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85

ISOT'OPIC SEPARATION REMO'| E ADVERTENCY

Gieason, Gregory William*

(USA, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 82467 Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, Gernackerstrasse 2, telephone 49 8821 750 2526, email::

gleasong@marshallcenter.org)

Abstract: fiauna-r craru cBr3aHa c HepacnpocrpaHeHneM np[MeHeHur ,ra:epuoii Texrolroixuo6orarqenmi. Ila:epHa-r rexHor'tort{r o6oraqeHnr sce euqe pa:pa6arr,Baercr. Ho ecrb trpu3Haxu.rITo oHa cKopo norBrircr B Kar{ecrBe 3HarlnTerbHo 6o.nee 4euenoro cnoco6a npor.r:eogcrraHueroro o6orarqeHHcrro ypaHa Art rJepHlrx peaKTopoB H Bo3MoxHo 4,rl roro, vroOrtnpon3BoAsrr sr,rcoxo o6orarqeHutrii ypax B uenfx co3AaHnr rAepHofo opyNnr. .{lrHaunraTexHuqecKoro nporpecca Moxier nplrBecrx K norBr'reHr.no noBttx npon3BoaHre,refi o6oraqeuuoroypaHa, yrpoxar pa3pyixxrb reKyu.ice cpaBiitrTenbrloe npeuMyrlecrBo frarHhrx [pon3Bo,qurenei:i,oco6eHHo rtx, Koropbre rcronb3yrcT [eurpnrpyxnuii cnoco6. O.{uarco, cyuecrByroulHeoclrotsHble l]pori38oJlr{Ten14 B3arrMHo 3aHHTepecoBaHr,l B orpaHnrleHnr: pacnpocTpaHeH}.1tTexHoirorr.rii, Korop!,le t\tor)'T npnBecru K palBurl{ro cnocoooa toit]'qeHnr tAepHbrx a3pbrBqarbixBeuccrB, ,Alrc raxrlr.rouHtrii rourpo,rr, KoropLrx 3arpyAHeH. AaHHa{ pa6ora HCcre4yer B,.rrirHr.re

STIiX B3aHMI{bIX ,lHTePeCOB.

"Remote advertency" refers to the capability to be aware of something at a

distance. Despite the numerous security challenges of the nuclear age, remote awarenessofenrichment and fissile material production was not a major security problem during theearly periods of the nuclear age. A number of early enrichment technologies wereexperimentaily researched resulting in a reliance on electrornagnetic separation andgaseous diffusion as the most commonly used means of isotopic enrichment. These twoprocesses were followed by centrifuge separation technology. The use of these threetechnologies -rlectromagnetic. gaseous dilfusion. and centrifuge-for uraniumenrichment on an industrial level was at such a scale and scope that they were relativelyeasily observable using national technical means such as electronic, photographic orseismic observation conducted at a distance. Very recently a previously abandoneduranium enrichment technology-laser enrichment-has reappeared,

Observation at a distance-remote advertency-has always been an importantaspect of non-prolif'eration verification. Intemational cooperaiion in nonproliferationverification exists on a number of levels. The basic international agreement is the Nuclear\on-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT recognized two categories of states; thoseacknowledging possession of nuclear weapons prior to 1967-the nuclear weaponstates-and those not acknowledging possession of nuclear weapons-the non-nuclearweapons states. The essence of the treaty consisls ofthree "pillars"; all signatories agreeto share the benefits of peacef'ul nuclear science, to promote disannament and to preventproliferation. The specific obligations under the treaty, however, are somewhat dilferenrfor the two categories. The nuclear rveapons states (China, France, Russia, the UK and

the U.S) are obligated to prevent nuclear proliferation and to undertake good faith effortstol.rard nuclear disarmanrent. The non-nuclear \\,eapon states are enjoined fromdeveloping or acquiring nuclear armaments and are additionally required to con'rply withverification measures 10 demonstrate they are not seeking to acquire or develop nucleararmaments. Nuclear weapons states are not required by the NPT to comply withverification measures.

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The "watchdog". organization established under the auspices of the UnitedNations, the Internatior.nl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the primary institutioncharged with conducting non-proliferation verification on an intemational basis. In 1990

following the determination that Iraq had skirted verification procedures by secretlyundertaking a nuclear weapons deveiopment program, the IAEA resolved to enhanceverilication measures. Two NPT follow-on agreements, the IAEA Safeguards Agreementand the IAEA Additional Protocol, increased the rigor of verificaticn measures. These

agreements ailolv detailed inspections ol declared sites and aliow the I-r\EA to cany outenvironmental monitoring of non-declared facilities in non-nuclear weapon states

suspected ofproliferation activity, Monitoring can take place to gauge a courrtry's effortsto develop a fissile material program. From the point of view of nuclear porverproduction, two stages in the nuclear fuel cycle are particularly sensitive; the initialproduction of fissile materials and the reprocessing olspent fuel. Monitoring may attend

to either or both of these stages as weil as to diversion efforts within the nuclear fuelcycle or from various other applications such as medical use, materials testing, and so on.

During the middle years of the Cold War sophisticated isotopic enrichmenttechnologies using other physical principles were experimented with and put into initialstages of development. Some of these technologies, in particular laser enrichmentmethods, were considered to have great commercial promise and national secririlypotential" These approaches were widely viewed as beyond the technical or 1..;,a.s1.1

capacity of many non-nuclear states. In 2001 one enrichment specialist nc',jd that laserisotope separation "has been regarded as too difficult a technolc..,y for a typicalproliferating nation in the middle economic rank (100B$/yr) to rr.rlize."[l] Support tbrthese more sophisticated methods diminished among nucie'.: .,, eapon states because largestockpiles of fissile materials had accumulatrj during the Cold War period.Ccmparatively low energy prices contribute,, to reducin{ suppcrt for research aniidevelopment in theoretically promisin. but commercially impractical enrichrner:1technologies. As a consequence, sca,',r. of these new enrichment techlrologies remair.e,:tron th{r le',/ei of research and sr'.,ns of the efforts to transition the technologies to aiiindustrial lcvel were simply :'',,s1ys6.

For several do,oades the U.S. relied exclusively on gaseous diffusion for uraniumenrichmert tct ?'-oduce low enriched uranium to be used lor reactor fuel conrmero'.;i1purpc.:es. i \)r'hile centrifuge technology offered substantial economic ari<1 envirnnr ;ntaladvantagcs, existing commercial fhcilities were retained while researr.;h rvas toni-i'._rjted onmore advanced enrichment technologies. Various forms of laser isotope 3ep..,. aiion (LIS)

1 Since the beginning of the nuclear age U.S. facilities have relied e .xu-11j3!..,31y upongaseous diffusion for uranium enrichment for commerciai Furposes. lic ccmmeriialcentrifuge enrichment facilities operated in tl.:e U.S r:,itil htil.ch. 2itl0 rvlien LtSF,{lannounced the operation of a cascade of centriluge mrehii,es rn a coninercial_plantconfiguration in Piketon, Ohio. A short time afterrvards. inJu:i.,2010. rhe firm i-li.ilrNCOannounced that it began production ofLEU at a cei.rtrifluge,:nricir,nent ia.iiir; tocaied inEunice, New Mexico. In october 2011 the t,r-uclear Rr:gularL,ry conrmission (I.JRC)issued a license to AREVA Enrichment Services Ll C r o-cor.siruct and operate a gascentrifuge uranium enrichment plant in Bonne.rille ccuntv. idaho. However, iheARE VA project stalled primarily for financial reasons base, lon i.utu re uranium pricelorecasls.

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treements. These:arry outn states's effortsr powerre initialr)' attendlear fuel.d so on.

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technology were identified as a theoretically piausible path to isotopic uraniumenrichment. A process cailed AVLIS (Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation) u,asexperimentally demonstrated as a successful physical process at Lawrence LivermoreNatiorral Laboratory (LLNl.) in 1974.121Free electron lasers (FEl.) have also been usedfor separation. Other countries around the world were also pursuing LIS technology. The{J.S. Department of Energy (DoE) came to regard LIS as the most promising method toprovide a low-cost, environmentally sound method to enrich uranium for the U.S. andtrading partners. 2DoE savr LiS as a way to replace the aging and energy inefficientgaseous diffusion f'acilities in the US and, at the same time, skip over the stage ofcenlrif'uge separation used in other countries.

The end of the Cold War brought ambitious plans for laser enrichment to a

standstili. New U.S. legislation privatized enrichment facilities and turned responsibilityfbr management over to a semi-private corporation created by the U.S. Congress in 1992,

the U.S. Enrichment Corporation, USEC. In 1994 USEC renewed the LIS program in the

U.S., plovi<iing suppod for further research and development for laser isotope separationn.rethcds. l{owever, lor financial reasons, in June 1999 USEC withdrew suppo( for LISresearch and development. Meanwhiie, others continued to research laser technology,pushing it ck>ser to commercial viability. ln 1988 in Australia Michael Goldsworthylbrmed a company to commerciaiize iaser technology under the name SILEX, separatiort

of isotopes by laser excitation.[3] I-n 1995 scientists Horst Struve and MichaelGolCsworthy conducted a "proof oi principle" experiment which demonstrated the

commercial viability of the proprietary SILEX approach. An Agreement for Cooperationbeiween the United States and Australian Govemments was signed paving the way forcontinued development of the SILEX Technology for uranium enrichment, and

facilitating its future transler to the US. The SILEX methodology was classified in ths US

and !n Australia by the govemments.

In 2006 CE Energy entered a partnership with the Australian firm SILEX Systems

to develop the third-generation SILEX process. ln the U.S., GE Energy partnered withHitachi, forming GE-Hitachi. ln July 200?. GE-Hitachi submitted a license amendment

request to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), seeking approval for research

and development associated with laser enrichmetrt to be conducted at its Global Nuclear

Fuels-Americas (GNF) facility in Wihnington, NC. 'Ihe GNF partnership leci to the

development of an industriai level "test loop" and, following that, to an industrial piloi"lead cascade". ln mid 2008 Cameco bought into the project, acquiring a 24o/o sharc'

alongside GE (5 I %) and Hitachi (25%). GE-Hitachi is currently operating the test loop at

Global Nuclear Fuel's (GNF) Wiimington, No(h Carolina fuel fabrication facility'GNF is a partnership of GE, Tcshiba, and Hitachi. In addition, in June 2009, GE-I{itachi

submitted a license application to construct a commercial laser enrichment plant in

t Lase, isotope separation using photo-disassociation (LlS) is based on the fact that

different isotopes of the same element, while chemically identical, have different

electronic energies and therefore absorb different colors of laser light.'l'he isotopes ofmost eiements can be separated by a laser-based process if they can be efficiently

vaporized as atoms. Lr the laser system used for the LIS uranium enr-ichment prooess

electrons from the "8U atoms are separated, leaving positively charged 23sU ions that can

be easily collected for use.

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wilmington, NC. The NRC staff is reviewing that application and expected to reach a

decision in September 2012. [4]

Electromagnetic and gaseous diffusion technology uses large amounts ofelectricity. In the past it has been quite easy to observe from a distance the functioning ofthese facilities. similarly, centriluge technology uses considerable electricity but also

produces a signature that are easily distinguishable as a result of the distinctive vibration

produced by equipment tl.rat runs at such a high number of revolutions per minute.'l-Io*"u"r,

laser inrichment technology does not share these features. The fact that LIS

technology is so much more compact and free of distinctive industrial signatures has led

scientistiio immediately question the proliferation implications. [5] some have raised

questions whether laser technology might be of palticular interest to states or groups

intent upon proliferation. [6]

The adverlency (remote observability) of LIS depends upon a number of factors.

[7] Researchers have challenged the NRC position on the issue of reviewing the GNF

proposal without includitig a formal process of non-proliferation assessment. [8 ]Researchers have objected that a formal non-proliferation assessment should be included

as a component of the review of the GNF license application' [9] GNF voluntarily

offered a specialist assessment of the non-proliferation implications o1 16e I lStechnology. The details ofthe assessment have not been made public, but the conclusion

ofthe assessment was that LIS technology did not present non-proliferation implications

that involved risks exceeding those of other enrichment technologies. Because the

details ofthe process are not public, without more information it is difficult to accept the

report's conclusion. If it is true that the LIS process requires UF6 as the basic feedstock,

then the uranium conversion process would be observable by existing means. 3

Fufihermore, ii the LIS process requires turnable dye lasers which are still on the

forefront of laser technology and easily observable through existing dual-use prioritycategories, tl.ren international acquisition as well domestic research and development

progiu.. would be observable. However, as technology advances the observability

iould be expected to decline. Fudhermore, unexpected breakthroughs in technology

might quickly exceed present oversight capacities.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Certain types oi technology are required and may be either internationally

acquired as components or in paft. Laser programs are known to requite tunable dye

lasirs and the associated equipment necessary to measure output. Uranium needs to be

vaporized. Sputtering, platings and coatings for advanced materials qualities to resist

highly corrosive substances are required.

Calling a moratorium on research on LIS technology is at best a temporary

palliative. The history of enrichment technology and, more generally, the history oficience in general suggest that once a technology is known to have been moved from the

theoretical to the practical plane, it is futile to attempt to impose upon other countries the

r Milled uranium ore-U3Os-is moved through a conversion process resulted in

uranium hexafluoride-UFe to be used as the gaseous process medium.

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ulted in

cessation of further research. In gencral it is fulile and counterproductive lbr nuclear

weapon states to either inclividually or jointly intercede in scientilllc development alld

industrial adoption of laser enrichment technology. Laser enrichment offers a path to less

expensive and more environmentally sustainable production ofreactor fuels'

At the same time, thc proliferation implications of laser technology ale an ordel ofmagnitucle more disruptive to cunent non-prolifcration monitoring and verification

cfforts. The further development o1-laser technology calls lor a more robust and focused

dialogue among nuclear weapon states of measures to enhance monitoring ' and

verifioation. This dialogue should be aimed at consensus based standards and principles

regarding remote observation.

REFEIIENCES

1. Gregory Gleason is prolessor of security studies at the Gcorge C. Marshall

European Center for Security Studies. This paper represents the author''s personal views

ancl does not represcnt the views of the Marshall Center.

2. 11l Erickson. S.A. Nuclear Proliferation Using l-aser Isotope Separation-

Verification Options. Lawrence Livermote National Lab., CA. UCRL-JC-145343(October 15,2001):2.

3. https://e-reports-cxt.llnl.gov/pdfl245348.pd14. [2] Campbell, E. Michael. Laser Program 25th Anniversary -- Uraniurr AVI-IS.

I-awrence Livermore Nalional Laboratory report. UCRL-TB-128043, 199'7 .

5 til Nikitin, Mary Belh and Bruce Vaughn, [J.S.-Australia Civilian NuclearCooperation: Issues fbr Congress (Dccember 1, 2010). Congressional Research Serlice,7-5700. R41312.

6 14] GE Laser Enrichment Facility Licensing, Nuciear Regulatory Commission.http : //n1,\,v.nrc. gov/materials/fu el-cycle-fac/laser. html

7 [5] Boureston, Jack- and Ferguson, C.D. "Laser Enrichment: Separation

anxiety." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (March-April 2005): 14-i8.8 t6l Broad, William J. "Laser Advances in Nuclear Fuel Stir Teror l-ear". The

\eq' York Timcs. (August 20, 2011).9 l7l Lyman, John. "Enrichment separative capacity fbr SII,F.X. I-os Alamos

)lational Laboratory LA-UR-O5-3786. http://cstsp.aaas.org/files/silex.pdfa10. [8] Slakey, Francis and Linda Cohen, "NRC Should Perform Non-Proliferation

-A.ssessment of Laser Enrichment Technology." American Physical Society, Forum on

Physics and Society.1 1. http://aps.org/unitsifps/newsletters/201 0O7/slakcy.clrn1,2. [9] Grossman, E]aine M. "Closely lJeld Report Discounts Proliferation Risk ol

Lascrs for Making Nuclear Fuel." Global Security Newswite (May 221. 2012)http://ul,rr'. nti.orq/gsnlarticlc/qloselv+eld-r'epofi-discolrnts- proliferatjort-tisk-laqsr-E:

makine-nuolear-fue1/

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