1

What to do with the Muslim problem? A critical analysis

of the public diplomacy efforts employed by Presidents

Bush and Obama to engage the Muslim population.

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Table of contents

I. Introduction……………………………………………………………………..…….3

II. Why go the public route with diplomacy?.............................................................4

III. The War on Terror: public diplomacy gone wrong………………………………..5

IV. Recuperating credibility and America’s image amongst Muslims……………….7

V. Is public diplomacy the future?.............................................................................9

VI. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..11

VII. Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………13

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1. Introduction

In the Information Age, the role of new media has gained prominence, giving a platform and

easy access for individuals to disseminate any form of information to the public. It has

provided politicians with a means to engage with people they do not encounter on a daily

basis – the citizens of other nations. President Putin expertly utilised this form of media to his

advantage by portraying the US as an aggressive, bellicose state, and Russia as a state

seeking peace through peaceful, diplomatic means in his New York Times article (Mullen,

2013). As observed by Robert Entman, the “relationship between governing elites and news

organisations is less distant and more cooperative…especially in foreign affairs” (2004, p. 2).

For public diplomacy to be effective, the state executing this practice will need to be credible

in the international community. This paper will examine the public diplomacy strategies

employed by the United States in an effort to re-engage with the global Muslim population

following the War on Terrorism. In the second section, this paper will argue why soft power

and public diplomacy have been gaining prominence over other forms of diplomacy, chiefly

coercion. The third section will examine the role of public diplomacy in the US-led war on

terror, and how this policy has negatively impacted the US’ credibility. The fourth section will

explore how the Obama administration has been using public diplomacy as a means to

restore the US’ credibility in the international platform. The fifth section of the paper will focus

on whether public diplomacy is the ‘future’ of diplomacy, with a critical examination of the

success of the recent multilateral agreement between Iran and the UN Security Council

P5+1. Finally, after presenting the line of reasoning for public diplomacy and classic

diplomacy (multilateral and bilateral relations), this paper will conclude by directly addressing

the question of whether one is more effective than the other, or if they are not mutually

exclusive in the era of globalisation.

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2. Why go the public route with diplomacy?

In recent years, soft power has gained importance due to its ability to effectively execute

political measures which are more compliant with international norms. It is instrumental in

“getting others to want the outcomes you want” (Nye, 2008, p. 95), without any necessary

aggressive confrontation. The increasing unpopularity of hard power – the use of force on

another state – is also a contributing factor; an armed attack requires a deep commitment to

the policy on the part of the aggressor, as well as financial, personnel, and material

resources. When the costs of these resources do not outweigh the benefits of the attack,

states will concentrate their efforts on a more successful trajectory – diplomacy.

One of the more radical forms of soft power is coercive diplomacy. Coercion tactics can be

engaged to compel other states to act in a manner which is beneficial to the more dominant

states; Alexander George, as illustrated by Bruce Jentleson (2006), proclaims that coercive

diplomacy has the means to “achieve reasonable objectives in a crisis with less cost; with

much less, if any, bloodshed” (George and Simons, 1994, p. 9). George is optimistic in his

assessment of the coercion approach when an analysis is made of the failure of coercive

diplomacy in Iraq; this form of diplomacy culminated in a war that has persisted for nearly a

decade. The US pursued a policy of regime change in Iraq, hoping the ‘domino effect’ – a

relic from the Vietnam War – would induce hostile and repressive states in the region to be

replaced by democratic regimes (Joshi, 2006). For coercive diplomacy to be successful the

coercer must issue demands which do not violate the basic material interests of the target;

for Saddam Hussein and Iraq, regime change defied this right.

On the other side of the spectrum, public diplomacy is increasingly becoming a viable

alternative to coercive diplomacy, whereby the norm is shifting to negotiations through

cooperation rather than threats. This form of diplomacy relies, as postulated by Joseph Nye

Jr., on governments attempting to “communicate with and attract the publics of other

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countries, rather than merely their governments” (2008, p. 95). Nicholas J. Cull (2009)

identified the key components of public diplomacy, comprising of listening (the most crucial

component of public diplomacy, requiring the effective utilisation of information on the

international community to convey the domain state’s policy or approach to diplomacy);

advocacy; cultural diplomacy; exchange diplomacy; and international broadcasting of news

by means of technology to engage with the foreign public, and also inform this audience of

the states’ policies (ibid).

3. The War on Terror: public diplomacy gone wrong

During George W. Bush’s presidency, the United States employed an advocacy strategy

which aimed to increase understanding of US policy and culture. This would result in states

and their publics developing a favourable opinion of the US, thus eventually solidifying its

influence in the world (Matwiczak, 2010). Peter G. Peterson, the chair of the Independent

Task Force on Public Diplomacy pointed out, “image problem and foreign policy are not

things apart” (2002, p. 75). When Bush became president, the US was the singular

superpower in a unipolar international system; the foreign policies adopted by his

administration reflect this unilateralism, including the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and non-

participation in the International Criminal Court (Joshi, 2006).

Therefore, after the attacks on September 11 many Americans were stunned to be

“confronted with such violent hatred of their country and everything it stands for: its foreign

policies as well as its values” (Van Ham, 2003). To counter these sentiments, the Bush

administration employed an intensive strategy to revitalise its global image. As postulated by

Wilson Dizard, “ideologically driven terrorism has sharpened the debate over the role of

government-sponsored information operations in advancing U.S. strategies” (2004, p. 3-4).

The appointment of Charlotte Beers, the former head of several distinguished advertising

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agencies, as the undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs was a pivotal

point in the post-9/11 tactic (Kennedy and Lucas, 2005). Although Eytan Gilboa described

the post-9/11 period as a “new phase in the development of public diplomacy” (2008, p. 55)

due to the communication revolution, the Bush administration’s overall approach was to

prove unsuccessful.

Hoping to appeal to the anti-American attitudes in the Muslim world, a cultural diplomacy

approach was utilised; the US State Department expended USD 15 million on advertisement

slots where Muslim Americans were encouraged to talk about the positive aspects and

experiences in living in the United States. ‘Shared Values’, a campaign to curb negative

sentiments towards the US in the Arab world was also launched in the post-9/11 period

(Kennedy and Lucas, 2005). It should be noted that ironically, these initiatives were

conducted while the US was planning to launch wars on two Muslim states.

In 2006, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice offered a policy to “support the

aspirations of the Iranian people for freedom in their own country” (Azimi, 2007). One of the

aspects of this initiative was utilising Voice of America Persian, which had garnered a

reputation for balanced and credible news reporting, to disseminate information otherwise

denied to Iranians due to the strictly regulated state channels (ibid). However, reports were

to later emerge of the White House agenda behind the programmes. One of the guests on

the show was Abdolmalek Rigi, the head of a militant Sunni group in Iran responsible for

terrorist attacks; information later materialised of the US’ role in channelling covert support to

Rigi’s group (ibid).

There is a fine line between success and failure in public diplomacy, and this rests primarily

on perception. Despite their efforts, the US’ public diplomacy policy was to be fruitless; the

findings of a December 2002 survey by the Pew Research Group showed that “the war on

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terrorism is opposed by majorities in nearly every predominantly Muslim country surveyed”

(Pew Research Center, 2002).

One of the principal reasons why the US failed in rallying states to support its global war was

because the Bush administration had failed to utilise the most important aspect of public

diplomacy identified by Nicholas Cull – listening. Although most states across the world

sympathised with the US following the initial attacks in 2001, vowing solidarity in combating

this emerging global threat (Baldauf, 2011), public opinion was to turn against the United

States as a consequence of its actions. The US pursued a war in Iraq without the explicit

support of the UN Security Council and amidst anti-war demonstrations across the world; the

failure to locate the rumoured weapons of mass destruction also contributed heavily to the

decline in public opinion of the US (Richburg, 2011).

Academic John L. Esposito corroborates this hypothesis, adding that “the flaunting of

international law, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, rendition and torture of prisoners and the

erosion of civil liberties at home have further affected America’s image and credibility” (n.d.).

Christopher J. Fettweis notes that the domino effect of spreading democracy the US was

hoping to achieve with the Iraq War has failed; “regional governments have been even more

oppressive to their people than before, and levels of anti-Americanism have skyrocketed”

(2007, p. 629), thus lending to the conclusion that the war in Iraq has significantly hampered

US credibility in the global sphere.

4. Recuperating credibility and America’s image amongst Muslims

While President Bush may have been maligned for much of his time in office – principally

due to the unpopular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq – his intent was never to create a division

between Americans and Muslims in the Middle East. In a speech made just a week after the

9/11 attacks, Bush clarified his stance, stating that “we reject every act of hatred against

8

people of Arab background or Muslim faith…ours is not a campaign against the Muslim faith"

(Kennedy, 2012). Despite his proclamation, Bush’s actions during his presidency critically

damaged the US’ image amongst Muslims, in the Middle East and beyond. When his

successor took office, his primary task was to restore the country’s image amongst the

Muslim population. Esposito proposed that a successful public diplomacy strategy would

require fostering mutual understanding based on shared interests, stating that the “cause of

anti-Americanism is not who [we] are but what [we] do” (n.d.).

Shortly after her second year in office, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced

“we now have a public diplomacy effort that is worthy of the name” (Gregory, 2011). This

statement serves as a reflection of President Obama’s efforts to restore America in the good

graces of the international community, especially in the Middle East. Obama’s strategy

aimed to focus on “US leadership, new approaches and skill sets for all American diplomats,

leveraging civilian power, and engaging beyond the state” (Gregory, 2011). The last

component – engaging beyond the state to reach its public has been a primary endeavour of

the Obama administration and one which has, so far, been more successful than that of

President Bush.

Noam Chomsky criticised Obama’s presidency, comparing it to that of his predecessor’s

second term, when negotiations were the dominant approach as opposed to blatant

aggression and coercion; he stated that “he [Obama] politely greets the leaders and people

of the world as ‘partners’, and only in private does he continue to treat them as ‘lieutenants’”

(2009). In spite of this observation, Obama’s ‘politeness’ has brought him success in foreign

policy. In a bid to mend the US-Iran relationship, Obama released an online video on the

White House official channel and YouTube, congratulating Iranians on the occasion of

Nowruz. (Subramanian, n.d.). Although the video failed to appease the Iranian leaders,

broadcasting a celebratory message for public consumption was undoubtedly successful in

9

shifting some of the blame of “strained bilateral relations” (Zacharia, 2010) from the US’

hands (Subramanian, n.d.).

This was not the first instance of Obama making public declarations to ‘appease’ the Muslim

population; he insisted on recruiting more Muslim Americans to work for the Obama

administration, calling America “one of the largest Muslim countries in the world” (Goldfarb,

2009). In one of his most poignant efforts to engage Muslims across the world, Obama

delivered a speech in Cairo in 2009, announcing that he had “come here to Cairo to seek a

new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world” (Tran, 2009). By

attempting to identify with this religious group as someone who has “Muslim members in his

family” (The New York Times, 2009), Obama had essentially evoked empathy and

commonality between the US and the Arab world, something his predecessor failed to

achieve.

The most significant initiative employed by the Obama administration to recuperate the US’

damaged credibility has been ending the war in Iraq and promising to evacuate the majority

of US troops in Afghanistan by 2014. This is based on Obama’s 2008 campaign promise to

end the two wars (Talev and Walcott, 2011), demonstrating that he is genuinely committed

to bringing peace in the Middle East. Much of the subsequent success enjoyed by Obama’s

administration in foreign policy, notably the nuclear agreement with Iran, can be attributed to

the president’s faithfulness to his pledge which has mitigated the wave of anti-American

sentiments which were rampant during the Bush administration.

5. Is public diplomacy the future?

On 27th September 2013, President Hassan Rouhani engaged in an historic phone call with

President Barack Obama, the first form of direct communication between the leaders of the

respective countries in over three decades (Soloman and Lee, 2013). Rouhani had earlier

10

declined Obama’s invitation to meet during the United Nations General Assembly in New

York, a form of public diplomacy on Rouhani’s part in an effort to avoid antagonising

hardliners in Tehran (Mason and Charbonneau, 2013). However, many analysts viewed

Rouhani’s phone call as a positive first step for furthering bilateral cooperation between the

two states. Despite these two incidents of public diplomacy, this diplomatic strategy itself

played only a small role in the actual negotiations.

Details of the nuclear agreement suggest that a series of multilateral negotiations took place

between American and Iranian officials since March 2013. Initially, the purposes of the

meetings were to discern if the two states could successfully engage in bilateral talks; the

election of Rouhani, a more moderate politician than his anti-US predecessor Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad, instilled fresh motivation to resume talks (BBC, 2013). The negotiations

culminated in Iran agreeing to curb their nuclear enrichment programme, despite Rouhani’s

previous claims that Iran would not give up its right to enrichment, citing it as a “red line” they

are unwilling to cross (George, 2013).

While public diplomacy may have been a catalyst in resuming diplomatic negotiations

between the US and Iran after thirty years, the material product of these talks was fostered

during the bilateral talks. This denotes the importance and effectiveness of classical

diplomacy where only a handful of actors are involved to reach a settlement, as opposed to

public diplomacy which requires the credibility of the state (or actor) pursuing this policy and

the audience’s reception to the message being delivered.

However, this argument should not be cited as a means to discredit the success of public

diplomacy. The discussion over Iran’s nuclear technology is a result of extenuating

circumstances. Braced with a crippling economy due to the sanctions imposed by the US

and international organisations, particularly on their oil and banking industries (Erdbrink,

11

2013), Rouhani had to seek the necessary means to relieve the sanctions and restore the

livelihood of Iranians (Nichols and Charbonneau, 2012).

6. Conclusion

Anti-Americanism has taken a solid form as an ideology – a rejection of all ideals pertaining

to the United States, and this has taken root in the Arab world. The research conducted by

Benjamin Goldsmith and Yusaku Horiuchi on the importance of public opinion on US foreign

policy concludes that “public opinion about US foreign policy indeed appears to matter when

countries make decisions on issues of importance to the US” (2012, p. 37). Obama’s

attempts to associate with the Iranians through the Nowruz video displayed his intention to

resume diplomatic ties with Iran, hence the success of the nuclear agreement.

In his book, Edward Djerejian proposes that to transform the nature of the relationship

between American and the Arab world, an approach to public diplomacy which is “candid

about differences but also stresses similarities – especially in values – can dampen the

animosity” (2007, p. 17). Christopher Ross posed the solution on how the US can succeed in

its public diplomacy efforts, stating that “in today’s world, the United States is more likely to

meet with success if it structures activities in ways that encourage dialogue” (2002, p. 82).

An examination of diplomacy through public means, and multilateral and bilateral means

indicates that both policies can be effectively utilised if the state adheres to the fundamental

principles of the approach – engaging with the target audience. Obama’s strategy to

reconnect with the Middle East was seen, by both the public and world leaders, as a sincere

effort to repair the damage inflicted by his predecessor.

With the evidence presented throughout this paper, it can be fairly surmised that while public

diplomacy was successful in bridging the gap between the US and Iran which lead to the

eventual nuclear agreement, the concept of public diplomacy itself has yet to take

12

importance over bilateral and multilateral agreements. Despite thawing the relation between

the two states prior to the reconvening of diplomatic talks earlier this year (Botelho, Cohen,

and Yan, 2013), the success of the agreement can be attributed to the talks and negotiations

which took place between the US and Iran, and subsequently with the P5+1. This can be

argued as a reversion back to classical diplomacy which built the US’ credibility for the better

part of the 20th century when the US enjoyed the height of its hegemonic status as the most

credible and democratic state.

13

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