Union Racial Problems in the South

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RAY MARSHALL* Union Racial Problems in the South SOUTHERN INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS have been influ- enced, as was inevitable, by the racial turmoil which has followed the Supreme Court’s school desegregation decision of 1954. Both unions and employers face difficult problems. Most unions are committed to equalitarian racial policies, the implementation of which, national leaders fear, will alien- ate southern members and potential members. On the other hand, employers are often caught between pressures from Negroes, courts, and the federal government for equal treatment of colored workers and resistance from southern whites to changing racial employment patterns. This paper explores some current aspects of the racial issue as it affects unions, with emphasis on four questions: 1. What are the effects of the equalitarian racial policies of national unions on southern organizing activity? 2. Will attempts to introduce equalitarian racial practices in the South evoke opposition from southern union members? 3. Will equalitarian policies cause members and local unions to secede from national organizations and join some of the segregationist labor organi- zations formed in the South following the Supreme Court’s school desegrega- tion decision? 4. What effect will racial conflict have on union political activity? Effect on Organizing Many unions are relatively weak in the South but are under constant pressure to strengthen southern jurisdictions in order to protect membership elsewhere. For this reason, there has been considerable concern over the possible effect of equalitarian racial policies. While organizing has been complicated by racial conflict, this has probably been exaggerated as a factor impeding southern union growth. It is true that some employers * Professor of Economics, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge. 117

Transcript of Union Racial Problems in the South

RAY M A R S H A L L *

Union Racial Problems in the South

SOUTHERN INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS have been influ- enced, as was inevitable, by the racial turmoil which has followed the Supreme Court’s school desegregation decision of 1954. Both unions and employers face difficult problems. Most unions are committed to equalitarian racial policies, the implementation of which, national leaders fear, will alien- ate southern members and potential members. On the other hand, employers are often caught between pressures from Negroes, courts, and the federal government for equal treatment of colored workers and resistance from southern whites to changing racial employment patterns. This paper explores some current aspects of the racial issue as it affects unions, with emphasis on four questions:

1. What are the effects of the equalitarian racial policies of national unions on southern organizing activity?

2. Will attempts to introduce equalitarian racial practices in the South evoke opposition from southern union members?

3. Will equalitarian policies cause members and local unions to secede from national organizations and join some of the segregationist labor organi- zations formed in the South following the Supreme Court’s school desegrega- tion decision?

4. What effect will racial conflict have on union political activity?

Effect on Organizing Many unions are relatively weak in the South but are under

constant pressure to strengthen southern jurisdictions in order to protect membership elsewhere. For this reason, there has been considerable concern over the possible effect of equalitarian racial policies. While organizing has been complicated by racial conflict, this has probably been exaggerated as a factor impeding southern union growth. It is true that some employers

* Professor of Economics, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.

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appeal to the racial prejudices of white employees during representation elections. Furthermore, the National Labor Relations Board has ruled that racial appeals do not violate the National Labor Relations Act.’ But it can- not be demonstrated that such appeals have been decisive in many cases in which representation might otherwise have been gained.

In a widely publicized case at Bay Springs, Mississippi, for example, the International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE) lost an election at the NECO Manufacturing Company after pictures were circulated showing IUE President Carey dancing with the Negro wife of a delegate to an Inter- national Labor Organization convention at Geneva. But the same picture was used in newspaper publicity against the IUE at Jackson, Mississippi, during the Vickers election and the union won; it is improbable that the IUE would have won the NECO election, even if the race issue had not been raised.

There were many differences between the NECO and Vickers situations: NECO workers were primarily women, while those at Vickers were mainly men and high-school graduates; at Vickers, the chief opposition to the union on racial grounds was in the community, whereas the employer offered the main opposition to the union at NECO; Vickers is located in Mississippi’s largest metropolitan area, while NECO is in a small rural community of 1,302 people; though owned by Chicago interests, NECO does not have manufacturing operations outside the South, whereas Vickers is a subsidiary of the Sperry-Rand Company; at Bay Springs, there were few employment opportunities for workers who elected to defy the employer by joining a union, but at Jackson there were other alternatives; and, unlike Vickers, NECO sells its products mainly through unorganized retailers. All of these factors made it much easier to organize Vickers2

This is not to deny that racial differences have cost unions some close elections in the South. One of the industries in which racial factors have been important is tobacco processing. R. J. Reynolds, one of the largest firms in the industry, is unorganized, partly because Negroes and whites have failed to support the same union. Negroes at present refuse to support the Tobacco Workers International Union. However, the Communist ques- tion became so confused with racial differences at Reynolds that neither issue alone is clearly responsible for dividing the workers. Although Negroes are not in the majority at Reynolds, they represent the balance of power between union and nonunion whites. As a general rule, industrial unions

190 NLRB 1513; 119 NLRB 26; 118 NLRB 42. 2 See Ray Marshall, “Some Factors Influencing the Growth of Unions in the South,” Pro-

ceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Meettng of the Industdal Relations Research Association, 1960 (Madison, W s . : 196l) , pp. 166-182.

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have been able to count on Negro support, but in this case a history of racial animosity has weakened the Tobacco Workers.

Although there have been a number of instances in which unions have won representation elections because Negroes held the balance of power, there is now an apparent tendency in some sections for Negroes to give less support to unions than formerly-probably because of the split between the Negro community and the labor movement over the racial practices of unions, symbolized by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s widely publicized attacks on the AFL-CIO.

Opposition from Southern Members Southern unionists have sometimes vigorously opposed equali-

tarian racial policies. For example, the Chattanooga Central Labor Union was bitterly criticized by segregationist union leaders for endorsing the local school boards plans to comply with the Supreme Court’s desegregation de- ~ is ion .~ The CLU’s action was prompted by a 1954 AFL convention resolu- tion endorsing the Supreme Court’s decision. Vicious attacks were forth- coming from labor segregationists led by members of the Printing Pressmen and joined by locals of the Switchmen, Carpenters, Plumbers, Machinists, Typographical Union, Stage Hands, Auto Workers ( AFL), and Interna- tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; in all, nine af€iliated locals and one unaliated local opposed the CLU’s actions. The CLU and the Labor World, the local labor paper, were accused of being under the domineering control of leaders “supporting organizations and sociological theories . . . dedicated to removing the last vestiges of our Southern heritage” and of “selling us out for 30 pieces of our own silver” by contributing union money to the NAACP. Local union leaders were also denounced as “alien Communist lovers and socializers who have had their way for a long time.” According to the segre- gationists, the CLU could not deny “some responsibility for the disgusting integration of Negro and white workers in the labor movement in Ten- nessee .7’4

As a result of this criticism, some members dropped their subscriptions to the Labor World, some locals withdrew from the Central Labor Union, and a special meeting was called to reconsider the central body’s support of the school board. This meeting, attended by the largest number of dele- gates since the thirties, adopted a resolution which vowed to organize all workers in order to “keep gains of the bargaining table from being taken

3 Resolution passed by the Chattanooga CLU, July 25,1955. 4 News-Free Press (Chattanooga), August 3 and 20, 1955; Chattanooga Times, August 21,

1955.

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away by anti-labor legislation,” but “because of the highly controversial nature of the issues raised by the Supreme Court’s decision on segregation in the public schools, issues which cut across our ranks tending to divide us, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Chattanooga Central Labor Union henceforth to refrain from involving itself on either side of this is~ue.’’~

National unions have likewise had difficulties implementing equalitarian racial policies in the South. The UAW lifted the charter of a local in Dallas, Texas, in 1952, for refusing to follow the international’s racial policies, and it has had considerable difficulty with locals in Memphis and Atlanta. The Memphis International Harvester local was placed under trusteeship in 1960 after a long series of disputes with the international over racial matters, especially the segregation of drinking and toilet facilities at the local’s new headquarters. At Harvester, the Negro workers have been able to move into a variety of jobs as a result of firmness on the part of both the company and the international in the face of vigorous opposition from local white members. The Memphis UAW local also defied the international by raising funds for the Little Rock private, segregated schools after public schools were integrated.

At the Memphis Firestone plant, Negro members of the United Rubber Workers filed suit in 1957 after Negroes were laid off in accordance with traditional “informal” job arrangements, but in violation of the seniority provisions of the contract. The informal layoff system was abolished, and all jobs were subsequently opened on a strict seniority basis. Senior whites dis- placed some Negroes and senior Negroes displaced some whites. However, when the process was completed, it was found that Negroes had lost more jobs than they had gained. Furthermore, many senior Negroes were unable to perform efficiently on their new jobs and lost money because they were on piece rates. There was a certain amount of tension over this episode because of the agitation of outside segregationist groups. However, the tension at Firestone had apparently abated enough by 1959 to permit the election of a Negro to the local executive board; after the Negroes had filed their lawsuit, an all-white slate of officers replaced a biracial group led by a pro-Negro president.

Both the American Federation of Teachers and the United Packing- house Workers (UPWA) lost southern locals in their efforts to enforce racial equality. The UPWA, which probably had the most vigorous integration policy of any union, lost about ten locals, partly because of its racial practices. A considerable conflict arose within the CIO in 1953 when the UPWA pro- tested a segregated Political Action Committee banquet and dance in Bir-

5 Chattanooga CLU, “Statement of Policy on Segregation in the Public Schools,” Septem- ber 12, 1955.

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mingham. Also, the Packinghouse Workers elicited bitter opposition in the South when a charge of violation of union racial policy was brought against the Atlanta regional director for permitting a segregated dinner, In the case of the UPWA, however, internal conflict over racial matters was so involved with internal politics and the Communist issue that it is impossible to say how important race was in the loss of southern membership. The UPWA subsequently regained some of its membership-including three Louisiana locals-after this conflict subsided.

The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) lost five southern locals which refused to obey an ultimatum to integrate; the locals had about four thousand members and paid some thirty thousand dollars to the AFT an- nually. About three thousand of these members were in Atlanta and vicinity, while the others were in New Orleans and Chattanooga. The white local in Atlanta had a long history and was the fourth largest local in the AFT. These losses left the AFT with about 850 Negro members in the South. The rela- tively small Negro membership was somewhat surprising in view of the fact that Negro locals were theoretically integrated and that an integrated local had been established in Houston, Texas, in 1958.

AFT officials hoped a strong equalitarian racial stand would induce more Negro teachers to join their union. The hope was not realized, appar- ently because Negro teachers occupy a relatively high status within the Negro community, and, therefore, the element of discontent which is a frequent prerequisite to union organization was absent. Moreover, many Negro teachers join the National Education Association, which has permitted segregated locals and, as a “professional” organization, has more appeal to teachers than the AFT, However, in 1961, the NEA decided to take meas- ures to eliminate segregated branches in the South.

Segregationist Labor Organizations The anti-integrationist labor organizations formed in the

wake of the Supreme Court’s 1954 school desegregation decision have created some alarm among national union leaders. One of these segregationist or- ganizations is the United Southern Employees Association ( USEA), char- tered in North Carolina in 1956. The USEA sought to organize the strikers at the Rock Hill (South Carolina) Printing and Finishing Plant in 1957 and to lead them through a Textile Workers’ picket line, Subsequently chartered as a corporation in Virginia, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina, the USEA makes a strong appeal to employers by encourag- ing “cooperation and fair dealing,” as well as anti-integrationist policies.e It

0 USEA, Independent Trade Union News (n.d.).

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has also attempted to attract membership through a welfare program, includ- ing hospital and pension benefits, which costs the worker only 65 cents a month! ’I

A USEA leader told the writer: “The great majority of USEA members are ex-AFL-CIO union members who have quit the AFL-CIO because of [its] race-baiting tactics. . . . We believe that southerners should organize and control their own unions just as we elect our own congressmen from the South to represent us in Congress, We don’t need northern rabble rousers to represent us in labor.’’8

The USEA’s political objectives include: reversal of the 1954 desegrega- tion decision on the ground that Felix Frankfurter was formerly attorney and legal adviser to the NAACP, defeat of liberal candidates for political office by splitting Negro-Liberal-Labor alliances where they exist, passage of right-to-work laws, and a program to get southern workers to write their congressmen “to enact laws requiring all advocates of integration to be ‘steri- lized’ so that they will be unable to produce a ‘mongrelized offspring.’”’

The leader of the USEA attempted unsuccessfully to form an alliance with Ku Klux Klan organizations in the Piedmont area. Many of the Klan members belonged to the Textile Workers and dropped their KKK member- ship after they were told that membership in the Klan was tantamount to membership in the USEA. When the USEA criticized the CIO at a Klan meeting, union members protested that they had come to talk about the “colored and white” and not to discuss “our union.” The USEA’s agitation, together with a newspaper revelation that the KKK had admitted a sixteen- year-old boy, resulted in a decline of Klan membership from about three thousand to around three hundred in the Rock Hill, South Carolina, area during 1957.10

It is too early to evaluate the USEA, but if its objective is to gain mem- bers and enter into collective bargaining contracts, it would seem to have had little success thus far. The evidence suggests that the movement largely reflects the efforts of a few men, the prime mover being William Somersett, who has been described by acquaintances as a “promoter.” The USEA seems to have been active mainly in the Piedmont area, though it is reported to have moved into Birmingham after the failure of another segregationist organization, the Southern Aircraft Workers (SAW), to take the Hayes Aircraft plant away from the UAW.

The organizers of the Southern Aircraft Workers were the Brock broth-

7 Charlotte (N.C.) Obseruer, September 2, 1957. 8 Letter to the writer from Harry W. Brown, President of USEA, June 4,1959. 9 USEA, Sterilize the Mongrelizers (February, 1959). 10 Chorkdte (N.C.) Obseruer, September 1, 1957.

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ers, Elmer and Jack, the former a member of the Painters and the latter a member of the Typographical Union. The SAW seems to have vanished after it failed to win a 1956 representation election at Hayes Aircraft. Some UAW officials were surprised that the SAW had so little success in Birming- ham, since the vast majority of United Auto Workers members there were strong segregationists. Many of the leaders who fought for the UAW against the SAW were the same unionists who walked out of a union education meeting in North Carolina to protest discussion of the race issue.

The Brock brothers also attempted to form a Southern Federation of Labor at the city auditorium in Birmingham, July 21, 1956, “to drive the AFL-CIO back North with its notions of integration.” The AFL-CIO was sufficiently concerned about this movement to send four observers to the founding conference. In what was billed as a mass meeting, 135 persons attended the afternoon session, including the four observers, four firemen required by the city, many AFL-CIO observers from the local area, and a photographer from Life; the evening meeting was attended by approxi- mately two hundred and fifty persons. This poor attendance probably was responsible for the decision, made at the evening meeting, to drop plans for forming a separate organization in favor of boring from within existing unions.

Another attempt at a dual labor movement is Southern Crafts, Inc., headed by James E. Price, a railroad engineer from Birmingham. Southern Crafts is restricted to whites, has dues of two dollars a month, supports right-to-work laws, and maintains that one of the principal reasons its members have withdrawn from the AFL-CIO is that they “don’t feel that they can remain a part of an organization that will take its members’ money and force integration upon the South.”’1 There is no way of telling how successful Southern Crafts has been, because efforts to secure membership figures were unsuccessful. It would appear, however, that the organization has very few members, even in the Birmingham area.

The Southern States Conference of Union People (SSCUP) was formed by a group of Chattanooga unionists, including three printing pressmen, one musician, one machinist, one steelworker, one plumber, one chemical worker, and two automobile workers. SSCUP aims to work within regular unions in an effort to educate the AFL-CIO to segregationist policies. A resolution adopted by the founding committee declared that the AFL-CIO was “under the control of labor leaders who are aiding and abetting the mixing of the White and Negro races in our public schools and elsewhere, and . . . have contributed many thousands of dollars to the NAACP, an

11 Advertisement in South, June 17, 1957.

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organization dedicated to the elimination of our Southern principle of seg- regation, and . , . is raising 10 million dollars to conduct a drive to end segregation in the South, and . . , Walter Reuther is a member of the Board of Directors of the NAACP, an organization that is Communist influenced and dedicated to destroying our Southern civilization. . . .’’ The SSCUP went on record as being “absolutely opposed to the socio-racial policy of the AFL-CIO.”

The leader of the SSCUP, Arthur A. Canada, was involved in the con- flict within the Chattanooga CLU and was also president of the Tennessee Society to Maintain Segregation. Canada, a member of the Printing Press- men’s Union, sought unsuccessfully to block the merger of the Tennessee AFL and CIO because of the racial policies of the latter organiZation.12

The Federation for Constitutional Government was organized at Mem- phis in December 1955 to coordinate the activities of the White Citizens’ Councils in 12 southern states.13 The White Citizens’ Councils claim not to be anti-labor and to have a large number of union members in their ranks; however, the official paper of the Citizens’ Councils of America listed sev- eral labor organizations under the caption, “Here is the Enemyl”14 Along with the Episcopal Church, other church groups, and civil rights organiza- tions, this list included the following labor organizations: AFL-CIO, Amal- gamated Meat Cutters, International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, International Union of Electrical Workers, Michigan State AFL-CIO, Textile Workers Union of America, United Automobile Workers, and the United Steelworkers. These organizations were branded “enemies” because they had supported civil rights legislation.

Various other organizations which are related to the Citizens’ Councils in personnel and objectives seek to work within southern unions to oppose the racial and political beliefs of national unions. For example, the Jackson ( Mississippi) States’ Rights Association appealed for support in its fight against a coalition of unions, the Communist Party, “the Communist-front dominated NAACP. . . and all other radical left-wing groups [who] are highly organized, liberally financed by misled tax-exempt foundations, by the con- tributions of misguided ‘liberals’ and by the enforced levy of union dues to be used without any regard for individual union rnembers.”l6

These segregationist organizations appear to have been more successful in getting newspaper coverage than in gaining union members, though organizations like the WCC and the KKK have gained much support from

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12 Tennessee Federation of Labor, Proceedings of the Fifty-Seuenth Convention, 1955,

13 Chattanooga Times, July 1, 1956. 14 The Citizens’ Council, November, 1959. 15 Jackson States’ Rights Association, “Confidential Communication No. 2,” April 14, 1955.

pp. 65-70.

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union members and have created considerable trouble, fear, and embarrass- ment for national union leaders.

Political Action One of the basic objectives of segregation leaders in the South

has been to break the political alliances that have been formed between unions and Negroes. These liberal coalitions have often been effective when the race issue has been secondary to joint economic considerations. In other cases, especially in the deep South, union leaders have been afraid of racial alliances, particularly on a state-wide basis; in some of these areas labor has been able to accomplish its objectives without the aid of Negro votes, and in others union leaders fear that such coalitions will lead to anti-union legislation.

White Citizens’ Council leaders believe that if the number of Negro votes increases to the point at which union leaders are willing to deal with Negro leaders, the balance of power will swing away from segregationist politicians, They consider it important, therefore, to fight unions or bring pressure to bear on union members to support segregation measures and oppose the racial policies of national unions. One effective technique for splitting Negro-labor coalitions is to support pro-labor segregationists for public office.

Arkansas furnishes an outstanding illustration of the effect of racial con- flict on political activity. Governor Orval Faubus was elected in 1956 with Negro and labor support. Late in 1957, however, after much racial tension following the Little Rock school situation, the majority of unionists con- tinued to support Faubus, whereas Negroes obviously were unable to do so.

Another effect of racial tension has been to make local Committees on Political Education unwilling to endorse candidates. Moreover, it is more difficult under such circumstances for COPE, the AFL-CIO political arm, to raise money: whites have been informed that COPE gives money to the NAACP, while Negroes have been told that it supports the KKK and the White Citizens’ Councils. COPE has been particularly damaged by this activ- ity because of the Taft-Hartley Act’s prohibition on the use of union funds for political activity, which forces the labor movement to rely on voluntary contributions.

Segregationists have not always succeeded in breaking Negro-labor alli- ances and defeating “moderates.” In 1960, for example, a Negro-labor alliance held together in Tennessee, despite vigorous efforts of segregationists, and provided an overwhelming margin of victory for Senator Estes Kefauver in his campaign for re-election. Union leaders attribute Kefauver‘s victory

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to hard work by COPE, which considered the Tennessee campaign a key contest, and to the fact that the philosophical differences between Senator Kefauver and his conservative opponent gave workers a clear choice. The outcome might have been different if a pro-labor segregationist had run against Kefauver. Moreover, in the Tennessee campaign unions emphasized economic and not race issues.

Conclusions In general, the evidence suggests that racial unrest probably

has had little effect on union organizing, that very few locals or members have withdrawn from AFL-CIO unions because of union racial policies, that the segregationist labor organizations have achieved relatively little success in the South, and finally that, aside from considerable embarrassment to national union leaders, the main impact of racial animosity on union activity has probably been in the political area. These conclusions can be supported by the following observations:

1. Segregationist labor organizations have been relatively unsuccessful because of inadequate leadership. There seems to have been no case in which a regular union leader has been willing to leave his position to lead one of the racist groups, The experience suggests the improbability of building a labor organization on purely racist principles. This does not imply that union education has persuaded most members to be integrationists; the writer is convinced that the great majority of southern unionists hold the racial views of their communities. They apparently believe that organizations such as the WCC and KKK should attend to racial matters, the church to religious affairs, and the union to economic matters. This compartmentalization of thinking probably explains some of the apparently inconsistent dual alle- giances to antagonistic organizations. Southern unionists seem to believe that national union leaders understand labor matters but have no real apprecia- tion of local racial problems; they continue to give allegiance to both the WCC type of organization and to trade unions, because they believe that national union leaders are interested mainly in the politico-economic aspects of unionism and will not push integration in the South.

2. Economic influences encourage union members to continue their alle- giance to national unions. The most important unions in the South are craft unions, railroad unions, and industrial organizations which are associated with strongly organized bases outside the South. Unions often use their power in other areas to force companies with southern branches to give equal conditions in the South. Southerners who attribute their good conditions to unions will not lightly abandon their jobs or unions over racial matters.

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3. The ability of a national union to enforce its racial policies in the South will depend upon the relative power of the local and national organizations. If southern members are receiving more than prevailing wages in the area, the power of the national over the local is likely to be enhanced, unless the market is purely local in character. Other factors involved in this power relationship include : whether the national or local is the certified bargaining agent; ownership of strike funds and other property; internal union politics, especially the political power of the local union; the nature of the market and the need for national coordination of wage policy; whether or not there are other unions with more compatible racial policies willing to admit seceding members or locals; and the ease with which trusteeships can be imposed on locals by national unions.

National unions will rarely expel locals in the South for violating national racial policies, especially if the national is the certified bargaining agent. The UAW expelled its Dallas local in 1952, but has refused to take similar action against other locals. UAW leaders privately admit that the Dallas expulsion was probably a mistake because it “did not settle anything.” The UAW’s use of trusteeship in dealing with its Memphis local was upheld by the Secretary of Labor as valid under the Landrum-Griffin Act. The Textile Workers Union also used trusteeship to prevent its Front Royal, Virginia, local from giving aid to a private, segregated school formed to avoid the Supreme Court’s desegregation decision. Other unions which seem more prone to expel-the American Federation of Teachers and the National Association of Letter Carriers (which has ordered its southern branches to integrate)-are not really effective bargaining organizations in the South.

4. Race trouble in unions seems most likely to occw where there is race trouble in the local community, where groups like the Citizens’ Councils or the NAACP raise the issue in local union affairs, and where national union leaders make widely publicized integrationist speeches or engage in open integrationist activity. Practices which go unnoticed for years will create trouble if publicized, because publicity frequently causes southerners to feel compelled to disassociate themselves from the policies of their national leaders. Southern whites usually break with southern tradition when they join unions and will rarely risk complete ostracism by becoming identified as integrationists. They must, therefore, repudiate equalitarian racial statements and actions by national leaders, especially when challenged by anti-integra- tionist organizations. For example, Alexandria, Louisiana, union leaders responded to the AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department’s support of the Freedom Riders with a public statement: We would like for the public to know that the union members and the union officials of this area are unalterably opposed to the so-called Freedom Riders. . , .

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We want to make it clear that as far as we can determine no union money from the State of Louisiana was contributed to these lawbreakers.

Similar objections were raised by other unions, including 11 Louisiana locals of the Communications Workers.

5. The AFL-CIO racial policy which seems to have developed in the last few years is insistence on compliance with national racial policy. George Meany, for example, has said that equalitarian racial policies will be pushed in the South whether or not the AFL-CIO organizes a single worker in that region. Some state labor councils have also adopted resolutions supporting equalitarian racial policies; Texas and North Carolina are among those adopt- ing particularly strong statements. These moves apparently reflect the belief that temporizing with racial policy will cost the labor movement more in the end.

The AFL-CIOs inadequate political and economic power has caused it to rely heavily on education and persuasion as means of bringing about com- pliance with its racial policy. However, for several reasons, union education has very little effect on racial practices: ( 1 ) civil rights classes are frequently attended only by those who already accept national racial policy, (2) many union education directors are afraid to discuss racial matters, (3) racial atti- tudes are usually emotional and not easily changed by reasoning, and (4) union education programs are too recent in origin and too limited to be effective in relation to this issue. Moreover, such education seeks to change attitudes which have relatively little influence on action. The action taken by a particular union leader is more likely to reflect the political and economic power position in which he must operate than his racial attitudes. Attitudes are not entirely unimportant, however, because they determine the extent to which a leader will seek to strain his power limits for or against equali- tarian measures.

6. Racial conflict within the labor movement, following the 1954 Supreme Court school desegregation decision and the merger of the AFL and CIO in 1955, has subsided after reaching a peak about 1957; however, there is much latent feeling that is likely to erupt as a reflection of racial conflict in the larger community.