Anna Hagberg

619184,

Gender in the Middle East,

15PGNH001

AS1

Nadje Al-Ali

3955

1. Introduction

Images of women actively participating in the public marches

and demonstrations during the so-called Arab spring were

published in newspapers, on the Internet and broadcasted on

TV. The images of women, demanding the authoritarian rulers to

step down, challenged common notions of Middle Eastern women

as passive, apolitical who’s role was limited to the domestic

sphere. Although these images challenged common stereotypes

about women in the Middle East, they ignored the long history

of women’s political participation, both within women’s rights

movements, religious movements and nationalist struggles.

Moreover, the images tended to group women into one category,

supposedly struggling for the same cause. My purpose of this

paper is to highlight the diversity of women’s movements in

the Middle East by investigating two, very different spaces

for political mobilisation in the context of Bahrain.

This essay will attempt to answer the question “How do women

and men challenge and resist patriarchy and authoritarianism

in the Middle East?” by investigating women’s movements in

Bahrain. The first example that will be explored is the Shi’a

women’s organisation in religious-community centres called

ma’ataim (singular: ma’tam, plural: ma’ataim). The second

example is the advisory board on women’s issues to the

Bahraini government called the Supreme Council for Women. The

two examples have been chosen because I would like to

investigate and criticise the commonly, but problematic

2

representations of “Women in the Middle East” and “Women of

the Arab Spring” or, in this case “Women in Bahrain”. These

concepts are often used in a non-reflective manner after the

so-called Arab Spring, not recognising the plurality of the

women’s movements. Although a detailed account of the

political epilogue of the 2011 Bahraini is beyond the scope of

this paper, I will however examine its potential effects on

the political women in ma’ataim and on the activities of the

Supreme Council for Women. I want to question the

essentialisation of women as a heterogeneous group as well as

the assumption that women in the world, Middle East and

Bahrain share the same aspirations and experiences. By

choosing two very different examples: women’s organising in

religious spaces and a governmental institution for women’s

issues I wish to examine if, and how, these groups challenge

patriarchy and/or authoritarianism in the context of Bahrain.

My analysis is attempting to explore the differences between

the two examples, thereby emphasising the importance of

recognising women’s different needs and experiences as well as

different views and possibilities of resisting patriarchy and

authoritarianism.

1.1. Structure

The essay will begin with an overview of the limited previous

research on the topic of women’s organising in Bahrain,

followed by a clarification of the method I will use in this

paper. The paper will follow with an outline of the background

of women’s organising and women’s rights in Bahrain in order

to situate the current situation in its historical context.

3

Attention will be given to the 2011 uprising and the effects

on the aforementioned forms of women’s activity. Thereafter,

the women’s organising in ma’ataim will be presented and

discussed, focusing on if, and if so, how activities in these

spaces challenge patriarchy and/or authoritarianism. I will

explore how ma’ataim can be seen as a space in-between the

public and private, thereby actively questioning the common

separation between “public” and “private” and its relevance

for the research question. The paper will then turn to the

structure and activities of the governmental body Supreme

Council for Women. The focus here will be on state feminism

and if there is space for resistance to authoritarianism and

patriarchy within a governmental institution in a highly

authoritative state. The analysis will then bring the two

examples together and discuss the potentials for, as well as

hinders to, women’s rights and activism in the country.

An important note should be given at this point. The

organisation in women’s ma’ataim in Bahrain are not

necessarily concerned with women’s rights and the participants

do not necessarily identify as “feminists.” Their incentives

for organising are mainly based on religious convictions, but

the relevance for this essay is that they do organise

political events within the space of the ma’tam. Conversely,

the Supreme Council for Women is not an explicit feminist

institution with a gender agenda, but is rather concerned with

“women empowerment”, legislative amendments and female

representation. It is however my belief that the two examples

4

can contribute to an interesting discussion on women’s

possibilities for organising within the limited organisational

spaces offered in Bahrain.

1.2. Previous research

Research on women’s groups and women’s rights in Bahrain is

generally scarce, although a few studies do exist. Sophia

Pandya’s “Women's Shi῾i Ma᾿atim in Bahrain” (Sophia Pandya,

2010) provides an interesting insight in women’s activities in

ma’atim, with a focus on religion and women’s education. In

this paper I will focus on Pandya’s discussion of the observed

politicisation of the activities in the ma’ataim. However, as

her article was published in 2010, before the Bahraini

uprising in 2011, I will attempt to analyse her observation of

a politicisation of the maa’taim in the current political

context. A more general overview of women and social change in

Bahrain is provided by May Seikaly (May Seikaly, 1994). This

text will be consulted in the background-section of this

paper, but has its limits in terms of applicability as it was

published in 1994. A more contemporary analysis focusing on

the impact of the uprising is provided by Samyah Alfoory’s

report “The 2011 Bahraini Uprising: Women's Agency, Dissent

and Violence” from the Institute for Women, Peace & Security

at Georgetown University (Samyah Alfoory, 2014) which is an

interesting analysis of oppositional women as well as pro-

government women’s participation in and against the uprising.

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1.3. Method

This paper will consult previous research in order to present

the relevant facts of the topics and then analyse the two

examples with the research question in mind, focusing on the

possibilities of resistance towards patriarchy and

authoritarianism, discussing the public/private sphere

distinction and state feminism.

For the purpose of this essay, patriarchy is understood

through Deniz Kandiyoti’s “patriarchal bargaining”, a concept

focusing on the notion that women organise within a set of

concrete constraints, “which may exhibit variations according

to class, caste, and ethnicity.” (Deniz Kandiyoti, 1988, p.

275) In the context of this paper, I find the term useful

since it opens up for alternative ways of thinking about

resistance towards authoritarianism and patriarchy.

2. Background

2.1 Women’s movements in Bahrain

Women’s political participation in Bahrain dates back to

1950’s, when women actively participated in demonstrations

against the British and supported male-led demands for reform,

focusing on the right to participate in issues affecting the

well-being of the population. The movement was further

politicised in the 1960’s and 1970’s due to the influence of

Arab nationalism, anti-colonial movements and an increase of

access to university education. (May Seikaly, 1994, p. 419)

6

Women had organised in charitable societies since the 1950’s,

but from the 1970’s and onwards, societies with political

aspirations were established and women’s participation in

politics increased. (Ibid) Women organised in the Bahraini

branch of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, in secular, radical

leftist groups and in non-governmental organisations. (Ibid,

p. 421)

In terms of women’s suffrage, women were excluded from the

right to vote until 2002, when Bahrain became the first state

of the Gulf Cooperation Council1 to grant universal women’s

suffrage. (Dunya Ahmed Abdulla Ahmed, 2010, p. 17) Similarly

to many other countries in the region and the world, men’s

initial encouragement of women’s participation in the movement

for political reforms did not extend to the support for

women’s socio-political demands, and thereby delayed the

process towards women’s suffrage.

One of the main areas of tension regarding women’s rights in

the Bahraini society regards the absence of a unified codified

Personal Status Law. Currently, the Family Provision Act (Law

19/2009) only applies to the Sunni2 population in Bahrain, due

to an outspoken resistance from Shi’a scholars who argued that

1 The Gulf Cooperation Council is a regional political and economical union consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates2 Although there are no reliable exact statistics of the percentages of Shi’a Muslims and Sunni Muslims in Bahrain, estimations suggest that 30% are Sunnis and 70% Shi’a. (Febe Armanios, 2004, p. 6)

7

“there should be no interference of laymen in the issues

traditionally reserved for Sharia scholars.” (Magdalena

Karolak, 2012, pp. 8, 10) Shi’a women are active in the

opposition movement, in political and non-political women’s

groups and in women’s groups of oppositional parties. The

following section will explore their activism within religious

spaces.

3. Women’s Activism in Ma’ataim

3.1 Background

In order to understand the presence of Shi’a religious centres

(ma’ataim) in Bahrain, one needs to understand certain

fundamental features of the Shia’a sect of Islam.3 An important

part of the practices of Shi’a Muslims concerns the observance

of the martyrdom of religious figures, especially the killing

of Imam Hussain, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammed, in the

Battle of Kerbala in 680. (Sophia Pandya, 2010, p. 34)

Communal history is evoked through the grief and mourning

related to the oppression and brutality the martyrs faced.

Functions commemorating this history takes place in ma’ataim

and “can be understood as providing cohesion and meaning for

the Shi‘i community”, allowing “the Shi‘a to relive their

communal past and to reaffirm and perform collective ethics,

such as the importance of standing up to tyranny and

demonstrating compassion for the suffering of all…” (Ibid, p.

35) Thus, the combination of the focus on historical

3 A vast majority of the Shi’a in Bahrain follow the Jafari or “Twelver” school of Shi’a Islam.

8

experiences of grief, suffering and the oppression and on-

going situation of marginalisation, discrimination and

suppression of political opposition, creates motives for

political organisation within these religious spaces.

Until the 19th century, ma’ataim were a part of private, family

homes. The ma’ataim for men later took on a more public form

as they were separated from the home. Specific women’s

ma’ataim were established where the activities revolved around

the “recitation of particular narratives from the sayings of

Shi‘i imams, religious stories and poems lamenting Shi‘i

martyrdom…Qur’anic passages, and grieving and socializing with

others.” (Ibid p. 37-38) The ma’ataim are also an important

site for religious education, due to a scarcity of religious

education of Shi’a Islam in public schools in the country.

Moreover, these religious centres function as a space for

refuge, where political discussions in-between public and

private can take place without the risk of persecution from

the government. (Ibid pp. 38, 39) However, as I will explore

later in this paper, the status of the ma’atem as a place for

refuge has recently been contested.

3.2 The politicisation of women’s ma’ataim

Dana, one of the interviewees in Sophia Pandya’s study of

women’s ma’ataim in Bahrain expressed that women in the past

spent all their time in the ma’tam crying, but now a days,

most people “only cry for ten minutes, and listen to a lecture

for forty minutes.” (Ibid p.45) The lectures involve a wide

range of topics, including law, health, education, marriage

9

and politics. (Ibid) As women were allowed to vote and run

for office from 2002, women’s candidates gave speeches in the

ma’ataim, utilising them as political spaces. Several people

in Pandya’s study indicate a generational shift, where the

exclusive focus on victimhood by previous generations is

increasingly rejected, especially by the “younger, educated

and more politically active generations” (Ibid pp. 43, 47)

Although Pandya’s research took place before the 2011-

uprising, the observed new, politicised ways of using the

religious space is relevant for this study.

I argue that there are strong reasons to believe that the

process of politicisation of activities in the women’s

ma’ataim have accelerated following the uprising of 2011,

spilling over to public events, demonstrations and other

political actions. As noted in the report on women’s role in

the 2011- uprising by Samyah Alfoory, “women’s participation

became so palpable that female martyrdom became a leitmotif of

the opposition’s social media. Indeed women’s efforts and

input into the uprising was substantial and ubiquitous and

continued for years after the initial protest began in

February 2011” (Samyah Alfoory, 2014, p. 7) This paper cannot,

however, provide any details regarding the exact connection

between the political activities in the ma’ataim and its

implications on the women’s activism in the uprising, as the

topic is hitherto unexplored. Further ethnographic research is

hence necessary, in order to explore the connection between

political activities in these religious spaces and its

10

potential spill-over effect on public political actions.

In this context, the conventional understanding of the

separation between a public and a private sphere can be

questioned. Stacey Philbrick Yadav’s work on Islamist women in

Yemen is useful when questioning the classic distinction

between public and private. She argues that “scholars

addressing women and Islamism tend to write of women as the

objects of (male) Islamist activism, rather than as agents in

the transformation of polity and society. Much of this problem

stems from an approach that reproduces the public/private

distinction and positions women’s activity firmly within the

private sphere” (Yadav, 2010, p. 2) In regards to women’s

ma’atim, their position as clearly in between public and

private, is destabilising the commonly understood separation

between the spheres. As this example highlights, religious

centres have moved from the private home sphere, to a more

public space and possibly extending into the streets of

Bahrain.

In regards to the research question, the women in these spaces

are actively challenging the paternalistic authoritarianism of

the Bahraini rulers through, firstly, the very existence of a

refuge space in between public and private where the

government control is questioned. Secondly, the politicisation

of the activities of the ma’atim, possibly spilling over to

the political activities on the streets, is clearly opposing

the government’s attempt to silence opinions and actions of

11

dissent. As the activities of the women’s ma’ataim do not

appear to explicitly target patriarchal oppression and

traditional gender roles , the extent to which patriarchy is

challenged can be questioned and requires further analysis.

Deploying Kandiyoti’s concept of “patriarchal bargaining”, I

would however argue that these women operate within a

constrained environment, based on patriarchal understandings

of the appropriate role of women in society, finding

inspiration from their religion in order to make political

demands in a highly authoritative environment.

4. The Supreme Council for Women (SCW)

The Supreme Council for Women (SCW) was established in 2001

under the authority of Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, the King of

Bahrain, with the stated mission of empowering Bahraini women

and “integrate their needs in development to ensure the

sustainability of her family stability and familial bond.”

Princess Sabeeka bint Ibrahim Al-Khalifa, the first wife of

the King of Bahrain is the president of the Council. (“Supreme

Council for Women | Vision and Mission,” n.d.) The SCW operate

a Women’s Support Centre which provide counselling and can

receive complaints “in order to identify the most important

problems faced by women, including the administrative and

legal obstacles that prevent women from living a secure and

stable life in addition to assume their role in life.”

(“Supreme Council for Women | Introduction,” n.d.) Moreover,

the Council is managing so-called “Empowerment Programs”,

focusing on politics, economy, family stability and gender

12

mainstreaming. (“Supreme Council for Women | Programs and

Projects,” n.d.)

Magdalena Karolak notes in her research on Bahraini women in

the 21st century, that the establishment of the SCW in 2001 was

the result of the government’s emphasis on the importance of

female empowerment in the larger political liberalisation

reforms. (Magdalena Karolak, 2012, p. 6) Thus, similarly to

other modernisation and reform-projects of many states in the

Middle East-region,4 women become essentialist symbols of

modernisation, progress and authenticity. The issue with

institutions such as the SCW is thus that they promote so-

called state feminism, where women’s empowerment is promoted

within the limits of the gender ideologies of the state. I

argue that in the case of Bahrain, women’s empowerment is

promoted through the activities of the SCW, but are limited

mainly due to two factors: the authoritative, undemocratic

rule of the state, on one hand, and patriarchal and

conservative gender ideologies, on the other.

In Bahrain, the government is effectively dominated by the Al-

Khalifa-family. Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa

has hold the position of Prime Minister since 1971 and the

King holds supreme authority. (“H.R.H. the Prime Minister,”

n.d.) These factors, in addition to the violent crack-down on

protesters and a new ban on unapproved contact between

political societies and foreign officials or organisations 4 The reform projects under Atatürk in Turkey, Nasser in Egypt and Saddam Hussain in Iraq to name a few.

13

contributed to Freedom House’s labelling of Bahrain as “Not

Free” in its 2014 Report “Freedom in the World” (“Bahrain |

Freedom House,” n.d.) Interestingly for this paper, Bahrain

scored 1 on a scale from 1-12 regarding associational and

organisational rights, where 12 represents the best possible

score. (Ibid) The consequences of the restrictive legislations

regarding the establishment and operation of political

organisations means that there are massive difficulties in

first of all, establishing independent, grassroots women’s

organisation’s and, if established, to operate without the

risk of being shut down by the government. Ghada Jamsheer, an

outspoken women’s rights activist in the country have

criticised the Supreme Council for Women on these specific

grounds, arguing that “The struggle for women’s rights in

Bahrain has become more difficult. That is because [the

government now] pretends to be the protector of women’s rights

by implementing artificial and marginal reforms. …The

government has used women’s rights as a decorative tool on the

international level.” (Erin Kilbride, 2014) Jamsheer thus

highlights the problematic nature of so-called state feminism

where women’s rights are understood as instrumental in

modernisation projects and thereby, instrumental for the

establishment of favourable international reputation. In terms

of agency and the right to political participation, the SCW is

problematic as it effectively excludes voices of dissent from

a variety of all segments of society. I believe that women

from the opposition are less likely to get involved in state-

sponsored initiatives for women’s rights based on political

14

convictions and/or the risk of being views as “traitors” by

their own community.

Although the SCW provide a platform for the improvement of the

women’s rights record in the country, the space is constrained

by the authoritative nature of the ruling regime, clearly

visible in the very organisational structure of the women’s

council, headed by the King’s wife and ultimately restricted

as an advisory body of the King. Thereby, the SCW is rather

re-producing, instead of challenging the authoritative

structure of the political system in Bahrain. I do however

argue that the very existence of a Women’s Council active in

the promotion of women’s rights in the country, is challenging

patriarchal structures, through the attempt of promoting

women’s rights. It should moreover be noted that the SCW has

had some success. The council efficiently campaigned for the

unified Personal Status Code, oversaw Bahrain’s implementation

of provisions in the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and established the

“National Strategy on the Empowerment of Bahraini Women” with

support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

(Magdalena Karolak, 2012, p. 6)

Patriarchal bargaining can be useful in order to create an

understanding for the constricted spaces where women in

Bahrain organise. Although Jamsheer’s critique powerfully

highlights the problematic nature of the operations of a

governmentally controlled women’s council in an authoritative

15

state, I believe that there is a need for nuancing the debate,

understanding that the possibilities for women’s organising in

Bahrain are enormously limited, and that individual women then

bargain with the patriarchy, represented in this case by the

male rule of the state, in order to have their voices heard by

organising in government-sponsored initiatives. I believe that

is it important to differentiate between the individual women

and men who are attempting to improve women’s rights in

Bahrain by partaking in initiatives by the government as a

form of patriarchal bargaining, and the repressive nature of

the state itself.

5. Conclusion

This paper explored if and how women in Bahrain are

challenging the patriarchal and authoritative structures in

Bahrain. The two entities researched was, firstly, the women’s

ma’ataim, where there has been an apparent politicisation of

the activities of the centres, previously mainly devoted to

the collective creation of a common history of grief and

suffering, but now focused more on educational and political

initiatives.

Based on the findings in Sophia Pandya’s research on the

women’s ma’ataim in Bahrain, I argued that the recent

political developments following the 2011 uprising in the

country are likely to have contributed to a further

politicisation of the activities of the women’s ma’ataim as

well as reaffirming their status as important spaces for

16

refuge from the oppressive “outside” Bahraini society, where

arrests against dissidents of the regime are on-going.

However, as the authoritative face of the government has

become more apparent since the uprising, Shi’a places of

warship have been demolished and religious leaders have been

arrested. (“Bahrain: The Authority Imposes Restrictions on

Religious Freedoms and Continues to Wipe Out the Cultural and

Historical Heritage,” 2014, “Bahrain opposition leader

arrested,” 2014) Thus, its status as a space of refuge is

clearly contested, which has consequences for the Bahraini

people’s possibilities for oppositional political

organisation. The consequences are possibly more severe for

the women’s organisation in oppositional spaces, as their

opportunities within the system are already limited due to

traditionally patriarchal gender ideologies.

Moreover, I emphasised that the women active in the ma’ataim

are not necessarily directly challenging the patriarchy, but

are rather performing a type of patriarchal bargaining, where

they are articulating their religious convictions within a

limited space. In terms of challenging the authoritative rule

of the regime, I perceive the very existence of political

activities within the space of women’s Shi’a religious spaces

acts as a form of resistance.

I concluded that the Supreme Council for Women can both be

endorsed and criticised. It has placed women’s right on the

agenda in the country by running campaigns for the

17

introduction of the Personal Status Code, promoting gender

mainstreaming, women’s empowerment and female representation.

Moreover, I argued that the women and men active in the

initiatives carried out by the SCW are engaging in patriarchal

bargaining, as they are utilising the space given, albeit by

the government, to question the problematic status of women’s

rights in the country, rooted in patriarchal interpretations

of gender roles, specifically in terms of women’s role in the

Bahraini society.

However, departing from a critical view of so-called state

feminism, I argued that women’s rights are, in effect,

dependent on the will of the male patriarch, the King of Bahrain

who, through the Constitution, exercises extensive power over

the executive, legislative and judicial authorities.(“ICL -

Bahrain Constitution,” n.d.) I argued that the structure of

the SCW is problematic: the King’s wife is chairing the

Council and it is only advisory, depending on the ruler for

any implementations of the Council’s advice. Strict laws

regarding the establishment of grassroots organisations

relating to women’s rights are furthermore strengthening the

government’s attempt to monopolise the women’s rights

discourse in the country, thereby effectively silencing voices

of women diverse religious sects, classes and backgrounds.

Through the silences of other women’s voices, the privileged

royal family and its supporters becomes the subject for the

women’s rights discourse in Bahrain, and the oppositional,

Shi’a women become the “other”.

18

These two examples have thus illuminated how very differently

“Women of the Arab Spring” and more specifically, Bahraini

women post-2011 can organise, mobilise and perform resistance

to authoritarianism and patriarchy and how class, gender and

religious sect might influence the different spaces where this

resistance is possible.

19

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