Post on 29-Mar-2023
1. Introduction
Images of women actively participating in the public marches
and demonstrations during the so-called Arab spring were
published in newspapers, on the Internet and broadcasted on
TV. The images of women, demanding the authoritarian rulers to
step down, challenged common notions of Middle Eastern women
as passive, apolitical who’s role was limited to the domestic
sphere. Although these images challenged common stereotypes
about women in the Middle East, they ignored the long history
of women’s political participation, both within women’s rights
movements, religious movements and nationalist struggles.
Moreover, the images tended to group women into one category,
supposedly struggling for the same cause. My purpose of this
paper is to highlight the diversity of women’s movements in
the Middle East by investigating two, very different spaces
for political mobilisation in the context of Bahrain.
This essay will attempt to answer the question “How do women
and men challenge and resist patriarchy and authoritarianism
in the Middle East?” by investigating women’s movements in
Bahrain. The first example that will be explored is the Shi’a
women’s organisation in religious-community centres called
ma’ataim (singular: ma’tam, plural: ma’ataim). The second
example is the advisory board on women’s issues to the
Bahraini government called the Supreme Council for Women. The
two examples have been chosen because I would like to
investigate and criticise the commonly, but problematic
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representations of “Women in the Middle East” and “Women of
the Arab Spring” or, in this case “Women in Bahrain”. These
concepts are often used in a non-reflective manner after the
so-called Arab Spring, not recognising the plurality of the
women’s movements. Although a detailed account of the
political epilogue of the 2011 Bahraini is beyond the scope of
this paper, I will however examine its potential effects on
the political women in ma’ataim and on the activities of the
Supreme Council for Women. I want to question the
essentialisation of women as a heterogeneous group as well as
the assumption that women in the world, Middle East and
Bahrain share the same aspirations and experiences. By
choosing two very different examples: women’s organising in
religious spaces and a governmental institution for women’s
issues I wish to examine if, and how, these groups challenge
patriarchy and/or authoritarianism in the context of Bahrain.
My analysis is attempting to explore the differences between
the two examples, thereby emphasising the importance of
recognising women’s different needs and experiences as well as
different views and possibilities of resisting patriarchy and
authoritarianism.
1.1. Structure
The essay will begin with an overview of the limited previous
research on the topic of women’s organising in Bahrain,
followed by a clarification of the method I will use in this
paper. The paper will follow with an outline of the background
of women’s organising and women’s rights in Bahrain in order
to situate the current situation in its historical context.
3
Attention will be given to the 2011 uprising and the effects
on the aforementioned forms of women’s activity. Thereafter,
the women’s organising in ma’ataim will be presented and
discussed, focusing on if, and if so, how activities in these
spaces challenge patriarchy and/or authoritarianism. I will
explore how ma’ataim can be seen as a space in-between the
public and private, thereby actively questioning the common
separation between “public” and “private” and its relevance
for the research question. The paper will then turn to the
structure and activities of the governmental body Supreme
Council for Women. The focus here will be on state feminism
and if there is space for resistance to authoritarianism and
patriarchy within a governmental institution in a highly
authoritative state. The analysis will then bring the two
examples together and discuss the potentials for, as well as
hinders to, women’s rights and activism in the country.
An important note should be given at this point. The
organisation in women’s ma’ataim in Bahrain are not
necessarily concerned with women’s rights and the participants
do not necessarily identify as “feminists.” Their incentives
for organising are mainly based on religious convictions, but
the relevance for this essay is that they do organise
political events within the space of the ma’tam. Conversely,
the Supreme Council for Women is not an explicit feminist
institution with a gender agenda, but is rather concerned with
“women empowerment”, legislative amendments and female
representation. It is however my belief that the two examples
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can contribute to an interesting discussion on women’s
possibilities for organising within the limited organisational
spaces offered in Bahrain.
1.2. Previous research
Research on women’s groups and women’s rights in Bahrain is
generally scarce, although a few studies do exist. Sophia
Pandya’s “Women's Shi῾i Ma᾿atim in Bahrain” (Sophia Pandya,
2010) provides an interesting insight in women’s activities in
ma’atim, with a focus on religion and women’s education. In
this paper I will focus on Pandya’s discussion of the observed
politicisation of the activities in the ma’ataim. However, as
her article was published in 2010, before the Bahraini
uprising in 2011, I will attempt to analyse her observation of
a politicisation of the maa’taim in the current political
context. A more general overview of women and social change in
Bahrain is provided by May Seikaly (May Seikaly, 1994). This
text will be consulted in the background-section of this
paper, but has its limits in terms of applicability as it was
published in 1994. A more contemporary analysis focusing on
the impact of the uprising is provided by Samyah Alfoory’s
report “The 2011 Bahraini Uprising: Women's Agency, Dissent
and Violence” from the Institute for Women, Peace & Security
at Georgetown University (Samyah Alfoory, 2014) which is an
interesting analysis of oppositional women as well as pro-
government women’s participation in and against the uprising.
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1.3. Method
This paper will consult previous research in order to present
the relevant facts of the topics and then analyse the two
examples with the research question in mind, focusing on the
possibilities of resistance towards patriarchy and
authoritarianism, discussing the public/private sphere
distinction and state feminism.
For the purpose of this essay, patriarchy is understood
through Deniz Kandiyoti’s “patriarchal bargaining”, a concept
focusing on the notion that women organise within a set of
concrete constraints, “which may exhibit variations according
to class, caste, and ethnicity.” (Deniz Kandiyoti, 1988, p.
275) In the context of this paper, I find the term useful
since it opens up for alternative ways of thinking about
resistance towards authoritarianism and patriarchy.
2. Background
2.1 Women’s movements in Bahrain
Women’s political participation in Bahrain dates back to
1950’s, when women actively participated in demonstrations
against the British and supported male-led demands for reform,
focusing on the right to participate in issues affecting the
well-being of the population. The movement was further
politicised in the 1960’s and 1970’s due to the influence of
Arab nationalism, anti-colonial movements and an increase of
access to university education. (May Seikaly, 1994, p. 419)
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Women had organised in charitable societies since the 1950’s,
but from the 1970’s and onwards, societies with political
aspirations were established and women’s participation in
politics increased. (Ibid) Women organised in the Bahraini
branch of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, in secular, radical
leftist groups and in non-governmental organisations. (Ibid,
p. 421)
In terms of women’s suffrage, women were excluded from the
right to vote until 2002, when Bahrain became the first state
of the Gulf Cooperation Council1 to grant universal women’s
suffrage. (Dunya Ahmed Abdulla Ahmed, 2010, p. 17) Similarly
to many other countries in the region and the world, men’s
initial encouragement of women’s participation in the movement
for political reforms did not extend to the support for
women’s socio-political demands, and thereby delayed the
process towards women’s suffrage.
One of the main areas of tension regarding women’s rights in
the Bahraini society regards the absence of a unified codified
Personal Status Law. Currently, the Family Provision Act (Law
19/2009) only applies to the Sunni2 population in Bahrain, due
to an outspoken resistance from Shi’a scholars who argued that
1 The Gulf Cooperation Council is a regional political and economical union consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates2 Although there are no reliable exact statistics of the percentages of Shi’a Muslims and Sunni Muslims in Bahrain, estimations suggest that 30% are Sunnis and 70% Shi’a. (Febe Armanios, 2004, p. 6)
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“there should be no interference of laymen in the issues
traditionally reserved for Sharia scholars.” (Magdalena
Karolak, 2012, pp. 8, 10) Shi’a women are active in the
opposition movement, in political and non-political women’s
groups and in women’s groups of oppositional parties. The
following section will explore their activism within religious
spaces.
3. Women’s Activism in Ma’ataim
3.1 Background
In order to understand the presence of Shi’a religious centres
(ma’ataim) in Bahrain, one needs to understand certain
fundamental features of the Shia’a sect of Islam.3 An important
part of the practices of Shi’a Muslims concerns the observance
of the martyrdom of religious figures, especially the killing
of Imam Hussain, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammed, in the
Battle of Kerbala in 680. (Sophia Pandya, 2010, p. 34)
Communal history is evoked through the grief and mourning
related to the oppression and brutality the martyrs faced.
Functions commemorating this history takes place in ma’ataim
and “can be understood as providing cohesion and meaning for
the Shi‘i community”, allowing “the Shi‘a to relive their
communal past and to reaffirm and perform collective ethics,
such as the importance of standing up to tyranny and
demonstrating compassion for the suffering of all…” (Ibid, p.
35) Thus, the combination of the focus on historical
3 A vast majority of the Shi’a in Bahrain follow the Jafari or “Twelver” school of Shi’a Islam.
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experiences of grief, suffering and the oppression and on-
going situation of marginalisation, discrimination and
suppression of political opposition, creates motives for
political organisation within these religious spaces.
Until the 19th century, ma’ataim were a part of private, family
homes. The ma’ataim for men later took on a more public form
as they were separated from the home. Specific women’s
ma’ataim were established where the activities revolved around
the “recitation of particular narratives from the sayings of
Shi‘i imams, religious stories and poems lamenting Shi‘i
martyrdom…Qur’anic passages, and grieving and socializing with
others.” (Ibid p. 37-38) The ma’ataim are also an important
site for religious education, due to a scarcity of religious
education of Shi’a Islam in public schools in the country.
Moreover, these religious centres function as a space for
refuge, where political discussions in-between public and
private can take place without the risk of persecution from
the government. (Ibid pp. 38, 39) However, as I will explore
later in this paper, the status of the ma’atem as a place for
refuge has recently been contested.
3.2 The politicisation of women’s ma’ataim
Dana, one of the interviewees in Sophia Pandya’s study of
women’s ma’ataim in Bahrain expressed that women in the past
spent all their time in the ma’tam crying, but now a days,
most people “only cry for ten minutes, and listen to a lecture
for forty minutes.” (Ibid p.45) The lectures involve a wide
range of topics, including law, health, education, marriage
9
and politics. (Ibid) As women were allowed to vote and run
for office from 2002, women’s candidates gave speeches in the
ma’ataim, utilising them as political spaces. Several people
in Pandya’s study indicate a generational shift, where the
exclusive focus on victimhood by previous generations is
increasingly rejected, especially by the “younger, educated
and more politically active generations” (Ibid pp. 43, 47)
Although Pandya’s research took place before the 2011-
uprising, the observed new, politicised ways of using the
religious space is relevant for this study.
I argue that there are strong reasons to believe that the
process of politicisation of activities in the women’s
ma’ataim have accelerated following the uprising of 2011,
spilling over to public events, demonstrations and other
political actions. As noted in the report on women’s role in
the 2011- uprising by Samyah Alfoory, “women’s participation
became so palpable that female martyrdom became a leitmotif of
the opposition’s social media. Indeed women’s efforts and
input into the uprising was substantial and ubiquitous and
continued for years after the initial protest began in
February 2011” (Samyah Alfoory, 2014, p. 7) This paper cannot,
however, provide any details regarding the exact connection
between the political activities in the ma’ataim and its
implications on the women’s activism in the uprising, as the
topic is hitherto unexplored. Further ethnographic research is
hence necessary, in order to explore the connection between
political activities in these religious spaces and its
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potential spill-over effect on public political actions.
In this context, the conventional understanding of the
separation between a public and a private sphere can be
questioned. Stacey Philbrick Yadav’s work on Islamist women in
Yemen is useful when questioning the classic distinction
between public and private. She argues that “scholars
addressing women and Islamism tend to write of women as the
objects of (male) Islamist activism, rather than as agents in
the transformation of polity and society. Much of this problem
stems from an approach that reproduces the public/private
distinction and positions women’s activity firmly within the
private sphere” (Yadav, 2010, p. 2) In regards to women’s
ma’atim, their position as clearly in between public and
private, is destabilising the commonly understood separation
between the spheres. As this example highlights, religious
centres have moved from the private home sphere, to a more
public space and possibly extending into the streets of
Bahrain.
In regards to the research question, the women in these spaces
are actively challenging the paternalistic authoritarianism of
the Bahraini rulers through, firstly, the very existence of a
refuge space in between public and private where the
government control is questioned. Secondly, the politicisation
of the activities of the ma’atim, possibly spilling over to
the political activities on the streets, is clearly opposing
the government’s attempt to silence opinions and actions of
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dissent. As the activities of the women’s ma’ataim do not
appear to explicitly target patriarchal oppression and
traditional gender roles , the extent to which patriarchy is
challenged can be questioned and requires further analysis.
Deploying Kandiyoti’s concept of “patriarchal bargaining”, I
would however argue that these women operate within a
constrained environment, based on patriarchal understandings
of the appropriate role of women in society, finding
inspiration from their religion in order to make political
demands in a highly authoritative environment.
4. The Supreme Council for Women (SCW)
The Supreme Council for Women (SCW) was established in 2001
under the authority of Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, the King of
Bahrain, with the stated mission of empowering Bahraini women
and “integrate their needs in development to ensure the
sustainability of her family stability and familial bond.”
Princess Sabeeka bint Ibrahim Al-Khalifa, the first wife of
the King of Bahrain is the president of the Council. (“Supreme
Council for Women | Vision and Mission,” n.d.) The SCW operate
a Women’s Support Centre which provide counselling and can
receive complaints “in order to identify the most important
problems faced by women, including the administrative and
legal obstacles that prevent women from living a secure and
stable life in addition to assume their role in life.”
(“Supreme Council for Women | Introduction,” n.d.) Moreover,
the Council is managing so-called “Empowerment Programs”,
focusing on politics, economy, family stability and gender
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mainstreaming. (“Supreme Council for Women | Programs and
Projects,” n.d.)
Magdalena Karolak notes in her research on Bahraini women in
the 21st century, that the establishment of the SCW in 2001 was
the result of the government’s emphasis on the importance of
female empowerment in the larger political liberalisation
reforms. (Magdalena Karolak, 2012, p. 6) Thus, similarly to
other modernisation and reform-projects of many states in the
Middle East-region,4 women become essentialist symbols of
modernisation, progress and authenticity. The issue with
institutions such as the SCW is thus that they promote so-
called state feminism, where women’s empowerment is promoted
within the limits of the gender ideologies of the state. I
argue that in the case of Bahrain, women’s empowerment is
promoted through the activities of the SCW, but are limited
mainly due to two factors: the authoritative, undemocratic
rule of the state, on one hand, and patriarchal and
conservative gender ideologies, on the other.
In Bahrain, the government is effectively dominated by the Al-
Khalifa-family. Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa
has hold the position of Prime Minister since 1971 and the
King holds supreme authority. (“H.R.H. the Prime Minister,”
n.d.) These factors, in addition to the violent crack-down on
protesters and a new ban on unapproved contact between
political societies and foreign officials or organisations 4 The reform projects under Atatürk in Turkey, Nasser in Egypt and Saddam Hussain in Iraq to name a few.
13
contributed to Freedom House’s labelling of Bahrain as “Not
Free” in its 2014 Report “Freedom in the World” (“Bahrain |
Freedom House,” n.d.) Interestingly for this paper, Bahrain
scored 1 on a scale from 1-12 regarding associational and
organisational rights, where 12 represents the best possible
score. (Ibid) The consequences of the restrictive legislations
regarding the establishment and operation of political
organisations means that there are massive difficulties in
first of all, establishing independent, grassroots women’s
organisation’s and, if established, to operate without the
risk of being shut down by the government. Ghada Jamsheer, an
outspoken women’s rights activist in the country have
criticised the Supreme Council for Women on these specific
grounds, arguing that “The struggle for women’s rights in
Bahrain has become more difficult. That is because [the
government now] pretends to be the protector of women’s rights
by implementing artificial and marginal reforms. …The
government has used women’s rights as a decorative tool on the
international level.” (Erin Kilbride, 2014) Jamsheer thus
highlights the problematic nature of so-called state feminism
where women’s rights are understood as instrumental in
modernisation projects and thereby, instrumental for the
establishment of favourable international reputation. In terms
of agency and the right to political participation, the SCW is
problematic as it effectively excludes voices of dissent from
a variety of all segments of society. I believe that women
from the opposition are less likely to get involved in state-
sponsored initiatives for women’s rights based on political
14
convictions and/or the risk of being views as “traitors” by
their own community.
Although the SCW provide a platform for the improvement of the
women’s rights record in the country, the space is constrained
by the authoritative nature of the ruling regime, clearly
visible in the very organisational structure of the women’s
council, headed by the King’s wife and ultimately restricted
as an advisory body of the King. Thereby, the SCW is rather
re-producing, instead of challenging the authoritative
structure of the political system in Bahrain. I do however
argue that the very existence of a Women’s Council active in
the promotion of women’s rights in the country, is challenging
patriarchal structures, through the attempt of promoting
women’s rights. It should moreover be noted that the SCW has
had some success. The council efficiently campaigned for the
unified Personal Status Code, oversaw Bahrain’s implementation
of provisions in the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and established the
“National Strategy on the Empowerment of Bahraini Women” with
support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
(Magdalena Karolak, 2012, p. 6)
Patriarchal bargaining can be useful in order to create an
understanding for the constricted spaces where women in
Bahrain organise. Although Jamsheer’s critique powerfully
highlights the problematic nature of the operations of a
governmentally controlled women’s council in an authoritative
15
state, I believe that there is a need for nuancing the debate,
understanding that the possibilities for women’s organising in
Bahrain are enormously limited, and that individual women then
bargain with the patriarchy, represented in this case by the
male rule of the state, in order to have their voices heard by
organising in government-sponsored initiatives. I believe that
is it important to differentiate between the individual women
and men who are attempting to improve women’s rights in
Bahrain by partaking in initiatives by the government as a
form of patriarchal bargaining, and the repressive nature of
the state itself.
5. Conclusion
This paper explored if and how women in Bahrain are
challenging the patriarchal and authoritative structures in
Bahrain. The two entities researched was, firstly, the women’s
ma’ataim, where there has been an apparent politicisation of
the activities of the centres, previously mainly devoted to
the collective creation of a common history of grief and
suffering, but now focused more on educational and political
initiatives.
Based on the findings in Sophia Pandya’s research on the
women’s ma’ataim in Bahrain, I argued that the recent
political developments following the 2011 uprising in the
country are likely to have contributed to a further
politicisation of the activities of the women’s ma’ataim as
well as reaffirming their status as important spaces for
16
refuge from the oppressive “outside” Bahraini society, where
arrests against dissidents of the regime are on-going.
However, as the authoritative face of the government has
become more apparent since the uprising, Shi’a places of
warship have been demolished and religious leaders have been
arrested. (“Bahrain: The Authority Imposes Restrictions on
Religious Freedoms and Continues to Wipe Out the Cultural and
Historical Heritage,” 2014, “Bahrain opposition leader
arrested,” 2014) Thus, its status as a space of refuge is
clearly contested, which has consequences for the Bahraini
people’s possibilities for oppositional political
organisation. The consequences are possibly more severe for
the women’s organisation in oppositional spaces, as their
opportunities within the system are already limited due to
traditionally patriarchal gender ideologies.
Moreover, I emphasised that the women active in the ma’ataim
are not necessarily directly challenging the patriarchy, but
are rather performing a type of patriarchal bargaining, where
they are articulating their religious convictions within a
limited space. In terms of challenging the authoritative rule
of the regime, I perceive the very existence of political
activities within the space of women’s Shi’a religious spaces
acts as a form of resistance.
I concluded that the Supreme Council for Women can both be
endorsed and criticised. It has placed women’s right on the
agenda in the country by running campaigns for the
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introduction of the Personal Status Code, promoting gender
mainstreaming, women’s empowerment and female representation.
Moreover, I argued that the women and men active in the
initiatives carried out by the SCW are engaging in patriarchal
bargaining, as they are utilising the space given, albeit by
the government, to question the problematic status of women’s
rights in the country, rooted in patriarchal interpretations
of gender roles, specifically in terms of women’s role in the
Bahraini society.
However, departing from a critical view of so-called state
feminism, I argued that women’s rights are, in effect,
dependent on the will of the male patriarch, the King of Bahrain
who, through the Constitution, exercises extensive power over
the executive, legislative and judicial authorities.(“ICL -
Bahrain Constitution,” n.d.) I argued that the structure of
the SCW is problematic: the King’s wife is chairing the
Council and it is only advisory, depending on the ruler for
any implementations of the Council’s advice. Strict laws
regarding the establishment of grassroots organisations
relating to women’s rights are furthermore strengthening the
government’s attempt to monopolise the women’s rights
discourse in the country, thereby effectively silencing voices
of women diverse religious sects, classes and backgrounds.
Through the silences of other women’s voices, the privileged
royal family and its supporters becomes the subject for the
women’s rights discourse in Bahrain, and the oppositional,
Shi’a women become the “other”.
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These two examples have thus illuminated how very differently
“Women of the Arab Spring” and more specifically, Bahraini
women post-2011 can organise, mobilise and perform resistance
to authoritarianism and patriarchy and how class, gender and
religious sect might influence the different spaces where this
resistance is possible.
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