Post on 27-Jan-2023
Governing the Water-Energy-Food Nexus: collaboration in the
Machángara river basin
MSc Thesis Environmental Policy Group
Student
Marco van Burik
Student number: 920320148020
Supervisors
Art Dewulf (PAP)
Mattijs Smits (ENP)
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Abstract
With a finite amount of natural resources being drawn from an increasingly contested
geographic area, efficiency is crucial. The Water-Energy-Food Nexus concept strives to
achieve efficiency of resource use by emphasizing the importance of interdependencies of its
sectors. However, limited knowledge and consensus on a Nexus concept is available raising
many questions, especially regarding the governing of actors and their processes of managing
resources. The research focuses on actors within the Machángara river council in Ecuador and
evaluates how collaboration therein allows for the implementation of a Nexus. The analysis
contains both qualitative as well as quantitative methods in order to precisely locate the
importance of collaboration within the theoretical as well as the practical realm of the Nexus.
Several semi-structured interviews were conducted with members of the river council
providing among other, data for the use of a Social Network Analysis in which complex
interactions can be mapped out. Theoretical multiplicity will be used as the theoretical
framework and includes network, multi-level and multi-scale governance. Progress is made
by disentangling and clarifying the high complexity of the linkages between theory and
practice and find common assumptions. The findings conclude that collaboration in the basin
tends to focus on a mixture of network and semi-leveled structures of governance, wherein a
decentralized role exists for governmental actors. Sectors, such as those within the Water-
Energy-Food Nexus, collaborate on the basis of a shared interest that tends to lie outside the
concept itself. Members of the river council share the interest of maintaining environmental
quality in the basin rather than each pursuing their own targets. However, the future of the
council is unclear as the institutional context is rapidly changing providing new challenges.
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Title Page
Abstract
1. Introductory chapter Page 3
1.1. Problem description
1.2. Research questions
2. Conceptual framework Page 8
2.1. Theoretical Multiplicity
2.2. Network governance
2.3. Multi-level governance
2.4. Multi-scale governance
2.5. Linking network, multi-level and multi-scale governance
2.6. Collaboration
2.7. Hypothesis
3. Research Questions Page 19
4. Methodology Page 20
5. Results Page 24
5.1. The Institutional setting
5.2. The Actor setting
6. Answering the research question Page 38
7. Discussion Page 55
8. Conclusion Page 59
9. References Page 62
10. Appendix Page 66
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1. Introductory chapter
1.1 Problem description
Currently there are about 1.1 billion people without access to clean water, 1 billion who are
undernourished and 1.5 billion who don‟t have access to electricity (Human Development
Report 2006, IFRC 2011, IEA). With current growth projections, we will need to increase
global agricultural output and fresh water availability by 50% and increase energy production
to 70% (Hoff, 2011). It is expected that events, such as droughts and floods, are going to
increasingly reach extremes causing for disturbances in availability of natural resources
(IPCC, 2007). For example, droughts will challenge the increase in agricultural output
needed. Without adequate counter measures such as reforestation, creating natural areas,
maintaining water quality and educating people, this situation will continue to deteriorate.
This implies that human (mis)management can affect the security of natural resources.
Imagine a large dinner party. The host only has a set amount of food and decides to serve it
buffet style. The servers keep filling the buffet trays giving a feeling of abundance to the
dinner guests so they take as they please, sometimes having extra on their plate. In reality,
there is no abundance, and the food runs out before the last few guests fill up their plates.
Now imagine that there are more guests arriving (population growth), that people stay longer
(aging population) and that there is a preference for a type of food (concentration due to
urbanization). These factors will create problems in a very short period of time (McGivern et.
Al., 2010). This problem setting shows that although there are many solutions visible, the best
ones will tackle all three problem areas rather than just one. Only limiting the amount of
guests (population growth) will not solve the other problems. Our society has become more
complex than we currently realize, requiring holistic solutions to its problems.
Holger Hoff was triggered by this problem setting and reignited the concept of a Water
Water-Energy-Food Nexus (WEF Nexus). It states that the three sectors need to been seen as
an integrated system rather than individual sectors. Many examples present the
interconnectedness between these sectors such as water use for the production of
hydroelectric energy or the use of energy to pump up groundwater used for irrigation. Hoff
calls for the importance of integration across sectors “in order to achieve reduction of
negative economic, social and environmental externalities” (2011). One way this can be
achieved is by „increasing efficiency, reducing trade-offs, building synergies and improving
governance across sectors‟ (Hoff, 2011). His view connects the natural and the social realms
and proves a social dependency on natural resource management.
The Nexus cannot be understood without regarding its theoretical and practical origins. These
can be traced back to the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) theory. Both
perceive the interdependencies of their sectors however IWRM keeps the focus point on water
as the most important sector. It does so by perceiving the only natural dimension, water, to be
the breeding ground for the others. The Nexus looks at all three sectors equally with the
intention of solving complex problems in complex manners, such as the previous problem
setting outlined. It also becomes clear is that the problem setting is a social one, rather than a
natural one. Although the natural resource water is vital to life on earth, it cannot be
prioritized to energy and food. Similar to the described problem setting, the social dimension
to managing resources and tackling problems such as urbanization is crucial. This is where
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similarities of both IWRM and Nexus come into play. Both face questions such as: How are
traditional management structures impacted by restructuring governance arrangements and
how resilient is it? Which levels are most important when looking at resource management at
a basin scale? One of the main reasons the IWRM theory was deemed a failure was because
of the lack of focus on a more flexible way
to govern its stakeholders (Gyawali, 2015).
Even though it contains such a high
ambiguity, limited selection of recognized
examples exists regarding the Nexus
concept. An example of a WEF Nexus with
focus on actors rather than institutions is
found in the Machángara basin in southern
Ecuador. Currently this Nexus is being
successfully implemented through a
mediating council (WEF Nexus Website,
2012). This council is made up of all
stakeholders related to the allocation of
water drawn from the river. This body
gathers on a regular basis to discuss and
allocate resources according to demands.
Current successes are visible through the
establishment of a water fund for
conservation activities, a community
natural resource management program
enabling local participation, and education
programs on water use for children.
However, since its creation several
droughts as well as political challenges
have caused problems of water allocation
and will do so in the future. In 2009,
Ecuador was hit by an electricity crisis due
to the extreme droughts limiting
hydropower potential. Furthermore, in times of crisis, concessions have to be made with
regard to water allocation. As a result, tensions may occur between different levels of
governance as well as between sectors. Additionally, the position of the council is not always
guaranteed as the current successes show, bigger actors possess better capabilities to create
change. This can cause for imbalance of power relations and influence water allocation. The
focus on actors as units of analysis is vital for this case. The main reason is that the
composition of the council dictates the interaction between levels and sectors. This unique
phenomenon shows the importance of good communication and interaction as a basis on
which long term rules and procedures can be built. Arguably, the WEF Nexus case of the
Machángara basin allows for a detailed analysis and can answer the ambiguities concerning
actors within the WEF Nexus and their integration across sectors.
The main problem within the Machángara river basin is the withdrawal of water for purposes
related to the energy, food and water demand, each to the extent they saw fit. This creates
severe stress on natural resources and their environment, especially in times of extreme
climatic conditions. To manage the withdrawal of natural resources, such as water, efficient
Figure 1: Map showing the location of the Machángara river basin within Ecuador and the Azuay region. Source: River council
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governance arrangements need to allow for integration across sectors. The current governance
arrangement in Ecuador and specifically in the Azuay region is complex. Several times the
water management was rescaled from regional, to municipal and basin levels (Warner et al.,
2014). Currently the basin is regulated through an inter-institutional entity, called the
Machángara River Council, attempting to integrate stakeholders across sectors in the scalar
conundrum. The Council has no legal or executive power and faces different regional and
local scales, operating at their own spheres of influence. In addition, the basin contains a high
complexity of actors with different interests and motives (Warner et al., 2014). Enforcing this
complexity is the current phase of decentralization which is being implemented rather
drastically from a top-down approach.
1.2 Research objective
In order to analyse the problems mentioned previously, this research will look at the
governance arrangements in the case study and find out how actors collaborate therein. The
importance thereof stems from both the gaps within the WEF Nexus concept regarding its
social application and the role these actors play in managing natural resources. An important
feature of the case study is the high variability of environmental and social conditions with
the 2009 drought as a good example. Therefore, it is important to regard adaptability and
flexibility when analyzing the interaction of stakeholders and the governance structure in
place.
The importance of governance as a means of regulating the flow of resources becomes
evident when limitations thereof start to occur. Abundance of water does not have to be
regulated, whereas shortage requires delicate management in order to prevent conflict. The
Nexus should strive to tackle the missing aspect of governance which caused its predecessor,
the IWRM theory, to fail. Regretfully, the Nexus concept is not fully elaborated and several
knowledge gaps exist. One of these regards the aspect of governance of actors and institutions
alike (Hoff, 2011).The main problem of the WEF Nexus is that it does not directly prescribe
guidelines on governance processes (Kattelus, 2009). However, this ambiguity can also serve
as breeding ground for new ideas and methods of governance by allowing flexibility and
innovation. This favours the nature of a WEF Nexus as it can occur at any scale and location
and consist in all shapes and sizes.
One problem of the current Nexus understanding is how actors actually cooperate between
these sectors and deal with or avoid conflict. Considering the ambiguity of the Nexus and
increasing complexity stemming from higher levels of integration worsens the problem (Hoff,
2011). Hoff found that there are significant tensions arising when integrating across sectors
and levels. The Nexus requires an internalization of externalities, in that interaction with
others sectors need to be integrated into holistic planning instead of being seen as „external
factors‟. Hoff claims the need of the Nexus to be addressed and applied at all levels of
governance in order to be truly effective, yet research on this and its interaction between the
different levels is still lacking (2011). This implies that an understanding of actors and
institutions is important when looking at governance processes.
To complete the investigation, it is important to see how stable the analyzed governance
arrangement is. This should be done through testing the linkages and the flexibility they
maintain. Also the governing environment in Ecuador and specifically the Azuay region
should be taken into account. As Warner claims, the governance structure has changed several
times during the last years (Warner et. Al., 2014). The aspect of stability is vital if the
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arrangement is to last in the future and prove a suitable insertion into the WEF Nexus
governance framework.
The units of analysis are the actors within the river council and the interaction they maintain
between themselves within the council when governing the natural resources of the
Machángara basin. The paper will focus on the interaction actors maintain between sectors of
the Nexus and levels of governance. Typically, this would involve the concept of
collaboration. This rather broad research angle leaves open the possibility to reason in both
actor and institutional standpoints due to the relative ambiguity surrounding the Nexus
concept. The reasoning is that actors are directly analysable objects of research, whereas
institutional settings encompass greater scopes and leave room for interpretation.
Nevertheless, this research will include the institutional setting as this would limit the validity
of the conclusion. A lacking concrete analysis is also part of the reasoning why the Nexus has
such a high degree of ambiguity.
In order to discover more about the Nexus, both theory and practice need to produce relatable
results. This can be done by linking the ambiguous WEF Nexus concept to more accepted
theories such as network and multi-level governance (see figure 4). Using such a „proxy‟
method requires a specific angle of analysis, since all theories involved are far more extensive
than their purpose for governance analysis. Therefore collaboration, used within these
theories, provides the connection between theory and practice for this research as it is more
analysable than the respectable governance theories due to their high ranging applicability.
Specifically, when searching for the theoretical application in the field, a concept is needed
that can be grasped and analysed. Hence, the connecting link is made between the case study
and the theory and the following research question can be perceived:
“How do actors collaborate across sectors, levels and scales in the Water-Energy-Food
Nexus and to what extent are they able to adapt to new challenges?”
Regarding the actor analysis, it is important to relate to several features of governance such as
power relations, communication and interactions between levels and scales. Such concepts are
important in analysing actor interactions within governance arrangements. For example,
powerful actors can steer negotiations in their favour due to their economic power or social
backing. Looking at scales and their (mis)matches can provide a good insight in the workings
of governance arrangements. Agricultural output of the Azuay region is mainly used for local
consumption, water use is distributed regionally and energy use is assigned on a larger basin
scale or even used nationally. These scales are important when looking at the stakeholder
interactions. Due to different scales, various interests and capacities are involved. Concluding
on such features is important to completing and understanding the investigation on the Nexus.
An important focus area regarding the governance analysis of the WEF Nexus is the role of
the local and community levels. Decentralization is a known phenomenon in Ecuador and the
current political power emphasizes more social empowerment. Research on local participation
has normally concluded a lack thereof and governance arrangements in developing countries
show sparse prospects. Therefore, expectations are instable regarding the achievement of a
different outcome. Nevertheless, these local realities are vital for Nexus research as, for
example, rural farmers have always approached these sectors conjointly. It is typically the
higher levels of bureaucracy that are slow to adapt (Middleton et al., 2014). As such there is
much to learn from these actors.
In summary, the primary aim of the research is to solve some of the ambiguity surrounding
the WEF Nexus concept. This paper will look at one of the acknowledged knowledge gaps,
namely that of collaboration between actors of different sectors. This question will be
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answered through the analysis of both actors and institutions alike, since they are interlinked
and jointly form a governance arrangement. Using a theoretical multiplicity approach
mitigates the problem of a lacking WEF Nexus theory or guidelines. In addition, the case
study of the Machángara river basin should provide for a functioning practical example of a
Nexus. Collaboration is also the connecting link within the theories used and the functioning
of a governance arrangement but also the link between these two realms. Concluding on the
existing actor interaction and the institutional framework in place, should answer the main
research question.
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2. Conceptual framework
The complexity of this research stems in part due to the ambiguity surrounding the WEF
Nexus concept. The lacking framework and guidelines on how to implement a Nexus cause
this research to pioneer in this field. In order to give guidance and structure to this
investigation, established theories should aid in creating a foundation on which to build the
theoretical analysis. This entails that the chosen conceptual framework will fill in missing
links that arise during the investigation, aid in the evaluation of the research, and finally
support to applicability of conclusions for further research. In order to better understand this
research, it is important to investigate all concepts, terms and theories that will be used. Due
to the scope of the investigation, an array of these will be used. This chapter will outline all
needed explanations and definitions in order to better understand the following empirical
chapters and support the conclusion.
First, the theoretical multiplicity approach will be outlined using the main theories used.
These are Network governance, multi-level governance and multi-scale governance. As a
continuation, all three theories will be compared to each other in order to find similarities
which can be used in the analysis. Thereafter, a short explanation of the term collaboration
should give insight into the idea of this research. This chapter will conclude with an overall
summary as well as the formulation of hypotheses.
2.1 Theoretical Multiplicity
Finding appropriate methods and forms of managing natural resources has been a crucial
phenomenon in current global politics as well as natural resource management literature
(Dietz, et. Al.,2003). In order to effectively allocate natural resources, the social (as opposed
to ecological) context carries significant weight. Therein, actors involved in the process of
resource allocation embody an important unit of analysis. Actors can influence institutions
and shape the cultural context of the area of analysis and vice versa. Governing this multitude
of actors requires flexible and adaptive structures of governance. Therefore, an evident shift
from government to governance as a means of governing processes within a certain policy
domain has been emerging.
The issue with analyzing complex governance structures is that they tend to comprise several
shapes and forms and favor change over time. In order to make sense of this social
complexity, theories have tried to find patterns and reasons. Regarding the complexity of both
social structures and the WEF Nexus ambiguity, not one theory can suffice. This is mainly
because it would create a one dimensional image rather than the needed three dimensional
one, thereby grasping complexity rather than simplifying it. In addition, the WEF Nexus
strives to be a theory on its own, whereby it leaves sufficient room for interpretation, which in
turn leaves room for a multitude of ideas and theories to give it shape. Therefore, this research
will use the method of theoretical multiplicity in order to view the problem from different
angles, thereby filling in missing links where necessary. Theoretical multiplicity, as opposed
to using a single theory, draws the needed information from each theory in order to create
connecting links for complex issues. It does so by comparing theories according to their
differences and similarities and draws from the distinctiveness of each (Termeer and Dewulf,
2009). The idea was previously defined by Termeer and Dewulf (2009), connecting four
theoretical frameworks together. Considering the analytical structure outlined in figure 2,a
concept is needed that allows for the analysis of actors across sectors, levels and networks.
Multi-level governance is extensively used to study the interaction between public and private
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actors within governance systems. This theory will outline how these actors cooperate across
vertical as well as horizontal boundaries. Complementing this analysis, Multi-scale
governance adds the scalar dimension to the discussion. Network governance analyzes actors
according to relative networks and the manner in which actors behave within them. This
research will use these two theories in order to gain understanding of the complexity involved
and visualize the actor interactions. Importantly, they will help establish a theoretical contour
for the WEF Nexus from which further research can advance.
2.2 Network Governance
Network governance theory focuses on the interaction between networks of actors from
public to private (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). A network can be defined as the „patterned
relationships between individuals, groups, and organizations‟ (Dubini & Aldrich, 1991). The
theories complement the trend of shifting government to governance in an attempt to move
towards less hierarchy and more interactive forms of managing actors. Hereby, the role of the
government remains important as it has the ability to steer networks and facilitate processes
therein. Nevertheless, there is a consensus that „more has to be done with less‟, indicating the
role of alternative governance arrangement to complement the work of the theoretically
quantitatively decreasing government (Weimer, 1994).
The origins of this theory are multiple and sometimes stem from conflicting sources.
Arguably, the beginnings of the network approach started with the gaining momentum of
„bottom up approach‟ calling for more citizen participation in policy making. The further
development of the concept relates to models focusing on interaction processes which adapt
and change according to the complexity of the objective and problems. The network theory
used for this research is based upon the inclusion of the institutional context, whereas
previous theories of networks focused on actor interaction solely (Klijn and Koppenjan,
2000). These previous theories drew much of their content from management practices in the
private sector.
The idea of the network governance theory is that policy is made through the interdependence
of relevant actors. This means that an objective can only be reached if collaboration exists
between parties‟ which dependent on each other‟s resources. In such a way, resource
efficiency is created as rules need to regulate the allocation of scarce resources and that
benefits are present for more than the signatories of bilateral agreements (Klijn and
Koppenjan, 2000). These rules are complex and need to grasp the interdependency of the
system as one missing link could result in serious problems. Within such a system, actors
need to be more aware of the institutional and actor context and require more careful thought
when engaging in collaboration. Especially for natural resources, such an approach could
establish resource efficiency and improve the quality and quantity of the ecosystem.
Problems do arise in network even with strong interdependencies. Issues could for example
revolve around the sharing of costs and benefits. Mitigating conflict is a matter of steering the
network collaboration in a successful manner, which means implementing management
structures. Currently, there are two acknowledged types of network management structures,
which are process management and network constitution. The main difference between these
two types is their focus on actors and institutions respectively. Process management looks at
how the interaction between actors can be managed to avoid conflict. This could typically be
done through changing perceptions and strategies of each actor. Network constitution looks at
organizational structures in managing conflict. This can be done by changing actor
constellations, the rules within the network and rehearsing the functioning of the network
(Termeer and Dewulf, 2009). The two differ in the approach they take towards changes.
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Process management seeks to change the network through its actors, whereas network
constitution tries to change actor processes through the institutional traits of the network. This
research will focus on network constitution more so than process management due to the aim
of analysing and configuring the larger picture. The research objective strives to answer part
of the WEF Nexus, which cannot be done when focusing on actor interactions within the river
council only. Nevertheless, both types form the larger network governance theory and are
thus important to take into account.
Success and failure of a network is important to understand for this research and the wider
importance for governance theories. The main problem within an interdependent system such
as a network is that actors possess resources that are scarce or the actor embodies an
authoritative entity. In such a situation, actors possess „veto power‟ in that they control the
flow of resources, whether beneficial or not to the system (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000).
Especially with natural resources, control can increase the power that actor has in the direct as
well as indirect environment. For example, a hydroelectric power plant controls the water
flow of the river and thus has a relative advantage over lower lying actors. Using its „veto
power‟ it could halt the flow of water for the sake of gaining strategic benefits. Another
important aspect of the success/failure scenario is the awareness of the actor‟s respective
network regarding their interdependencies. If actors fail to acknowledge such, veto power will
become a common instrument to use. The objective of the network composition is to align
goals and interest in such a way that no actor is excluded and that exchange of scarce
resources is beneficial to all. If a network changes shape or composition, it is this
characteristic that will cause for friction (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). Thus, common
objectives are important when working with the complexity flowing from different actors,
sectors and levels. The government plays an important role in this regard. Another aspect of
success/failure is the risk of stagnation. If actors feel a loss of benefits of their membership
within the network, they could opt to withdraw, undermining the foundation. It is not
uncommon that networks produce benefits beyond their borders which outsiders can reap
benefits from without contribution (Barney and Hesterly, 2006). If local users draw water
from the river but do not invest in its upkeep, other basin members might opt to choose the
same strategy or initiate conflict with non-participatory actors. Although this phenomenon is
hard to solve, it is important that actors are aware of risks and costs to taking part in a
network. Nevertheless, benefits should generally outweigh the costs, whether in the long or
short term, for any arrangement to work. Regarding the joint perception and objective,
networks do not focus on achieving singular goals. Rather, they strive to emphasize
collaboration with the addition of acknowledging a multitude of goals of each actor. Hence,
the objective is the process in which individual or joint goals are realized (Klijn and
Koppenjan, 2000).
Power and rules are related key characteristics of most networks and tend to influence the
output of them. Most networks create rules on which processes are based and through which
collaboration, rather than conflict, is maintained. These informal, and mostly unwritten, rules
are established through time and experience. They tend to change over time and thereby
influence the way power is distributed within the network (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). For
example, an actor can be excluded from a certain process if costs and risks are not bearable.
Likewise, it is sometime more practical to reach objectives in the most efficient way, thereby
excluding actors that do not have sufficient capacities. Like previously stated, the overall
benefits should be maintained, for both the excluded and the included. The problem with
network rules is that they are slow to change and hence might hinder collaboration for a
certain composition of the network, which in turn needs to simultaneously create newer rules.
Hence, evident is a „lag-time‟ applied to these rules. Academic consensus states that “the
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stronger the territorial demarcations in a network and the weaker the rules for conflict
management and mediation, the more difficult decision making will be” (Klijn and
Koppenjan, 2000). Adding to this phenomenon is the fact that power differences influence the
way processes and rules evolve. As long as actors hold veto powers, rules will likely prevail.
A main criticism of networks within the academic realm, focuses on the perceived limited
role of the government and hence the lack of steering. The claim is that an equal
governmental role within the network stimulates problems of accountability and creates a
closed system based on interests rather than interaction of ideas. Results of such perceived
systems are a lack of innovation and increasing privatization of benefits. However, the
governmental and other public actors represent the „common interest‟ and are therefore
important to include in any decision making process, especially if the network leans towards
being a closed system. There is also the opposing view that public actors should not interact
with other societal actors due to the special representative role they carry with regard to public
interest. Entering into agreements could alter this representation; especially in more closed
systems it could threaten the democratic accountability of these actors. On the other hand, it
might well change the legitimacy of the network and hence improve its status (Klijn and
Koppenjan, 2000). This is the uniqueness that governmental actors possess due to their
characteristics which other private actors might not have. Those are among others, a “sizeable
budget and personnel, special powers, access to mass media, a monopoly on the use of force
and democratic legitimization” (Kickert et al. 1997). With such capacity, the government can
change the aspects of a network, whether the rules, composition or other traits. Academics
have identified four methods of engagement for governmental or public actors within
networks. The first option would be that of imposing rules and regulation on the network from
a steering position. Although unpopular, might it break deadlocks and potentially create
benefits. Secondly, it could collaborate with the network as one of the members with the
previously mentioned pros and cons. Third option would be a facilitating role for integration
in which processes might be improved and outcomes stimulated. A final option would be that
of constructing and shaping the network through the governmental characteristics. Shaping a
network could steer a network towards a certain objective such as efficiency, quality or even
democratic legitimacy.
Concluding, it can be stated that there is a sufficient theoretical foundation for the concept of
network governance. This is an important aspect for this research as it allows for the use of
important aspects to place within the still ambiguous WEF Nexus theory. Whether it will have
practical applicability will be seen in the case study of the Machángara basin and be evaluated
in the discussion chapter. It is clear that a network can only exist with good collaboration of
its actors, which in turn can be shaped by the institutional context of the environment of the
network itself. Rules and procedures within a network tend to change and adapt, making it
flexible but also susceptible to powerful actors. These can shape processes through several
methods and could cause for tensions. The role of the government hereby is crucial as it has
special abilities and traits that can positively alter a network. Doing so, a possible problem
could be the decreasing democratic accountability, which tends to be seconded to the creation
of output.
2.3 Multi-level Governance
“Multi-level governance is the dispersion of governance across multiple jurisdictions, such
that decision-making is shared among multiple actors at different levels” (Hooghe and Marks,
2002). Research on multi-level governance strives to understand connections between these
levels, encompassing actors at the local, national and global stage (Adger et. al., 2005). The
directions of such analysis of levels can be performed in a vertical, horizontal or cross sectoral
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manner. It is important for any governance arrangement to encompass multiple scales in order
to internalize externalities. This aspect is important when dealing with interconnectedness and
the efficient management of scarce natural resources. Hence, the dispersion of authority is
vital to, among others, stimulate innovation and embody several public interests (Hooghe and
Marks, 2002).
Within multi-level governance two main types have been identified, namely Type I and Type
II (Hooghe and Marks, 2002). The first perceives a dispersion of power over a limited number
of actors as well as levels. These tend not to overlap and usually remain rather stable
constructions. Type I then focuses on the role of government to ensure authority is derived
from central locations and that power is concentrated to few levels. The second type perceives
a more complex and overlapping arrangement in which several actors, mainly public, could
potentially replace the governmental role. These arrangements tend to be more flexible and
can be more easily altered according to changing jurisdictions and capacities. Type II
connects towards the network governance model in that the arrangement is more flexible,
adjustable and limits the authority of the government. Henceforth, it stimulates a more
decentralized mode of governance. Comparatively to the network governance theory, this
research will focus on only one branch of the theory more suited to the case study but keep
the other within grasp. Therefore, Type II multi-level governance will be the main reference
point for Multi-level governance in analysing the Nexus concept.
There are several acknowledged features of Type II multi-level governance systems, each
creating different functions of structure and objective for their respective system. For
example, Task-specific jurisdictions as identified by Ostrom, whereby citizens are represented
by service sectors rather than governmental entities (1999). Examples of such sectors would
be the police, fire or health service sector. Type II also differs from its counterpart through the
existence of overlapping and thus competing jurisdictions whereby no hierarchy exists
between larger and smaller jurisdictional areas (Frey and Eichenberger 1999). One could call
this arrangement „polycentric‟ in that several centres of authority and decision-making power
exist and that collaboration exists to avoid conflict due to overlapping jurisdictions (Ostrom,
1999).
The question remains regarding the characteristics that create a successful jurisdiction and
differentiate Type I from type II multi-level governance. One aspect creating difference in
Types regards to multitude of jurisdictions that can form. Any group of citizens has the ability
to create authority from a shared set of ideas or demands. Within Type I, this process would
have to formally go via a governmental entity or an acknowledged system (Hooghe and
Marks, 2002). A unique and important feature is the fact that jurisdictions can be created at all
levels and do not have to be bound by traditional administrative/governmental levels (local,
regional, national). This is an important feature for the Nexus as it bases its governance
arrangement on criteria of efficiency, democratic accountability or others. However, such a
phenomenon can also create problems of acknowledgement or adaptability to the larger
national system and could be deemed „fragmentation‟. A final characteristic is that of
flexibility. Due to the ease of creating a jurisdiction they tend to be rather flexible and
adaptable. This proves vital in times of institutional change but can also aid in the adaptation
to internal demands. However, such flexibility stands contrary to stability and creates certain
risks within the governance arrangement. Jurisdictions can be created based on demand, but
once this objective has been achieved, the relative authority created no longer has a standing
(Ostrom, 1999). With the increasing complexity of current governance processes, such a
phenomenon could heavily impact the interdependent system and potentially cause it to fail.
This is where the pros and cons counteract each other, as flexibility of creation can also create
13
failure, which in turn can cause for the adaptation of the system to the new change. Arguably,
this would create a different kind of stability.
Arguably, the problems of both Type I and II relate to the respective role of the government
therein. The main problem of multi-level governance is the amount of jurisdictions and their
spill over of externalities. Hence, more actors require more coordination in order to include
adverse effects of policy making and make sure that all aspects of governance are covered. A
sole jurisdiction cannot do this alone and thus needs to collaborate. The problem is that
collaboration costs increase drastically with increasing numbers of jurisdictions (Hooghe and
Marks, 2002). Type I solves this problem by limiting its jurisdictional numbers and enforces a
top-down approach of coordinating collaboration. The role of the government consists of
steering and accounting for its jurisdictions, even in highly decentralized systems. However,
Type II compensates for a lack of governmental hierarchy, with a problem based division of
authority. Collaboration amongst and within jurisdictions is based upon the specific problem
and do not seek to impact the wider society.
Whereas power plays a crucial role within network types of governance, identity does so for
Multi-level jurisdictions. Type I, more so than Type II, governance structures are maintained
through territorial jurisdictions. The reasoning is that citizens allocate identity to certain levels
within governance because of the affiliation citizens perceive with them. As such do citizens
perceive local, regional and national jurisdictions more clearly than any further level.
Therefore, limited trust and support for EU integration policy stems from the perceived
national identity (Hooghe and Marks, 2002). Stronger national identity (hence, acceptance of
territorial jurisdictions) result in weaker support for EU policy changes. Typically, this
phenomenon can be witnessed in countries such as Austria, Hungary or Great Britain. This
perceived identity within territorial jurisdictions can also be witnessed in regional levels such
as in Belgium or Spain. The role of the government is important when regarding identity as it
has the capacity to steer the institutional context. In Type I scenarios the governmental role
has limited effect on changing the institutional setting as it is more robust to change. Type II
settings are more easily affected by institutional change, however the role of the government
is limited. Hence, there is a trade-off between strong jurisdictional structures (Type I) and
weaker structures but limited authority of governmental bodies (Type II).
2.4 Multi-Scale governance
To add to the complexity of theoretical multiplicity, researching governance arrangements,
especially in ambiguous contexts, multi-scale governance cannot be neglected. Its purpose
within this research is to create a better understanding of the interdependency within
governance arrangements and the relation between theories. Academics often connect multi-
level and multi-scales of governance as these overlap and sometimes co-depend on each
other. With regard to theoretical multiplicity, this theory will serve as an additional source on
which to understand the governance arrangement in the Machángara basin.
A scale can be defined as the spatial, temporal, quantitative and analytical dimension of
analysis. Levels are defined as units of analysis spanning across different scales (Cash et al.,
2006). Scale dimension dictate the spatial context of the analysis. The scale for this research
will be the Machángara river basin, wherein multi-levels as well as scales are visible. This
implies that the basin can actually span across several administrative scales/boundaries such
as municipal or regional. Furthermore, the multi-sector approach of the Nexus creates several
spatial or temporal dimensions as each sector operates at different scales. For example, does
energy production typically serve for a regional or national purpose, whereas the agricultural
14
output of the Azuay region maintains a domestic character. Arguably, a strong governance
arrangement will take these scales into account and adopt a structure that allows for the
cohesion of such. This implies that when looking at WEF Nexus governance, one should take
into account the scalar dimension of the analysis.
The following diagrams were created to present the two theories (multi-level/scale) visually,
thereby aiding the understanding of examples given. The idea to place them together stems
from the fact that the two complement each other in some aspects. Noticeable is that the
complexity of multi-level reaches beyond the simple interaction of levels, but that each level
has internal processes and that several connections to other levels might be evident.
Especially in Type II, levels do not collaborate according to strict hierarchies, but maintain a
free flowing interaction. Therefore, it is possible that governmental actors engage directly
with local authorities. This aspect relates well to the multi-scale diagram, as it shows that each
respective level-based interaction can be placed on a scale. These scales on the other hand,
impact the respective levels through variables such as time. Time changes constellations of
actors and the institutional setting and thereby also the respective governance arrangements.
Related to the diagrams on both multi-scale and multi-level governance, several aspects
related to decentralization and power come to mind. It is important not to restrict the relative
view on governance arrangements through using only acknowledged theories. In fact, the
following accounts are made without regard to a previously described theory and therefore aid
in the understanding of the complexity of governance arrangements.
As a reoccurring phenomenon, decentralization is an important concept to take into account
when looking at scales and the levels therein. Natural resources do not follow the
administrative scales of communities or cities. As such it is important to realize the effect of
decentralization for multiple levels. Participation within a multi actor setting is crucial for
governance effectiveness and equality. Especially in the multi-local level, advocacy of such
actors is often limited. NGO‟s acting in the interest of locals can be falsely interpreted. Within
vulnerable levels, multi actor settings need to be carefully reviewed as to their actual power
constellation (Bebbington et. al., 2006). Hierarchies tend to be necessary in social governance
processes. Empowering local communities will strengthen their ability to control their
Figure 2: Multi-scale governance Figure 3: Multi-level governance
15
respective level better, without the hierarchical structure. Local chiefs might obtain more
horizontal power in the absence of governmental control (Markelova and Mwangi, 2012).
Accountability does increase when empowering locals or decentralizing and can result in
more effective/efficient allocation of resources (McCaryhy, 2003). The trade-off has to be
made regarding the scale of the natural resource to be governed. Decentralization does create
difficulties for cross-sector cooperation. A river basin concludes many communities and
possibly levels, making coordination a complex task. Therefore, the approach to governing
multiple levels has to be heavily related to the context of the natural resource to be allocated.
Roggero (2010) states that when controlling factors like hierarchy or general authority are
flexible and not well established can actors within the social process fill the gap. Therefore,
power relations are inconclusive when lacking agreement exists between public and private
entities. This lack of hierarchy creates a vacuum in which actors pursue their own ways of
dealing with each other to conclude resource allocation. The typical multi-level perception
hereby is that these actors would not have concluded an agreement without their pre-set
levels. In other words, these levels define the actors and their „power‟ when clear hierarchy
ceases (Roggero, 2010). The role of the state is hereby multi-faceted and divided. The state
does not act as one coherent entity and therefore concludes multiple actors with multiple tasks
and capabilities (Markelova and Mwangi, 2012).
2.5 Linking network, multi-level and multi-scale governance
In order to adhere to the principles of theoretical multiplicity, all theories will be compared in
order to find overlapping or linking features. For this research the theories generally
complement each other. As such, certain criteria can be formulated regarding the comparison.
The chosen criteria will return in the discussion chapter in order to link theoretical with
practical findings. This approach will create a strong foundation for the conclusion regarding
the WEF Nexus.
The main connection between the theories can be found within their connecting and
overlapping boundaries. The limitations of multi-level governance can be filled by the theory
of networks. The extent to which actors can cooperate across levels depends on the context of
the setting. With heavy decentralization come significant pitfalls in creating a spanning
cooperation. Network governance allows these level boundaries to subside and creates
cooperation based on different values and with less hierarchy. The role of the government is
in all theories based on the relative power it can obtain, whereby networks dictate a weaker
role for governmental agents than Type I multi-level governance. An intriguing finding is
that, were power plays an important role in networks, identity does so for levels.
Nevertheless, their functionality is very similar and therefore provides a good analytical scope
for analyzing the Machángara basin. Another important finding is the interaction between the
institutional and actor context. Whereas in networks, the interaction is strongly two sided,
multi-level governance arrangements have stronger foundations for their jurisdictions.
Especially with a blurred border between Type I and II, this aspect can be decisive when
analyzing the effect of institutional change on the river council. Finally, is it interesting to see
that like networks, Type II jurisdictions can be formulated at any chosen level of governance,
creating high flexibility and impose a direct challenge to the „status quo‟.
The following table, partly adopted from Termeer and Dewulf (2009), compares the two
theories according to perceived characteristics. The multi-level theory is divided into two
categories as first proposed by Hooghe and Marks. Noticeable is that Hooghe and Marks use
multi-level governance mainly in the intergovernmental setting whereas it can be applied in
16
more detail within national boundaries. As such, it is relatively new ground to apply this
theory at a river basin scale, challenging the theoretical boundaries. Multi-scale is not
included in this table as it is not fully comparable as a theory, but functions as an addition to
multi-level.
Multi-level governance
(Type I)
Multi-level governance
(Type II)
Network
governance
Main actors Central Government and
sub-national
governments (general
purpose jurisdictions) at
different/most important
levels
Public service industries
(task-specific
jurisdictions)
Public and private
actors linked in
networks,
supporting or
hindering policy
strategies
Relationship
between actors
Exclusive jurisdictions.
No overlap
Spanning across levels
due to function focus
(forming networks),
overlap possible
Sustainable
interdependencies
between actors,
engaged in
overlapping policy
networks
Steering/influencing Assignment of functions
to level by central organ.
Policy not unit of
analysis, no overlap
Open method of
coordination1,
Polycentric, overlap
Providing
incentives for co-
operation, process
management,
network
constitution,
Leading figures State Citizens, public bodies, Network manager
or process manager
Role of government Multi-function.
Functions bundle to
central organs
Decentralized Partner, process
manager, network
builder or staying
out
Success Keohane: state never
replaced but
complemented by
multiple actors
Effective management of
tasks/problems (input vs
output trade-off)
Win-win situations
Enriched chance of
policy
implementation
Democracy
Adaptive capacity Limited due to pre-set
jurisdictions
Flexible in design,
fragmentation
High
Aim of theory Interaction between
levels and shared
competences
Multitude of actors
integrating across levels
and role of state (pre-
modern theory)
Mitigating the use
of administrative
deadlocks?
Example EU, Federalism in
Germany
EU, Zweckverbände
(goals oriented
organizations) in
Switzerland
Coastal fisheries in
Sweden/Amazonas
etc. in managing
resource allocation Table 1. Comparing the main theories Source: Adapted from Termeer and Dewulf (2009)
1The open method of coordination (OMC) adapted from the European Union can be described as a form of ‘soft’ law.
Policy-making that does not result in binding legislative or legal measures (EUR-Lex website).
17
Typically, Type I multi-level governance constitutes a greater role for governmental
institutions and centralizes administration. This means that actors of greater influence are
likely to dominate allocation of resources. Furthermore, the network of actors is
predominately collaborative system instead of an interdependent and mutually beneficial one
like that of network governance. It seems that networks contain the characteristics needed for
integration across Nexus sectors. Type II multi-level governance should aid in the allocation
of leading figures in order to stimulate whether a governance arrangement is likely to fall
under network governance structures. This is also a main overlap between the two theories, as
one identifies the borders on which the other can build. Finally, multi-level governance, being
more sector/level dependent constitutes much more innovation (especially in type II) as
opposed to networks, which typically serve as managerial systems where innovation stems
from the flexibility/adaptability of the arrangement.
The theory on seeing social interaction as a process of networks is important in order to
understand wider ranging governance arrangements other than those limited to administrative
or hydrological boundaries. Network governance can complement multi-level analysis by
giving the broader picture, whereas multi-level would indulge into the sector or level specific
activities. The use of a network interaction tool will allow the mathematical measurement of
each interaction and conclude, amongst others, upon strength and weaknesses within the
network. Further elaboration on the network and multi-level theory will be given in the
conceptual framework section.
2.6 Collaboration
During the description of the theoretical framework, it became clear that the focus of this
research lies with the interaction between actors within a given governance setting. In order to
define such interaction a concept is needed that will give shape to the relevant interaction. The
main concept used in this research will be that of „collaboration‟, especially between the
actors of the river Council. Collaboration is the act were two or more people/entities are
working together to achieve the same goal (Cambridge Advanced Learner‟s Dictionary &
Thesaurus, 2016). This implies that there is a mutual understanding of the need to reach a
common target and that collaboration is the most efficient way of doing so. This seems highly
similar to the concept of cooperation, however crucial differences exist. Cooperation is the act
of working together or doing what someone asks you to, in order to reach aligned yet possibly
selfish goals (Cambridge Advanced Learner‟s Dictionary & Thesaurus 2016). The difference
stems from the fact that cooperation reaches lesser depths, as goals may differ and do not
dictate the act of working together. Collaboration only exists when trying to reach a common
goal, without which no collaboration can exist. Thereby, the path or method is also aligned.
Within the capitalistic realities of the private sector, cooperation is the prevailing method of
progress. The problem this causes is the lack of interdependent thinking and the inclusion of
externalities within the action plans. The creation of waste from one source is not linked to
possible use for another. This creates higher resource use and possibly inefficiency. The
previous metaphor of the dinner buffet touches upon this concept of cooperation instead of
collaboration. In order to achieve Nexus thinking, collaboration is crucial in order to create
interdependencies and limit the exclusion of externalities. The reason this research focuses on
collaboration rather than cooperation stems from the fact that the chosen case study of a WEF
Nexus has to adhere to the principles of collaboration. Nevertheless, this is open to academic
debate and for reasons of simplicity, this term will be used in this research.
18
The question remains as to how collaboration is measured and how it will be used in this
research. There are many methods of analysing it and thus exist multiple scales and
indicators. In order to avoid going into the theory of collaboration, it will simply be used as a
given fact within the case study and that all activities contribute towards it. Furthermore, the
research question does not analyse collaboration but the use of it within the WEF Nexus.
Hence, collaboration as a concept will be taken as a given phenomenon within the council and
the research will not compare results to the collaboration guidelines.
The diagram above (figure 4) shows part of the theories used, applied to the WEF Nexus
concept. It shows how governance between sectors, scales and levels interact with each other
in order to create functioning management structures. The complexity thereof is highlighted
through the limited explanation each of the theories (arrows) can provide. Thus, the diagram
shows that multiple theories are needed in order to better understand the Nexus concept and
collaboration therein. The use of the network governance theory can best be explained in its
own right, and has previously been outlined. What becomes clear with the diagram is the
complexity of collaboration streams in the Nexus case study.
In order to obtain a holistic and realistic idea of this collaboration, it would be important to
know how stable it actually is. This stability should allow for the adaptation to change,
whether social or natural, and should therefore encompass a certain degree of flexibility. A
mentioned before, this aspect was the arguable cause of failure of the IWRM theory. Hence,
we arrive at the last part of the main research question; the aspect of adaptability to change.
Multi
level
analy
sis
Multi sector analysis
Multi scale analysis
Figure 4: The multiple theories applied to the WEF Nexus
19
2.7 Hypotheses
Concluding the conceptual chapter as well as the first part of this thesis, it is feasible to state
certain hypotheses which will later be concluded upon. They should also aid in summarizing
the previous chapters and put them into practical outcomes.
1. Regarding the network theory, it is expected that the Machángara river council will
adopt a similar formation and maintain processes of collaboration therein. A network
approach is expected to mitigate the problems of hierarchy and also give certain
flexibilities in the structure.
2. The role of the government is expected to be rather demanding and following a Type I
top-down approach. This comes in contrast to the expected network formation, and
hence shows the benefit of conducting a theoretical multiplicity approach. The
expectation comes from the fact that the president has since his election implemented
several top-down laws, shifting authority to higher institutions.
3. Collaboration within the council will be based on the sector (horizontal) rather than
level based (vertical) processes. This means that collaboration will exist due to similar
sector related interests rather than political or administrative interests.
3. Research question
With the background to the research, the objective, and the theory outlined the following
research questions will guide and finally conclude this research.
Main research question
“How do actors collaborate across sectors, levels and scales in the Water-Energy-Food
Nexus and to what extent are they able to adapt to new challenges?”
Sub-questions
How do actors collaborate horizontally across sectors in the Water-Energy-Food Nexus for
the Machángara catchment?
How do actors collaborate vertically across levels in the Water-Energy-Food Nexus for the
Machángara catchment?
How do the different scales affect the ability of actors to govern natural resources coherently?
To what extent are stakeholder formations able to adapt the Water-Energy-Food Nexus to
current and/or future climate change impacts?
20
4. Methodology
The study area for this research is the Machángara river basin in southern Ecuador, flowing
past the city of Cuenca in the Azuay region. The analysis will focus on stakeholder/actors
connected to the WEF Nexus in the region. This entails that the span of research should not
exceed that of the river basin but the larger context will be taken into account. This means that
government policy or even regional settings will influence the basin scale and therefore play a
role in this investigation. This research will collect information from all existing levels of
governance and possibly all participating actors. This ranges from national to local levels. The
Machángara river council includes several important governmental actors, representing a
national interest in the matter. The involved actors in the region range according to their
respective sectors such as the industry or the agriculture sector. Although the industry is
theoretically not part of the WEF Nexus, it contributes and influences decisions on water
governance. As such, could this research deal with a more elaborate Nexus, containing four
instead of three sectors. However, concluding upon this aspect will occur at a later stage. Due
to their size, some sectors will be summarized through a selection of actors therein. For the
farmers, this selection is based upon the analysis of the farmer union, acting as a mediating
entity. Another important aspect to consider are the three sectors (water, energy and food)
which tend to span across actors. This requires a delineation of sector involvement of each
actor.
Collaboration was taken as the aspect of analysis as it summarizes the functioning of the
council and thus a WEF Nexus. It is also a relatively easy concept to study as it can be
translated in both qualitative and quantitative results. Furthermore, it is an aspect within
governance arrangement that hasn‟t been fully understood and has the tendency to change.
Especially within the larger WEF Nexus investigation, this aspect can bring forth important
information regarding the functioning of the larger system. This research focuses on the
positive collaboration that actors maintain and does not delve into the conflicts within the case
study. This decision was based on the image that the case study possesses, which is that of a
functioning example of a Nexus approach.
Several connections for this research pre-existed from my personal network and aided in the
development of the research angle and questions as well as the furthering of the network such
as Jorge Rodrigo Nuñez. The thesis supervisor also contributed to advancing my network
which proved essential upon arrival. He introduced the professors from the IDHRIA
department of the university of Cuenca, Rolando Celleri and Alex Aviles. They were of vital
help due to their involvement in the council and their experience with similar types of
research conducted in the area. The plan was to use their contacts in order to initiate a first
introduction and encounter. It is very useful to have third persons do the introduction
regarding you and the project as this adds importance to the research. Furthermore, in
developing countries, status is deemed important when trying to realize research. This proved
more efficient than having to write emails and calling these institutions until one actors would
be willing to speak. In fact, one of the closer contacts was Catalina Diaz, who is the technical
secretary of the council. She was able to produce a list of personal contact details of actors
involved in the council. This method of indirect contact proved a long process. One reason
could be the holiday season of the research period or possibly the failing information which
the actors had. In any case it is expected that personal contact would have taken longer due to
the missing status of the research. Furthermore, the Machángara basin is closed to the public
and access is difficult. Due to the introduction to the IDHRIA group I was able to meet other
students doing research in the area who hold an access pass to the area. In addition, through
21
the group I was able to visit the hydroelectric reservoir, which is impossible to reach without
proper vehicle and an experienced driver.
The analysis will be limited to an actor analysis and therefore avoids taking the entire
complexity of the institutional context into account. This is due to time and financial issues,
which exists in most research. Furthermore, focusing on one aspect will give more definite
answers to the research questions, formulated more precisely. Legal statutes and political
realities, as part of the institutional context, will be used to fill the gaps explanatory within the
actor analysis. For example, a new water law has been introduced and constitutes updates to
the old and outdated ones. This law should benefit the integration across sectors as it, for
example, defines more clearly the relative importance of each sector. Furthermore, actors
influence institutional developments and vice versa, indicating that there is no limitation of
importance of institutional change to this research. These aspects are also of importance when
looking at the aspect of durability of the governance arrangement. The institutional setting can
influence the composition of the arrangement and shift it in such a way that it might break, or
vice versa.
Empirical research is crucial for this study in order to obtain relevance through applicability.
Studying governance arrangements and processes in a developing country is hard to base on
existing documents and data as these can be inaccessible or limited in validity/relevance.
Therefore, going into the field to obtain first-hand information is necessary. Methods of
obtaining information include interviews with council members, informal discussions with
relevant external actors and sending out questionnaires. The interviews were conducted in a
semi-structured manner. This was done to steer the conversation in a controlled direction and
yet allow for a certain degree of flexibility which could be used to discuss additional topics
deemed important by the interviewee. This proved very important as the new water law
proved to be an important institutional change for the collaboration within the council. With
the semi-structured format, I was able to adapt the questions and manoeuvre more easily. The
informal discussions were held with actors to whom I held closer ties. These included the
interviews held prior to the research, university professors at the University of Cuenca, the
technical secretary and Mr. Bustamente from the GPA as well as Mr. Idrovo from Elecaustro.
From these discussions I was able to learn a lot about interviewing techniques, the context of
the case study and detailed accounts on how the council functions. Keeping this informal
relationship with certain actors also facilitated the inclusion within the network of actors in
the basin. This proved especially vital as interviews were hard to obtain as actors did not
answer calls or emails. The third method of questionnaires relates to the formal interviews, in
which the interviewees were asked about the cooperation within the council. This information
was given in a quantitative way which allowed me to create the SNA diagram. The final form
of analysis is the use of literature. Although this has been extensively done prior to the data
collection phase, it will serve as a verification of obtained information. Although the research
angle is unique in its way, prior research on governance arrangements in Ecuador does serve
as a comparative method. Yet, it proved insufficient as new laws and organizational
developments were more important than assumed from prior literature review.
In order to obtain data through interviews actors have to be contacted and motivated to
participate in the research. Several aspects aided in the process of obtaining these such as
network use, status of research, and hierarchical consent.
The status of the research proved to be very important. Due to the professors of IDHRIA I
was able to formulate the importance of my research in such a way that it connects to a future
plan of the Azuay government to create a larger Santiago river basin council. My study would
act as a pilot and thus gain importance and status. This aspect was included in all interview
22
invitations I sent out and motivated some actors to speak more openly. There is a trade-off
between being seen as a simple student researcher and being part of a larger project.
Depending on the strived for results, it is best to connect with interviewees on a similar level.
Defending a position relevant to the larger Santiago river plans allowed me to talk to
governmental officials more easily. Yet, having a too high position within a project could
eliminate the openness of local actors. This is where the network comes in place, as it
connects external researchers with local actors through a known mediator.
A final aspect that aided in obtaining interview concessions was the hierarchical path of
working. The initial idea was to contact the top of the council first, in this case the director of
the technical council. Arguably this would avoid cancellations from actors that didn‟t find
confirmation in the status of the research nor the network through which I obtained their
contact. This plan would also create more openness of answers as the director has given
consent to the investigation. The latter happened as several times actors asked from whom I
received the consent to draw information from council functioning. Mentioning the directors
name satisfied these concerns. However, the directors stimulating efforts to bring actors to
answering my email didn‟t bring the expected results. In fact, all interviews were set up
through personal contact or phone. One council actor didn‟t respond to the emails, phone calls
or invitations from the director, leaving ambiguity to the explanation.
A total of fifteen interviews, nine questionnaires and several informal conversations were held
in the duration of the data collection phase from July until September 2016 at the case study
location. The majority of interviewees were members of the Machángara river council. All
interviews were preceded by a formal email with all necessary
information about the research and about the confidentiality
thereof. Each interviewee was informed about their right to
cancel the interview at any given stage and had the right to
review information obtained. In addition, an agreement was
made with the director of the technical council, which stated
that the results of the investigation were to be sent to the
council members. The intention was to record all interviews
that were held with council members as this would avoid loss
of information. Since council member interviews were held in
Spanish, some words were lost in translation but could be
reused after the transcribing the recordings. Consent was asked
with regard to the recordings as well as to the general purpose
and use of the information obtained. Use of a translator was
only necessary for the information leaflets (see figure 5). The
interviews held in Spanish went unexpectedly well and
brought forth fruitful discussions. To ensure proper
understanding, interviewees were occasionally asked to verify a
short summary of the conversational highlights.
The received data should be analysed using proven methods. The interviews will be evaluated
according to qualitative measures whereby the creation of a quantitative scale could aid the
understanding. Interview recordings are transcribed according to keywords and themes. In
general, the interviews were grouped according to various categories such as „cooperation‟
and ‟new water law‟. This automatically highlights the two important aspects of this research
which are the actor and institutional setting. In order to obtain quantitative data from the
interviews, the questionnaires are reviewed through ranking the given answers. This is only
possible with certain answers which regard a hierarchical response (eg. very bad to very
Figure 5: Interview invitation info sheet
23
good). The responses can be used for the Social Network Analysis (SNA) tool in order to
create a network diagram. This diagram can highlight the complexity and density of
interaction within the council and beyond. It aids in the understanding of the qualitative
results by visualizing outcomes. Furthermore, graphs are helpful when comparing certain
hypotheses to be tested. When analysing interaction within certain settings they can produce
valuable insights. In summary, this research will focus on both the qualitative and quantitative
aspects when analysing the collaboration within the governance arrangement in the
Machángara river basin.
We have delved into the general context of what this research aims to achieve, established a
research framework and connected a methodology to it and have outlined a complex but solid
theoretical framework which will compensate for any lacking guidance from the WEF Nexus
concept. Therefore, progress will be made towards answering the research question through
the presentation of the results gathered at the case study. Hereby, it is important to keep the
theoretical characteristics in mind as these will be combined with the empirical results in the
discussion chapter. The points drawn from there will finalize this research in the conclusion
chapter.
24
5. Results
The empirical findings of this research will be presented according to the following structure.
At first, this chapter will present findings regarding the institutional and actor context.
Therein, overarching developments, problems and characteristics will be described.
Thereafter, the explanatory results will be presented, which include the preliminary answers
to the research questions.
5.1 The Institutional setting
Agriculture, hydropower generation and drinking water and sanitation are the key components
the Azuay region depends on from the river (Borrero Vega, 2015). Furthermore, the third
largest city in Ecuador, Cuenca, is located at the Machángara river basin. Many people
depend on the environmental services of the region to maintain these three sectors (Buckalew
et. al., 1998). Per year, about304 hm3 of water is available for hydropower production,
irrigation, drinking water systems and industrial users (Celleri, 2016). This amount is split
between the three sectors and creates input and output on a regional scale. The hydropower is
generated by the Saucay and Saymirin dams, generating 39.5 MW of electricity. 840 l/s of
water are used for the drinking water treatment plant Tixán and the industrial park north of the
city. The irrigation system composes the third part of the WEF Nexus, consisting of the
Machángara, Checa-Sidcay and the Ricaurte systems. The natural complexity makes this case
study relatively unique and thus difficult to compare to other examples.
Good natural resource governance requires that the institutional processes go paired with the
given natural setting such as described above. To balance the allocation of resources, such as
water, efficient governance arrangements need to allow for integration across sectors.
Furthermore, with changing environmental contexts social structures need to be sufficiently
flexible in dealing with change. The current governance arrangement in Ecuador and
specifically in the Azuay region is complex. Several times the water management was
rescaled from regional, to municipal and basin levels (Warner et. al., 2014). Currently the
basin is regulated through an inter-institutional entity struggling to integrate stakeholders
across sectors in the scalar conundrum. The basin scale only regulates water resources and
does not contain any governmental capacity such as jurisdictional or administrative powers.
Thus, the council has no legal or executive power and faces different regional and local
scales, operating at their own spheres of influence. In addition, the basin contains a high
complexity of actors with different interests and motives (Warner et. al., 2014).
From the above description, several
themes stick out and provide a
guideline for further analysis.
Examples are the rescaling of
governance arrangements, inter-
institutional entities and balancing
use of resources. Thus, the
institutional setting will be presented
according to three main phenomena.
These are the new water law,
decentralization and the Machángara
river council.
In summary: The new water law
- Entered into force in 2014
- Official name: Ley orgánica de recursos
hídricos, usos y aprovechamiento del agua
- Approved by the national assembly, created
by SENAGUA
- Sets the prioritization of water in times of
shortage
- Reorganizes the river council structure:
larger Santiago basin will oversee its sub-
basins among which, the Machángara
- SENAGUA is the implementing body
25
The new water law
Confronting this given social complexity, the previous administration has implemented
several changes to the institutional setting. Part of the reason was the 2009 drought, which
impacted the whole of Ecuador and caused shortage in electricity. In part, this was due to the
limited hydropower output due to the lowwater flow and the subsequent downstream uses
such as irrigation and drinking water. In times of crisis concessions must be made regarding
water allocation and use thereof. This causes tensions between various levels of governance
as well as between sectors. A new „water law‟ was introduced to set certain managerial and
structural rules which should improve the governance of water. This new law sets forth a set
of priorities which should take effect in times of water shortage. These are 1. Drinking water,
2. Irrigation, and 3. Ecological purposes. Fourth priority are the production activities which
include Hydroelectricity, touristic activities etc. (Ley de recursos hidricos, 2014). Hence, the
new law impacts the way in which natural resources are prioritized and thus governed. This
will have consequences for the relationships within the way these governance arrangements
function. Most notably, a governmental entity needs to implement and control this law. In the
case of Ecuador, SENAGUA is the governmental body that oversees that the water law is
implemented correctly. This actor also provides the permits for using the water in the region
for which stricter rules have been introduced. Formerly one permit could hold up to 5
companies but now each entity needs to apply separately to obtain a license (Bustamente,
2016). The new law supports the claim that the state owns the natural resources and hence
holds sole power to decide upon its use.
The new law also carries significant additional changes to the Azuay region. For example,
article 5 of that lawdictates that the State is the main authority of all water related activities
and should always be consulted (Ley de recursos hidricos, 2014). Regarding the duties of the
same state, environmental protection and conservation only comes as a subsection within
article 83, in which it falls under climate change adaptation and mitigation. In effect, the state
prioritizes water governance over any other sector, failing to adhere to the fragile
interlinkages between ecosystem and natural resources and thereby limits the importance of
the third priority of the new water law, ecological purposes.
Another change is the restructuring of the river council and other water managing bodies. The
idea is to create larger administrative areas in which one large council assimilates knowledge
and information to and from the smaller councils and bodies. This means that the Machángara
river council will fall under the Santiago council and report to it. The purpose is to facilitate
communication and improve knowledge transmission. Essentially framed as
„decentralization‟ this restructuring should give local councils a more effective voice than
being a dispersion of unofficial entities regulating local water supplies. Nevertheless, the
water law and its responding changes are subject to a top-down approach of governance,
whereby the state maintains authority and directs processes. In effect, not much changes for
the Machángara river council in terms of composition or status. For the long term, power is
diverted upwards as local basins indirectly follow the guidelines of the state. It is debatable
whether this change will be a positive or negative step towards decentralization as this change
is only in its planning stage.
Decentralization
The priorities set as well as the Santiago river council plans, are created and implemented
from the government down to the people (top-down). This is occurringwhile the general trend
in recent years in Ecuador was that of decentralization. This has mainly been attributed to the
former president, Correa (Aviles, 2016). The idea is to give regional and local authorities
more power to implement more efficiently, projects according to perceived necessities.
26
However, through laws such as the new water law of 2014, the reality shows that the
government gives the orders from the top to be implemented locally. The reasoning is that
these laws are produced and enforced at the top and limited consultation with, for example,
the river basin councils is evident. The new law proposes a larger basin council to take over
the authority of smaller river councils such as the Machángara river council. The aim is to
minimize bureaucracy and increase efficiency (Bustamente, 2014). Furthermore, benefits
arise for finances as these can be distributed by and according to regional needs instead of a
central organ. Financing from a higher levelled or foreign source is still needed and sought
(Bustamente, 2016). Ecuador and the Machángara basin have close ties to the World Bank
and institutions such as GIZ (Uyaguari, 2016). However, simplification causes issues of
adaptability and flexibility at the regional and local levels as this is where the law is turned
into action. Due to the numerous levels of governance involved, it becomes apparent that the
communication between them needs to be fluent for any change to its structure to be
successful. Thus, one of the key features to find during the actor analysis is the cooperation
between vertical administrative levels (multi-level governance).
Historically the Azuay region has been known to cooperate effectively within its boundaries.
However, Quito (the capital) limited its cooperation with southern regions in the past, leaving
them to run autonomously while creating a perception of distrust (Idrovo, 2016). As such,
private and public bodies within Cuenca, act on a familiar basis and keep a broad network of
relationships. Many activities are governed by friendship ties due to the relatively small size
of the city. Furthermore, the Azuay region is known for its good cooperation especially
regarding the water sector. There are examples of neighbouring regions in which water
conflicts are evident.
The Machángara river council
The Machángara river basin council (Consejo de la cuenca del rio Machángara) is an inter-
institutional formation composed of eight different actors from the private as well as public
domains. Allactors are related to the allocation of water drawn from the river for purposes of
energy, food and water and hence directly compose the stakeholders of a WEF Nexus. The
council is structured according to a board of directors, which formulates actions and a
technical council which implements them. Each of the eight entities bring forth two or three
people to be involved in the technical council‟s processes. For larger actors, their functions
would be director, general secretary and technical advisor (Diaz, 2016). The council functions
on a rotating chair, typically the general secretary, who facilitates communication between the
board of directors and the technical council as well as within the technical council.
This council gathers on a regular basis to discuss future activities and allocate resources
according to the demands. Current activities are the establishment of a water fund for
conservation activities, community natural resource management program enabling local
participation, education programs on water use and the legalization of properties. The council
also advises and finances technical solutions such as the lining of irrigation channels,
reforestation, implementing drip irrigation and maintaining/building new canals (Celleri,
2016). Due to the lacking official status of the council regarding its voluntary membership, it
does not meet on a regular basis. This is interesting regarding the fact that departments within
institutions are devoted to the council‟s activities which creates a core group of active
members. Its unofficial status bestows no legal or administrative powers onto its activities.
Impact of the council‟s output is therefore limited to its basin boundaries unless governmental
decree states otherwise.
27
The Machángara river basin is divided into three main sections, namely the lower, middle and
upper basin (see figure 1). These parts divide the basin according to natural borders, such that
the upper basin contains most of the paramo (moorland) vegetation whereas the lower basin
has a higher urbanized area. Furthermore, these divisions allow the river council to divide
their work according to their competences (table 2). As such, the council works on specific
tasks needed per geographic region of the basin. This means that the governance
arrangements adapt their structure and activities according to the natural surroundings. Hence,
there is a subordination of governance structures to that of natural structures. Such a
prioritization benefits collaboration as hierarchy is created on natural terms and not on social
ones. Arguably, this should create more stable social relations as nature is less fragile than
social processes.
To understand the context in which the council operates and justifies its actions on a basin
level, it is important to understand the problems it faces. Furthermore, knowing the specific
problems will aid in the understanding and developing analysis of the council‟s composition
in which detailed functions of individuals will become clearer. The problems can be grouped
into environmental, social and technical categories and influence the relationships which
council members maintain. It is these problems that shape or break the ties between actors.
The following problems are specific for the Machángara river basin and do not relate to the
larger institutional context such as the new water law or larger climate change problems. First,
the environmental problems will be explained, followed by the social and then technical ones.
The main natural problem within the Machángara basin is the changing precipitation patterns
which result in extreme variance in terms of water availability. Although the river is fed by an
underground spring stemming from ayear-round wet peat land, it is significantly reduced
during the dryer periods. To counter this, reservoirs have been built aiding the ecosystem as
well as the water availability downstream. Nevertheless, water use is reduced during the dry
season to keep a constant water table. Thus, the phenomenon of precipitation goes paired with
desertification of the basin. Besides the decreasing rainfall, increasing human migration as
well as production output cause for vegetation covers to decline. This directly affects water
retention and affects water flow. Henceforth, reforestation is one of the key projects in the
basin conducted by the council. Foremost, information on these geophysical activities is still
lacking but required in order to develop further programs countering these natural problems.
The social problems in the basin, arguably related to the increasing migration of people, focus
on matters of legal ambiguity and issues of competences. Farmers must compete on land use
and rights with private land owners, who have acquired land in the past. Many of the basin‟s
land owners are originally foreigners (mostly from the USA) who have leased or borrowed
their land to locals. This in turn is problematic because documentation is oftentimes lacking,
causing for disputes of land rights. Official registration/documentation is also the cause of
land owners entering protected areas. This causes friction between council members in charge
of technically registering pastures through measurements and those in charge of formally
legalizing. In addition to this comes the role of environmental actors, who do not perceive the
same social objectives as others. It is therefore, that the basin is closed for public access as
this should mitigate illegal activities and avoid further development within the basin. The
problem thereby is that the council has no legal power and therefore cannot prohibit the
access to common lands. Collaboration on such a closure should be unanimous and should not
exclude certain actors. Hence, the issue of legality and the issuing of land use certificates
strains the relationships within the council and the larger basin.
Issues of competences exist in many cases in which governance arrangements are restructured
28
and actors need to adjust to their new tasks. The case of the Machángara regards the overuse
of water resulting in problems for all sectors affiliated and the council itself. Although this
happens on a small scale, the council strives to educate and control on the usage of water.
This is done primarily within the basin as the city holds a set percentage of water to be used.
Use in the basin is harder to control and its solution relies on communication and education of
communities. It is evident that there is a trade-off between improving the quantity and quality
of the environment affecting the flow/availability of water and securing equal social
development in line with national laws and targets. These two realms are very evident in
many river basins and will therefore also be studied regarding the river council. Furthermore,
with the entry of the Agencia de Regulación y Control del Agua (ARCA) as stated by the new
water law, a new technical actor is added to the council. Beyond the general problem of the
young age of the law and it still being implemented, communication between the Secretaría
Nacional del Agua (SENAGUA) and its counterpart ARCA is still very weak (Bustamente,
2016). In terms of organization, the new water law needs time to implement and actors to
adjust their new objectives and tasks. However, the law was introduced in 2014 and has thus
given both institutions and actors time to adjust. Therefore, it is debatable what the needed
timeframe of implementing a new law should be. In this case, institutions and actors alike
have had two years to adapt. Strengthening the argument that sufficient time has passed is the
fact that ARCA, until today, does not have a regional office in Azuay and hence lacks the
physical ability to establish important relationships with the council. This responds in very
slow administration of licenses and other processes and creates confusion within the council
regarding tasks (Bustamente, 2016). On the one hand, (as previously established) the
historical context of the Azuay region creates a favourable environment for working
relationships and should therefore aid in the adaptation to the new law. On the other hand,
deep historical ties strengthen governance arrangements but limit its flexibility. Hence, this
analysis will focus on finding both durability and flexibility of cooperation within the basin.
The Machángara river has long been controlled to such an extent that the natural river remains
a mere stream, whereas most of the water is contained within canals. These split according to
their purposes such as irrigation, drinking water and sanitation and hydropower. The drinking
water canals are the biggest and best maintained. Arguably, this can be traced to the financial
means of the energy sector in comparison to others and to the priority of energy within the
law. About 80% of the irrigation canals are at the end of their life but due to lacking financial
means repairs or replacement of them is not planned for the foreseeable future. Some of them
are more than 40 years old, resulting in efficiency losses through leakages or misuse through
tapping (Uyaguari, 2016). Although irrigation holds a strong second position within the
national priorities, local communities must, to a substantial extent, finance the maintenance of
the canals by themselves. The budget stems from local donations, private financiers and some
governmental funds. The discrepancy between these sectors within the institutional setting
seems to refute the third hypothesis of strong sectoral cooperation. However, the technical
problems are mostly dealt with at a local scale, rather than a basin scale, and thus only affect a
small amount of council members at a time. The local users, including its boards,
communities and municipalities are responsible for technical assistance to keeping the water
flow. This implies that the cooperation within the council reaches beyond the technicalities at
the lower governance levels. This aspect will deserve further examination later on.
Although a broader (national/international) view is not is not directly relevant for the case
study, it can serve as a guide for future developments and possibly explain certain regional
endeavours.
29
One factor significantly influencing the sectors of the WEF Nexus is the fact that Ecuador
relies on agricultural and petroleum exports. These account for 30% and 52% respectively of
national income (CEPAL, 2015). Important is that these sectors rely on the functioning of the
water, energy and food sectors. Agricultural output is heavily dependent on water availability
through irrigation and energy through the pumping of groundwater. More importantly, the
importance of petroleum exports shines a different light on the creation of the new water law
in which energy provision ranks last. This is ironic as Ecuador strives to achieve 80% of total
energy production by 2020 to originate from hydropower thus stressing the ability to draw
water by the other sectors (Energia16 website).The recent oil drillings in the Yasuni rainforest
introduce questions regarding the prioritizing of certain sectors and the intention behind the
water law.
What this larger institutional setting shows is that the WEF Nexus is impacted by further
reaching contexts than its immediate surroundings. This creates a new level of complexity,
which this research will no delve into, but remains important to consider.
The three main themes outlined include the new water law with the established priorities, the
new phenomenon of restructuring administrative arrangements through decentralization, and
finally the river council itself and the historical context of the region in which it operates. It
seems likely that the institutional setting has a significant impact on the governance
arrangement in the basin. In fact, it becomes interesting to find out to what extent the actor
setting is influenced by the given setting.
5.2 The actor setting
Knowing the institutional setting, the description of the actors relevant in this research will be
defined. Due to the relative importance of each actor, a detailed description of each will be
necessary. This will be done by presenting a table summarizing the council members and their
respective characteristics, followed by a more detailed and argued description of each and
outlining their ties within the council. This will serve as a basis on which the continuing
results will connect as the relevant actors will be described. In addition, this section outlines
the actors which are deemed missing from the council but which have evident and claimed
ties to it.
30
Actor Purpose Projects Involve
ment
Sector Scale Area of activity Spokesperson
Empresa Pública Municipal de
Teléfonos, Agua Potable y
Alcantarillado (ETAPA)
Municipal public
telecommunications,
potable water, sewer and
sanitation service
company of the city of
Cuenca
Technical support,
Capacity building,
Uncultivated land
Monitoring quality of
water, ecosystem
maintenance,
“conservation and
production”,
90% of lands do not
have paper of official
properties: Legalizing,
Highly involved in
council, Co-founder,
MICPA- conservation,
ARES - research
5 Water City of
Cuenca
Upper and
middle basin
Catalina Díaz –
Technical council
secretary
Paul Vintimilla –
Director of Technical
Council
Fabián Barrera -
Engineer
Empresa Electro Generadora del
Austro (ELECAUSTRO S.A.)
Electricity Generation Company
of the Austro
Two hydroelectric dams
on the river. They
contribute to national
energy production
Reforestation „green
corridor‟, largest
financier, controls entry
to the Machangara area
(even though illegal),
5 Energy Regional Upper basin Diego Idrovo Murillo
Junta General de Usuarios del
Sistema de Riego Machángara
(JGUSRM)
Machángara Water Users Board
Users of the river basin
irrigation sectors.
The Machángara
irrigation channel
capacity: 770 liters per
second and provides
water for the irrigation of
584 hectares, benefiting
2,325 families,
Servicing the canals,
mediating voice for
local users
4 Food Machángara
basin
Middle and
upper parts of
the basin
Angel Uyaguari
31
Secretaria Nacional del Agua
(SENAGUA)
National Secretariat for Water
Supervisory institution
for water resources in
Ecuador: oversee
integrated water
management throughout
the national territory,
through policies,
regulations, monitoring
and decentralized
management.
The new water law Water National Xavier Murillo
Ministerio de Agricultura,
Ganadería, Acuacultura y Pesca
(MAGAP)
Ministry of agricultural
output. Within the
Machángara basin it
mainly concerns itself
with irrigation and
drainage management:
Consolidating and
executing the National
Irrigation and Drainage
Plan through the
establishment of public
policies that contribute to
agricultural development
in order to guarantee food
sovereignty
Irrigation with the
farmers (not the main
stream which is
authority of provincial
government)
Optimization of water
use. Riego = provincial
gob, mixed water matter
= SENAGUA,
3 Food National Carlos Cisneros
Provincial government of Azuay
(GPA)
Promotes and executes
works at the provincial
level: environment,
irrigation and
management of the river
basins and microbasins
Plan de manejo de
cambio climático,
legalization, limiting the
fencing/closing of
properties, 17 climate
goals, map of
4 Food Regional Oscar Sanchez
32
under its jurisdiction vegetation,
Universidad de Cuenca Research activities Domestic animal
education, hydro cycle
analysis, plant research,
GIS mapping,
5 Regional Andres Alvarado
The Ministry of Environment
(MAE)
Enforcing environmental
legislation with regard to
the conservation of flora,
fauna and wildlife
Forestmaintenance,
conservation
volunteering, „socio
bosque‟, environmental
education, soil analysis,
vulnerability analysis,
„Condor‟,
3-4 Water National Upper basin Silvio Cabrera
Table 2: Members of the Machàngara river council
33
ELECAUSTRO
Compañía Electro Generadora del Austro is the regional electricity company. It was founded
in 1999 and provides energy to the national energy grid. Although traditionally a private
company, its largest shareholders are the national ministry of energy and regional
governmental bodies (ELECAUSTRO website, 2016). This aspect is important when looking
at figure 7 (diagram of council structure) where it becomes clear that energy is the only sector
controlled by a sole entity. This point is strengthened by the fact that ELECAUSTRO is the
largest financial contributor to the council. Of interest, as well is that the relationship with
ETAPA and the university of Cuenca is very good. The previous observations are crucial
when analysing the cooperation within the council at a later point. Its activities, like all actors
within the council, range broadly and encompass activities not related to the official business
of providing energy. These include for example reforestation of the conservation area in the
basin or legalizing private properties. The latter is an effort to legitimize the properties within
the basin, which until recently had not been registered by the governmental authority.
Registering these properties requires a legal authority to do so and the technical knowledge to
distinguish properties from the protected and other fragile areas. Like many projects, this is
done in collaboration with many other council members and beyond.
ETAPA
Empresa Pública Municipal de Teléfonos, Agua Potable y Alcantarillado is the municipal
company dealing with phone networks, drinking water and sewage. Its origins are found with
the telecommunications business where after it expanded its services according to the needs of
the city (ETAPA website). Within the council its main purpose is the representation of the
water sector and its importance to the city of Cuenca. Due to its tasks, ETAPA is closely
engaged with local actors, especially in the basin. As table 2 shows, its activities range from
environmental conservation to reforestation and maintenance of canals. It possesses authority
over the main canal in the Machángara basin for which it bears sole responsibility. Unlike the
many other canals in the basin, the purpose is not based on irrigation but drinking water. Like
ELECAUSTRO, ETAPA is a major financial contributor for the council. Related to the
council structure diagram (figure 7) we can see that it shares the water sector with one other
entity only. It therefore embodies an important player of the water sector and can hence acts
accordingly with its activities.
GPA
The provincial government of the Azuay region is the regional embodiment of the
government. Its main tasks involve the environment, irrigation and management of the river
basins and micro basins under its jurisdiction. Its activities represent the managerial angle of
the activities conducted in the basin. These include the provision of a management plan,
legalizing projects, overseeing activities and connecting action to the climate goals (Sánchez,
2016). Its position regarding one of the WEF Nexus sectors is tricky to conclude. The reason
it is indicated in the food sector stems from its main activities relating to irrigation activities
in the basin. The involvement of the GPA is important in most activities of the council since it
takes the role of intermediary body between the state and the local levels as well as between
formal and informal roles within the basin. This means that the GPA legitimizes certain
activities and hence possesses a valuable tool to defend its importance within the council.
MAE
The ministry of environment is a national entity distributed within Ecuador and its regions. It
has smaller and larger offices in each region, whereby in Cuenca it maintains two offices. One
of these contributes within the Machángara council actively. Its main task within the basin is
34
the conservation of the upper basin area (Cabrera, 2016). It does this by enforcing the
environmental laws in effect. Due to its activities focusing on the upper area of the basin, few
projects involve a complex social context and therefore limit the involvement with other
council actors. Nevertheless, the MAE maintains a legal position, which council members
need to consult when activities overlap. For example, the legalization of properties sometimes
reaches into the protected area (moorland) and hence the competence of MAE. The quality of
water is also maintained from the upper basin, setting the importance of environmental
conservation efforts. Reforestation and canal infrastructure as well as the flow of water are
issues which need to be addressed jointly with the MAE. It should also be mentioned that this
actor concludes greater ties outside the council including the World Bank. With such
relationships, it receives funding for its projects and concludes an important actor within the
council in terms of creating a network. However, limited contact is needed with the Council
from the side of MAE, due to its focus on environmental aspects rather than social.
UNIVERSITY OF CUENCA
As one of the four main universities in Cuenca, it stands out due to its involvement within the
council. Its position therein was established when it served as a mediating body between
disputing parties. It is also the only non-aligned actor, meaning it has no direct interest within
the council nor is it politically affiliated. Such an actor is important in keeping balance as its
mediating history has shown. Today, it is heavily involved with technical assistance for
activities and decision making. Its position is unrivaled partly explainable through the fact
that it does not belong to a direct sector within the Nexus. This makes a difference regarding
its purpose and connectedness to the basin. Noticeable is that the extent of its relationships
tends to be limited and more concentrated. This implies that it maintains near to perfect ties
with the core group including ELECAUSTROand ETAPA, but fails to hold ties to the
JGSURM for example. This could serve as a cause of its missing affiliation with a specific
sector. Nevertheless, such discrepancies could also question its neutrality.
MAGAP
The ministry of agriculture was previously represented by INAR (National Irrigation
Institute).This institute oversaw the development of irrigation schemes in the country. It did
so by supporting organizations and entities which are implementing projects on irrigation
improvement. Founded in 2007 it concluded a newer membership within the council but left
in 2014 with the entry of the new water law. MAGAP strives to tackle the same issues, with
the difference that it has multiple objectives beyond irrigation. Its entry also serves as the
official embodiment of the food sector within the council. Like SENAGUA, it holds local
offices and direct contact with local entities. It currently maintains closer ties with the GPA,
JGUSRM and actors involved with irrigation. Therefore, it seems that the entry of an official
governmental body in the agricultural sector was still lacking. Due to its governmental status,
it challenges the dominant role of SENAGUA in the council and on topics regarding water.
As such, its entry could be a step towards a WEF Nexus with balances being created from the
actor setting rather than the larger institutional one. MAGAP is an important actor within
Ecuador as it maintains ties with international institutions such as the World Bank, which
serve as financial beneficiaries for projects. In contrast to most members and affiliates, such
international ties serve as a means of projecting the Azuay region abroad and exchange
knowledge. Historically, the Ecuadorian government has been skeptical of international
cooperation and even expelled certain foreign actors such as the GIZ. This creates dominant
actors within the country and could create deadlocks in governance settings. Hence, it is
important that actors maintain ties outside the country in order to balance power relations and
improve best practices.
35
JGUSRM
Junta General de Usuarios del Sistema de Riego Machángara (Machángara Water Users
Board) is the joint body of mainly farmers and other private residents in the basin. In 1998 the
state granted the basin‟s users to govern the water of the Machángara. However, as a board it
does not have a budget alike the other actors and relies on funding from external sources.
Although receiving consent for its creation, it does not receive governmental funding.
Arguably, this is a reason it maintains good relationships with ETAPA and the GPA. The
JGUSRM is an important actor in connecting the local communities in the basin to the
developments of the council and vice versa. Acting as a mediating body, it is vital for the
cohesion of the council. Its ties to ETAPA are represented not only through the large
financing but also the shared office at the JGUSRM. This collaboration is unique within the
council and yet seems to be neglected under the visible relationships of the core group.
SENAGUA
The national secretariat for water is the institution responsible for overseeing water resources
in Ecuador. It has governmental powers and serves as the executive power for implementing
the law. It does this through policies, regulations, monitoring and decentralized management.
Although steered directly from the government, its decentralized arrangement allows for
regionally adapted policy input. The Azuay office of SENAGUA serves as a mediating body
between regional/local interests and those of the government. It is due to this function that
national laws such as the water law of 2014 are tailored to needs of regions and vice versa.
Being the voice or embodiment of the government in topics related to water resources it
enjoys greater responsibilities and thus influence in the council. It does not finance the council
directly, not does it implement projects within the basin. Nevertheless, its importance stems
from the policy oriented responsibilities such as legalizing or approving projects.
ARCA
This actor has officially entered the council with entry of the new water law in 2014, yet has
not been able to actively take part in its meetings. This is mainly due to its lacking regional
office as well as the slowly developing clarity on tasks. Its main task is to technically aid
SENAGUA and the council in making decision regarding regional as well as local water
policy. As a governmental agency, it does not possess technical capacities of investigation but
collects information and knowledge from local actors and then processes it. Ironically,
effective communication and a functioning relationship with the council is therefore essential.
This also creates problems at the local scale when citizens or companies need to apply for
certificates of water use, in the absence of a physical office (Bustamente, 2016). With the
new-found authority of the state in matters of natural resource management, is it important
that ARCA establishes itself rapidly within the council. If successful, the addition should
facilitate knowledge exchange from local actors to higher levels of governance. As such, this
entity facilitates the strived-for decentralization in which the new water law has been
introduced.
Arguably due to the size of the basin, the Machángara river council composes a rather small
contingency of actors. Officially registered are eight members. Although this size might be
effective for several reasons, external ties will sometimes be inevitable. One reason for this is
the ever-changing composition of governance arrangements, creating new actors and
eliminating others. INAR is one of those actors losing its role within the council to MAGAP
due to the restructured. Another reason is the geographic location of the Machángara river and
its shared source for many of the larger rivers in Ecuador but also the Amazon. The question
remains: which actors do indirectly engage with the council but are not officially part of it?
36
To answer this question, interviewees were asked to outline actors which they felt were
missing in the analysis of this research. Respondents were free to choose actors they felt
contributed directly/indirectly to the processes within the basin.
IP
The industrial park is an important actor within the basin as it uses the water drawn from the
river and contributes to its pollution. However, is it not an official member of the council and
neither does it actively contribute to the activities thereof. This is a unique situation within the
basin as it is a direct user and polluter, yet fails to hold any meaningful ties with the council.
One reason for its lacking involvement could be its highly diverse and ranging composition.
There are about 120 companies from all sorts of sectors contained in the industrial park. The
chamber of commerce of the Azuay region is a potential spokesperson for the park, however,
likewise communication with the council is not evident. ETAPA seems to maintain a dire
relationship with the IP in cases of severe pollution which would affect the drinking water
supply. However, this relationship is not based on long-term visions to improve the pollution
output.
GAD
The municipality of Cuenca is an important partner for many council members but especially
for ETAPA. Due to the downstream location of the city of Cuenca it enjoys a direct flow of
water from the Machángara river. It therefore also controls a significant role in the flow
further downstream. This could carry importance for the future endeavors of the Santiago
basin plans for which the GAD may develop a significant role. However, like many other
administrative or governmental bodies, the GAD does not hold a position within the river
council.
FONAPA/Fondo del Agua
This entity was created in 2008 through eight members. Three of those, namely
ELECAUSTRO, ETAPA and University of Cuenca, are present within the Machángara river
council. These three actors constitute the core group within the river council, thereby
questioning the reasons why this entity is not part of the council. It also maintains ties with
MAE in the endeavour of maintaining the ecological systems through e.g. Reforestation.
Fondo del Agua is an initiative aimed at improving the ecological and hydrological systems of
the Paute river. This river covers a larger area than that of the Machángara but stems from the
same source, namely the Cajas national park. This aspect relates well to the previous
statement, in that the city of Cuenca and the Machángara basin constitute an important
starting point for most hydrological systems downstream. This also raises the importance of
its actors and with that the role of FONAPA. This body shares characteristics with the
Machángara river basin in terms of constituents, tasks and area of activity. Yet, it differs in
the sense that it works internationally and holds various projects in South America. This
stimulates knowledge exchange and funding for projects. Arguably, the relationship with
certain Machángara river council members brings some of that knowledge and funding to the
basin. However, evidence of this is lacking.
SETECI
The Secretaria tecnica de cooperacion internacional strives to improve political and
organizational systems from regional to international levels. Its main goal is to improve
cooperation between entities within governance arrangements. Its absence was constituted by
the GPA representative who claims to have a relatively stable relationship with this actor. In
part, this is due to the capacity building goals which the Azuay region reaches out to in order
37
to improve their administrative and political processes. It might well be a good sign that such
an entity is not necessary to be represented within the council, nevertheless it shows the lack
of capacity building actors therein. Change is coming with the new water law and its
restructuring and thus creates questions as to the flexibility of the council.
Condesan
This NGO maintained relationships with the council (specifically ETAPA) in the past. This
was based on a mutual friendship and encompassed informational exchange as a key activity.
Recently the connection was lost since the contact person at Condesan left the job and hence
broke off communications with ETAPA. Although the cooperation was at a minimum, it did
provide for the promotion of the council abroad. In fact, to such an extent that the website
outlining the Machàngara case study initiated this research. Especially relating to the larger
work and image of the council, it is important to promote such activities through NGO‟s
willing to research and communicate about it. This stimulates knowledge exchange and
potentially pushes for financial incentives.
38
6. Answering the research question
The following section will present the explanatory results which will strive to answer the
respective sub-questions and will be structured accordingly. However, clarity will develop
once the theoretical framework is being connected to the findings in the evaluation chapter
hereafter.
6.1 Horizontal and vertical collaboration
To analyse collaboration in governance arrangements, it is important to regard horizontal and
vertical directions of social interaction. These were outlined in the conceptual framework and
are hereby applied to the case study. The sub-questions 1 and 2: “How do actors collaborate
horizontally across sectors in the Water-Energy-Food Nexus for the Machángara
catchment?“ and “How do actors collaborate vertically across levels in the Water-Energy-
Food Nexus for the Machángara catchment?” will be answered jointly due to their shared use
of findings and their complementary reasoning.
“We work horizontally” claims Catalina Diaz, the technical secretary of the council during the
interview, talking about the council and its ways of working (2016). The technical council
works conjointly and with the people. She states that “we are one of them”, on the issue of
working with locals in implementing projects in the basin (Diaz, 2016).However, the two-
leveled structure of the council includes a director‟s level, which creates plans to be
implemented by the technical council. Hence, the technical council needs to work vertically to
properly implement the tasks from above. Nevertheless, the directors work vertically due to
the necessity of communicating with governments and other relevant levels of governance.
Thus, the overall council works in both vertical and horizontal directions, however, actual
implementation of projects happens through horizontal collaboration by the technical
council.To find out whether this simplified methodology is actually true, the interviews as
well as the management plan of the river council will be used. The management plan gives a
detailed description of the internal functioning of the council through previous analysis
including graphs. The findings give answer to both research questions and therefore the
structure will follow that of the findings rather than the horizontal/vertical division.
Firstly, the plan gives a description of projects, actor and processes, and outlines detailed
social interactions and the effects thereof. For example, a list of prioritized problems is given
with the severity and the specific actors able and responsible of solving that problem. The
council also delineates between competences and authority of its actors in dealing with
objectives. However, most acknowledged problems relate to technical rather than social
solutions. One reason could be the technical capacity of the council; however, the social
aspect is evident in the activities of the actors as presented in the actor description.
Misuse of
water
resources
3 •Lack of resources
for maintenance of
irrigation and
drinking water
systems
•Lack of awareness
and lack of concern
• Train users
• Train system operators
• Technical improvement
of irrigation systems
• Improve Operation and
Maintenance of Water
Systems
•Community board
•Ministry of
Environment
•Community
•Municipality
•GPA
•ETAPA EP
Table 3: Problem description and solution. Source: Plan de Manejo
39
The translated extract from the management plan (table 3) shows the priority, cause, solution
and responsible actors for the problem of water misuse. What sticks out is that the priority of
this problem is rather low considering the consequences for the council. Noticeable is that the
extent to which social causes or solutions are presented is limited. Especially in the
Machángara basin, misuse is mainly attributed to overuse and leakages (Uyaguari, 2016).
Hence, it would be rational to adopt a social solution to this problem especially regarding the
competences of the actors listed. Another interesting feature of this example is that it fails to
perceive SENAGUA as one of the actors with solving capacities. Nevertheless, under the new
law (initiated before the management plan) SENAGUA is to be informed always and should
play a vital role in ensuring good cooperation and legitimacy of all projects. A final remark is
that the solutions tend to follow a top-down approach in which locals are educated on
management and maintenance tasks. This would suggest more vertical methods, however the
actors implementing these solutions tend to be mostly public institutions. Automatically these
have a greater democratic accountability and hence constitute more horizontal processes.
The second aspect of the management plan is the axis diagram (figure 6), which shows all the
actors in the Machángara basin including the council. It allocates the actors on a horizontal
and vertical axis. The horizontal axis represents the technicality of the topic ranging from
social to environmental. The vertical axis shows the level of governance of each actors,
ranging from international to local, whereby the international actors are represented by for
example NGOs. The light blue group clearly represents the council and its immediate
connections. Public entities are colored in brown, communities in green, civil society in
purple and others in pink. Noticeable is that some actors, such as the GAD, are colored as part
of the council even though they do not hold a direct seat therein. A possible explanation could
be the simplification of the coding, taking actors on board which have strong ties to the
council. It is important to consider that the diagram was made in collaboration with the
council, thereby creating a certain bias. The diagram gives a good impression of how complex
both sub-questions are and the inter-linkages they require between vertical and horizontal
processes.
The vertical axis shows the relative level of governance at which the actor is engaging and is
holding connections with, ranging from local to international. Overall, the council aligns more
towards the regional or national levels, shown by most actors placed beneath the center. This
should not be a surprise as the council does not engage with higher levelled actors. Striking is
the position of MAGAP, which seems to be the outlier with a high relation to local levels.
This comes in contradiction to the expectation of the JGUSRM, which is the embodiment of
local landowners and farmers. This could be due to the ties which it holds with for example
the World Bank and thus promotes to a higher ranking on this axis. This argument would
place MAGAP at the local levels due to the regional office in Cuenca only dealing with
agriculture which is limited to the middle and lower parts of the basin. The same can be said
for SENAGUA, which holds the voice of the government. However, their representation is
diffused over the regions in which they conduct their tasks in relative autonomy. The rest of
the council seems to align their level of governance with the tasks conducted. This alignment
benefits collaboration due to the evident hierarchy between actors. This implies that the
council can rely on tasking actors according to their capacities. For example, for reasons of
communication with national entities, the GAD will be a logical institution to approach. They
can voice regional problems and views to national levels.
40
The horizontal axis shows the range of actors according to their sectoral focus, with the left
side showing environmental activity and affiliation. Therefore, it is no surprise to find the
ministry of environment on the far left. In fact, little surprises are visible on this axis, although
the overall expectation was to see all actors of the council leaning towards the environmental
side. Again, the creators of the diagram might have taken the entire range of activities of each
actor into account, whereby ETAPA and ELECAUSTRO will inevitably move more towards
the centre. Hence, the position of the council highlights that most members remain with
subject neutrality due to the overall objective of the institution. This aspect is also important
to the research, as it only focused on the collaboration within the council, which is primarily
concerned with environmental issues and therefore only portrays that aspect of each
institution. This implies that a certain bias exists regarding this axis within this research as it
fails to encompass all activities of each actor. Therefore, it is good to obtain a different and
more balanced view on the relevant actors through this diagram, who engage on a larger range
of topics other than the Machángara river and thus focus of this research. However, looking at
the dependency of certain actors on a healthy ecosystem, it is rather surprising to see that
universities are more environmentally positioned than actors such as ETAPA,
ELECAUSTRO or SENAGUA. Especially the latter should maintain close ties to its objective
by positioning itself for the healthy environment. ETAPA requires good drinking water which
is drawn from a healthy river. It is in its own interest to counter for example soil degradation.
Another important feature of this diagram is that the horizontal axis can be related to the
aspect of sector-crossing collaboration. A wide gap between positions on this axis would
indicate distant objectives and thereby strain efforts of collaboration. Thus, it is important to
see the council actors being positioned closer to each other as this will facilitate collaboration
due to shared or overlapping interests and support the claim made by Diaz regarding
Figure 6: Sociogram of the relevant actors in the Manchàngara river basin. Source: Plan de Manejo
41
horizontal workings. This also explains the difficult position of MAE within the council, as its
objectives solely focus on environmental improvements, which clash with those of more
economically driven actors. Other actors have a wider range of interest which inevitably
causes a diffusion of importance to sectors such as the environment even if the actor is
dependent on for example a healthy river. One important finding is that the environment plays
an important common denominator, which unites the council even if interests differ. This can
be used as an argument for the collaboration between ELECAUSTRO and MAE. These two
immediately don‟t share major similarities beyond the fact that their territories overlap, but
due to a common interest in maintaining water flow, they have to cooperate. Within each
sector, actors might compete more than with external sectors, which would stimulate
hierarchy due to inevitable dominance established. This in turn would relate to a greater use
of vertical collaboration. This is an important finding as it provides an argument for why
horizontal and vertical collaboration within the Nexus is possible and how it functions. The
example of ELECAUSTRO and MAE shows this as the former holds most regional power
and greater public support. However, MAE holds the voice of the government and is in terms
of its level of governance (vertical axis figure 6) more powerful. The aspect of power
becomes an interesting feature of collaboration as actors strive to obtain a more beneficial
position to promote and facilitate their interests (Purdy, 2012).
42
ELECAUSTRO U. Cuenca
MAGAP
MAE ETAPA JGSURM
GPA
SENAGUA
Level within Governance arrangement
National Local Regional
The composition of the Machángara river council
Legend:
= Food Sector
= Water Sector
= Energy Sector
= Undefined Sector
Figure 7: Composition of the river council
43
The diagram above (figure 7) was created based on the interviews as well as the established
information from the management plan. It shows the actors of the council placed on a scale of
governance levels as well as colored in their respective sector. The placement on the scale
was done by looking at the level at which each actor is most active and at which most
influence is exerted. The difference with the vertical axis of the previous figure is that figure 6
includes the number of connections each actor maintains at various levels. Thus, this diagram
(figure 7) takes an external view on the visible level at which the actors engage. Furthermore,
it is meant to show the relationship between levels of governance and the WEF sectors and
thus the collaboration within the river council. Figure 6 displayed the levels of governance but
failed to take the respective sectors into account. Hence, combining the sectoral aspect of the
Nexus and the levels evident in the council, a new angle on the functioning of governance
within the Nexus might arise.
Noticeable in figure 7 is that there are several levels of governance present and each contains
actors of most sectors. Clearly, there is only one actor representing the energy sector, and only
one local entity dealing with food. Another remark should emphasize the stated priorities
within the new water law, which relate to the Water and Food sector receiving remarkably
more importance than energy. This could explain the limited number of actors within the
energy sector but does not explain how the water sector is only governed by two actors, of
which one is a state organ. More importantly, the water of the Machángara basin is not
governed by an actor related to the water sector at the local level. Here it becomes clearer that
water is deemed a far greater importance to larger scales/higher levels than just for the
communities. This also relates to the importance water consumption obtains within the new
water law, making this a state/national issue rather than a local one. Due to these facts, actors
in the water sector enjoy a hierarchical advantage as comparative importance has increased.
This can have crucial impact in times of water shortage, in which this sector will receive
larger shares due to hierarchical power. Through these assumptions the question can be asked
whether the level of governance or the sector of the actor promotes good collaboration.
Favoring the assumption that sectors promote good collaboration is the relationship between
ELECAUSTRO and SENAGUA, which do not share the same governance level, yet maintain
good ties. An explanation could be that the interdependencies of the sectors cause the
necessity to collaborate. ELECAUSTRO controls the flow of water and the access to the basin
but SENAGUA holds the legal priority given to water as well as the administrative power
over ELECAUSTRO. The same argument can be made for any other sector as they each
depend on the functioning of the other sector. Furthermore, the small scale of the basin also
promotes the necessity of collaboration.
The aspect of a ´veto´ within the council is not to be underestimated. As stated,
interdependency creates collaboration but also a certain degree of bargaining power. This
implies that if an actor within the chain of dependency decides to end all relationships, that
this chain would become rather unstable. Although it would not be logical and no examples
exist within the basin, such a power can always be implied. This is mostly evident in politics
were certain actors can use his position to obtain a better bargaining position.
Previously, the importance of the shared dependency of a healthy environment was
introduced. This aspect carries further significance as we see that actors like the university or
ELECAUSTRO are involved with activities improving the ecosystem. This implies that a
shared dependency on the environment also promotes collaboration. In essence the WEF
Nexus could be extended to include the Environment within it.
On the other hand, a shared level of governance also provides for examples of good
collaboration. For example, the core, and thus well collaborating, group consisting of
44
ELECAUSTRO, ETAPA and Universidad Cuenca are present in the similar governance level.
Also, MAE and SENAGUA have a very good relationship, arguably attributable to their
shared level of governance. The shared level of governance could therefore provide breeding
ground for good relationships. Supporting this claim is the fact that actors of a shared level
tend to engage on the same geographic area and hence are oftentimes confronted with each
other. For example, both the GPA and ETAPA mainly conduct activities within the lower and
middle parts of the basin. Another argument could be that a shared level decreases the feeling
of hierarchy, putting more focus on collaboration rather than on the need to clarify
competences.
A possible answer regarding the question on which aspect, level or sector, contribute most to
effective collaboration will be formulated later in this research after having viewed more
angles. However, this short analysis provides the argumentation that collaboration in the
Machángara river basin stems from a complex array of reasons. Besides the levels and
sectors, other influences exist stimulating vertical and horizontal collaboration.
The core group containing ELECAUSTRO, ETAPA and Uni. Cuenca are also the main
donors of projects within the basin. Their spread across the regional level indicates a lack of
funding from national and local levels. Nevertheless, the state actors are obtaining a greater
say in the policy process as the new water law states. The legal power of the higher
governance levels thus surpasses the social power that the regional level possesses. The
tradeoff between legal and social power will become more evident as the investigation
unfolds. Like previously outlined, the council possesses no legal power but authorizes most
activities in the basin. ELECAUSTRO placed physical border which control the access to the
basin and only with permission can external actors enter. This activity is meant to combat
illegal logging and pollution of the basin. However, ELECAUSTRO has neither the legal
permission nor the expertise for this activity. MAE would be a suitable actor to impose such a
restriction as they control the ecosystem and possess national authority. However, the council
and the wider basin accept this situation without questions. This is a case of social power
surpassing legal power, as citizens acknowledge the importance of this restricted access and
stakeholders realize the interdependency of the basin actors. Although this situation is known,
the government does not strive to abolish this situation. Due to the strong local and regional
support, ELECAUSTRO possesses a great social legitimacy. National entities such as MAE
and MAGAP are too distant and do not directly engage with the population through for
example projects. This example aligns with the plans to decentralize authority in Ecuador but
fails to contribute to a solid legal framework in which rules stabilize regional governance
arrangements. This example shows that strong regional control can mitigate weaker national
authority and thus raises questions regarding the flexibility of this arraignment and the
implementation of the new water law.
When analyzing the roles of actors within the influences of a changing institutional setting,
the concept of power becomes visible. The institutional setting is going to change but the
impact on the actor setting is not yet known. The new water law fortifies the position of state
actors in dictating processes regarding the hydrological cycle, with the newly created ARCA
and the foreseen diminishing role of local and regional authority. Furthermore, the divide
between public and private entities will become more dominant as the latter is the main
financial contributor to the council. Acknowledging that certain actors have greater social
rather than legal power, it is important to find a reasonable explanation. The explanation used
in this research will base its reasoning on the visible dominance of the core group of actors
within the council. The argument is that a higher involvement in the council (and thus in the
river basin) allocates more social power to an actor than those less involved. One example is
45
0 1 2 3 4 5
Elecaustro
Etapa
JGSURM
GPA
MAGAP
MAE
Uni Cuenca
Level of involvment (5 highest)
Level of involvement within Council
that MAE possesses the legal power to control the correct implementation of legislative
frameworks. However, many activities in the basin are not reported to this institution or even
involve it. One example is the certification of properties in the basin, which are currently not
registered. This initiative is mainly carried out by ETAPA, ELECAUSTRO and the GPA.
The graph (Figure 8)
shows the level of
involvement each actor
perceives to have within
the council. Involvement
is an important aspect of
analysing collaboration as
it stimulates the creation
of importance or the
perception thereof. This
creates the link towards a
perceived stronger
position within the
council. This is evident
from the food sector,
which is represented by
limited perceived involvement. This could be
connected to a lower level of governance as with the case of MAGAP. Furthermore, all food
sector actors are public. This promotes the image that involvement can only be obtained if the
actor is from the private sector or acts on a higher level of governance. Clearly strong
involvement is felt by the private sector as well as actors on the national levels. Nevertheless,
it is debatable, where to place the private actors, whether with their respective governance
level or their public/private background. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the WEF
Nexus sectors play a role within the involvement of perceived importance. Although
SENAGUA is not represented in the data, other actors have stated its involvement to be rather
high and relationships are very good. Hence, another actor within the water sector would
reach the higher marks of involvement. With this argument, there is a difference of
involvement to be seen regarding WEF sectors. It is unclear whether this beneficial role of the
water sector can be traced back to the new water law, or whether the institutional setting is
still in the process of changing this role.
Another interesting feature is that the public sector seems to be represented in all levels of
governance. This could indicate good administrative division as governmental bodies are
present in all vital levels to obtain the best knowledge exchange and steer policy. This
challenges the idea that the basin is divided according to natural rather than administrative
boundaries. Arguably, a hierarchy exists between the natural boundaries, the governance
levels and the WEF Nexus sectors. The dominant reality would dictate the collaboration
within in the basin by creating favorable or unfavorable conditions. Administrative
boundaries can produce efficient governance, however tend to be less flexible regarding
environmental change due to the potential mismatch with environmental boundaries. This
aspect will be viewed more closely in the next section answering sub-question 3.
Figure 8: Graph showing perceived involvement
46
Concluding on the first two sub-questions regarding horizontal and vertical collaboration
within the WEF Nexus in the Machángara river basin, several findings have been presented. It
seems evident that vertical and horizontal processes within the case study mutually support
each other and thereby give meaning to the complexity of the governance arrangement in the
basin. The council incorporates these levels and processes mainly through its structure. This
implies that vertical and horizontal processes are evident through the collaboration between
directors and the technical council as well as through the activities of the technical council
itself. Such complexity is needed if the council is to fulfill its main duty as mediating body
within the basin, thereby engaging with stakeholder from different sectors and levels.
Figure 6 shows that the council only encompasses a small array of stakeholders compared to
those evident in the whole basin. This relatively small composition raised questions regarding
the standing as well as the representation it is supposed to entail. Evidently important actors
such as the industrial park are not engaging with the council and thereby challenge the
mediating role the council should play. Furthermore, such a composition challenges many of
the councils decisions regarding legitimacy with examples such as the control of access to the
basin. This challenges not only the role of other actors in the basin but foremost the
importance of national legal and social statutes. Implementing the new water law with the
Santiago river council will be challenging if river councils take matters into their own hands.
However, this introduces the aspect of social power, which the council evidently possesses.
This implies that citizens and other actors in the basin accept the activities of the council,
whether they hold legal legitimacy or not. This on the other hand can also serve as an
explanation as to the composition of the council.
Another finding is that both the governance levels and the sectors provide for good
collaboration, without major differences. Furthermore, the interconnectedness of sectors
within the Nexus stimulates the collaboration between them. The joint dependency on a
healthy environment also stimulates collaboration from sectors which do not directly require
such an objective but are drawn into the network of collaboration. This strengthens the
argument that the interdependency of sectors causes collaboration from beyond the immediate
Nexus. This strengthens the internal actor setting but can be disrupted if the institutional
setting changes. The new water law gives priority to the water sector and reduces the
importance of hydropower production. This directly challenges the position of
ELECAUSTRO and creates imbalances within the actor setting in the basin. However, the
slow implementation of the new law benefits the actor setting. Arguably, this is also the
reason that the research did find irregularities within the actor network through for example a
fragile role for ELECAUSTRO. This means that the impact of the institutional setting on the
Machángara basin is remains to be seen.
The management plan shows that oftentimes, the technical solutions are preferred over the
social ones. This can in part be drawn from the complexity such social solutions contain and
the limited governing potential of the river council. Lacking legal and official authority and
requiring self-funding, there is a limited capacity of the council to address governance issues.
Arguably, this is also the reason it relies on historical networks and a familiar structure, which
have proven to stimulate efficient collaboration in the past. The question remains whether this
same structure is flexible enough to deal with change.
47
6.2 Scales of governance
The question“How do the different scales affect the ability of actors to govern natural
resources coherently?”should answer the second part of the multi-level/scale theory.
Furthermore, it serves as another angle other than the horizontal and vertical, to view the
WEF Nexus governance arrangement. Furthermore, when analyzing governance
arrangements, scales become important features that influence the interaction between
institutional and actor settings.
As described in the theoretical
framework, scales can exist in
several manners such as
administrative scales. Scales can
also exist within the WEF Nexus,
as each sector is traced to a certain
region of production. Since the
food produced in the basin is
mainly consumed therein, its scale
is limited to such. The energy
sector produces electricity used for
the national power grid. As such,
there is a hierarchy of importance
between the sectors. The question
is whether these scales actually
influence the collaboration and
functioning of the governance
arrangement. The answer will regard the conclusions of the previous section and elaborate on
them. The scales at which the WEF sectors are evident don‟t influence each other. The food
production does not dictate the scale at which water is to be produced/used. However, the
actors within each sector constitute the interaction between the scales and sectors. The
previous section on the aspect of influence outlined the different scales in which certain actors
hold power. Looking at figure 7 we saw scales working alongside their multiple levels in
governance by viewing their respective sectors within the WEF Nexus. With this diagram, it
becomes visible which actors operate within which sectors and the relevant scale of activity.
Figure 6 also showed the scales at which actors engage, ranging from local to international.
These scales gain importance when the spheres of influence cross them. Hence, there is a
disparity between the governance levels of figure 6 and 7, whereby the former solely takes
into account the level of influence. This changes the importance actors maintain on their given
level. The example of JGSURM shows that, although its network reaches beyond the regional
spheres (figure 6), its actual importance and thus area of activity is limited to the local scale
(figure 7).Thus, one scale is that of the influence each actor maintains within the case study
and beyond.
Another scale that should be taken into account is the geographic and correlated
administrative scale of the case study. Looking at figure 9, a correlation between the area of
the basin and the Azuay and even the smaller Cantòn of Cuenca can be seen. This implies that
the rules and procedures to take into account regarding the activities in the basin are those of
the Azuay region. This shows that beyond the simplified scales in figure 7, several scales exist
even within the regional scale. These influence the complexity of authority, especially
regarding the plans of decentralization and the new water law. Another important aspect to
consider is that the Machángara river stems from the region of Cañar making the basin a
Figure 9: Map showing the river basin within the Azuay region
48
trans-regional one in terms of administration. However, simplifying this administrative
burden is the fact that the origin is within the national park, which holds its own authority in
the form of MAE. In effect, this should not carry additional administrative borders since
national parks don‟t function as a fully fledged region or other administrative scale. Besides
the multitude of scales within the region, the case of the Machàngara basin is drastically
simplified die to the lacking multi-regional/trans-regional administrative scales. Examples
exist where regions are in conflict due to the crossing administrative scales of a river. This
allows the development of a strong governance structure, unchallenged by influences in the
region. The same can be said for the Machàngara river council nexus collaboration. To some
extent, a „scale match‟ exists between the administrative boundaries in the region and the river
basin.
The problems for the region and its governance arrangement arise with the new water law and
the proposed rescaling of the water governance arrangement. Especially the centralizing of the
river councils to fall under a larger Santiago council will challenge this scale match and cause
for high interaction between multiple scales. These scales will stem from municipalities,
communities and regions and provide a significant challenge to the harmony existing in the
Machàngara basin. Furthermore, new authorities will enter the picture and take over the role
of currently dominant actors such as ELECAUSTRO. Consequences of such a change will
inevitably lead to conflict or in the best case demands adaptation from all actors. This will be
a testing time considering the historical, actor relations and scale matches existing in the basin
since 10 years. It will test the flexibility of the governance arrangement and require a
reorganization of the governance arrangement. On the other hand the argument can be made
that such a rescaling to a larger scale will not affect the small basin in the Azuay region. In the
end, the Machàngara is not the only river in the Azuay region. On the other hand, new scales
also cause a shift in roles and power, which inevitable also challenge the role of actors in the
basin.
The link between institutional changes and actor settings becomes clear through the addition
of the multi-scale reality. Different scales are evident such as administrative, geographical and
influential scales. Although complex, a governing structure and logic exists. The influence
ELECAUSTRO is able to maintain is related to the scale at which it functions. On the one
side it represents the largest scaled sector. However, its dominant role is bound to change with
the restructuring planned for with the new water law. Arguably, it is the complexity of scales
that allows flexibility to deal with such challenges. In addition, through complexity arises the
need for structure, which led to the intact formation of roles and spheres of influences in the
region. Even though the council was formed on the basis of a conflict of natural resources, no
conflicts happened since its creation. This argument stimulates the perception that throughout
the years, these scales have adjusted themselves to each other in order to create efficiency.
Helping this situation is the fact that the river only merges with one other region through a
national park, which constitutes no official regional authority. It does raise the question with
regard to the role of MAE as an actor outside the administrative scale of the basin and the
wider Azuay region. The aspect of finding out to what extent the governance arrangement is
flexible to deal with the institutional change will be answered in the next section.
49
AUTORIDADES LOCALES:
JUNTAS PARROQUIALES
PLAN DE MANEJO DE
LA SUBCUENCA DEL
MACHÁNGARA
PLANIFICACIÓN, REGULACIÓN
-CONTROL Y GESTIÓN
PLANES – PROGRAMAS-
PROYECTOS
SOCIEDAD CIVIL
USUARIOS
ACTORES CLAVES
· GAD MUNICIPAL DE
CUENCA
· ETAPA EP
· ELECAUSTRO
· UNIVERSIDADES
JUNTAS DE
REGANTES
JUNTAS DE AGUA
POTABLE
ASOCIACIONES
AGROPECUARIAS
COOPERATIVAS
ENTIDADES
PÚBLICAS:
MAGAP,
MNISTERIO DEL
AMBIENTE,
SENAGUA, GAD
PROVINCIAL,
RIESGOS
6.3 Network analysis
The fourth and final sub-question of this research “To what extent are stakeholder formations
able to adapt the Water-Energy-Food Nexus to current and/or future climate change
impacts?” will use the most complex analytical tool. The question relates to the relative
flexibility or governance arrangements within the Nexus as this will be important in the
stability of the governance arrangement in times of change. As previously described, this
change takes the form of both institutional and natural settings. Hence, this section will
analyse dynamics of social interaction and thereby give meaning to the previous sections. To
do this, visualization tools can aid in simplifying information. Social Network Analysis
(SNA) is a method of visualizing the strength and reach of social relationships, but its use
reaches further into governance analysis.
The management plan (figure 10) shows a
simple social network diagram indicating the
official relationship structure. Noticeable is
that the plan itself is centrally positioned as to
indicate that it dictates and guides the social
processes. Another feature is the quantity of
actors perceived to be influential within the
council‟s processes. Hereby, actors are shown
which haven‟t been mentioned during the
investigation. This could have multiple
reasons which range from simple human error
of forgetting to more complex reasons such as
strategic avoidance to mention. The diagram
seems to suggest that relationships within the council
cannot be free flowing and cannot reach beyond the indicated structure. Accordingly, the
governmental actors are in direct contact with the local communities but fail to hold ties with
the council‟s core actors. These on the other hand do not seem to connect to the management
plan and seem to serve as the mediating role between local communities and the regional
offices. Historically, this is true as the council was established through a dispute over water
allocation. This diagram is a good indication of how social network analysis works and
provides the overall framework for the followed in depth analysis of the river council only.
A SNA diagram helps understand the complex relationship ties within the council and
beyond. This investigation has created its own diagram on the basis of quantitative data from
the interviewees. The color coded members and the outlying non-members are connected
through lines indicating the strength of the relationship. This is done through the thickness of
each line, whereby thicker lines represent a stronger relationship. Due to most relationship
lines going both ways, their thickness is relative to the corresponding link. Hence, if actor A
perceives perfect ties with actor B, who only perceives meagre ties, the line will take the
average size. In addition, the line turns its color towards the actor with the stronger ties.
JGUSRM quantitatively maintains equal relationship strength with all actors but its line with
MAGAP is thicker than the one with University Cuenca. This indicates an ever stronger
returning tie from the side of MAGAP. In this case, the color changes in favour of MAGAP,
indicating the main origin of this strength.
Figure 10: Simple SNA diagram of the council Source: Plan de Manejo, 2014
50
Figure 12: SNA diagram for the river council
Before analysing the detailed networks of each actor, some general remarks on the figure 12.
Noticeable through the thicker lines is the previously outlined core group, composed of
ELECAUSTRO, ETAPA and University of Cuenca. In addition to this core group, it seems
that another trio exists with strong ties, namely that of University of Cuenca, ELECAUSTRO
and SENAGUA. This hasn‟t previously been evident but supports the conclusion of the
public/private debate. The outcome states that strongly tied actors within the council either
come from the private sector or act on a higher level of governance. The following section
will give a more detailed analysis of key actor relationships and evaluate the most interesting
networks. Each actor is visible through the highlighted connections leaving its main hub.
52
Possibly due to its mediating history within the council and its position as a non-political and
non-sector related actor, the University maintains relatively good relationships with all actors
and even beyond. One argument is its political neutrality, eliminating the importance of its
level within governance. Hence, it serves as a comparative actor for the SNA.
SENAGUA maintains three noticeably weak ties with the local bodies JGUSRM and GPA but
surprisingly also with ETAPA. Visible through the pink color, this weakness stems from
ETAPA indicating a weak relationship. Beyond the public/private or level of governance
debate, this relationship is important for the future of the council as ETAPA and SENAGUA
represent the water sector. Furthermore, ETAPA holds the priority number one under the new
water law, the drinking water. The new law also states that SENAGUA has the authority to
deal with council disputes and should therefore be seen as the new power in the council.
Therefore, this relationship carries significant weight and will be crucial within the
restructuring process of the Santiago council plans. The fragile nature of this relationship
could be an indication that the governance arrangement in the basin is not as stable as
previously presumed.
For MAE the most noticeable aspect are its relatively good relationships with the actors of the
Water sector within the council, namely SENAGUA, ELECAUSTRO and ETAPA. This
should confirm the importance of the national park at the source of the river and its
importance to the flow and quality of water. Arguably, the hierarchy within the council is
partly derived from the geographic location of actors. ELECAUSTRO has significant power
in the basin, partly due to its largely unrivalled geographic location. However, only MAE has
upper control of the river and therefore the only rival for ELECAUSTRO. No other sector
maintains better relationships with MAE than the water sector, indicating the importance of
the flow of water. This argument is supported with the relatively weak ties MAE holds with
actors from the food sector. The new water law, supporting the argument of institutional
influences on actors, complements the theory on geographic hierarchy dictating actor
relationships. On the one hand, ETAPA has legal power to assert control of the river flow and
quality, however, this phenomenon goes paired with a healthy national park at the source of
the river. This brings us back to the finding that the environment is a binding factor for the
river council and to a certain extent, dictates the collaboration between actors.
The GPA holds very weak ties with the higher governance levels and non-food related actors
MAE and SENAGUA. This is a worrying fact as this actor should maintain a central role
within the new water law and the Santiago council and serves as the main representation
organ for the Azuay region. Both MAE and SENAGUA are fortifying their positions and
should hold good ties with structurally important actors in order to implement the new law
effectively. The GPA has often been associated with agricultural topics and is thus concluded
in the food sector of the Nexus. This could be a reason for its limited ties with other actors.
However, this does mean that administrative power does not imply beneficial collaboration in
the Machàngara basin. This is worrying regarding the restructuring of the governance
arrangement with the new water law, requiring greater internal cohesion if the river council is
to obtain a significant role in the new structure.
Surprisingly, MAGAP holds stable relationships with most actors, concluding the best
connected actor for the food sector. Part of this could be attributed to its governmental role
and the corresponding position within the levels of governance. This refutes the previous
analysis, which showed weak promises for this actor, evident through its changing name and
53
tasks. It also shows the importance of using both qualitative and quantitative information to
derive a more complete analysis.
Not surprisingly, ELECAUSTRO holds very good relationships with all actors. Like
previously established, this could be due to its funding capacity as a private actor or its
regional level of governance, maintaining the link to local realities. Thus, it provides a good
example of an actor with high social power and no significant legal power, nevertheless
holding the strongest network. Likewise evident is the core group of actors, University of
Cuenca, ELECAUSTRO and ETAPA, which also conclude the most active members of the
council.
ETAPA seems to be the outlier of the members with the largest network but holding very
weak to very strong ties. Its semi private background as well as its municipal level of
governance makes it an interesting actor to study. Arguably, due to the latter, it holds weak
ties with national actors such as MAE or SENAGUA. It is also the only actor representing a
municipal level, concluding a wicked position within the council. Due to its numerous ties,
ETAPA seems to be the key of a flexible and holistic governance arrangement in the basin.
When looking at the significant restructuring that is supposed to occur, it becomes vital to
speak with a common voice of the river basin in order to find a beneficial role within the new
Santiago council. ETAPA, considering its ties, will be the factor to close the gap between
some actors in the basin.
The JGUSRM dethrones the argument of weak relationships between opposite levels of
governance. Its ties with MAGAP are outstanding, in part due to the returning perception of
MAGAP. This is a key argument for the functioning of collaboration within the Nexus, as
actors within the same sector collaborate more easily. This phenomenon could be
strengthened by the fact that the food sector is witnessing several challenges from both the
institutional and actor setting. The former places unfavourable conditions with the rescaling of
authority, demanding irrigation to be governed from a trans-regional level. However, the
second priority obtained should aid in the establishment of more dominance for the food
sector. The actor setting has proven testing as generally weak ties exist with this sector. This
can be seen with the low perceived involvement and SNA diagram, arguably explainable
through the lower governance levels of those actors. Hereby, the explanation lies with figure
6, in which the council places MAGAP at a lower level than JGSURM due to the ties these
actors have beyond the river basin. In contrast, figure 7 notes that the actual level of
governance at which these actors act is different and sometimes higher. This could state that
the perception that of some of the river council members have on the food sector actors,
seems to be rather critical. For the Machángara river basin this could be related to the
relatively low output which the food sector produces compared to the energy or water sector,
while at the same time obtaining a high priority in the water law. This output can also take the
form of financial strength, which is limited for the food sector.
Answering the fifth research question will draw upon some of the striking findings from the
SNA diagram in combination with the conclusions drawn from previous sections.
The use of the SNA has found its purpose in this analysis, providing a different angle of
reviewing collaboration. Thus, some of the previously deadlocked debates surrounding levels
of governance and sectors become more transparent. The results show that actors of the Food
sector have good ties between them, while being the worst connected sector in the Nexus case
study. This relates to the public/private debate, whereby private actors tend to be better
connected to higher levels of governance than public ones. The JGUSRM provides a
54
counterbalance to this argument by maintaining good ties with most actors, indicating that
sector collaboration is a more dominant issue than governance levels. This returns the focus
onto the WEF Nexus as an instrument of collaboration within a governance arrangement. This
argument is strengthened by the weak ties between ETAPA and SENAGUA, which compose
the water sector actors in the basin. A weak relationship indicates a fragile balance between
the same-sector collaboration and overlapping spheres of influence. A small basin might not
be able to sustain more than one actor of each WEF Nexus sector. This argument can be
carried on by the power ELECAUSTRO possesses and the dispersed authority of the three
food sector actors. Having to share power weakens the individual strength of each actor,
which inevitably leads to the feeling of lesser involvement (figure 8) and unclear task
distribution.
The social versus legal power debate is reignited during this section, especially regarding the
ETAPA and SENAGUA relationship. ETAPA possesses the social power in the basin,
whereas SENAGUA clearly holds the legal power. The new water law and the creation of a
new river council will test the strength of each attribute and conclude on the strength of the
current governance arrangement.
The answer to the question on adaptation to change within the governance arrangement is a
complex task and cannot be concluded in only one SNA. However, it becomes clear that the
actors in the WEF Nexus tend to predominantly function on a horizontal scale. This becomes
clear when looking at the University of Cuenca, which holds good ties with many actors from
different sectors This is important as it shows the lacking pattern, in which higher levels of
governance tend to be better positioned in the basin. Especially when seeing the difference in
level placement between figure 6 and 7, the ambiguity on levels of governance by the council
becomes clear. The reoccurring rescaling happening in Ecuador through programs of
decentralization and the new water law outlines the problems actors face regarding a stable
governance level. The changing institutional setting causes the river council to find stability in
its own ranks. Therefore, when looking at the adaptability of the council to climate change,
one has to regard the horizontal and network methods of collaboration. These seem to be out
of balance when comparing horizontal and vertical dimension, in which the WEF sectors are
unevenly represented and distributed across the levels of governance. However, when looking
at the SNA, it becomes clear that the balance exists within the relationships between actors,
creating a mutually reinforcing spider-web. A weak relationship between two important
bodies such as ETAPA and SENAGUA is circumvented through the mediating body of the
ELECAUSTRO. This informal structure allows the council to adjust to changing patterns of
precipitation by placing certain connections over others. However, within the scope of climate
change, the institutional changes put forth with the new water law, influence these social
balances by creating legal priorities. Here again one can only speculate what the institutional
effect will have on the social powers evident in the basin.
55
7 Discussion
The discussion will try to combine the conclusions of the previous sections and attempt to
clarify the functioning of the WEF Nexus regarding its horizontal, vertical and network
processes. These three elements will be linked to their respective theoretical foundation and
should jointly provide a conclusion in the following section.
The general presumption of going from government to governance is the key to understanding
any governance arrangement and the social interaction therein. The theory dictates that more
has to be done with less and that interconnectedness is crucial. The new water law strives to
decentralize governance by simplifying the structure as witnessed with the Santiago river
council. Involving mediating institutions like the University of Cuenca and creating technical
bodies such as ARCA should conform to the establishment of a neutral and technically-
founded governance arrangement. However, the reality proves more complex. The
institutional setting has significant influence on the actor relationships such as the new
priorities created. In turn, the actor setting contains a delicate yet efficient system of
collaboration. Within this complex environment, horizontal processes support and sometimes
confront vertical processes. The inevitable overlap of jurisdictions provides breeding ground
for more complex methods of governance such as networks. The WEF Nexus finds itself
between these governance methodologies and due to its weak theoretical foundation, allows
for ambiguity. Finding out which processes exist and how they function was the task of this
research. Thus, this section will be structured according to the relevant governance processes
and conclude on the relationship between the case study and the theory.
Regarding collaboration between the horizontal and vertical axis, it is important to relate to
both multi-level and scale theories. The results show that collaboration is facilitated between
actors on the same level of governance. However, a straightforward Type I multi-level
arrangement, with clear delineation between the respective levels is hard to conclude.
Different methods of placing actors in levels (figure 6 and 7) as well as wide-ranging tasks
(e.g. ETAPA) make a theoretical comparison complex. ETAPA represents the example that
Type II multi-level governance is evident through the task specific jurisdictions (table 1). This
would explain the good relationships ETAPA maintains with all kinds of actors within and
outside the council. Besides the described „veto power‟, this actor does not need to relate to
overlapping jurisdictions like the food sector. This limits the presence of „polycentric‟
processes, whereby ETAPA is able to maintain its dominant position. Regarding the task
specific roles of some actors, it is interesting to relate this fact to the division the basin
according to natural features (figure 7). Looking at scales, we can see that natural,
administrative and technical divisions are made within the basin. Hereby, natural divisions
dictate the other division such as administrative, thereby showing the importance of the
environmental aspect within the WEF Nexus. Creating output requires delineation between
administrative (social) and natural features of the area in question and position actors
accordingly. This position of actors happens through the previously mentioned „veto powers‟
or through the influences of the institutional setting.
The horizontal functioning of the council is foremost visible through the collaboration
between actors regardless of their level of governance. Actors engage on the basis of a mutual
dependency on a healthy environment, thereby stimulating collaboration even if personal
objectives lie far apart. One example is the relationship between ELECAUSTRO and
University of Cuenca. The argument that this relationship is based on technical exchange
seems vague due to the proficient capacity thereof within ELECUSTRO. The principle of
collaboration in the Nexus is based upon the cross-sector dependency these actors have to
respect. Unlike the IWRM theory all sectors should be regarded as equal regardless of their
natural availability or social demand. This creates the situation in which actors hold `veto
56
powers´ in order to bargain for certain outcomes. Dependency on the flow of water creates a
strong position for ELECAUSTRO as opposed to the agricultural sector, not only due to its
geographic location but also due to the sole representation of the energy sector. Although the
new priorities set with the water law confront this issue, it remains a tool of actors to mitigate
conflict.
However, there are many factors that influence the horizontal collaboration. The institutional
setting strives to decentralize the region and create a merged river council. This would imply
less governmental control and more autonomous and horizontal resource management. The
same law also created a list of priorities, which help less dominant sectors to gain
significance. The food sector has traditionally shared its influence over several actors, thereby
limiting the individual power. ELECAUSTRO, as a sole representative of the energy sector,
enjoys close to unrivalled access to a water source as well as greater social power.
Furthermore, the research has shown that weak relationships, such as the one between
ETAPA and SENAGUA, cannot be attributed to conflicting economic or sector related
interests. This relationship was weakened by the institutional setting in which SENAGUA
obtained significant power through the new priorities and updated authority to form the
Santiago river council. Both actors engage on different levels of governance and do not
compete for similar resources. Hence, horizontal collaboration between actors is susceptive to
institutional changes, which pull at the vertical dimensions. This introduces the relationship
with the vertical axis of governance.
The vertical processes of collaboration are evident through the levels of governance within the
case study. The Machángara river council works vertically between the technical and directors
levels, however maintains horizontal collaboration within each level. This shows that both
processes are compatible and sometimes necessary. Ecuador has undergone significant
decentralization and hopes to continue this process with the new Santiago council. However,
bottom up approaches (unlike those dictated from above) are not clearly visible (table 3),
causing a hierarchical governance reality. Bottom-up approaches are important for a Type II
multi-governance arrangement, engaging citizens and other non-governmental bodies (see
table 1).
However, vertical processes are needed in order to break certain horizontal governance
deadlocks. The social and legal power discussion showed that with certain hierarchical
differences some actions are more easily implemented. The social power balance in the basin
proves to be vital in order to gain a common understanding amongst all stakeholders and
create a cohesive identity. Practically, the standing of ELECAUSTRO allows it to regulate the
access to the basin and thereby prevents illegal activities that would harm the common good.
It seems that the interplay of public and private actors challenges the need of vertical
processes. Funding is a crucial instrument of power in the council, with ELECAUSTRO and
JGUSRM forming the two opposite extremes. This argument shows that financial and
hierarchical independence can create a more favourable position than actors bound to higher
level consensus and public budgets.
A clear division of tasks between national, regional and local levels should theoretically
benefit administration and thus efficiency. However, the changing institutional setting creates
imbalances, whereby national and regional actors gain administrative power. Yet, they fail to
gain authority in the basin, with SENAGUA holding relatively weak ties with regional actors
and MAGAP and GPA being excluded from the council workings (see figure 8). Thus,
horizontal and network characteristics of the river basin governance arrangement seem to be
coherent enough to allow functioning without greater influence of higher levels of
governance. Arguably, the power of the food sector can only be achieved on a higher level of
57
governance. This is evident through the position of MAGAP which embodies the link
between public actors and their respective level of governance. The involvement of MAGAP
and its sector colleagues is low (figure 10), even though the food sector has gained
importance with the new law. However, the importance of the levels of governance become
relative to the perceived position actors are placed at. Figures 6 and 7 show that a small
difference in measurement can create different conclusions. Within the scope of this research,
horizontal and vertical processes do not give the complete picture within the case study.
Although hierarchical structures are visible but their impact limited, they do not explain how
the arrangement manages to allow for deeper actor collaboration.
Network governance completes the two dimensional picture given by horizontal and vertical
processes and links the results to the theoretical multiplicity approach. Furthermore, network
governance introduces the aspect of flexibility within the governance arrangement of the
Machángara basin. The historical setting and the social hierarchy in the basin have created a
well functioning example of a WEF Nexus case study and presented the cross-sector
collaboration therein. However, the institutional setting is bound to change and further
environmental change is expected with for example changing precipitation patterns. Thus, the
existing structure has to provide a certain degree of flexibility to adapt to this change. Aspects
such as the `veto power´ or social power create structure to which actors abide. However,
these powers tend to be sensitive to change, as witnessed with the MAGAP. Its role changed
with the reorganization of the agricultural ministry to adjust to the decentralization plans and
was renamed from INAR. Currently, it lacks formal tasks and thus holds limited authority.
Ideally, it should envisage the food sector and provide a strong counterbalance to the created
dominance of ELECAUSTRO and ETAPA.
The argument of cross-sector dependency proves to be a simplification of the reality in the
basin. According to the horizontal and vertical processes JGUSRM should encompass a
weaker position in the basin due to its public composition and financial means as well as its
lack of social or legal power. Its position at the lower levels of governance seems to weaken
its influence and the multitude of actors in the food sector gives it a less `veto power´.
However, looking at the SNA, we saw that it holds a broad range as well as a number of
crucial ties. Its broad relationship base allows it to be noticed and well informed. More
importantly, it holds strong relationship with actors who do not share the same strength in
collaboration. Thus, it serves as a mediating actor, mitigating the problems arising with
weaker ties between important actors in the network. A good example is the relationship
between ETAPA and SENAGUA, which should be a problem with the water law priorities
favouring SENAGUA as well as its role in restructuring the governance arrangement. To this
comes its missing physical presence in the basin, which ETAPA fills with ease. However,
both hold strong ties (stated from both sides) with JGUSRM. This argument fills the gaps
explaining collaboration as a result of the two dimensional horizontal/vertical debate. More
importantly, it allows the placement of the network governance theory within the case study.
This implies that a meaningful theoretical explanation to the knowledge gaps in the WEF
Nexus concept can be formulated.
As the task of this research was to fill the void of explanation regarding governance of the
WEF Nexus, it is important to compare the findings to the theories using table 1. In relation to
the hypotheses, the findings will be put into a larger theoretical framework.
Overall, there is a mix of all theories visible in the case study, which somewhat contradicts
the hypotheses, which states a network structure to be evident. Furthermore, the expected top
down approach of a Type I multi level governance arrangement was overshot as the
government puts great emphasis on decentralizing the country. However, in practice this
might look different as the example of the Santiago river council shows. Although a
58
horizontal structure is maintained, with close contact to the citizens, the activities are mostly
steered from the top. This relates well to the Type I and Network theories, which prescribe a
State or other managerial function to lead and thus steer the process of governance.
Furthermore, when looking at the role of government, Type I and network governance seem
to share more similarities than with a Type II setting, as the government takes the role of a
mediator and interest bundler. In terms of structure, the case study shares many similarities
with the network type processes, however the influential institutional setting takes the shape
of a Type I top down approach.
The composition within the governance arrangement aligns more closely to Type II and
network processes. This is visible through the relationship between actors, which hold
overlapping jurisdictions and engage on their interdependencies. Also the characteristics of
the actors share greater similarities with network compositions, including a healthy mix
between public and private actors. Nevertheless, the evident presence of the state limits the
alignment to network governance. In terms of collaboration, the hypotheses expected a
horizontal rather than vertical process. This is generally visible through the technical council
however, vertical processes such as the level of directors are necessary in order to provide
steering. Even within the technical council certain hierarchies exist, which inevitably steer it
in certain directions. If the findings align to the Type II and network structures, the flexibility
of the arrangement should be evident or even high. The results show different view when
including the WEF Nexus dimension. Restructuring the river council will cause certain
sectors to be underrepresented and social power structures will shift. Notably, SENAGUA
will gain greater significance and important actors like ELECAUSTRO will have to redefine
its role in a larger scale of the Santiago council. This contradicting situation could be aided by
the last row in the table showing a relatable example. Here the difference between Type II and
network governance could stem from the scale of the case study. Type II arrangements, with a
flexibility relatable to the Machángara case study, tend to be evident on larger scales.
Network arrangement examples have yet to reach such scales and currently only focus on
local or regional levels. This could be a crucial difference, making the Machángara case study
the largest example of a network arrangement. However, the question of flexibility can hereby
be solved, as a larger scale than that normally evident for a network arrangement, could
indicate less flexibility. Nevertheless, the conclusion is that a significant level of flexibility
remains, leaving open the question on how the council will deal with the coming changes of
the Santiago river council. Clear is that the WEF Nexus has proven to be an instrument of
collaboration within a governance arrangement. More importantly, it proves to be a crucial
addition to the understanding of the theoretical gaps existing between Multi-level and network
governance arrangements. Traditional analysis on administrative functioning is no longer
sufficient in environmental governance and needs to adhere to new aspects.
59
8 Conclusion
This research aimed at answering some of the knowledge gaps regarding governance of the
Water-Energy-Food Nexus. Collaboration between actors as units of analysis were
investigated in the case study of the Machángara river basin council. The research question
was formulated as: “How do actors collaborate across sectors, levels and scales in the Water-
Energy-Food Nexus and to what extent are they able to adapt to new challenges?” Several
methods for answering this question were used such as theoretical multiplicity as well as
empirical findings resulting in specific tools such as the SNA. Due to the complexity of the
research, the results are multiple and wide ranging.
The main direction of processes happens on the horizontal axis, at which actors collaborate
without greater hierarchy. The technical council functions on the basis of interdependencies
on certain the represented sectors. As such are weaker actors within an important sector still
regarded as equals and benefit from a stronger position. The example of the food sector
clearly shows that power is dispersed over several actors; nevertheless, they possess
individual ´veto power´ which can be used to obtain certain benefits. In addition, the joint
dependency on a healthy environment stimulates all actors to actively engage on tasks they
are not normally confronted with. This joint sector holds together the social ties and is thus
vital for the WEF Nexus.
However, vertical processes are evident and somewhat steer the technical council. The
obvious example is the directors level in the council, making the decisions for the wider river
basin. Another example is the role of private actors such as ELECAUSTRO, which hold
greater influence in the basin. In part, this is due to their stronger financial position but is also
derived from its social power by holding vital relationships. SENAGUA, holding legal power,
is not an evident actor in the basin and therefore does not hold the same relationships as other
actors. However, the SNA showed that weak relationships can be balanced through a ´proxy´
relationship with an actor who is connected to that missing link. This aspect relates to the
flexibility of the arrangement, as it seems to be well balanced and thereby mitigates evident
mismatches between actors. It also seems that levels of governance tend to cooperate more
easily on a shared level. This seemingly obvious fact stimulates the horizontal collaboration
theory and allows for better horizontal collaboration on that level. A good example is the role
of the state, which does not have great influence in the basin. Arguably, this is due to the
historical isolation of the region as well as the decentralization measures imposed by it. The
result is an autonomous region, which functions very well on its internal processes. The threat
comes with change in the form of the new Santiago river council and the shift in scales. Most
actors, even governmental, act on a regional scale due to the decentralized structure of
governance in Ecuador. This means that differences between scales are not as grave as they
could be, weakening the importance of vertical processes. Furthermore, the scale dimensions
prove why the collaboration in the Nexus case study functions as it does. A near-to scale
match is visible between the river basin and the region. This implies that trans-regional
collaboration between actors is not needed and thus simplifies the relationship network. In
addition, such a simplification also aids in the establishment of strong networks, which can
endure major changes such as a restructuring of a river basin. The origin of the river is the
only outlier to the scalar match, however being in a national park it falls under different
jurisdictions. Actors can focus their collaboration on MAE, who governs that park and do not
have to go through administrative levels evident from an autonomous region.
60
Theoretical implications
The chosen theoretical multiplicity approach aided in the explanation of missing links in the
empirical findings More importantly, the joint use of explanations from the different theories
helped in bridging some of the gaps between the theoretical boundaries. Surprisingly the case
study did not match with one or the other theory, even though a network governance
arrangement seemed to fit a WEF Nexus. In addition, the differences between the theories are
not as great as they seem at first sight. The analysis showed that the findings can be placed in
several theoretical table. Striking is the aspect of flexibility which aligns more to a Type II
structure and is thus less flexible than a network governance arrangement. The difficulty of
finding this difference stems in the complexity of the topic, which leaves several aspects open
for discussion. Therefore, a clear alignment to one or the other theory is not possible and
neither desired. Important is the lesson learned that typical governance theories do not suffice
in the explanation of environmental governance analysis. Arguably, due to the high
complexity and dynamic setting of the environment, governance theories need to adjust. This
research has shown that typical governance theories are not solely able to explain
environmental governance. Furthermore, a theoretical multiplicity approach helps alleviate
the problem of knowledge gaps, but remains limited in flexibility.
A possible improvement can be made with deeper analysis on theoretical multiplicity
approaches, which should aim to align but also distinguish the detailed characteristics of each
theory. Much like the case study, theories need to be tested with regard to their flexibility of
acknowledging change.
Further research
This research has laid the foundation for continuing progress on the WEF Nexus. Therefore,
the recommendations focus on the expansion of the WEF Nexus concept through further case
study analysis in which different angles should solidify the previous conclusions. This
research has shown that a WEF Nexus can exist and function under certain conditions. It is
these conditions that need to be applied and tested for progress in understanding to develop.
Furthermore, a diverse set of results are needed on the time scale as well in order to
understand change over time. Hence, this research should create the incentive for further
research on this case study, in which the implications of the new Santiago river council are
measured. A practical guide for such a continuation should be the SNA diagram, which also
produces results that change of time.
Further research on the theoretical dimension is also required. In academia, a Water-Energy-
Food-Environment Nexus exists, just like it exists with the addition of Industry. These
additions are important when looking at collaboration. However, it is not clear whether the
addition of the environmental or industry sector to the concept would have the same effect as
it currently has. The Industry has not been represented in this research as it is not an evident
part of the council. Nevertheless, it could play an important role in other Nexus case studies
by being the connecting factor. The Machángara basin is about the conservation and
production, which does include industrial production. This aspect should be regarded in future
research. In addition, this research has failed to obtain information from the industry sector
due to a missing response.
61
Practical implications
The implications for the case study are highly dependent on the developments at the
institutional stage as well as the future composition of the council. Thus, the following
recommendations should be regarded with caution in respect of changes not envisioned in this
research.
Foremost, it is important that the council continues its activities in the basin, whether or not
they belong to a larger river council. This is important for the actor setting but also in terms of
the social balances creates with a functioning council. Citizens require certain stability in
terms of the services needed in the basin.
Secondly, it became evident that the council has not yet agreed on a common position
regarding the changes with the Santiago council. Some have ousted skepticism whereas others
were not even informed. A common position should bring all actors up to speed and also
democratize the whole process. This would benefit the horizontal collaboration in the basin.
Thirdly, the council should strive to be more inclusive and achieve a larger composition than
it currently possesses. Especially the industrial park and NGO´s can bring meaningful
contributions to the basin. NGO´s also have better ties to the international levels, from which
they can attract greater attention and financing for the council´s activities. The river council
should use its position as a WEF Nexus case study more vividly, which can open more doors
for knowledge exchange and even create a more coherent structure, able to fend off unwanted
institutional changes. Financial means are needed to upgrade the old pipeline infrastructure in
the basin as well as aid some of the reforestation projects going on.
62
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doi:10.1002/pam.4050130113
Interviews
Catalina Díaz
Paul Vintimilla
Fabián Barrera
Diego Idrovo Murillo
Angel Uyaguari
Xavier Murillo
Carlos Cisneros
Oscar Sanchez
Andres Alvarado
Silvio Cabrera
66
10. Appendix
Transcriptions (note: not all interviews were recorded)
Interview Claudio Bustamente
is there a new law?
- yes, senagua is keeper of this new law. There are many actors involved in this law but final
authority is senagua. The superior actor.
- based on water only
- This department focuses on irrigation.
- Until now the law isn‟t being implemented correctly. Many aspects still missing. For
example process of responding to a claim for water is very slow and bound by rules
and procedures. so how was it before?
- Sengua still main authority, but had sole power of all aspects. Now ARCA (technical
institution) is taking over the technical aspects of water management.
- Still no good established working manner between senagua and arca. This slows
process and legitimacy. ARCA was established by senagua but independent. Still no
office of ARCA in Cuenca! ARCA is highly rechnical: measurements and analysis of
hydro areas. Creates studies. but do not work well currently
- Also in the machangara the problem with soliciting for water use is evident.
How can ARCA decide or investigate without office?
- “that‟s the problem”
- Many juridical problems with creating new institution
The machangara river council is managing the water distribution well no?
- No: elecaustrois having problems managing the water
- There are problems with quantity of water use. Some institutions carry more some
less. In the end its working fine but discrapencies exist.
- Within extreme climatic occurances, ARCA is going to control the flow of water and
the distribution thereof to the sectors! So new law exists including priorities but
ARCA controls
- The council is consolatory, not technical.
If all actors are working for technical information, what can ARCA contribute?
- Controlling. Without ARCA consultation needs to solve water distribution problem.
ARCA can enforce more with more technical decision base. Council does not have
enforcing powers but how come actions are made?
- ARCA uses knowledge, data and information from the other actors. So one institution
to gather/summarize all information. So process of information exchange can happen a
lot quicker in the future with only one entity.
- The new law states this new change. So implementation has to be followed if
legitimacy of council should prevail. Without legitimacy future projects would lack
enforcement. (issue of changing the name from council to cooperation…)
- Splitting into two institutions is going to be good in the future even though costs are
involved
- Reason for creating ARCA comes also from the limitations of SENAGUA
Name changing of council to adhere/not adhere to law
67
- You cannot operate without concession of law. So even if not taking part officially,
need to cooperate with larger plans. The Santiago council plans show that escape from
law is not possible
- Larger Santiago plans seems slow in progress. Smaller councils formed but haven‟t
cooperated yet
Decentralization?
- In theory yes. All councils have a voice. But final decisions lie with higher
institutions.
- This will help in future. Administration: positive effect in that smaller
communities/councils will align in terms of their policies due to law and not each do
their own thing.Negative side: the smaller scales need to ask for concession from
higher levels. Hereby are processes involved that limit decentralized authority.
Law article of final word lying with president:
- It‟s a political decision/aspect
- Authority lies with SENAGUA as right hand of the president
- SO: new plans will work and seem positive, only drawback is the authority of the
president which could be dangerous since there is no equilibrium to presidents power
Future of council/region machagara:
- The new law is going to benefit the council
- The council has several years of experience and is working well.
- New law should benefit council
Problems with authority?
- Yes, and not only in Cuenca
- Problems with people taking water unauthorized
- But law needs to manifest itself. So if actor is denounced nothing happens if no one
takes initiative. SO: new law needs to be executed actively and does not develop by
itself SENAGUA important for establishing law
Fraud in Cuenca?
- It is easier to have corruption without council than with. This is because many actors
are involved and affected
New actors enter
- SENAGUA is now replacing the dominant position of ELECAUSTRO and ETAPA
- It is highly unclear whether the current composition of the council will continue to
exist in the future
- Unsure on how financing of ARCA and SENAGUA works. Presumably the
government doesn‟t raise budget but merely splits it into two. this is the problem
now, that budget of council didn‟t increase, but plans are being enlarged.
- In general, the new law is created to solve the previous/existing problems.
- But, they exxagurated some aspects of the law: like: in order to get concession you
need agreements and documents with the junta de usarios etc. The council can aid an
actor in the methodological/practical aspect of this process. Before, the council was
the decision taker/maker of actor entries, making it easier for communication. Now
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there are rules and procedures with more external actors (SENAGUA) which cost
more time and money.
- Council only observes and advises but cannot take action
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Interview Andres Alvarado
What are the bigger projects within the council in which the university is involved in?
- Involved in many studies with ELECAUSTRO with hydro studies
- ETAPA as well, signed agreement for students to investigate/internship
- But in general involved with many actors
- Uni is technical actor for creating maps
- Uni is founding member
Santiago council plans?
- Hard to state whether its going to be positive or negative now
- Positive: thinkingprojecst or coordination in geographic scales. Not political
- Negative: level of cooperation within machangara is very high. Not paralleled by other
councils. So larger cooperation will be difficult.
How do national plans reflect/affect the regional targets?
- Hydroelectricity of machangara is just for the region
- Hydroelectricity is more clean than that many of the other rivers
- More capacity for potable water within the basin. Hydroelectricity not sure, but
could be!
Do you perceive working in administrative/political or Nexus sectors?
- University is involved in larger agreements linking to political levels, but also within
machangara working in sectors
- University is not a political actor, so focused more on Nexus sectors (working within
them)
- No perceived problems working with sectors
- Alvarado been active since 3 years within the council
- No political influence or desires!
- New law is too new. So he doesn‟t know what it states and has no opinion on it.
Action plans to prevent drought like in 2009?
- Few years ago there was a initiative from the MAE with world bank to promote
conservation of the basin
- Still in a phase of evaluating and analysing
- There doesn‟t exist a action plan of prevention yet. But there are several initiatives: the
daily activities of the council. Study the effect of climate change
- Cant comment on concrete other initiatives, except active participation in research.
How to prevent overuse by one actor
- Participation in the council? Yes.
- Don‟t witness any problems within the council
- Doesn‟t know junta de usuarios very well…
- University faculty has connections to industrial park
70
Interview Angel Ayaguari
Projects of the Junta
- Provide water for all communities and pators (service of irrigation)
- 1998 the state granted the Usuarios to govern/manage the water
- Irrigation channels are old: 40 years of usage. 80% of canals are out of service.
- Rehabilitation of the canals, working with council, national bank
- Artificial canals
- 17 km of main canals, 35 juntas locales, 2000 users
- Irrigation water, users pay. ETAPA pays for using the canals. Not money from
government!
- SENAGUA doesn‟t provide money for irrigation. Only helps in practical matters like
investigations, controls, administration etc
- Most users are farmers. Some 100%, some only 70%.
- No need for saving water, can be used. So sufficient water available all year round?
Priorities set in in case of drought!?
- Migrants (mainly from US) mostly obtained land through friends in Ecuador. Now
don‟t live there but maintain the land
- 5000dollars budget of usarios comes from funds from irrigation systems, ETAPA,
- Industrial park not involved in council yet. Governmental actors are involved with
them
- Industrial park outside irrigation sphere. Just one company inside, but is involved in
Junta
- The new law states that each company needs to verify with SENAGUA about
usage of water – before they could jointly reach agreement with junta
Larger Santiago basin plans
- Before, actors didn‟t have to do much to use the water. Now each actor individually
has to have a motivation. Sent to SENAGUA. With one permit, 3 or 4 actors could use
water rights
- ARCA will improve organization and management of council.
- Subsecretariade riego y drenaje is INAR in the past
- Neither for or against new law and the powers to the president
- Before everyone took what they wanted and had disputes. Now everything
belongs to the state, making disputes less likely.
- So he is happy that this process will allow more universal access to water
- Some will use the new law, some not. It‟s a political instrument, not a natural one
- MAGAP and juntas parroquiales missing in list
- MAGAP involved in council as part of Riego y drenaje, which is formerly known
as INAR!
- 3 local communities involved, who are out of the council
- Works most with ETAPA, GPA (in constant contact)
- With GPA working towards prioritizing the use of irrigation water
- How to del with droughts: searching for rehabilitation of canals, new studies,
- Two reservoirs provide enough water and electricity.
- The water for electricity is connected to water for irrigation and drinking water!
Nexus? “multipurpose” – angel uyaguari
- no problems with national hydroelectric plans and quantity of water available
- every user has a certain percentage to use. In dry seasons there is less for everyone
71
- there are users that use more these are the local communities – good relationship
with them. 4 on a scale of 5. Network diagram
- the users within the institution are all very close and work closely together.
Facilitated through education and promotion campaigns
- trash is taken up by the local communities. Usuarios
- we are providing a service for the people. We exist because of them.
- No problems viewed with respect to different sectors!
72
Interview Catalina Diaz
Structure of council, ETAPA has three actors and others only 1?
- Directors, subgerente, and technical advisors
- Directors plan, technical council implements
- Before 2008, new water law, the river council was not constitutionally recognized
-
Major actors that helped develop the council since 1998
- The main three, CREA,
- MAE involved because high protected area cover
- We have all a priority of protected natural resources and above all the water resources
- No cooperation with IP but they are on the third priority list in times of shortage of
water. How can this function?
Filling in table of relationships
- With elecaustro: perfect since they have a high agreement on the gestion ambiental!
Conservation effeorts have high cooperation. aswell question of production
- SENAGUA: very good. They want to strengthen the councils position within the
Santiago basin
- All have the same objective but a different level of agreement- for example the
relationship with farmers is very good but not with all and only about basic things like
conservation efforts
- Sometimes its better to have a actor with social knowledge more than one with legal
knowledge! About acceptance
- Within the law, the machangara council doesn‟t exist and doesn‟t have legal powers. It
is part of the 3 big Santiago river system demarcation. Mchangara, samorra, mayo.
- The practical effects of the reorganization do not change but legally the machnagara
council falls under der larger Santiago council and its objectives
- Santiago council knows and has clear plans on how to continue (interview?)
- The council is an executive arm of the Santiago council
- New presidential rights: we don‟t have control over it, all we can do is keep working.
All
- INAR part of MAGAP (ministry of agriculture)
- Management of riego: GPA: general canals etc. INAR/Magap: irrigation on pastures.
- Relationship between INAR and MAGAP complicated due to unclear division of tasks
and authority. SO: irrigation is split among 3 authorities.
- GPA relationship is good. But areas of work are different. GPA works with irrigation
at the lower basin and ETAPA at the middle and upper basin with the protected area.
More a coordination relationship, not so much collaboration
- MAE: very good. Coordination of legalization efforts, protection of forest. In order to
obtain legal paper, all actors are involved in the process.
- Condesan: no relationship. Before with luisa costa.
- PI: only when there is contamination there is a relationship.
WEF working
- We cannot only think in terms of water. First come the people who need water.
- “People are also the ones that give us the power, hence we need to serve them, not our
interests”
- There are products which are flourishing there but are not used. Like mushrooms. So
there are projects to teach a wider range of using products.
73
- “working horizontally” : the council works in vertical structures (director and tech
council) but the technical council works together with the people.Its all about
communication and collaboration. We teach and get taught. “we are another one of
them” also, the council consists of people with equal powers democratically. (power
play?) if another actors (eg. ARCA) enters the council they maintain theyre one vote
power. Within the machangara basin there is a concealed power. So greater Santiago
plans will diminish these powers (Idrovo opposed to new plans)?
- There is a transition with the new plans and ARCA. Its true that they may have the
power to decide on the direction. They will have the legal power but will they have the
social power?
- objectivo 7 del plan nacional del buenvivir national plans and those of council. We
cannot isolate us from the national plans. SENAGUA and ARCA are needed and part
of the council. Each project is evaluated according to the national plan buenvivir on
their potential (but financing comes from within the council?!) with new actors no new
money will come, only be split between more councils
- the government says to implement certain things, the provinces do the work. Cuenca is
then also a forerunner in innovation because they act alone and more cooperatively.
People with visions and motivation. The university under lead of one professor
managed to stimulate the question of the environment, enabling this culture to last
until today
- the national plans also copy a lot of innovation coming from Cuenca, such as a new
method from ETAPA on community soil use (rehabilitation of soil, managing forests
etc. based on participation) which saved the city from water shortage.
- ETAPA works horizonally as it serves its people.
- So does the environmental education/effort come from the council or the education
system or the people themselves? The council stimulates the education system to
environmentally educate.
- Public private difference? ELECAUSTRO and ETAPA used to be private, now public.
(part of greater governmental plans?) BUT cooperation or activism is not about this
but about larger financing institutions creating a budget for environmental action!!
74
Interview Paul Vintimilla
The main projects of ETAPA
- Technical support
- Uncultivated land
- Monitoring quality of water, ecosystem etc
- ETAPA doesn‟t work alone in council, in cooperation with others
- Productivearea: Catalina: “conservacion y produccion”
- 90% of lands do not have paper of oficial properties. Legalizing these is one main
project
- Highly involved in council. Co-founder.
Technical capacity?
- Yes. With ELECAUSTRO the only technical institutions
- ETAPA, ELECAUSTRO and Uni (in that order) are the main actors (for legalizing
projects). With MAE, they authorize projects.Senagua not necessary because MAE is
authority in the park
- University of Cuenca entered as mediator of a dispute between two actors (which two
actors?).
- 75% of machangara basin is inside protected forest area. Hence the importance of
MAE.
- Industrial park is not part of council but does use the water. Why not part of Junta de
Usuarios? – both sides don‟t seek contact. Only if there is a pollution or overuse.
Larger Santiago plans
- It‟s a political plan
- We are part of the system so we take part
- Something is going to change obviously.
- Problem with the name: not a decision of ETAPA only. Decision lies with Directors
Government plans of hydropower etc
- We are only concerned with the sub Cuenca of machangara, protection of environment
etc.
- Hydroelectricity not compentency of ETAPA.
- According to law, hydroelectricity comes third in priorities.
- Hydroelectricity not 100% clean but its brings infrastructure which improves the
natural environment aswell
Working with WEF Nexus or political levels?
- ETAPA works a lot with WEF – project: ETAPA technical and environment,
ELECAUSTRO socializing the importance of protecting the environment, ministry of
agriculture –support from the side of food all within gestion the recursoshidricos
Directors
- Always informed
- Technical council plans and presents plans
- Directors approve,
Action plan for extreme climatic events?
- Not only the machangara basin is affected
75
- Normal activities of council contribute to improving the environmental situation and
prevent disasters? – eg. anti-desertification,
- There are periods of limited rainfall
- Retaining reservoirs created before the drought
- A few of the big actors created a study/analysis of the hydrological system to see what
it would support and what the capacity is to prevent drought.
Council works well?
- More established now
- Always have been political questions which tested the council
- ELECAUSTRO and ETAPA have similar objectives as companies within the
machangara
- Good example of functioning coordination
Multiple actors of each company present
- Each company has more…engineers, sociologists etc. is this the case for all
actors?
76
Email Message to interviewees
Estimado Sr/Sra,
Mi nombre es Marco van Burik y estoy haciendo mi Maestría en Ciencias Ambientales con
una especialización en Gobernanza de Agua en la Universidad de Wageningen en Holanda.
Actualmente estoy desarrollando mi tesis en la cuenca del Río Machángara. Quiero saber
cómo las partes interesadas cooperan a través de los distintos niveles y sectores dentro del
consejo de cuenca del río Machángara. Esta cooperación debe seguir un eje vertical y
horizontal. Vertical para la interacción entre los niveles dentro de los sectores y horizontal
para la cooperación entre los sectores (Water-Energy-Food). Con el fin de probar la
estabilidad de la cooperación quiero saber cómo extremas ocurrencias climáticas afectan a
esta interacción social (como la sequía del 2009).
Con el fin de obtener toda la información relevante de los actores importantes, es más factible
llevar a cabo entrevistas. Éstos deberían definir un conocimiento más profundo de los actores
sobre el tema de investigación y crear una cuenta que no sea interpretado.
Por la presente me gustaría pedirle que participe en esta investigación como usted es un actor
importante dentro de mi ámbito de investigación. No existen riesgos asociados con la
participación. Al ser una participación voluntaria, puede detener la entrevista en cualquier
momento. Si usted tiene alguna pregunta sobre mí, la investigación o la entrevista no dude en
ponerse en contacto conmigo. Con mucho gusto responder a cualquier pregunta.
Soy un investigador independiente y no estoy alineado a ningún partido político, actor privado
u otros intereses. La selección de mi tema y su ubicación fueron basados en preferencias e
intereses personales. Usted me ayudará a responder ciertas preguntas que son de gran
importancia para mi investigación. Toda la información será manejada con cuidado y, de ser
el caso, analizada anónimamente. Si usted escoge responder a esta invitación por favor hágalo
de una manera abierta y honesta ya que solo de esa forma se pueden llegar a conclusiones
validas.
Miro adelante a recibir su respuesta y espero que acepte mi invitación.
Saludos cordiales,
Marco van Burik
WageningenUniversity
Estudiante de Maestría de Ciencias Ambientales
Especialización en la gobernabilidad del agua y la diplomacia desarrollo sostenible
77
Interview Blueprint
Interviewee receives the information sheet before!
Entrevista sobre la collaboracion entre los sectores del Water-Energy-Food Nexus
Soy un investigador independiente y no estoy alineado a ningún partido político, actor privado u otros
intereses. La selección de mi tema y su ubicación fueron basados en preferencias e intereses
personales. Usted me ayudará a responder ciertas preguntas que son de gran importancia para mi
investigación. Toda la información será manejada con cuidado y, de ser el caso, analizada
anónimamente. Si usted escoge responder a esta invitación por favor hágalo de una manera abierta y
honesta ya que solo de esa forma se pueden llegar a conclusiones validas. La entrevista será grabada
con su consentimiento y ayudará a la mejor comprensión de las respuestas dadas.
Se le ha pedido a usted ser parte de esta investigación contestando ciertas preguntas sobre el tema para
poder completar la información. No existe ningún tipo de riesgo o inconveniente al participar en esta
investigación. Al ser voluntaria su participación, usted puede dejar la entrevista cuando guste. Si tiene
alguna pregunta sobre mi investigación o la entrevista siéntase libre de preguntarme. Gustosamente
responderé cualquier inquietud.
Institución y/u organización:
Nombre del Entrevistado:
Cargo que desempeña:
Dirección:
Fecha de la entrevista:
Entrevistador/a:
Terceras personas:
1. Proyectos en ejecución que estén referidos a la Cuenca del Machángara y sus características
brevemente
Nº. Titulo del proyecto Características
1
2
3
4
78
5
Cuál de estos proyectos requiere más colaboración con los actores externos?
Elaboración:
2. ¿Qué proyectos han considerado realizar al futuro en relación a la problemática de la Cuenca?
Titulo del
proyecto
Características Problemática
1
2
3
4
5
3. ¿Cuál es el nivel de involucramiento en el Desarrollo de la Cuenca del Río a través de sus
acciones?
Califique 1 2 3 4 5
Exponga las razones:
4. Nivel de relación con otros actores
A = Financiamiento de proyectos
B = Comparte visión y objetivos
C = Mismo sector
Nº. Actores con los que
se relaciona
Intensidad de la relación Razones de la relación y su
intensidad
Ex Mb B Deb C A B C Otras razones
1 Elecaustro
2 Junta General de Usuarios del
Sistema de Riego Machángara
(JGUSRM)
Ex = Excelente
Mb= Muy Buena
B = Buena
Deb = Débil
C = Conflicto
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3 ETAPA
4 Secretaria Nacional del Agua
(SENAGUA)
5 Agricultores
6 Instituto Nacional del Riego
(INAR)
7 Gobierno de la provincia del
Azuay
8 Universidad de Cuenca
9 El Ministerio de Medio Ambiente
10 Condesan
11 Parque Industrial
5. Con quién colaboran / trabajo con la mayoría? ¿Por qué?
6. Hay actores externos al consejo con los que colaboras? Porque?
7. Usted notará que algunos actores tienen más influencia en las discusiones? ¿Por qué? ¿Existe
un equilibrio natural del poder?
8. Are you in agreement with larger Santiago basin council plans?
Yes No
9. How does the council perceive larger climate change goals and national targets?
10. Do you perceive working in sectors or administration levels?
Water, energy food: Community, regional, national:
11. Cómo se comunica con otros actores / sectores? ¿Con qué frecuencia?
80
12. Cuál es el nivel de facilidad de comunicación entre los actores?
Califique 1 2 3 4 5
Exponga las razones:
13. Hay una diferencia para la colaboración intersectorial?
Si______________ No_________________
Elaboración:
14. Es la cooperación con otros sectores incluidos en la estrategia de gestión?
15. Funciona Administración reunión más cruzar sectorial de los subgrupos?
16. Cómo se comunica dentro de su organismo más amplio (o tiene competencias únicas)? Si es
así, ¿con qué frecuencia y qué niveles están involucrados?
17. Existen planes de acción de sucesos climáticos extremos? ¿Cómo se crean? ¿Por quién?
(priorities)
18. Si no hay planes, ¿cómo lidiar con los sucesos climáticos extremos? ¿Hay más / menos los
actores involucrados?
19. Conoce sobre el Water-Energy-Food Nexus (Nexo Agua-Energía-Comida)?
Si______________ No_______ __________
En caso afirmativo, ¿qué sabe usted al respecto?
20. Existe un plan para lograr activamente una WEF Nexus?
Si______________ No_________________
En todos casos, ¿podría explicar?
………………………………………….
81
Coding of SNA
Vertex 1 Vertex 2 Color Width Style Opacity Visibility Label Label Text Color
Label Font Size
Add Your Own Columns Here
JGUSRM ELECAUSTRO Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show ETAPA ELECAUSTRO Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show
SENAGUA ELECAUSTRO Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show
INAR ELECAUSTRO Yellow 3,0 Solid 100 Show
GPA ELECAUSTRO Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show
Uni Cuenca ELECAUSTRO Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show
MAE ELECAUSTRO Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show
ELECAUSTRO JGUSRM Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show ETAPA JGUSRM Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show SENAGUA JGUSRM Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show INAR JGUSRM Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show GPA JGUSRM Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show Uni Cuenca JGUSRM Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show MAE JGUSRM Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show
ELECAUSTRO ETAPA Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show JGUSRM ETAPA Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show SENAGUA ETAPA Yellow 2,0 Solid 100 Show INAR ETAPA Yellow 3,0 Solid 100 Show GPA ETAPA Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show Uni Cuenca ETAPA Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show MAE ETAPA Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show Industrial
Park Uni Cuenca Yellow 1,0 Dash 100 Show
ELECAUSTRO INAR Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show JGUSRM INAR Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show ETAPA INAR Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show SENAGUA INAR Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show GPA INAR Yellow 3,0 Solid 100 Show Uni Cuenca INAR Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show MAE INAR Yellow 3,0 Solid 100 Show
ELECAUSTRO GPA Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show JGUSRM GPA Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show ETAPA GPA Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show SENAGUA GPA Yellow 2,0 Solid 100 Show
82
INAR GPA Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show Uni Cuenca GPA Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show MAE GPA Yellow 2,0 Solid 100 Show
ELECAUSTRO Uni Cuenca Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show JGUSRM Uni Cuenca Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show ETAPA Uni Cuenca Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show SENAGUA Uni Cuenca Yellow 5,0 Solid 100 Show INAR Uni Cuenca Yellow 0,0 Solid 100 Show GPA Uni Cuenca Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show MAE Uni Cuenca Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show
ELECAUSTRO MAE Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show JGUSRM MAE Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show ETAPA MAE Yellow 3,0 Solid 100 Show SENAGUA MAE Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show INAR MAE Yellow 0,0 Solid 100 Show GPA MAE Yellow 2,0 Solid 100 Show Uni Cuenca MAE Yellow 4,0 Solid 100 Show