained in the entity’s incident management system (IMS)and other components of the program to the level of theirinvolvement.

2013 Edition

1600–10 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

7.5 Recordkeeping. Records of training and education shallbe maintained as specified in Section 4.7.

7.6 Regulatory and Program Requirements. The curriculumshall comply with applicable regulatory and program require-ments.

7.7* Public Education. A public education program shall beimplemented to communicate the following:

(1) The potential impact of a hazard(2) Preparedness information(3) Information needed to develop a preparedness plan

Chapter 8 Exercises and Tests

8.1 Program Evaluation.

8.1.1 The entity shall evaluate program plans, procedures,training, and capabilities and promote continuous improve-ment through periodic exercises and tests.

8.1.2 The entity shall evaluate the program based on post-incident analyses, lessons learned, and operational perfor-mance in accordance with Chapter 9.

8.1.3 Exercises and tests shall be documented.

8.2* Exercise and Test Methodology.

8.2.1 Exercises shall provide a standardized methodology topractice procedures and interact with other entities (internaland external) in a controlled setting.

8.2.2 Exercises shall be designed to assess the maturity ofprogram plans, procedures, and strategies.

8.2.3 Tests shall be designed to demonstrate capabilities.

8.3* Design of Exercises and Tests. Exercises shall be de-signed to do the following:

(1) Ensure the safety of people, property, operations, andthe environment involved in the exercise or test

(2) Evaluate the program(3) Identify planning and procedural deficiencies(4) Test or validate recently changed procedures or plans(5) Clarify roles and responsibilities(6) Obtain participant feedback and recommendations for

program improvement(7) Measure improvement compared to performance objec-

tives(8) Improve coordination among internal and external

teams, organizations, and entities(9) Validate training and education

(10) Increase awareness and understanding of hazards andthe potential impact of hazards on the entity

(11) Identify additional resources and assess the capabilitiesof existing resources, including personnel and equip-ment needed for effective response and recovery

(12) Assess the ability of the team to identify, assess, and man-age an incident

(13) Practice the deployment of teams and resources to man-age an incident

(14) Improve individual performance

8.4 Exercise and Test Evaluation.

8.4.1 Exercises shall evaluate program plans, procedures, train-ing, and capabilities to identify opportunities for improvement.

2013 Edition

8.4.2 Tests shall be evaluated as either pass or fail.

8.5* Frequency.

8.5.1 Exercises and tests shall be conducted on the frequencyneeded to establish and maintain required capabilities.

Chapter 9 Program Maintenance and Improvement

9.1* Program Reviews. The entity shall maintain and improvethe program by evaluating its policies, program, procedures, andcapabilities using performance objectives.

9.1.1* The entity shall improve effectiveness of the programthrough evaluation of the implementation of changes result-ing from preventive and corrective action.

9.1.2* Evaluations shall be conducted on a regularly sched-uled basis and when the situation changes to challenge theeffectiveness of the existing program.

9.1.3 The program shall be re-evaluated when a change in anyof the following impacts the entity’s program:

(1) Regulations(2) Hazards and potential impacts(3) Resource availability or capability(4) Entity’s organization(5)*Funding changes(6) Infrastructure, including technology environment(7) Economic and geographic stability(8) Entity operations

9.1.4 Reviews shall include post-incident analyses, reviews oflessons learned, and reviews of program performance.

9.1.5 The entity shall maintain records of its reviews and evalu-ations, in accordance with the records management practices de-veloped under Section 4.7.

9.1.6 Documentation, records, and reports shall be providedto management for review and follow-up.

9.2* Corrective Action.

9.2.1* The entity shall establish a corrective action process.

9.2.2* The entity shall take corrective action on deficienciesidentified.

9.3 Continuous Improvement. The entity shall effect continu-ous improvement of the program through the use of programreviews and the corrective action process.

Annex A Explanatory Material

Annex A is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA documentbut is included for informational purposes only. This annex containsexplanatory material, numbered to correspond with the applicable textparagraphs.

A.1.1 The Emergency Management and Business Continuitycommunity comprises many different entities, including the gov-ernment at distinct levels (e.g., federal, state/provincial, territo-rial, tribal, indigenous, and local levels); commercial businessand industry; not-for-profit and nongovernmental organizations;and individual citizens. Each of these entities has its own focus,unique mission and responsibilities, varied resources and capa-bilities, and operating principles and procedures.

ANNEX A 1600–11

•

A.1.2 The standard promotes a common understanding ofthe fundamentals of planning and decision making to helpentities examine all hazards and produce an integrated, coor-dinated, and synchronized program for disaster/emergencymanagement and business continuity.

A.1.3 The application of NFPA 1600 within the private sectoris described in detail in Implementing NFPA 1600, National Pre-paredness Standard, published by the National Fire ProtectionAssociation.

A.3.2.1 Approved. The National Fire Protection Associationdoes not approve, inspect, or certify any installations, proce-dures, equipment, or materials; nor does it approve or evalu-ate testing laboratories. In determining the acceptability ofinstallations, procedures, equipment, or materials, the author-ity having jurisdiction may base acceptance on compliancewith NFPA or other appropriate standards. In the absence ofsuch standards, said authority may require evidence of properinstallation, procedure, or use. The authority having jurisdic-tion may also refer to the listings or labeling practices of anorganization that is concerned with product evaluations and isthus in a position to determine compliance with appropriatestandards for the current production of listed items.

A.3.2.2 Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ). The phrase “au-thority having jurisdiction,” or its acronym AHJ, is used inNFPA documents in a broad manner, since jurisdictions andapproval agencies vary, as do their responsibilities. Where pub-lic safety is primary, the authority having jurisdiction may be afederal, state, local, or other regional department or indi-vidual such as a fire chief; fire marshal; chief of a fire preven-tion bureau, labor department, or health department; build-ing official; electrical inspector; or others having statutoryauthority. For insurance purposes, an insurance inspection de-partment, rating bureau, or other insurance company repre-sentative may be the authority having jurisdiction. In manycircumstances, the property owner or his or her designatedagent assumes the role of the authority having jurisdiction; atgovernment installations, the commanding officer or depart-mental official may be the authority having jurisdiction.

A.3.3.2 Business Continuity. Another term for business conti-nuity is operational continuity or continuity of operations (COOP).In the public sector, the term continuity of government (COG) isalso used. See also 3.3.7 and A.3.3.7.

A.3.3.7 Continuity. An evolving concept that is linked to con-tinuity is resilience. Organizational resilience is the ability ofan entity to withstand potential impacts of natural, human-caused, and technology-caused hazards; respond effectivelywhen an incident occurs; continue to provide a minimum ac-ceptable level of service during and in the immediate after-math of the incident; and thereafter return conditions to alevel that is acceptable to the entity. Entities generally are in-terdependent with a wider community. To ensure that thecommunity in which the entity operates is resilient, entitiesshould work with local stakeholders (including public, private,and not-for-profit organizations) to promote emergency man-agement and business continuity processes. Entities shouldevaluate their suppliers. The entity should request that thesupplier develop and maintain programs and processes to en-sure organizational resilience and their ability to provide criti-cal services and goods during emergencies and disasters. Pro-viding generic advice as well as more detailed assistance on aone-to-one basis to external stakeholders can ensure that busi-nesses and government are resilient and can quickly restore a

community’s ability to function normally after an incident.The underlying strategy is to bring together all sectors to col-laborate and share good practice. This concept can be re-ferred to as “community resilience.”

A.3.3.12 Exercise. Exercise is the principal means of evaluat-ing a program’s ability to execute its response procedures. Itallows the entity and stakeholder organizations to practiceprocedures and interact in a controlled setting. Participantsidentify and make recommendations to improve the overallprogram. Exercises include activities performed for the pur-pose of training and conditioning team members and person-nel in appropriate responses, with the goal of achieving maxi-mum performance.

An exercise can include seminars, workshops, games, drills,tabletops, functional exercises, or full-scale exercises and in-volve the simulation of a response or operational continuityincident. Exercises can be announced or unannounced andinvolve participant role-play in order to identify issues thatmight arise in a real incident.

A.3.3.15 Incident Management System (IMS). The incidentmanagement system is based on effective management charac-teristics that can be used by the public, private, and not-for-profit sectors. For an IMS to work effectively each manage-ment characteristic should contribute to the strength andefficiency of the overall system.

A description of commonly identified management charac-teristics follows.

Common Terminology. Common terminology allows diverseincident management and support entities to work togetheracross a wide variety of incident management functions andhazard scenarios. This common terminology is covered in theparagraphs that follow.

Organizational Functions. Major functions and functionalunits with domestic incident management responsibilities arenamed, and defined terminology for the organizational elementsinvolved is standard and consistent. The incident managementorganization establishes a process for gathering, sharing, andmanaging incident-related information and intelligence.

Modular Organization. The organizational structure devel-ops in a top-down, modular fashion that is based on the sizeand complexity of the incident, as well as the specifics of thehazard environment created by the incident. Where needed,separate functional elements can be established, each ofwhich can be further subdivided to enhance external organi-zational management and external coordination.

Comprehensive Resource Management. Maintaining an accu-rate and up-to-date picture of resource utilization is a criticalcomponent of domestic incident management. Resourcemanagement includes processes for categorizing, ordering,dispatching, tracking, and recovering resources. It also in-cludes processes for reimbursement for resources, as appro-priate. Resources are defined as personnel, teams, equipment,supplies, and facilities available or potentially available for as-signment or allocation in support of incident managementand emergency response activities. Personnel and equipmentshould respond only when requested or when dispatched byan appropriate authority.

Incident Facilities. Various types of operational locations andsupport facilities are established in the vicinity of an incident toaccomplish a variety of objectives, such as decontamination, do-nated goods processing, mass care, and evacuation. Typical facili-ties include incident command posts, bases, camps, staging areas,mass casualty triage areas, and other facilities as required.

2013 Edition

1600–12 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

Management by Objectives. Management by objectives repre-sents an approach that is communicated throughout the en-tire organization. This approach includes establishing over-arching objectives for the following:

(1) Developing and issuing assignments, plans, procedures,and protocols

(2) Establishing specific, measurable objectives for various inci-dent management functional activities and directing effortsto attain them in support of defined strategic objectives

(3) Documenting results to measure performance and facili-tate corrective action

Reliance on an Incident Action Plan. Incident action plans(IAPs) provide a coherent means of communicating the over-all incident objectives in the context of both operational andsupport activities.

Manageable Span of Control. Span of control is key to effec-tive and efficient incident management. Although effectivespan of control varies, the span of incident management su-pervisory responsibility in the public sector is typically three toseven subordinates. The type of incident, the nature of thetask, hazards and safety factors, and distances between person-nel and resources all influence span of control considerations.

Integrated Communications. Incident communications are fa-cilitated through the development and use of a common com-munications plan and interoperable communications pro-cesses and architectures. This integrated approach links theoperational and support units of the various agencies in-volved. It is necessary to maintain communications connectiv-ity and discipline and to enable common situational awarenessand interaction. Preparedness planning should address theequipment, systems, and protocols necessary to achieve inte-grated voice and data incident management communications.

Establishment and Transfer of Command. The command func-tion has to be clearly established from the beginning of inci-dent operations. The agency with primary jurisdictional au-thority over the incident designates the individual at the scenewho will be responsible for establishing command. When com-mand is transferred, the process should include a briefing thatcaptures all essential information for continuing safe and ef-fective operations.

Chain of Command and Unity of Command. Chain of com-mand refers to the orderly line of authority within the ranks ofthe incident management organization. Unity of commandmeans that every individual has a designated supervisor towhom he or she reports at the scene of the incident. Theseprinciples clarify reporting relationships and eliminate theconfusion caused by multiple, conflicting directives. Incidentmanagers at all levels have to be able to control the actions ofall personnel under their supervision.

Unified Command (UC). In incidents involving multiple juris-dictions, a single jurisdiction with multi-agency involvement,or multiple jurisdictions with multi-agency involvement, uni-fied command (UC) allows agencies with different legal, geo-graphic, and functional authorities and responsibilities towork together effectively without affecting individual agencyauthority, responsibility, or accountability.

Although a single Incident Commander normally handlesthe command function, an incident management system(IMS) can be expanded into a UC. The UC is a structure thatbrings together the incident commanders of all major organi-zations, which could include personnel from both private andpublic sectors involved in the incident, in order to coordinatean effective response while at the same time they carry out

2013 Edition

their own jurisdictional responsibilities. The UC links the or-ganizations responding to the incident and provides a forumfor the entities to make consensus decisions. Under the UC,the various jurisdictions and/or agencies and nongovernmentresponders blend together throughout the operation to cre-ate an integrated response team.

A.3.3.18 Mutual Aid/Assistance Agreement. The term mutualaid/assistance agreement, as used herein, includes cooperativeagreements, partnership agreements, memoranda of under-standing, memorandum of agreement, intergovernmentalcompacts, or other terms commonly used for the sharing ofresources. Agreements can be executed between any combina-tion of public, private, and not-for-profit entities.

A.3.3.20 Prevention. The term prevention refers to activities,tasks, programs, and systems intended to avoid or intervene inorder to stop an incident from occurring.

Prevention can apply to accidental and intentional human-caused incidents and technology-caused incidents. Accidentprevention and safety programs can reduce the frequency ofworkplace accidents. Prevention and deterrence of human-caused intentional incidents can include gathering intelli-gence and information and implementing countermeasuressuch as enhanced surveillance and security operations; inves-tigations to determine the nature and source of the threat;and law enforcement operations directed at deterrence, pre-emption, interdiction, or disruption. Implementation of net-work and information security can help prevent penetrationof networks and intercept malware. Analyses of the vulnerabil-ity of systems can identify means to prevent incidents causedby interruption, disruption, or failure of technology.

A.3.3.21 Recovery. Recovery programs are designed to assistvictims and their families, restore entities to suitable economicgrowth and confidence, relocate or rebuild destroyed prop-erty, and reconstitute government operations and services. Re-covery actions can be short term or long term, often continu-ing long after the incident has ended. Recovery programsinclude mitigation components designed to avoid damagefrom future incidents.

A.3.3.22 Resource Management. This system includes a pro-cess for identifying, categorizing, ordering, mobilizing, track-ing, and recovering and demobilizing resources, as well as aprocess for reimbursement for resources, as appropriate.

A.3.3.23 Response. The term response refers to the actionstaken by an entity to an incident or event. Actions can includeactivities, tasks, programs, and systems to protect life safety,meet basic human needs, preserve operational capability, andprotect property and the environment.

An incident response can include protective actions for lifesafety (evacuation, shelter-in-place, and lockdown), conductingdamage assessment, initiating recovery strategies, and any othermeasures necessary to bring an entity to a more stable status.

A.4.1 Leadership should research applicable legal, regula-tory, and other industry requirements that are related to thehazards, threats, and risks associated with the entity’s facilities,activities, functions, products, services, and supply chain; theenvironment; and stakeholders. The entity should documentthis information and keep it up to date.

A.4.2 It is not the intent of this standard to restrict the usersto the title program coordinator. It is recognized that different

ANNEX A 1600–13

•

entities use various forms and names for the person who per-forms the program coordinator functions identified in thestandard. Examples of titles are emergency manager (for the pub-lic sector), and business continuity manager (for the private sec-tor). A written position description should be provided.

Certification programs for emergency managers and busi-ness continuity professionals can be found in the DRII Profes-sional Practices for Business Continuity Practitioners and throughFEMA’s Emergency Management Institute and the CertifiedEmergency Manager (CEM) program administered by Inter-national Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM).

A.4.3.1 All state and local emergency management entitiesreport to a higher authority and might include governors, ad-jutant generals, chief law enforcement officers, county com-missions, or city commissions, among others. These authori-ties set the agendas for emergency management activities, anda program committee might not be appropriate. Mandatingan entity to have a program committee might, in some cases,violate the authorities under which the emergency manage-ment entity is established. Those entities that can have, orwant to have, a program committee that will provide adviceand guidance should be encouraged to do so.

A.4.3.3 When the representation on the program committeeis being determined, consideration should be given to publicsector representation on a private sector committee and viceversa, which will help to establish a coordinated and coopera-tive approach to the program.

A.4.4.1(2) Goals and objectives should be consistent with theentity’s policy, vision, mission statement, roles and responsi-bilities, and enabling authority. Consideration should also begiven to financial constraints, management support, regula-tory requirements, and codes of practice.

A.4.4.1(3) Industry codes of practices and guidelines shouldalso be considered. In the private sector, corporate policymight dictate the directives that should be followed.

The entity should consider local cultural and religious cus-toms as well as demographics when developing the program.

A.4.4.3 Key program elements cross boundaries during pre-vention, mitigation, preparedness, response, continuity, andrecovery. Each element should be considered interrelatedwith other elements and can be considered concurrently. Theuse of the terms, phases, elements, or components varies fromprogram to program.

A.4.5.3 If, through exercise or incident analysis, programevaluation, or corrective action, limitations in the necessarylaws and applicable authorities are discovered, a formal pro-cess should exist to amend them. This procedure should in-clude an understanding of the procedures to influence thenecessary changes to applicable legislation, policies, direc-tives, standards, and industry codes of practice.

In the case of public/private entities, consideration shouldbe made for periodic review of existing legislation, regula-tions, codes, and authorities to determine whether adequateflexibility exists to accommodate evolving programmaticpolicy or if new legislation should be developed and intro-duced through a legislative initiative. This is particularly rel-evant because program requirements change to comply withchanging roles and relationships in and among varying levelsof government.

For example, the entity might have the appropriate author-ity to conduct emergency operations but lack authority to take

action prior to an event to mitigate the occurrence or therecurrence of an incident. In other cases, additional authori-ties could be needed to generate the necessary revenue tosustain a viable program or to create a standing contingencyfund to adequately support an emergency operation.

A.4.6.2 In addition to having sound financial and administra-tion procedures for daily operations, it is equally important tohave procedures in place that will allow an entity to expeditefinancial decision making and ensure that proper accountingoccurs. To develop proper financial and administration proce-dures, the following steps should be taken:

(1) The finance department could be considered for mem-bership of the program committee.

(2) The finance department should be actively involved withidentifying, prioritizing, and purchasing internal and ex-ternal resources.

(3) The entity’s financial opportunities or limitations shouldbe identified within the strategic plan that defines the vi-sion, mission, goals, and objectives of the program.

A.4.6.4(2) The entity should consider establishing contractsfor resources in advance of an incident.

A.4.6.4(4) Existing internal controls that necessitate a re-sponse could be affected by the same event, which opens thedoor for opportunistic fraud. It is important that the entityrecognize the possibility of fraud occurring during this win-dow of opportunity and take reasonable precautions.

A.4.7 Records management is designed to aid in the identifi-cation, backup, protection, and access to paper-based andelectronic records that are vital to the entity and required forthe emergency management and business continuity pro-gram. It is not the intent of this section to require a recordsmanagement program for all of the entity’s records.

Records management practices should include the follow-ing activities:

(1) Creating, approving, and enforcing records managementpolicies, including a classification system and a recordsretention policy

(2) Developing a records storage plan, including the short-term and long-term housing of physical records and digi-tal information

(3) Identifying existing and newly created records and classi-fying and storing them according to standard operatingprocedures (SOPs)

(4) Coordinating the access and circulation of records withinand outside the organization

(5) Executing a retention policy to archive and destroyrecords according to operational needs, operating proce-dures, statutes, and regulations

A.5.1.1 Assumptions used in preparation of plans, especiallythose regarding hazard identification, risk assessment, analysis ofpotential impacts, and the availability and capability of resources,should be identified, evaluated, and validated during the plan-ning process. Confidential or sensitive information can be re-dacted or protected. Assumptions should be documented as re-quired by 6.1.2(1).

A.5.2 Risk assessment is a process for identifying potentialhazards/risk exposures and their relative probability of occur-rence; identifying assets at risk; assessing the vulnerability of theassets exposed; and quantifying the potential impacts of thehazard/risk exposures on the assets. Periodic reassessment is

2013 Edition

1600–14 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

needed when changes to the entity occur. Reassessment isalso necessary because hazards/risk exposures change overtime, and the collective knowledge of hazards/risk expo-sures develops over time.

In addition to identifying hazards that could be the pri-mary cause of an incident, consideration should also be givento those secondary hazards or cascading events that couldcause additional impact to the entity and its assets. As an ex-ample, a fire could result in injury or death, property damage,interruption of operations, contamination of the environ-ment, and negative attention on the entity.

A comprehensive risk assessment identifies the range ofhazard/risk exposures, including threats, hazards, or disrup-tive incidents, that have impacted or might impact the entity,the surrounding area, or the critical infrastructure supportingthe entity. The potential impact of each threat, hazard/riskexposure, or disruptive incident is determined by the capabili-ties of the perpetrator, the magnitude of the hazard, and thescope of the incident, as well as the vulnerability of people,property, technology, the environment, and the entity’s opera-tions to the threat, hazard, or incident and the adequacy ofexisting mitigation. There are multiple methods to perform arisk assessment, but the entity should adhere to the followingsteps for conducting a comprehensive risk assessment:

(1) Determine the methodology the entity will use to conductthe assessment and determine whether the entity has thenecessary expertise to perform the assessment.

(2) Consult with internal or external experts with the exper-tise to assess the vulnerability of the entity’s assets fromidentified hazards.

(3) Identify and categorize assets (human resources, buildings,equipment, operations, technology, electronic information,suppliers, vendors, third-party service providers, etc.).

(4) Identify threats and hazards — natural, human caused(accidental and intentional), and technology caused.

(5) Evaluate hazard/risk exposures to which the entity is ex-posed.

(6) Assess the existing/current preventive measures and miti-gation controls in place against credible threats.

(7) Categorize threats, hazard/risk exposures, and potential in-cidents by their relative frequency and severity. Keep inmind that there might be many possible combinations offrequency and severity for each, as well as cascading impacts.

(8) Evaluate the residual hazard/risk exposures (those that re-main hazardous after prevention and mitigation activities).

Information from the risk assessment and impact analysiswill help determine priorities for prevention and mitigationactivities as well as prioritize development of plans and proce-dures. The entity should attempt to prevent, mitigate, preparefor, plan to respond to, and plan to recover from incidentsthat have significant potential to impact people; property; op-erational capabilities, including technology; the environment;and the entity itself.

A.5.2.2.1 The following is an expanded list of hazards thatshould be considered during the risk assessment. Many hazardscan be classified in multiple categories. A wildland fire might becaused by lightning or an intentional act. A fire in a chemicalplant could be caused by human error or the failure of technol-ogy, such as a malfunctioning or improperly programmed con-trol system. Hazards that should be considered during the riskassessment include natural hazards/risk exposures (geologic,

2013 Edition

meteorologic, and biological), human-caused events (accidentaland intentional), and technology-caused incidents:

(1) Geologic hazards/risk exposures(a) Earthquake(b) Tsunami(c) Volcano(d) Landslide, mudslide, subsidence

(2) Meteorologic hazards/risk exposures(a) Flood, flash flood, seiche, tidal surge(b) Water control structure (e.g., dam, levee) failure(c) Drought(d) Snow, ice, hail, sleet, avalanche, arctic freeze(e) Windstorm, tropical cyclone, hurricane, tornado, wa-

ter spout, duststorm, sandstorm(f) Extreme temperatures (heat, cold)(g) Wildland fire(h) Lightning strikes(i) Famine(j) Geomagnetic storm

(3) Biological hazards/risk exposures(a) Food-borne illnesses(b) Pandemic disease (e.g., avian flu, H1N1)(c) Infectious/communicable disease [e.g., plague, small-

pox, anthrax, West Nile virus, foot and mouth disease,severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), bovine spongi-form encephalopathy (BSE, or Mad Cow Disease)]

(4) Accidental human-caused events(a) Hazardous material spill or release (flammable liquid;

flammable gas; flammable solid; oxidizer; poison; ex-plosive, radiological, or corrosive material)

(b) Nuclear power plant incident, radiological incident(c) Explosion/fire(d) Transportation accident(e) Building/structure collapse(f) Entrapment and/or rescue (machinery, confined

space, high angle, water)(g) Fuel/resource shortage(h) Mechanical breakdown(i) Transportation incidents (motor vehicle, railroad,

watercraft, aircraft, pipeline)(j) Untimely death of employee

(5) Intentional human-caused events(a) Strike or labor dispute(b) Criminal activity (vandalism, sabotage, arson, robbery,

theft, fraud, embezzlement, data theft, malfeasance)(c) Physical or information security breach(d) Lost person, child abduction, kidnapping, extortion,

hostage incident, workplace/school/university vio-lence, homicide

(e) Product defect or contamination(f) Disinformation(g) Harassment(h) Discrimination(i) Demonstrations, civil disturbance, public unrest,

mass hysteria, riot(j) Bomb threat, suspicious package(k) Terrorism (explosive, chemical, biological, radiologi-

cal, nuclear, cyber, electromagnetic pulse)(l) Insurrection

(m) Enemy attack, war(n) Arson

(6) Technology-caused incidents

ANNEX A 1600–15

(a) Computer systems [outages, hardware failure, data cor-ruption, deletion, theft, loss of network connectivity (In-ternet or intranet), loss of electronic data interchangeor ecommerce, loss of domain name server (DNS), vi-rus, worm, Trojan horse, power surge, lightning, hostsite interdependencies, direct physical loss, water dam-age, cyber terrorism, vulnerability exploitation, botnets,hacking, phishing, spyware, malware, computer fraud,loss of encryption, denial of service, improper systemuse by employee, telecommunications interruption orfailure, electricity brownout or blackout]

(b) Computer software or application interruption, dis-ruption, or failure (internal/external)

(c) Loss, corruption, or theft of electronic information(d) Utility interruption or failure (telecommunica-

tions, electrical power, water, gas, steam, HVAC,pollution control system, sewage system, other criti-cal infrastructure)

(7) Other hazards/risk exposures, such as supply chain inter-ruption [loss of shipping or transportation, vendor failure(single or sole source provider)]

A.5.2.3(3) In order to maintain continuity of operations, theentity should identify essential or critical functions and pro-cesses, their recovery priorities, and their internal and exter-nal interdependencies, so that recovery time objectives can beset. Consideration also should be given to situations that causethe entity to become incapable of response or incapable ofmaintaining any continuity of operations for the foreseeablefuture. This process is called a business impact analysis (BIA)and is defined further in Section 5.3.

A.5.2.3(4) Assets include production machinery and process-ing equipment, tools, finished goods/inventory, raw materials,vehicles, electronic information, vital records, patents, intellec-tual property, and personnel/institutional knowledge. The analy-sis of impacts also should include evaluation of the infrastructurenecessary to operate buildings, equipment, and technology.

A.5.2.3(8) Quantification of the potential economic and fi-nancial impacts resulting from property damage, interruptionor disruption of operations, and environmental contamina-tion provides input into the determination of where to investin mitigation and planning efforts.

A.5.2.4 It is important to consider the cascading impact ofregional, national, or international incidents. One example isthe cascading impact of a hurricane. Direct impacts can in-clude wind and flood damage. Secondary impacts can includetelecommunications, electrical power, and transportation dis-ruptions, both inside and outside the direct impact area. Theearthquake and tsunami in Japan in 2011 resulted in supplychain interruptions around the world. The terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001, shut down air travel in the United Statesfor days and impacted the financial markets.

A.5.3 The BIA provides an assessment of how key disruptionrisks could affect an entity’s operations and identifies capabili-ties that might be needed to manage the disruptions.

The BIA Process. A BIA can be undertaken using engineeringanalysis, mathematical modeling, simulations, surveys, question-naires, interviews, structured workshops, or a combinationthereof, to identify the critical processes, people/personnel, as-sets and resources, physical and nonphysical properties, and thefinancial and operational effects of the loss of these elements, aswell as the required recovery time frames and supporting re-sources.

Based on the risk and vulnerability assessments, the follow-ing steps should be taken to confirm the processes and out-puts of the organization:

(1) Determine the consequences of a disruption on the iden-tified processes in financial, regulatory, customer and/oroperational terms over defined periods.

(2) Identify the interdependencies with key internal and ex-ternal stakeholders, which could include mapping the na-ture of the interdependencies through the supply chain(both inbound and outbound).

(3) Determine the current available resources and the essen-tial level of resources required to continue operation at aminimum acceptable level following a disruption.

(4) Identify ways to bypass problems (“workarounds”) in pro-cesses that are currently in use or are planned to be devel-oped. It might be necessary to develop alternative pro-cesses where resources or capability might be inaccessibleor insufficient during the disruption.

(5) Determine the recovery time objective (RTO) for eachprocess, based on the identified consequences and thecritical success factors for the function. The RTO repre-sents the maximum period of time the organization cantolerate the loss of capability.

(6) Determine the rate at which the severity of the impactincreases over time if the RTO is not met.

(7) Confirm the current level of preparedness of the entity’sprocesses to manage a disruption. This might include evalu-ating the level of redundancy within the process (e.g., spareequipment) or the existence of alternative suppliers.

The BIA processes should consist of the following threecomponents:

(1) Identify the lines of process flow (i.e., material flow, infor-mation flow, people movement, cash flow) and time con-straints. Typical output of the BIA will provide a processflow for the entire entity, identifying internal and externaldependencies.

(2) Identify the interruption potentials that describe the fi-nancial, regulatory, customer, or operational impacts, in-cluding potential bottlenecks, upstream and downstreamsupply chains, single points of failure, long lead time orimported equipment, single-source and sole-source sup-pliers, time constraint processing (e.g., long batch times),and interdependencies between internal and external en-tities and facilities.

(3) Identify the entity’s dependency on technology infrastruc-ture, including systems and applications, by identifyingthe technology needed to continue time-sensitive opera-tional processes; correlate specific technology compo-nents with the operational processes they support andbased on that information, assess the impact to the enti-ty’s operations due to disruption of those components.

A typical BIA would supply the following information:

(1) The financial impact to the organization if the processfails to perform, for example:(a) Loss of sales(b) Fines or penalties incurred(c) Overtime pay(d) Additional costs to recover(e) Loss of raw materials/finished products

(2) The regulatory or legal impact, for example:(a) Failure to meet reporting requirements(b) Failure to meet contractual commitments(c) Potential lawsuits

2013 Edition

1600–16 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

(3) Customer impact, for example:(a) How soon customers will know a problem exists and

how worried they will be(b) Impact to a customer’s supply chain(c) Potential for a customer to take its business elsewhere(d) Harm that could be caused to the customer(e) Impact to brand(f) Impact to reputation

(4) Operational impact, for example:(a) Seasonal impact(b) Backlog impact(c) Workload changes(d) Overtime(e) Employee morale

(5) The RTO required for the process in order to meet theoperational level acceptable to the entity

(6) Resources required to continue or resume time-sensitiveprocesses and the escalation of resource needs over time,for example:(a) Technology infrastructure components, systems, and

applications including:i. RTO of the required technology components

ii. Interdependency among different technologycomponents

iii. Core infrastructure, systems, and services suchas network components, directory services, etc.,that are essential for recovery of other technol-ogy components

iv. Recovery point objectives (RPOs) for data (themaximum amount of acceptable data loss)

(b) Vital records requirements(c) Equipment requirements such as printers, fax ma-

chines, scanners, mail sorters, postage meters, timestamps, forklifts, ladders, and tools

(d) Desktop requirements such as computers, telephones(e) Supplies such as paper, envelopes, letterhead, forms(f) Regulatory reporting requirements(g) Description of internal and external dependencies(h) Previous disruption experience(i) Known competitive issues analysis

The outputs of the BIA typically would include the following:

(1) Financial, operational, regulatory, customer, and othertangible and nontangible impact to the entity

(2) Identification of all time-sensitive processes and theircritical resources requirements

(3) Identification of time-sensitive technology componentsessential to recover the operational processes

(4) Prioritization of processes to be recovered(5) Prioritization of the technology components in alignment

with operational processes(6) Identification of key internal and external interdepen-

dencies of operational units, functions, processes, criticalresources, and technology components

(7) Identification of seasonal impact to operations for eachoperational process

(8) Determination of resources (people, vendors, equip-ment, technology, data/information, funding, and time)required for resumption and recovery

(9) RTO for each process

The output information of the BIA will help to achieve thefollowing:

(1) Identify the entity’s critical operations

2013 Edition

(2) Identify the entity’s time-sensitive operations(3) Determine the RTO for each critical operation(4) Determine the internal and external dependencies(5) Determine whether the recovery of each dependent com-

ponent is in alignment with process RTO(6) Determine the critical resources (people, vendors, equip-

ment, technology, data/information, funding, and time)required to support the entity’s mission

A.5.3.3 RTOs are often used as the basis for the developmentof recovery strategies and as a determinant as to when toimplement the recovery strategies during a disaster situation.Three examples follow:

(1) An RTO in the range of a few minutes to hours might re-quire that the operational process be fully functional in twogeographically diverse sites that are fully equipped andstaffed. In technology environments, this might require thattwo facilities either operate in parallel (active/active, e.g.,mirroring) or at least duplicate the primary environment(active/passive, e.g., clustering or high availability).

(2) An RTO expressed in hours to days can be sufficientlyaddressed by transferring the operations and staff to analternative site, such as a commercial recovery facility oran internally developed and maintained hot, warm, ormobile site.

(3) An RTO expressed in weeks can be sufficiently addressed bya cold site that requires that all necessary equipment, tech-nology, and supplies be re-established at the time of theevent.

A.5.3.5 The RPO is the point in time from which data are recov-ered, “the last good backup offsite at the time of the event.” Anyactivities that occurred after this point are lost and will need to bere-created by some other means. This includes activities occur-ring in technology applications, work in progress in operationalareas, and vital records stored onsite. The gap between the RPOand the time of disruption equals the amount of loss sustainedduring the incident. It can be deemed as an acceptable amountof data loss.

A.5.3.6 Recovery strategies provide a means to restore opera-tions quickly and effectively following a service disruption.The recovery strategies should consider the impacts of disrup-tion and allowable outage times identified in the impact analy-sis, as well as cost, security, and integration with larger, entity-level recovery plans.

A.5.4.1 The entity should identify the resources necessary tosupport the program, plan for and procure needed resources,effectively manage resources that have been acquired to supportoperational needs, and establish mutual aid/partnership agree-ments as necessary. Resources should be available within the re-quired time frame as required for emergency operations/response and to meet recovery time objectives. Resources shouldhave the capability to perform their intended function.

Scenarios developed during the risk assessment and businessimpact analysis should be used to identify resources needed bythe program. Resources for emergency operations/response toprotect life safety, stabilize the incident, and protect propertyshould be identified. Resources required to execute recoverystrategies within the recovery time objective also should be iden-tified. The resource needs assessment should identify resourcerequirements necessary to achieve performance objectives.

A.5.4.2(1) The resource needs assessment might include “cre-dentialing,” which addresses the need for individuals licensed

ANNEX A 1600–17

(e.g., doctors, engineers) in one jurisdiction (state or country)performing their professional duties (as volunteers or under mu-tual aid compacts) during an incident in a jurisdiction wherethey are not licensed or do not hold the proper credentials. Cre-dentialing provides minimum professional qualifications, certifi-cations, training, and education requirements that define thestandards required for specific emergency response functionalassignments.

A.5.4.3 All program equipment should be checked and testedon a regularly scheduled basis to ensure it will function properlywhen required. This might include vehicles, personal protectiveequipment (PPE), radio, information technology equipment,and warning and alerting devices and equipment, including si-rens, special emergency response equipment, and so forth.

Resources can be prepositioned to expedite deployment.These resources can include the following:

(1) Locations, quantities, accessibility, operability, and main-tenance of equipment

(2) Supplies (medical, personal hygiene, consumable, ad-ministrative, ice)

(3) Sources of energy (electrical, fuel)(4) Emergency power(5) Communications systems(6) Food and water(7) Technical information(8) Clothing(9) Shelter

(10) Specialized human resources (medical, faith-based, andvolunteer organizations; emergency management staff;utility workers; morticians; and private contractors)

(11) Employee and family assistance

A.5.4.5 Mutual aid/assistance or partnership agreements be-tween entities are an effective means to obtain resources andshould be developed whenever possible.

Agreements should be in writing, be reviewed by legal coun-sel, be signed by a responsible official, define liability, and detailfunding and cost arrangements.

The term mutual aid/assistance agreement, as used here, in-cludes cooperative assistance agreements, intergovernmentalcompacts, or other terms commonly used for the sharing ofresources. Partnerships can include any combination of pub-lic, private, and not-for-profit entities or nongovernmental or-ganizations (NGOs).

Mutual aid/assistance and partnership agreements are themeans for one entity to provide resources, facilities, services,and other required support to another entity during an inci-dent. Each entity should be party to the agreement with ap-propriate entities from which they expect to receive or towhich they expect to provide assistance during an incident.This would normally include neighboring or nearby entities,as well as relevant private sector and NGOs. States should par-ticipate in interstate compacts and look to establish intrastateagreements that encompass all local entities. Mutual aid/assistance agreements with NGOs, such as the InternationalRed Cross/Red Crescent, can be helpful in facilitating thetimely delivery of private assistance.

If mutual aid/assistance is needed, agreements should in-clude the following:

(1) Definitions of key terms used in the agreement, includ-ing intellectual property, duration of the agreement, and dura-tion of assistance

(2) Roles and responsibilities of individual parties

(3) Procedures for requesting and providing assistance, in-cluding mobilization and demobilization

(4) Procedures, authorities, and rules for payment, reim-bursement, and allocation of costs

(5) Notification procedures(6) Protocols for interoperable communications(7) Relationships with other agreements among entities(8) Workers’ compensation(9) Treatment of liability and immunity

(10) Recognition of qualifications and certifications

A.5.5.1 Performance objectives should be established for all el-ements in the program and should be linked to human perfor-mance. Without well-written performance objectives, measure-ment and evaluation of performance, when the performance iscompared to criteria to determine if the performance meets ex-pectations, are impossible. Performance objectives should con-tain the following three essential parts:

(1) Performance. Specific identification of expected behaviorthat is observable and measurable. If the specific behavioris based on expected knowledge (cognitive process) orattitudes (emotions, feelings), indicator behaviors shouldbe used, because knowledge and attitude performanceobjectives are not directly observable and, therefore, arenot measurable. An indicator behavior is observable andis based on either cognitive or emotional processes.

(2) Conditions. Specific identification of exact location, tools,the equipment used, and so forth, that will be part of theobservable, measurable behavior.

(3) Criteria. Specific criteria that will be used to compare theobserved behavior so that it can be determined if the per-formance objectives have been achieved.

An example of a technique for the development of perfor-mance objectives is the “SMART” acronym for checking:

(1) Specific. The wording must be precise and unambiguous indescribing the objective.

(2) Measurable. The design and statement of objectives shouldmake it possible to conduct a final accounting as towhether objectives were achieved.

(3) Action oriented. The objective must have an action verb thatdescribes the expected accomplishments.

(4) Realistic. Objectives must be achievable with the resourcesthat the entity can allocate or make available.

(5) Time sensitive. Time frames should be specified (ifapplicable).

A.5.5.4 Time frames defining short-term and long-term per-formance objectives should be developed by the entity. Ex-amples of short-term objectives might include “stabilize theincident” and “support entities that are responding to andstabilizing the incident,” while long-term objectives might in-clude “prevent environmental damage” and “comply withregulatory requirements.”

A.6.1.1 The safety and health of personnel are critical to thesuccessful execution of the program. When every person ac-cepts and performs as if safety and health are their personalresponsibility, hazardous exposures will be minimized and theprobability of accidents and incidents will be reduced.

Hazard/risk exposure can be eliminated or minimized byremoving the hazards or by not performing the hazardoustask. However, complete elimination of risk is not always befeasible, and controls should then be instituted.

Hazard control begins with identification of the hazardand the vulnerability of people or assets potentially exposed

2013 Edition

1600–18 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

•

and elimination or mitigation according to the hierarchy ofcontrols as follows:

(1) Elimination or substitution. Whenever possible, the hazardshould be eliminated from the work area (e.g., repairingor removing fallen electrical power lines before allowingother work to proceed in the area). Although desirable,elimination or substitution might not be options for mostairborne/chemical hazards created by an incident.

(2) Engineering controls. Steps should be taken to reduce oreliminate exposure to a hazard through engineering con-trols such as the installation of ventilation systems, auto-matic sprinklers (building), or special protection systems.

(3) Administrative controls. Work practices should be imple-mented that reduce the duration, frequency, and severityof risk exposures. Safety and health controls include train-ing, safety procedures, observations, and enforcement ofsafe behavior, for example, using well-rested crews anddaylight hours to perform higher hazard or unfamiliartasks, requiring frequent breaks during hot weather, re-moving nonessential personnel from the area during cer-tain tasks/operations, and decontaminating equipmentand personnel after contact with contaminated floodwa-ter or chemicals, and when possible, using water to sup-press dust and work upwind in dusty conditions.

(4) Personal protective equipment (PPE). If hazard exposures can-not be engineered or administratively controlled, indi-viduals should be shielded or isolated from chemical,physical, and biological hazards through the use of PPE.Careful selection and use of adequate PPE should protectthe respiratory system, skin, eyes, face, hands, feet, head,body, and hearing. Examples of PPE are safety glasses andgoggles for eyes, gloves for hands, and respirators to pro-tect the lungs. Control of the hazard exposures shouldnot stop with providing PPE.

Incident management systems (IMSs) have trained, desig-nated incident safety officers, but hazard exposure controlshould be a paramount concern of every person involved.

Recovery operations can be particularly hazardous. Due tothe nature of the recovery, normal operations might be dis-rupted and the hazards uncontrolled. For example, work con-ditions change drastically after hurricanes and other naturaldisasters. In the wake of a hurricane, response and recoveryworkers face additional challenges, such as downed powerlines, downed trees, and high volumes of construction debris,while performing an otherwise familiar task or operation. Pro-cedures and training are needed to help ensure safe perfor-mance of those engaged in cleanup after an incident.

Corrective actions to eliminate or mitigate hazard expo-sure should be aggressive and complete, but they also shouldbe carefully considered before implementation so as not tocreate a new set of hazard exposures.

A.6.1.3 Many entities have written one or more plan docu-ments for their programs. For example, environmental healthand safety, security, emergency response, business continuity,and crisis communications plans are written by private sectororganizations. Some plans exist at the corporate level (e.g.,crisis management) to direct the efforts of senior manage-ment. Within the public sector, mitigation, emergency man-agement, continuity of operations, and other plans are writ-ten. The committee’s intent in 6.1.3 is to provide flexibility forthe user to create needed program plans. However, develop-ment of all plans should be coordinated, and plans should besufficiently connected to ensure that they meet the needs of

the entity.

2013 Edition

A.6.1.4 Distributing plans internally or to key stakeholderscould require an entity to exercise safeguards like obtaining con-fidentiality or nondisclosure agreements. Multi-organizationalcoordination of the planning process and plans ensures no du-plication, improves understanding, increases support, and en-sures that all stakeholders have a voice [e.g., the National Inci-dent Management System (NIMS)]. The extent of planningrequirements will depend on the program’s performance objec-tives, results of the hazard analysis, and the entity’s culture, phi-losophy, and regulations.

A.6.2.1 Common prevention and deterrence strategies in-clude the following:

(1) Security patrols inside and outside facilities; increasedinspections of vehicles entering the facility; backgroundchecks of personnel

(2) Access controls, including perimeter fence line and gates,access control systems, camera surveillance, intruder detec-tion systems (motion-sensing cameras, infrared detectors)

(3) Immunizations, isolation, or quarantine(4) Land use restrictions to prevent development in hazard-

prone areas, such as flooding areas or construction ofhazardous materials facilities in areas near schools, inpopulation centers, or in areas of identified critical infra-structure

(5) Uninterruptible power supply (UPS) to provide short-term backup power to critical electrical components, in-cluding the data center power distribution unit (PDU),desktop computers in time-sensitive operational areas,phone switchboard (PBX), the HVAC system, and safetycontrols such as elevators and emergency lighting

(6) Gasoline- or diesel-powered generators to provide long-term backup power

(7) Crime prevention through environmental design(CPTED), including site layout, landscape design, andexterior lighting

(8) Personnel management(9) Background investigations

(10) Cyber security, including firewalls, intrusion detection, vi-rus protection, password management, cryptographic keymanagement, and access to information based on need toknow

A.6.2.2 Techniques to consider in a prevention strategy in-clude the following:

(1) Ongoing hazard identification(2) Threat assessment(3) Risk assessment(4) Analysis of impacts(5) Operational experience, including incident analysis(6) Information collection and analysis(7) Intelligence and information sharing(8) Regulatory requirements

The cost-benefit analysis should not be the overriding fac-tor in establishing a prevention strategy. Other considerationshave indirect benefits that are difficult to quantify (e.g., safety,property conservation).

A.6.3.1 Mitigation strategies can include the following:

(1) Use of applicable building construction standards(2) Hazard avoidance through appropriate land use practices(3) Relocation, retrofitting, or removal of structures at risk

ANNEX A 1600–19

•

•

(4) Removal or elimination of the hazard(5) Reduction or limitation of the amount or size of the hazard(6) Segregation of the hazard from that which is to be pro-

tected(7) Modification of the basic characteristics of the hazard(8) Control of the rate of release of the hazard(9) Provision of protective systems or equipment for both

cyber risks and physical risks(10) Establishment of hazard warning and communication

procedures(11) Redundancy or diversity of essential personnel, critical sys-

tems, equipment, information, operations, or materials(12) Acceptance/retention/transfer of risk (insurance pro-

grams)(13) Protection of competitive/proprietary information

A.6.3.2 Development of the mitigation strategy should con-sider the following:

(1) Explanation of hazard and vulnerabilities(2) Quantification of the risk if unmitigated(3) Anticipated cost(4) Anticipated benefit(5) Cost-benefit analysis(6) Prioritization of projects based on probability of occur-

rence and severity of potential impacts(7) Planned changes to the entity(8) Project timeline(9) Resources required

(10) Funding mechanism

A.6.4.1 The crisis communications plan should include a pre-established structure and process for gathering and disseminat-ing emergency or crisis information to both internal and exter-nal stakeholders. The communications plan should identify notonly key stakeholders but also who on the communications teamis responsible for tailoring and communicating appropriate in-formation to each stakeholder group before, during, and afteran incident. Formal awareness initiatives should be established inadvance of an emergency with the intention of reaching popula-tions that could be impacted by a risk or hazard. A means ofcollecting inquiries and responding to concerns from the publicalso should be incorporated into the process to better ensure atwo-way dialogue. This can be done through pamphlets, websites,social media, community meetings, newsletters, and othermeans.

A.6.4.2 The entity should create a basic communicationsstructure that is flexible enough to expand and contract to fitthe needs of the situation. Communications activities shouldbe coordinated not only among the various communicationsfunctions that have been activated but also with the site teamand response organization.

A joint information center (JIC) can be established duringincident operations to support the coordination and dissemi-nation of critical emergency as well as public affairs informa-tion from all communications operations related to the inci-dent, including federal, state, local, and tribal publicinformation officers (PIOs) as well as private entity or corpo-rate communications staff. The JIC can be physical or virtual.

A.6.4.2(1) Stakeholder liaisons and others tasked with com-munications responsibilities should coordinate informa-tion through a central communications hub to ensure anorganized, integrated, and coordinated mechanism for thedelivery of understandable, timely, accurate, and consistentinformation to all parties. Information or tools that can be

prepared in advance, such as pre-scripted information bul-lets or template press releases, can help speed the release ofinformation. Similarly, narrowing the time between wheninformation becomes known and when it is approved forrelease to the public can be a critical factor in shaping pub-lic opinion.

A.6.5.1 The entity should determine warning, notification,and communications needs based on the hazards and poten-tial impacts identified during the risk assessment and the ca-pabilities required to execute response, crisis communica-tions, continuity, and recovery plans, procedures, and publiceducation/emergency information programs.

Warning systems can include fire alarm, emergency voicecommunication, public address, mass notification, and othersystems designed to warn building occupants, people on acampus, or citizens in the community that there is a threat orhazard and to take protective action. Notification systems areused to alert members of response, continuity, and recoveryteams as well as external resources (public emergency ser-vices), regulators, management, and so forth. Communica-tions needs include two-way radio systems, and wired and wire-less voice and data communications, among other systems.

A.6.5.2 Since warning, notification, and communications sys-tems must be immediately available and functional to warnpersons potentially at risk, to alert persons to respond, and toenable communications between responders, reliability of sys-tems and equipment is critically important. Redundancy insystems and equipment provides assurance that essential warn-ings, notifications, and communications can be made. Systemsand equipment must be interoperable to ensure that respond-ers are able to communicate effectively during an incident.Also see 3.3.16, Interoperability.

A.6.5.3 The entity should identify the circumstances requiringemergency communication and the stakeholders that wouldneed to be warned. Protocols defining the circumstances andprocedures for implementing communications should be estab-lished in advance, tested, and maintained. Scripting templatesfor likely message content and identification of the best commu-nication mechanisms in advance reduce the time necessary tocommunicate and enhance the effectiveness of messages.

Stakeholders will vary depending on the entity. Typical stake-holders for many entities include the media, government, cus-tomers, employees and their families, vendors, suppliers, com-munity, visitors, and investors.

A.6.6.3 The term property conservation means minimizingproperty damage. Actions can be taken in advance of a fore-cast event such as a hurricane (e.g., boarding up windows) andduring and following the incident (e.g., using water vacuumsto remove water that has entered a building). Also see Section6.8 for details on protective actions for life safety, incidentstabilization, and other guidance.

A.6.7.1 An incident management system (IMS) should beused to manage an incident. The system used varies amongentities and among jurisdictions within entities. In minor inci-dents, IMS functions might be handled by one person: theincident commander or equivalent designee.

An example of an effective public sector IMS would bethe National Incident Management System (NIMS) used inthe United States or its equivalent in other countries. In theIncident Command System (ICS) portion of NIMS, inci-dent management is structured to facilitate activities in five

2013 Edition

1600–20 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

INCIDENTCOMMANDER

OPERATIONS PLANNING L

Protectiveactions

Evacuation

Shelter-inplace

Lockdown

Building systems& utilities

Propertyconservation

Salvage& cleanup

Medical

Fire

Security

Hazardousmaterials

Decontamination

Technicalrescue

Search &rescue

Situationassessment

Weather

Damageassessment

Communications

Documentation

Resources

Technicalexperts

Legal

T

C

F

FIGURE A.6.7.1 Diagram of Incident Command System.

major functional areas: command, operations, planning, lo-gistics, and finance and administration. For private sectorentities, it is acceptable for the IMS to be organized in what-ever way best fits the organizational structure, as long as it isclear how the entity will coordinate its operations with pub-lic sector resources arriving at the incident scene.

Figure A.6.7.1 illustrates private sector functions under theICS. All positions would not be filled for all incidents. In addi-tion, the number of positions reporting to any supervisorshould not exceed the “manageable span of control” withinthe ICS. The intent of Figure A.6.7.1 is to show how positionsfor different scenarios would be organized under the ICS. Inaddition, the figure illustrates that the organization can growas the scale of the incident and the resources needed to man-age the incident expand.

It is common to find that environmental, health, and safetyprofessionals within private industry fill positions, including“Safety Officer,” as well as positions within “Operations.” Pub-lic affairs and media relations staff would likely fill the “PublicInformation” position. Facilities management, engineering,and operations typically staff “Operations” as well. Personneltrained to provide first aid and administer CPR would staff the“Medical” function. Security would fill the “Security” function.Finance staff, including insurance and risk management staff,would likely fill positions under “Finance & Administration.”Supply chain personnel would have the ideal expertise to staff

2013 Edition

FINANCE &ADMINISTRATION

ICS

Safety

PublicInformation

Liaison

ties

entlies

ing

rtation

ications

cal

water

ter

Time & costaccounting

Compensation

Claims

Purchasing &procurement

the “Logistics” section. “Planning” could be filled by staff withplanning expertise.

It is not the intent that Figure A.6.7.1 suggest that everyentity must include all of the functions in its response, conti-nuity, or recovery organization. Each entity is unique andshould structure its teams and IMS to best fit its needs. Manyof the positions can be combined and filled by a single person.

A.6.7.1.1 An emergency operations center (EOC) is the loca-tion where the coordination and support of incident manage-ment activities take place. The EOC should have adequateworkspace, communications, and backup utilities and shouldmeet basic human needs. For complex incidents, EOCs mightneed to be staffed by personnel representing multiple jurisdic-tions, sectors, functional disciplines, and resources. The physi-cal size, staffing, and equipping of an EOC will depend on thesize of the entity, the resources available and the anticipatedincident management support required. EOCs can be perma-nent facilities or can be established to meet temporary, short-term needs.

A.6.7.1.1.1 The requirement to establish primary and alternateEOCs is intended to ensure that the capacity exists to supportoperations from a centralized facility or virtual capability. Theprimary and alternate EOCs should be located so both are notimpacted by the same event and at least one EOC will be opera-tional. Alternate EOCs can include site or department EOCs,

OGIST

Facili

Equipm& supp

Staff

ranspo

ommun

Medi

ood &

Shel

ANNEX A 1600–21

which focus on internal department or agency incident manage-ment and are linked to and, in most cases, physically representedin a higher level EOC.

On-sceneincidentcommandposts(ICPs),whicharelocatedator in the immediate vicinity of an incident site, should be linkedto EOCs to ensure communications and effective and efficientincident management.An ICP is focused primarily on the tacticalon-scene response but can be used to function as an EOC-likefunction in smaller-scale incidents or during the initial phase ofthe response to larger, more complex events.

A.6.7.1.1.2 Virtual EOCs that link team members located inseparate locations via conference call, web meeting, and or otherelectronic meeting tool meet the requirements of this section.

A.6.7.6 In larger scale incidents a formal incident action plan(see 3.3.14) is developed and approved by the incident com-mander. In small-scale incidents, objectives are established by theincident commander and verbally communicated. Operationsare then managed by command to achieve the objectives.

A.6.8.1 Emergency action plans should be based on the haz-ard scenarios developed during the risk assessment to accom-plish established program goals. Plans should define responsi-bilities for warning persons at risk or potentially at risk,alerting responders, and notifying those who must be madeaware of the incident. Plans should also define specific func-tional roles and responsibilities for protection of life safety,incident stabilization to the extent the entity is required orchooses, and property conservation. Documentation such aschecklists, emergency action guides, and standard operatingprocedures (SOPs) should identify emergency assignments,responsibilities, and emergency duty locations. The SOPs andnotification procedures should be integrated.

A.6.8.2 Protective actions for life safety include evacuation,shelter-in-place, and lockdown and depend upon the na-ture and location of the threat or hazard. Action shouldinclude defining the protocols and procedures for warningpeople at risk or potentially at risk and the actions thatshould be taken to protect their safety. Special attentionmight be needed to address the needs of people with accessand functional needs (for guidance, see http://www.fema.gov/plan/prepare/specialplans.shtm). Emergency plans should ad-dress those who might have additional needs before, dur-ing, or after an incident in one or more of the followingfunctional areas:

(1) Visually impaired(2) Hearing impaired(3) Mobility impaired(4) Single working parent(5) Language competency(6) People without vehicles(7) People with special dietary needs(8) People with medical conditions(9) People with intellectual disabilities

(10) People with dementia

Persons with access and functional needs can include thosewho reside in institutionalized settings, the elderly, children,and those from diverse cultures who have limited proficiencyin the local language.

A.6.8.3 Incident stabilization is the action taken to prevent anincident from growing and to minimize the potential impact onlife, property, operations, and the environment. Incident stabili-zation can include many different functions depending upon the

nature and location of the threat or hazard, the magnitude of theincident, the actual and potential impact of the incident, appli-cable regulations that could dictate minimum response capabili-ties, the entity’s program goals, and the resources available to theentity for incident response. Examples of incident stabilizationactivities are listed under “Operations” in Figure A.6.7.1.

A.6.9.1 Examples of recovery strategies options/alternativesinclude the following:

(1) Recovery strategies for loss of operational site(a) Transfer of workload to a surviving site(b) Transfer of staff and workload to a surviving site(c) Contracted alternate site with a vendor(d) Reciprocal agreement with a like organization(e) Dedicated alternate site(f) Mobile facility(g) Remote access/work from home(h) Resources acquired at the time of disruption(i) Mutual aid agreement

(2) Technical recovery alternatives(a) Commercial vendor (hot site)(b) Resources acquired at time of disruption(c) Quick-ship equipment(d) Dual data center with active/active(e) Dual data center with active/passive(f) Outsourcing with a service level agreement (cloud

computing)(g) Stockpiled equipment(h) Manual workarounds or alternate systems

(3) Backup strategies for records(a) Electronic storage(b) Synchronous replication(c) Asynchronous replication(d) Electronic journaling(e) Standby database(f) Electronic vaulting(g) Tape backup(h) Full backup(i) Differential backup(j) Incremental backup(k) Salvage(l) Hard-copy storage

(m) Film(n) Fiche(o) Photocopy(p) Scan(q) Salvage

(4) Third-party (vendor provided/extended enterprise) re-covery strategy options(a) Multiple sourcing(b) Alternate sourcing(c) Service level agreement(d) In-source (do not outsource)

A.6.9.2 Plans for business continuity, continuity of government,and continuity of operations are generally similar in intent andless similar in content. Continuity plans have various names inboth the public and private sectors, including business continuityplans, business resumption plans, and disaster recovery plans.

A.6.9.3 Recovery planning for the public and private sectorsshould provide for continuity of operations to return the entity,infrastructure, and individuals back to an acceptable level. Thisincludes implementation of mitigation measures to facilitateshort-term and long-term recovery.

2013 Edition

1600–22 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

The recovery plan should include the following:

(1) Facilities and equipment(2) Critical infrastructure(3) Telecommunications and cyber protection systems(4) Distribution systems for essential goods(5) Transportation systems, networks, and infrastructure(6) Human resources(7) Psychosocial services(8) Health services

Short-term goals and performance objectives should be es-tablished and include the following:

(1) Vital personnel, systems, operations, records, andequipment

(2) Priorities for restoration and mitigation(3) Acceptable downtime before restoration to a minimal level(4) Minimal functions, services, and resources needed to

provide for the restoration of facilities, programs, andinfrastructure

Long-term goals and objectives should be based on the en-tity’s strategic plan and include the following:

(1) Management and coordination of activities(2) Funding and fiscal management(3) Management of volunteers (both affiliated and spontane-

ous), contractual, and entity resources(4) Opportunities for mitigation

A.6.10.1 Employee assistance and support might also becalled human continuity, human impact, workforce continu-ity, human aspects of continuity, and so forth. Employee assis-tance and support includes the entity’s employees and theirfamilies or significant others affected by the incident.

A.6.10.1(1) Communications procedures are the methodsthat the entity and its employees will use to inform employeesof the program before an event occurs and to inform employ-ees that the program is activated and available following theoccurrence of an event. Employees should have a means ofnotifying the entity of the need for assistance through thecommunications system established. Similarly, the entityshould develop a means of communicating with employeeswhen operations are interrupted at a site and the staff hasbeen sent home and how communications will be made toemployees when the interruption has occurred outside nor-mal business hours.

Various communications methodologies can be estab-lished, including the following:

(1) Automated notification systems or call centers(2) Email, web site, or voicemail broadcasts(3) Call lists(4) Social media

There are situations in which customers, vendors, and otherparties might be located at the entity’s facility, and the programshould include the ability to provide assistance for them as well.

A.6.10.1(2) The entity should develop policies and proce-dures to store, retrieve, and control access to personal infor-mation when needed in an emergency situation, including sys-tems to facilitate reunification of family members.

A.6.10.3 Family preparedness is an ongoing process to edu-cate and train individuals to plan for and take steps during anemergency. (See Annex I for more information.)

2013 Edition

A.7.1 Competency-based education and training programs fo-cus on the specific knowledge elements, skills, and/or abilitiesthat are objective, that is, measurable or demonstrable, on thejob. Education is usually focused on unknown risk exposures.Training is instruction that imparts and/or maintains the skillsnecessary for individuals and teams to perform their assignedsystem responsibilities and is usually focused on known risk expo-sures. The learning objectives of training should be competency-based and the criteria related to the relevant competencies. Com-petency is based on demonstrated performance to achievedesignated goals.

All personnel designated to perform specific task(s)should demonstrate competence to perform the tasks andmeet the expected criteria identified in the performanceobjectives. Competency is defined as demonstrated perfor-mance to achieve designated objectives. Competencies aremastered through a multitude of ways: life experience, edu-cation, apprenticeship, on-the-job experience, self-helpprograms, and training and development programs.

A.7.7 Information that should be included in public out-reach and awareness efforts include regulatory disclosuressuch as those required by the SARA Title III [(EmergencyPlanning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)],the Community Awareness Emergency Response (CAER),and the Clery Act. Other nonregulatory examples of aware-ness that might be included in public education includesevere weather outreach and alerts, shelter-in-place, andevacuation.

A.8.2 An exercise is an instrument used to train for, assess, prac-tice, and improve performance in prevention, protection, re-sponse, and recovery capabilities in a risk-managed environment.Exercises can be used for testing and validating policies, plans,procedures, training, equipment, and interagency agreements;clarifying and training personnel in roles and responsibilities; im-proving interagency coordination and communications; identify-ing gaps in resources; improving individual performance; andidentifying opportunities for improvement.

A test/testing is a unique and particular type of exercisethat incorporates an expectation of a pass or fail elementwithin the goal or objectives established. An exercise is also anexcellent way to demonstrate community resolve to preparefor disastrous events.

Exercise and testing might be synonymous in certain areas;however, there are times they are not synonymous. As an ex-ample, testing of a data center recovery plan will need to havean indication of success or failure.

An exercise is the principal means of testing a program’sability to implement its response procedures. It allows the en-tity and other agencies and organizations to practice proce-dures and interact in a controlled setting. Participants identifyand make recommendations to improve the overall program.The fundamental purpose is to improve implementation pro-cedures. In support of that goal, an exercise should be used toachieve the following:

(1) Reveal planning weaknesses and strengths in plans, stan-dard operating procedures (SOPs), and standard operat-ing guidelines (SOGs) and to test and validate recentlychanged procedures

(2) Improve the coordination among various response orga-nizations, elected officials, and community support orga-nizations

(3) Validate the training for response (e.g., incident com-mand, hazard recognition, evacuation, decontamination)and recovery

ANNEX A 1600–23

(4) Increase the entity’s general awareness of the hazards(5) Identify additional resources, equipment, or personnel

needed to prepare for, respond to, and recover from anincident

(6) Include activities performed for the purpose of trainingand conditioning team members and personnel in appro-priate actions

(7) Practice improvisation of activities in a safe environ-ment (Improvisation might be necessary in actual dis-ruptive events because predictions of disruptions areusually flawed.)

A.8.3 An exercise can involve invoking response and opera-tional continuity procedures, but it is more likely to involvethe simulation of a response or operational continuity inci-dent, or both, announced or unannounced, in which partici-pants role-play in order to assess, prior to a real invocation,issues that arise. Exercises should include, but not be limitedto, orientation seminars, drills, tabletop exercises, functionalexercises, and full-scale exercises.

Orientation Seminar. The orientation seminar is an overviewor introduction. Its purpose is to familiarize participants withroles, plans, procedures, or equipment. It can also be used toresolve questions of coordination and assignment of responsi-bilities.

Drill. A drill is a coordinated, supervised exercise activitynormally used to test a single specific operation or function.With a drill, there is no attempt to coordinate organizations orfully activate the EOC. Its role in an exercise program is topractice and perfect one small part of the response plan andhelp prepare for more extensive exercises, in which severalfunctions will be coordinated and tested. The effectiveness ofa drill is its focus on a single, relatively limited portion of theoverall emergency management system. It makes possible atight focus on a potential problem area.

Tabletop exercise. A tabletop exercise is a facilitated analysis ofan emergency situation in an informal, relatively stress-freeenvironment. It is designed to elicit constructive discussion asparticipants examine and resolve problems based on existingoperational plans and identify where those plans need to berefined. The success of the exercise is largely determined bygroup participation in the identification of problem areas.

Functional exercise. A functional exercise is a fully simulatedinteractive exercise that tests the capability of an organizationto respond to a simulated event. The exercise tests multiplefunctions of the organization’s operational plan. It is a coordi-nated response to a situation in a time-pressured, realisticsimulation

Full-scale exercise. A full-scale exercise simulates a real eventas closely as possible. It is designed to evaluate the operationalcapability of emergency management systems in a highlystressful environment that simulates actual response condi-tions. To accomplish this realism, it can include the mobiliza-tion and actual movement of emergency personnel, equip-ment, and resources. Ideally, the full-scale exercise should testand evaluate most functions of the emergency managementplan or operational plan.

A.8.5 Where no frequency is established, a minimum annualfrequency of exercises and testing is recommended.

A.9.1 Performance improvement is based on the followingtwo distinct but interrelated functions:

(1) Measurement, sometimes called “assessment” or “observa-tion,” is the function in which the personnel accurately

determine exactly what organizational performance hasoccurred.

(2) Evaluation is the function in which the observed perfor-mance is compared with criteria, sometimes called “stan-dards” or “competencies,” to determine if the actual orga-nizational performance meets expectations.

A.9.1.1 Improvements to the program can be made in manyways, such as following an exercise or test of the program,following an actual event that required one or more of theprogram elements to be activated or through a scheduled pe-riodic review of the program.

A.9.1.2 The program should be reviewed on a regularly sched-uled basis, after major changes to or within the entity (e.g., newfacility, process, product, policy), after scheduled exercises (test-ing of the program), or following an incident that required a partof the plan associated with the program to be utilized. Consider-ation should be given to the use of external evaluators.

A.9.1.3(5) Many emergency management entities and pro-grams in both the public and private sectors are supported inpart by grants from government entities or private sources. Achange in grant assistance could materially impact the entity’sprogram, necessitating an evaluation of the program.

A.9.2 The corrective action process should follow a review ofthe program or follow an actual event or exercise to identify pro-gram deficiencies and take necessary corrective actions to ad-dress such deficiencies. The corrective action program shouldinclude techniques to manage the capabilities improvement pro-cess. The corrective action program should begin following the“after-action” discussion/critique of the incident or exercise orshould take place during the incident if a lengthy or extendedevent is being managed. During the evaluation process, deficien-cies that require improvement should be identified. Process defi-ciencies should be identified within one or more of the programelements found in this standard.

Corrective actions should be identified by the following:

(1) Changes to regulations, policy, plans, or procedures(2) Additions or modifications to facilities, systems, or equip-

ment(3) Results of exercises and testing(4) After-action reviews of actual incidents

A task group should be assigned to each identified area ofnoted deficiency to develop the necessary actions for improve-ment, and a time schedule for development of the necessarycorrective action should be established.

The task group should take the following actions:

(1) Develop options for appropriate corrective action(2) Make recommendations for a preferred option(3) Develop an implementation plan, including training if re-

quired(4) Ensure that during the next exercise the corrective ac-

tions are evaluated to determine if the corrective actionshave been successful

The entity should establish a process to identify the rootcause of the deficiencies noted. The entity also should estab-lish a change management process (i.e., a process involving allsectors of an entity’s operations in which changes to the opera-tions are reflected in the plan and, vice versa, changes in theplan are reflected in the entity’s operations).

A.9.2.1 The corrective action process should include thefollowing:

(1) Development of a problem statement that states the prob-lem and identifies its impact

2013 Edition

1600–24 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

•

(2) Review of corrective action issues from previous evaluationsand identification of possible solutions to the problem

(3) Selection of a corrective action strategy and prioritizationof the actions to be taken, as well as an associated sched-ule for completion

(4) Provision of authority and resources to the individual as-signed responsibility and accountability for implementa-tion, so that the designated change can be accomplished

(5) Identification of the resources required to implement thestrategy

(6) Check of the progress of completing the corrective action(7) Forwarding of problems that need to be resolved by

higher authorities to the level of authority that can resolvethe problem

(8) Once the problem is solved, testing of the solution throughexercising

A.9.2.2 The appropriate corrective actions might not betaken due to budgetary or other constraints or might be de-ferred as a part of the long-range capital project. However,temporary actions could be adopted until the desired optionis funded and implemented.

Annex B Program Development Resources

This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA documentbut is included for informational purposes only.

B.1 Using the Internet. The Internet is an invaluable tool thathas become a necessity for the program developer, main-tainer, and assessor. The content of the NFPA 1600 annexeshas changed based on the context of the widespread compe-tence and use of the Internet for research.

The Internet can be a great tool for finding information, butlike any tool it must be used wisely and correctly. Because virtuallyanyone can publish information on the Internet, the informa-tion must be used with care. The best advice is to attempt to findthe same information from two different web sites (not two differ-ent pages on the same web site). It is important to check the datethe information was posted. Business continuity and emergencymanagement information has changed drastically in the yearssince 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. Though some informationdoes not change, the prudent user of the Internet should checkthe date to avoid using out-of-date information.

A search engine is an Internet tool that locates web pages andsorts them according to specified key words. As with any tool, it isa good idea to read the directions for each search engine to en-sure the best use. The three most common search engines areGoogle (www.google.com), Yahoo! Search (www.yahoo.com),and Ask.com (www.ask.com). Some search engines are betterthan others. Often there is a tendency to use Google exclusively.Google is an excellent tool for researching the Internet, but it isnot the only search engine.

Search directories are not search engines, and the similarityof the search fields can be misleading. A search directory is anindex handpicked by a human. Search engines search a databaseof the full text of web pages automatically harvested from the webpages available. A search engine uses a somewhat outdated copyof the real web page, not the actual pages. However, search en-gines produce valuable information and should not be ignored.

The following list is provided as a starting resource for build-ing programs:

(1) Digital Librarian (www.digital-librarian.com)(2) Google (www.directory.google.com)

2013 Edition

(3) Infomine (http://infomine.ucr.edu)(4) Internet Public Library (www.ipl.org)(5) Open Directory (www.dmoz.org)(6) Yahoo search (http://diryahoo.com)(7) The WWW virtual library (http://vlib.org)(8) BUBL Countries Catalogue of Internet resources by coun-

try (http://bubl.ac.uk/link/world/index.html)(9) InfoPlease Countries of the World (www.infoplease.com/

countries.html) (See also under InfoPlease General Infor-mation.) This source, as well as similar sources, such as theBBC Country Reports, uses The CIA World Factbook as asource for its information.

(10) The CIA World Factbook, a handbook of economic, political,and geographic intelligence (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html) (Excellentsource of country information, including background in-formation on countries not limited to geography, demo-graphics, disaster, economy, political, transportation, andmilitary information. The online version is updated con-tinuously, while the print version is published every year.)

B.2 Web Sites and Documents of Interest. Web sites are in-cluded here as examples of program development resourcesavailable on the Internet. Inclusion in this annex does notconstitute an endorsement. The user is cautioned that web siteaddresses change, and a search engine might be needed tolocate the correct URL.

American Waterworks Association, “Utilities Helping Utilities:AnAction Plan for MutualAid andAssistance Networks for Waterand Wastewater Utilities”: http://www.awwa.org/files/Utilities_Helping_Utilities.pdf

Congressional Research Service, “Emergency Communica-tions: The Emergency Alert System (EAS) and All-Hazard Warn-ings”: http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32527.pdf

Crisis Communications Plan Template (Canadian Cen-tre for Emergency Preparedness): http://www.ccep.ca/templates/ccplan.rtf

Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware: http://www.udel.edu/DRC/Emergency Management and Civil ProtectionAct and Regulation (Ontario): http://www.search.e-laws.gov.on.ca/en/isysquery/78ea6acf-3e22-41e7-8d1b-66282cd4213f/3/doc/?search=browseStatutes&context=#hit1

Emergency Management Assessment Program (EMAP):http://www.emaponline.org/

Emergency Management Competencies: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/EMCompetencies.asp

Emergency Management Institute (FEMA) IS-120 Introduc-tion to Exercises: http://emilms.fema.gov/IS120A/index.htm

Emergency Management Institute homepage (FEMA):http://training.fema.gov/

Emergency Manager Toolkit (FEMA): http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is1Toolkit/unit2.htm

Emergency Program Manager: Knowledge, Skills, andAbilities: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/EmergProgMgr.doc

Enterprise Preparedness (International Center for EnterprisePreparedness): http://www.nyu.edu/intercep

EPA Risk Assessment Portal: http://www.epa.gov/risk/FEMA: Developing Effective Standard Operating Proce-

dures for Fire and EMS Departments: http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/fa-197-508.pdf

Hazard Mitigation Planning (FEMA): http://www.fema.gov/plan/mitplanning/index.shtm

ANNEX C 1600–25

Homeland Exercise and Security Evaluation Program:https://hseep.dhs.gov/pages/1001_HSEEP7.aspx

ICS All-Hazard Core Competencies (FEMA): http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=2948

http://www.theirm.org/publications/documents/Risk_Management_Standard_030820.pdf

International Standards Organization (ISO): http://www.iso.org

Mitigation Best Practices Search (FEMA): http://www.fema.gov/mitigationbp/index.jsp

National Incident Management System (NIMS) ResourceCenter: http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/

Natural Hazards Center, University of Colorado: http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/

New York State Department of Health (EMS) EMS MutualAid Planning Guidelines: http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/ems/policy/89-02.htm

Ready Business, Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA): http://www.ready.gov/business

Records Managers (National Archives): http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/

Risk Management Standard (Australia): http://www.risk

management.com.au/

Disaster Recovery Planning, University of Toronto: http://www.utoronto.ca/security/documentation/business_continuity/dis_rec_plan.htm

Washington Military Department, Emergency ManagementDivision, Mutual Aid and Interlocal Agreement Handbook:http://emd.wa.gov/plans/documents/MutualAidHandbook.pdf

Annex C Self-Assessment for Conformity with NFPA1600, 2013 Edition

This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA documentbut is included for informational purposes only.

C.1 Table C.1 shows a self-assessment tool that is intended toassist entities in determining conformity with the require-ments of NFPA 1600. The table includes a list of hazards fromAnnex A and also repeats text from the body of the standardwhere needed to make the self-assessment tool more userfriendly. Users of this self-assessment tool can indicate confor-mity, partial conformity, or nonconformity as well as evidenceof conformity, corrective action, task assignment, a schedule

for action, or other information in the Comments column.

Table C.1 Self-Assessment Tool for Conformity with the 2013 Edition of NFPA 1600.

PartiallyNFPA 1600 Program Elements Conforming Conforming Nonconforming Comments

Chapter 4 Program Management4.1* Leadership and Commitment.4.1.1 The entity leadership shall demonstrate commitment to the

program to prevent, mitigate the consequences of, prepare for,respond to, maintain continuity during, and recover fromincidents.

4.1.2 The leadership commitment shall include the following:(1) Support the development, implementation, and maintenance

of the program

(2) Provide necessary resources to support the program

(3) Ensure the program is reviewed and evaluated as needed toensure program effectiveness

(4) Support corrective action to address program deficiencies

4.1.3 The entity shall adhere to policies, execute plans, and followprocedures developed to support the program.

4.2* Program Coordinator. The program coordinator shall beappointed by the entity’s leadership and authorized to develop,implement, administer, evaluate, and maintain the program.

4.3* Program Committee.4.3.1* A program committee shall be established by the entity in

accordance with its policy.

4.3.2 The program committee shall provide input, and/or assistin the coordination of the preparation, development,implementation, evaluation, and maintenance of the program.

(continues)

2013 Edition

1600–26 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

Table C.1 Continued

PartiallyNFPA 1600 Program Elements Conforming Conforming Nonconforming Comments

4.3.3* The program committee shall include the programcoordinator and others who have the expertise, the knowledgeof the entity, and the capability to identify resources from allkey functional areas within the entity and shall solicit applicableexternal representation.

4.4 Program Administration.4.4.1 The entity shall have a documented program that includes

the following:(1) Executive policy, including vision, mission statement, roles,

and responsibilities, and enabling authority

(2) Program scope, goals, performance objectives, and metrics forprogram evaluation

(3) Applicable authorities, legislation, regulations, and industrycodes of practice as required by Section 4.5

(4) Program budget and schedule, including milestones

(5) Program plans and procedures that include the following:(a) Anticipated cost

(b) Priority

(c) Resources required

(6) Records management practices as required by Section 4.7

(7) Change management process

4.4.2 The program shall include the requirements specified inChapters 4 through 9, the scope of which shall be determinedthrough an “all-hazards” approach and the risk assessment.

4.4.3* Program requirements shall be applicable to prevention,mitigation, preparedness, response, continuity, and recovery.

4.5 Laws and Authorities.4.5.1 The program shall comply with applicable legislation,

policies, regulatory requirements, and directives.

4.5.2 The entity shall establish and maintain a procedure(s) tocomply with applicable legislation, policies, regulatoryrequirements, and directives.

4.5.3* The entity shall implement a strategy for addressing theneed for revisions to legislation, regulations, directives, policies,and industry codes of practice.

4.6 Finance and Administration.4.6.1 The entity shall develop finance and administrative

procedures to support the program before, during, and afteran incident.

4.6.2* There shall be a responsive finance and administrativeframework that does the following:

(1) Complies with the entity’s program requirements

(2) Is uniquely linked to response, continuity, and recoveryoperations

2013 Edition

ANNEX C 1600–27

Table C.1 Continued

PartiallyNFPA 1600 Program Elements Conforming Conforming Nonconforming Comments

(3) Provides for maximum flexibility to expeditiously request,receive, manage, and apply funds in a nonemergencyenvironment and in emergency situations to ensure the timelydelivery of assistance

4.6.3 Procedures shall be created and maintained for expeditingfiscal decisions in accordance with established authorization levels,accounting principles, governance requirements, and fiscal policy.

4.6.4 Finance and administrative procedures shall include thefollowing:

(1) Responsibilities for program finance authority, includingreporting relationships to the program coordinator

(2)* Program procurement procedures

(3) Payroll

(4)* Accounting systems to track and document costs

(5) Management of funding from external sources

(6) Crisis management procedures that coordinate authorizationlevels and appropriate control measures

(7) Documenting financial expenditures incurred as a result of anincident and for compiling claims for future cost recovery

(8) Identifying and accessing alternative funding sources

(9) Managing budgeted and specially appropriated funds

4.7* Records Management.4.7.1 The entity shall develop, implement, and manage a records

management program to ensure that records are available to theentity following an incident.

4.7.2 The program shall include the following:(1) Identification of records (hard copy or electronic) vital to

continue the operations of the entity

(2) Backup of records on a frequency necessary to meet programgoals and objectives

(3) Validation of the integrity of records backup

(4) Implementation of procedures to store, retrieve, and recoverrecords onsite or offsite

(5) Protection of records

(6) Implementation of a record review process

(7) Procedures coordinating records access

(continues)

2013 Edition

1600–28 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

Table C.1 Continued

PartiallyNFPA 1600 Program Elements Conforming Conforming Nonconforming Comments

Chapter 5 Planning5.1 Planning and Design Process.5.1.1* The program shall follow a planning process that develops

strategies, plans, and required capabilities to execute theprogram.

5.1.2 Strategic planning shall define the entity’s vision, mission,and goals of the program.

5.1.3 A risk assessment and business impact analysis (BIA) shalldevelop information to prepare prevention and mitigationstrategies.

5.1.4 A risk assessment, a BIA, and resource needs assessmentshall develop information to prepare emergencyoperations/response, crisis communications, continuity, andrecovery plans.

5.1.5 Crisis management planning shall address issues thatthreaten the strategic, reputational, and intangible elements ofthe entity.

5.1.6 The entity shall include key stakeholders in the planningprocess.

5.2* Risk Assessment.5.2.1* The entity shall conduct a risk assessment to develop

required strategies and plans.

5.2.2 The entity shall identify hazards and monitor those hazardsand the likelihood of occurrence.

5.2.2.1* Hazards to be evaluated shall include the following:(1) Natural hazards (geological, meteorologic, and biological)

Geologic hazards/risk exposures

– Earthquake

– Tsunami

– Volcano

– Landslide, mudslide, subsidence

Meteorologic hazards/risk exposures– Flood, flash flood, seiche, tidal surge

– Water control structure/dam/levee failure

– Drought

– Snow, ice, hail, sleet, avalanche, arctic freeze

– Windstorm, tropical cyclone, hurricane, tornado, waterspout, dust/sand storm

– Extreme temperatures (heat, cold)

– Wildland fire

– Lightning strikes

2013 Edition

ANNEX C 1600–29

Table C.1 Continued

PartiallyNFPA 1600 Program Elements Conforming Conforming Nonconforming Comments

– Famine

– Geomagnetic storm

Biological hazards/risk exposures– Food-borne illnesses

– Pandemic disease (avian flu, H1N1, etc.)

– Infectious/communicable disease [plague, smallpox, anthrax,West Nile virus, foot and mouth disease, severe acuterespiratory syndrome (SARS), BSE (Mad Cow Disease)]

(2) Human-caused events (accidental and intentional)Accidental– Hazardous material spill or release (explosive, flammable

liquid, flammable gas, flammable solid, oxidizer, poison,radiological, corrosive)

– Nuclear power plant incident, radiological incident

– Explosion/fire

– Transportation accident

– Building/structure collapse

– Entrapment and or rescue--machinery, confined space, highangle, water

– Fuel/resource shortage

– Mechanical breakdown

– Transportation incidents (motor vehicle, railroad, watercraft,aircraft, pipeline)

– Untimely death of employee

Intentional– Strike or labor dispute

– Criminal activity (vandalism, sabotage, arson, robbery, theft,fraud, embezzlement, data theft, malfeasance)

– Physical or information security breach

– Lost person, child abduction, kidnapping, extortion, hostageincident, workplace/school/university violence, homicide

– Product defect or contamination

– Disinformation

– Harassment

– Discrimination

(continues)

2013 Edition

1600–30 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

Table C.1 Continued

PartiallyNFPA 1600 Program Elements Conforming Conforming Nonconforming Comments

– Demonstrations, civil disturbance, public unrest, mass hysteria,riot

– Bomb threat, suspicious package

– Terrorism (explosive, chemical, biological, radiological,nuclear, cyber, electromagnetic pulse)

– Insurrection

– Enemy attack, war

– Arson

(3) Technology-caused events (accidental and intentional)– Computer systems (outages, hardware failure, data corruption,

deletion, or theft, loss of network connectivity (internet orintranet), loss of electronic data interchange or ecommerce,loss of domain name server (DNS), virus, worm, Trojan horse,power surge, lightning, host site interdependencies, directphysical loss, water damage, cyber terrorism, vulnerabilityexploitation, botnets, hacking, phishing, spyware, malware,computer fraud, loss of encryption, denial of service, impropersystem use by employee, telecommunications interruption orfailure, internet service provider, electricity brownout orblackout)

– Computer software or application interruption, disruption orfailure (internal/external)

– Loss, corruption, or theft of electronic information

– Utility interruption or failure (telecommunications, electricalpower, water, gas, steam, HVAC, pollution control system,sewage system, other critical infrastructure)

Other hazards/risk exposures– Supply chain interruption (loss of shipping or transportation,

vendor failure (single- or sole-source provider)

5.2.2.2 The vulnerability of people, property, operations, theenvironment, and the entity shall be identified, evaluated, andmonitored.

5.2.3 The entity shall conduct an analysis of the impacts of thehazards identified in 5.2.2 on the following:

(1) Health and safety of persons in the affected area

(2) Health and safety of personnel responding to the incident

(3)* Continuity of operations

(4)* Property, facilities, assets, and critical infrastructure

(5) Delivery of the entity’s services

(6) Supply chain

(7) Environment

(8)* Economic and financial condition

2013 Edition

ANNEX C 1600–31

Table C.1 Continued

PartiallyNFPA 1600 Program Elements Conforming Conforming Nonconforming Comments

(9) Regulatory and contractual obligations

(10) Reputation of or confidence in the entity

5.2.4* The analysis shall evaluate the potential effects of regional,national, or international incidents that could have cascadingimpacts.

5.2.5 The risk assessment shall evaluate the adequacy of existingprevention and mitigation strategies.

5.3* Business Impact Analysis.5.3.1 The entity shall conduct a business impact analysis (BIA).

5.3.2 The BIA shall evaluate the potential impacts resulting frominterruption or disruption of individual functions, processes,and applications.

5.3.3* The BIA shall identify those functions, processes,infrastructure, systems, and applications that are critical to theentity and the point in time (recovery time objective) when theimpact of the interruption or disruption becomes unacceptable tothe entity.

5.3.4 The BIA shall identify dependencies and interdependenciesacross functions, processes, and applications, to determine thepotential for compounding impacts in the event of aninterruption or disruption.

5.3.5* The BIA shall evaluate the potential loss of information andthe point in time (recovery point objective) that defines thepotential gap between the last backup of information and the timeof the interruption or disruption.

5.3.6* The BIA developed in Section 5.3 shall be used in thedevelopment of recovery strategies and plans to support theprogram.

5.3.7 The analysis of impacts required by 5.2.3 and the BIA requiredby Section 5.3 shall be conducted jointly or separately.

5.4 Resource Needs Assessment.5.4.1* The entity shall conduct a resource needs assessment based

on the hazards identified in Section 5.2 and the business impactanalysis in Section 5.3.

5.4.2 The resource needs assessment shall include the following:(1)* Human resources, equipment, training, facilities, funding,

expert knowledge, materials, technology, information, intelli-gence, and the time frames within which they will be needed

(2) Quantity, response time, capability, limitations, cost, andliabilities

5.4.3* The entity shall establish procedures to locate, acquire, store,distribute, maintain, test, and account for services, humanresources, equipment, and materials procured or donated tosupport the program.

(continues)

2013 Edition

1600–32 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

Table C.1 Continued

PartiallyNFPA 1600 Program Elements Conforming Conforming Nonconforming Comments

5.4.4 Facilities capable of supporting response, continuity, andrecovery operations shall be identified.

5.4.5* The need for mutual aid/assistance or partnershipagreements shall be determined.

5.4.5.1* If needed, agreements shall be established anddocumented.

5.5 Performance Objectives.5.5.1* The entity shall establish performance objectives for the

program in accordance with the requirements in Chapter 4 andthe elements in Chapters 5 through 9.

5.5.2 The performance objectives shall address the results of thehazard identification, risk assessment, and business impactanalysis.

5.5.3 Performance objectives shall be developed by the entity toaddress both short-term and long-term needs.

5.5.4* The entity shall define the terms short term and long term.

Chapter 6 Implementation6.1 Common Plan Requirements.6.1.1* Plans shall address the health and safety of personnel.

6.1.2 Plans shall identify and document the following:(1) Assumptions made during the planning process

(2) Functional roles and responsibilities of internal and externalagencies, organizations, departments, and positions

(3) Lines of authority

(4) The process for delegation of authority

(5) Lines of succession for the entity

(6) Liaisons to external entities

(7) Logistics support and resource requirements

6.1.3* Plans shall be individual, integrated into a single plandocument, or a combination of the two.

6.1.4* The entity shall make sections of the plans available tothose assigned specific tasks and responsibilities therein and tokey stakeholders as required.

6.2 Prevention.6.2.1* The entity shall develop a strategy to prevent an incident

that threatens life, property, and the environment.

6.2.2* The prevention strategy shall be based on the informationobtained from Section 5.2 and shall be kept current using thetechniques of information collection and intelligence.

2013 Edition

ANNEX C 1600–33

Table C.1 Continued

PartiallyNFPA 1600 Program Elements Conforming Conforming Nonconforming Comments

6.2.3 The prevention strategy shall be based on the results ofhazard identification and risk assessment, an analysis ofimpacts, program constraints, operational experience, and costbenefit analysis.

6.2.4 The entity shall have a process to monitor the identifiedhazards and adjust the level of preventive measures to becommensurate with the risk.

6.3 Mitigation.6.3.1* The entity shall develop and implement a mitigation

strategy that includes measures to be taken to limit or controlthe consequences, extent, or severity of an incident that cannotbe prevented.

6.3.2* The mitigation strategy shall be based on the results ofhazard identification and risk assessment, an analysis ofimpacts, program constraints, operational experience, and costbenefit analysis.

6.3.3 The mitigation strategy shall include interim and long-termactions to reduce vulnerabilities.

6.4 Crisis Communications and Public Information.

6.4.1* The entity shall develop a plan and procedures todisseminate information to and respond to requests forinformation from the following audiences before, during, andafter an incident:

(1) Internal audiences, including employees

(2) External audiences, including the media, functional needspopulation, and other stakeholders

6.4.2* The entity shall establish and maintain a crisiscommunications or public information capability that includesthe following:

(1)* Central contact facility or communications hub

(2) Physical or virtual information center

(3) System for gathering, monitoring, and disseminatinginformation

(4) Procedures for developing and delivering coordinatedmessages

(5) Pre-scripted information bulletins or templates

(6) Protocol to clear information for release

6.5 Warning, Notifications, and Communications.

6.5.1* The entity shall determine warning, notification, andcommunications needs.

6.5.2* Warning, notification, and communications systems shallbe reliable, redundant, and interoperable.

(continues)

2013 Edition

1600–34 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

Table C.1 Continued

PartiallyNFPA 1600 Program Elements Conforming Conforming Nonconforming Comments

6.5.3* The entity shall develop and test warning, notification, andcommunications protocols and procedures to alert stakeholderspotentially at risk from an actual or impending incident.

6.5.4 Procedures shall include issuing warnings throughauthorized agencies if required by law.

6.6 Operational Procedures.6.6.1 The entity shall develop, coordinate, and implement

operational procedures to support the program.

6.6.2 Procedures shall be established and implemented forresponse to and recovery from the impacts of hazards identifiedin 5.2.2.

6.6.3* Procedures shall provide for life safety, propertyconservation, incident stabilization, continuity, and protectionof the environment under the jurisdiction of the entity.

6.6.4 Procedures shall include the following:(1) Control of access to the area affected by the incident

(2) Identification of personnel engaged in activities at theincident

(3) Accounting for personnel engaged in incident activities

(4) Mobilization and demobilization of resources

6.6.5 Procedures shall allow for concurrent activities of response,continuity, recovery, and mitigation.

6.7 Incident Management.

6.7.1* The entity shall develop an incident management system todirect, control, and coordinate response, continuity, andrecovery operations.

6.7.1.1* Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs).

6.7.1.1.1* The entity shall establish primary and alternate EOCscapable of managing response, continuity, and recoveryoperations.

6.7.1.1.2* The EOCs shall be permitted to be physical or virtual.

6.7.1.1.3 On activation of an emergency operations center(EOC), communications and coordination shall be establishedbetween incident command and the EOC.

6.7.2 The incident management system shall describe specificorganizational roles, titles, and responsibilities for eachincident management function.

6.7.3 The entity shall establish procedures and policies forcoordinating mitigation, preparedness, response, continuity,and recovery activities.

6.7.4 The entity shall coordinate the activities specified in 6.7.3with stakeholders.

2013 Edition

ANNEX C 1600–35

Table C.1 Continued

PartiallyNFPA 1600 Program Elements Conforming Conforming Nonconforming Comments

6.7.5 Procedures shall include a situation analysis thatincorporates a damage assessment and a needs assessment toidentify resources to support activities.

6.7.6* Emergency operations/response shall be guided by anincident action plan or management by objectives.

6.7.7 Resource management shall include the following:(1) Establishing processes for describing, taking inventory of,

requesting, and tracking resources

(2) Resource typing or categorizing resources by size, capacity,capability, and skill

(3) Mobilizing and demobilizing resources in accordance with theestablished IMS

(4) Conducting contingency planning for resource deficiencies

6.7.8 A current inventory of internal and external resources shallbe maintained.

6.7.9 Donations of human resources, equipment, material, andfacilities shall be managed.

6.8 Emergency Operations/Response Plan.

6.8.1* Emergency operations/response plans shall defineresponsibilities for carrying out specific actions in anemergency.

6.8.2* The plan shall identify actions to be taken to protectpeople including those with access and functional needs,property, operations, the environment, and the entity.

6.8.3* The plan shall identify actions for incident stabilization.

6.8.4 The plan shall include the following:(1) Protective actions for life safety in accordance with 6.8.2

(2) Warning, notifications, and communication in accordancewith Section 6.5

(3) Crisis communication and public information in accordancewith Section 6.4

(4) Resource management in accordance with 6.7.7

(5) Donation management in accordance with 6.7.9

6.9.1* The continuity plan should include recovery strategies tomaintain critical or time-sensitive functions and processesidentified during the business impact analysis.

6.9.2* The continuity plan shall identify stakeholders that need tobe notified; critical and time-sensitive applications; alternativework sites; vital records, contact lists, functions, and processes,that must be maintained; and personnel, procedures, andresources that are needed while the entity is recovering.

(continues)

2013 Edition

1600–36 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

Table C.1 Continued

PartiallyNFPA 1600 Program Elements Conforming Conforming Nonconforming Comments

6.9.3* The recovery plan shall provide for restoration offunctions, services, resources, facilities, programs, andinfrastructure.

6.10* Employee Assistance and Support.6.10.1* The entity shall develop a strategy for employee assistance

and support that includes the following:(1) Communications procedures

(2)* Contact information, including emergency contact outsideanticipated hazard area

(3) Accounting for persons affected, displaced, or injured by theincident

(4) Temporary, short-term, or long-term housing, and feedingand care of those displaced by an incident

(5) Mental health and physical well-being of individuals affectedby the incident

(6) Pre-incident and post-incident awareness

6.10.2 The strategy shall be flexible for use in all incidents.

6.10.3* The entity shall promote family preparedness educationand training for employees.

Chapter 7 Training and Education7.1* Training and Education Curriculum. The entity shall develop

and implement a competency-based training and educationcurriculum that supports all employees who have a role in theprogram.

7.2 Goal of the Curriculum. The goal of the curriculum shall beto create awareness and enhance the knowledge, skills, andabilities required to implement, support, and maintain theprogram.

7.3 Scope and Frequency of Instruction. The scope of thecurriculum and frequency of instruction shall be identified.

7.4 Incident Management System Training. Personnel shall betrained in the entity’s incident management system (IMS) andother components of the program to the level of theirinvolvement.

7.5 Recordkeeping. Records of training and education shall bemaintained as specified in Section 4.7.

7.6 Regulatory and Program Requirements. The curriculum shallcomply with applicable regulatory and program requirements.

7.7* Public Education. A public education program shall beimplemented to communicate:

(1) Potential hazard impacts

(2) Preparedness information

(3) Information needed to develop a preparedness plan

2013 Edition

ANNEX C 1600–37

Table C.1 Continued

PartiallyNFPA 1600 Program Elements Conforming Conforming Nonconforming Comments

Chapter 8 Exercises and Tests8.1 Program Evaluation.8.1.1 The entity shall evaluate program plans, procedures,

training, and capabilities and promote continuousimprovement through periodic exercises and tests.

8.1.2 The entity shall evaluate the program based on post-incidentanalyses, lessons learned, and operational performance inaccordance with Chapter 9.

8.1.3 Exercises and tests shall be documented.

8.2* Exercise and Test Methodology.8.2.1 Exercises shall provide a standardized methodology to

practice procedures and interact with other entities (internaland external) in a controlled setting.

8.2.2 Exercises shall be designed to assess the maturity of programplans, procedures, and strategies.

8.2.3 Tests shall be designed to demonstrate capabilities.

8.3* Design of Exercises and Tests.

8.3.1 Exercises and tests shall be designed to:(1) Ensure the safety of people, property, operations, and the

environment involved in the exercise or testing

(2) Evaluate the program

(3) Identify planning and procedural deficiencies

(4) Test or validate recently changed procedures or plans

(5) Clarify roles and responsibilities

(6) Obtain participant feedback and recommendations forprogram improvement

(7) Measure improvement compared to performance objectives

(8) Improve coordination between internal and external teams,organizations, and entities

(9) Validate training and education

(10) Increase awareness and understanding of hazards and thepotential impact of hazards on the entity

(11) Identify additional resources and assess the capabilities ofexisting resources, including personnel and equipmentneeded for effective response and recovery

(12) Assess the ability of the team to identify, assess, and managean incident

(13) Practice the deployment of teams and resources to managean incident

(14) Improve individual performance

(continues)

2013 Edition

1600–38 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

Table C.1 Continued

PartiallyNFPA 1600 Program Elements Conforming Conforming Nonconforming Comments

8.4 Exercise and Test Evaluation.8.4.1 Exercises shall evaluate program plans, procedures, training,

and capabilities to identify opportunities for improvement.

8.4.2 Tests shall be evaluated as either pass or fail.

8.5* Frequency.

8.5.1 Exercises and tests shall be conducted on the frequencyneeded to establish and maintain required capabilities.

Chapter 9 Program Maintenance and Improvement9.1* Program Reviews. The entity shall maintain and improve the

program by evaluating its policies, program, procedures, andcapabilities using performance objectives.

9.1.1* The entity shall improve effectiveness of the programthrough evaluation of the implementation of changes resultingfrom preventive and corrective action.

9.1.2* Evaluations shall be conducted on a regularly scheduledbasis, and when the situation changes to challenge theeffectiveness of the existing program.

9.1.3 The program shall be re-evaluated when a change in any ofthe following impacts the entity’s program:

(1) Regulations

(2) Hazards and potential impacts

(3) Resource availability or capability

(4) Entity’s organization

(5)* Funding

(6) Infrastructure, including technology environment

(7) Economy and geopolitical stability

(8) Entity operations

9.1.4 Reviews shall include post-incident analyses, reviews oflessons learned, and reviews of program performance.

9.1.5 The entity shall maintain records of its reviews andevaluations, in accordance with the records managementpractices developed under Section 4.7.

9.1.6 Documentation, records, and reports shall be provided tomanagement for review and follow-up.

9.2* Corrective Action.9.2.1* The entity shall establish a corrective action process.

9.2.2* The entity shall take corrective action on deficienciesidentified.

9.3 Continuous Improvement. The entity shall effect continuousimprovement of the program through the use of programreviews and the corrective action process.

2013 Edition

ANNEX E 1600–39

•

Annex D Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) Cycle

This annex is not a part of the recommendations of this NFPAdocument but is included for informational purposes only.

D.1 The Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) (see Figure D.1), alsoknown as the Deming or Shewhart cycle, is a four-stepproblem-solving process typically used for business process im-provement and quality assurance management.

Annex E Crosswalk Between NFPA 1600, DRII, andCSA Z1600

This annex is not a part of the recommendations of this NFPAdocument but is included for informational purposes only.

E.1 Annex E is a cross-reference to the requirements ofNFPA 1600; Disaster Recovery Institute International ProfessionalPractices for Business Continuity Practitioners; and CSA Z1600,Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs. (SeeTable E.1). This crosswalk is intended purely as a high-levelcomparison of the component section of the indicated stan-dards. Reference should be made the actual details in eachsection if a full comparison is needed.

FIGURE D.1 The Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) Cycle.

Table E.1 Cross-Reference of NFPA 1600 to DRII Professional Practices and CSA Z1600

CSA Z1600-08DRII Professional Practices for Emergency Management and

NFPA 1600 (2013) Business Continuity Practitioners (2012) Business Continuity ProgramsChapter/Section Subject Area Chapter/Section

Chapter 4 Program Management 4 Program Management

4.1 Leadership and Commitment 1. Project Initiation and Management 4.1 Leadership and Commitment

4.2 Program Coordinator 1. Project Initiation and Management 4.2 Program Coordinator

4.3 Program Committee 1. Project Initiation and Management 4.3 Advisory Committee

4.4 Program Administration 1. Project Initiation and Management 4.4 Program Administration

4.5 Laws and Authorities 1. Program Initiation and Management 4.5 Laws and Authorities3. Business Impact Analysis9. Crisis Communications10. Coordinating with External Agencies

4.6 Finance and Administration 1. Project Initiation and Management 4.6 Financial Management

4.7 Records Management 3. Business Impact Analysis 4.4.6 Records Management

Chapter 5 Planning 5 Planning

5.1 Planning and Design Process 2. Risk Evaluation and Control 5.2 Planning Process3. Business Impact Analysis4. Business Continuity Strategies5. Emergency Preparedness andResponse6. Business Continuity PlanDevelopment and Implementation

(continues)

A Management System

1. Administration4 2. Referenced

Program PublicationsManagement 3. Definitions

9 5Program Maintenance Planning

and Improvement

8 6Exercises and Testing Implementation

7Training andEducation

2013 Edition

1600–40 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

Table E.1 Continued

CSA Z1600-08DRII Professional Practices for Emergency Management and

NFPA 1600 (2013) Business Continuity Practitioners (2012) Business Continuity ProgramsChapter/Section Subject Area Chapter/Section

5.2 Risk Assessment 2. Risk Evaluation and Control 5.1.1 Hazard Identification5.1.2 Risk Assessment

5.3 Business Impact Analysis 3. Business Impact Analysis 5.1.3 Business Impact Analysis (BIA)

5.4 Resource Needs Assessment 1. Program Initiation and Management 6.2 Resource Management3. Business Impact Analysis 6.3 Mutual Aid/Mutual Assistance6 Business Continuity PlanDevelopment and Implementation

5.5 Performance Objectives 1. Project Initiation and Management 4.4.3 Program Goals and Objectives

Chapter 6 Implementation 6 Implementation

6.1 Common Plan Requirements 2. Risk Evaluation and Control 5.3 Common Plan Requirements3. Business Impact Analysis4. Business Continuity Strategies5. Emergency Preparedness andResponse6. Business Continuity PlanDevelopment and Implementation8. Business Continuity Plan Exercise,Audit and Maintenance9. Crisis Communications

6.2 Prevention 2. Risk Evaluation and Control 6.1.2 Prevention

6.3 Mitigation 2. Risk Evaluation and Control 6.1.3 Mitigation

6.4 Crisis Communications and Public 6. Business Continuity Plan 6.6 Communications and WarningInformation Development and Implementation

9. Crisis Communications

6.5 Warning, Notifications, and 5. Emergency Preparedness and 6.6.4 Public WarningCommunications Response

9. Crisis Communications10. Coordinating with External Agencies

6.6 Operational Procedures 5. Emergency Preparedness and 6.7 Operational ProceduresResponse6. Business Continuity PlanDevelopment and Implementation8. Business Continuity Plan Exercise,Audit and Maintenance9. Crisis Communications

6.7 Incident Management 5. Emergency Preparedness and 6.5 Incident ManagementResponse 6.8 Facilities6. Business Continuity PlanDevelopment and Implementation9. Crisis Communications

2013 Edition

ANNEX E 1600–41

Table E.1 Continued

CSA Z1600-08DRII Professional Practices for Emergency Management and

NFPA 1600 (2013) Business Continuity Practitioners (2012) Business Continuity ProgramsChapter/Section Subject Area Chapter/Section

6.8 Emergency Operations/Response Plan 5. Emergency Preparedness and 6.4 Emergency ResponseResponse6. Business Continuity PlanDevelopment and Implementation9. Crisis Communications

6.9 Business Continuity and Recovery 4. Business Continuity Strategies 6.10 Business Continuity6. Business Continuity Plan 6.11 RecoveryDevelopment and Implementation

6.10 Employee Assistance and Support 5. Emergency Preparedness and -Response6. Business Continuity PlanDevelopment and Implementation

Chapter 7 Training and Education 8. Business Continuity Plan Exercise, 6.9 TrainingAudit and Maintenance

7.1 Training and Education Curriculum 6.9.1

7.2 Goal of the Curriculum 6.9.2

7.3 Scope and Frequency of Instruction 6.9.3

7.4 Incident Management System Training -

7.5 Recordkeeping 6.9.4

7.6 Regulatory and Program Requirements 4.5.1 Compliance

7.7 Public Education 6.6.5 Public Awareness

Chapter 8 Exercises and Tests 8. Business Continuity Plan Exercise, 7 Exercises, Evaluations, andAudit and Maintenance Corrective Actions

8.1 Program Evaluation 7.1

8.2 Exercise and Test Methodology -

8.3 Design of Exercises and Tests 7.2

8.4 Exercise and Test Evaluation 7.1

8.5 Frequency 7.1

Chapter 9 Program Maintenance and 8. Business Continuity Plan Exercise, 8 Management ReviewImprovement Audit and Maintenance

9.1 Program Reviews 8.1

9.2 Corrective Action 7.4 Corrective Action

9.3 Continuous Improvement 8.2 Continuous Improvement

DRII: DRI International, Inc.; CSA: Canadian Standards Association.

2013 Edition

1600–42 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

Annex F NFPA 1600 2013 Edition as a ManagementSystem Standard

This annex is not a part of the recommendations of this NFPAdocument but is included for informational purposes only.

Information in this annex is intended to be adopted by theentity at its discretion, replacing Chapters 1 through 9. Al-though this annex is written in mandatory language, it is notintended to be enforced or applied unless specifically adoptedby the entity, thereby replacing Chapters 1–9 and becomingthe full requirements of the standard. A management system isdefined as a framework of processes designed to ensure theachievement of an entity’s “business” objectives. By adoptingthis annex, the entity is committing to using a managementsystem standard for implementation and maintenance of theprogram.

This annex was created using the Draft ISO Guide 83, Highlevel structure and identical text for management system standardsand common core management system terms and definitions. Cross-references to NFPA 1600 Chapters 1 through 9 are provided inbrackets. Paragraphs without a cross-reference are part of theISO identical text for management system standards (MSS),common management system (MS) terms, and core defini-tions from the Draft ISO Guide 83.

F.1 Scope. [Chapter 1]

F.1.1 Scope. This standard shall establish a common set ofcriteria for all-hazards disaster/emergency management andbusiness continuity programs, hereinafter referred to as “theprogram.” [1.1]

F.1.2 Purpose. This standard provides the fundamental crite-ria for a management system designed to develop, implement,assess, and maintain the program for prevention, mitigation,preparedness, response, continuity, and recovery. [1.2]

F.1.3 Application. This document shall apply to public, not-for-profit, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and pri-vate entities. [1.3]

F.2 Normative References. [Chapter 2]

F.2.1 General. The documents or portions thereof listed inthis chapter are referenced within this standard and shall beconsidered part of the requirements of this document. [2.1]

F.2.2 NFPA Publications. (Reserved) [2.2]

F.2.3 Other Publications. [2.3] Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dic-tionary, 11th edition, Merriam-Webster, Inc., Springfield, MA,2003.

F.2.4 References for Extracts in Mandatory Sections. (Re-served) [2.4]

F.3 Terms and Definitions. [Chapter 3]

F.3.1 General. The definitions contained in this chapter shallapply to the terms used in this standard. Where terms are notdefined in this chapter or within another chapter, they shallbe defined using their ordinarily accepted meanings withinthe context in which they are used. Merriam-Webster’s CollegiateDictionary, 11th edition, shall be the source for the ordinarilyaccepted meaning.

F.3.2 NFPA Official Definitions. [3.2]

F.3.2.1 Approved. Acceptable to the authority having jurisdic-tion. [3.2.1]

2013 Edition

F.3.2.2 Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ). An organization,office, or individual responsible for enforcing the require-ments of a code or standard, or for approving equipment,materials, an installation, or a procedure. [3.2.2]

F.3.2.3 Shall. Indicates a mandatory requirement. [3.2.3]

F.3.2.4 Should. Indicates a recommendation or that which isadvised but not required. [3.2.4]

F.3.2.5 Standard. A document, the main text of which con-tains only mandatory provisions using the word “shall” to indi-cate requirements and which is in a form generally suitable formandatory reference by another standard or code or for adop-tion into law. Nonmandatory provisions are not to be consid-ered a part of the requirements of a standard and shall belocated in an appendix, annex, footnote, informational note,or other means as permitted in the Manual of Style for NFPATechnical Committee Documents. [3.2.5]

F.3.3 General Definitions. [3.3]

F.3.3.1 All-Hazards. An approach for prevention, mitigation,preparedness, response, continuity, and recovery that ad-dresses a full range of threats and hazards, including natural,human-caused, and technology-caused. [3.3.1]

F.3.3.2 Business Continuity. An ongoing process to ensurethat the necessary steps are taken to identify the impacts ofpotential losses and maintain viable recovery strategies, recov-ery plans, and continuity of services. [3.3.2]

F.3.3.3 Business Impact Analysis. A management level analysisthat identifies, quantifies, and qualifies the impacts resultingfrom interruptions or disruptions of an entity’s resources. Theanalysis may identify time-critical functions, recovery priori-ties, dependencies, and interdependencies so that recoverytime objectives can be established and approved. [3.3.3]

F.3.3.4 Capability. The ability to perform required actions.[3.3.4]

F.3.3.5 Competence. Demonstrated ability to apply knowl-edge and skills to achieve intended results. [3.3.5]

F.3.3.6 Continual Improvement. Recurring process of en-hancing the management program in order to achieve im-provements in overall performance consistent with the entity’spolicy, goals, and objectives. [3.3.6]

F.3.3.7 Continuity. A term that includes business continuity,continuity of operations (COOP), operational continuity, suc-cession planning, and continuity of government (COG),which support the resilience of the entity. [3.3.7]

F.3.3.8 Crisis Management. The ability of an entity to manageincidents that have the potential to cause significant security,financial, or reputational impact. [3.3.8]

F.3.3.9 Damage Assessment. An appraisal or determination ofthe effects of the incident on humans, on physical, opera-tional, economic characteristics, and on the environment.[3.3.9]

F.3.3.10 Disaster/Emergency Management. An ongoing pro-cess to prevent, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, maintaincontinuity during, and recover from an incident that threat-ens life, property, operations, or the environment. [3.3.10]

ANNEX F 1600–43

F.3.3.11 Entity. A governmental agency or jurisdiction, privateor public company, partnership, nonprofit organization, orother organization that has emergency management and con-tinuity of operations responsibilities. [3.3.11]

F.3.3.12 Exercise. A process to assess, train, practice, and im-prove performance in an entity. [3.3.12]

F.3.3.13 Incident. An event that has the potential to cause in-terruption, disruption, loss, emergency, crisis, disaster, or ca-tastrophe. [3.3.13]

F.3.3.14 Incident Action Plan. A verbal plan, written plan, orcombination of both, that is updated throughout the incidentand reflects the overall incident strategy, tactics, risk manage-ment, and member safety that are developed by the incidentcommander. [3.3.14]

F.3.3.15 Incident Management System (IMS). The combina-tion of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and com-munications operating within a common organizational struc-ture, designed to aid in the management of resources duringincidents. [3.3.15]

F.3.3.16 Interoperability. The ability of diverse personnel, sys-tems, and organizations to work together seamlessly. [3.3.16]

F.3.3.17 Mitigation. Activities taken to reduce the impactsfrom hazards. [3.3.17]

F.3.3.18 Mutual Aid/Assistance Agreement. A prearrangedagreement between two or more entities to share resources inresponse to an incident. [3.3.18]

F.3.3.19 Preparedness. Ongoing activities, tasks, and systemsto develop, implement, and maintain the program capabili-ties. [3.3.19]

F.3.3.20 Prevention. Activities to avoid or stop an incidentfrom occurring. [3.3.20]

F.3.3.21 Recovery. Activities and programs designed to returnconditions to a level that is acceptable to the entity. [3.3.21]

F.3.3.22 Resource Management. A system for identifying avail-able resources to enable timely access to resources needed toprevent, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, maintain continu-ity during, or recover from an incident. [3.3.22]

F.3.3.23 Response. Immediate and ongoing activities, tasks,programs, and systems to manage the effects of an incidentthat threatens life, property, operations, or the environment.[3.3.23]

F.3.3.24 Risk Assessment. Process of hazard identification,and the analysis or probabilities, vulnerability, and impacts.[3.3.24]

F.3.3.25 Situation Analysis. The process of collecting, evaluat-ing, and disseminating information related to the incident,including information on the current and forecasted situa-tion, and on the status of resources for management of theincident. [3.3.25]

F.3.3.26 Test. Procedure for evaluation with a pass or fail re-sult. [3.3.26]

F.3.3.27 Vital Records. Information critical to the continuedoperation or survival of an entity. [3.3.27]

F.3.4 ISO Terms and Definitions. For the purposes of thisdocument, the following terms and definitions apply.

NOTE 1 The following terms and definitions constitute anintegral part of the “common text” for management systemsstandards.

NOTE 2 Bold type in a definition indicates a cross-referenceto another term defined in this clause, and the number referencefor the term is given in parentheses.

F.3.4.1 Terms Related to “Plan.”

F.3.4.1.1 Organization. Person or group of people that has itsown functions with responsibilities, authorities, and relation-ships to achieve its objectives (F.3.4.1.4).

NOTE The concept of organization includes, but is not lim-ited to sole-trader, company, corporation, firm, enterprise, au-thority, partnership, charity or institution, or part or combina-tion thereof, whether incorporated or not, public or private.

F.3.4.1.2 Risk. Effect of uncertainty on objectives (F.3.4.1.4).NOTE 1 An effect is a deviation from the expected – posi-

tive and/or negative.NOTE 2 Objectives can relate to different disciplines (such

as financial, health and safety, and environmental goals) andcan apply at different levels (such as strategic, organization-wide, project, product and process (F.3.4.2.2)). An objectivecan be expressed in other ways, e.g. as an intended outcome, apurpose, an operational criterion, as a disaster/emergencymanagement and business continuity objective or by the useof other words with similar meaning (e.g. aim, goal, or target).

NOTE 3 Risk is often characterized by reference to poten-tial events (Guide 73, 3.5.1.3) and consequences (Guide 73,3.6.1.3), or a combination of these.

NOTE 4 Risk is often expressed in terms of a combinationof the consequences of an event (including changes in cir-cumstances) and the associated likelihood (Guide 73, 3.6.1.1)of occurrence.

NOTE 5 Uncertainty is the state, even partial, of efficiencyof information related to, understanding or knowledge of, anevent, its consequence, or likelihood.

NOTE 6 In the context of disaster/emergency managementand business continuity management system standards disaster/emergency management and business continuity objectives areset by the organization, consistent with the disaster/emergencymanagement and business continuity policy, to achieve specificresults. When applying the term risk and components of riskmanagement, this should be related to the objectives of the orga-nization that include, but are not limited to the disaster/emergency management and business continuity objectives asspecified in F.6.2 of the common MSS text.

F.3.4.1.3 Policy. Intentions and direction of an organization(F.3.4.1.1 as formally expressed by its top management(F.3.4.1.1).

F.3.4.1.4 Objective. Result to be achieved.NOTE 1 An objective can be strategic, tactical, or operational.NOTE 2 An objective can be expressed in other ways, e.g.,

as an intended outcome, a purpose, an operational criterion;as a disaster/emergency management and business continuityobjective or by the use of other words with similar meaning(e.g. aim, goal, or target).

2013 Edition

1600–44 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

F.3.4.1.5 Top management. Person or group of people who di-rects and controls an organization (F.3.4.1.1) at the highest level.

NOTE 1 Top management has the power to delegate au-thority and provide resources within the organization.

NOTE 2 An organization can for this purpose be identifiedby reference to the scope of the implementation of a manage-ment system (F.3.4.2.1).

F.3.4.1.6 Interested party (preferred term), stakeholder (ad-mitted term). Person or group of people that holds a view thatcan affect the organization (F.3.4.1.1).

F.3.4.1.7 Requirement. Obligatory need or expectation that isstated or implied.

F.3.4.2 Terms Related to “Do.”

F.3.4.2.1 Management system. Set of interrelated or interact-ing elements of an organization (F.3.4.1.1) to establish poli-cies (F.3.4.1.3) and objectives (F.3.4.1.4), and processes(F.3.4.2.2) to achieve those objectives.

NOTE 1 A management system can address a single disci-pline or several disciplines.

NOTE 2 The system elements include the organization’sstructure, roles and responsibilities, planning, operation, etc.

NOTE 3 The scope of a management system may includethe whole of the organization, specific and identified func-tions of the organization, specific and identified sections ofthe organization, or one or more functions across a group oforganizations.

F.3.4.2.2 Process. Set of interrelated or interacting activitieswhich transforms inputs into outputs.

F.3.4.2.3 Competence. Ability to apply knowledge and skills toachieve intended results.

F.3.4.2.4 Documented information. Information required tobe controlled and maintained by an organization (F.3.4.1.1).

NOTE 1 Documented information can be in any formatand media and from any source.

NOTE 2 Documented information can, e.g., refer to – themanagement system (F.3.4.2.1), including related processes(F.3.4.2.2); – information created in order for the organiza-tion to operate; – evidence of results achieved.

F.3.4.2.5 Performance. Measurable result.NOTE 1 Performance can relate either to quantitative or

qualitative findings.NOTE 2 Performance can relate to the management of

activities, processes (F.3.4.2.2), products (including services),systems or organizations (F.3.4.1.1).

F.3.4.2.6 Outsource (verb). Make an arrangement where anexternal organization (F.3.4.1.1) performs part of an organiza-tion’s function or process (F.3.4.2.2.

NOTE An external organization is outside the scope of themanagement system (F.3.4.2.1), although the outsourcedfunction or process is within the scope.

F.3.4.3 Terms Related to “Check.”

F.3.4.3.1 Monitoring. Determining the status of a system, aprocess (F.3.4.2.2) or an activity.

NOTE To determine the status there may be a need tocheck, supervise or critically observe.

F.3.4.3.2 Measurement. Process (F.3.4.2.2) to determine a value.

2013 Edition

F.3.4.3.3 Audit. Systematic, independent, and documentedprocess (F.3.4.2.2) for obtaining audit evidence and evaluat-ing it objectively to determine the extent to which the auditcriteria are fulfilled.

NOTE 1 An audit can be an internal audit (first party) oran external audit (second party or third party), and it can be acombined audit (combining two or more disciplines).

NOTE 2 “Audit evidence” and “audit criteria” are definedin ISO 19011.

F.3.4.3.4 Effectiveness. Extent to which planned activities arerealized and planned results achieved.

F.3.4.3.5 Conformity. Fulfillment of a requirement (F.3.4.1.7).

F.3.4.3.6 Nonconformity. Non-fulfillment of a requirement(F.3.4.1.7).

F.3.4.4 F.3.4.4 Terms Related to “Act.”

F.3.4.4.1 Correction. Action to eliminate a detected noncon-formity (F.3.4.3.6)

F.3.4.4.2 Corrective action. Action to eliminate the cause of anonconformity (F.3.4.3.6) and to prevent recurrence.

NOTE In the case of other undesirable outcomes, action isnecessary to minimize or eliminate the causes and to reducethe impact or prevent recurrence. Such actions fall outside theconcept of “corrective action” in the sense of this definition.

F.3.4.4.3 Continual improvement. Recurring activity to en-hance performance (F.3.4.2.5).

F.4 Context of the Organization.

F.4.1 Understanding the Organization and Its Context. Theorganization shall determine external and internal issues thatare relevant to its purpose and that affect its ability to achievethe intended outcomes of its disaster/emergency manage-ment and business continuity management system.

These issues shall be taken into account when establishing,implementing, maintaining and improving the organization’sdisaster/emergency management and business continuitymanagement system.

F.4.2 Understanding the Needs and Expectations of Inter-ested Parties. When establishing its disaster/emergency man-agement and business continuity program, the entity shall de-termine:

(1) Its relevant interested parties and(2) Their requirements (i.e. their needs and expectations

whether stated, implied or obligatory)

F.4.3 Determining the Scope of the Management System. Theorganization shall determine the scope of the disaster/emergency management and business continuity manage-ment system, such that the boundaries and applicability of themanagement system can be clearly communicated to relevantinternal and external parties. When determining the scope ofthe management system the organization shall consider:

(1) The external and internal issues referred to in Section F.4.1(2) The requirements referred to in Section F.4.2

F.4.4 Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Conti-nuity Management System. The organization shall, establish,implement, maintain and improve disaster/emergency man-agement and business continuity management system in ac-cordance with the requirements of this International Stan-dard including the processes needed and their interactions.

ANNEX F 1600–45

F.4.5 Laws and Authorities. [4.5]

F.4.5.1 The program shall comply with applicable legislation,policies, regulatory requirements, and directives. [4.5.1]

F.4.5.2 The entity shall establish and maintain a procedure(s)to comply with applicable legislation, policies, regulatory re-quirements, and directives. [4.5.2]

F.4.5.3 The entity shall implement a strategy for addressingthe need for revisions to legislation, regulations, directives,policies, and industry codes of practice. [4.5.3]

F.5 Leadership.

F.5.1 General. Persons in top management and other relevantmanagement roles throughout the organization shall demon-strate leadership with respect to the disaster/emergency man-agement and business continuity management system.

NOTE: This can be shown, for example, by motivating andempowering persons to contribute to the effectiveness of thedisaster/emergency management and business continuitymanagement system.

F.5.2 Management Commitment.

F.5.2.1 Top management shall demonstrate its commitment by:

(1) Ensuring the disaster/emergency management and busi-ness continuity management system is compatible withthe strategic direction of the organization;

(2) Integrating the disaster/emergency management and busi-ness continuity management system requirements into theorganization’s business processes;

(3) Providing the resources to establish, implement, maintain,and continually improve the disaster/emergency manage-ment and business continuity management system;

(4) Communicating the importance of effective disaster/emergency management and business continuity man-agement and conforming to the disaster/emergencymanagement and business continuity management sys-tem requirements;

(5) Ensuring that the disaster/emergency management andbusiness continuity management system achieves its in-tended outcomes;

(6) Directing and supporting continual improvement

NOTE: reference to “business” in this International Stan-dard should be interpreted broadly to mean those activitiesthat are core to the purposes of the organization’s existence.

F.5.2.2 Leadership and Commitment. [4.1]

F.5.2.2.1 The entity leadership shall demonstrate commit-ment to the program to prevent, mitigate the consequencesof, prepare for, respond to, maintain continuity during, andrecover from incidents. [4.1.1]

F.5.2.2.2 The leadership commitment shall include the fol-lowing: [4.1.2]

(1) Support the development, implementation, and mainte-nance of the program

(2) Provide necessary resources to support the program(3) Ensure the program is reviewed and evaluated as needed

to ensure program effectiveness(4) Support corrective action to address program deficiencies

F.5.2.2.3 The entity shall adhere to policies, execute plans, and

follow procedures developed to support the program. [4.1.3]

F.5.3 Policy.

F.5.3.1 Top management shall establish a disaster/emergencymanagement and business continuity policy. The policy shall:

(1) Be appropriate to the purpose of the organization;(2) Provide the framework for setting disaster/emergency

management and business continuity objectives;(3) Include a commitment to satisfy applicable requirements;(4) Include a commitment to continual improvement of the

disaster/emergency management and business continu-ity program and management system;

(5) Be communicated within the organization;(6) Be available to interested parties, as appropriate.

F.5.3.2 The organization shall retain documented informa-tion on the disaster/emergency management and businesscontinuity policy.

F.5.3.3 Program Administration. [4.4]

F.5.3.3.1 The entity shall have a documented program thatincludes the following: [4.4.1]

(1) Executive policy, including vision, mission statement,roles, and responsibilities, and enabling authority

(2) Program scope, goals, performance objectives, and met-rics for program evaluation

(3) Applicable authorities, legislation, regulations, and indus-try codes of practice as required by F.4.5

(4) Program budget and schedule, including milestones(5) Program plans and procedures that include:

(a) Anticipated cost(b) Priority(c) Resources required

(6) Records management practices as required by F.7.5.4(7) Change management process

F.5.3.3.2 The program shall include the requirements speci-fied in Sections F.4 to F.10, the scope of which shall be deter-mined through an “all-hazards” approach, and the risk assess-ment. [4.4.2]

F.5.3.3.3 Program requirements shall be applicable to pre-vention, mitigation, preparedness, response, continuity, andrecovery. [4.4.3]

F.5.4 Organizational Roles, Responsibilities and Authorities.

F.5.4.1 Top management shall ensure that the responsibili-ties and authorities for relevant roles are assigned and com-municated within the organization.

F.5.4.2 Top management shall assign the responsibility andauthority for

(1) Ensuring that the disaster/emergency management andbusiness continuity management system conforms to therequirements of this International Standard

(2) Reporting on the performance of the disaster/emergencymanagement and business continuity management sys-tem to top management

F.5.4.3 Program Coordinator. The program coordinator shallbe appointed by the entity’s leadership and authorized to de-velop, implement, administer, evaluate, and maintain the pro-gram. [4.2]

F.5.4.4 Program Committee. [4.3]

F.5.4.4.1 A program committee shall be established by the

entity in accordance with its policy. [4.3.1]

2013 Edition

1600–46 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

F.5.4.4.2 The program committee shall provide for, and/or as-sist in the coordination of the preparation, development, imple-mentation, evaluation, and maintenance of the program. [4.3.2]

F.5.4.4.3 The program committee shall include the programcoordinator and others who have the expertise, the knowl-edge of the entity, and the capability to identify resources fromall key functional areas within the entity and shall solicit appli-cable external representation. [4.3.3]

F.6 Planning. [Chapter 5]

F.6.1 Actions to Address Risks and Opportunities.

F.6.1.1 The organization shall consider the issues referred toin Section 4.1 and the requirements referred to in Section 4.2and determine the risks and opportunities that need to beaddressed to:

(1) Assure the management system can achieve its intendedoutcome(s)

(2) Prevent undesired effects(3) Realize opportunities for improvement.

F.6.1.2 The organization shall:

(1) Evaluate the need to plan actions to address these risksand opportunities, and

(2) Where applicable(a) Integrate and implement these actions into its disaster/

emergency management and business continuity man-agement system processes (see F.8.1)

(b) Ensure information will be available to evaluate if theactions have been effective (see F.9.1)

F.6.2 Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Conti-nuity Objectives and Plans to Achieve Them.

F.6.2.1 Top management shall ensure that disaster/emergencymanagement and business continuity objectives are establishedand communicated for relevant functions and levels within theorganization.

F.6.2.2 The disaster/emergency management and businesscontinuity objectives shall:

(1) Be consistent with the disaster/emergency managementand business continuity policy

(2) Be measurable (if practicable)(3) Take into account applicable requirements(4) Be monitored and updated as appropriate

F.6.2.3 The organization shall retain documented informationon the disaster/emergency management and business continuityobjectives.

F.6.2.4 To achieve its disaster/emergency management andbusiness continuity objectives, the organization shall determine:

(1) Who will be responsible(2) What will be done(3) What resources will be required(4) When it will be completed(5) How the results will be evaluated

F.6.2.5 Performance Objectives. [5.5]

F.6.2.5.1 The entity shall establish performance objectives forthe program in accordance with the requirements in Section 5and the elements in Sections 6 through 10. [5.5.1]

2013 Edition

F.6.2.5.2 The performance objectives shall address the resultsof the hazard identification, risk assessment, and business im-pact analysis. [5.5.2]

F.6.2.5.3 Performance objectives shall be developed by theentity to address both short-term and long-term needs. [5.5.3]

F.6.2.5.4 The entity shall define the terms short term and longterm. [5.5.4]

F.6.3 Planning and Design Process. [5.1]

F.6.3.1 The program shall follow a planning process that de-velops strategies, plans, and required capabilities to executethe program. [5.1.1]

F.6.3.2 Strategic planning shall define the entity’s vision, mis-sion, and program goals. [5.1.2]

F.6.3.3 Risk assessment and business impact analysis (BIA)shall develop information to prepare prevention and mitiga-tion strategies. [5.1.3]

F.6.3.4 Risk assessment, business impact analysis, and re-source needs assessment shall develop information to prepareemergency operations/response, crisis communications, con-tinuity, and recovery plans. [5.1.4]

F.6.3.5 Crisis management planning shall address issues thatthreaten the strategic, reputational, and intangible elementsof the entity. [5.1.5]

F.6.3.6 The entity shall include key stakeholders in the plan-ning process. [5.1.6]

F.6.4 Risk Assessment. [5.2]

F.6.4.1 The entity shall conduct a risk assessment in accordancewith Section 5.4 to develop required strategies and plans. [5.2.1]

F.6.4.2 The entity shall identify hazards and monitor thosehazards and the likelihood of occurrence. [5.2.2]

F.6.4.2.1 Hazards to be evaluated shall include the following:[5.2.2.1]

(1) Natural hazards (geologic, meteorologic, and biological)(2) Human-caused events (accidental and intentional)(3) Technology-caused events (accidental and intentional)

F.6.4.2.2 The vulnerability of people, property, the environ-ment, and the entity shall be identified, evaluated, and moni-tored. [5.2.2.2]

F.6.4.3 The entity shall conduct an analysis of the impact ofthe hazards identified in F.6 on:

(1) Health and safety of persons in the affected area(2) Health and safety of personnel responding to the inci-

dent(3) Continuity of operations(4) Property, facilities, assets, and critical infrastructure(5) Delivery of the entity’s services(6) Supply chain(7) Environment(8) Economic and financial conditions(9) Regulatory and contractual obligations

(10) Reputation of or confidence in the entity

F.6.4.4 The analysis shall evaluate the potential effects of re-gional, national, or international incidents that could have cas-cading impacts. [5.2.4]

ANNEX F 1600–47

F.6.4.5 The risk assessment shall evaluate the adequacy of exist-ing prevention and mitigation strategies. [5.2.5]

F.6.5 Business Impact Analysis. [5.3]

F.6.5.1 The entity shall conduct a business impact analysis(BIA). [5.3.1]

F.6.5.2 The BIA shall evaluate the potential impact resultingfrom interruption or disruption of individual functions, pro-cesses, and applications. [5.3.2]

F.6.5.3 The BIA shall identify those functions, processes, in-frastructure, systems, and applications that are critical to theentity and the point in time (recovery time objective) whenthe impact of the interruption or disruption becomes unac-ceptable to the entity. [5.3.3]

F.6.5.4 The BIA shall identify dependencies and interdepen-dencies across functions, processes, and applications, to deter-mine the potential for compounding impacts in the event ofan interruption or disruption. [5.3.4]

F.6.5.5 The BIA shall evaluate the potential loss of informa-tion and the point in time (recovery point objective) that de-fines the potential gap between the last backup of informationand the time of the interruption or disruption.

F.6.5.6 The BIA developed in Section F.6.5 shall be used inthe development of recovery strategies and plans to supportthe program.

F.6.5.7 The analysis of impacts required by F.6.5.3 and theBIA required by Section F.6.5 shall be conducted jointly orseparately.

F.7 Support.

F.7.1 Resources. The organization shall determine and pro-vide the resources needed for the disaster/emergency man-agement and business continuity management system.

F.7.1.1 Resource Needs Assessment. [5.4]

F.7.1.1.1 The entity shall conduct a resource needs assess-ment based on the hazards identified in F.6.4 and the businessimpact analysis in F.6.5. [5.4.1]

F.7.1.1.2 The resource needs assessment shall include: [5.4.2]

(1) Human resources, equipment, training, facilities, fund-ing, expert knowledge, materials, technology, informa-tion, intelligence, and the time frames within whichthey will be needed.

(2) Quantity, response time, capability, limitations, cost, andliabilities.

F.7.1.1.3 The entity shall establish procedures to locate, ac-quire, store, distribute, maintain, test, and account for ser-vices, human resources, equipment, and materials procuredor donated to support the program. [5.4.3]

F.7.1.1.4 Facilities capable of supporting response, continu-ity, and recovery operations shall be identified. [5.4.4]

F.7.1.1.5 The need for mutual aid/assistance or partnershipagreements shall be determined. [5.4.5]

F.7.1.1.5.1 If needed, agreements shall be established anddocumented. [5.4.5.1]

F.7.1.2 Resource Management.

F.7.1.2.1 Resource management shall include the followingtasks: [6.7.7]

(1) Establishing processes for describing, taking inventory of,requesting, and tracking resources

(2) Resource typing or categorizing resources by size, capac-ity, capability, and skill

(3) Mobilizing and demobilizing resources in accordancewith the established IMS

(4) Conducting contingency planning for resource deficiencies

F.7.1.2.2 A current inventory of internal and external re-sources shall be maintained. [6.7.8]

F.7.1.2.3 Donations of human resources, equipment, mate-rial, and facilities shall be managed. [6.7.9]

F.7.1.3 Finance and Administration. [4.6]

F.7.1.3.1 The entity shall develop finance and administrativeprocedures to support the program before, during, and afteran incident. [4.6.1]

F.7.1.3.2 There shall be a responsive finance managementand administrative framework that: [4.6.2]

(1) Complies with the entity’s program requirements(2) Is uniquely linked to response, continuity, and recovery

operations(3) Provides for maximum flexibility to expeditiously request,

receive, manage, and apply funds in a non-emergency en-vironment and in emergency situations to ensure thetimely delivery of assistance

F.7.1.3.3 Procedures shall be created and maintained for ex-pediting fiscal decisions in accordance with established autho-rization levels, accounting principles, governance, require-ments, and fiscal policy. [4.6.3]

F.7.1.3.4 Finance and administrative procedures shall includethe following: [4.6.4]

(1) Responsibilities for program finance authority, includingreporting relationships to the program coordinator

(2) Program procurement procedures(3) Payroll(4) Accounting systems to track and document costs(5) Management of funding from external sources(6) Crisis management procedures that coordinate authori-

zation levels and appropriate control measures(7) Documenting financial expenditures incurred as a result of

an incident and for compiling claims for future cost recovery(8) Identifying and accessing alternative funding sources(9) Managing budgeted and specially appropriated funds

F.7.2 Competence.

F.7.2.1 The organization shall:

(1) Determine the necessary competence of person(s) doingwork under its control that affects its disaster/emergencymanagement and business continuity performance.

(2) Ensure these persons are competent on the basis of ap-propriate education, training, or experience.

(3) Where applicable, take actions to acquire the necessary com-petence, and evaluate the effectiveness of the actions taken.

(4) Retain appropriate documented information as evidenceof competence.

NOTE: Applicable actions may include, for example: the pro-vision of training to, the mentoring of, or the re-assignment ofcurrent employees; or the hiring or contracting of competentpersons.

2013 Edition

1600–48 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

F.7.2.2 Training [Chapter 7]

F.7.2.2.1 Training and Education Curriculum. The entity shalldevelop and implement a competency-based training andeducation curriculum that supports all employees who have arole in the program. [7.1]

F.7.2.2.2 Goal of the Curriculum. The goal of the curriculumshall be to create awareness and enhance the knowledge,skills, and abilities required to implement, support, and main-tain the program. [7.2]

F.7.2.2.3 Scope and Frequency of Instruction. The scope ofthe curriculum and frequency of instruction shall be identi-fied. [7.3]

F.7.2.2.4 Incident Management System Training. Personnelshall be trained in the entity’s incident management system(IMS) and other components of the program to the level oftheir involvement. [7.4]

F.7.2.2.5 Recordkeeping. Records of training and educationshall be maintained as specified in Section F.7.5.5. [7.5]

F.7.2.2.6 Regulatory and Program Requirements. The cur-riculum shall comply with applicable regulatory and programrequirements. [7.6]

F.7.2.2.7 Public Education. A public education program shallbe implemented to communicate the following: [7.7]

(1) Potential hazard impacts(2) Preparedness information(3) Information needed to develop a preparedness plan

F.7.3 Awareness. Persons doing work under the organization’scontrol shall be aware of:

(1) The disaster/emergency management and business con-tinuity policy

(2) Their contribution to the effectiveness of the disaster/emergency management and business continuity man-agement system, including the benefits of improveddisaster/emergency management and business conti-nuity performance

(3) The implications of not conforming with the disaster/emergency management and business continuity manage-ment system requirements

F.7.4 Communication.

F.7.4.1 The organization shall determine the need for inter-nal and external communications relevant to the disaster/emergency management and business continuity manage-ment system including:

(1) What to communicate(2) When to communicate(3) To whom it will communicate

F.7.4.2 Crisis Communications and Public Information. [6.4]

F.7.4.2.1 The entity shall develop a plan and procedures todisseminate information to and respond to requests for infor-mation from the following audiences before, during, and afteran incident: [6.4.1]

(1) Internal audiences, including employees(2) External audiences, including the media, functional

needs population, and other stakeholders

2013 Edition

F.7.4.2.2 The entity shall establish and maintain a crisis com-munications or public information capability that includes thefollowing: [6.4.2]

(1) Central contact facility or communications hub(2) Physical or virtual information center(3) System for gathering, monitoring, and disseminating in-

formation(4) Procedures for developing and delivering coordinated

messages(5) Pre-scripted information bulletins or templates(6) Protocol to clear information for release

F.7.4.3 Warning, Notifications, and Communications. [6.5]

F.7.4.3.1 The entity shall determine warning, notification,and communications needs. [6.5.1]

F.7.4.3.2 Warning, notification, and communications systemsshall be reliable, redundant, and interoperable. [6.5.2]

F.7.4.3.3 The entity shall develop and test warning, notifica-tion, and communications protocols and procedures to alertstakeholders potentially at risk from an actual or impendingincident. [6.5.3]

F.7.4.3.4 Procedures shall include issuing warnings throughauthorized agencies if required by law. [6.5.4]

F.7.5 Documented Information.

F.7.5.1 General The organization’s disaster/emergency man-agement and business continuity management system shallinclude:

(1) Documented information required by this InternationalStandard

(2) Documented information determined by the organizationas being required for the effectiveness of the disaster/emergency management and business continuity manage-ment system

F.7.5.2 Common Plan Requirements. [6.1]

F.7.5.2.1 Plans shall address the health and safety of personnel.[6.1.1]

F.7.5.2.2 Plans shall identify and document the following: [6.1.2]

(1) Assumptions made during the planning process(2) Functional roles and responsibilities of internal and external

agencies, organizations, departments, and positions(3) Lines of authority(4) The process for delegation of authority(5) Lines of succession for the entity(6) Liaisons to external entities(7) Logistics support and resource requirements

F.7.5.2.3 Plans shall be individual, integrated into a singleplan document, or a combination of the two.

F.7.5.2.4 The entity shall make sections of the plans availableto those assigned specific tasks and responsibilities thereinand to key stakeholders as required. [6.1.4]

F.7.5.3 Create and Update The process for creating and up-dating documented information shall ensure appropriate:

(1) Identification and description (e.g. a title, date, author,number )

(2) Format (e.g. language, software version, graphics) andmedia (e.g. paper, electronic)

(3) Review and approval for adequacy

ANNEX F 1600–49

NOTE The extent of documented information for adisaster/emergency management and business continuitymanagement system can differ from one organization to an-other due to:

(1) The size of organization and its type of activities, pro-cesses, products and services,

(2) The complexity of processes and their interactions, and(3) The competence of persons

F.7.5.4 Control of Documented Information.

F.7.5.4.1 Documented information required by the disaster/emergency management and business continuity manage-ment system and by this International Standard shall be con-trolled.

F.7.5.4.2 Control of documented information shall includethe following, as applicable:

(1) Distribution(2) Access(3) Storage and preservation(4) Retrieval and use(5) Control of changes (e.g., version control)(6) Preservation of legibility (i.e., clear enough to read)(7) Prevention of the unintended use of obsolete informa-

tion(8) Retention and disposition

F.7.5.4.3 Documented information of external origin deter-mined by the organization to be necessary for the planningand operation of the disaster/emergency management andbusiness continuity management system shall be identified asappropriate, and controlled.

F.7.5.4.4 When establishing control of documented informa-tion, the organization shall ensure that there is adequate pro-tection for the documented information (e.g. protectionagainst compromise, unauthorized modification or deletion).

NOTE: Access implies a decision regarding the permissionto view the documented information only, or the permissionand authority to view and change the documented informa-tion, etc.

F.7.5.5 Records Management. [4.7]

F.7.5.5.1 The entity shall develop, implement, and manage arecords management program to ensure records are availableto the entity following an incident. [4.7.1].

F.7.5.5.2 The program shall include the following: [4.7.2]

(1) Identification of records (hard copy or electronic) vital tocontinue the operations of the entity

(2) Backup of records on a frequency necessary to meet pro-gram goals and objectives

(3) Validation of the integrity of records backup(4) Implementation of procedures to store, retrieve, and re-

cover records onsite or offsite(5) Protection of records(6) Implementation of a record review process(7) Procedures coordinating records access

F.8 Operation.

F.8.1 Operational Planning and Control.

F.8.1.1 The organization shall determine, plan, implement andcontrol those processes needed to address the risks and opportu-nities determined in F.6.1 and to meet requirements, by:

(1) Establishing criteria for those processes(2) Implementing the control of these processes in accor-

dance with the criteria(3) Keeping documented information to demonstrate that

the processes have been carried out as planned

F.8.1.2 The organization shall control planned changes andreview the consequences of unintended changes, taking ac-tion to mitigate any adverse effects, as necessary.

F.8.1.3 The organization shall control processes that arecontracted-out or outsourced.

F.8.2 Prevention. [6.2]

F.8.2.1 The entity shall develop a strategy to prevent an incidentthat threatens life, property, and the environment. [6.2.1]

F.8.2.2 The prevention strategy shall be based on the infor-mation obtained from Section F.6.4 and shall be kept currentusing the techniques of information collection and intelli-gence. [6.2.2]

F.8.2.3 The prevention strategy shall be based on the resultsof hazard identification and risk assessment, an analysis of im-pacts, program constraints, operational experience, and cost-benefit analysis. [6.2.3]

F.8.2.4 The entity shall have a process to monitor the identi-fied hazards and adjust the level of preventive measures to becommensurate with the risk. [6.2.4]

F.8.3 Mitigation. [6.3]

F.8.3.1 The entity shall develop and implement a mitigationstrategy that includes measures to be taken to limit or controlthe consequences, extent, or severity of an incident that can-not be prevented. [6.3.1]

F.8.3.2 The mitigation strategy shall be based on the results ofhazard identification and risk assessment, an analysis of im-pact, program constraints, operational experience, and cost-benefit analysis. [6.3.2]

F.8.3.3 The mitigation strategy shall include interim andlong-term actions to reduce vulnerabilities. [6.3.3]

F.8.4 Operational Procedures. [6.6]

F.8.4.1 The entity shall develop, coordinate, and implementoperational procedures to support the program. [6.6.1]

F.8.4.2 Procedures shall be established and implemented forresponse to and recovery from the impact of hazards identi-fied in F.6.5. [6.6.2]

F.8.4.3 Procedures shall provide for life safety, property con-servation, incident stabilization, continuity, and protection ofthe environment under the jurisdiction of the entity. [6.6.3]

F.8.4.4 Procedures shall include the following: [6.6.4]

(1) Control of access to the area affected by the incident(2) Identification of personnel engaged in activities at the in-

cident(3) Accounting for personnel engaged in incident activities(4) Mobilization and demobilization of resources

F.8.4.5 Procedures shall allow for concurrent activities of re-sponse, continuity, recovery, and mitigation. [6.6.5]

2013 Edition

1600–50 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

F.8.5 Incident Management. [6.7]

F.8.5.1 The entity shall develop an incident management sys-tem to direct, control, and coordinate response, continuity,and recovery operations. [6.7.1]

F.8.5.1.1 Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs). [6.7.1.1]

F.8.5.1.1.1 The entity shall establish primary and alternateEOCs capable of managing response, continuity, and recoveryoperations. [6.7.1.1.1]

F.8.5.1.1.2 The EOCs shall be permitted to be physical orvirtual. [6.7.1.1.2]

F.8.5.1.1.3 On activation of an emergency operations center(EOC), communications and coordination shall be estab-lished between incident command and the EOC. [6.7.1.1.3]

F.8.5.2 The incident management system shall describe spe-cific organizational roles, titles, and responsibilities for eachincident management function. [6.7.2]

F.8.5.3 The entity shall establish procedures and policies forcoordinating mitigation, preparedness, response, continuity,and recovery activities. [6.7.3]

F.8.5.4 The entity shall coordinate the activities specified inF.8.5.3 with stakeholders. [6.7.4]

F.8.5.5 Procedures shall include a situation analysis that in-corporates a damage assessment and a needs assessment toidentify resources to support activities. [6.7.5]

F.8.5.6 Emergency operations/response shall be guided byan incident action plan or management by objectives. [6.7.6]

F.8.6 Emergency Operations/Response Plan. [6.8]

F.8.6.1 Emergency operations/response plans shall define re-sponsibilities for carrying out specific actions in an emergency.[6.8.1]

F.8.6.2 The plan shall identify actions to be taken to protectpeople including those with access and functional needs,property, operations, the environment, and the entity. [6.8.2]

F.8.6.3 The plan shall identify actions for incident stabiliza-tion. [6.8.3]

F.8.6.4 The plan shall include the following: [6.8.4]

(1) Protective actions for life safety in accordance with F.8.6.2(2) Warning, notifications, and communication in accor-

dance with F.7.4.3(3) Crisis communication and public information in accor-

dance with F.7.4.2(4) Resource management in accordance with F.7.1.2.1(5) Donation management in accordance with F.7.1.2.3

F.8.7 Business Continuity and Recovery. [6.9]

F.8.7.1 The continuity plan should include recovery strate-gies to maintain critical or time-sensitive functions and pro-cesses identified during the business impact analysis. [6.9.1]

F.8.7.2 The continuity plan shall identify stakeholders whoneed to be notified; critical and time-sensitive applications;alternate work sites; vital records, contact lists, functions, andprocesses that must be maintained; and personnel, proce-dures, and resources that are needed while the entity is recov-ering. [6.9.2]

2013 Edition

F.8.7.3 The recovery plan shall provide for restoration offunctions, services, resources, facilities, programs, and infra-structure. [6.9.3]

F.8.8 Employee Assistance and Support. [6.10]

F.8.8.1 The entity shall develop a strategy for employee assis-tance and support that includes the following: [6.10.1]

(1) Communications procedures(2) Contact information, including emergency contact out-

side anticipated hazard area(3) Accounting for persons affected, displaced, or injured by

the incident(4) Temporary, short-term, or long-term housing, and feed-

ing and care of those displaced by an incident(5) Mental health and physical well-being of individuals af-

fected by the incident(6) Pre-incident and post-incident awareness

F.8.8.2 The strategy shall be flexible for use in all incidents.[6.10.2]

F.8.8.3 The entity shall promote family preparedness educa-tion and training for employees. [6.10.3]

F.9 Performance Evaluation.

F.9.1 Monitoring, Measurement, Analysis and Evaluation.

F.9.1.1 The organization shall determine:

(1) What needs to be measured and monitored(2) The methods for monitoring, measurement, analysis and

evaluation, as applicable, to ensure valid results(3) When the monitoring and measuring shall be performed(4) When the analysis and evaluation of monitoring and mea-

surement results shall be performed

F.9.1.2 The organization shall evaluate the disaster/emergencymanagement and business continuity performance and theeffectiveness of the disaster/emergency management and busi-ness continuity management system.

F.9.1.3 Additionally, the organization shall:

(1) Take action when necessary to address adverse trends orresults before a nonconformity occurs.

(2) Retain relevant documented information as evidence ofthe results.

F.9.2 Internal Audit.

F.9.2.1 The organization shall conduct internal audits atplanned intervals to provide information to assist in the deter-mination of whether the disaster/emergency managementand business continuity management system:

(1) Conforms to(a) The organization’s own requirements for its disaster/

emergency management and business continuitymanagement system

(b) The requirements of this International Standard(2) Is effectively implemented and maintained

F.9.2.2 The organization shall:

(1) Plan, establish, implement and maintain an audit pro-gram(s), including the frequency, methods, responsibili-ties, planning requirements and reporting, while takinginto consideration the importance of the processes con-cerned and the results of previous audits.

(2) Define the audit criteria and scope for each audit.

ANNEX F 1600–51

(3) Select auditors and conduct audits to ensure objectivityand the impartiality of the audit process.

(4) Ensure that the results of the audits are reported to rel-evant management.

(5) Retain documented information as evidence of theresults.

F.9.3 Management Review.

F.9.3.1 Top management shall review the organization’sdisaster/emergency management and business continuitymanagement system, at planned intervals, to ensure its con-tinuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness.

F.9.3.2 The management review shall include consideration of:

(1) The status of actions from previous management reviews(2) Changes in external and internal issues that are relevant

to the disaster/emergency management and businesscontinuity management system

(3) Information on the disaster/emergency management andbusiness continuity performance, including trends in:(a) Nonconformities and corrective actions(b) Monitoring and measurement evaluation results and(c) Audit results

(4) Opportunities for continual improvement

F.9.3.3 The outputs of the management review shall includedecisions related to continual improvement opportunitiesand the possible need for changes to the disaster/emergencymanagement and business continuity management system.

F.9.3.4 The organization shall retain documented informa-tion as evidence of the results of management reviews.

F.9.4 Exercises and Tests. [Chapter 8]

F.9.4.1 Program Evaluation. [8.1]

F.9.4.1.1 The entity shall evaluate program plans, proce-dures, training, and capabilities and promote continuous im-provement through periodic exercises and tests. [8.1.1]

F.9.4.1.2 The entity shall evaluate the program based on post-incident analyses, lessons learned, and operational perfor-mance in accordance with Chapter 9. [8.1.2]

F.9.4.1.3 Exercises and tests shall be documented. [8.1.3]

F.9.4.2 Exercise and Test Methodology. [8.2]

F.9.4.2.1 Exercises shall provide a standardized methodologyto practice procedures and interact with other entities (inter-nal and external) in a controlled setting. [8.2.1]

F.9.4.2.2 Exercises shall be designed to assess the maturity ofprogram plans, procedures, and strategies. [8.2.2]

F.9.4.2.3 Tests shall be designed to demonstrate capabilities.[8.2.3]

F.9.4.3 Design of Exercises and Tests. [8.3]

F.9.4.3.1 Exercises and tests shall be designed to do the fol-lowing: [8.3.1]

(1) Ensure the safety of people, property, operations, andthe environment involved in the exercise or testing

(2) Evaluate the program(3) Identify planning and procedural deficiencies(4) Test or validate recently changed procedures or plans

(5) Clarify roles and responsibilities(6) Obtain participant feedback and recommendations for

program improvement(7) Measure improvement compared to performance objec-

tives(8) Improve coordination between internal and external

teams, organizations, and entities(9) Validate training and education

(10) Increase awareness and understanding of hazards andthe potential impact of hazards on the entity

(11) Identify additional resources and assess the capabilitiesof existing resources, including personnel and equip-ment needed for effective response and recovery

(12) Assess the ability of the team to identify, assess, and man-age an incident

(13) Practice the deployment of teams and resources to man-age an incident

(14) Improve individual performance

F.9.4.4 Exercise and Test Evaluation. [8.4]

F.9.4.4.1 Exercises shall evaluate program plans, procedures,training, and capabilities to identify opportunities for im-provement. [8.4.1]

F.9.4.4.2 Tests shall be evaluated as either pass or fail. [8.4.2]

F.9.4.5 Frequency. [8.5]

F.9.4.5.1 Exercises and tests shall be conducted on the fre-quency needed to establish and maintain required capabili-ties. [8.5.1]

F.10 Improvement. [Chapter 9]

F.10.1 Nonconformity and corrective action

F.10.1.1 The organization shall:

(1) Identify nonconformities(2) React to the nonconformities, and as applicable

(a) Take action to control, contain and correct them(b) Deal with the consequences

F.10.1.2 The organization shall also evaluate the need foraction to eliminate the causes of nonconformities, including:

(1) Reviewing nonconformities(2) Determining the causes of nonconformities(3) Identifying if potential similar nonconformities exist else-

where in the disaster/emergency management and busi-ness continuity management system

(4) Evaluating the need for action to ensure that nonconfor-mities do not recur or occur elsewhere

(5) Determining and implementing action needed, and(6) Reviewing the effectiveness of any corrective action taken.(7) Making changes to the disaster/emergency management

and business continuity management system, if necessary

F.10.1.3 Program Reviews. The entity shall maintain and im-prove the program by evaluating its policies, program, proce-dures, and capabilities using performance objectives. [9.1]

F.10.1.3.1 The entity shall improve effectiveness of the pro-gram through evaluation of the implementation of changesresulting from preventive and corrective action. [9.1.1]

F.10.1.3.2 Evaluations shall be conducted on a regularlyscheduled basis, and when the situation changes to challengethe effectiveness of the existing program. [9.1.2]

2013 Edition

1600–52 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

F.10.1.3.3 The program shall be re-evaluated when a changein any of the following impacts the entity’s program: [9.1.3]

(1) Regulations(2) Hazards and potential impacts(3) Resource availability or capability(4) Entity’s organization(5) Funding(6) Infrastructure, including technology environment(7) Economy and geopolitical stability(8) Entity operations

F.10.1.3.4 Reviews shall include post-incident analyses, re-views of lessons learned, and reviews of program performance.[9.1.4]

F.10.1.3.5 The entity shall maintain records of its reviews andevaluations, in accordance with the records managementpractices developed under Section F.7.5.4. [9.1.5]

F.10.1.3.6 Documentation, records, and reports shall be pro-vided to management for review and follow-up. [9.1.6]

F.10.1.4 Corrective actions shall be appropriate to the effectsof the nonconformities encountered.

F.10.1.5 Corrective Action. [9.2]

F.10.1.5.1 The entity shall establish a corrective action process.[9.2.1]

F.10.1.5.2 The entity shall take corrective action on deficien-cies identified. [9.2.2]

F.10.1.6 The organization shall retain documented informa-tion as evidence of

(1) The nature of the nonconformities and any subsequentactions taken, and

(2) The results of any corrective action

F.10.2 Continual Improvement. The organization shall con-tinually improve the suitability, adequacy or effectiveness ofthe disaster/emergency management and business continuitymanagement system.

NOTE The organization can use the processes of thedisaster/emergency management and business continuitymanagement system such as leadership, planning and perfor-mance evaluation, to achieve improvement.

F.10.3 Continuous Improvement. [9.3] The entity shall effectcontinuous improvement of the program through the use ofprogram reviews and the corrective action process.

Annex G Maturity Models

This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA documentbut is included for informational purposes only.

G.1 Development. An internal assessment of the develop-ment, implementation, and progress made in an emergencymanagement and business continuity program is an impor-tant part of an organization’s growth and success. The entityshould consider the benefits of developing a documentedmethod to conduct an assessment that tracks the program’scontinuous improvement and progress. This can be donethrough a “maturity model” or other form of internal metricsthe organization has adopted and committed to monitoringfor tracking progress through a defined time period. By quan-tifying progress through a scalable method, the entity can also

2013 Edition

benefit by documenting its efforts when responding to an in-ternal or external audit process. This form of continuous im-provement allows the entity to set goals (short term throughlong term), track progress, and eliminate waste in cost andeffort while monitoring present state through future state.This also helps in justifying expenses and substantiating theneed for capital, personnel, and other process componentsthat can help to improve implementation of an emergencymanagement and business continuity program. Internal met-rics can be monitored over a defined time period (e.g., semi-annual or annual) and cross-compared with other divisions,departments, or sectors of the entity.

Best practices, lessons learned, and other criteria discov-ered during the assessment can be shared throughout, result-ing in process improvement for the entire organization.

There are multiple approaches to evaluating the maturityof an emergency management and business continuity pro-gram, and multiple models have been published. Regardlessof the approach selected, a continued focus on a quantifiableprocess and its use throughout all levels of the organizationwill provide maximum benefits for the entity.

G.2 Examples of Maturity Models.

G.2.1 Capability Maturity Model (CMM)®. CMM, which wasdeveloped at Carnegie Mellon University, is a model in whichthe term maturity relates to the degree of formality and optimi-zation of processes. Originally created for use in software de-velopment, the model has been adopted by other disciplines.The five maturity levels are Initial (ad hoc), Repeatable, De-fined, Managed, and Optimizing.

G.2.2 Organizational Project Management MaturityModel (OPM3). OPM3 was published by the Project Manage-ment Institute (PMI) as a way to understand project manage-ment processes. One version is an American National Stan-dard (ANSI/PMI 08-004-2008). Within a lifecycle ofassessment-improvement-re-assessment, there are three inter-locking elements: Knowledge (learn about best practices); As-sessment (identify current capabilities and areas for improve-ment); and Improvement (take steps to achieve performanceimprovement goals).

Annex H APELL

This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA documentbut is included for informational purposes only.

H.1 APELL (Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies atthe Local Level) consists of a series of programs developed in1988 under the leadership of the United Nations Environ-mental Programme (UNEP) with the cooperation of multipleorganizations, including the U.S. EPA, in response to theUnion Carbide gas leak in Bhopal, India, in December 1984.APELL is a multi-stakeholder dialogue tool that establishesadequate coordination and communication in situations inwhich the public might be affected by accidents and disasters.

APELL process implementation consists of 10 steps:

(1) Identify the emergency response participants and estab-lish their roles, resources, and concerns.

(2) Evaluate the hazards and risks that might result in emer-gency situations in the community.

(3) Have participants review their own emergency responseplans for adequacy relative to a coordinated response.

ANNEX I 1600–53

(4) Identify the required response tasks not covered by exist-ing plans.

(5) Match the Step 4 tasks to the resources available fromthe identified participants.

(6) Make changes necessary to improve existing plans andintegrate existing plans into an overall community planand gain agreement.

(7) Commit an integrated community plan to writing andget approvals from the local government.

(8) Educate participating groups about the integrated planand ensure that all responders are trained.

(9) Establish procedures for periodic testing, review, and up-dating of the plan.

(10) Educate the general community on the integrated emer-gency response plan.

The APELL process informs the community about the risksto which they are exposed and educates the community onhow to react to accidents/disasters. The program promotesthe coordination among representatives from the industry,local-level institutions, and the public. The APELL process in-cludes the preparation of an integrated community prepared-ness plan, including preparing the community for early warn-ings of emergencies.

The APELL program for technological hazards was imple-mented over 10 years ago in Bahia Blanca, Argentina, a citylocated in the southeast of the province of Buenos Aires, bythe Atlantic Ocean. The city, with a population of over300,000, is an important seaport whose harbor reaches adepth of 40 ft (12 m). The name Bahía Blanca, which means“White Bay,” comes from the typical color of the salt coveringthe soil surrounding the shores.

The need for the APELL program in Bahia Blanca is rein-forced by a review of the number and amounts of hazardouschemicals produced each year. The industrial complex ismade up of three types of industry:

(1) Petroleum industry, with an installed capacity of 4 milliontons a year, producing ethanol, petrol, naphtha, GLP, fueloil, gas oil, gasoline, asphalt, and kerosene

(2) Petrochemical industry, with an installed capacity of3.4 million tons a year, producing ethylene, VCM, PVC,polyethylene, urea, and pure ammonia

(3) Chemical industry, with an installed capacity of 350,000 tonsa year, producing chlorine and caustic soda

Led by Ing. Nestor Sposito, of Dow Chemical in BahiaBlanca and a member of the NFPA Capitulo Argentina, theAPELL program for technological hazards has been success-fully used to implement NFPA 1600, Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs, a stan-dard developed to define a program for the integration ofemergency management and business continuity, and appli-cable to the private, public, and not-for-profit sectors. Thecommunity support for the project has been excellent. Themayor of Bahia Blanca has established the goal for his city tobe the first in the world to implement NFPA 1600. Due to thesuccess of combining APELL with NFPA 1600 in Argentina, arecent conference held with representatives of chemical com-panies in Zhanjiagang, China, included presentations on theBahia Blanca project and on NFPA 1600.

IRAM, the national standards body of Argentina, issuedIRAM/NFPA 1600 as its national standard, the result of nearly3 years of cooperative effort between NFPA volunteers in bothArgentina and the United States, including working with theAPELL process in Bahia Blanca.

Other APELL programs have been produced for mining,port areas, multi-hazards, transportation, and tourism and areavailable at http://www.unep.fr/scp/sp/.

Annex I Family Preparedness

This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA documentbut is included for informational purposes only.

I.1 Family preparedness is an ongoing process to educate andtrain individuals to plan for, understand, and be able to imple-ment the steps they need to take in the event of an emergency.The process must consider not just what it takes to be ready butalso the elements that build capabilities to recover rapidly andimprove resilience. An organization must plan for protective ac-tions and recovery of individuals at a personal level before estab-lishing recovery time objectives (RTOs) and dispensing duties.The organizational plan must include adequate education andtraining to ensure that individuals have prepared, can communi-cate, and know their family’s status in order to function with fulleffectiveness. The training and education provided to employeesshould include preparations needed for the evacuating and shel-tering of families, as well as the unique needs of populations withfunctional needs, before reporting for duty and include redun-dancy of the information needed to aid in personal recovery. Aplan must ensure that affected populations understand and areprepared for self-sufficiency for periods of time ranging from72 hours to 14 days.

Following the standard “Plan-Do-Check-Act” (PDCA) model,family preparedness actions can be integrated.

I.2 The PDCA Model.

I.2.1 Plan. Establish a system to identify, document, commu-nicate, measure, educate, and train employees on how to planfor, understand, and implement the steps they need to take toprepare their families in the event of an emergency.

I.2.2 Do. Implement a program that educates and trains indi-viduals to be informed of risks, community and individual pro-tective actions, and skills required for effective response in anemergency or disaster situation. Individuals have specific re-sponsibilities outside of their professional obligations. By tak-ing personal preparedness measures, such as an individualrisk assessment, family preparedness planning, and develop-ing personal readiness kits, individuals will be able to respondto an emergency with a greater level of confidence that willhelp them meet their individual and household responsibili-ties as well as fulfill their professional duties and obligations.

The preparedness and resiliency of employees from all sec-tors is a requirement for both public and private sector conti-nuity and an emerging priority for resilience at all levels. Itrequires a specific focus on the education and training forindividual and family preparedness that builds resiliency at agranular level.

I.2.2.1 The following categories of preparedness follow a na-tional consensus on messaging about individual and familypreparedness used by FEMA and other federal agencies as wellas national nonprofit organizations conducting preparednesstraining.

(1) Risk assessment. Based on the individual’s geography, livingconditions, socio-economic status, including work andhome-based roles and responsibilities, a risk assessmentshould guide individuals to prepare for natural disasters

2013 Edition

1600–54 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

and emergencies that are most likely to occur in theirlocation. Being prepared for these events will build resil-ience for unforeseen future emergencies.

(2) Protective Actions, Alerts and Warnings. Based on the hazardsidentified in the risk assessment, knowledge and skills totake the appropriate primary and alternative protectiveactions that will decrease vulnerability in an event; knowl-edge of local alerts and warning systems and plans for howto receive updated information during an emergency;knowledge of jurisdictions’ and frequent locations’ re-sponse plans (e.g. home, work, sports venues) includingshelter and evacuation plans.

(3) Family emergency plan. Designated rally locations if sepa-rated in an emergency, home fire escape plan, communi-cation plan for when household members are separatedor normal communications are disrupted (e.g., the cellphones are out), the unique needs for disabled or specialindividuals, emergency utility shutoff, shelter and evacua-tion plans for individuals based on their frequent locationplans and local jurisdiction emergency plans, emergencycontact information.

(4) Recovery. Plans for all types of emergencies (natural disas-ter, fire, death in family, insurance claims)

(5) Disaster resiliency plans. For separated families (child, elderand home care), financial and personal records and man-agement, manage shifted roles and responsibilities of anabsent family member.

(6) Response and recovery tools and supplies to support protectiveactions and plans. Survival kits for multiple locations andeach household/family member, copies of identificationand essential documents, contents of wallet, and medi-cine cabinet.

The following represents the vital information necessary inpreparation for, response to, and recovery from an event. Thevital information is divided into five basic information areasand is presented with its intended purpose and a recom-mended checklist of data components. Note: A list of resourcescan be found in Annex J.

Personal information is intended to provide the basic infor-mation needed to prove an individual’s identity, provide keymedical information to first responders, or to aid in the infor-mation needed to apply for disaster assistance relief. Personalinformation can include the following:

(1) Family contact information(2) Date of birth(3) Birth place(4) Phone numbers(5) Social Security number(6) Driver’s license number(7) Other identification numbers(8) Email addresses(9) Passwords and PINs

(10) Family medical information(11) Immediate medical concerns(12) Major health issues(13) Known allergies(14) Current medications (name, dosage, frequency)(15) Medical insurance provider information

Financial information is intended to help individuals re-build their financial history and/or to make insurance claimsfollowing an emergency. Financial information can includethe following:

(1) Bank information: checking/savings accounts, safe de-posit box, other

2013 Edition

(2) Investments: stocks, bonds, CDs, IRAs, 401K, pensions,brokerage and other accounts

(3) Debts: credit cards, auto loans, student loans, otherdebts

(4) Real property: home, rental, time share, senior housing,other

(5) Personal property (major items): automobiles, motor-cycles, boats, RVs, other

(6) Personal property (minor items): furniture, jewelry, art,collectibles, other

(7) Income sources: wages, bonuses, commissions, rent,leases, alimony, child support, other

(8) Expenses: mortgage, electric, gas, water, cable, homephone, cellular, trash, pet care, other

(9) Insurances: home, vehicle, renters, other(10) Tax record history: federal, state, business, estate, other

Emergency information is intended to help individuals andtheir families in pre-planning emergency action steps specificto their geographic risks, communication methods, and as-sembling of disaster emergency kit resources. Emergency in-formation may include the following:

(1) Emergency communication methods(a) Emergency contacts (out-of-town, regional, primary,

work, etc.)(b) Other relevant contacts (employer, insurance agent,

landlord, school, etc.)(c) Virtual rallying point locations (Facebook, Myspace,

Twitter, etc.)(2) Shelter-in-place or pre-arranged alternative shelter loca-

tions(a) Evacuation plans and routes(b) Rally point locations near the home (if the emer-

gency is localized to the home or a few homes)(c) Utility shutoff procedures

(3) Disaster kit (home, work, car): First aid, go bag, food, andwater

(4) Geographical identification of risks (natural or man-made):Local emergency resources (CERT, Red Cross, 511, 211,etc.)

(5) Critical workplace information (goes to Yes, But whatdo I do?)(a) Workplace disaster assistance (benefits, policies, pro-

cesses)(b) Workplace roles and responsibilities

(6) Emergency physical access information (secured areas,garage, pool, etc.)

(7) Emergency technology access information (work files,voicemail, home files, etc.)

(8) Location of spare keys(9) Wallet contents

Household information is intended to assist an alternativeprovider in assuming household responsibilities and/or fam-ily care at a moment’s notice. Household information can in-clude the following:

(1) Household details(a) Security system(b) Mail delivery(c) Waste removal(d) Watering(e) Landscaping(f) Housecleaning

ANNEX J 1600–55

(g) Pool or spa(h) Water(i) Nonemergency utility controls

(2) Routine bill pay information: Type of bill, amount, ac-count it is paid out of, due date, and payment method(check, automatic, online)

(3) Child and elder care information(a) Emergency contact information(b) Nicknames(c) Physician information(d) Special considerations

(4) Pet care(a) Breed and sex(b) Markings(c) Veterinarian(d) Special considerations(e) Vaccination dates(f) Medical history

(5) Household security(a) Online accounts (user names, passwords, and secret

question answers)(b) ATM card numbers(c) Home alarms(d) Gated community access codes(e) Other numbers that someone else might need to as-

sume care of your household or family members

Legal information is intended to assist a household in re-building the critical legal family information and to providecritical legal information that might need to be conveyed(such as medical directives and final considerations). Legalinformation can include the following:

(1) Legal service provider information(2) Marriage certificates(3) Divorce and custody court orders(4) Alimony and childcare court orders(5) Adoption papers(6) Wills and trusts(7) Birth, marriage, and death certificates(8) Powers of attorney and medical releases(9) Location of identification cards

(10) Location of tax and financial records(11) Medical directives and final considerations

I.2.3 Check. Education and training must prepare personnelto respond to emergencies and disasters and ensure perfor-mance of the organizations essential functions. Education andtraining of all personnel is critical for building the resiliencethat will allow the organization or business to recover rapidlyand resume its mission and functions. As part of its trainingprogram, the organization must provide documentation oftraining conducted, the date of training, those completing thetraining, and the training facilitator/instructor. This processand its supporting documentation will help ensure that indi-viduals have received the necessary guidance and support andknow prior to, during, and after an event what is expected ofthem. Training follows the criteria set forth in Section 7.

I.2.4 Act. Based on measures of documented understanding,adequacy, and effectiveness of the education and training, theorganization must take any corrective actions to improve orenhance the individual and family preparedness educationand training program. Program improvements follow the cri-teria set forth in Section 9 et seq.

Annex J Informational References

J.1 Referenced Publications. The documents or portionsthereof listed in this annex are referenced within the informa-tional sections of this standard and are not part of the require-ments of this document unless also listed in Chapter 2 forother reasons.

J.1.1 NFPA Publications. National Fire Protection Associa-tion, 1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02169-7471.

Schmidt, Donald L. (editor), Implementing NFPA 1600,National Preparedness Standard, 2007.

J.1.2 Other Publications.

J.1.2.1 ASTM Publications. ASTM International, 100 BarrHarbor Drive, P.O. Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959.

ASTM WK 16252, Standard Guide for Resource Management inEmergency Management and Homeland Security.

J.1.2.2 CSA Publications. Canadian Standards Association,5060 Spectrum Way, Mississauga, ON, L4W 5N6, Canada.

CSA Z1600, Emergency Management and Business ContinuityPrograms, 2008.

J.1.2.3 DHS Publications. DHS Integration Center, U.S. Depart-ment of Homeland Security, FEMA, 500 C Street SW, Washing-ton, DC 20472.

NIMS DHS ICS-300, Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents,2008.

J.1.2.4 DRII Publications. DRI International, 1115 Broadway,12th Floor, New York, NY 10010.

Professional Practices for Business Continuity Practitioners, 2012.

J.1.2.5 ISO Publications. International Organization for Stan-dardization, 1, ch. De la Voie-Creuse, Case postale 56, CH-1211Geneva 20, Switzerland.

ISO Guide 72, Guidelines for the Justification and Developmentof Management System Standards.

Draft ISO Guide 83, High Level Structure and Identical Text forManagement System Standards and Common Core Management Sys-tem Terms and Definitions.

ISO/TC 223, Societal Security.

J.1.2.6 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. U.S. Depart-ment of Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program(HSEEP), Washington, DC.https://hseep.dhs.gov/pages/1001_HSEEP7.aspx

J.1.2.7 Other Publications. Quarantelli, E. L., Major Criteria forJudging Disaster Planning and Managing and Their Applicability inDeveloping Countries, Newark, DE: Disaster Research Center,University of Delaware, 1998.

Training, July 1996.http://www.fema.gov/plan/prepare/specialplans.shtm

J.2 Informational References. The following documents orportions thereof are listed here as informational resources only.They are not a part of the requirements of this document.

The American Red Cross Community Disaster Educationprovides information organized for home and family, work-place and employees, and school and students. See http://www.redcross.org/surveys/capss/cde

The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency Com-munity Emergency Response Team (CERT) program provides

2013 Edition

1600–56 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

information on disaster preparedness, fire safety, disastermedical operations, light search and rescue, disaster psychol-ogy, and terrorism. See: https://www.citizencorps.gov/cert/

ARMA International, 11880 College Blvd, Suite 450, Over-land Park, KS 66210.

ANSI/ARMA 5-2010, ARMA TR22–2012, Vital Records: Iden-tifying, Managing, and Recovering Business-Critical Records,ARMA International, 2012.

National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS Re-source Center, http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/.

National Incident Management System (NIMS), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf.

Contingency Planning Guide for Information Technology (IT) Sys-tems, National Institute of Standards and Technology, NISTSpecial Publication 800-34, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-rev1/sp800-34-rev1_errata-Nov11-2010.pdf

Guide to Test, Training, and Exercise Programs for IT Plans andCapabilities, Recommendations of the National Institute of Standardsand Technology, Special Publication 800-84, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-84/SP800-84.pdf.

Building an Information Technology Security Awareness andTraining Program, National Institute of Standards and Tech-nology, Special Publication 800-50, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-50/NIST-SP800-50.pdf.

Information Security Handbook: A Guide for Managers, NationalInstitute of Standards and Technology, SP 800-100, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-100/SP800-100-Mar07-2007.pdf.

2013 Edition

Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, Na-tional Institute of Standards and Technology, SP 800-30, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-30/sp800-30.pdf.

Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Informa-tion Technology Systems, National Institute of Standards andTechnology, SP 800-14, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-14/800-14.pdf.

An Introduction to Computer Security: The NIST Handbook, Na-tional Institute of Standards and Technology, SP 800-12, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-12/handbook.pdf.

“Emergency Preparedness for People with Disabilities,”2001.

Emergency Evacuation Planning Guide For People withDisabilities, National Fire Protection Association, http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/PDF/Forms/EvacuationGuide.pdf.

People with disabilities, online resources from the Na-tional Fire Protection Association, http://www.nfpa.org/categoryList.asp?categoryID=824.

Saving Lives: Including People with Disabilities in EmergencyPlanning, National Council on Disability Emergency Proce-dures for Employees with Disabilities in Office Occupancies,U.S. Fire Administration, http://www.ncd.gov/rawmedia_repository/fd66f11a_8e9a_42e6_907f_a289e54e5f94?document.pdf

J.3 References for Extracts in Informational Sections. (Re-served)

INDEX 1600–57

Index

Copyright © 2013 National Fire Protection Association. All Rights Reserved.

The copyright in this index is separate and distinct from the copyright in the document that it indexes. The licensing provisions set forth for thedocument are not applicable to this index. This index may not be reproduced in whole or in part by any means without the express written

permission of NFPA.

-A-Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chap. 1

Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3, A.1.3Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2, A.1.2Scope. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1, A.1.1

All-HazardsDefinition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1

APELL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annex HApproved

Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1, A.3.2.1Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ)

Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2, A.3.2.2

-B-Business Continuity

Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2, A.3.3.2Business Impact Analysis

Definition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3

-C-Capability

Definition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.4Competence

Definition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.5Continual Improvement

Definition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.6Continuity

Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.7, A.3.3.7Crisis Management

Definition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.8Crosswalk Between NFPA 1600, DRII, and CSA Z1600. . . . . . . . Annex E

-D-Damage Assessment

Definition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.9Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chap. 3Disaster/Emergency Management

Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.10

-E-Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7.1.1, A.6.7.1.1Entity

Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.11Exercise

Definition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.12, A.3.3.12Exercises and Tests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chap. 8

Design of Exercises and Tests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3, A.8.3Exercise and Test Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4Exercise and Test Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2, A.8.2Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5, A.8.5Program Evaluation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1

Explanatory Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annex A

-F-Family Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annex I

-I-Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chap. 6

Business Continuity and Recovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.9

Common Plan Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1Crisis Communications and Public Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4Emergency Operations/Response Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.8Employee Assistance and Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.10Incident Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7Mitigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3Operational Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2Warning, Notifications, and Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5

IncidentDefinition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.13

Incident Action PlanDefinition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.14

Incident Management System (IMS)Definition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.15, A.3.3.15

Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annex JInteroperability

Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.16

-M-Maturity Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annex GMitigation

Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.17Mutual Aid/Assistance Agreement

Definition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.18, A.3.3.18

-N-NFPA 1600 2013 Edition as a Management System

Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annex F

-P-Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annex DPlanning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chap. 5

Business Impact Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3, A.5.3Performance Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5Planning and Design Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1Resource Needs Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4

Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.5, A.5.4.5Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2, A.5.2

PreparednessDefinition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.19

PreventionDefinition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.20, A.3.3.20

Program Development Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annex BProgram Maintenance and Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chap. 9

Continuous Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3Corrective Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2, A.9.2Program Reviews. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1, A.9.1

Program Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chap. 4Finance and Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6Laws and Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5Leadership and Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1, A.4.1Program Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4Program Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3Program Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2, A.4.2Records Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7, A.4.7

-R-Recovery

Definition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.21, A.3.3.21

2013 Edition

1600–58 DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS

Referenced Publications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chap. 2General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1NFPA Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2Other Publications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3References for Extracts in Mandatory Sections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4

Resource ManagementDefinition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.22, A.3.3.22

ResponseDefinition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.23, A.3.3.23

Risk AssessmentDefinition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.24

-S-Self-Assessment for Conformity with NFPA 1600,

2013 Edition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annex CShall

Definition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3Should

2013 Edition

Situation AnalysisDefinition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.25

StandardDefinition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.5

-T-Test

Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.26Training and Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chap. 7

Curriculum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1, A.7.1Goal of Curriculum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2Incident Management System Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4Public Education. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7, A.7.7Recordkeeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5Regulatory and Program Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6Scope and Frequency of Instruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3

-V-Vital Records

Definition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.4 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.27

Sequence of Events Leading to Issuance Committee Membership Classificationsof This NFPA Committee Document The following classifications apply to Technical Commit-

tee members and represent their principal interest in the activity of the committee.

Step 1: Call for Proposals

• M Manufactur er: A representative of a maker or mar- Proposed new Document or new edition of an existing keter of a product, assembly, or system, or portion Document is entered into one of two yearly revision cy- thereof, that is affected by the standard.cles, and a Call for Proposals is published. U User: A representative of an entity that is subject to

the provisions of the standard or that voluntarily Step 2: Report on Proposals (ROP) uses the standard.

• I/M Installer/Maintainer: A representative of an entity Committee meets to act on Proposals, to develop its own that is in the business of installing or maintaining Proposals, and to prepare its Report.

• a product, assembly, or system affected by the stan- Committee votes by written ballot on Proposals. If two- dard.thirds approve, Report goes forward. Lacking two-thirds L Labor: A labor representative or employee con-approval, Report returns to Committee.

• cerned with safety in the workplace.Report on Proposals (ROP) is published for public re- R/T Applied Research/Testing Laboratory: A representative view and comment. of an independent testing laboratory or indepen-

Step 3: Report on Comments (ROC) dent applied research organization that promul-gates and/or enforces standards.

•Committee E Enforcing Authority: A representative of an agency meets to act on Public Comments to develop or an organization that promulgates and/or en-its own Comments, and to prepare its report.

• forces standards.Committee votes by written ballot on Comments. If two-I Insurance: A representative of an insurance com-thirds approve, Report goes forward. Lacking two-thirds

pany, broker, agent, bureau, or inspection agency.approval, Report returns to Committee.• C Consumer: A person who is, or represents, the ul-Report on Comments (ROC) is published for public re-

timate purchaser of a product, system, or service view.affected by the standard, but who is not included

Step 4: Technical Report Session in the User classification.SE Special Expert: A person not representing any of

• “Notices of intent to make a motion” are filed, are reviewed, the previous classifications, but who has a special and valid motions are certified for presentation at the expertise in the scope of the standard or portion Technical Report Session. (“Consent Documents” that thereof.have no certified motions bypass the Technical Report Session and proceed to the Standards Council for issu- NOTES:ance.)

• 1. “Standard” connotes code, standard, recommended NFPA membership meets each June at the Annual Meet- practice, or guide.ing Technical Report Session and acts on Technical 2. A representative includes an employee.Committee Reports (ROP and ROC) for Documents 3. While these classifications will be used by the Standards with “certified amending motions.”

• Council to achieve a balance for Technical Committees, Committee(s) vote on any amendments to Report ap- the Standards Council may determine that new classifi-proved at NFPA Annual Membership Meeting. cations of members or unique interests need representa-

Step 5: Standards Council Issuance tion in order to foster the best possible committee delib-erations on any project. In this connection, the Standards

• Council may make appointments as it deems appropriate Notification of intent to file an appeal to the Standards in the public interest, such as the classification of “Utili-Council on Association action must be filed within 20 ties” in the National Electrical Code Committee.days of the NFPA Annual Membership Meeting.

• 4. Representatives of subsidiaries of any group are gener-Standards Council decides, based on all evidence, ally considered to have the same classification as the par-whether or not to issue Document or to take other ac-ent organization.tion, including hearing any appeals.

12/12-A

Submitting Public Input / Public Comment through the Electronic Submission System (e-Submission):

As soon as the current edition is published, a Standard is open for Public Input.

Before accessing the e-Submission System, you must first sign-in at www.NFPA.org. Note: You will be asked to sign-in or create a free online account with NFPA before using this system:

a. Click in the gray Sign In box on the upper left side of the page. Once signed-in, you will see a red “Welcome” message in the top right corner.

b. Under the Codes and Standards heading, Click on the Document Information pages (List of Codes & Standards), and then select your document from the list or use one of the search features in the upper right gray box.

OR

a. Go directly to your specific document page by typing the convenient short link of www.nfpa.org/document#, (Example: NFPA 921 would be www.nfpa.org/921) Click in the gray Sign In box on the upper left side of the page. Once signed in, you will see a red “Welcome” message in the top right corner.

To begin your Public Input, select the link The next edition of this standard is now open for Public Input (formally “proposals”) located on the Document Information tab, the Next Edition tab, or the right-hand Navigation bar. Alternatively, the Next Edition tab includes a link to Submit Public Input online

At this point, the NFPA Standards Development Site will open showing details for the document you have selected. This “Document Home” page site includes an explanatory introduction, information on the current document phase and closing date, a left-hand navigation panel that includes useful links, a document Table of Contents, and icons at the top you can click for Help when using the site. The Help icons and navigation panel will be visible except when you are actually in the process of creating a Public Input.

Once the First Draft Report becomes available there is a Public comment period during which anyone may submit a Public Comment on the First Draft. Any objections or further related changes to the content of the First Draft must be submitted at the Comment stage.

To submit a Public Comment you may access the e-Submission System utilizing the same steps as previous explained for the submission of Public Input.

For further information on submitting public input and public comments, go to: http://www.nfpa.org/publicinput

Other Resources available on the Doc Info Pages

Document information tab: Research current and previous edition information on a Standard

Next edition tab: Follow the committee’s progress in the processing of a Standard in its next revision cycle.

Technical committee tab: View current committee member rosters or apply to a committee

Technical questions tab: For members and Public Sector Officials/AHJs to submit questions about codes and standards to NFPA staff. Our Technical Questions Service provides a convenient way to receive timely and consistent technical assistance when you need to know more about NFPA codes and standards relevant to your work. Responses are provided by NFPA staff on an informal basis.

Products/training tab: List of NFPA’s publications and training available for purchase.

Community tab: Information and discussions about a Standard

12/12

Information on the NFPA Standards Development Process

I. Applicable Regulations. The primary rules governing the processing of NFPA standards (codes, standards, recommended practices, and guides) are the NFPA Regulations Governing the Development of NFPA Standards (Regs). Other applicable rules include NFPA Bylaws, NFPA Technical Meeting Convention Rules, NFPA Guide for the Conduct of Participants in the NFPA Standards Development Process, and the NFPA Regulations Governing Petitions to the Board of Directors from Decisions of the Standards Council. Most of these rules and regulations are contained in the NFPA Standards Directory. For copies of the Directory, contact Codes and Standards Administration at NFPA Headquarters; all these documents are also available on the NFPA website at “www.nfpa.org.”

The following is general information on the NFPA process. All participants, however, should refer to the actual rules and regulations for a full understanding of this process and for the criteria that govern participation.

II. Technical Committee Report. The Technical Committee Report is defined as “the Report of the responsible Committee(s), in accordance with the Regulations, in preparation of a new or revised NFPA Standard.” The Technical Committee Report is in two parts and consists of the First Draft Report and the Second Draft Report. (See Regs at 1.4)

III. Step 1: First Draft Report. The First Draft Report is defined as “Part one of the Technical Committee Report, which documents the Input Stage.” The First Draft Report consists of the First Draft, Public Input, Committee Input, Committee and Correlating Committee Statements, Correlating Input, Correlating Notes, and Ballot Statements. (See Regs at 4.2.5.2 and Section 4.3) Any objection to an action in the First Draft Report must be raised through the filing of an appropriate Comment for consideration in the Second Draft Report or the objection will be considered resolved. [See Regs at 4.3.1(b)]

IV. Step 2: Second Draft Report. The Second Draft Report is defined as “Part two of the Technical Committee Report, which documents the Comment Stage." The Second Draft Report consists of the Second Draft, Public Comments with corresponding Committee Actions and Committee Statements, Correlating Notes and their respective Committee Statements, Committee Comments, Correlating Revisions, and Ballot Statements. (See Regs at Section 4.2.5.2 and 4.4) The First Draft Report and the Second Draft Report together constitute the Technical Committee Report. Any outstanding objection following the Second Draft Report must be raised through an appropriate Amending Motion at the Association Technical Meeting or the objection will be considered resolved. [See Regs at 4.4.1(b)] V. Step 3a: Action at Association Technical Meeting. Following the publication of the Second Draft Report, there is a period during which those wishing to make proper Amending Motions on the Technical Committee Reports must signal their intention by submitting a Notice of Intent to Make a Motion. (See Regs at 4.5.2) Standards that receive notice of proper Amending Motions (Certified Amending Motions) will be presented for action at the annual June Association Technical Meeting. At the meeting, the NFPA membership can consider and act on these Certified Amending Motions as well as Follow-up Amending Motions, that is, motions that become necessary as a result of a previous successful Amending Motion. (See 4.5.3.2 through 4.5.3.6 and Table1, Columns 1-3 of Regs for a summary of the available Amending Motions and who may make them.) Any outstanding objection following action at an Association Technical Meeting (and any further Technical Committee consideration following successful Amending Motions, see Regs at 4.5.3.7 through 4.6.5.3) must be raised through an appeal to the Standards Council or it will be considered to be resolved. VI. Step 3b: Documents Forwarded Directly to the Council. Where no Notice of Intent to Make a Motion (NITMAM) is received and certified in accordance with the Technical Meeting Convention Rules, the standard is forwarded directly to the Standards Council for action on issuance. Objections are deemed to be resolved for these documents. (See Regs at 4.5.2.5)

VII. Step 4a: Council Appeals. Anyone can appeal to the Standards Council concerning procedural or substantive matters related to the development, content, or issuance of any document of the Association or on matters within the purview of the authority of the Council, as established by the Bylaws and as determined by the Board of Directors. Such appeals must be in written form and filed with the Secretary of the Standards Council (See Regs at 1.6). Time constraints for filing an appeal must be in accordance with 1.6.2 of the Regs. Objections are deemed to be resolved if not pursued at this level.

VIII. Step 4b: Document Issuance. The Standards Council is the issuer of all documents (see Article 8 of Bylaws). The Council acts on the issuance of a document presented for action at an Association Technical Meeting within 75 days from the date of the recommendation from the Association Technical Meeting, unless this period is extended by the Council (See Regs at 4.7.2). For documents forwarded directly to the Standards Council, the Council acts on the issuance of the document at its next scheduled meeting, or at such other meeting as the Council may determine (See Regs at 4.5.2.5 and 4.7.4).

IX. Petitions to the Board of Directors. The Standards Council has been delegated the responsibility for the administration of the codes and standards development process and the issuance of documents. However, where extraordinary circumstances requiring the intervention of the Board of Directors exist, the Board of Directors may take any action necessary to fulfill its obligations to preserve the integrity of the codes and standards development process and to protect the interests of the Association. The rules for petitioning the Board of Directors can be found in the Regulations Governing Petitions to the Board of Directors from Decisions of the Standards Council and in 1.7 of the Regs. X. For More Information. The program for the Association Technical Meeting (as well as the NFPA website as information becomes available) should be consulted for the date on which each report scheduled for consideration at the meeting will be presented. For copies of the First Draft Report and Second Draft Report as well as more information on NFPA rules and for up-to-date information on schedules and deadlines for processing NFPA documents, check the NFPA website (www.nfpa.org/aboutthecodes) or contact NFPA Codes & Standards Administration at (617) 984-7246.

TERMS AND PAYMENT:❏ 1 year ($150)

❏ 2 years ($270)

❏ 3 years ($390) SAVE $60

Annual membership dues include a $45 subscription to NFPA Journal®. Regular membership in NFPA is individual and non-transferable. NFPA Journal is a registered trademark of the National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA 02169. Voting privileges begin after 180 days of individual membership. Prices subject to change.

PAYMENT METHOD:Check One:

❏ Payment Enclosed (Make check payable to NFPA.)

❏ Purchase Order (Please attach this form to your P.O.)

❏ Bill Me Later (Not available on International memberships.)

Charge My: ❏ VISA ❏ MasterCard ❏ AmEx ❏ Discover

Card # _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Expiration Date _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Name on Card _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Signature _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _International members: Please note prepayment is required on all International orders. Be sure to enclose a check or select your preferred credit card option.

❏ YES please enroll me as a member of NFPA for the term checked below. Activate all benefits, and ship my Member Kit including the Benefits Guide, NFPA Codes and Standards Directory, and other resources to help me make the most of my NFPA membership. Please allow three to four weeks for the kit to arrive.

Job Title (check one)

❏ Architect, Engineer, Consultant, Contractor (C17)❏ Facilities Safety Officer (F14)❏ Fire Chief, Other Fire Service (A11)❏ Loss Control, Risk Manager (L11)❏ Inspector, Building Official, Fire Marshal (F03)❏ Owner, President, Manager, Administrator (C10)❏ Other (please specify): (G11) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Type of Organization (check one)

❏ Architecture, Engineering, Contracting (A14)❏ Commercial Firm (Office, Retail, Lodging, Restaurant) (G13)❏ Electrical Services, Installation (J11)❏ Fire Service, Public and Private (AA1)❏ Government (C12)❏ Industrial Firm (Factory, Warehouse) (C11)❏ Institutional (Health Care, Education, Detention, Museums) (B11)❏ Insurance, Risk Management (B12)❏ Utilities (G12)❏ Other (please specify): (G11) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

4 EASY WAYS TO JOIN

STAY UP-TO-DATE. JOIN NFPA® TODAY!

Fax: 1-800-593-6372, Outside the U.S. +1-508-895-8301Mail: NFPA Membership Services Center,

11 Tracy Drive, Avon, MA 02322-9908Online: nfpa.orgCall: 1-800-344-3555 Outside the U.S. call +1-617-770-3000

BILLING INFORMATION:

Name _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Title _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Organization _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

City _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ State _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Zip/Postal Code _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Country _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Phone _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ E-mail _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Priority Code: 8J-MIS-1Z

100% MONEY-BACK GUARANTEEIf anytime during your first year you decide

membership is not for you, let us know and you’ll receive a 100% refund of your dues.

✓

10/08–D

SAVE $30

1 year ($165)

2 years ($300) SAVE $303 years ($430) SAVE $65

❒ YES Please enroll me as a member of NFPA for the term checked below. Activate all benefits, and ship my Member Kit including the Benefits Guide and other resources to help me make the most of my NPFA membership. Please allow three to four weeks for the kit to arrive.

✔

12/12-D

“Member-Only” Benefits Keeps You Up-To-Date!

FREE! Technical Support — Technical Support by Phone/Email. Get fast, reliable answers to all code-related questions—from electrical safety for employee workplaces to carbon dioxide extinguishing systems—from NFPA’s team of fire protection specialists.

NFPA Journal® — THE journal of record for fire protection, this bi-monthly publication will keep you abreast of the latest fire prevention and safety practices, as well as new technologies and strategies for protecting life and property from fire.

NFPA Update — This easy-to-read monthly e-newsletter will keep you up-to-date on important association programs such as the annual meeting; bring you times of interest from NFPA’s regional offices; and alert you to nationwide events and opportunities you won’t want to miss.

NFPA News — From new standards for dry cleaning plants to warning equipment for household carbon monoxide, this monthly online update keeps you abreast of additions of changes that could impact how you do you work.

NFPA Standards Directory — The NFPA Standards Directory is your complete guide to NFPA’s code-making process. Simply access your online NFPA member profile for document revision guidelines, the revision cycle schedule, and forms for submitting Proposals and Comments. Your online NFPA member profile and access to the NFPA Standards Directory is automatically generated once you join NFPA.

FREE! Section Membership — Share YOUR expertise with others in any of 16 industry-specific sections covering your own field of interest.

Member Kit — Includes Membership Certificate, Pin, Decals, ID Card, and Camera-ready Logo Art. Display the NFPA member logo proudly on your business correspondence, literature, website, and vehicles.

10% Discounts — Save hundreds of dollars each year on the many products and services listed in the NFPA Catalog, including codes and standards publications, handbooks, training videos, and other education materials to increase your knowledge and skills.Voting Rights — Your chance to help shape the future direction of fire prevention codes and standards. Voting rights go into effect 180 days from the start of individual membership.

Conference Invitation— Invitation to the NFPA Conference and Expo. Attend this important meeting at discounted rates as a member of NFPA.

Join NFPA today!www.nfpa.org

NFPA® and NFPA Journal® are registered trademarks of the National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA 02169-7471

12/12-E

SONOMA COUNTY OPERATIONAL AREA

LOCAL HAZARD MITIGATION PROGRAM

FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THIS PROGRAM

PLEASE VISIT:

http://sonomacounty.ca.gov/PRMD/Long-Range-Plans/Hazard-Mitigation/Approved-Update/

SONOMA COUNTY OPERATIONAL AREA

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN

THIS DOCUMENT IS ON FILE AND AVAILABLE AT:

SONOMA COUNTY

FIRE AND EMERGENCY SERVICES DEPARTMENT

2300 COUNTY CENTER DRIVE, STE. 220B

SANTA ROSA, CA 95403

707-565-1152

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action FDOC 104-008-1 / December 2011

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

i

Tab le o f Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1

National Dialogue on a Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management .........2

Whole Community Defined .....................................................................................................3

Whole Community Principles and Strategic Themes ...........................................................4

Strategic Themes in Practice ....................................................................................... 6

Understand Community Complexity .....................................................................................6

Recognize Community Capabilities and Needs .....................................................................8

Foster Relationships with Community Leaders ..................................................................10

Build and Maintain Partnerships .........................................................................................11

Empower Local Action ..........................................................................................................14

Leverage and Strengthen Social Infrastructure, Networks, and Assets ...........................16

Pathways for Action .................................................................................................... 19

Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 23

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

ii

This page intentionally left blank.

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

1

I n t roduct ion The effects of natural and manmade disasters have become more frequent, far-reaching, and widespread. As a result, preserving the safety, security, and prosperity of all parts of our society is becoming more challenging. Our Nation’s traditional approach to managing the risks associated with these disasters relies heavily on the government. However, today’s changing reality is affecting all levels of government in their efforts to improve our Nation’s resilience while grappling with the limitations of their capabilities.1 Even in small- and medium-sized disasters, which the government is generally effective at managing, significant access and service gaps still exist. In large-scale disasters or catastrophes, government resources and capabilities can be overwhelmed. The scale and severity of disasters are growing and will likely pose systemic threats.2 Accelerating changes in demographic trends and technology are making the effects of disasters more complex to manage. One future trend affecting emergency needs is continued population shifts into vulnerable areas (e.g., hurricane-prone coastlines). The economic development that accompanies these shifts also intensifies the pressure on coastal floodplains, barrier islands, and the ecosystems that support food production, the tourism industry, and suburban housing growth. Other demographic changes will affect disaster management activities, such as a growing population of people with disabilities living in communities instead of institutions, as well as people living with chronic conditions (e.g., obesity and asthma). Also, communities are facing a growing senior population due to the Baby Boom generation entering this demographic group. Consequently, changes in transportation systems and even housing styles may follow to accommodate the lifestyles of these residents. If immigration trends continue as predicted, cities and suburbs will be more diverse ethnically and linguistically. Employment trends, when combined with new technologies, will shift the ways in which local residents plan their home-to-work commuting patterns as well as their leisure time. All of these trends will affect the ways in which residents organize and identify with community-based associations and will influence how they prepare for and respond to emergencies.3

1 Resilience refers to the ability to adapt to changing conditions and withstand and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies. White House, “Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8),” March 30, 2011. 2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation,” November 2011. 3 Strategic Foresight Initiative, “U.S. Demographic Shifts: Long-term Trends and Drivers and Their Implications for Emergency Management,” May 2011. Strategic Foresight Initiative, “Government Budgets: Long-term Trends and Drivers and Their Implications for Emergency Management,” May 2011.

Figure 1: Joplin, Missouri, May 24, 2011—Homes were leveled with the force of 200 mph winds as an F5 tornado struck the city on May 22, 2011. This scene is representative of the growing impacts of disasters. Jace Anderson/FEMA

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

2

This document presents a foundation for increasing individual preparedness and engaging with members of the community as vital partners in enhancing the resiliency and security of our Nation through a Whole Community approach. It is intended to promote greater understanding of the approach and to provide a strategic framework to guide all members of the emergency management community as they determine how to integrate Whole Community concepts into their daily practices. This document is not intended to be all-encompassing or focused on any specific phase of emergency management or level of government, nor does it offer specific, prescriptive actions that require communities or emergency managers to adopt certain protocols. Rather, it provides an overview of core principles, key themes, and pathways for action that have been synthesized from a year-long national dialogue around practices already used in the field. While this is not a guide or a “how-to” document, it provides a starting point for those learning about the approach or looking for ways to expand existing practices and to begin more operational-based discussions on further implementation of Whole Community principles.

Nat ional D ia logue on a Whole Co mmuni ty App ro ach to Emergen cy Management In a congressional testimony, the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Craig Fugate, described today’s reality as follows: “Government can and will continue to serve disaster survivors. However, we fully recognize that a government-centric approach to disaster management will not be enough to meet the challenges posed by a catastrophic incident. That is why we must fully engage our entire societal capacity....”4 To that end, FEMA initiated a national dialogue on a Whole Community approach to emergency management, an approach that many communities have used for years with great success, and one which has been gathering strength in jurisdictions across the Nation. The national dialogue was designed to foster collective learning from communities’ experiences across the country. It occurred in various settings, such as organized conference sessions, research seminars, professional association meetings, practitioner gatherings, and official government meetings. The various settings created opportunities to listen to those who work in local neighborhoods, have survived disasters, and are actively engaged in community development. Participants in this dialogue included a broad range of emergency management partners, including representatives from the private and nonprofit sectors, academia, local residents, and government leaders. The conversations with the various stakeholders focused on how communities are motivated and engaged, how they understand risk, and what their experiences are with resilience following a disaster. In addition, international and historical resiliency efforts, such as FEMA’s Project Impact, were explored to gather lessons learned and best practices.5 FEMA also brought together diverse members from across the country to comprise a core working group. The working group reviewed and validated emerging Whole Community principles and themes, gathered examples of the Whole Community approach from the field, and

4 Administrator Craig Fugate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, before the United States House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management at the Rayburn House Office Building, March 30, 2011. 5 FEMA introduced Project Impact in 1997as a national initiative designed to challenge the country to undertake actions that protect families, businesses, and communities by reducing the effects of natural disasters. The efforts focused on creating active public-private partnerships to build disaster-resistant communities.

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

3

identified people, organizations, and communities with promising local experiences. They participated in various meetings and conferences and, in some cases, provided the examples included in this document. In addition to the national dialogue, this document was created concurrently with a larger effort to build an integrated, layered, all-of-Nation approach to preparedness, as called for by Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8): National Preparedness.6 As such, the Whole Community approach is being incorporated into all PPD-8 deliverables, including the National Preparedness Goal, National Preparedness System description, National Planning Frameworks, and the campaign to build and sustain preparedness nationwide, as well as leverage the approach in their development.7 In support of these efforts, FEMA seeks to spark exploration into community engagement strategies to promote further discussion on approaches that position local residents for leadership roles in planning, organizing, and sharing accountability for the success of local disaster management efforts, and which enhance our Nation’s security and resilience.

Whole Communi ty Def ined As a concept, Whole Community is a means by which residents, emergency management practitioners, organizational and community leaders, and government officials can collectively understand and assess the needs of their respective communities and determine the best ways to organize and strengthen their assets, capacities, and interests. By doing so, a more effective path to societal security and resilience is built. In a sense, Whole Community is a philosophical approach on how to think about conducting emergency management. There are many different kinds of communities, including communities of place, interest, belief, and circumstance, which can exist both geographically and virtually (e.g., online forums). A Whole Community approach attempts to engage the full capacity of the private and nonprofit sectors, including businesses, faith-based and disability organizations, and the general public, in conjunction with the participation of local, tribal, state, territorial, and Federal governmental partners. This engagement means different things to different groups. In an all-hazards environment, individuals and institutions will make different decisions on how to prepare for and respond to threats and hazards; therefore, a community’s level of preparedness will vary. The challenge for those engaged in emergency management is to understand how to work with the diversity of groups and organizations and the policies and practices that emerge from them in an effort to improve the ability of local residents to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from any type of threat or hazard effectively. 6 President Barack Obama, “Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8): National Preparedness,” March 30, 2011. 7 FEMA, “National Preparedness Goal,” September 2011. (Formally released on October 7, 2011.)

Whole Community is a philosophical approach in how to conduct the business of emergency management. Benefits include: Shared understanding of community

needs and capabilities Greater empowerment and

integration of resources from across the community

Stronger social infrastructure Establishment of relationships that

facilitate more effective prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery activities

Increased individual and collective preparedness

Greater resiliency at both the community and national levels

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

4

The benefits of Whole Community include a more informed, shared understanding of community risks, needs, and capabilities; an increase in resources through the empowerment of community members; and, in the end, more resilient communities. A more sophisticated understanding of a community’s needs and capabilities also leads to a more efficient use of existing resources regardless of the size of the incident or community constraints. In times of resource and economic constraints, the pooling of efforts and resources across the whole community is a way to compensate for budgetary pressures, not only for government agencies but also for many private and nonprofit sector organizations. The task of cultivating and sustaining relationships to incorporate the whole community can be challenging; however, the investment yields many dividends. The process is as useful as the product. In building relationships and learning more about the complexity of a community, interdependencies that may be sources of hidden vulnerabilities are revealed. Steps taken to incorporate Whole Community concepts before an incident occurs will lighten the load during response and recovery efforts through the identification of partners with existing processes and resources who are available to be part of the emergency management team. The Whole Community approach produces more effective outcomes for all types and sizes of threats and hazards, thereby improving security and resiliency nationwide.

Whole Communi ty Pr inc ip les and S t rateg i c Th emes Numerous factors contribute to the resilience of communities and effective emergency management outcomes. However, three principles that represent the foundation for establishing a Whole Community approach to emergency management emerged during the national dialogue.

Whole Community Principles: Understand and meet the actual needs of the whole community. Community engagement

can lead to a deeper understanding of the unique and diverse needs of a population, including its demographics, values, norms, community structures, networks, and relationships. The more we know about our communities, the better we can understand their real-life safety and sustaining needs and their motivations to participate in emergency management-related activities prior to an event.

Engage and empower all parts of the community. Engaging the whole community and empowering local action will better position stakeholders to plan for and meet the actual needs of a community and strengthen the local capacity to deal with the consequences of all threats and hazards. This requires all members of the community to be part of the emergency management team, which should include diverse community members, social and community service groups and institutions, faith-based and disability groups, academia,

Figure 2: Madison, Tennessee, May 29, 2010—Gary Lima, Tennessee Emergency Management Agency Community Relations Coordinator, leads Boy Scout troop #460 in a Memorial Day project to place flags on graves. The picture reflects emergency managers becoming involved in the day-to-day activities of community groups. David Fine/FEMA

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

5

professional associations, and the private and nonprofit sectors, while including government agencies who may not traditionally have been directly involved in emergency management. When the community is engaged in an authentic dialogue, it becomes empowered to identify its needs and the existing resources that may be used to address them.

Strengthen what works well in communities on a daily basis. A Whole Community approach to building community resilience requires finding ways to support and strengthen the institutions, assets, and networks that already work well in communities and are working to address issues that are important to community members on a daily basis. Existing structures and relationships that are present in the daily lives of individuals, families, businesses, and organizations before an incident occurs can be leveraged and empowered to act effectively during and after a disaster strikes.

In addition to the three Whole Community principles, six strategic themes were identified through research, discussions, and examples provided by emergency management practitioners. These themes speak to the ways the Whole Community approach can be effectively employed in emergency management and, as such, represent pathways for action to implement the principles.

Whole Community Strategic Themes: Understand community complexity. Recognize community capabilities and needs. Foster relationships with community leaders. Build and maintain partnerships. Empower local action. Leverage and strengthen social infrastructure, networks, and assets. In the Strategic Themes in Practice section of this document, the Whole Community concept is explored through real-world examples that highlight the key principles and themes of the Whole Community approach. In order to provide an illustration of how the principles and themes can be applied, examples for each of the five mission areas—Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery (as outlined in the National Preparedness Goal)—are included. In addition, examples from other community development and public safety efforts have been included—most notably, community policing. While the focus and outcomes may differ, such efforts have proven effective in advancing public health and safety and offer a model for emergency management personnel to consider. The Pathways for Action section provides a list of reflective questions and ideas for emergency management practitioners to refer to when they are beginning to think about how to incorporate the Whole Community concepts into their security and resilience efforts. As a field of practice, our collective understanding of how to effectively apply Whole Community as a concept to the daily business of emergency management will continue to evolve. It is hoped that this document will assist emergency managers, as members of their communities, in that evolution—prompting new actions and soliciting new ideas and strategies. FEMA is committed to continued engagement in ongoing discussions with its partners in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors to further develop and refine strategies to deliver more effective emergency management outcomes and enhance the security and resilience of our communities and our Nation.

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

6

S t ra teg ic Themes in Pract ice The strategic themes presented in this section speak to the various ways the Whole Community approach can be effectively employed in emergency management and, as such, represent pathways for action by members of the emergency management community at all levels. These themes and pathways are explored through the presentation of real-world examples that highlight how Whole Community concepts are being applied in communities across the country.

Understand Communi ty Compl exi ty Communities are unique, multi-dimensional, and complex. They are affected by many factors and interdependencies, including demographics, geography, access to resources, experience with government, crime, political activity, economic prosperity, and forms of social capital such as social networks, social cohesion between different groups, and institutions. Developing a better understanding of a community involves looking at its members to learn how social activity is organized on a normal basis (e.g., social patterns, community leaders, points of collective organization and action, and decision-making processes), which will reveal potential sources (e.g., individuals and organizations) of new collective action. A realistic understanding of the complexity of a community’s daily life will help emergency managers determine how they can best collaborate with and support the community to meet its true needs. Understanding the complexities of local communities helps with tailoring engagement strategies and shaping programs to meet various needs. Numerous examples that involve local initiatives to identify, map, and communicate with a wide range of local groups exist nationwide. For example, the Houston Department of Health and Human Services (HDHHS) has been actively identifying ways to better communicate and plan with linguistically isolated populations (LIP) and limited-English proficient (LEP) populations within the city. HDHHS is working with about 20 community organizations that serve and represent LIP/LEP communities, along with Interfaith Ministries for Greater Houston, four refugee resettlement agencies that work with these populations, and several apartment complexes in southwest Houston (where many refugee and some immigrant populations live), in an effort to develop trusted relationships and ways to provide current preparedness, response, and recovery information. Because of this outreach, significant unmet needs (e.g., transportation) for these specific populations have been identified. The City of Houston is using this information to fulfill unmet needs for these populations and continues to work with these community organizations and private sector partners to improve outreach materials, methods of communication, and preparedness programs.

Figure 3: New Orleans, Louisiana, September 5, 2008—A bilingual volunteer helps non-English speaking evacuees, guiding them in the right direction to board the correct buses to their parishes. Understanding the complexity of communities (e.g., non-English speakers) helps emergency management practitioners to meet the residents’ needs. Jacinta Quesada/FEMA

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

7

The full diversity of communities is better understood when communication and engagement efforts move beyond easy, typical approaches to looking at the real needs and issues a community faces. In one California city, the police noticed a high level of violent crime in a particular neighborhood. In a typical policing model, the police would have assigned additional officers to patrol the neighborhood, approached the community to provide them with information about the criminal activity, and informed residents of what they might do to avoid being affected by the crime. However, as part of an operational shift, the police took a proactive approach by first engaging with the community to obtain information about the nature and frequency of the local crimes. At the initial meeting, the police learned from the local residents that a number of problems contributed to the unsafe conditions of the neighborhood—problems that police response alone could not correct. Cars speeding through the neighborhood; the presence of abandoned cars, couches, and other litter in front yards; rundown conditions of apartment buildings; few safe walkways for neighborhood children; and a lack of lighting on street corners all contributed to the crime situation. At the next community meeting, the police brought together a number of government departments, including fire, public works, and the housing authority, to address the residents’ concerns. Government representatives agreed to provide dumpsters for the litter and the residents agreed to fill them. The community agreed to tow the abandoned cars and identified street repaving as a high priority. Together, the community and city officials approached the apartment owners, who agreed to paint the exteriors of the buildings. The public works department fixed the street lighting. Building upon the cooperation and the demonstrated responsiveness to the community’s needs, several residents provided the police with information that led to the arrests of several individuals involved in the area’s drug-related activities. In a relatively short period of time, police worked with local residents to transform what had been perceived to be a narrow crime issue into a broad-based community revitalization effort. Crime decreased, residents became involved, and the neighborhood was significantly improved. Emergency management practitioners can take a similar approach by understanding the underlying and core community concerns in order to build relationships and identify opportunities to work together to develop solutions that meet everyone’s needs. Numerous approaches exist to identify and better understand the complexities of local populations, how they interact, what resources are available, and the gaps between needs and solutions. For example, community mapping is a way to identify community capabilities and needs by visually illustrating data to reveal patterns. Examples of patterns may take into account the location of critical infrastructure, demographics, reliance on public transportation, available assets and resources (e.g., warehouses that can be used as distribution centers), and businesses that can continue to supply food or water during and after emergencies. Understanding communities is a dynamic process as patterns may change. Emergency managers and local groups often use community mapping to gather empirical data on local patterns. Revealing patterns can help emergency managers to better engage communities and understand and meet the needs of individuals by illustrating the dynamics of populations, how they interact, and available resources.

Understand Community “DNA” Learn how communities’ social activity is organized and how needs are met under normal conditions. A better understanding of how segments of the community resolve issues and make decisions—both with and without government as a player—helps uncover ways to better meet the actual needs of the whole community in times of crisis.

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

8

One community mapping program that the Washington State Emergency Management Division developed (“Map Your Neighborhood”) won FEMA’s 2011 Challenge.gov award for addressing community preparedness. This program helps citizens identify the most important steps they need to take to secure their homes and neighborhoods following a disaster. In addition, it helps to identify the special skills and equipment that neighbors possess, the locations of natural gas and propane tanks, and a comprehensive contact list of neighbors who may need assistance, such as older residents, children, and people with disabilities and other access and functional needs.

Recognize Communi ty Capabi l i t i es and Needs Appreciating the actual capabilities and needs of a community is essential to supporting and enabling local actions. For example, in response to past disasters, meals ready-to-eat (MREs) have been used to feed survivors because these resources were readily available. However, for a large portion of the population, such as children, seniors, or individuals with dietary or health considerations, MREs are not a suitable food source for various reasons, as MREs tend to contain high levels of fat and sodium and low levels of fiber. A community’s needs should be defined on the basis of what the community requires without being limited to what traditional emergency management capabilities can address. By engaging in open discussions, emergency management practitioners can begin to identify the actual needs of the community and the collective capabilities (private, public, and civic) that exist to address them, as the role of government and private and nonprofit sector organizations may vary for each community. The community should also be encouraged to define what it believes its needs and capabilities are in order to fully participate in planning and actions. Based on a shared understanding of actual needs, the community can then collectively plan to find ways to address those needs. Following the devastating tornadoes in Alabama during the spring of 2011, various agencies, organizations, and volunteers united to locate recovery resources in the community and communicate information about those resources to the public. Two days after the tornadoes, they formed the Alabama Interagency Emergency Response Coordinating Committee. The committee was led by representatives from Independent Living Resources of Greater Birmingham, United Cerebral Palsy of Greater Birmingham, and the Alabama Governor’s Office on Disability. The committee also included representatives from FEMA and the American Red Cross.

Figure 4: Fargo, North Dakota, March 23, 2009—Thousands of students and community members work together with the National Guard at the Fargo Dome to make sand bags during a 24-hour operation. Community members have the capabilities to help meet their own emergency needs. Michael Reiger/FEMA

Recognize Community Capabilities and Broaden the Team

Recognize communities’ private and civic capabilities, identify how they can contribute to improve pre- and post-event outcomes, and actively engage them in all aspects of the emergency management process.

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

9

A daily conference call was attended by as many as 60 individuals representing agencies that serve individuals with disabilities and chronic illnesses. In addition, volunteers with disabilities continuously scanned broadcast media and printed and electronic newspapers and called agency contacts to obtain the latest information on resources for disaster recovery. For instance, volunteers placed calls to local hospitals and clinics, faith-based organizations, and organizations representing clinical professionals to request help with crisis counseling. Recovery resource information was compiled in an extensive database with entries grouped within the following categories: Red Cross, FEMA, emergency shelters/housing assistance, medication assistance, health care services, mental health support, food assistance, eyewear, communications, computers/Internet, hiring contractors for home repairs, insurance claims, legal aid, vital documents, older adult care, childcare, blood donations, animal shelter and services, and emergency preparation. The Disaster Recovery Resource Database was updated twice daily and information was disseminated in multiple formats (e.g., email attachment, website, hard copy, and telephone). The committee used local media outlets, state agencies (e.g., health, education, rehabilitation, aging, and mental health), city and county governments, the United Way’s 2-1-1 Information & Referral Search website, and nonprofit organizations to disseminate the database to community residents. Independent Living Resources of Greater Birmingham hosted a website with recovery resources presented by category. This collaboration greatly enhanced the delivery of services to individuals with disabilities, as well as older residents. As a protection effort, some communities have developed self-assessment tools to evaluate how prepared they are for all threats and hazards. One example is a Community Resilience Index (CRI), which was developed by the Gulf of Mexico Alliance’s Coastal Community Resilience Priority Issue Team, the Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Consortium, and the Louisiana Sea Grant College Program in collaboration with 18 communities along the Gulf Coast, from Texas to Florida. It is a self-assessment tool and provides communities with a method of determining if an acceptable level of functionality may be maintained after a disaster. The self-assessment tool can be used to evaluate the following areas to provide a preliminary assessment of a community’s disaster resilience: critical infrastructure and facilities, transportation issues, community plans and agreements, mitigation measures, business plans, and social systems. Gaps are identified through this analysis. The CRI helps to identify weaknesses that a community may want to address prior to the next hazard event and stimulates discussion among emergency responders within a community, thus increasing its resilience to disasters. As a result of the initial implementation of the Community Resilience Index (CRI), additional grant funding is being provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Coastal Storms Program to continue to build capacity in the region so facilitators can assist communities in taking the next steps. Under this new grant, facilitators will continue their work by helping communities identify issues and needs in connection with becoming more resilient, create a shared community understanding of the potential extent of future losses, apply strategies to serve near- and long-term mitigation needs, and take the first steps toward adapting to a rise in sea level. This support will be in the form of follow-up training and/or technical assistance.

Plan for the Real Plan for what communities will really need should a severe event occur and not just for the existing resources on hand.

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

10

Foster Relat ionsh ips wi th Communi ty L eaders Within every community, there are many different formal and informal leaders, such as community organizers, local council members and other government leaders, nonprofit or business leaders, volunteer or faith leaders, and long-term residents, all of whom have valuable knowledge and can provide a comprehensive understanding of the communities in which they live. These leaders can help identify activities in which the community is already interested and involved as people might be more receptive to preparedness campaigns and more likely to understand the relevancy of emergency management to their lives. The Colorado Emergency Preparedness Partnership (CEPP) exemplifies the benefits of fostering relationships with community leaders. According to its website, “CEPP is a collaborative enterprise created by the Denver Police Foundation, Business Executives for National Security, and the Philanthropy Roundtable. It is a broad coalition to implement a voluntary, all-hazards partnership between business and government and, to date, is the product of many Colorado partners including leaders of the philanthropic community, Federal, state and local agencies, business, academia, and US Northern Command.” CEPP has built these trusted relationships since its inception in 2008. When not responding to a disaster, Colorado Emergency Preparedness Partnership (CEPP) partners remain connected with their network through information bulletins and tap into their capabilities for smaller emergencies and other needs. For example, the police recently needed a helicopter for a murder investigation and they contacted CEPP, a trusted partner, to see if there was one available. Within 30 minutes, three helicopters were offered by three different member organizations. As suggested previously, disaster-resilient communities are, first and foremost, communities that function and solve problems well under normal conditions. By matching existing capabilities to needs and working to strengthen these resources, communities are able to improve their disaster resiliency. Community leaders and partners can help emergency managers in identifying the changing needs and capabilities that exist in the community. Community leaders can also rally their members to join community emergency management efforts and to take personal preparedness measures for themselves and their families. The inclusion of community leaders in emergency management training opportunities is a way to reach individuals, as these leaders can pass preparedness information to their members. They can be a critical link between emergency managers and the individuals they represent. Many emergency management agencies, such as the New York City Office of Emergency Management, include their private sector partners in regular exercises, sustaining and strengthening their relationships in the process. For example, central Ohio is home to the country’s second-largest Somali population. The Mid-Ohio Regional Planning Commission has been working to gather information about this group’s preferred communication methods, traditions, behaviors, and customs in order to appropriately plan for its needs in the event of an emergency. The Somali population requested that planners include the Somali community leaders in emergency preparedness and response efforts because they were the foremost sources of trustworthy communication. Both emergency managers and the community benefit from developing these trusted relationships.

Meet People Where They Are Engage communities through the relationships that exist in everyday settings and around issues that already have their attention and drive their interactions. Connect the social, economic, and political structures that make up daily life to emergency management programs.

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

11

Trust is a recurring theme that underpins healthy and strong communities. It acts as the glue that holds different groups together, strengthens and sustains solidarity, and supports the means for collective action. It is crucial that partnerships are based on trust and not on fear or competition to ensure the success of the Whole Community approach. Building social trust requires more than conventional outreach focused on “trust issues”; it requires collaborating with communities in joint activities designed to address specific local problems. As emergency managers and community leaders work together to solve problems, trusted relationships are formed as they learn to support and rely on one another. Fostering relationships and collaborating with community leaders is a way to build trust within the broader community as they are the links to individual community members. To this end, it is important that the government and its partners are transparent about information sharing, planning processes, and capabilities to deal with all threats and hazards.

Bui ld and Ma in ta in Par tnersh ip s While certainly not a new concept, building relationships with multi-organizational partnerships and coalitions is an exemplary organizing technique to ensure the involvement of a wide range of local community members. The collective effort brings greater capabilities to the initiatives and provides greater opportunities to reach agreement throughout the community and influence others to participate and support activities. The critical step in building these partnerships is to find the overlapping and shared interests around which groups and organizations are brought together. Equally important is to sustain the motivations and incentives to collaborate over a long period of time while improving resilience through increased public-private partnership. As FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate stated at the first National Conference on Building Resilience Through Public-Private Partnerships, “We cannot separate out and segment one sector in isolation; the interdependencies are too great.… We want the private sector to be part of the team and we want to be in the situation where we work as a team and not compete with each other.”8

8 Administrator Craig Fugate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, First National Conference on Building Resilience through Public-Private Partnerships, August 2011.

Build Trust through Participation Successfully collaborating with community leaders to solve problems for non-emergency activities builds relationships and trust over time. As trust is built, community leaders can provide insight into the needs and capabilities of a community and help to ramp up interest about emergency management programs that support resiliency.

Figure 5: Tuscaloosa, Alabama, June 9, 2011—The Japanese International Cooperation Agency made a donation of several pallets of blankets to representatives from several faith-based and volunteer organizations. The donation came in the wake of the April tornados that hit the southeast. Tim Burkitt /FEMA

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

12

Businesses play a key role in building resilient communities. As businesses consider what they need to do to survive a disaster or emergency, as outlined in their business continuity plans, it is equally important that they also consider what their customers will need in order to survive. Without customers and employees, businesses will fail. The ongoing involvement of businesses in preparedness activities paves the way to economic and social resiliency within their communities. An example of a public-private partnership that successfully negotiated difficult community political and economic dynamics comes from Medina County, just southwest of Cleveland, Ohio. Like so many urban areas, expansion into rural areas placed new demands on water supplies. Some homebuilders initially wanted to develop large plots that would require filling in existing wetlands and natural floodplains. The building plans also required firefighting services to truck in large amounts of water in the event of an incident. A broad-based coalition that included the local government, county floodplain manager, planning commission, homebuilders association, and emergency manager came together to spearhead a process to promote development in the county while protecting water supplies and preserving wetlands and ponds. The partnership achieved a building standard that allowed builders to develop their desired housing design but also required them to build ponds and wetlands within each housing subdivision in an effort to sustain water supplies and allow for improved fire protection and floodplain management. The zoning and land use mitigation efforts promoted and protected the health, safety, and welfare of the residents by making the community less susceptible to flood and fire damage. Working as a public-private partnership enabled the participants to reach an agreement and institutionalize it through cooperative legal processes. Mutual interests and priorities brought this otherwise disparate group together to form a productive partnership. Partnerships are attractive when all parties benefit from the relationship. The State of Florida established a team dedicated to business and industry. This dedicated private sector team is

Partners to Consider Engaging Community councils Volunteer organizations (e.g., local

Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, Community Emergency Response Team programs, volunteer centers, State and County Animal Response Teams, etc.)

Faith-based organizations Individual citizens Community leaders (e.g.,

representatives from specific segments of the community, including seniors, minority populations, and non-English speakers)

Disability services School boards Higher education institutions Local Cooperative Extension

System offices Animal control agencies and animal

welfare organizations Surplus stores Hardware stores Big-box stores Small, local retailers Supply chain components, such as

manufacturers, distributors, suppliers, and logistics providers

Home care services Medical facilities Government agencies (all levels and

disciplines) Embassies Local Planning Councils (e.g.,

Citizen Corps Councils, Local Emergency Planning Committees)

Chambers of commerce Nonprofit organizations Advocacy groups Media outlets Airports Public transportation systems Utility providers And many others…

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

13

composed of various state agencies/organizations and business support organizations. The purpose of this team is to coordinate with local, tribal, state, territorial, and Federal agencies to provide immediate and short-term assistance for the needs of business, industry, and economic stabilization, as well as long-term business recovery assistance. The private sector team’s preparedness and response assistance may include accessing financial, workforce, technical, and community resources. Local jurisdictions in the state are also incorporating this concept into their planning processes. Such partnerships help get businesses back up and running quickly after a disaster so they can then assist with the response and recovery efforts. Throughout 2011, the Miami-Dade County Department of Emergency Management, in partnership with Communities United Coalition of Churches, the American Red Cross--South Florida Region, FEMA, Islamic Schools of South Florida and many others, conducted a pilot effort to identify what works and what does not work in engaging the whole community in emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. The following seven target population groups were chosen: low-income and disadvantaged residents, seniors, immigrants and those with limited English-speaking abilities, those of minority faith traditions, disabled people, youth, and the homeless. Given the size, diversity (e.g., ethnicity, religion, and age), and breadth of experience of Miami-Dade County Emergency Management, many lessons could be learned by focusing Whole Community efforts on this geographic area. Most notably, the pilot identified previously unknown assets that the target population groups could bring to an emergency situation, which resulted in the following developments: A network of 25 newly affiliated groups now partnering with emergency management and

the Red Cross; Identification of 65 houses of worship, community groups, and religious broadcasters who

can support disaster communications and language translation; New capacity to serve 8,000 survivors; Nine facilities already in the community identified as potential new sites for feeding and

sheltering; and Five existing facilities identified as new points of distribution for commodities. Following the pilot and despite significant budget cuts, Miami-Dade emergency management officials established a team of people to work over the next two years to institutionalize Whole Community into the way the department thinks, plans, and acts. Once partnerships have been established, relationships like the ones created in Miami-Dade can be sustained through regular activities. Community ownership of projects will help ensure continued involvement and progress in the future. Furthermore, engaging community members through routine resilience-building activities, such as business continuity-related exercises, will ensure they can be activated and sustained during emergencies.

Create Space at the Table Open up the planning table and engage in the processes of negotiation, discussion, and decision making that govern local residents under normal conditions. Encourage community members to identify additional resources and capabilities. Promote broader community participation in planning and empower local action to facilitate buy-in.

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

14

Including partners such as representatives from for-profit and nonprofit private sector organizations and individuals from the community in preparedness activities (e.g., emergency management exercises) is a way to maintain momentum. One key aspect of maintaining partnerships is to set up regular means of communication with community groups and local leaders, such as through newsletters, meetings, or participating volunteers, to ensure that they stay informed about and engaged in emergency management activities. The Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians sends out a monthly outreach newsletter that includes emergency preparedness updates. Contact information is provided in the newsletter to encourage community members to provide feedback on emergency management programs. The tribe also uses social media applications like Twitter and Facebook to update the community on emergency management issues and programs. Emergency managers can continue to build and maintain partnerships that emerge during the response phase, enabling a better response when another disaster strikes. For example, Support Alliance for Emergency Readiness Santa Rosa (SAFER) is a network of organizations committed to serving actively during disasters. It was developed to bring together local businesses and faith-based and nonprofit organizations to provide more efficient service to disaster survivors after Hurricane Ivan devastated northwest Florida. The network’s coordinating efforts were aimed specifically at eliminating unnecessary duplication of effort. During non-emergency periods, SAFER works closely with other agencies to address the needs of the county’s impoverished and vulnerable populations. In connection with this, SAFER helps families who lose their homes to fire, replenishes local food pantries, and provides cold weather shelters to the homeless. The relationships it forms while serving community residents daily provides the foundation for collective action when disaster strikes.

Empower Local Act ion Recognition that government at all levels cannot manage disasters alone means that communities need the opportunity to draw on their full potential to operate effectively. Empowering local action requires allowing members of the communities to lead—not follow—in identifying priorities, organizing support, implementing programs, and evaluating outcomes. The emergency manager promotes and coordinates, but does not direct, these conversations and efforts. Lasting impacts of long-term capacity building can be evident in an evolving set of civic practices and habits among leaders and the public that become embedded in the life of the community. In this regard, the issue of social capital becomes an important part of encouraging communities to own and lead their own resilience activities.9 Furthermore, community ownership of projects provides a powerful incentive for sustaining action and involvement. In May 2011, a devastating tornado struck Joplin, Missouri, leading to the development of the Citizens Advisory Recovery Team (CART). CART is composed of city officials, business leaders, community leaders, and residents whose shared purposes are to engage residents to determine their recovery vision and share that vision with the community; provide a systematic way to address recovery through a planning process; and bring all segments of the community

9 “By analogy with notions of physical capital and human capital—tools and training that enhance individual productivity—‘social capital’ refers to features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.” Putnam, Robert D., “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Journal of Democracy 6:1, Jan 1995, 65-78, p. 67.

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

15

together to share information and work together.10 Shortly after the tornado, CART, with support from FEMA’s Long-Term Recovery Task Force, Housing and Urban Development, Environmental Protection Agency, and the American Institute of Architects, conducted extensive public input and community sessions to discuss: housing and neighborhoods, schools and community facilities, infrastructure and environment, and economic development. All of the ideas and comments from these meetings were used to draft a recovery vision as well as goals and project concepts. Recommendations were then presented to the City Council in November 2011. Similarly, following the 2008 flood in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, the city came together to identify the capabilities of agencies and organizations that could assist with the recovery. Representatives from state, county, and city governments, the chamber of commerce, schools, businesses, faith-based organizations, nonprofit organizations, and neighborhood associations, many of which were involved in the response to the flood, formed the Recovery and Reinvestment Coordinating Team (RRCT). They explicitly forged the partnership to help create a framework for recovery that would include the broad interests of the entire area. The RRCT organized open houses and general public meetings for hundreds of residents and business owners in an effort to develop a community-wide discussion on the priorities for long-term revitalization and investment in the city. They also focused the public discussions on the need to integrate the revitalization plan with a flood protection plan. Out of these efforts, the RRCT established the Neighborhood Planning Process to oversee the city’s post-flood Reinvestment and Revitalization Plan. The Reinvestment and Revitalization Plan included area action plans, goals, timelines, and redevelopment strategies for all ten affected neighborhoods, ultimately turning the recovery effort into an opportunity for redesigning and revitalizing the city. Strengthening the government’s relationship with communities should be based on support and empowerment of local collective action, with open discussion of the roles and responsibilities of each party. This vision should be clearly conveyed so that participating organizations can commit adequate resources over the long term and have a clear understanding of what the desired outcomes will be. Engaging members of communities as partners in emergency planning is critical to developing collective actions and solutions. Two consecutive tragedies involving youth in a city in Colorado caused community members to recognize a need to better educate their youth on emergencies. A local fire department battalion chief helped form a small group of volunteers from the fire and police departments, enlisted support from a local television station’s meteorologist, and began offering clinics and classes. Other agencies joined the effort and the group also began offering a Youth Disaster Training program for teenagers, hoping to engage the younger population in a broader, more meaningful experience through which emergency management skills and knowledge could easily be learned. The organizers found that when the teen participants became involved, the program’s learning

10 Citizens Advisory Recovery Team. Listening to Joplin: Report of the Citizens Advisory Recovery Team, Nov. 2011.

Let Public Participation Lead Enable the public to lead, not follow, in identifying priorities, organizing support, implementing programs, and evaluating outcomes. Empower them to draw on their full potential in developing collective actions and solutions.

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

16

objectives and training approach were transformed from what had initially been envisioned. The teens rejected the program’s original logo and redesigned it to be more meaningful to their peers. The teens also pressed for a different type of instruction. They wanted to hear from people who had actually survived a disaster and learn what the experience was like and how the survivors and relatives of victims felt afterward. The Youth Disaster Training program became such a success that requests to participate quickly outstripped the available and planned resources. Other organizations, including public school leaders, state agencies, and other organizations, joined in. The teenagers brought their parents, informed their friends, and participated in activities such as a career development session during which they met emergency managers from the health, fire, and police departments, as well as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and FEMA. As a result of the summer program, the teenagers became empowered to voice their needs and interests and design and implement the best ways to fulfill them. Empowering local action is especially important in rural communities where there tends to be less infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, public transportation, and health services) and where emergency managers are often part-time employees who are also responsible for areas outside of emergency management. Rural communities understand that the social capital found in local volunteer organizations and individuals is necessary for preparing for and responding to unique rural threats such as agroterrorism. The Agrosecurity Committee of the Extension Disaster Education Network (EDEN) has established the Strengthening Community Agrosecurity Planning (S-CAP) workshop series to address challenges concerning the protection of agriculture and the food supply. Workshop participants include a wide range of community representatives (e.g., local emergency management and public health personnel, first responders, veterinarians, producers/commodity representatives, and agribusinesses). They come together to address the issues relevant to their specific agricultural vulnerabilities. The workshops help guide local Extension personnel and other community partners in developing the agricultural component of their local emergency operations plan to help safeguard the community’s agriculture, food, natural resources, and pets. The workshops empower communities to build on their capacity to handle agricultural incidents through improved networking and team building.

Leverage and S t rengthen So cia l In f ras t ruc ture , Ne two rks, and Assets Leveraging and strengthening existing social infrastructure, networks, and assets means investing in the social, economic, and political structures that make up daily life and connecting them to emergency management programs. A community in general consists of an array of groups, institutions, associations, and networks that organize and control a wide variety of assets and structure social behaviors. Local communities have their own ways of organizing and managing this social infrastructure. Understanding how communities operate under normal conditions (i.e., before a disaster) is critical to both immediate response and long-term recovery after a disaster. Emergency managers can strengthen existing capabilities by participating in discussions and decision-making processes that govern local residents under normal conditions and aligning emergency management activities to support community partnerships and efforts. Emergency managers can engage with non-traditional partners within their communities to build upon these day-to-day functions and determine how they can be leveraged and empowered during a disaster.

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

17

Communities are extremely resourceful in using what is available—in terms of funding, physical materials, or human resources—to meet a range of day-to-day needs. Whether relying on donations and volunteers to stock a local food bank or mobilizing neighbors to form “watch groups” to safeguard children playing in public parks, communities have a great capacity for dealing with everyday challenges. There are opportunities for government to support and strengthen these pathways, such as providing planning spaces where people can meet and connect, providing resources to support local activities, and creating new partnerships to expand shared resources. Enhancing the successful, everyday activities in communities will empower local populations to define and communicate their needs, mediate challenges and disagreements, and participate in local organizational decision making. As a result, a culture of shared responsibility and decision making emerges, linking communities and leaders in tackling problems of common concern. For example, the protection and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure is a shared responsibility involving all levels of government and critical infrastructure owners and operators. Prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts relating to the Nation’s infrastructure are most effective when there is full participation of government and industry partners. The mission suffers (i.e., full benefits are not realized) without the robust participation of a wide array of partners. Following September 11, 2001, communities discovered that partnerships with local rail enthusiasts can help strengthen the security of the Nation’s rail network. Across the United States, thousands of rail enthusiasts, or “rail fans,” enjoy a hobby that takes them to public spots alongside rail yards where they watch and photograph trains. Rail fans are drawn from across a community’s social and demographic landscape. However, the heightened security measures that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in law enforcement and rail security police becoming suspicious of rail fans photographing busy locations where commuter and freight trains clustered. After two rail fans were detained by local police for taking pictures of trains, a public outcry arose from rail fans online and their national associations. Across the country, rail fans insisted that they were far from being a threat to security and were actually one of the rail network’s best security assets because they were routinely in a position to observe suspicious behavior. A coalition of senior police officers, rail fans, and local elected leaders convened to review and resolve the conflict. The controversy subsided as police acknowledged the rights of rail fans to

Figure 6: Margaretville, New York, September 4, 2011—Volunteers came to help residents remove mud and salvage belongings from homes ruined by floodwaters on “Labor for Your Neighbor” weekend events following Hurricane Irene. Elissa Jun/FEMA

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

18

photograph trains from public locations and the rail fans publicly embraced the need for greater security around rail yards. Rail fans offered to help keep America’s rail network safe from vandalism, terrorism, and other incidents by reporting situations that appeared to be out of the ordinary. BNSF Railway, one of the largest freight rail companies in North America, developed a community-based rail fan reporting program called Citizens for Rail Security. This program includes a web-based reporting system in which rail fans can enter a minimal amount of their personal information, generate an official identification card, and receive guidelines on how to report any suspicious activities or potential security breaches. Experiences in Haiti after the catastrophic earthquake in 2010 also underscore the value of leveraging existing social infrastructure. A research team that had worked for months after the disaster identified two different types of social and organizational networks providing aid to earthquake survivors.11 One network consisted of large relief agencies that focused on transporting a large volume of humanitarian aid from outside the country and into the disaster area. The second type of network involved pre-existing social groups that routinely worked with and inside local Haitian neighborhoods to provide basic social services. The network of large relief agencies had to create systems and gather manpower and equipment to distribute the aid, whereas the second group that used pre-existing social groups already had systems, manpower, and equipment in place. The unfamiliar network of large relief agencies was also plagued by aggression and theft by the locals, which the familiar pre-existing social groups did not experience. Since the network of pre-existing social groups routinely worked with and inside local Haitian neighborhoods to provide basic social services, they were trusted and had detailed knowledge of local conditions, which allowed them to anticipate local needs accurately and provide the aid required. Since they knew the actual amount of resources needed, they did not rely on large convoys that would be tempting to vandals. Many of the problems encountered in providing aid to Haiti resemble difficulties faced in other large-scale emergency response operations. Problems did not occur because of an absolute shortage of supplies or slow responses. Rather, they resulted from failures to connect with and benefit from the strengths of existing, familiar patterns of community interaction and assistance. One reason why local community organizations are effective during emergencies is that they are rooted in a broad-based set of activities that address the core needs of a community. They are of, by, and with the community. They may be, for instance, involved in feeding and sheltering the homeless or working with children in after-school programs. They also remain visible in the community, communicating regularly with local residents about issues of immediate concern, as well as more distant emergency management interests.

11 Holguín-Veras, José, Ph.D., et al., “Field Investigation on the Comparative Performance of Alternative Humanitarian Logistic Structures after the Port au Prince Earthquake: Preliminary Findings and Suggestions,” March 2, 2011.

Strengthen Social Infrastructure Align emergency management activities to support the institutions, assets, and networks that people turn to in order to solve problems on a daily basis.

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

19

Pa thw ays for Act ion While there are many similarities that most communities share, communities are ultimately complex and unique. Ideas that work well in one community may not be feasible for another due to local regulations, available funding, demographics, geography, or community culture, for example. Some communities have fully integrated Whole Community concepts into their operations. For other communities, this is a new concept that they are hearing about for the first time. If this concept is familiar to you, think about what you can teach and share with others. On the other hand, if you are looking to begin a Whole Community approach or expand existing programs, the following questions and bullets may help get you started. What follows are ideas and recommendations that were collected as part of the national dialogue during facilitated group discussions with emergency management practitioners from nonprofit organizations, academia, private sector organizations, and all levels of government. These recommendations are by no means exhaustive, but are intended to help you think about ways in which you can establish or broaden a Whole Community practice of emergency management within your community. How can we better understand the actual needs of the communities we serve?

Educate your emergency management staff on the diversity of the community and implement cultural competence interventions, such as establishing a relationship with a multi-lingual volunteer to help interact with the various groups.12

Learn the demographics of your community. Develop strategies to reach community members and engage them in issues that are important to them.

Know the languages and communication methods/traditions in the community—not only what languages people speak and understand, but how they actually exchange new information and which information sources they trust.

Know where the real conversations and decisions are made. They are not always made at the council level, but at venues such as the community center, neighborhood block parties, social clubs, or places of worship. Tap into these opportunities to listen and learn more about the community. For example, homeowner association quarterly meetings (social or formal) may serve as opportunities to identify current community issues and concerns and to disseminate important public information.

What partnerships might we need in order to develop an understanding of the community’s needs?

Identify a broad base of stakeholders, including scout troops, sports clubs, home school organizations, and faith-based and disability communities to identify where relationships can be built and where information about the community’s needs can be shared. Partner with groups that interact with a given population on a daily basis, such as first responders, places of worship, niche media outlets, and other community organizations. These

12 For more information on cultural competence interventions, see Betancourt, J., et al., “Defining Cultural Competence: A Practical Framework for Addressing Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Health and Health Care,” Public Health Reports, 2003, Vol. 118.

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

20

groups/organizations have already established trust within the community and can act as liaisons to open up communication channels.

Every year, foreign-born residents and visitors are among those affected by disasters in our country. Reach out to local foreign country representatives through consulates or embassies to incorporate international partners in a Whole Community approach to domestic disasters.

How do we effectively engage the whole community in emergency management to include a wide breadth of community members?

Reach out and interact with your Citizen Corps Council (or similar organization) to inquire about groups that are currently involved in emergency planning, as well as groups that are not involved but should be. Citizen Corps Councils facilitate partnerships among government and nongovernmental entities, including those not traditionally involved in emergency planning and preparedness. Additionally, Councils involve community members in order to increase coordination and collaboration between emergency management and key stakeholders while increasing the public’s awareness of disasters.

Strive to hire a diverse staff that is representative of the community. Maintain ongoing, clear, and consistent communication with all segments of the community

by using vocabulary that is understood and known by those members. Discuss how organizations can have a formal role in the community’s emergency plan and,

when feasible, include them in training activities and exercises. Use the power of social media applications (e.g., Facebook and Twitter) to disseminate

messages, create two-way information exchanges, and understand and follow up on communication that is already happening within the community.

Involve children and youth through educational programs and activities centered on individual, family, and community preparedness.

Develop recovery plans with full participation and partnership within the full fabric of the community.

Incorporate emergency planning discussions into the existing format of community meetings. Multi-purpose meetings help increase participation, especially in communities where residents must travel long distances to attend such meetings.

Identify barriers to participation in emergency management meetings (e.g., lack of childcare or access to transportation, and time of the meeting) and provide solutions where feasible (e.g., provide childcare, arrange for the meeting to be held in a location accessible by public transportation, and schedule for after-work hours).

Consider physical, programmatic, and communication access needs of community members with disabilities when organizing community meetings.

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

21

How do we generate public interest in disaster preparedness to get a seat at the table with community organizations?

Integrate the public and community institutions into the planning process by hosting town hall meetings and by participating in non-emergency management community meetings. Listen to the public’s needs and discuss how individuals can play a role in the planning process.

Make yourself available for local radio call-in programs to answer questions that callers have about emergency management and solicit input from the listeners on what they see as the top priorities for community resilience.

Have an open house at your emergency operations center (EOC) and invite the public. Invite schools for field trips. Explain the equipment, organization, and coordination that are used to help protect the community.

How can we tap into what communities are interested in to engage in discussions about increasing resilience?

Find local heroes and opinion leaders and learn what they are interested or involved in and tailor emergency management materials and information to meet their interests.

Find out what issues or challenges various groups in your community are currently confronting, how they are organizing, and how emergency management might help them address pressing needs.

What activities can emergency managers change or create to help strengthen what already works well in communities?

Understand how you can share and augment resources with partners within your community during emergencies. For example, providing a power generator to a store that has all the supplies the community needs but no power to stay open would be an example of a way in which to share and augment resources.

Work with your partner organizations to better understand the various ways they will be able to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from threats and hazards and supplement their activities and resources rather than compete with them.

Identify organizations that already provide support to the community and determine how you can supplement their efforts during times of disaster when there might be a greater need. For example, if food banks distribute food on a regular basis, emergency managers can deliver additional food to the food banks to help them meet a greater demand during a disaster.

Leverage existing programs, such as the local Parent Teacher Association (PTA), to strengthen emergency management skills in the community. Offer Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) training to PTA members.

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

22

How can communities and emergency management support each other?

Provide adequate information to organizations ahead of time so they can better prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from threats and hazards. In return, organizations will provide you with information on their status and ability to assist when you need them. For this reason, ongoing multi-directional information sharing is one of the most important aspects of maintaining your partnerships. Have regular meetings with formal and informal community leaders and partners to maintain momentum.

Provide support to for-profit private sector organizations in the development of business continuity plans. Keeping businesses up and running after an event helps to stabilize a community’s economy and promotes resiliency.

When reflecting on the previous questions and ideas, it is important to remember that one size does not fit all. The definition of success will vary by community. Just as certain Whole Community efforts are appropriate for some communities and not for others, every jurisdiction has a different idea of what success means to them. Periodically assessing progress facilitates an ongoing dialogue and helps determine if the needs of the community are being met. Whole Community implementation requires flexibility and refinement through routine evaluation as lessons are learned. Communities should define metrics that are meaningful to them to track progress in the actions they choose to take toward meeting the communities’ needs. Regardless of what stage you are at in practicing Whole Community principles, think about how you can start or continue incorporating Whole Community principles and themes into what you do today. Test out your ideas and discuss them with your colleagues to learn and continue the national dialogue.

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

23

Conc lus ion FEMA began its national dialogue with a proposition: A community-centric approach for emergency management that focuses on strengthening and leveraging what works well in communities on a daily basis offers a more effective path to building societal security and resilience. By focusing on core elements of successful, connected, and committed communities, emergency management can collectively achieve better outcomes in times of crisis, while enhancing the resilience of our communities and the Nation. The three core principles of Whole Community—understanding and meeting the actual needs of the whole community, engaging and empowering all parts of the community, and strengthening what works well in communities on a daily basis—provide a foundation for pursuing a Whole Community approach to emergency management through which security and resiliency can be attained. Truly enhancing our Nation’s resilience to all threats and hazards will require the emergency management community to transform the way the emergency management team thinks about, plans for, and responds to incidents in such a way to support community resilience. It takes all aspects of a community to effectively prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from threats and hazards. It is critical that individuals take responsibility for their own self-preparedness efforts and that the community members work together to develop the collective capacity needed to enhance their community’s security and resilience. Building community resilience in this manner requires emergency management practitioners to effectively engage with and holistically plan for the needs of the whole community. This includes but is not limited to accommodating people who speak languages other than English, those from diverse cultures or economic backgrounds, people of all ages (i.e., from children and youth to seniors), people with disabilities and other access and functional needs, and populations traditionally underrepresented in civic governance. At the same time, it is important to realign emergency management practices to support local needs and work to strengthen the institutions, assets, and networks that work well in communities on a daily basis. To that end, FEMA will continue its national dialogue to exchange ideas, recommendations, and success stories. FEMA also intends to develop additional materials for emergency managers that will support the adoption of the Whole Community concept at the local level. As part of this ongoing dialogue, reactions and feedback to the Whole Community concept presented in this document can be sent to FEMA-Community-Engagement@fema.gov. This document is just a start. It will take time to transform the way the Nation thinks about, prepares for, and responds to disasters. FEMA recognizes that the challenges faced by the communities it serves are constantly evolving; as an Agency, it will always need to adapt, often at a moment’s notice. This shift in the Nation’s approach to addressing the needs of survivors is vital in keeping people and communities safe and in preventing the loss of life and property from all threats and hazards. The Whole Community themes described in this document provide a starting point to help emergency managers, as members of their communities, address the challenge. However, it will require the commitment of members of the entire community—from government agencies to local residents—to continue learning together.

A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action

24

This page intentionally left blank.

Basics Operations

Individual Skills

Collective Tasks

Sonoma County Operational Area

EmergencyOperationsCenter(EOC)StaffDevelopmentProgram

October 2014

 

 

 

 

Sonoma County Operational Area EOC Staff Development Plan

Table of Contents

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1

Staff Assignments ........................................................................................................... 4

Roles and Responsibilities .............................................................................................. 4

Initial and Ongoing Training ............................................................................................ 4

Training Accountability .................................................................................................... 6

Training Resources ......................................................................................................... 7

Appendix A: EOC Position Training Requirements ........................................................ 8

Appendix B: EOC Organization ...................................................................................... 9

i October 2014

Sonoma County Operational Area EOC Staff Development Plan

Introduction Emergencies and disasters happen unexpectedly and without warning. Realizing that local governments are responsible for restoring services and systems, in the most efficient and expeditious manner, Sonoma County Fire and Emergency Services Department has implemented this Sonoma County Operational Area Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Staff Development Program.

This program directly supports the Operational Area’s Public Safety Core Service Area (CSA) by providing County employees training and experience that improves their effectiveness and confidence in delivering high quality service to the public even under the most difficult conditions.

The Sonoma County Fire and Emergency Services Department manages the EOC Staff Development Program at the direction of the EOC Director. The Emergency Services Department will develop and regularly review the courses that are considered part of the EOC Staff Development Program.

The guidance within the Fire and Emergency Services Department EOC Staff Development Program is not absolute. Ultimately, the complexity of the incidents and/or event would determine personnel responsibilities as well as the required training. The EOC Staff Development Program training requirements (Appendix A) follow the guidance established in the National Incident Management System Training Program, the Combined Training Matrix (2011-2012) developed by Cal OES and is based on the five levels of incident complexity identified in Figure 1:

Figure 1: Incident Complexity

Type

1

This type of incident is the most complex, requiring national resources for safe and effective management and operation.

All command and general staff positions are filled. Operations personnel often exceed 500 per operational period

and total personnel will usually exceed 1,000. Branches need to be established. A written incident action plan (IAP) is required for each

operational period. The agency administrator will have briefings, and ensure that the

complexity analysis and delegation of authority are updated. Use of resource advisors at the incident base is recommended. There is a high impact on the local jurisdiction, requiring

additional staff for office administrative and support functions.

1 October 2014

   

Sonoma County Operational Area EOC Staff Development Plan

Type

2

This type of incident extends beyond the capabilities for local control and is expected to go into multiple operational periods. A Type 2 incident may require the response of resources out of area, including regional and/or national resources, to effectively manage the operations, command, and general staffing.

Most or all of the command and general staff positions are filled. A written IAP is required for each operational period. Many of the functional units are needed and staffed. Operations personnel normally do not exceed 200 per

operational period and total incident personnel do not exceed 500 (guidelines only).

The agency administrator is responsible for the incident complexity analysis, agency administration briefings, and the written delegation of authority.

Type

3

When incident needs exceed capabilities, the appropriate ICS positions should be added to match the complexity of the incident.

Some or all of the command and general staff positions may be activated, as well as division/group supervisor and/or unit leader level positions.

A Type 3 IMT or incident command organization manages initial action incidents with a significant number of resources, an extended attack incident until containment/control is achieved, or an expanding incident until transition to a Type 1 or 2 IMT.

The incident may extend into multiple operational periods. A written IAP may be required for each operational period.

Type

4

Command staff and general staff functions are activated only if needed.

Several resources are required to mitigate the incident, including a task force or strike team.

The incident is usually limited to one operational period in the control phase.

The agency administrator may have briefings, and ensure the complexity analysis and delegation of authority is updated.

No written IAP is required but a documented operational briefing will be completed for all incoming resources.

The role of the agency administrator includes operational plans including objectives and priorities.

2 October 2014

Type

5

The incident can be handled with one or two single resources with up to six personnel.

Command and general staff positions (other than the incident commander) are not activated.

No written IAP is required. The incident is contained within the first operational period and

often within an hour to a few hours after resources arrive on scene.

Examples include a vehicle fire, an injured person, or a police traffic stop.

IC

Sonoma County Operational Area EOC Staff Development Plan

The National Integration Center (NIC) maintains the NIMS Training Program which assumes that most jurisdictions will have, at a minimum, Type 4 incidents. Sonoma County’s training matrix (Appendix A) has been designed to prepare personnel for a Type 1 incident due to the responsibilities and the population density of the Sonoma County Operational Area.

Addi

tiona

l Tra

inin

g(A

dvan

ced)

Position Specific

ICS-400

Incident Com

plexity

ICS-300

IS-800

S-200

ICS-100

Base

line

IS-700

NIMS Course

High (Type 1)

Low (Type 5)

3 October 2014

Sonoma County Operational Area EOC Staff Development Plan

Staff Assignments The EOC is a location from which centralized emergency management can be performed during a major emergency or disaster. The EOC facilitates a coordinated response by community, local, state and federal agencies.

The Fire & Emergency Services Department assists the County Administrator (EOC Director) with developing staff that is sufficient to initially activate and then maintain sustained EOC operations. EOC staff are usually chosen based on training, experience or position. The EOC Director may assign staff to the EOC as necessary.

Roles and Responsibilities Sonoma County Fire & Emergency Services Department

Coordinate and deliver training courses, exercises, and resources for EOC staff.

Publish a comprehensive catalog of courses and a quarterly training calendar. Publish and revise a Multi-Year Training & Exercise Plan at each Emergency

Coordinator’s Forum. As needed, recommend employees to serve as EOC staff to the EOC Director. Manage and update the EOC Staff Development Program as needed.

County Administrative Office

Designate employees to serve as EOC staff as recommended by the Fire & Emergency Services Department or other department heads.

Support efforts to ensure EOC staff attend required training and exercises.

All Sonoma County Departments

Support and provide employees to staff the EOC as requested. Release employees to attend required EOC training and exercises. Assist in identifying training needs and implementing corrective actions. Confirm employees attend and complete required EOC training and exercises.

Initial and Ongoing Training Progressing from basic or common training subjects, EOC staff move forward with additional individual, position-specific coursework followed by section and functional workshops which begin to develop the team capabilities.

Initial

Emergency Management Systems – (1 hours) Introduction to the California Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS), National Incident Management System (NIMS), the Incident

4 October 2014

Sonoma County Operational Area EOC Staff Development Plan

Command Systems (ICS) 100/200, the National Response Framework and the role of Disaster Service Workers (DSWs). This course must be completed within six months of the employee’s assignment to the EOC staff and attendance is documented by Human Resources.

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Orientation – (2 hours) Introduction to Sonoma County’s EOC. Basic overview of the mission, organization, and operation of the EOC including activation, staffing, message flow and relationships with outside agencies. Includes an overview of the natural, man-made, and technological threats facing Sonoma County. Discussion of response and recovery resources and systems. This course must be completed within six months of the employee’s assignment to the EOC staff.

Section Specific Training – (Varied hours) Courses and topics that are specific to each section’s roles, responsibilities, equipment, computer programs and applications, processes, policies, etc. Department heads/Section Chiefs are responsible to ensure that their section can operate as a functional unit within the EOC. Fire & Emergency Services maintains recommended training topics and has identified trainers, however leaders are encouraged, and allotted time, to address specific OA EOC Section (Management / Planning / Operations / Finance / Logistic) training needs.

EOC Position Training – (Varied hours) Courses specific to each EOC function should be completed within one year, or as practical (See Appendix A: EOC Job Skills Training).

Ongoing Training & Exercise

In order to remain effective, all EOC staff must attend training and exercises according to the Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan.

Biannual EOC Refresher Training – (2 hours) Review of SEMS, NIMS, ICS, EOC mission, section responsibilities, individual position responsibilities, EOC equipment and capabilities, Operational Area information flow, and updates to EOC policies and procedures.

Functional Exercise (5 hours est.) This realistic exercise simulates communications between EOC staff and simulators based on scenarios developed to meet objectives. A functional exercise is held at least every other year and when possible will be executed in conjunction with Regional or State Exercise.

5 October 2014

Sonoma County Operational Area EOC Staff Development Plan

Training Accountability Upon receiving an assignment in an EOC position, assigned employees will meet with Fire & Emergency Services Department staff at which time they will receive an assignment briefing, training packet describing the job function, required and recommended training, resource materials, and a quarterly training calendar. Once assigned, an employee, with full support of their manager, is responsible for fulfilling the required training obligations.

The Fire & Emergency Services Department will report staff development status biannually at each Operational Area Disaster Counsel meeting detailing employee attendance at EOC staff development program trainings and exercises. Fire & Emergency Services may recommend to the EOC Director that some employees be relieved from their assignment due to failure to meet training requirements.

Training Progression

Progressing from basic or common training subjects, EOC staff move forward with additional individual, position-specific coursework. This training is then followed by section and functional workshops which begin to develop the collective team capabilities. This training is coupled with a progressive series of team, section and full EOC exercises to reinforce knowledge and skills. The following chart illustrates this progression:

Major Functions*

Instructor led training

Section Operations

Individual Position Skills

Position Checklist

Basic EOC Operations Videos

Emergency Mgt Systems

Individual Collective Just In Time

* Major functions include Public Info, Sit Analysis, Damage Assessment

6 October 2014

Sonoma County Operational Area EOC Staff Development Plan

Training Resources

Training Calendar

The Fire & Emergency Services Department publishes and distributes a quarterly EOC Staff Development Program training calendar. This calendar includes the Fire & Emergency Services Department training and outside resource courses that have been identified as suitable and have benefit to EOC staff. The quarterly EOC Staff Development Program training calendar will be distributed in conjunction with materials for the Emergency Coordinator’s Forum.

Catalog of Courses

The Fire & Emergency Services Department maintains a registry of county, regional, state and federal courses that support EOC staff development. Staff may contact the Fire & Emergency Services Department to access the registry.

Resident Training Courses

Some of the courses listed in Appendix A may also be available as a resident course at the FEMA Emergency Management Institute (EMI) outside Washington, D.C. EMI offers full reimbursement for travel and per diem. Staff may contact the Fire & Emergency Services Department to check on course availability and coordination.

Online Training Courses

In addition to the listed courses in Appendix A, EOC staff are encouraged to take additional training as their interests and time permit via the FEMA Emergency Management Institute (EMI). Individuals can register and take emergency management courses at anytime at no cost. Students receive a certificate upon course completion – some courses may be used for college or professional development credit. See http://training.fema.gov/is/

7 October 2014

Sonoma County Operational Area EOC Staff Development Plan

Appendix A: EOC Position Training Requirements

8 October 2014

 

Sonoma County Operational Area EOC Staff Development Plan

Appendix B: EOC Organization

9 October 2014

PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT Intro-1

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) April 2013

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program i

Contents INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW ....................................................................................... INTRO-1

Purpose .......................................................................................................................................... Intro-1 Role of Exercises ........................................................................................................................... Intro-1 Applicability and Scope ................................................................................................................ Intro-2 Supersession .................................................................................................................................. Intro-2 How to Use This Document .......................................................................................................... Intro-2 Revision Process ............................................................................................................................ Intro-3

1. HSEEP FUNDAMENTALS ............................................................................................................. 1-1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................. 1-1 Fundamental Principles ....................................................................................................................... 1-1 Exercise Program Management ........................................................................................................... 1-1 Exercise Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 1-2

Exercise Design and Development ............................................................................................... 1-3 Exercise Conduct .......................................................................................................................... 1-3 Exercise Evaluation ...................................................................................................................... 1-3 Improvement Planning .................................................................................................................. 1-3

2. EXERCISE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ................................................................................... 2-1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................. 2-1 Engage Elected and Appointed Officials............................................................................................. 2-1 Multi-year Exercise Program Priorities ............................................................................................... 2-1

Training and Exercise Planning Workshop .................................................................................. 2-2 Multi-year Training and Exercise Plan ................................................................................................ 2-3

Progressive Approach ................................................................................................................... 2-3 Discussion-Based Exercises .......................................................................................................... 2-4 Operations-Based Exercises .......................................................................................................... 2-5

Rolling Summary of Outcomes ........................................................................................................... 2-6 Manage Exercise Program Resources ................................................................................................. 2-7

Exercise Budget Management ...................................................................................................... 2-7 Program Staffing ........................................................................................................................... 2-7 Other Resources ............................................................................................................................ 2-7

3. EXERCISE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT .............................................................................. 3-1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................. 3-1 Exercise Foundation ............................................................................................................................ 3-1 Exercise Planning Team and Events ................................................................................................... 3-2

Exercise Planning Team Considerations....................................................................................... 3-2 Exercise Planning Team Positions ................................................................................................ 3-3 Planning Activities ........................................................................................................................ 3-4

Exercise Design ................................................................................................................................... 3-9 Scope ........................................................................................................................................... 3-10 Exercise Objectives ..................................................................................................................... 3-11 Evaluation Requirements ............................................................................................................ 3-12 Scenario ...................................................................................................................................... 3-12 Exercise Documentation ............................................................................................................. 3-13 Media or Public Affairs Guidance .............................................................................................. 3-19

Exercise Development ....................................................................................................................... 3-20 Planning for Exercise Logistics .................................................................................................. 3-20 Planning for Exercise Control ..................................................................................................... 3-22

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program ii

Planning for Exercise Evaluation ................................................................................................ 3-25 4. EXERCISE CONDUCT ................................................................................................................... 4-1

Overview ............................................................................................................................................. 4-1 Exercise Play Preparation .................................................................................................................... 4-1

Setup for Discussion-Based Exercises .......................................................................................... 4-1 Setup for Operations-Based Exercises .......................................................................................... 4-1 Briefings ........................................................................................................................................ 4-2

Exercise Play ....................................................................................................................................... 4-2 Participant Roles and Responsibilities .......................................................................................... 4-3 Conduct for Discussion-Based Exercises ..................................................................................... 4-4 Conduct for Operations-Based Exercises ..................................................................................... 4-5 Contingency Process ..................................................................................................................... 4-7

Wrap-Up Activities ............................................................................................................................. 4-7 Debriefings .................................................................................................................................... 4-7 Player Hot Wash ........................................................................................................................... 4-7 Controller/Evaluator Debriefing ................................................................................................... 4-8

5. EVALUATION .................................................................................................................................. 5-1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................. 5-1 Evaluation Planning ............................................................................................................................ 5-1

Evaluation Team ........................................................................................................................... 5-1 Exercise Evaluation Guide Development ..................................................................................... 5-2 Recruit, Assign, and Train Evaluators .......................................................................................... 5-3 Evaluation Documentation ............................................................................................................ 5-3 Pre-Exercise Evaluator Briefing ................................................................................................... 5-4

Exercise Observation and Data Collection .......................................................................................... 5-4 Observation ................................................................................................................................... 5-4 Data Collection ............................................................................................................................. 5-4

Data Analysis ...................................................................................................................................... 5-5 After-Action Report Draft ................................................................................................................... 5-5

6. IMPROVEMENT PLANNING ....................................................................................................... 6-1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................. 6-1 Corrective Actions ............................................................................................................................... 6-1 After-Action Meeting .......................................................................................................................... 6-1 After-Action Report/Improvement Plan Finalization .......................................................................... 6-2 Corrective Action Tracking and Implementation ................................................................................ 6-2 Using Improvement Planning to Support Continuous Improvement .................................................. 6-2

GLOSSARY OF TERMS .................................................................................................... GLOSSARY-1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................. ACRONYM-1

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Intro-1

Introduction and Overview Purpose The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) provides a set of guiding principles for exercise programs, as well as a common approach to exercise program management, design and development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning. Exercises are a key component of national preparedness—they provide elected and appointed officials and stakeholders from across the whole community with the opportunity to shape planning, assess and validate capabilities, and address areas for improvement.

Through the use of HSEEP, exercise program managers can develop, execute, and evaluate exercises that address the priorities established by an organization’s leaders. These priorities are based on the National Preparedness Goal, strategy documents, threat and hazard identification/risk assessment processes, capability assessments, and the results from previous exercises and real-world events. These priorities guide the overall direction of a progressive exercise program, where individual exercises are anchored to a common set of priorities or objectives and build toward an increasing level of complexity over time. Accordingly, these priorities guide the design and development of individual exercises, as planners identify exercise objectives and align them to core capabilities1

In this way, the use of HSEEP—in line with the National Preparedness Goal and the National Preparedness System—supports efforts across the whole community that improve our national capacity to build, sustain, and deliver core capabilities.

for evaluation during the exercise. Exercise evaluation assesses the ability to meet exercise objectives and capabilities by documenting strengths, areas for improvement, core capability performance, and corrective actions in an After-Action Report/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP). Through improvement planning, organizations take the corrective actions needed to improve plans, build and sustain capabilities, and maintain readiness.

Role of Exercises Exercises play a vital role in national preparedness by enabling whole community stakeholders to test and validate plans and capabilities, and identify both capability gaps and areas for improvement. A well-designed exercise provides a low-risk environment to test capabilities, familiarize personnel with roles and responsibilities, and foster meaningful interaction and communication across organizations. Exercises bring together and strengthen the whole community in its efforts to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from all hazards. Overall, exercises are cost-effective and useful tools that help the nation practice and refine our collective capacity to achieve the core capabilities in the National Preparedness Goal.

1 Core Capabilities are distinct critical elements necessary to achieve the specific mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. Capabilities provide a common vocabulary describing the significant functions required to deal with threats and hazards that must be developed and executed across the whole community to ensure national preparedness.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Intro-2

Applicability and Scope HSEEP exercise and evaluation doctrine is flexible, scalable, adaptable, and is for use by stakeholders across the whole community.2 HSEEP doctrine is applicable for exercises across all mission areas—prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. Using HSEEP supports the National Preparedness System3

HSEEP doctrine is based on national best practices and is supported by training, technology systems, tools, and technical assistance. The National Exercise Program (NEP) is consistent with the HSEEP methodology. Exercise practitioners are encouraged to apply and adapt HSEEP doctrine to meet their specific needs.

by providing a consistent approach to exercises and measuring progress toward building, sustaining, and delivering core capabilities.

Supersession This 2013 iteration of HSEEP supersedes the 2007 HSEEP Volumes. The current version reflects the feedback, lessons learned, and best practices of the exercise community, as well as current policies and plans.

How to Use This Document This document serves as a description of HSEEP doctrine. It includes an overview of HSEEP fundamentals that describes core HSEEP principles and overall methodology. This overview is followed by several chapters that provide exercise practitioners with more detailed guidance on putting the program’s principles and methodology into practice.

The doctrine is organized as follows:

• Chapter 1: HSEEP Fundamentals describes the basic principles and methodology of HSEEP.

• Chapter 2: Exercise Program Management provides guidance for conducting a Training and Exercise Planning Workshop (TEPW) and developing a Multi-year Training and Exercise Plan (TEP).

• Chapter 3: Exercise Design and Development describes the methodology for developing exercise objectives, conducting planning meetings, developing exercise documentation, and planning for exercise logistics, control, and evaluation.

• Chapter 4: Exercise Conduct provides guidance on setup, exercise play, and wrap-up activities.

• Chapter 5: Evaluation provides the approach to exercise evaluation planning and conduct through data collection, analysis, and development of an AAR.

• Chapter 6: Improvement Planning addresses corrective actions identified in the exercise IP and the process of tracking corrective actions to resolution.

2 The whole community includes individuals, families, communities, the private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, and Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial governments. 3 The National Preparedness System includes identifying and assessing risks; estimating the level of capabilities needed to address those risks; building or sustaining the required levels of capability; developing and implementing plans to deliver those capabilities; validating and monitoring progress; and reviewing and updating efforts to promote continuous improvement.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Intro-3

Revision Process The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will review HSEEP doctrine and methodology on a biennial basis, or as otherwise needed, to make necessary modifications and incorporate lessons learned.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 1-1

1. HSEEP Fundamentals Overview HSEEP doctrine consists of fundamental principles that frame a common approach to exercises. This doctrine is supported by training, technology systems, tools, and technical assistance, and is based on national best practices. It is intended to enhance consistency in exercise conduct and evaluation while ensuring exercises remain a flexible, accessible way to improve our preparedness across the nation.

Fundamental Principles Applying the following principles to both the management of an exercise program and the execution of individual exercises is critical to the effective examination of capabilities:

• Guided by Elected and Appointed Officials. The early and frequent engagement of elected and appointed officials is the key to the success of any exercise program. They provide the overarching guidance and direction for the exercise and evaluation program as well as specific intent for individual exercises.

• Capability-based, Objective Driven. The National Preparedness Goal identifies a series of core capabilities and associated capability targets across the prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery mission areas. Through HSEEP, organizations can use exercises to examine current and required core capability levels and identify gaps. Exercises focus on assessing performance against capability-based objectives.

• Progressive Planning Approach. A progressive approach includes the use of various exercises aligned to a common set of exercise program priorities and objectives with an increasing level of complexity over time. Progressive exercise planning does not imply a linear progression of exercise types.

• Whole Community Integration. The use of HSEEP encourages exercise planners, where appropriate, to engage the whole community throughout exercise program management, design and development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning.

• Informed by Risk. Identifying and assessing risks and associated impacts helps organizations identify priorities, objectives, and core capabilities to be evaluated through exercises.

• Common Methodology. HSEEP includes a common methodology for exercises that is applicable to all mission areas—prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. This methodology enables organizations of divergent sizes, geographies, and capabilities to have a shared understanding of exercise program management, design and development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning; and fosters exercise-related interoperability and collaboration.

Exercise Program Management Exercise program management involves a collaborative approach that integrates resources, organizations, and individuals in order to identify and achieve program priorities. Through the

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 1-2

management of an exercise program, stakeholders provide oversight to specific training and exercise activities sustained over time. An effective exercise program maximizes efficiency, resources, time, and funding by ensuring that exercises are part of a coordinated and integrated approach to building, sustaining, and delivering core capabilities.

Key elements of HSEEP’s approach to exercise program management include:

• Engaging Elected and Appointed Officials to Provide Intent and Direction. Elected and appointed officials must be engaged early and often in an exercise program. They provide both the strategic direction for the program as well as specific guidance for individual exercises. Routine engagement with elected and appointed officials ensures that exercises have the support necessary for success.

• Establishing Multi-year Exercise Program Priorities. These overarching priorities inform the development of exercise objectives, ensuring that individual exercises evaluate and assess core capabilities in a coordinated and integrated fashion.

• Using a Progressive Approach. A progressive exercise program management approach includes exercises anchored to a common set of objectives, built toward an increasing level of complexity over time, and involves the participation of multiple entities.

• Developing a Multi-year Training and Exercise Plan. A TEP, developed through a TEPW, aligns exercise activities and supporting training to exercise program priorities.

• Maintaining a Rolling Summary of Exercise Outcomes. A rolling summary report provides elected and appointed officials and other stakeholders with an analysis of issues, trends, and key outcomes from all exercises conducted as part of the exercise program.

• Managing Exercise Program Resources. An effective exercise program utilizes the full range of available resources for exercise budgets, program staffing, and other resources.

Exercise Methodology HSEEP uses a common methodology for planning and conducting individual exercises. This methodology applies to exercises in support of all national preparedness mission areas. A common methodology ensures a consistent and interoperable approach to exercise design and development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning, as depicted in Figure 1.1. The following chapters contain more detailed descriptions of each phase.

Figure 1.1: HSEEP Exercise Cycle

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 1-3

Exercise Design and Development In designing and developing individual exercises, exercise planning team members are identified to schedule planning meetings, identify and develop exercise objectives, design the scenario, create documentation, plan exercise conduct and evaluation, and coordinate logistics. At key points in this process, the exercise planning team engages elected and appointed officials to ensure their intent is captured and that the officials are prepared to support the exercise as necessary.

Exercise Conduct After design and development activities are complete, the exercise is ready to occur. Activities essential to conducting individual exercises include preparing for exercise play, managing exercise play, and conducting immediate exercise wrap-up activities.

Exercise Evaluation Evaluation is the cornerstone of an exercise and must be considered throughout all phases of the exercise planning cycle, beginning when the exercise planning team meets to establish objectives and initiate exercise design. Effective evaluation assesses performance against exercise objectives, and identifies and documents strengths and areas for improvement relative to core capabilities.

Improvement Planning During improvement planning, the corrective actions identified during individual exercises are tracked to completion, ensuring that exercises yield tangible preparedness improvements. An effective corrective action program develops IPs that are dynamic documents, which are continually monitored and implemented as part of the larger system of improving preparedness.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 2-1

2. Exercise Program Management Overview Exercise program management is the process of overseeing and integrating a variety of exercises over time. An effective exercise program helps organizations maximize efficiency, resources, time, and funding by ensuring that exercises are part of a coordinated, integrated approach to building, sustaining, and delivering core capabilities. This approach—called multi-year planning—begins when elected and appointed officials, working with whole community stakeholders, identify and develop a set of multi-year exercise priorities informed by existing assessments, strategies, and plans. These long-term priorities help exercise planners design and develop a progressive program of individual exercises to build, sustain, and deliver core capabilities.

Effective exercise program management promotes a multi-year approach to:

• Engaging elected and appointed officials

• Establishing multi-year exercise program priorities

• Developing a multi-year TEP

• Maintaining a rolling summary of exercise outcomes

• Managing exercise program resources Through effective exercise program management, each exercise becomes a supporting component of a larger exercise program with overarching priorities. Exercise practitioners are encouraged to apply and adapt HSEEP doctrine on exercise program management to meet their specific needs.

Engage Elected and Appointed Officials Engaging elected and appointed officials in the exercise process is critical because they provide both the strategic direction for the exercise program, as well as specific guidance for individual exercises. As representatives of the public, elected and appointed officials ensure that exercise program priorities are supported at the highest level and align to whole community needs and priorities. Elected and appointed officials should be engaged early and often in an exercise program, starting with the development of exercise program priorities at the TEPW. In developing individual exercises, the exercise planning team should continue to engage their appropriate elected and appointed officials throughout the exercise planning cycle in order to ensure the leaders’ vision for the exercise is achieved.

Multi-year Exercise Program Priorities An exercise program should be based on a set of strategic, high-level priorities selected by an organization’s elected and appointed officials. These priorities guide the development of exercise objectives, ensuring that individual exercises build and sustain preparedness in a progressive and coordinated fashion. Exercise program priorities are developed at the TEPW, as described in the following sections.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 2-2

Training and Exercise Planning Workshop Purpose

The TEPW establishes the strategy and structure for an exercise program. In addition, it sets the foundation for the planning, conduct, and evaluation of individual exercises. The purpose of the TEPW is to use the guidance provided by elected and appointed officials to identify and set exercise program priorities and develop a multi-year schedule of exercise events and supporting training activities to meet those priorities. This process ensures whole community exercise initiatives are coordinated, prevents duplication of effort, promotes the efficient use of resources, avoids overextending key agencies and personnel, and maximizes the efficacy of training and exercise appropriations. TEPWs are held on a periodic basis (e.g., annual or biennial) depending on the needs of the program and any grant or cooperative agreement requirements. Participation

When identifying stakeholders, exercise program managers should consider individuals from organizations throughout the whole community, including but not limited to:

• Elected and appointed officials responsible for providing direction and guidance for exercise program priorities and those responsible for providing resources to support exercises;

• Representatives from relevant disciplines that would be part of the exercises or any real-world events, including appropriate regional or local Federal department/agency representatives;

• Individuals with administrative responsibility relevant to exercise conduct; and

• Representatives from volunteer, nongovernmental, nonprofit, or social support organizations, including advocates for children, seniors, individuals with disabilities, those with access and functional needs, racially and ethnically diverse communities, people with limited English proficiency, and animals.

Once a comprehensive set of stakeholders has been identified, exercise program managers can include them in the exercise program by having them regularly participate in TEPWs. Conduct of the TEPW

When developing exercise program priorities and the multi-year schedule at the TEPW, stakeholders should engage organizational elected and appointed officials early in the process to obtain their intent and guidance. TEPW participants also review and consider various factors such as:

• Jurisdiction-specific threats and hazards (e.g., Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment [THIRA], local risk assessments);

• Areas for improvement identified from real-world events and exercises;

• External requirements such as State or national preparedness reports, homeland security policy (e.g., the National Preparedness Goal), and industry reports; and

• Accreditation standards (e.g., hospital accreditation requirements), regulations, or legislative requirements.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 2-3

Figure 2.1 illustrates some of the specific factors for consideration in developing exercise program priorities.

Figure 2.1: Factors for Consideration in Developing Exercise Program Priorities

Drawing on the above factors and core capabilities, the workshop facilitator leads a group stakeholder discussion to review exercise program priorities and outline training and exercise priorities shared across multiple organizations. The group should also develop a multi-year schedule of training and exercise activities designed to meet those priorities.

At the conclusion of the TEPW, program managers will have a clear understanding of specific multi-year training and exercise program priorities, and any available information on previously planned training and exercises that align to those priorities. This combined set of information is used to develop a multi-year TEP.

Multi-year Training and Exercise Plan Once the training and exercise program priorities have been outlined, stakeholders develop the multi-year TEP. The TEP identifies a combination of exercises—along with associated training requirements—that address the priorities identified in the TEPW.

Progressive Approach A progressive, multi-year exercise program enables organizations to participate in a series of increasingly complex exercises, with each successive exercise building upon the previous one until mastery is achieved. Regardless of exercise type, each exercise within the progressive series is linked to a set of common program priorities and designed to test associated capabilities.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 2-4

Further, by defining training requirements in the planning process, organizations can address known shortfalls prior to exercising capabilities.

This progressive approach, with exercises that build upon each other and are supported at each step with training resources, will ensure that organizations do not rush into a full-scale exercise too quickly. Effective planning of exercises and integration of the necessary training will reduce the waste of limited exercise resources and serve to address known shortfalls prior to the conduct of the exercise. The different types of exercises that may be included in the multi-year plan are described in the following sections.

Discussion-Based Exercises Discussion-based exercises include seminars, workshops, tabletop exercises (TTXs), and games. These types of exercises can be used to familiarize players with, or develop new, plans, policies, agreements, and procedures. Discussion-based exercises focus on strategic, policy-oriented issues. Facilitators and/or presenters usually lead the discussion, keeping participants on track towards meeting exercise objectives. Seminars

Seminars generally orient participants to, or provide an overview of, authorities, strategies, plans, policies, procedures, protocols, resources, concepts, and ideas. As a discussion-based exercise, seminars can be valuable for entities that are developing or making major changes to existing plans or procedures. Seminars can be similarly helpful when attempting to assess or gain awareness of the capabilities of interagency or inter-jurisdictional operations. Workshops

Although similar to seminars, workshops differ in two important aspects: participant interaction is increased, and the focus is placed on achieving or building a product. Effective workshops entail the broadest attendance by relevant stakeholders.

Products produced from a workshop can include new standard operating procedures (SOPs), emergency operations plans, continuity of operations plans, or mutual aid agreements. To be effective, workshops should have clearly defined objectives, products, or goals, and should focus on a specific issue. Tabletop Exercises

A TTX is intended to generate discussion of various issues regarding a hypothetical, simulated emergency. TTXs can be used to enhance general awareness, validate plans and procedures, rehearse concepts, and/or assess the types of systems needed to guide the prevention of, protection from, mitigation of, response to, and recovery from a defined incident. Generally, TTXs are aimed at facilitating conceptual understanding, identifying strengths and areas for improvement, and/or achieving changes in perceptions.

During a TTX, players are encouraged to discuss issues in depth, collaboratively examining areas of concern and solving problems. The effectiveness of a TTX is derived from the energetic

A progressive exercise program is a series of exercises tied to a set of common program priorities. Each exercise builds on previous exercises using more sophisticated simulation techniques or requiring more preparation time, personnel, and planning.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 2-5

involvement of participants and their assessment of recommended revisions to current policies, procedures, and plans.

TTXs can range from basic to complex. In a basic TTX (such as a Facilitated Discussion), the scenario is presented and remains constant—it describes an emergency and brings discussion participants up to the simulated present time. Players apply their knowledge and skills to a list of problems presented by the facilitator; problems are discussed as a group; and resolution is reached and documented for later analysis.

In a more advanced TTX, play advances as players receive pre-scripted messages that alter the original scenario. A facilitator usually introduces problems one at a time in the form of a written message, simulated telephone call, videotape, or other means. Players discuss the issues raised by each problem, referencing established authorities, plans, and procedures for guidance. Player decisions are incorporated as the scenario continues to unfold.

During a TTX, all participants should be encouraged to contribute to the discussion and be reminded that they are making decisions in a no-fault environment. Effective TTX facilitation is critical to keeping participants focused on exercise objectives and associated capability targets. Games

A game is a simulation of operations that often involves two or more teams, usually in a competitive environment, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or hypothetical situation. Games explore the consequences of player decisions and actions. They are useful tools for validating plans and procedures or evaluating resource requirements.

During game play, decision-making may be either slow and deliberate or rapid and more stressful, depending on the exercise design and objectives. The open, decision-based format of a game can incorporate “what if” questions that expand exercise benefits. Depending on the game’s design, the consequences of player actions can be either pre-scripted or decided dynamically. Identifying critical decision-making points is a major factor in the success of evaluating a game.

Operations-Based Exercises Operations-based exercises include drills, functional exercises (FEs), and full-scale exercises (FSEs). These exercises can be used to validate plans, policies, agreements, and procedures; clarify roles and responsibilities; and identify resource gaps. Operations-based exercises are characterized by actual reaction to an exercise scenario, such as initiating communications or mobilizing personnel and resources. Drills

A drill is a coordinated, supervised activity usually employed to validate a specific function or capability in a single agency or organization. Drills are commonly used to provide training on new equipment, validate procedures, or practice and maintain current skills. For example, drills may be appropriate for establishing a community-designated disaster receiving center or shelter. Drills can also be used to determine if plans can be executed as designed, to assess whether more training is required, or to reinforce best practices. A drill is useful as a stand-alone tool, but a series of drills can be used to prepare several organizations to collaborate in an FSE.

For every drill, clearly defined plans, procedures, and protocols need to be in place. Personnel need to be familiar with those plans and trained in the processes and procedures to be drilled.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 2-6

Functional Exercises

FEs are designed to validate and evaluate capabilities, multiple functions and/or sub-functions, or interdependent groups of functions. FEs are typically focused on exercising plans, policies, procedures, and staff members involved in management, direction, command, and control functions. In FEs, events are projected through an exercise scenario with event updates that drive activity typically at the management level. An FE is conducted in a realistic, real-time environment; however, movement of personnel and equipment is usually simulated.

FE controllers typically use a Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) to ensure participant activity remains within predefined boundaries and ensure exercise objectives are accomplished. Simulators in a Simulation Cell (SimCell) can inject scenario elements to simulate real events. Full-Scale Exercises

FSEs are typically the most complex and resource-intensive type of exercise. They involve multiple agencies, organizations, and jurisdictions and validate many facets of preparedness. FSEs often include many players operating under cooperative systems such as the Incident Command System (ICS) or Unified Command.

In an FSE, events are projected through an exercise scenario with event updates that drive activity at the operational level. FSEs are usually conducted in a real-time, stressful environment that is intended to mirror a real incident. Personnel and resources may be mobilized and deployed to the scene, where actions are performed as if a real incident had occurred. The FSE simulates reality by presenting complex and realistic problems that require critical thinking, rapid problem solving, and effective responses by trained personnel.

The level of support needed to conduct an FSE is greater than that needed for other types of exercises. The exercise site for an FSE is usually large, and site logistics require close monitoring. Safety issues, particularly regarding the use of props and special effects, must be monitored. Throughout the duration of the exercise, many activities occur simultaneously.

Rolling Summary of Outcomes To help ensure that exercise program priorities are adequately addressed, exercise program managers should periodically develop and distribute a rolling summary of exercise outcomes, or rolling summary report. A rolling summary report provides stakeholders with an analysis of issues, trends, and key outcomes from all exercises conducted as part of the exercise program. This report is designed to:

• Inform elected and appointed officials on the progress of the exercise program;

• Provide data to support preparedness assessments and reporting requirements; and

• Enable exercise planners to modify objectives and the exercise schedule to reflect knowledge gathered from the exercises.

The rolling summary report is not a collection of AARs, but rather an analysis of trends across exercises. It is developed periodically throughout the series of exercises covered in a multi-year TEP (e.g., quarterly or biennially, depending how many exercises are conducted). This report is

The rolling summary report is an analysis of exercise trends, which guides the development of future exercises.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 2-7

intended to serve as an exercise program management and communications tool, which informs stakeholders and guides the development of future exercises.

Manage Exercise Program Resources An effective exercise program should utilize the full range of available resources. Program managers should ensure that they have planned for an exercise budget, program staffing, and other resources.

Exercise Budget Management Effective budget management is essential to the success of an exercise program, and it is important for exercise managers to maintain awareness of their available resources and expected expenditures. In developing and maintaining an exercise program budget, program managers should work with the full range of stakeholders to identify financial resources and define monitoring and reporting requirements as required by individual exercises.

Program Staffing Program managers should identify the administrative and operational staff needed to oversee the exercise program. The TEP can be one basis for determining exercise program staffing needs in addition to grant funds or other programmatic considerations. Program managers should also identify gaps between staffing availability and staffing needs. Exercise program managers can consider alternative means of procuring staff members, such as adding volunteers, students from universities (e.g., student nurses or emergency management students), or interns.

Other Resources Exercise program managers should also consider other resources that can support exercises. Such resources can include:

• Information technology (e.g., modeling and simulation capabilities)

• Exercise tools and resources (e.g., document templates)

• Materials from previous exercises

• Training courses

• Mutual aid agreements, memoranda of understanding, and memoranda of agreement

• Technical assistance

• Equipment or props (e.g., smoke machines)

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-1

3. Exercise Design and Development Overview In the design and development phase, exercise practitioners use the intent and guidance of their elected and appointed officials and the exercise program priorities developed in Program Management to plan individual exercises. Exercise planning teams apply this guidance to shape the key concepts and planning considerations for an individual exercise or series of exercises. The eight key steps of exercise design and development include:

• Setting the exercise foundation by reviewing elected and appointed officials’ guidance, the TEP, and other factors;

• Selecting participants for an exercise planning team and developing an exercise planning timeline with milestones;

• Developing exercise-specific objectives and identifying core capabilities based on the guidance of elected and appointed officials;

• Identifying evaluation requirements;

• Developing the exercise scenario;

• Creating documentation;

• Coordinating logistics; and

• Planning for exercise control and evaluation.

Exercise practitioners are encouraged to apply and adapt HSEEP doctrine on exercise design and development to meet their specific needs.

Exercise Foundation The exercise foundation is a set of key factors that drive the exercise design and development process. Prior to the beginning of its design, exercise program managers should review and consider the following items:

• Elected and appointed officials’ intent and guidance

• Multi-year TEP

• Relevant AAR/IPs from real-world events and exercises

• THIRA or other risk, threat, and hazard assessments

• Organizational plans and procedures

• Grant or cooperative agreement requirements. By reviewing these elements, exercise program managers adhere to the progressive approach to exercises, and ensure the exercise builds and sustains a jurisdiction’s capabilities while taking prior lessons learned into account during the exercise design process.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-2

Exercise Planning Team and Events Exercise Planning Team Considerations The exercise planning team manages, and is ultimately responsible for, exercise design, development, conduct, and evaluation. Using the exercise program priorities and guidance from elected and appointed officials, the team determines exercise objectives and core capabilities to be assessed; creates a realistic scenario to assess them; and develops supporting documentation, processes, and systems that are used in evaluation, control, and simulation. Planning team members also help with developing and distributing pre-exercise materials, and conducting exercise planning meetings, briefings, and training sessions. An Exercise Director with authority to make decisions for the sponsoring organization provides direction to, and oversight of, the exercise planning team.

The exercise planning team should be of manageable size yet represent the full range of participating organizations as well as other relevant stakeholders. For multi-jurisdictional exercises, planning team members should include representatives from each jurisdiction and participating functional areas or relevant disciplines. The membership of an exercise planning team should be modified to fit the type or scope of an exercise, which varies depending on exercise type and complexity. Usually the exercise planning team is managed by a designated team leader. To design and develop exercises most effectively, exercise planning teams should:

• Adhere to a clear organizational structure, with a distinct chain of command, roles and responsibilities, and accountability to the exercise planning team leader;

• Use proven management practices, processes, and tools, such as project plans and timelines, status reports, and other communications;

• Identify and understand the desired objectives and associated core capabilities for the exercise, and design and develop the exercise accordingly;

• Incorporate evaluation planning from the start of exercise design and development; and

• Use subject-matter experts (SMEs) to develop a realistic and challenging scenario. Support agencies/organizations including advocates for children, seniors, individuals with disabilities, those with access and functional needs, diverse communities, and people with limited English proficiency should also be included throughout the planning process. In doing so, exercise planners can better understand their perspectives and promote early understanding of roles, responsibilities, and planning assumptions.

Generally, planning team members are not exercise players. When resources are limited, exercise planning team members who act as both planners and players should be especially careful not to divulge sensitive exercise information to other players.

Whole community stakeholders include:

All levels of government Volunteer organizations Community groups Private entities Nonprofit organizations Faith-based groups Groups working with individuals

with disabilities or access and functional needs

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-3

Exercise Planning Team Positions Regardless of the scale and complexity of an exercise, the exercise planning team can be most effective if it adheres to a coherent organizational structure that clearly delineates roles and responsibilities. In developing a structure for the planning team, exercise planners may use ICS principles, as established in the National Incident Management System (NIMS). This structure can expand or contract to reflect the scope of the exercise and the available resources and personnel of the participating organizations; depending on available resources, the same personnel can be used to execute multiple functions. This structure may include the following, which is illustrated in Figure 3.1:

Figure 3.1: Sample Exercise Planning Team

• Command Section. The Command Section coordinates all exercise planning activities. The Command Section includes the exercise planning team leader, who assigns exercise activities and responsibilities, provides guidance, establishes timelines, and monitors the development process.

• Operations Section. The Operations Section provides most of the technical or functional expertise for scenario development and evaluation. This includes development of the Master Scenario Events List (MSEL).

• Planning Section. The Planning Section is responsible for compiling and developing all exercise documentation. The Planning Section collects and reviews policies, plans, and procedures that will be assessed in the exercise. This group is also responsible for planning exercise evaluation. During the exercise, the Planning Section may be responsible for developing simulated actions by agencies not participating in the exercise and for setting up a SimCell as required.

• Logistics Section. The Logistics Section provides the supplies, materials, facilities, and services that enable the exercise to function smoothly without outside interference or disruption. This section consists of two subsections: service and support. The service subsection provides transportation, barricading, signage, food and drinks, real-life medical capability, and exercise security. The support subsection provides

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-4

communications, purchasing, general supplies, management of very important persons (VIPs) and observer processing, and recruitment and management of actors.

• Administration/Finance Section. The Administration/Finance Section provides financial management and administrative support throughout exercise development, including exercise registration support and scheduling.

Planning Activities This section describes the types of planning activities—often in the form of planning meetings4

Concept and Objectives Meeting

—most useful in exercise design and development. The exercise planning team members decide the type and number of planning activities needed to successfully plan a given exercise, based on its scope and complexity. When arranging meeting and exercise site locations, the planning team should take into consideration those individuals who require assistance or accommodations during attendance.

Primary Focus A Concept and Objectives (C&O) Meeting is the formal beginning of the planning process. It is held to identify the scope and objectives of the exercise. For less complex exercises and for organizations with limited resources, the C&O Meeting can be conducted in conjunction with the Initial Planning Meeting (IPM).

Elected and appointed officials, representatives from the sponsoring organization, participating organizations, and the exercise planning team leader typically attend the C&O Meeting. The C&O Meeting helps planners determine the exercise program priorities to be addressed based on elected and appointed officials’ guidance, design objectives based on those priorities, align exercise objectives to core capabilities, and identify exercise planning team members.

Discussion Points Topics or issues generally covered during a C&O Meeting include the following:

• Exercise scope

• Proposed exercise objectives and their aligned core capabilities

• Proposed exercise location, date, and duration

• Participants and anticipated extent of play for exercise participants

• Exercise planning team

• Exercise assumptions and artificialities

• Exercise control and evaluation concepts

• Exercise security organization and structure

• Available exercise resources

• Exercise logistics

4 HSEEP uses the term “meetings” to indicate smaller events focused on a specific topic (exercise planning), rather than “conferences,” which are generally larger gatherings with broader agendas.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-5

• Exercise planning timeline and milestones

• Local issues, concerns, and sensitivities

Tools The primary tools for the C&O Meeting are an agenda and the background and rationale for conducting the exercise. A briefing is useful for presenting the exercise background and rationale, as well as exercise methodology for persons unfamiliar with HSEEP. Outcomes

The following outcomes are expected from the C&O Meeting:

• Agreement regarding exercise concept (scope, type, mission area[s], exercise program priorities to be addressed), exercise objectives, and aligned core capabilities;

• Consensus on the target exercise timeframe;

• Anticipated extent of participation;

• Identification of exercise planning team members; and

• Exercise planning timeline with milestones, including the date of the next planning meeting.

Initial Planning Meeting

Primary Focus The IPM marks the beginning of the exercise development phase. Regardless of whether a C&O Meeting is held, an IPM should be conducted for all exercises. Its purpose is to determine exercise scope by getting intent and direction from elected and appointed officials, and gathering input from the exercise planning team; and to identify exercise design requirements and conditions (e.g., assumptions and artificialities), exercise objectives, participant extent of play, and scenario variables (e.g., time, location, hazard selection). The IPM is also used to develop exercise documentation by obtaining the planning team’s input on exercise location, schedule, duration, and other relevant details.

During the IPM, exercise planning team members are assigned responsibility for activities associated with designing and developing exercise documents, such as the Exercise Plan (ExPlan) and the Situation Manual (SitMan), and coordinating exercise logistics.

Discussion Points Topics or issues generally covered during an IPM include the following:

• Clearly defined exercise objectives and aligned core capabilities;

• Evaluation requirements, including EEG capability targets and critical tasks;

• Relevant plans, policies, and procedures to be tested in the exercise;

• Exercise scenario;

• Modeling and simulation planning;

• Extent of play for each participating organization;

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-6

• Optimum duration of the exercise;

• Exercise planners’ roles and responsibilities;

• Decision to record exercise proceedings (audio or video);

• Local issues, concerns, or sensitivities;

• Any discussion points typically covered during a C&O Meeting if a C&O Meeting was not conducted; and

• Consensus regarding the date, time, and location for the next meeting.

Tools The primary tools for the IPM are the read-ahead packet, agenda, core capabilities, threat and hazard information (if applicable), a proposed room layout (if applicable), and the exercise planning timeline with milestones. A briefing is useful for presenting an overview of the exercise and meeting discussion points.

Outcomes The IPM results in desired outcomes, such as:

• Any outcomes listed in the C&O Meeting section above if a C&O Meeting was not conducted;

• Clearly defined exercise objectives and aligned core capabilities;

• Initial capability targets and critical tasks, which will be reviewed and confirmed prior to the next planning meeting;

• Identified exercise scenario variables (e.g., threat scenario, scope of hazard, venue, conditions);

• A list of participating exercise organizations and anticipated organizational extent of play;

• Draft SitMan or ExPlan;

• Identification and availability of all source documents (e.g., policies, plans, procedures) needed to draft exercise documents and presentations;

• A refined exercise planning timeline with milestones;

• Identification and availability of SMEs, as necessary, for scenario vetting and/or expert evaluation;

• Determination of preferred communication methods among the exercise planning team;

• Clearly identified and assigned responsibility for exercise logistical issues;

• A list of tasks to be accomplished by the next planning meeting with established dates for completion and responsible planning team members identified; and

• An agreed-upon date, time, and location for the next planning meeting and the actual exercise.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-7

Midterm Planning Meeting

Midterm Planning Meetings (MPMs) provide additional opportunities to engage elected and appointed officials and to settle logistical and organizational issues that may arise during exercise planning.

Primary Focus The MPM is a meeting to discuss exercise organization and staffing concepts, scenario and timeline development, scheduling, logistics, and administrative requirements. It is also held to review draft documentation. If only three planning meetings are scheduled (i.e., IPM, MPM, and Final Planning Meeting [FPM]), a portion of the MPM should be devoted to developing the MSEL, as needed. See the next section, MSEL Meeting, for more information.

Prior to the MPM, the exercise team leader should engage elected and appointed officials to provide awareness of the planning process, address any questions, and ensure alignment with guidance and intent.

Discussion Points Possible topics or issues for an MPM include the following:

• Comments on draft exercise documentation

• Construction of the scenario timeline—usually the MSEL—if an additional MSEL Planning Meeting will not be held

• Identification of exercise venue artificialities and/or limitations

• Agreement on final logistical items

• Assignment of additional responsibilities

Tools MPM tools include, but are not limited to, an agenda, IPM minutes, draft scenario timeline, draft documentation (e.g., ExPlan, Controller/Evaluator [C/E] Handbook), and other selected documentation needed to illustrate exercise concepts and provide planning guidance.

Outcomes The following outcomes are expected from the MPM:

• Fully reviewed SitMan or ExPlan;

• Draft Facilitator Guide or C/E Handbook, including EEGs;

• A fully reviewed exercise scenario timeline, which is typically the MSEL (if an additional MSEL Meeting will not be held);

• Well-developed scenario injects (imperative if an additional MSEL Planning Meeting is not scheduled);

• Agreement on the exercise site; and

• Finalization of date, time, and location of the MSEL Planning Meeting and/or FPM.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-8

Master Scenario Events List Meeting

For more complex exercises, one or more additional planning meetings—or MSEL Meetings—may be held to review the scenario timeline. If not held separately, topics typically covered in a separate MSEL Meeting can be incorporated into the MPM and FPM.

Primary Focus The MSEL Meeting focuses on developing the MSEL, which is a chronological list that supplements the exercise scenario with event synopses, expected participant responses, objectives and core capability targets to be addressed, and responsible personnel. It includes specific scenario events (or injects) that prompt players to implement the plans, policies, procedures, and protocols that require testing during the exercise, as identified in the capabilities-based planning process. It also records the methods that will be used to provide injects (e.g., phone call, radio call, e-mail).

Discussion Points In developing a MSEL, the exercise planning team should first consider the critical tasks, conditions, and standards set forth by each exercise objective. A condition is the environment in which a task is performed; it can be provided by the scenario or through the MSEL.

If scenario conditions do not trigger performance of the appropriate critical task, the exercise planning team should develop a MSEL entry to simulate the desired situation. A well-written entry considers the following questions:

• Is the event key (i.e., is it directly related to meeting an exercise objective)?

• What is the desired critical task? Who will demonstrate the critical task?

• What will stimulate the behavior (e.g., course of play, phone call, actor, video)?

• Who originates the stimulant? Who receives it and how?

• What action is the player expected to complete?

• Should a contingency entry be developed for injection into the exercise in case the players fail to demonstrate the critical task?

Tools MSEL Meeting tools include, but are not limited to, previous planning meeting minutes, draft exercise documentation, and an agreed-upon MSEL template.

Outcomes Following a MSEL Meeting, the level of MSEL completion may vary. At a minimum, key events and the time of their delivery are identified, and responsibility for constructing the remaining events is assigned.

MSEL entries are tied to the Exercise Evaluation Guide critical tasks to ensure the critical tasks and core capabilities can be demonstrated during the exercise.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-9

Final Planning Meeting

The FPM is the final forum for reviewing exercise processes and procedures. Both before and after the FPM, the exercise team leader should engage elected and appointed officials to ensure that the exercise is aligning with their intent, address any questions, and receive any last-minute guidance.

Primary Focus An FPM should be conducted for all exercises to ensure that all elements of the exercise are ready for conduct. Prior to the FPM, the exercise planning team receives final drafts of all exercise materials. No major changes to the exercise’s design, scope, or supporting documentation should take place at or following the FPM. The FPM ensures that all logistical requirements have been met, outstanding issues have been identified and resolved, and exercise products are ready for printing.

Discussion Points The following items are addressed during the FPM:

• Conduct a comprehensive, final review and approve all remaining draft exercise documents (e.g., SitMan, MSEL, C/E Handbook, EEGs) and presentation materials;

• Resolve any open exercise planning issues and identify last-minute concerns; and

• Review all exercise logistical activities (e.g., schedule, registration, attire, special needs).

Tools The primary tools for the FPM include IPM and/or MPM minutes, an agenda, and previously finalized and/or drafted exercise documents.

Outcomes The FPM should not generate any significant changes. The following outcomes are expected:

• Exercise documents and materials for production are approved;

• Attendees understand and approve exercise processes and procedures;

• Last-minute issues are identified and resolved; and

• Logistical elements, including equipment, facilities, and schedule, are confirmed.

Follow-Up The exercise planning team finalizes all publications, prepares all supporting materials, rehearses presentations and briefings, and prepares to conduct the exercise. Prior to the exercise, documentation and any additional instructions should be disseminated to the appropriate personnel (e.g., presenters, facilitators, controllers, evaluators, simulators).

Exercise Design The exercise planning meetings serve as the principal mechanism for executing the major steps of exercise design. The core components of design include establishing the scope of the exercise, setting exercise objectives, creating an exercise scenario, developing exercise documentation, and determining media and public relations guidance.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-10

Scope Determining exercise scope enables planners to “right-size” an exercise to meet the objectives while staying within the resource and personnel constraints of the exercising organizations. Key elements in defining exercise scope include exercise type, participation level, exercise duration, exercise location, and exercise parameters. Some of these elements are determined, or initially discussed, through program management activities or grant requirements. However, the exercise planning team finalizes the scope based on the exercise objectives. Alterations to the scope are reviewed with the exercise objectives in mind; planners must consider whether a change in the scope will improve or impede the ability of players to meet the objectives. Exercise Type

A first step in defining exercise scope is determining what exercise type to conduct. The exercise type is selected based on the purpose of the exercise. If the intent is to review and discuss a new policy, plan, or set of procedures, a discussion-based exercise may be appropriate. If the intent is to assess the responders’ knowledge of a plan, policy, or set of procedures, an operations-based exercise may be appropriate. Participation Level

Active participation by appropriate entities and key leaders is paramount to meeting the exercise objectives successfully. Participation level refers to the organizations and level of personnel (e.g., tactical operators, line supervisors, agency directors) participating in the exercise, as well as the general number of personnel who will participate in the exercise.

At times, scheduling conflicts, real-world events, or other competing requirements will limit an organization’s or key players’ ability to participate in an exercise. In this case, exercise designers will need to simulate the decisions and actions of those participants through an exercise SimCell. An Extent of Play Agreement (XPA) defines the level of participation. Exercise Duration

When selecting the exercise duration, the planning team should determine how long it will take to address the exercise objectives effectively. Discussion-based exercises and some drills are generally shorter, ranging from a couple of hours to a full day. FEs and FSEs may take longer. Prevention-focused FEs that exercise the intelligence and information sharing core capability may last up to 30 days with limited duration of play each day. Resource constraints, including the opportunity cost of having employees away from their primary roles, should be factored into determining duration. Exercise Parameters

Exercise parameters clearly outline what should be included in an exercise scenario based on the objectives and scope, and what should not be exercised. Often there is a desire to add exercise activities that fall outside of the scope of the exercise in order to meet diverse planning and training requirements. While these activities may be useful to an organization, they may impact the ability of players to meet exercise objectives or may reduce the benefit of the exercise by diluting its focus. Clearly defining the exercise scope early in the design process will help exercise planners keep the exercise to a manageable and realistic level.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-11

Exercise Objectives Based on direction from elected and appointed officials, the exercise planning team selects one or more exercise program priorities on which to focus an individual exercise. These priorities drive the development of exercise objectives, which are distinct outcomes that an organization wishes to achieve during an exercise. Exercise objectives should incorporate elected and appointed officials’ intent and guidance, and exercise participants’ plans and procedures, operating environment, and desired outcomes. Generally, planners should select a reasonable number of specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound (SMART) exercise objectives to facilitate effective scenario design, exercise conduct, and evaluation. Table 3.1 depicts guidelines for developing SMART objectives.

SMART Guidelines for Exercise Objectives

Specific Objectives should address the five Ws- who, what, when, where, and why. The objective specifies what needs to be done with a timeline for completion.

Measurable Objectives should include numeric or descriptive measures that define quantity, quality, cost, etc. Their focus should be on observable actions and outcomes.

Achievable Objectives should be within the control, influence, and resources of exercise play and participant actions.

Relevant Objectives should be instrumental to the mission of the organization and link to its goals or strategic intent.

Time-bound A specified and reasonable timeframe should be incorporated into all objectives.

Table 3.1: SMART Guidelines for Exercise Objectives

The exercise planning team aligns each exercise objective to one or more core capabilities. Figure 3.2 shows the relationship between exercise program priorities, exercise objectives, and core capabilities.

Figure 3.2: Priorities, Objectives, and Core Capabilities

Aligning objectives to a common set of capabilities enables:

• Systematic tracking of progress over the course of exercise programs and/or cycles;

• Standardized exercise data collection to inform preparedness assessments; and

• Fulfillment of grant or funding-specific reporting requirements.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-12

Evaluation Requirements It is important to develop exercise evaluation requirements early in the design process, as they will guide development of the exercise scenario, discussion questions, and/or MSEL. Evaluation requirements clearly articulate what will be evaluated during the exercise and how exercise play will be assessed. This information is documented in the EEGs.

Once the exercise planning team aligns objectives to core capabilities, it identifies which capability targets and critical tasks for each core capability are being addressed by the exercise. Capability targets are the performance thresholds for each core capability; they state the exact amount of capability that players aim to achieve. Generally, these targets are based on targets identified as part of an organization’s or jurisdiction’s THIRA or other threat and hazard identification or risk assessment process. Critical tasks are the distinct elements required to perform a core capability. Critical tasks may be derived from Mission Area Frameworks, organizational operations plans or SOPs, or discipline-specific standards.

Scenario A scenario is an outline or model of the simulated sequence of events for the exercise. It can be written as a narrative or depicted by an event timeline. For discussion-based exercises, a scenario provides the backdrop that drives participant discussion, and is contained in a SitMan. For operations-based exercises, a scenario provides background information about the incident catalyst(s) of the exercise. The overall scenario is provided in the C/E Handbook, and specific scenario events are contained in the MSEL.

Exercise planners should select and develop scenarios that enable an exercise to assess objectives and core capabilities. All scenarios should be realistic, plausible, and challenging; however, designers must ensure the scenario is not so complicated that it overwhelms players.

A scenario consists of three basic elements: (1) the general context or comprehensive story; (2) the required conditions that will allow players to demonstrate proficiency and competency in conducting critical tasks, demonstrating core capabilities, and meeting objectives; and (3) the technical details necessary to accurately depict scenario conditions and events. The exercise planning team ensures that the design effort is not characterized by a fixation on scenario development; rather, the scenario facilitates assessment of exercise objectives and core capabilities. Because of this, exercise planners should refrain from developing the scenario until after the scope and objectives of the exercise have been clearly defined. Furthermore, scenarios should avoid any sensitivity that may arise, such as the use of real names of terrorist groups or sensitive venues. Threat or Hazard

The first step in designing a scenario is determining the type of threat or hazard on which the exercise will focus. Each type of emergency has its own strengths and weaknesses when it comes to evaluating different aspects of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. The exercise planning team should choose a threat or hazard that best assesses the objectives and core capabilities on which the exercise will focus. The identification of this threat or hazard scenario should also be based on the organization’s threat/hazard identification and risk assessment.5

5 For further guidance on identifying and assessing risks and associated impacts, please refer to the DHS Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201: Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide, First Edition, April 2012.

Developing and maintaining these risk analyses is an essential component of

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-13

the National Preparedness System, as they enable organizations to identify potential events that would stress their core preparedness capabilities. Modeling and Simulation

When incorporated into the development of the scenario and overall exercise design, modeling and simulation can bring versatility, cost savings, and fidelity to exercises. A model is a representation of a system at a point in time or space intended to expand an understanding of the real system. Simulation is a method of implementing the performance of a model, or combination of models, over time. Modeling and simulation supports decision-making processes by providing human and/or computer feedback to players during exercise play, thus dynamically representing the impact of their decisions. For example, human-based simulation during exercises is often manifested through the SimCell, which represents nonparticipating entities. An example of a computer-based simulation could include wind damage and storm surge forecasting models developed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which enable simulation of a hurricane’s effects on coastal communities.

Modeling and simulation can also be applied in situations where reality cannot be achieved. For example, for safety reasons a bioterrorism exercise cannot be conducted by releasing a deadly virus into the environment. However, it is still important to exercise the capabilities necessary to respond to this type of scenario. The use of modeling and simulation can realistically replicate variables such as disease propagation, radiation, and chemical attacks.

Exercise Documentation Comprehensive, organized exercise documentation is critical to ensure an accurate account of the exercise is preserved. This in turn allows organizations to leverage past documentation to support future exercises and, more importantly, ensures that all critical issues, lessons learned, and corrective actions are appropriately captured to support improvement efforts.

While most exercise materials are not sensitive or classified, some materials (e.g., scenario details) may necessitate restrictions on distribution. It is important for the exercise sponsor(s) to understand the specific requirements for security marking rules and requirements, access and dissemination, storage, disposal, and incident reporting of sensitive documents.

Consideration should also be given to the accessibility of presentations and documents, such as making information available in alternative formats (e.g., large print, compact disc, Braille), closed captioning or another form of text display, or the provision of sign language interpreters.

Benefits of using modeling and simulation in exercises include: Enhanced realism Efficiency Ability to exercise situations

that cannot be safely or realistically replicated

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-14

Table 3.2 lists the key exercise design and development documents identified by the exercise type and relevant audience.

Document Title Exercise Type Distribution Audience

Situation Manual (SitMan) Seminar (Optional), Workshop (Optional), TTX, Game All Participants

Facilitator Guide Seminar (Optional), Workshop (Optional), TTX, Game Facilitators

Multimedia Presentation Seminar (Optional), Workshop (Optional), TTX, Game All Participants

Exercise Plan (ExPlan) Drill, FE, FSE Players and Observers Controller and Evaluator (C/E) Handbook Drill, FE, FSE Controllers and Evaluators

Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) Drill, FE, FSE, Complex TTX (Optional), Game (Optional)

Controllers, Evaluators, and Simulators

Extent of Play Agreement (XPA) FE, FSE Exercise Planning Team Exercise Evaluation Guides (EEGs) TTX, Game, Drill, FE, FSE Evaluators Participant Feedback Form All Exercises All Participants

Table 3.2: Exercise Design and Development Documents

Situation Manual

SitMans are provided for discussion-based exercises as the core documentation that provides the textual background for a facilitated exercise. The SitMan supports the scenario narrative and serves as the primary reference material for all participants during conduct.

The introduction provides an overview of the exercise—including scope, objectives and core capabilities, structure, rules, and conduct—as well as an exercise agenda. The next section of the SitMan is the scenario, which may be divided up into distinct, chronologically sequenced modules. Each module represents a specific time segment of the overall scenario, based on exercise objectives and scenario requirements.

Each module is followed by discussion questions, usually divided by organization or discipline. Responses to the modules’ discussion questions are the focus of the exercise, and reviewing them provides the basis for evaluating exercise results. These discussion questions should be derived from the exercise objectives and associated core capabilities, capability targets, and critical tasks documented in each EEG.

The SitMan generally includes the following information:

• Exercise scope, objectives, and core capabilities

• Exercise assumptions and artificialities

• Instructions for exercise participants

• Exercise structure (i.e., order of the modules)

• Exercise scenario background (including scenario location information)

• Discussion questions and key issues

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-15

• Schedule of events SitMan reference appendices may include, but are not limited to:

• Relevant documents regarding plans, SOPs, etc.

• Jurisdiction- or organization-specific threat information

• Material Safety Data Sheet6

• A list of reference terms

or agent fact sheet, when applicable

Facilitator Guide

A Facilitator Guide is designed to help facilitators manage a discussion-based exercise. It usually outlines instructions and key issues for discussion during the event and provides background information to help the facilitator answer questions from participants or players. This guide may also include an evaluation section that provides evaluation staff members with guidance and instructions on evaluation or observation methodology to be used as well as essential materials required to execute their specific functions. Multimedia Presentation

Multimedia presentations are often used to illustrate the general scenario for participants. They are given at the Start of Exercise (StartEx) and support the SitMan. The presentation should concisely summarize information contained in the written documentation. Like the SitMan, the multimedia presentation is also divided into distinct, chronologically segmented modules that, when combined, create the entire scenario.

This presentation typically contains, at a minimum, the following information:

• Introduction

• Exercise scope, objectives, and core capabilities

• Exercise play rules and administrative information

• Modules that describe the scenario The presentations are intended to help focus and drive the exercise as well as add realism. A/V enhancements to a presentation include video or sounds that convey information to participants. Exercise Plan

ExPlans are general information documents that help operations-based exercises run smoothly by providing participants with a synopsis of the exercise. They are published and distributed to the participating organizations following development of most of the critical elements of the exercise. In addition to addressing exercise objectives and scope, ExPlans assign activities and responsibilities for exercise planning, conduct, and evaluation. The ExPlan is intended to be seen by the exercise players and observers—therefore, it does not contain detailed scenario information that may reduce the realism of the exercise. Players and observers should review all elements of the ExPlan prior to exercise participation.

6 Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) or Product Safety Data Sheet (PSDS) is intended to provide emergency personnel with procedures for handling or working with a substance in a safe manner and includes information such as toxicity, health effects, first aid, storage, disposal, protective equipment, and handling procedures.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-16

An ExPlan typically contains the following sections:

• Exercise scope, objectives, and core capabilities

• Participant roles and responsibilities

• Rules of conduct

• Safety issues, notably real emergency codes and phrases, safety controller responsibilities, prohibited activities, and weapons policies

• Logistics

• Security of and access to the exercise site

• Communications (e.g., radio frequencies or channels)

• Duration, date, and time of exercise and schedule of events

• Maps and directions

Player Handout The Player Handout provides key information to exercise players. A Player Handout can supplement the SitMan or ExPlan by providing a quick-reference guide to logistics, agenda or schedule, and key contact data for players. Controller and Evaluator Handbook

The C/E Handbook describes the roles and responsibilities of exercise controllers and evaluators and the procedures they should follow. Because the C/E Handbook contains information about the scenario and about exercise administration, it is distributed to only those individuals designated as controllers or evaluators. The C/E Handbook may supplement the ExPlan or be a standalone document. When used as a supplement, it points readers to the ExPlan for more general exercise information, such as participant lists, activity schedules, required briefings, and the roles and responsibilities of specific participants. Used as a standalone document, it should include the basic information contained in the ExPlan, and detailed scenario information.

The C/E Handbook usually contains the following sections:

• Assignments, roles, and responsibilities of group or individual controllers and evaluators

• Detailed scenario information

• Exercise safety plan

• Controller communications plan (e.g., a phone list, a call-down tree, instructions for the use of radio channels)

• Evaluation instructions

The Controller portion of the C/E Handbook, sometimes known as Control Staff Instructions (COSIN), provides guidelines for control and simulation support and establishes a management structure for these activities. This section provides guidance for controllers, simulators, and evaluators on procedures and responsibilities for exercise control, simulation, and support. The Evaluation portion of the C/E Handbook, sometimes known as the EvalPlan, provides evaluation

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-17

staff members with guidance and instructions on evaluation or observation methodology to be used, as well as essential materials required to execute their specific functions.

Controller and Evaluator Packets While C/E Handbooks contain detailed information that should be read and understood well in advance of the exercise, Controller Packets and Evaluator Packets are provided immediately prior to an exercise to controllers and evaluators respectively. The packets contain key information from the C/E Handbook and additional information specific to the functional area in which the given controller or evaluator will be working. This information is needed during exercise play in order to carry out control and evaluation responsibilities.

Both Controller Packets and Evaluator Packets should contain the following:

• Essential C/E Handbook information

• Ground truth document, detailing key elements of the exercise scenario (primarily used for prevention-focused exercises)

• MSEL, including injects and events for each responsible controller and evaluator

• Appropriate EEGs

• Maps and directions

Master Scenario Events List A MSEL is typically used during operations-based or complex discussion-based exercises and contains a chronological listing of the events that drive exercise play. Each MSEL entry should contain the following at a minimum:

• Designated scenario time

• Event synopsis

• Controller responsible for delivering the inject, with controller or evaluator special instructions (if applicable)

• Intended player (i.e., agency or individual player for whom the MSEL event is intended)

• Expected participant response (i.e., player response expected upon inject delivery)

• Objective, core capability, capability target, and/or critical task to be addressed (if applicable)

• Notes section (for controllers and evaluators to track actual events against those listed in the MSEL, with special instructions for individual controllers and evaluators)

Scenario timelines listed in a MSEL should be as realistic as possible and based on input from SMEs. If the activity occurs sooner than the MSEL writers anticipated, then controllers and evaluators should note the time it occurred, but play should not be interrupted.

Controllers delivering MSEL injects will either be co-located with players in the venue of play, or they will reside in a SimCell. A SimCell is a location from which controllers deliver messages representing actions, activities, and conversations of an individual, agency, or organization that is not participating in the exercise but would likely be actively involved during

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-18

a real incident. Prior to StartEx, the mechanisms for introducing injects into exercise play should be tested to ensure that controllers are aware of the procedures for delivering MSEL injects and that any systems that will be used to deliver them are functioning properly.

The three types of descriptive MSEL events that support exercise play include:

1. Contextual injects introduced to a player by a controller help build the exercise operating environment and/or keep exercise play moving. For example, if the exercise is designed to test information-sharing capabilities, a MSEL inject can be developed to direct an actor to portray a suspect by behaving suspiciously in front of a law enforcement player.

2. Expected action events reserve a place in the MSEL timeline and notify controllers when a response action would typically take place. For example, during an FSE involving a chemical agent, establishing decontamination is an expected action that the players will take without the prompting of an inject.

3. Contingency injects are provided by a controller or simulator to players to ensure play moves forward to adequately evaluate performance of activities. For example, if a simulated secondary device is placed at an incident scene during a terrorism response exercise, but is not discovered, a controller may want to prompt an actor to approach a player and state that he or she witnessed suspicious activity close to the device location. This should prompt the responder to discover the device, resulting in subsequent execution of the desired notification procedures.

MSELs are typically produced in long formats, short formats, or both. Short-form MSELs usually list injects in a single row in a spreadsheet format. These can be used as a quick-reference guide during exercise play or projected onto a large screen in a control cell or SimCell. Long-form MSELs are used when greater detail is necessary; they include more detailed descriptions, exact scripting language for actors and simulators, and more detailed descriptions of expected actions. Extent of Play Agreements

XPAs can be used to define the organizations participating in the exercise as well as their extent of play (e.g., one fire station for 8 hours, county Emergency Operations Center [EOC] activated at level A for 24/7 exercise operations). These agreements are formed between exercise participants and the exercise sponsor, and can be vital to the planning of an exercise, recruitment of evaluators, and development of support requirements. Exercise Evaluation Guides

EEGs are intended to help evaluators collect relevant exercise observations. These documents are aligned to objectives, and document the related core capability, capability target(s), and critical tasks. Each EEG provides evaluators with information on what they should expect to see demonstrated or hear discussed. For more information on EEGs, see Chapter 5: Evaluation. Participant Feedback Form

At the end of an exercise, participants may receive a Participant Feedback Form that asks for input regarding observed strengths and areas for improvement that players identified during the exercise. Providing Participant Feedback Forms to players during the exercise wrap up activities allows them to provide their insights into decisions made and actions taken. A Participant Feedback Form also provides players the opportunity to provide constructive criticism about the

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-19

design, control, or logistics of the exercise to help enhance the planning of future exercises. At a minimum, the questions on the Participant Feedback Form solicit the following:

• Strengths and areas for improvement pertaining to the implementation of participating agencies and organizations’ policies, plans, and SOPs; and

• Impressions about exercise conduct and logistics. Information collected from feedback forms contributes to the issues, observations, recommendations, and corrective actions in the AAR/IP. Feedback forms can be supplemented by the conduct of a Hot Wash immediately following the exercise, during which facilitators, controllers, and evaluators capture participant perspectives on the key strengths and areas for improvement identified during the exercise. Waiver Forms

Each actor should receive a waiver form prior to the exercise. Signing this form waives liability for all exercise planners and participants. Exercising entities should use discretion when recruiting actors under the age of 18 because of additional challenges and concerns related to liability. If the exercise requires volunteers younger than 18-years-old, parents or legal guardians must sign their waiver forms. Weapons and Safety Policy

All exercises, where applicable, should employ a written weapon and safety policy that is in accordance with applicable State or local laws and regulations. Exercise sponsors should coordinate the application of this policy with the appropriate safety and/or legal departments as necessary.

Media or Public Affairs Guidance Members of the media have the unique ability to fulfill an important function before, during, and after an exercise. Prior to an exercise, they inform the public that an exercise will take place, and raise public awareness that the community is preparing for disasters. During an exercise, they can facilitate the validation of public information plans and procedures. Following an exercise, the media may release details to the host community on the state of its preparedness, if the exercise planning team leader provides such information. Therefore, exercise sponsors should work to incorporate media-related issues into exercise planning. Press Release

Prior to an exercise, the exercise planning team should develop a written press release to disseminate to media outlets, including web-based and/or social media outlets, as appropriate. This release informs the media and the public about general exercise information. Additionally, this information can be distributed to observers, elected and appointed officials, and other VIPs. This release should not contain detailed scenario information, such as the type of threat or hazard, nor should it contain information that might hinder meeting exercise objectives if a participant were to see it.

Typically, the contents of a media or public information release include the following:

• Introduction, including sponsor and exercise program information

• Exercise scope and objectives

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-20

• General scenario information

• Participating agencies or disciplines Public Announcement

Public announcements should be made prior to any exercise involving public space or space that will be viewable by the public. This precaution helps avoid confusion on the part of the public. It will also help the public avoid congestion near the exercise site by providing suggestions for alternate routes. Announcements can be made through local media, through mass mailings or pamphlets, and/or on signs near the exercise site. Media Policy

The agency or organization sponsoring the exercise should decide whether to invite media representatives to the exercise. If invited, media representatives should have an opportunity prior to the exercise to conduct interviews with key planners and participants.

At discussion-based exercises, media representatives should not be present during the discussion of any potentially sensitive information, and filming exercise conduct should be avoided so as not to inhibit or hinder discussion or the flow of play.

During operations-based exercises, media representatives may be allowed to film certain activities but should be cautioned not to interfere with exercise play or film any sensitive operations. Unless media representatives are invited to participate in the exercise, a guide—typically a public information officer or designee—should escort media representatives at all times. If mock media or exercise controllers simulating the real-world media are employed during an exercise to test public affairs training, they should be kept completely separate from any real-world media representatives who may be observing the exercise.

Exercise Development Exercise development involves planning for the critical elements of exercise conduct: logistics, control, and evaluation.

Planning for Exercise Logistics Logistical details are important, but often overlooked, aspects of an exercise. They can make the difference between a smooth, seamless exercise and one that is confusing or even unsafe. Venue

Facility and Room Meetings, briefings, and exercises should be conducted in facilities that are appropriate for the exercise scope and attendance. Planners should also ensure that all environmental and historical preservation documentation is completed if required. Facilities should be reserved solely for exercise purposes and should be accessible to all participants and free from distractions.

When selecting a facility and room for exercise planning or conduct, planners should account for the following considerations:

• Ensure there are enough tables and chairs for every relevant participant.

• Arrange tables to best suit the meeting or exercise (e.g., U-shaped layout for exercises requiring facilitation and participant interaction).

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-21

• Select a facility with room acoustics that facilitate ease of discussion.

• Select a facility with accessibility of parking and restrooms for all participants.

Audio/Visual Requirements A/V requirements are identified during the design phase including individuals assigned to ensure equipment is properly functioning.

Supplies, Food, and Refreshments Exercise planners should not assume participants will bring necessary supplies with them. Writing utensils, notepads, easels, copies of plans and procedures, name badges, and any other equipment deemed necessary should be procured prior to exercise conduct and provided to participants.

The exercise planning team should also consider whether food and refreshments can be provided for participants and observers, in accordance with applicable funding guidance or venue policies. For discussion-based exercises, it is often beneficial to have a working lunch provided to minimize disruption to play. For operations-based exercises, hydration of participants is an important consideration. Badging and Identification

For security purposes, all exercise participants should wear some form of identification. Although some players may wear their uniforms, badges are typically used to identify each exercise participant by name and organization. Where appropriate, name tents should be placed on tables prior to StartEx to ensure proper seating arrangements. Additionally, each table should have a table tent identifying the organization or functional area seated at that table.

Registration and Table/Breakout Identification Participants register upon arrival, for both identification and security reasons. Each participant should, at minimum, provide their name, organization, telephone number, and e-mail address. The exercise planning team retains copies of the sign-in sheets, so that participants can receive follow-up correspondence such as thank-you notes, certificates of completion, copies of the AAR/IP, and invitations to future planning meetings and exercises. Actors

Volunteer actors provide added realism and prompt players to provide simulated victim care. Exercise planning team members can recruit them from local colleges and universities, medical and nursing schools, drama clubs, theaters, civic groups, emergency response academies, and Federal and State military units. Consideration should be given to soliciting volunteer actors from within the access and/or functional needs population to provide an opportunity to practice meeting the needs of these individuals in a variety of operational environments.

Prior to the exercise, actors should receive the following:

• Waiver forms for signature, clearing liability for exercise planners and participants;

• Actor instructions including information on when to arrive, where to report, and other logistical details; and

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-22

• Symptomatology cards containing the signs and symptoms the actor will portray, as well as information for medical providers.

Parking, Transportation, and Designated Areas

Established parking areas should be clearly labeled for use by participants arriving in personal owned vehicles. If required, law enforcement personnel should be available to help direct vehicles to proper parking areas.

Operations-based exercises may also have several key areas for exercise conduct. Designated exercise areas should be clearly marked, and can include:

• Exercise Assembly Area. This is a gathering place for all deployable resources that will be playing in an exercise. The purpose of the exercise assembly area is to gather all resources and personnel near the exercise site prior to StartEx for safety briefings, weapons checks, and to ensure that resources and personnel are transported in a safe and unhurried manner.

• Operations Area. This is a large space where tactical operations—such as decontamination, triage, or render-safe procedures—take place.

• Response Route. This is the path traveled by responding emergency units from the Assembly Area to the exercise site during a response-focused exercise.

• Observer/Media Area. This is a designated area that provides observers and real-world media representatives with a view of the exercise but prevents them from interfering with exercise play.

Planning for Exercise Control Exercise control maintains exercise scope, pace, and integrity during conduct under safe and secure conditions. Key elements of exercise control include controller staffing, structure, training, communications, and safety and security. Staffing The planning team identifies the number of controllers needed during the exercise to deliver and track information. As a guiding principle, at least one controller should be present at every venue whenever possible. In addition to controlling the flow of information and release of MSEL events, positioning a controller at every site helps ensure the exercise is conducted safely with proper security controls.

During discussion-based exercises, the control staff provides the facilitation. If participants divide into groups for part of conduct, a table facilitator is assigned to each group. A complex multijurisdictional FSE, on the other hand, may require hundreds of controllers at field and headquarters play sites, as well as additional controllers in control cells, to coordinate among the various play sites or serve in a SimCell. Resource constraints may make placing a controller at every site challenging. Multitasking personnel to serve as both a controller and an evaluator can help. While not desirable, exercise planners may also assign selected players to serve as controllers. Such players/controllers would need to understand clearly how to separate the roles to avoid feeding advance information into play or otherwise harming exercise integrity.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-23

Control Structure and Simulation Cell

The control structure is the framework that allows controllers to communicate and coordinate with other controllers at other play sites or at a control cell to deliver and track exercise information. For discussion-based exercises, the structure is usually minimal. For operations-based exercises, however, the control structure may need to be fairly substantial to allow for proper coordination.

In an exercise involving field and headquarters play among multiple organizations in one location, a control cell serves as a central node for sharing information among controllers at the various sites and for putting all of the information together to form a common exercise picture. If an exercise contains multiple jurisdictions, particularly multiple levels of government in different geographic locations, it may be beneficial to establish multiple venue control cells that communicate and coordinate with each other through a master control cell. When an exercise does require establishment of multiple control cells, it is important to define their roles and relationships, including their decision-making hierarchy. Figure 3.3 shows a sample control structure with multiple control cells.

Figure 3.3: Sample Exercise Control Structure

A SimCell is used to generate injects, receive player responses, and provide information in place of nonparticipating organizations that would likely participate actively if exercise events were real. Physically, the SimCell is a working location for a number of qualified professionals who portray these non-participating organizations. These professionals are knowledgeable of the organizations they are portraying, and they deliver injects in a realistic fashion. Depending on the type of exercise, the SimCell may require a telephone, computer, e-mail account, radio, or other means of communication.

When developing the control structure, exercise planners should consider their resource environment. Ideally, a control cell will contain a point of contact (POC) or a liaison representing each participating organization. In exercises involving a mix of classified and unclassified information, it may be required to separate control cells, with appropriate security

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-24

firewalls set up to handle classified and unclassified information. Moreover, if an exercise uses a SimCell to drive exercise play, a determination needs to be made how to staff and integrate it into the broader control structure. Controller Training

If all exercise controllers can be recruited from the exercise planning team, there is little need to develop and provide special training for controllers. If, however, controllers are recruited from participating entities or other sources outside the planning team, it is very beneficial to provide some level of advance training to ensure that controllers understand the exercise, their role in it, and what they need to do.

The training generally includes a basic primer on the exercise design and all of the developed aspects of exercise control, including the scenario, information delivery methods, control staff, structure, and communications plan. Controllers are also trained to use the documents (e.g., MSEL) and the facilities (e.g., SimCell) that will help them control the exercise. Communications Plan

The best-designed exercise control structure staffed by the most experienced exercise practitioners will fail if controllers cannot communicate effectively and efficiently. A communications section in the C/E Handbook or COSIN serves as a communications plan by telling controllers who to communicate with, what they need to communicate, and how they will communicate. This communications section may include:

• Controller Communications. Controllers at field or headquarters play sites may need to communicate with controllers at other sites or only with a control cell. Control cells will need to be able to communicate with all controllers at field or headquarters play sites, internally, and with other control cells if appropriate. Controllers and control cells may also need to communicate with players through means other than face-to-face interaction.

• Timing and Content of Communications. While controllers should communicate exercise events as they occur, establishing a regular communications schedule with defined information requirements will help to ensure effective information flow.

• Communications Methodology. Communications may occur by phone, radio, e-mail, over a networked system, or a mix. Controllers and control cells will need to be equipped to use the designated method(s) of communication.

Safety and Security

Controllers also play an important role in ensuring that the exercise is conducted safely in a secure environment. In exercises involving potentially dangerous field play or the use of classified materials, the control team designates a safety and/or security controller(s) to focus on those areas of control.

Safety Safety is the most important consideration in planning any exercise. For operations-based exercises, consideration should be given to the following to help ensure a safe environment:

• Appoint a safety controller(s).

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 3-25

• Dedicate non-exercise participating advanced life support or basic life support ambulance unit(s) for real-world emergencies that may occur during the exercise.

• Identify real-world emergency procedures with a code word or phrase.

• Outline safety requirements and policies.

• Consider other safety issues outside the scope of exercise control (e.g., weather, heat stress, hypothermia, etc.).

Security Because of the sensitive nature of many exercises, it is important for the exercise site to be secure. Local law enforcement should provide site security where appropriate. Exercises often also involve sensitive or classified information or procedures. For all exercises involving sensitive or classified information, exercise planners should identify and adhere to appropriate security standards to ensure that this information is not compromised. Such measures can include conducting registration prior to a discussion-based exercise, ensuring that uninvited or unregistered individuals do not participate, or having law enforcement or security guards monitor and control access to a play site for the duration of the exercise.

Planning for Exercise Evaluation Thorough planning and organization prior to an exercise is imperative to effective and successful exercise evaluation. As described above, the exercise planning team identifies evaluation elements early in the exercise design process. Additionally, during exercise development, an evaluation team organizes itself appropriately and develops a comprehensive plan to address how the exercise will be evaluated. Additional details regarding evaluation planning can be found in Chapter 5: Evaluation.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 4-1

4. Exercise Conduct Overview Exercise conduct involves activities such as preparing for exercise play, managing exercise play, and conducting immediate exercise wrap-up activities. For discussion-based exercises, conduct also entails presentation, facilitation, and discussion. For operations-based exercises, conduct encompasses all operations occurring between the designated StartEx and End of Exercise (EndEx). Exercise practitioners are encouraged to apply and adapt HSEEP doctrine on exercise conduct to meet their specific needs. Throughout these efforts, the engagement of elected and appointed officials by practitioners will ensure that the exercise is addressing the guidance and intent of officials.

Exercise Play Preparation Setup for Discussion-Based Exercises Members of the exercise planning team assigned to support exercise setup should visit the exercise site at least one day prior to the event to arrange the room, test A/V equipment, and discuss administrative and logistical issues. On the day of the exercise, planning team members should arrive several hours before StartEx to handle setup activities and arrange for registration.

Prior to exercise conduct, the exercise planning team must deliver the necessary exercise materials and equipment, which may include the following:

• SitMans or other written materials for exercise participants

• Multimedia presentation

• Appropriate A/V equipment including televisions, projectors, projection screens, microphones, and speakers

• Table tents for each table

• Name tents for each participant

• Badges identifying the role of each exercise participant

• Sign-in sheets

• Participant Feedback Forms

Setup for Operations-Based Exercises The appropriate exercise planning team members should begin event setup as many days prior to the event as necessary, depending on the scope of the simulated environment. Setup entails arranging briefing rooms and testing A/V equipment, placing props and effects, marking the appropriate exercise areas and their perimeters, and checking for potential safety issues. On the day of the exercise, all exercise planning team members should arrive several hours before StartEx to handle any remaining logistical or administrative items pertaining to setup, and arrange for registration. A communications check should also be conducted prior to the start of an operations-based exercise.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 4-2

Briefings Held before an exercise, briefings educate participants about their roles and responsibilities. By scheduling separate briefings for elected and appointed officials, controllers and evaluators, actors, players, and observers, exercise planning team members can avoid giving extraneous material to different groups and ensure the design, development, and conduct of an exercise aligns to their elected and appointed officials’ guidance. Elected and Appointed Official Briefing

Elected and Appointed Official Briefings should occur during design and development and prior to the conduct of an exercise. The exercise planning team leader should periodically consult with the elected and appointed officials within the exercise planning team to ensure the exercise aligns with leadership intent. Controller/Evaluator Briefing

The C/E Briefing is generally conducted before operations-based exercises. It begins with an exercise overview and then reviews the exercise location and area, schedule of events, scenario, control concept, controller and evaluator responsibilities, instructions on completing EEGs, and any miscellaneous information. Additional training for evaluators may be conducted. Actor Briefing

The Actor Briefing should be conducted before the exercise, prior to the actors taking their positions. The actor controller leads this briefing and includes the following information: exercise overview, safety, real emergency procedures, symptomatology, acting instructions, and schedule. Identification badges and symptomatology cards are distributed at this briefing. Player Briefing

Shortly before StartEx, a controller conducts a briefing for all players to address individual roles and responsibilities, exercise parameters, safety, security badges, and any remaining logistical exercise concerns or questions. Participant Handouts and ExPlans or SitMans, depending on the type of exercise being conducted, are often distributed during this briefing. Following the exercise, controllers ensure that appropriate players attend the post-exercise Hot Wash in their respective functional area. Observer Briefing

An Observer Briefing is generally conducted the day of an exercise and informs observers and VIPs about the exercise background, scenario, schedule of events, observer limitations, and any other miscellaneous information. Often, observers will be unfamiliar with public safety procedures and will have questions about the activities they see. Designating someone, such as a public information officer, to answer questions prevents observers from asking questions of players, controllers, or evaluators.

Exercise Play During exercise play, participants accomplish various roles and responsibilities aimed at achieving exercise objectives and demonstrating core capabilities.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 4-3

Participant Roles and Responsibilities Table 4.1 describes the exercise participant role and responsibilities associated with exercise conduct and the applicable exercise types.

Role Responsibilities Exercise

Type Exercise Director

The Exercise Director oversees all exercise functions during exercise conduct, oversees and remains in contact with controllers and evaluators, debriefs controllers and evaluators following the exercise, and oversees setup and cleanup of the exercise as well as positioning of controllers and evaluators.

All

Evaluator Evaluators are chosen based on their expertise in the specific functional areas they will observe. Evaluators use evaluation documents to document observations, capture unresolved issues, and analyze exercise results. Evaluators do not interfere with exercise flow.

All

Lead Evaluator

The lead evaluator should participate as a member of the exercise planning team and be familiar with all relevant issues associated with the exercise, including plans, policies, and procedures; incident command and decision-making processes; and interagency and/or inter-jurisdictional coordination issues. The lead evaluator should have the management skills needed to oversee a team of evaluators over an extended process as well as the knowledge and analytical skills to undertake a thorough and accurate analysis of all capabilities.

All

Facilitator During a discussion-based exercise, the facilitator(s) is responsible for keeping participant discussions on track with exercise objectives and ensuring all issues and objectives are explored as thoroughly as possible within time constraints. If an exercise uses breakout groups, more than one facilitator may be needed.

Seminar, Workshop, TTX, Game

Controller In operations-based exercises and some games, controllers plan and manage exercise play, set up and operate the exercise incident site, and possibly take the roles of individuals and agencies not actually participating in the exercise. Controllers direct the pace of exercise play, provide key data to players, and may prompt or initiate certain player actions and injects to the players as described in the MSEL to ensure exercise continuity. Controllers issue exercise materials to players as required, monitor the exercise timeline, and supervise the safety of all exercise participants. Controllers are the only participants who should provide information or direction to players. All controllers should be accountable to one senior controller.

Game, Drill, FE, FSE

Senior Controller

The senior controller (sometimes known as a lead controller) is responsible for the overall organization of the exercise. The senior controller monitors actions by controllers and exercise progress, and coordinates decisions regarding deviations or significant changes to the scenario caused by unexpected developments during play. The senior controller debriefs controllers and evaluators after the exercise and oversees the setup and takedown of the exercise.

Game, Drill, FE, FSE

Safety Controller

The safety controller is responsible for monitoring exercise safety during exercise setup, conduct, and cleanup. All exercise controllers assist the safety controller by reporting any safety concerns. The safety controller should not be confused with the safety officer, who is identified by the incident commander during exercise play.

Drill, FE, FSE

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 4-4

Role Responsibilities Exercise

Type Exercise Assembly Area Controller

The exercise assembly area controller is responsible for the logistical organization of the exercise assembly area, including placement locations for units entering the exercise assembly area, the release of dispatched units into the field, and coordination of pathways and overall safety within the exercise assembly area.

FSE

Simulator Simulators are control staff personnel who role play as nonparticipating organizations or individuals. They most often operate out of SimCell, but they may occasionally have face-to-face contact with players. Simulators function semi-independently under the supervision of SimCell controllers, enacting roles in accordance with instructions provided in the MSEL. All simulators are ultimately accountable to the Exercise Director and senior controller.

Drill, FE, FSE

Observer Observers do not directly participate in the exercise; rather, they observe selected segments of the exercise as it unfolds, while remaining separated from player activities. Observers view the exercise from a designated observation area and are asked to remain within the observation area during the exercise. A dedicated controller or public information officer should be assigned to manage these groups. In a discussion-based exercise, observers may support the development of player responses to the situation by asking relevant questions, delivering messages, or citing references; however, they generally do not participate in moderated discussion.

All

Player Players have an active role in preventing, responding to, or recovering from the risks and hazards presented in the scenario, by either discussing or performing their regular roles and responsibilities. Players initiate actions that will respond to and/or mitigate the simulated emergency.

All

Actor Actors are typically volunteer personnel responsible for simulating a specific role in an exercise. Actors are vital to creating a realistic scenario and can play a variety of roles.

Drill, FSE

Table 4.1: Exercise Participant Roles

Conduct for Discussion-Based Exercises Multimedia Presentation

The multimedia presentation is a crucial vehicle for conveying information to the players. The presentation typically starts with brief remarks by representatives from the exercise planning team or sponsoring organization, and/or elected and appointed officials from the governing jurisdiction. After the opening remarks, the presentation moves into a brief introductory and explanatory phase led by a facilitator. During this phase, attendees will be introduced to any other facilitators, controllers (games only), or evaluators; given background on the exercise process; and advised about their individual roles and responsibilities.

The facilitator generally presents the multimedia briefing, which describes the scenario and any relevant background information. The facilitator also leads the discussion, introduces spokespersons, poses questions to the audience, and ensures that the schedule remains on track.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 4-5

Facilitated Discussion

Facilitated group discussions can occur in a plenary session or in breakout groups, which are typically organized by discipline or agency/organization. In both formats, a facilitator is responsible for keeping the discussion focused on the exercise objectives and making sure all issues are explored within the time allotted. A good facilitator should possess:

• The ability to keep side conversations to a minimum, keep discussions on track and within established time limits, control group dynamics and strong personalities, and speak competently and confidently about the subject without dominating conversation;

• Functional area expertise or experience;

• Awareness of appropriate plans and procedures; and

• The ability to listen well and summarize player discussions. If feasible and/or appropriate, co-facilitators who are knowledgeable about local issues, plans, and procedures may assist the lead facilitator. Also, designating a recorder to take notes allows the facilitator to focus on key discussion issues. Moderated Discussion

Moderated discussions generally follow breakout discussions. In moderated discussions, a representative from each group presents all participants with summarized results from a group’s facilitated discussion. This spokesperson is selected before the facilitated discussion so that he or she can prepare to speak on behalf of the group. During moderated discussions, spokespersons summarize the facilitated discussion, present key findings and issues, and discuss any unresolved issues or questions. At the end of the moderated discussion period, the facilitator opens the floor for questions.

Time for moderated discussion is generally scheduled at the end of each module, with another longer period for each at the conclusion of the exercise. During the moderated discussion, groups should focus only on the material presented in a given module. Exercise Data Collection

During discussion-based exercises, facilitators help evaluators collect useful data by keeping discussions focused on exercise objectives, core capabilities, capability targets, and critical tasks. Additional information about data collection can be found in Chapter 5: Evaluation.

Conduct for Operations-Based Exercises During conduct of operations-based exercises, the exercise planning team leader normally serves as the senior controller or Exercise Director. Controllers and evaluators report key activities to the senior controller. The senior controller is responsible for both commencing exercise play by announcing StartEx, and announcing EndEx at the conclusion of the scenario, after a certain period of time has passed, or when all exercise objectives have been met.

Prior to StartEx, rules for exercise play should be disseminated to all participants to establish the parameters that they must follow during the exercise. These rules help players understand their roles in the exercise environment, describe appropriate behavior, establish guidelines for physical contact, and aim to prevent physical harm to individuals or damage to property. Written rules should be reviewed and approved by appropriate authorities.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 4-6

Exercise areas for operations-based exercises should be clearly defined, and all exercise operations should take place within these designated areas. The exercise area for an FE is usually limited to the control or command centers and their onsite staff members. All other activity and deployment of resources outside of these locations are notional and is simulated by the SimCell staff. The exercise area for an FSE or drill might include one or more simulated incident sites, as well as control or command centers. It is important that these areas be clearly marked to ensure player safety and avoid confusion with real-world operations.

To prevent confusion with real-world communications or accidental deployment of resources, all communications must be clearly identified as exercise-related. This can be accomplished by displaying the phrase “exercise material only” prominently on all typed or printed communications, and by beginning each verbal communication by stating, “This is an exercise,” or a similar statement as agreed upon by the exercise planning team. Additionally, players should be supplied with an exercise directory that provides contact information for each of the simulated organizations portrayed by simulators in the SimCell. Control

As detailed in Chapter 3: Exercise Design and Development, the control structure for an operations-based exercise describes how controllers communicate and coordinate with one another and how they track exercise information. These procedures, as well as clearly defined roles and responsibilities for each controller, should be detailed in the C/E Handbook. During exercise play, controllers carry out these responsibilities and closely monitor exercise play to ensure a safe and effective exercise.

During FE play, SimCell control is particularly important. Because of the great deal of simulated activity that occurs during FEs, these exercises require a robust and detailed MSEL and close communication between the site controller(s) and the SimCell. Site controllers should advise the SimCell on the pace of exercise play, and request more or fewer injects as necessary to maintain an appropriate pace.

During FSEs and drills, the exercise assembly area controller plays a key role. The exercise assembly area controller remains in close communication with other controllers throughout the exercise to ensure safe and realistic deployment of personnel. When a unit arrives at the assembly area, the exercise assembly area controller takes attendance to ensure all players are present. Units are positioned according to their deployment times, and qualified individuals perform a weapons check to guarantee the tagging of all inspected weapons to indicate they are safe for exercise play. This controller is also responsible for the exercise assembly area’s logistical organization, including placement locations for units and coordination of exiting patterns for dispatched units. It is imperative for the exercise planning team to create a deployment timetable based on realistic response times; failure to do so will result in a compromised and disorganized exercise. The exercise assembly area controller must be informed about any updates to the exercise that may require changes to the deployment timetable, and he or she should update the deployment timetable accordingly.

In all operations-based exercises, it is critical that all exercise controllers take appropriate actions to ensure a safe and secure exercise environment. These actions may involve monitoring conditions that impact player and/or actor safety, such as heat stress and other health issues.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 4-7

Exercise Data Collection

During the exercise, each evaluator should use the EEGs to record both quantitative and qualitative data for capabilities, capability targets, and critical tasks, as assigned by the lead evaluator. During operations-based exercises, evaluators should be strategically pre-positioned in locations at which they can gather useful data, and they should track and record participant actions carefully.

Contingency Process In order to prevent jeopardizing mission performance in response to real-world events, the exercise planning team should maintain a contingency process to halt, postpone, or cancel an exercise as necessary. Should the conduct of the exercise put at risk any efforts to respond to real-world events or should real-world events hinder conduct of the exercise, the Exercise Director and exercise planning team should convene, in coordination with elected and appointed officials from participating organizations,

to determine the appropriate course of action. Following decision on a final course of action, the Exercise Director should communicate that course of action to all exercise planners, participants, and other key stakeholders through all relevant communications mechanisms.

Wrap-Up Activities Performing thorough exercise wrap-up will ensure that all relevant data is collected to support effective evaluation and improvement planning.

Debriefings Immediately following the exercise, a short debriefing should be conducted with exercise planning team members to ascertain their level of satisfaction with the exercise, discuss any issues or concerns, and propose improvements. Planners should collect exercise attendance lists, provide copies to the exercise planning team leader, collect Participant Feedback Forms, and develop debriefing notes.

Player Hot Wash A Hot Wash provides an opportunity for exercise participants to discuss exercise strengths and areas for improvement immediately following the conduct of an exercise. The Hot Wash should be led by an experienced facilitator who can ensure that the discussion remains brief and constructive. The information gathered during a Hot Wash can be used during the AAR/IP process, and exercise suggestions can be used to improve future exercises. Hot Washes also provide opportunities to distribute Participant Feedback Forms, which, when completed by players, can be used to help generate the AAR/IP.

For operations-based exercises, a Hot Wash should be conducted for each functional area by that functional area’s controller or evaluator immediately following an exercise. It can also provide an opportunity for players to gain clarification on exercise play at other exercise sites or in other functional areas.

An effective contingency process is critical to ensure the exercise can be halted, postponed, or canceled if a real-world event takes place.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 4-8

Controller/Evaluator Debriefing The C/E Debriefing provides a forum for functional area controllers and evaluators to review the exercise. The exercise planning team leader facilitates this debriefing, which provides each controller and evaluator with an opportunity to provide an overview of the functional area they observed and to discuss both strengths and areas for improvement. During the debriefing, controllers and evaluators complete and submit their Participant Feedback Forms. Debriefing results are captured and may be included in the AAR/IP. Similarly, for discussion-based exercises, a Facilitator/Evaluator Debriefing is held to review exercise conduct. This debriefing can be facilitated by the exercise planning team leader and provides a forum for facilitators and evaluators to discuss strengths, areas for improvement, and progress in completing exercise objectives.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 5-1

5. Evaluation Overview Exercise evaluation maintains the fundamental link between the exercise and improvement planning. Through exercise evaluation, organizations assess the capabilities needed to accomplish a mission, function, or objective. This assessment is based on the performance of critical tasks to capability target levels. Effective exercise evaluation involves:

• Planning for exercise evaluation;

• Observing the exercise and collecting exercise data during exercise conduct;

• Analyzing collected data to identify strengths and areas for improvement; and

• Reporting exercise outcomes in a draft AAR. Using a common approach to evaluation supports consistent and meaningful reporting of exercise results.

Evaluation Planning It is important that evaluation planning begins during the initial planning phases of the exercise, as described in Chapter 3: Exercise Design and Development. Identifying clear evaluation requirements early in the planning process will ensure that the design, development, and conduct of the exercise best support an effective evaluation. Exercise planners should collaborate to ensure a consistent approach for evaluating capabilities during an exercise. Additionally, elected and appointed officials should be engaged early in evaluation planning in order to identify any specific evaluation requirements. Planning an exercise evaluation typically includes:

• Selecting lead evaluator and define evaluation team requirements;

• Developing EEGs, which include objectives, core capabilities, capability targets, and critical tasks;

• Recruiting, training, and assigning evaluators;

• Developing and finalizing evaluation documentation; and

• Conducting a pre-exercise C/E Briefing. Through this process, an evaluation team can develop a thorough plan to address how the exercise will be evaluated.

Evaluation Team Early in the exercise planning process, the exercise planning team leader should appoint a lead evaluator to oversee all facets of the evaluation process. The lead evaluator participates fully as a member of the exercise planning team and should be familiar with the exercise’s objectives. A lead evaluator should have the management skills needed to oversee a team of evaluators as well as the knowledge and analytical skills to undertake a thorough and accurate analysis of all objectives and core capabilities of an exercise. The lead evaluator must have the skills to effectively communicate and coordinate with the exercise controllers. In addition, the lead

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 5-2

evaluator should be familiar with the mission areas and core capabilities associated with the exercise; plans, policies, and procedures of the participating organizations; incident command and decision-making processes; and key preparedness doctrine and policy.

The exercise planning team and lead evaluator should determine the structure of the exercise evaluation team based on the scope of the exercise, the exercise objectives, associated core capabilities, and critical tasks that will be evaluated during the exercise. Specific security clearance levels may be required for some exercise play or locations. Exercises that involve multiple jurisdictions and/or multiple venues should consider assigning site leads, as illustrated by the example provided in Figure 5.1. A site could be a jurisdiction, a specific emergency operations center, or another exercise location. These individuals support the lead evaluator and manage the activities of other evaluators assigned to that location.

Figure 5.1: Sample Exercise Evaluation Team Organization

The exercise planning team and lead evaluator should determine the tools and documentation needed to support the evaluation team, such as the need for a separate Evaluation Plan instead of relying on the evaluation section in the C/E Handbook. The lead evaluator also identifies data collection methods to ensure that information specific to that exercise is recorded.

Consideration should be given to an exercise’s scope and objectives when selecting the number of individuals for evaluation support. For exercises of limited scope and having fewer objectives and capabilities, the lead evaluator and one additional person may be all that is needed. For more complex or larger exercises with a greater number of objectives and capabilities, more individuals may be required for evaluation and AAR development.

Exercise Evaluation Guide Development EEGs provide a consistent tool to guide exercise observation and data collection. EEGs are aligned to exercise objectives and core capabilities, and list the relevant capability targets and critical tasks. These targets and critical tasks may be drawn from the National Preparedness Goal and the five national planning frameworks, a threat/hazard identification and risk assessment product, or from an organization’s own plans and assessments, as described in Chapter 3: Exercise Design and Development.

EEGs are designed to accomplish several goals:

• Streamline data collection

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 5-3

• Enable thorough assessments of the participant organizations’ capability targets

• Support development of the AAR

• Provide a consistent process for assessing preparedness through exercises

• Help organizations map exercise results to exercise objectives, core capabilities, capability targets, and critical tasks for further analysis and assessment

Recruit, Assign, and Train Evaluators Once evaluation requirements have been defined by the planning team, the lead evaluator oversees the recruiting, assigning, and training of evaluators. The evaluation requirements play a critical role in determining how many evaluators are needed, the type of subject matter expertise they should possess, their assignment during the exercise, and the type of training or instruction required prior to the exercise. Whenever possible, evaluators should have experience and subject matter expertise in their assigned functional area. Evaluator assignments should be communicated to evaluators prior to exercise conduct.

Effective evaluator training ensures that exercise evaluators have a shared understanding of the key data to be collected and how that data will contribute to the evaluation of the exercise. Evaluator training typically includes reviewing the following:

• General information about the exercise, including scope, objectives and aligned core capabilities, scenario, and schedule;

• Relevant evaluator documentation (e.g., SitMan, C/E Handbook, evaluation tools); and

• Appropriate plans, policies, procedures, agreements, or other information that are the focus of the exercise.

Evaluator training should also include guidance on observing exercise discussion or operations, and criteria for inclusion of data in the final exercise analysis.

Evaluation Documentation Once exercise requirements have been defined and evaluation planning completed, the lead evaluator should finalize the evaluation section of the C/E Handbook or develop the Evaluation Plan. The C/E Handbook or Evaluation Plan typically contains the following information:

• Exercise-Specific Details: Exercise scenario, schedule of events, and evaluation schedule;

• Evaluator Team Organization, Assignments, and Locations: A list of evaluator locations, shift assignments, a map of the exercise site(s), evaluation team organizational chart, and evaluation team contact information;

• Evaluator Instructions: Step-by-step instructions for evaluators for activities before, during, and following the exercise; and

• Evaluation Tools: EEGs, the MSEL or a list of venue-specific injects, electronic or manual evaluation logs or data collection forms, relevant plans and procedures, Participant Feedback Forms, and Hot Wash templates.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 5-4

In less complex exercises, the C/E Handbook may be a brief, simple document. For more complex exercises, the C/E Handbook will be a longer document, containing all the information and tools that evaluators require.

Pre-Exercise Evaluator Briefing Before exercise play begins, the lead evaluator should meet with all evaluators to verify roles, responsibilities, and assignments, and to provide any significant updates (e.g., last-minute changes to the scenario, new assignments). The Evaluator Briefing provides an opportunity for evaluators to ask questions and to ensure complete understanding of their roles and responsibilities. Depending on a variety of factors, including exercise scope, objectives, and scenario, this briefing may be done in conjunction with exercise controllers, as a Controller/Evaluator Briefing. Depending on the exercise organization, it may be necessary to conduct briefings at more than one exercise site.

Exercise Observation and Data Collection Exercise observations and data collection can differ between discussion-based exercises and operations-based exercises. Discussion-based exercises often focus on issues involving plans, policies, and procedures; consequently, observations of these exercises may consist of an evaluator or a note-taker recording data from participant discussions on EEGs. Operations-based exercises focus on issues affecting the operational execution of capabilities and critical tasks. During operations-based exercises, evaluators collect and record participant actions, which form the analytical basis for determining if critical tasks were successfully demonstrated and capability targets were met.

Observation Exercise evaluators should observe exercise activity in a non-attribution environment, in accordance with the evaluation training and EEGs. Evaluators will generally be able to observe many of the following topics:

• Plans, policies, and procedures used during the exercise;

• Legislative authorities used or implemented;

• Roles and responsibilities of the government agencies and private organizations;

• Pertinent decisions made, including information gathered to make decisions;

• Activation or implementation of processes and procedures, requests for resources, use of mutual aid agreements, etc.; and

• How and what information is shared with other agencies and the public.

Data Collection Evaluators should retain their notes and records of the exercise to support the development of the AAR. As necessary, the lead evaluator may assign evaluators to collect supplemental data during or immediately after the exercise. Such data is critical to fill in gaps identified during exercise evaluation. For example, useful sources of supplemental evaluation data might include records produced by automated systems or communication networks, and written records, such as duty logs and message forms.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 5-5

Data Analysis The goal of data analysis is to evaluate the ability of exercise participants to perform core capabilities and to determine if exercise objectives were met. During data analysis, the evaluation team consolidates the data collected during the exercise and determines whether participants performed critical tasks and met capability targets. Evaluators consider participant performance against all targets to determine the overall ability to perform core capabilities. Additionally, the evaluation team takes notes on the course of exercise play, demonstrated strengths, and areas for improvement. This provides the evaluators with not only what happened, but why events happened.

After this initial data analysis, evaluators examine each critical task not completed as expected and each target not met, with the aim of identifying a root cause. A root cause is the source of or underlying reason behind an identified issue toward which the evaluator can direct an improvement. When conducting a root-cause analysis, the evaluator should attempt to trace the origin of each event back to earlier events and their respective causes. Root-cause analysis may also require the review and evaluation of an organization’s plans, policies, and procedures. When completing the analysis, evaluators should consider the following questions:

• Were the capability targets met? If the targets were not met, what factors contributed to this result?

• Did discussion or activities suggest the critical tasks were executed to meet capability targets? If not, what was the impact or consequences?

• Do current plans, policies, and procedures support critical tasks and capability targets? Were participants familiar with these documents?

Analyzing events in this sequence will help evaluators determine the underlying cause of issues, and inform an organization’s corrective actions to remedy the issue.

After-Action Report Draft The AAR is the document that summarizes key information related to evaluation. The length, format, and development timeframe of the AAR depend on the exercise type and scope. These parameters should be determined by the exercise planning team based on the expectations of elected and appointed officials as they develop the evaluation requirements in the design and development process. The main focus of the AAR is the analysis of core capabilities. Generally, AARs also include basic exercise information, such as the exercise name, type of exercise, dates, location, participating organizations, mission area(s), specific threat or hazard, a brief scenario description, and the name of the exercise sponsor and POC.

The AAR should include an overview of performance related to each exercise objective and associated core capabilities, while highlighting strengths and areas for improvement. Therefore, evaluators should review their evaluation notes and documentation to identify the strengths and areas for improvement relevant to the participating organizations’ ability to meet exercise objectives and demonstrate core capabilities.

Root-cause analysis involves not just identifying what issues emerged, but rather discovering the root causes of those issues.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 5-6

Upon completion, the evaluation team provides the draft AAR to the exercise sponsor, who distributes it to participating organizations. Elected and appointed officials, or their designees, review and confirm observations identified in the formal AAR, and determine which areas for improvement require further action. Areas for improvement that require action are those that will continue to seriously impede capability performance if left unresolved. As part of the improvement planning process, elected and appointed officials identify corrective actions to bring areas for improvement to resolution and determine the organization with responsibility for those actions. This process is further described in Chapter 6: Improvement Planning.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 6-1

6. Improvement Planning Overview Exercises afford organizations the opportunity to evaluate capabilities and assess progress toward meeting capability targets in a controlled, low-risk setting. After the evaluation phase concludes, organizations should reach consensus on identified strengths and areas for improvement and develop a set of improvements that directly addresses core capability gaps. This information is recorded in the AAR/IP and resolved through the implementation of concrete corrective actions, which are prioritized and tracked as part of a corrective action program. This process constitutes the improvement planning phase and the final step in conducting an exercise.

Corrective Actions Once exercise data are analyzed, organizations should perform an additional qualitative assessment to identify potential corrective actions. Corrective actions are concrete, actionable steps that are intended to resolve capability gaps and shortcomings identified in exercises or real-world events. In developing corrective actions, elected and appointed officials or their designees should first review and revise the draft AAR, as needed, prior to the After-Action Meeting (AAM) to confirm that the issues identified by evaluators are valid and require resolution. The reviewer then identifies which issues fall within their organization’s authority, and assume responsibility for taking action on those issues. Finally, they determine an initial list of appropriate corrective actions to resolve identified issues.

The organization’s reviewer should use the following questions to guide their discussion when developing corrective actions:

• What changes need to be made to plans and procedures to improve performance?

• What changes need to be made to organizational structures to improve performance?

• What changes need to be made to management processes to improve performance?

• What changes to equipment or resources are needed to improve performance?

• What training is needed to improve performance?

• What are the lessons learned for approaching similar problems in the future?

After-Action Meeting Once the organization’s reviewer has confirmed the draft areas for improvement and identified initial corrective actions, a draft IP is developed for review at an AAM. AAMs serve as forums to review the revised AAR and the draft IP. Prior to the AAM, as appropriate, the exercise sponsor will distribute the revised AAR, which incorporates feedback on the strengths and areas for improvement, and the draft IP to participants. Distributing these documents for review prior to the meeting helps to ensure that all attendees are familiar with the content and are prepared to discuss exercise results, identified areas for improvement, and corrective actions. The

Elected and appointed officials confirm that issues identified in the draft AAR are valid and need resolution, and they determine appropriate corrective actions to resolve those issues.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 6-2

organization’s elected and appointed officials, or their designees, should attend the AAM along with exercise planners to answer any questions or provide necessary details on the exercise itself.

During the AAM, participants should seek to reach final consensus on strengths and areas for improvement, as well as revise and gain consensus on draft corrective actions. Additionally, as appropriate, AAM participants should develop concrete deadlines for implementation of corrective actions and identify specific corrective action owners/assignees. Participant organizations are responsible for developing implementation processes and timelines, and keeping their elected and appointed officials informed of the implementation status.

After-Action Report/Improvement Plan Finalization Once all corrective actions have been consolidated in the final IP, the IP may be included as an appendix to the AAR. The AAR/IP is then considered final, and may be distributed to exercise planners, participants, and other preparedness stakeholders as appropriate.

Corrective Action Tracking and Implementation Corrective actions captured in the AAR/IP should be tracked and continually reported on until completion. Organizations should assign points of contact responsible for tracking and reporting on their progress in implementing corrective actions. By tracking corrective actions to completion, preparedness stakeholders are able to demonstrate that exercises have yielded tangible improvements in preparedness. Stakeholders should also ensure there is a system in place to validate previous corrective actions that have been successfully implemented. These efforts should be considered part of a wider continuous improvement process that applies prior to, during, and after an exercise is completed.

Conducting exercises and documenting the strengths, areas for improvement, and associated corrective actions is an important part of the National Preparedness System, and contributes to the strengthening of preparedness across the Whole Community and achievement of the National Preparedness Goal. Over time, exercises should yield observable improvements in preparedness for future exercises and real-world events.

Using Improvement Planning to Support Continuous Improvement The identification of strengths, areas for improvement, and corrective actions that result from exercises help organizations build capabilities as part of a larger continuous improvement process. The principles of continuous improvement are:

• Consistent Approach. Organizations should employ a consistent approach for continuous improvement-related activities across applicable mission areas—prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. This consistent approach enables a shared understanding of key terminology, functions, processes, and tools. This approach also fosters continuous improvement-related interoperability and collaboration across an organization’s components.

• Support National Preparedness. By conducting continuous improvement activities, organizations support the development and sustainment of core capabilities across the whole community. Continuous improvement activities also ensure that organizations are able to support assessments of national preparedness in a timely, actionable, and meaningful way.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 6-3

• Effective Issue Resolution and Information Sharing. Through improvement planning, organizations complete continuous improvement action items at the lowest level possible while facilitating the sharing of strengths and areas for improvement.

• Application across Operational Phases. The functions, processes, and tools apply to all operational phases, including:

- Near-real time collection and analysis during real-world events or exercises

- Post-event/exercise analysis

- Trend analysis across multiple events/exercises over time

Application of these principles and the conduct of improvement planning ultimately support the program management phase of the HSEEP exercise cycle. By continually examining the implementation of corrective actions, organizations can identify capability gaps, as well as determine which corrective actions require validation through exercises. In this way, improvement planning activities can help shape an organization’s exercise program priorities and support continuous improvement in the building and sustaining of core capabilities.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Glossary-1

Glossary of Terms This document provides descriptions for many of the commonly-used terms in HSEEP.

A Term Description

Actor Actors are volunteers who simulate specific roles, such as disaster casualty victims, in order to add realism to an exercise.

Actor Briefing An Actor Briefing is generally conducted before the exercise and provides actors with an overview of the exercise, including: exercise overview, safety, real emergency procedures, symptomatology, acting instructions, and schedule. Identification badges and symptomatology cards are distributed before or during this briefing.

Administration/ Finance Section

The Administration/Finance Section of the exercise planning team provides financial management and administrative support throughout exercise development, including exercise registration support and scheduling.

After-Action Meeting (AAM)

The AAM is a meeting held among elected and appointed officials or their designees from the exercising organizations, as well as the lead evaluator and members of the exercise planning team, to debrief the exercise and to review and refine the draft AAR/IP. The AAM should be an interactive session, providing attendees the opportunity to discuss and validate the analytical findings and corrective actions in the draft AAR/IP.

After-Action Report (AAR)

The AAR summarizes key exercise-related evaluation information, including the exercise overview and analysis of objectives and core capabilities. The AAR is usually developed in conjunction with an IP. The lead evaluator and exercise planning team draft the AAR and submit it to meeting participants before the AAM.

B Best Practices Best practices are peer-validated techniques, procedures, and solutions

that prove successful and are solidly grounded in actual experience in operations, training, and exercises.

C Capabilities-Based Planning

Capabilities-based planning is defined as planning, under uncertainty, to build capabilities suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards while working within an economic framework that necessitates prioritization and choice. Capabilities-based planning is the basis for guidance such as the National Preparedness Goal.

Capability A capability may be delivered with any combination of properly planned, organized, equipped, trained, and exercised personnel to achieve an intended target.

Capability Target Capability targets are the performance thresholds for a core capability. Capability targets may be derived from Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRAs), subject-matter experts, national guidance, or industry standards.

Concept and Objectives (C&O) Meeting

A C&O Meeting is the formal beginning of the exercise planning process. It is held to identify the scope and objectives of the exercise. For less complex exercises and for organizations with limited resources, the C&O Meeting can be conducted in conjunction with the IPM.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Glossary-2

Contextual Inject Contextual injects are introduced to a player by a controller to help build the exercise operating environment and/or keep exercise play moving. For example, if the exercise is designed to test information-sharing capabilities, a MSEL inject can be developed to direct an actor to portray a suspect by behaving suspiciously in front of a law enforcement player.

Contingency Inject Contingency injects are events that a controller provides to a player if the players get off track or do not take an action that is necessary for the continuation of the exercise. This ensures that play moves forward, as needed, to adequately evaluate performance of activities. For example, if a simulated secondary device is placed at an incident scene during a terrorism response exercise, but is not discovered, a controller may want to prompt an actor to approach a player to say that he or she witnessed suspicious activity close to the device location.

Control Staff Instructions (COSIN)

The COSIN contains guidance that controllers, simulators, and evaluators need concerning procedures and responsibilities for exercise control, simulation, and support. The COSIN provides guidelines for control and simulation support and establishes a management structure for these activities.

Controller/Evaluator (C/E) Briefing

The C/E Briefing is a pre-exercise overview for controllers, evaluators, and the exercise administrative staff. The briefing summarizes the C/E Handbook (or the COSIN and EvalPlan) and focuses on explaining the roles and responsibilities of controllers and evaluators.

Controller/Evaluator (C/E) Debriefing

The C/E Debriefing provides a forum for functional area controllers and evaluators to review the exercise. The exercise planning team leader facilitates this debriefing, which provides each controller and evaluator with an opportunity to provide an overview of the functional area they observed and to discuss both strengths and areas for improvement. During the debriefing, controllers and evaluators complete and submit their EEGs and their Participant Feedback Forms. Debriefing results are captured for inclusion in the AAR/IP.

Controller/Evaluator (C/E) Handbook

The C/E Handbook specifically describes the roles and responsibilities of exercise controllers and evaluators and the procedures they must follow. Because the C/E Handbook contains information about the scenario and about exercise administration, it is distributed to only those individuals specifically designated as controllers or evaluators.

Controllers In operations-based and some complex discussion-based exercises, controllers plan and manage exercise play, set up and operate the exercise incident site, and possibly take the roles of individuals and agencies not actually participating in the exercise. Controllers direct the pace of exercise play, provide key data to players, and may prompt or initiate certain player actions and injects to the players as described in the MSEL to ensure exercise continuity. Controllers issue exercise materials to players as required, monitor the exercise timeline, and supervise the safety of all exercise participants. Controllers are the only participants who should provide information or direction to players. All controllers should be accountable to one senior controller.

Core Capabilities Distinct critical elements necessary to achieve the National Preparedness Goal.

Corrective Action Corrective actions are the concrete, actionable steps outlined in an IP that are intended to resolve preparedness gaps and shortcomings experienced in exercises or real-world events.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Glossary-3

Critical Tasks Critical tasks are the distinct elements required to perform a core capability. Critical tasks may be derived from Mission Area Frameworks, organizational operations plans or SOPs, or discipline-specific standards.

D Drill A drill is a coordinated, supervised activity usually employed to validate a

specific operation or function in a single agency or organization. Drills are commonly used to provide training on new equipment, develop or validate new policies or procedures, or practice and maintain current skills.

E End of Exercise (EndEx) The official conclusion of an exercise. Evaluation Plan (EvalPlan)

The EvalPlan is typically used for exercises of a large scope and scale. An EvalPlan provides evaluation staff with guidance and instructions on evaluation or observation methodology to be used as well as essential materials required to execute their specific functions.

Evaluation Team The evaluation team consists of evaluators trained to observe and record participant actions. These individuals should be familiar with the exercising jurisdiction’s plans, policies, procedures, and agreements.

Evaluator Evaluators, selected from participating agencies, are chosen based on their expertise in the functional areas they will observe. Evaluators use EEGs to measure and assess performance, capture unresolved issues, and analyze exercise results. Evaluators passively assess and document players’ performance against established emergency plans and exercise evaluation criteria, in accordance with HSEEP standards and without interfering with exercise flow.

Event Within the MSEL, an event is an expected action that is anticipated to take place during an exercise.

Exercise An exercise is an instrument to train for, assess, practice, and improve performance in prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery capabilities in a risk-free environment. Exercises can be used for testing and validating policies, plans, procedures, training, equipment, and interagency agreements; clarifying and training personnel in roles and responsibilities; improving interagency coordination and communications; improving individual performance; identifying gaps in resources; and identifying opportunities for improvement.

Exercise Assembly Area

The exercise assembly area is a gathering place for all deployable resources that will be playing in an exercise. The purpose of the assembly area is to gather all resources and personnel near the exercise site prior to StartEx for safety briefings, weapons checks, and to ensure that resources and personnel are transported in a safe and unhurried manner.

Exercise Assembly Area Controller

The exercise assembly area controller is responsible for the logistical organization of the exercise assembly area, including placement locations for units entering the exercise assembly area, release of dispatched units into the field, and coordination of pathways and overall safety within the assembly area.

Exercise Director The Exercise Director oversees all exercise functions during exercise conduct; oversees and remains in contact with controllers and evaluators; debriefs controllers and evaluators following the exercise; and oversees setup and cleanup of the exercise as well as positioning of controllers and evaluators.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Glossary-4

Exercise Evaluation Guide (EEG)

EEGs provide a template for observing and collecting exercise data in relation to objectives and associated core capabilities. EEGs typically identify targets and critical tasks for exercise objectives and core capabilities and enable evaluators to capture structured and unstructured data regarding exercise performance. Evaluators should develop and customize EEGs to meet the unique objectives of their exercise and to reflect jurisdiction-specific capability targets.

Exercise Plan (ExPlan) An ExPlan is a general information document that helps operations-based exercises run smoothly by providing participants with a synopsis of the exercise. It is published and distributed to the participating organizations following development of most of the critical elements of the exercise. In addition to addressing exercise objectives and scope, an ExPlan assigns activities and responsibilities for exercise planning, conduct, and evaluation. The ExPlan is intended to be seen by the exercise players and observers—therefore, it does not contain detailed scenario information that may reduce the realism of the exercise.

Exercise Planning Team The exercise planning team is responsible for the successful execution of all aspects of an individual exercise. The planning team determines exercise objectives and core capabilities, creates a realistic scenario to achieve the exercise objectives, and develops documents to guide exercise conduct and evaluation. The planning team’s organization and management principles should include clearly defined roles and responsibilities and a manageable span of control.

Exercise Play Area The exercise play area is the site or facility where the bulk of tactical player activities and tasks are demonstrated during an exercise.

Exercise Play Rules Exercise play rules are the parameters that exercise participants follow during the exercise. Exercise play rules describe appropriate exercise behavior, particularly in the case of real-world emergencies.

Exercise Program Management

Exercise program management is the process of overseeing a variety of individual exercises and supporting activities sustained over time. An effective exercise program helps whole community stakeholders maximize efficiency, resources, time, and funding by ensuring that individual exercises are part of a coordinated, integrated approach to building, sustaining, and delivering core capabilities.

Exercise Program Manager

The exercise program manager develops a self-sustaining exercise program through program budget management oversight, exercise conduct, and improvement tracking monitoring and reporting.

Exercise Project Management

Exercise project management is the act of engaging in design and development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning for an individual exercise. Effective project management ensures that all aspects of planning and executing an individual exercise are done efficiently and are grounded in common approaches and best practices.

Expected Action Event An expected action event serves as a holding place in the MSEL and notifies controllers of when an expected action should occur.

F Facilitated Discussion A facilitated discussion is the focused discussion of specific issues through

a facilitator with functional area or subject-matter expertise.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Glossary-5

Facilitator During a discussion-based exercise, the facilitator(s) is responsible for keeping participant discussions on track with exercise objectives and ensuring all issues and objectives are explored as thoroughly as possible within time constraints. If an exercise uses breakout groups, more than one facilitator may be needed.

Final Planning Meeting (FPM)

The FPM is the final forum for reviewing exercise processes and procedures. An FPM should be conducted for all exercises to ensure that all elements of the exercise are ready for conduct. Prior to the FPM, the exercise planning team receives final drafts of all exercise materials. No major changes to exercise’s design, scope, or supporting documentation should take place at or following the FPM. The FPM ensures that all logistical requirements have been met, outstanding issues have been identified and resolved, and exercise products are ready for printing.

Full-Scale Exercise (FSE)

FSEs are typically the most complex and resource-intensive type of exercise. They involve multiple agencies, organizations, and jurisdictions and validate many facets of preparedness. FSEs often include many players operating under cooperative systems such as the Incident Command System or Unified Command.

Functional Exercise (FE)

Functional exercises are designed to validate and evaluate capabilities, multiple functions and/or sub-functions, or interdependent groups of functions. FEs are typically focused on exercising plans, policies, procedures, and staff members involved in management, direction, command, and control functions. In FEs, events are projected through an exercise scenario with event updates that drive activity at the management level. An FE is conducted in a realistic, real-time environment; however, movement of personnel and equipment is usually simulated.

G Game A game is a simulation of operations that often involves two or more teams,

usually in a competitive environment, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or hypothetic situation. Games explore the consequences of player decisions and actions and are therefore excellent tools to use when validating or reinforcing plans and procedures or evaluating resource requirements.

Ground Truth The ground truth is comprised of the detailed elements of a prevention exercise scenario that must remain consistent during exercise development and conduct to ensure that realism is maintained and objectives may be met in the unscripted move-countermove exercise environment. The ground truth includes the scenario timeline, local threat environment, simulated threat group, and individual adversary profiles and relationships. Once composed, the ground truth is used as the basis for MSEL development and red team operations planning, if applicable.

Ground Truth Advisor In prevention exercises, the ground truth advisor tracks how the adversary (i.e., red team) and exercise participant moves and countermoves change the fabric of the exercise environment, potentially creating additional truths. To ensure consistency, each unscripted MSEL inject should be vetted by the ground truth advisor.

H Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

HSEEP is a program that provides a set of guiding principles for exercise programs, as well as a common approach to exercise program management, design and development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Glossary-6

Hot Wash A Hot Wash is a facilitated discussion held immediately after an exercise among exercise players. It captures feedback about any issues, concerns, or proposed improvements players may have about the exercise. The Hot Wash is an opportunity for players to voice their opinions on the exercise and their own performance.

I Improvement Plan (IP) The IP identifies specific corrective actions, assigns them to responsible

parties, and establishes target dates for their completion. The IP is developed in conjunction with the After-Action Report.

Initial Planning Meeting (IPM)

The IPM marks the beginning of the exercise development phase. An IPM’s purpose is to determine exercise scope by gathering input from the exercise planning team; design requirements and conditions (e.g., assumptions and artificialities); objectives; extent of play; and scenario variables (e.g., time, location, hazard selection). The IPM is also used to develop exercise documentation by obtaining the planning team’s input on exercise location, schedule, duration, and other relevant details.

Inject Injects are MSEL events that prompt players to implement the plans, policies, and procedures that planners want the exercise to validate. Exercise controllers provide injects to exercise players to drive exercise play toward achievement of objectives. Injects can be written, oral, televised, and/or transmitted via any means (e.g., fax, phone, e-mail, voice, radio). Injects can be contextual or contingency.

L Lead Evaluator The lead evaluator should participate fully as a member of the exercise

planning team and should be a senior-level individual familiar with all relevant issues associated with the exercise, including plans, policies, and procedures of the exercising organizations; Incident Command and decision-making processes of the exercising organizations; and interagency and/or inter-jurisdictional coordination issues relevant to the exercise. The lead evaluator should have the management skills needed to oversee a team of evaluators over an extended process as well as the knowledge and analytical skills to undertake a thorough and accurate analysis of all capabilities being tested during an exercise.

Logistics Section The Logistics Section of the exercise planning team provides the supplies, materials, facilities, and services that enable the exercise to function smoothly without outside interference or disruption. This section consists of two subsections: service and support. The service subsection provides transportation, barricading, signage, food and drinks, real-life medical capability, and exercise security. The support subsection provides communications, purchasing, general supplies, management of VIPs, observer processing, and recruitment and management of actors.

M Master Scenario Events List (MSEL)

The MSEL is a chronological timeline of expected actions and scripted events to be injected into exercise play by controllers to generate or prompt player activity. It ensures necessary events happen so that all objectives are met. Larger, more complex exercises may also use a procedural flow, which differs from the MSEL in that it contains only expected player actions or events. The MSEL links simulation to action, enhances exercise experience for players, and reflects an incident or activity meant to prompt players to action.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Glossary-7

MSEL Meeting The MSEL Meeting may be held in preparation for more complex exercises to review the scenario timeline and focus on MSEL development. A MSEL Meeting can be held in conjunction with or separate from the MPM to review the scenario timeline for the exercise.

Midterm Planning Meeting (MPM)

The MPM is a planning meeting for exercises. It is used to discuss exercise organization and staffing concepts; scenario and timeline development; and scheduling, logistics, and administrative requirements. It is also a session to review draft documentation.

Mitigation The capabilities necessary to reduce loss of life and property by lessening the impact of disasters.

Moderated Discussion A moderated discussion is a facilitated, discussion-based forum where a representative from each functional area breakout presents to participants a summary and results from a group’s earlier facilitated discussion. During moderated discussions, spokespersons summarize the facilitated discussion, present key findings and issues, and discuss any unresolved issues or questions. At the end of the moderated discussion period, the floor is open for questions.

N National Exercise Program (NEP)

The NEP’s mission is to serve as the principal exercise mechanism for examining the preparedness and measuring the readiness of the United States across the entire homeland security enterprise by designing, coordinating, conducting, and evaluating a progressive cycle of exercises that rigorously test the Nation’s ability to perform missions or functions that prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.

National Incident Management System (NIMS)

The NIMS standard was designed to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive system for incident management. It is a system mandated by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) that provides a consistent, nationwide approach for Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial governments; the private sector; and nongovernmental organizations to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity.

National Preparedness Goal (Goal)

The National Preparedness Goal defines the core capabilities necessary to prepare for the specific types of incidents that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation. The Goal emphasizes actions aimed at achieving an integrated, layered, and all-of-Nation preparedness approach that optimizes the use of available resources. Specifically, the Goal defines success as: A secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.

National Preparedness System

The National Preparedness System is an integrated set of guidance, programs, and processes that will enable the Nation to meet the National Preparedness Goal.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Glossary-8

O Objectives Objectives are the distinct outcomes an organization wishes to achieve

during an individual exercise. Objectives should reflect the exercise sponsor’s specific needs, environment, plans, and procedures, while providing a framework for scenario development and a basis for evaluation. Objectives can be based on outcomes from a THIRA, from Homeland Security Strategies, and other preparedness documents. Planners should create objectives that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound (SMART) and should limit the number of exercise objectives to enable timely exercise conduct, facilitate reasonable scenario design, and support successful evaluation.

Observer Observers do not directly participate in the exercise; rather, they observe selected segments of the exercise as it unfolds, while remaining separated from player activities. Observers view the exercise from a designated observation area and are asked to remain within the observation area during the exercise. A dedicated controller or public information officer should be assigned to manage these groups. In a discussion-based exercise, observers may support the development of player responses to the situation during the discussion by delivering messages or citing references.

Observer Briefing An Observer Briefing is generally conducted the day of an exercise and informs observers and VIPs about program background, scenario, schedule of events, observer limitations, and any other miscellaneous information. Participant Handouts and ExPlans or SitMans, depending on the type of exercise being conducted, are often distributed during this briefing.

Observer/Media Area This is a designated area that provides observers and real-world media representatives with a view of the exercise but prevents them from interfering with exercise play.

Operations Section The Operations Section of the exercise planning team provides most of the technical or functional expertise for both scenario development and evaluation. This includes development of the MSEL.

P Participant Participants are the overarching group that includes all players, controllers,

evaluators, and staff members involved in conducting an exercise. Participant Feedback Form

Players and observers receive a Participant Feedback Form after the end of the exercise that asks for input regarding observed strengths and areas for improvement that players identified during the exercise. Providing Participant Feedback Forms to players during the exercise Hot Wash allows them to provide evaluators with their insights into decisions made and actions taken. A Participant Feedback Form also provides players the opportunity to provide constructive criticism about the design, control, or logistics of the exercise to help enhance future exercises. Information collected from feedback forms contributes to the issues, observations, recommendations, and corrective actions in the After-Action Report/Improvement Plan.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Glossary-9

Planning Meetings Effective exercise design and development involve a combination of exercise planning meetings. These meetings bring together the full range of exercise stakeholders to discuss and agree on key aspects of the exercise’s design and development. Various factors—including exercise scope, type, and complexity—inform the types of meetings needed, and exercise planners should tailor the planning meeting schedule to suit the particular nature of the exercise.

Planning Section The Planning Section of the exercise planning team is responsible for compiling and developing all exercise documentation. To accomplish this effectively, the Planning Section also collects and reviews policies, plans, and procedures that will be assessed in the exercise. This group is also responsible for planning exercise evaluation. During the exercise, the Planning Section may be responsible for developing simulated actions by agencies not participating in the exercise and for setting up a SimCell as required.

Player Players have an active role in preventing, responding to, or recovering from the risks and hazards presented in the scenario, by either discussing or performing their regular roles and responsibilities. Players initiate actions that will respond to and/or mitigate the simulated emergency.

Player Briefing A Player Briefing is held immediately before an exercise and addresses individual roles and responsibilities, exercise parameters, safety, badges, and any other logistical items. For a drill or full-scale exercise, Player Briefings typically occur in the exercise assembly area.

Preparedness The actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation.

Prevention The capabilities necessary to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism.

Prevention Exercises Prevention exercises may focus on issues that pertain to information and intelligence sharing, credible threats, surveillance, and/or opposing forces.

Props Props are nonfunctional replications of objects. The presence or discovery of props requires certain actions by exercise players. Examples of props include simulated bombs, bomb blast debris (shrapnel), mannequins or body parts, and foam bricks and beams. Simulants that mimic the effects of chemical or radiological hazards or that cause a positive reading of an actual detection device are also considered props.

Protection The capabilities necessary to secure the homeland against acts of terrorism and manmade or natural disasters.

R Recovery The capabilities necessary to assist communities affected by an incident to

recover effectively. Response The capabilities necessary to save lives, protect property and the

environment, and meet basic human needs after an incident has occurred. Rolling Summary Report

The rolling summary report is an analysis of outcomes across a series of exercises. The report includes an analysis of issues, trends, and key outcomes from all exercises listed in an organization’s multi-year TEP. It is developed and updated periodically (e.g., quarterly or biennially), depending on the number of exercises conducted.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Glossary-10

Root-Cause Analysis When evaluating exercises, root-cause analysis involves not merely identifying what issues emerged, but rather discovering the root causes of those issues. Root-cause analysis enables exercise stakeholders to target how best to address areas for improvement and close capability gaps.

S Safety Controller The safety controller is responsible for monitoring exercise safety during

exercise setup, conduct, and cleanup. All exercise controllers assist the safety controller by reporting any safety concerns. The safety controller should not be confused with the safety officer, who is identified by the incident commander during exercise play.

Scenario A scenario provides the storyline that drives an exercise to test objectives. The scenario selected for an exercise should be informed by the actual threats and hazards faced by the exercise stakeholders. The exercise scenario should realistically stress the delivery of core capabilities, providing a mechanism for testing objectives and assessing core capability levels and gaps.

Scope Scope is an indicator of extent of the exercise. The key elements in defining exercise scope include exercise type, participation level, exercise duration, exercise location, and exercise parameters.

Seminar Seminars generally orient participants to, or provide an overview of, authorities, strategies, plans, policies, procedures, protocols, resources, concepts, and ideas. As a discussion-based exercise, seminars can be valuable for entities that are developing or making major changes to existing plans or procedures. Seminars can be similarly helpful when attempting to gain awareness of, or assess, the capabilities of interagency or inter-jurisdictional operations.

Senior Controller The senior controller is responsible for the overall organization of the exercise. The senior controller monitors exercise progress and coordinates decisions regarding deviations or significant changes to the scenario caused by unexpected developments during play. The senior controller monitors actions by controllers and ensures they implement designated and modified actions at the appropriate time. The senior controller debriefs controllers and evaluators after the exercise and oversees the setup and takedown of the exercise.

Simulation (1) An electronic simulation is a method for predicting the results of implementing a model over time, i.e., modeling and simulation. (2) Simulation of nonparticipating personnel and agencies is a technique for increasing realism in exercises.

Simulation Cell (SimCell)

A SimCell is used to generate injects for, receive player responses for, and provide information in place of nonparticipating organizations that would likely participate actively if exercise events were real. Physically, the SimCell is a working location for a number of qualified professionals who portray these nonparticipating organizations.

Simulators Simulators are control staff personnel who role play as nonparticipating organizations or individuals. They most often operate out of the SimCell, but they may occasionally have face-to-face contact with players. Simulators function semi-independently under the supervision of SimCell controllers, enacting roles in accordance with instructions provided in the MSEL. All simulators are ultimately accountable to the Exercise Director and senior controller.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Glossary-11

Situation Manual (SitMan)

A SitMan is provided for TTXs and games as the core documentation that provides the textual background for a multimedia, facilitated exercise. The SitMan supports the scenario narrative and serves as the primary reference material for all participants during conduct.

Special Effects Special effects are technical, mechanical, or electronic scenario enhancements. Special effects typically require trained and licensed personnel, special permission for use, and additional safety and/or security precautions. Examples include use of pyrotechnics or explosives.

Sponsor The sponsor is the primary funding organization for an exercise. Start of Exercise (StartEx)

The official beginning of an exercise.

Subject-Matter Expert (SME)

SMEs add functional knowledge and expertise in a specific area or in performing a specialized job, task, or skill to the exercise planning team. They help make the scenario realistic and plausible and ensure jurisdictions have the appropriate capabilities to respond. SMEs are ideal for the positions of controllers and evaluators.

Support Staff The exercise support staff includes individuals who are assigned administrative and logistical support tasks during the exercise (e.g., registration, catering).

Symptomatology Card Symptomatology cards are provided to each actor in a response-focused exercise. Each card is unique, containing the signs and symptoms the actor will portray as well as information for medical providers. At a minimum, symptomatology cards should include vital signs; symptoms; trauma injuries; acting instructions (e.g., disorientation, emotional distress); and special needs (e.g., language barriers, physical limitations).

T Tabletop Exercise (TTX) A TTX is typically held in an informal setting intended to generate

discussion of various issues regarding a hypothetical, simulated emergency. TTXs can be used to enhance general awareness, validate plans and procedures, rehearse concepts, and/or assess the types of systems needed to guide the prevention of, protection from, mitigation of, response to, and recovery from a defined incident. Generally, TTXs are aimed at facilitating conceptual understanding, identifying strengths and areas for improvement, and/or achieving changes in attitudes.

Training and Exercise Plan (TEP)

The TEP is the foundation document guiding a successful exercise program. The TEP articulates overall exercise program priorities and outlines a schedule of training and exercise activities designed to meet those priorities.

Training and Exercise Planning Workshop (TEPW)

A TEPW is usually conducted to create a Multi-year TEP. At a TEPW, stakeholders work together in a collaborative workshop environment to identify and set exercise program priorities based on core capabilities. Based on these program priorities, TEPW stakeholders develop a multi-year schedule of specific training and exercises.

V Venue A venue is the primary location of exercise conduct.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Glossary-12

W Whole Community A focus on enabling the participation in national preparedness activities of

a wider range of stakeholders from the Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial government, the private and nonprofit sectors (including nongovernmental organizations), and the general public in order to foster better coordination and working relationships. Used interchangeably with “all-of-Nation.”

Workshop Although similar to seminars, workshops differ in two important aspects: participant interaction is increased, and the focus is placed on achieving or building a product. Effective workshops entail the broadest attendance by relevant stakeholders. Products produced from a workshop can include new standard operating procedures, emergency operations plans, continuity of operations plans, and mutual aid agreements. To be effective, workshops should focus on a specific issue, and the desired objective, product, or goal must be clearly defined.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Acronyms-1

Acronyms and Abbreviations Acronym/Abbreviation Description A/V Audio/Visual AAM After-Action Meeting AAR After-Action Report C/E Controller/Evaluator C&O Concept and Objectives COSIN Control Staff Instructions DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security EEG Exercise Evaluation Guide EndEx End of Exercise EOC Emergency Operations Center EvalPlan Evaluation Plan ExPlan Exercise Plan FE Functional Exercise FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FPM Final Planning Meeting FSE Full-Scale Exercise HSEEP Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program ICS Incident Command System IP Improvement Plan IPM Initial Planning Meeting MPM Midterm Planning Meeting MSEL Master Scenario Events List NEP National Exercise Program NGO Nongovernmental Organization NIMS National Incident Management System POC Point of Contact SimCell Simulation Cell SitMan Situational Manual SMART Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-bound SME Subject-Matter Expert SOP Standard Operating Procedure StartEx Start of Exercise THIRA Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment TEP Training and Exercise Plan TEPW Training and Exercise Planning Workshop TTX Tabletop Exercise VIP Very Important Person XPA Extent of Play Agreement

Sonoma County Operational Area

Disaster Service Worker Volunteer Program (DSWVP) Guidance & Policy Registering, Training & Supervising for Success

Sonoma County Fire & Emergency Services Department 11/1/2013

ii

Sonoma County Operational Area Disaster Service Worker Volunteer Program (DSWVP) Guidance & Policy

Contents Disaster Service Worker Volunteer Program .............................................................................. 1

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1

Disclaimer .............................................................................................................................. 1

Disaster Service Worker Program History .................................................................................. 1

Sonoma County Operational Area (OA) Emergency Council .................................................. 2

Accredited Disaster Councils .................................................................................................. 2

Definitions .................................................................................................................................. 2

Disaster Service Worker Volunteer (DSWV) ........................................................................... 2

Registered DSWV ............................................................................................................... 2

Impressed into Service ........................................................................................................ 3

Disaster Service ..................................................................................................................... 3

Convergent Volunteers ........................................................................................................... 3

Single Event Registration .................................................................................................... 3

Good Samaritan Laws ............................................................................................................ 4

Immunity from Liability ............................................................................................................ 4

Classifications of Disaster Service Worker Volunteers ............................................................... 4

Classifications ........................................................................................................................ 4

Specialties .......................................................................................................................... 4

Disaster Service Worker Volunteer (DSWV) Groups .................................................................. 5

Purpose of DSWV Groups ...................................................................................................... 5

Developing DSW Groups........................................................................................................ 5

DSWV Group Audits ............................................................................................................... 6

Volunteer Registration ................................................................................................................ 6

Purpose of Registration .......................................................................................................... 6

Registration ......................................................................................................................... 6

Loyalty Oath ........................................................................................................................... 7

Administration of the Oath ................................................................................................... 7

iii

Registration Expiration ........................................................................................................... 7

Background Investigations ...................................................................................................... 7

Program Administration .............................................................................................................. 8

File Retention and Record Keeping ........................................................................................ 8

Training .................................................................................................................................. 8

Documenting Training ......................................................................................................... 8

Exclusions ........................................................................................................................... 8

Activations .............................................................................................................................. 9

Sponsoring Department/Agency Responsibilities ................................................................... 9

Appendix A: DSWV Group Application ...................................................................................... A

Appendix B: DSWV Group Audit Sheet ..................................................................................... B

Appendix C: DSWV Loyalty Oath .............................................................................................. C

Appendix D: DSWV Registration Form ...................................................................................... D

Appendix E: List of Volunteers Template ................................................................................... E

1 Sonoma County OA DSWV Guidance & Policy

Disaster Service Worker Volunteer Program

Introduction Recent changes in California Disaster Service Worker (DSW) statutes have given

additional responsibility to local disaster councils to accredit affiliated DSW programs that meet specific guidelines. The intent of the Sonoma County Operational Area (OA) Disaster Service Worker Volunteer Program (DSWVP) is to ensure qualified workers’ are entitled to compensation insurance coverage in the event a Disaster Service Worker volunteer (DSWV) is injured while performing assigned disaster duties. Included in this publication are the processes for registering DSWVP with the Sonoma County OA Emergency Council.

This publication provides program history, establishes Sonoma County OA DSW group registration/affiliation processes, and answers frequently asked questions.

This publication is to be used in conjunction with the DSWVP regulations. (Cal. Code of Regs., Title 19, §2570-2573.3)

The DSWVP Guidance & Policy dated November 2013 will be revised as regulations are amended, affiliated programs are recognized or decommission by the Sonoma County Operational Area Emergency Council or other significant changes are deemed appropriate.

Additional information can be obtained by contacting the Sonoma County Fire & Emergency Services Department at (707) 565-1152.

Disclaimer This publication is a guidance document and establishes Sonoma County OA

registration/affiliation procedures. It does not establish new standards. It is informational only and does not replace California regulations or statute. Legal questions should be addressed with your city or county counsel.

Disaster Service Worker Program History In 1943, during World War II, the War Powers Act was signed which created the

California War Council. Subsequently, the Council established subordinate County and City Councils. The War Councils recognized that because of the war effort, human resources in California were inadequate to address the problems of mass attack or natural disasters. As a result, local war councils were forced to recruit numerous civilian volunteers.

Prior to the War Powers Act, civilian volunteers were not provided any form of compensation if injured during the course of their volunteer duties. In 1942, the State Attorney General issued an opinion that under the California Workmen’s Compensation Act (later re-named Workers’ Compensation), volunteers injured during civilian defense work were not eligible for compensation. The legal theory was that because these volunteers freely donated their time for the benefit of California citizens without expectation of compensation, they similarly could not expect compensation if they were injured, as there was no employment relationship.

Realizing that failure to compensate volunteers for injuries received while volunteering was not conducive to recruitment, the Legislature addressed the problem with the War Powers Act. The Act provided that volunteers might receive the benefits of the State Workmen’s Compensation funds if the volunteer was injured in the course of his or her volunteer duty. One requirement of this benefit was that the volunteers must be registered with a local War Council, which in turn must be certified by the California (State) War Council. On June 4, 1943, the California (State) War Council certified all existing War Councils in California as “accredited” for the purpose of qualifying their enrolled Civilian Defense workers for workers’ compensation for

2 Sonoma County OA DSWV Guidance & Policy

injuries incurred during the course of volunteer duties. Today War Councils are known as Disaster Councils, as set forth in the California Emergency Services Act (CESA), Govt.Code §8550 et seq., enacted in 1970.

Sonoma County Operational Area (OA) Emergency Council The Sonoma County Disaster Council was created in December 19th, 1946. This

accredited Disaster Council is known as the Emergency Council in Sonoma County. Sonoma County Code, Chapter 10, “Civil Defense and Disaster”, establishes the local Disaster Council and sets forth roles and responsibilities as it relates to the CESA. The Sonoma County Operational Area was established with the incorporation of the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) Operational Area Agreement in 1997. The Sonoma County Operational Area Emergency Council currently meets semi-annually, in May and November, and continues to advise the County Administrator’s Office and review preparation for disasters and other emergencies. One of the statutory duties of the Emergency Council, mandated by the State of California, is to register disaster service worker volunteers in the DSW Volunteer Program (DSWVP). The DSWVP provides volunteers with Workers’ Compensation if they are injured performing disaster service work and, in addition, provides limited immunity from liability.

Accredited Disaster Councils California law requires Disaster Service Workers register with an accredited Disaster

Council, the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, or an authorized State agency. Affiliation with an accredited Disaster Council and delegated authority from that council are required prior to a jurisdiction administering a disaster service worker volunteer program (Cal. Code of Regs., Title 19, §2571). Below identifies accredited local Disaster Councils within in the Sonoma County (Table 1).

Table 1: Accredited Disaster Councils within the Sonoma County OA as of November 1, 2013 Jurisdiction Date Accredited Date Incorporated

Sonoma County OA 12/19/1946 02/18/1850 Cloverdale 06/16/1949 02/28/1872 Cotati 01/14/1965 07/16/1963 Healdsburg 06/16/1949 02/20/1867 Petaluma 06/16/1949 04/12/1858 Rohnert Park 07/19/1963 08/27/1962 Santa Rosa 04/27/1948 03/16/1868 Sebastopol 11/29/1950 06/13/1902 Sonoma 09/12/1950 06/22/1900 Windsor 11/21/1997 07/01/1992

Definitions

Disaster Service Worker Volunteer (DSWV)

Registered DSWV A disaster service worker volunteer is “…any person registered with an accredited

Disaster Council…for the purpose of engaging in disaster service…without pay or other consideration.” Registered DSWVs are persons who have chosen to volunteer their time to assist a disaster or emergency services agency in carrying out the responsibilities of that agency. The person must:

3 Sonoma County OA DSWV Guidance & Policy

be officially registered with the accredited Disaster Council; and, not receive any pay, monetary or otherwise, for the service being provided.

Impressed into Service The definition “…also includes any unregistered person impressed into service during

a state of war emergency, a state of emergency, or a local emergency by a person having authority to command the aid of the citizens in the execution of his or her duties.” Circumstances can occur when an emergency official (a fire fighter, law enforcement officer, or other public official having authority to command the aid of citizens to carry out assigned duties) requires the immediate assistance of another person who may not be a public employee or a registered volunteer. In such a time, that official can order a bystander to assist in an emergency situation. When the order is made under such circumstances, the bystander has been impressed into service, and as such, is covered by worker’s compensation and has immunity from liability to the same degree as a registered DSW volunteer. The emergency official should take note of the impressed person’s name, address, and phone number at the scene of the incident. The impressed person is under the supervision of that official until released from that duty.

Disaster Service “Disaster service means all activities authorized by and carried on pursuant to the

California Emergency Services Act, including approved and documented training necessary or proper to engage in such [disaster] activities.” (Cal. Code of Regs., Title 19,§2570.2. (3)(b)(1)). The California Emergency Services Act provides a definition of disaster activities resulting from a “State of war emergency”, a “State of emergency”, and/or a “Local emergency.” The disaster service, as defined for the DSW Volunteer Program, is designed primarily to aid in disaster events. It does not include the day-to-day emergency response activities typically associated with, law enforcement, fire services or emergency medical services.

Convergent Volunteers Convergent volunteers are not pre-registered volunteers, and have not been impressed

into service. They are volunteers who come forward spontaneously during the time of a disaster or emergency event, or post disaster to assist without pay or compensation. As many as 10,000 of these individuals came forward during the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989. Convergent volunteers are used to augment existing OA departments/agencies. Pre-disaster registered volunteers are typically used before convergent volunteers. Convergent volunteers serve at the pleasure of the management of the agency they are assisting. The agency may restrict assignments, control their level of participation, or prohibit their use all together. The agency’s management assumes the responsibility to ensure that convergent volunteers are physically and mentally capable of performing duties to which they will be assigned, and must provide training appropriate to the assignment.

Single Event Registration Volunteers who spontaneously come forward to assist can become registered as a

DSWV for the duration of that single event. It is the responsibility of sponsoring Sonoma County Departments/Agencies to ensure volunteers are properly registered, appropriately trained and working under official supervision.

4 Sonoma County OA DSWV Guidance & Policy

Good Samaritan Laws Convergent volunteers that are not registered as DSW volunteers, have some liability

protection for disaster service under Good Samaritan Laws. They are not, however, provided immunities to the extent as registered DSW volunteers and are not covered for workers’ compensation insurance through the DSW Volunteer Program. (Govt.Code, §§820, §8657, Public Law 105-19, Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 42 USCA 14501-14505)

Immunity from Liability The Emergency Services Act (§8657) provides DSW volunteers with limited immunity

from liability while providing disaster service as it is defined in §§2570.2 and 2572.2 of the Disaster Service Worker Volunteer Program Regulation (Cal. Code of Regs., Title 19). Additionally, U.S. Public Law 105-19, Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, provides limited protection. Immunity from liability protects the political subdivision or political entity, and the DSW volunteer in any civil litigation resulting from acts of good faith made by the political subdivision or political entity, or the DSW volunteer, while providing disaster service (e.g., damage or destruction of property; injury or death of an individual). Immunity from liability does not apply in cases of willful intent, unreasonable acts beyond the scope of DSW training, or if a criminal act is committed.

Classifications of Disaster Service Worker Volunteers

Classifications DSWVs are used throughout the OA and State to augment first responder and rescue

teams in a state of war, state of emergency, or a local emergency disaster, and to assist in recovery activities following a catastrophic event. The DSWV classifications are listed below (Table 2). If an accredited Disaster Council determines a need for volunteer disaster services not included in one of these classifications, the Council may contact the Fire & Emergency Services Department for further information and guidance.

Table 2: State Recognized Disaster Service Worker Classifications Animal Rescue, Care & Shelter Laborer Communications Law Enforcement Community Emergency Response Team Member Logistics Finance & Administrative Staff Medical & Environmental Health Human Services Safety Assessment Inspector Fire Search & Rescue Utilities

Specialties Classifications may further be defined into specialty areas (e.g.; Human Services may

include, providers of food, shelter, registration of evacuees, and religious or spiritual needs. Laborer may include a person under the direction and supervision of the responding agency who is doing general labor services and supporting emergency operations. Medical and Environmental Health may include, doctors, nurses, radiologists, laboratory technicians, etc.). The DSWV registration form should include a space for the specialty.

5 Sonoma County OA DSWV Guidance & Policy

Disaster Service Worker Volunteer (DSWV) Groups

Purpose of DSWV Groups The Sonoma County OA Emergency Council recognizes that in order to meet the criteria

set forth in the Disaster Service Worker statute, it is responsible to ensure that affiliated DSW programs provide proper training, and that they effectively track and manage DSWVs registered within its jurisdiction. In order to provide sufficient oversight of numerous DSWVs the OA Emergency Council will require that volunteers participate in approved DSWV group in order to be registered. For a DSWV group to be registered by the Emergency Council, they must be sponsored by a County Department or Agency. Sonoma County Departments and Agencies or partnering Disaster Councils are responsible to develop and carry out training based on job classification and specific operational needs, conduct volunteer registration, and manage their DSWV group. New DSWV groups must submit an application to the Emergency Council for review in order to become registered. The table below indicates the DSWV groups currently registered with and recognized by the Sonoma County OA Disaster Council (table 3).

Table 3: DSWV Groups registered with the Sonoma County OA Disaster Council DSWVP Sonoma County Department Program Manager

Medical Reserve Corps Health Services, Division of Public Health

MRC Volunteer Coordinator

Auxiliary Communication Services

Fire & Emergency Services Department, Division of Emergency Managment

Emergency Coordinator

Developing DSW Groups The OA Emergency Council will accept DSWV group proposals for registrations from

county departments and agencies 60 days prior to the fall Emergency Council meeting of even numbered years (ex 2014, 2016, 2018, etc.) A DSWV group application will consist of:

1. Sponsoring Department/Agency with contact information 2. Program Manager 3. Area of Operation/Jurisdiction 4. Program Justification 5. Mission and Scope 6. Organizational Chart 7. List of Volunteers (see Appendix E) 8. Job Classification/Specialty by position to include:

a. Roles and Responsibilities b. Training Requirements c. Activation Criteria

9. Training Outline to include: a. Training Objectives b. Two Year Training Plan

10. Other DSWV Group Affiliations (Federal, State, or other OA Disaster Councils) An example of a DSWV group application is located in Appendix A. Proposal

applications will be reviewed by the Fire & Emergency Services Department - Emergency management Division and present to the OA Emergency Council for adoption. The OA Emergency Council decision will be recorded in the OA Emergency Council meeting minutes. Table 3 within this document will be updated following the adoption or decommission of any

6 Sonoma County OA DSWV Guidance & Policy

DSWV group. The OA Emergency Council reserves to the right to establish DSWV groups or register individuals at anytime based on operational needs.

Accredited Disaster Councils within the Sonoma County OA reserve the right to affiliate with DSWV groups or individuals according to their internal policies, however the Sonoma County OA Disaster Council will only recognize/pre-registered volunteers participating in the DSWV groups identified in table 3. All other volunteers will be considered “convergent” or “impressed into service.”

Questions regarding DSWV groups and registration with the Sonoma County OA Emergency Council can be directed to the Fire & Emergency Services Department at (707) 565-1152.

DSWV Group Audits The Fire & Emergency Services Department will conduct audits of existing DSWV

groups two months prior to the fall OA Emergency Council meeting of odd numbered years (ex 2015, 2017, 2019, etc.). A DSWV group inspection sheet is located in Appendix B. Audit findings will be presented to OA Emergency Council and any program deficiencies will be recorded in the following Emergency Council meeting minutes. A follow up audit will be scheduled 30 days prior to the following OA Emergency Council meeting to ensure program deficiencies had been corrected. Follow up audit results will be recorded in the next OA Emergency Council meeting minutes.

Volunteer Registration Program Managers are responsible to ensure “group members” or volunteers are

tracked, documented and updated. Program managers must verbally report the following at each Sonoma County OA Emergency Council meeting:

Total number of DSWVs as of the last Emergency Council meeting Total number of DSWVs as of the current Emergency Council meeting Net increase or decrease of DSWVs Significant activities to include; activations, group trainings, leadership

succession, etc. Note: Verbal reports will be recorded in the minutes following each OA Emergency Council meeting.

Purpose of Registration DSWVs are registered in order to:

Assist the emergency organization in advance disaster planning Assist in the dispatch and management of resources Facilitate administration of the loyalty oath, as required by law Protect the interests of volunteers who provide direct services to government

agencies and; Provide documentation required for workers’ compensation coverage under the

DSW Program.

Registration Volunteers, as well as the authority administering the loyalty oath, should sign and date

the registration form. If under 18 years of age, the signature of a parent or legal guardian is required. Note: It is illegal to retroactively register a volunteer as a DSW volunteer.

7 Sonoma County OA DSWV Guidance & Policy

Loyalty Oath A loyalty oath is required for all DSWV who wish to be a part of a registered DSWV

group. No workers’ compensation benefit or reimbursement of expenses incurred may be paid to any DSWV unless the loyalty oath has been taken or subscribed to. The approved oath can be found in appendix C.

Administration of the Oath The oath is to be administered only by an officer authorized to administer oaths. The

County Clerk, at the request of the Fire & Emergency Services Department, may deputize selected staff from the sponsoring County Department or Agency. At a minimum, Program Managers will be deputized in order administer loyalty oaths. Sponsoring County Departments will retain all volunteer documentation, to include the loyalty oath (Refer to Appendix E: Govt. Code §3104 and Memo Subject: Administration of Oath).

Registration Expiration All registered DSWV must be given an expiration date. The effective period of a

registration may differ according to circumstances. Single Event Registration - A DSWV can be registered for a single event only; such as

an exercise, a drill or an actual disaster, even though the person is not a regular active member of an organized response team. At the discretion of the accredited Disaster Council, a single event only registration can be extended to a period of up to one calendar year. (Govt. Code, §3102)

Multi Event Registration - For a registered, active DSWV response team member, the registration is effective for the period the person remains an active member of the organization, but no more than 10 years. The accredited Disaster Council does have the discretion to establish a more limited oath/registration period such as a certain number of years. Registration renewal times could prompt the DSWV to provide any updates on personal information such as address, telephone numbers and emergency contact information. It is not necessary for the active DSWV to retake or re-subscribe to the loyalty oath with each registration renewal. If, however, the volunteer withdraws from service and later re-registers, the loyalty oath must be re-administered. (Govt. Code. 3102.(c))

Background Investigations California does not have a statute or regulation requirement for criminal background

investigation and health examinations for DSWVs. Sonoma County OA Department/Agencies may make a determination to review the criminal and health background of potential DSWVs based on the job classification or the agency operational needs. This determination should be made in consultation with legal counsel. Regardless, Sonoma County Agencies should request enough information on their volunteer application to conduct at minimum a basic background investigation. Program managers or designee(s) will verify professional licenses or certificates, when these documents are pertinent to the duties of the DSWV.

Appendix D is an example of an individual registration application. This sample can be used, or revised, to meet the needs of the department or jurisdiction, including the use of a department or jurisdiction’s logos. The volunteer applicant should completely fill out the registration application. When signing the registration form, a person having the delegated

8 Sonoma County OA DSWV Guidance & Policy

authority to do so must administer the loyalty oath, and the form signed and dated by the authorized official.

Program Administration

File Retention and Record Keeping DSWV applications and loyalty oaths should be filed and follow the same document

retention rules as other public agency personnel records. The Registration application with oath or affirmation shall be filed within 30 days of the date it was taken or subscribed as follows:

Counties (OA) - The registration/oath of the DSWV shall be filed by the sponsoring Department/Agency. The oath may be destroyed without duplication five years after the termination of the DSWV. (Govt. Code, §3105,(b))

Cities - Per state guidance, “File DSWV registration/oaths in the office of the City Clerk. At the request of the City OES, the City Clerk may designate a department (e.g., City OES) as the official repository for Disaster Service Worker records in order to make the administration of the program more practical.”

Note: DSWVP original documents are public record and subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act (Govt. Code, §6250, et. seq.). Records should be retained in an official file, available for review.

Training DSWVs should be trained and prepared for disaster service assignments based on the

classification and the operational need of the sponsoring department/agency. Registered DSWVs are provided workers’ compensation insurance coverage while participating in training activities that are pre-approved and documented by the supervising authority. All training should be supervised by the DSWV group sponsor or program manager. (Cal. Code Regs., §2573.1 (5)(b)(c)(2)(3)) “Pre-approved” means that any training offered by someone other than the program manager must be authorized by the program manager prior to the conduct of the training.

While some classifications require very basic training, others require extensive and specialized training. Some professionals (physicians, nurses, engineers, architects, etc.) may need additional training in order to provide their services under extreme circumstances or hazardous conditions. Regardless of the classification, all DSWVs should be given basic safety instruction commensurate with the environment in which they may be providing services.

Documenting Training Each registered DSWV should have training prior to being activated and assigned to a

disaster event. Training can be documented on a training sign-in sheet or an individual electronic training record. In the event a DSWV is injured while attending a training activity, this record would substantiate that the DSWV was participating in a pre-approved official activity. Training schedule documentation will be prepared prior to the event and will be inspected during the audit process.

Exclusions Registered DSWVs will not be provided workers’ compensation coverage for

participating in parades, public exhibitions, physical fitness training, or other activities not related to disaster service. There are exceptions to this, when a nexus to the disaster service can be established. For example, Auxiliary Communications Service (ACS) may schedule an

9 Sonoma County OA DSWV Guidance & Policy

authorized DSWV training for crowd control communications and may use a public parade event as the environment for that specific type of training. In this example, crowd control communications is not the day-to-day activity of the ACS volunteer and the parade acts as an exercise to develop volunteer skills that are applicable to their role in a disaster.

Activations Registered DSWV groups will wait for official activation from their sponsoring

departments or program manager before carrying out volunteer work. Activation of DSWV groups will be documented by the sponsoring department and program managers on incident activity log. The following are covered activities:

Performing disaster service, including travel to and from the incident site, when called to duty during an emergency or disaster, or while participating in a search and rescue operation.

Participating in an authorized and documented, planned disaster training activity or disaster exercise. Coverage for these activities does not include travel to and from the training site.

Sponsoring Department/Agency Responsibilities The sponsoring department/agency is responsible for briefing registered DSWVs on

injury reporting procedures. This should be done as part of the initial safety training. In the event of an injury, the sponsoring county department/agency is responsible to

report the injury to the Director of Emergency Services, initiate a timely Employee’s Claim for Workers’ Compensation Benefits and track the status of the claim unit the issue is resolved. Program Managers should ensure the following is completed and submitted to properly initiate a claim:

SCIF Form 3301, Employee's Claim for Workers' Compensation Benefits (revised with new header address, June 2000). This form must be provided to the DSWV within 24 hours3 of the supervising agency receiving knowledge that an injury occurred or is alleged. The injured DSWV should fill out and sign the form, returning it to the supervisor within 3 days (72 hours) of requesting the form. Two copies should be submitted to SCIF.

SCIF Form 3267, Employer’s Report of Occupational Injury. This form must be sent to SCIF within 5 days4 of the supervising agency receiving knowledge that an injury occurred or is alleged.

A brief and clear, written narrative of the incident leading to the injury. A copy of the current DSWV registration form including the signed loyalty oath.

Copies of these forms should be submitted to both SCIF and the Fire and Emergency

Services Department.

A Sonoma County OA DSWV Guidance & Policy

Appendix A: DSWV Group Application Department/Agency Name:

Department/Agency Address:

Department/Agency Phone Number:

Program Manager Title:

Program Manager Name:

Program Manager Phone Number:

Program Manger Alternate Phone Number:

Program Manager Email:

Program Manager Alternate Email:

Jurisdiction the DSWV Group will operate in:

Other DSWV Group Affiliations: Federal Agencies:

State Agencies:

Other OA Disaster Councils:

Please attach the following:

1. Program Justification 2. Mission and Scope 3. Organizational Chart 4. List of Volunteers (see Appendix E: List of Volunteers Template) 5. Job Classification/Specialty by position to include:

a. Roles and Responsibilities b. Training Requirements c. Activation Criteria

6. Training Outline to include: a. Training Objectives b. Two Year Training Plan

B Sonoma County OA DSWV Guidance & Policy

Appendix B: DSWV Group Audit Sheet

Is the sponsor contact information current? YES / NO Notes: Is the program manager information current? YES / NO Notes: Is the DSWV group operating in new jurisdictions? YES / NO Notes: Has the DSWV group become affiliated with additional organizations/agencies? YES / NO Notes: Have there been any changes to the mission statement? YES / NO Notes: Have there been any changes to the scope of work? YES / NO Notes: Have there been changes to the organizational chart? YES / NO Notes: Is the DSWV list current? YES / NO Notes: Random record inspections: Auditor will randomly select individuals (not to exceed 25% of DSWV list) from the DSWV list to ensure proper documentation is being maintained.

a. Does the DSWV have a completed and signed registration form? YES / NO b. Has the DSWV registration form been signed by the authorized approving

authority? YES / NO

c. Is the DSWV’s registration current? (within 10 years) YES / NO d. Is there documentation that the DSWV taken or subscribed to the loyalty? YES / NO e. Does each DSWV have defined roles and responsibilities? YES / NO f. Do the roles and responsibilities define activations procedures? YES / NO g. Has the DSWV attended required training? YES / NO h. Are copies of training certificates being maintained? YES / NO i. Is the DSWV currently in good standing with the DSWV group? YES / NO

Notes: Have there been changes to the training program since last audit? YES / NO Has the 2 year training plan been updated? YES / NO Notes:

C Sonoma County OA DSWV Guidance & Policy

Appendix C: DSWV Loyalty Oath I, ___________________ do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the

Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California against

all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the

Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of California; that I take this

obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well

and faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter.

D Sonoma County OA DSWV Guidance & Policy

Appendix D: DSWV Registration Form

E Sonoma County OA DSWV Guidance & Policy

Appendix E: List of Volunteers Template

DSWV Group Name Sonoma County OA Sponsor Department/Agency Address

Department/Agency Contact Information DSWV Name (Last, First) DSWV Position/Title

COUNTY ADMINISTRATION CENTER 575 ADMINISTRATION DRIVE, ROOM 105A SANTA ROSA, CALIFORNIA 95403 TELEPHONE: (707) 565-2421 FACSIMILE: (707) 565-2624 __________

ASSISTANT COUNTY COUNSEL ROBERT H. PITTMAN

OFFICE OF THE COUNTY

COUNSEL BRUCE D. GOLDSTEIN

County Counsel

CHIEF DEPUTIES DEBBIE F. LATHAM JEFFREY M. BRAX ALEGRÍA DE LA CRUZ PHYLLIS C. GALLAGHER

DEPUTIES

JEFFREY L. BERK PETRA BRUGGISSER LINDA D. SCHILTGEN LESLIE A. THOMSEN JENNIFER C. KLEIN MARGARET A. SINGLETON CORY W. O’DONNELL TAMBRA CURTIS LISA A. PHEATT JOSHUA A. MYERS HOLLY RICKETT VERNE BALL IAN TRUEBLOOD ADAM L. BRAND ELIZABETH COLEMAN WITH LAUREN WALKER

CHRISTA L. SHAW MICHAEL KING KARA ABELSON ALDO MERCADO DIANA GOMEZ TASHAWN SANDERS ADAM RADTKE JESSICA MULLAN CHRISTOPHER W. MAGAÑA SITA KUTEIRA JEREMY FONSECA LANI MAHJER MICHAEL CABALLERO

MEMORANDUM DATE: 2/26/2018 TO: Jim Colangelo

Interim Director, Sonoma County Fire and Emergency Services FROM: Jessica Mullan Deputy County Counsel RE: The Sonoma County Operational Area: The Legal Framework for the County’s

Role, Authority & Responsibilities in an Emergency I. Summary The County of Sonoma (“County”) serves as the “Operational Area” in the event of an emergency. In this role, the County takes on a specific leadership responsibilities in aspects of emergency planning, coordination, and management within the Operational Area, which covers cities and special districts within the County’s jurisdictional boundaries. While the Operational Area designation gives the County various responsibilities for coordinating and convening key groups to respond to a disaster, cities and special districts within the Operational Area nevertheless retain authority to make independent decisions and allocate resources. Indeed, nothing in the California Emergency Services Act, which is a key source of the County’s authority as an Operational Area, is to be construed to diminish or remove any authority of any city, county, or city and county granted by Section 7 of Article XI of the California Constitution (California Government Code section 8668(b)). Section 7 of Article XI of the California Constitution provides that a county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.

February 26, 2018 Page 2

Where the County does not have express authority to direct or otherwise manage the activities of the political subdivisions (e.g. cities and special districts) and non-governmental partners directly within the Operational Area, the County’s strategy has been to enter into mutual aid or other forms of agreement to establish how and under what circumstances the parties will work together in advance of an emergency event. In short, the County’s role as the Lead Agency in the Operational Area in an emergency is significant in terms of facilitating cooperation and communication. At the same time, the County’s authority to compel action by cities or special districts within the Operational Area is more limited, such that cooperative agreements take on greater importance as a tool to ensure successful coordination within the Operational Area during a disaster. II. The California Emergency Services Act & the Standardized Emergency

Management System (SEMS) The Operational Area concept arises from the California Emergency Services Act (Government Code §8550 et seq.), which sets forth basic authorities in California for conducting emergency operations following a proclamation of Local Emergency, State of Emergency or State of War Emergency by the Governor and/or appropriate local authorities. The Standardized Emergency Management System (“SEMS”) is intended to standardize response to emergencies involving multiple jurisdictions or multiple agencies. (Chapter 1, Division 2 of Title 19 of the California Code of Regulations, the “SEMS Regulations”). The SEMS model was adopted following the 1991 East Bay Hills Fire in Oakland (Senate Bill 1841, January 1, 1993). The SEMS Regulations require emergency response agencies to utilize basic principles and components of emergency management including: Incident command system (ICS), multi-agency or interagency coordination, the operational area concept, and established mutual aid systems. (19 CCR §2401) State Agencies must use SEMS. (19 CCR §2401) Local governments were required to begin using SEMS by December 1, 1996 in order to be eligible for state funding of response-related personnel costs pursuant to activities identified in California Code of Regulations, Title 19, §2920, §2925, and §2930. (19 CCR §2401) At the same time, the SEMS does not override existing local government authority per se, with the SEMS Regulations stating that “[i]ndividual agencies' roles and responsibilities contained in existing laws or the state emergency plan are not superseded by these regulations.” (19 CCR §2401) The SEMS Regulations establish the following five organizational levels and functions of emergency response as follows:

A. “Field response level” commands emergency response personnel and resources to carry out tactical decisions and activities in direct response to an incident or threat. (19 CCR §2403(b)(1)).

B. “Local government level” manages and coordinates the overall emergency response

and recovery activities within their jurisdiction. (19 CCR §2403(b)(2)).

C. “Operational area level”, which is the role the County plays in an emergency, manages and/or coordinates information, resources, and priorities among local

February 26, 2018 Page 3

governments within the operational area and serves as the coordination and communication link between the local government level and the regional level. (19 CCR §2403(b)(3)).

D. “Regional level” manages and coordinates information and resources among

operational areas within the mutual aid region designated pursuant to Government Code §8600 and between the operational areas and the state level. This level along with the state level coordinates overall state agency support for emergency response activities. (19 CCR §2403(b)(4)).

E. “State level” manages state resources in response to the emergency needs of the other

levels, manages and coordinates mutual aid among the mutual aid regions and between the regional level and state level, and serves as the coordination and communication link with the federal disaster response system. (19 CCR §2403(b)(5)).

The Operational Area is defined by SEMS Regulations as an intermediate level of the state emergency services organization, consisting of a county and all political subdivisions within the county area. (19 CCR §2409(a)). Each county geographic area is designated as an Operational Area. (19 CCR §2409(a)). The Operational Area is intended to be used by the county and the political subdivisions comprising the Operational Area for the coordination of emergency activities and to serve as a link in the system of communications and coordination between the state's emergency operation centers and the operation centers of the political subdivisions comprising the Operational Area, as defined in California Government Code §8559(b) and §8605. (19 CCR §2409(a)). The definition of Operational Area in the SEMS Regulations is not intended to change the definition of operational area as used in existing fire and rescue mutual aid systems. (19 CCR §2409(a)). County Boards of Supervisors were required to establish Operational Areas by 1995 (19 CCR §2409(b)). The County Government is the lead agency in an Operational Area, unless that role is assumed by another local government via written agreement with the County. (19 CCR §2409(d)). In Sonoma County, the County retains the lead agency role. As lead agency in the Operational Area, the County is responsible for:

• Coordinating information, resources and priorities among local governments and between the regional level and local government level and using multi-agency or inter-agency coordination to facilitate decision making about emergency response activities for the Operational Area. (19 CCR §2409(e)(1)-(3))

• Activating the Operational Area EOC under specified circumstances, for instance

where local governments in the Operational Area activate their EOC and request Operational Area EOC activation, two or more cities in the Operational Area declare or proclaim a local emergency, or the County and one or more cities have declared or proclaimed a local emergency (19 CCR §2409(f)).

Fire and law enforcement resources are coordinated separately, instead using respective mutual aid systems and agreements. (19 CCR §2409(e)(2)).

February 26, 2018 Page 4

III. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) After September 11, 2001 and following California’s adoption of SEMS, the federal government adopted a National Incident Management System (“NIMS”). Like SEMS, NIMS was intended to provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, local, and tribal governments; the private-sector, and nongovernmental organizations to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. IV. Local Implementation of NIMS/SEMS: Establishment of the Operational Area with

Chapter 10 of the Sonoma County Code The County adopted an ordinance codified in Chapter 10 of the Sonoma County Code to comply with the California Emergency Services Act, to establish the Operational Area within the County based on NIMS/SEMS and to coordinate the efforts of the various emergency services agencies within the County when dealing with emergencies. Consistent with California Government Code §8559(b) and §8605, Section 10-2 of the Sonoma County Code defines “Operational Area” as “an intermediate level of the State Emergency Services Organization, consisting of the county of Sonoma and all political subdivisions within the county area.” Chapter 10 of the Sonoma County Code also outlines key roles and responsibilities for the County in the Operational Area, including the following:

• Creation of an Emergency Council within the Operational Area and establishment of its role and duties; and

• Designation of a Director of the Department of Emergency Services, and

empowerment of that Director to take certain steps during an emergency. A. Emergency Council; Powers and Duties Section 10-7(a) of the Sonoma County Code creates the Emergency Council for the Operational Area. Membership includes: (Sonoma County Code, §10-7(b)):

1. County Officials: The Chairman of the Board of Supervisors; the Emergency Services Director (County Administrator) or his/her designee; the County Director of the Department of Emergency Services (County Fire Chief); the County sheriff; the County Director of General Services; the County Director of Information Systems; the County Director of the Department of Health Services, the County Director of Human Resources; the County Director of Human Services; the County Director of the Permit and Resource Management Department; the County Director of the Department of Transportation and Public Works; and the General Manager of the Sonoma County Water Agency.

2. Other Representatives from within the Operational Area: The Regional Manager

of Coast Valleys EMS Agency and representatives from: each unincorporated city within the County; the power, gas, telephone and similar public utilities within the

February 26, 2018 Page 5

County; public schools; the general public; the local chapter of the Red Cross; the California National Guard; the United States Coast Guard Two Rock Training Center; and various state agencies, including the California Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (Cal-Fire), the California Highway Patrol, and the California Office of Emergency Services. Any signatory to an Operational Area Agreement not otherwise listed may also be represented on the Emergency Council.

The Chair of the Board of Supervisors serves as ex officio chair of the Emergency Council. (Sonoma County Code, §10-7(c)). In his/her absence the Director of Emergency Services is chair. (Sonoma County Code, §10-7(c)). The Emergency Council is required to meet semi-annually and is required to review the Operational Area goals and objectives once every calendar year. (Sonoma County Code, §10-8(b), (d)) Section 10-8 of the Sonoma County Code empowers the Emergency Council to (1) study, revise, and recommend to the Board of Supervisors for adoption, the Sonoma County/operational area emergency plan, (2) to review and recommend action upon all proposed mutual aid agreements with the United States, state of California, other political subdivisions, corporations, groups, or individuals, and (3) to review and recommend the adoption of such ordinances, resolutions and rules and regulations as may be necessary to implement the Sonoma County/operational area emergency plan or any mutual aid agreement entered into pursuant to such plan. (Sonoma County Code, §10-8(a)). However, such plans only take effect when adopted by resolution by the County Board of Supervisors. (Sonoma County Code, §10-8(a)). Periodic review of the Operational Area emergency plan is also required and the Emergency Council may also recommend joint or independent test exercises. (Sonoma County Code, §10-8(f)-(g)). Approval of funding distribution proposals in the Operational Area is necessary only to the extent required by the California Office of Emergency Services. Sonoma County Code, §10-8(h)). B. Director of Emergency Services; Powers and Duties Per section 10-4 of the Sonoma County Code, the Director of the Emergency Services is the County Administrator. In general, section 10-5 of the Sonoma County Code empowers the Director of the Department of Emergency Services to:

1. Direct the efforts of the department of emergency services and the emergency services organization within the county/operational area (Sonoma County Code, §10-5(a)). The term “emergency services organization” includes “all officers and employees of the county/operational area, all persons enrolled to aid such officers and employees during an emergency, and all officers and employees of political subdivisions, groups, organizations, or persons, who may, by agreement, or by operation of law, be charged with duties incident to the protection of life and property within the county during an emergency, or who may be impressed into service pursuant to law.” (Sonoma County Code, §10-2) (emphasis added).

February 26, 2018 Page 6

2. Request that the Board of Supervisors proclaim the existence of a local emergency if in session, or issue such proclamation if the Board is not in session (Sonoma County Code, §10-5(b));

3. Request that the Governor proclaim a state of emergency (Sonoma County Code,

§10-5(c));

4. Promote cooperation and resolve questions of authority and responsibility that may arise between agencies in the emergency services organization and coordinate the services of and direct staff within the emergency services organization Sonoma County Code, §10-5(d));

5. With the recommendation of the Emergency Council and approval by the Board,

enter into mutual aid agreements with public and/or private entities, with a provision giving the Director authority to resolve questions of authority (Sonoma County Code, §10-5(e)); and

6. Represent the County with public and private agencies related to the emergency.

Sonoma County Code, §10-5(f)). Where there is a proclamation of a state or local emergency, the Director is empowered with additional authority for the protection of life or property affected by the emergency:

7. Make and issue rules and regulations; however, such rules need to be ratified as early as practicable by the Board. (Sonoma County Code, §10-5(g)(1));

8. Obtain necessary resources, equipment or other properties and if required

immediately, to commandeer the same for public use (Sonoma County Code, §10-5(g)(2));

9. Require the immediate service of any county officer or employee, and in the event of

a proclamation of a state of emergency or the existence of a state of war emergency, to command the services and aid of any citizen as he deems necessary in the execution of his duties; such persons so impressed into such service shall be entitled to all the privileges, benefits, and immunities as are provided by law for registered disaster service workers (Sonoma County Code, §10-5(g)(3));

10. Requisition necessary personnel and materials from any County department or

agency. (Sonoma County Code, §10-5(g)(4)); and

11. Order those impeding response efforts to leave the area (Sonoma County Code, §10-5(g)(6)), designate an order of succession (Sonoma County Code, §10-5(h)), and to execute all other ordinary powers and special powers conferred by chapter 10 of the Sonoma County Code and other resolutions and/or emergency plans (Sonoma County Code, §10-5(g)(5)).

V. Contractual Cooperation in the Sonoma County Operational Area

February 26, 2018 Page 7

To supplement the County’s planning and coordination efforts under the NIMS/SEMS framework and related provisions of Chapter 10 of the Sonoma County Code, the County is party to mutual aid and other cooperative agreements. These mutual aid and similar agreements, which are not superseded by SEMS or Chapter 10 of the Sonoma County Code, leave the local official in the jurisdiction where the incident occurs in charge, including with respect to essential maters like the direction of personnel and equipment. Examples of Mutual Aid and Memoranda of Agreement include:

A. Sonoma County Fire Master Mutual Aid Agreement (1998): Parties to this agreement maintain and operate fire protection organizations, each of whom agree to provide emergency services in the event of an emergency. Signatories include City Fire Departments, Fire Protection Districts, Community Services Districts, State and Federal Agencies, Fire Brigades and County Fire Agencies (CSA No. 40 VFCs).

B. Operational Area Agreement (April 22, 1997): In connection with the establishment of

the County as the Operational Area as required by the SEMS Regulations, the County approved an agreement for participation in the Sonoma Operational Area Emergency Management Organization (Resolution 97-0505, April 25, 1997). Cities within the County and Sonoma State University are signatories to the Agreement. Under the terms of the Agreement, the parties have agreed to participate in the Sonoma County Operational Area Emergency Coordinator’s Forum; Share and disseminate disaster intelligence to the Sonoma County Op Area EOC; Train and exercise personnel as needed to apply effective disaster management within their own jurisdiction; Exchange resource requests between the cities and the Sonoma County Op Area; and Designate a representative who is authorized to speak on behalf of the party at the Sonoma County Operational Area Emergency Council. Special districts and/or non-governmental organizations are not party to this Agreement.

C. Sonoma County Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Agreement (1965): Parties to this

agreement agree to provide supplementary police aid to one another. Signatories include the cities within the County.

D. Sonoma County Civil Defense and Disaster Mutual Aid Agreement (1963): Provides for

the mobilization of resources and availability of facilities to other parties to the agreement in times of emergency or disaster. The County and cities within the County are signatories to this agreement.

VI. Master Mutual Aid System In addition to mutual aid arrangements initiated by the County, the County participates in Statewide Mutual aid efforts. Statewide mutual aid is voluntary aid provided between and among local jurisdictions and the State under the terms of the California Disaster and Civil Defense Master Mutual Aid Agreement (MMAA) as provided for in the California Emergency Services Act. The MMAA creates a formal structure wherein each jurisdiction retains control of its own facilities, personnel and resources, but may also receive or render assistance without the expectation of reimbursement, to other jurisdictions within the State.

February 26, 2018 Page 8

A statewide mutual aid system, operating within the framework of the MMAA, allows for the mobilization of resources to and from local governments, operational areas, regions and state to provide requesting agencies with adequate resources. The system includes several discipline­specific mutual aid agreements, such as fire and rescue, law, medical, building and safety, coroners, emergency managers (EMMA) and public works. These systems are consistent with NIMS and SEMS at all levels.

In addition to the mutual aid agreements that are in place within the State of California, the Governor signed the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) which allows California to participate with the other states in a nationwide mutual aid system.

JM:j1m