The winter of change: A Romanian revolution, coup d’état or a civil war?
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Transcript of The winter of change: A Romanian revolution, coup d’état or a civil war?
Author Catalin Rolea
1
The winter of change A Romanian revolution coup drsquoeacutetat or a
civil war
A theoretical perspective on the events that ended Ceausescursquos communist regime in
December 1989
Name Catalin Rolea
School School of Politics and International Relations University of Nottingham
Degree Course International Relations and Global Issues (MSci)
Submission date 29082014
Author Catalin Rolea
2
Abstract
The focus of this research is one of the most contentious political transitions in Eastern
Europe the case of Romania As there is still no official consensus on the nature of the
events that ousted Ceausescu in 1989 in Romania this dissertation provides an
alternative theoretical framework by analysing the events through the prism of the
broader literature on revolutions coups drsquoeacutetat and civil wars By adopting an
interpretative methodology and deploying qualitative methods the extent to which the
events of 1989 fit in each category are evaluated by isolating key criteria used to test
the validity and suitability of such explanations The findings of this research point
towards the hybridised nature of the events and the necessity of the development of
new all-encompassing theory of political change
Author Catalin Rolea
3
Table of Contents
I Introduction 4
a Background and purpose of research 4
b Methodology and structure 9
II Political change theory and the Romanian case 11
a Revolutions 11
b Coups 14
c Civil wars 17
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution 20
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat 31
V A Romanian Civil War 39
VI Conclusion 45
VII Bibliography 47
Articles 47
Books 48
Online sources 53
Author Catalin Rolea
4
I Introduction
Contentious political change has always been a fascinating topic for social sciences
scholars especially in the fields of political science history and sociology Whether
psychological or ethno-religious in nature national or triggered by the international
context revolutionary movements civil wars and coups have shaped world politics
throughout the world and still are as illustrated by the Arab Spring the civil war in Syria
or the events occurring in Ukraine at the moment As such a thorough analysis of such
events is of utmost importance to the understanding of the causes and nature of social
economic and political change The focus of this paper will be the contentious politics
that have dominated the Romanian political sphere both preceding and proceeding 1989
when the country began transitioning from a repressive communist regime to a
democratic society While the 1989rsquos wind of change that swept Eastern Europersquos
communist regimes and led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and implicitly to the
end of the Cold War represented turning points in the former satellitesrsquo history in the
case of Romania it also represented one of its greatest enigmas Almost 25 years after
Ceausescursquos ousting a lot of questions have still remained unanswered with no official
consensus of the nature of the events of 1989
a Background and purpose of research
Romania was unsurprisingly the last country where communism fell and the only one
that took a violent turn The reason it did not come as a surprise was due to its
uncommon regime different than the other Soviet Satellites While it was seen as a
potential anti-Soviet Western ally due to its nationalist form of communism at the same
time it also conducted one of the most repressive dictatorships in Eastern Europe and
refused to take consideration any reforms either from the West (the US the UN
regarding the treatment of minorities) or the East (Soviet Union glasnost perestroika)
(Scurtu 2000 89) Eventually both internal and external pressure turned the country
Author Catalin Rolea
5
into what Radio Free Europe called a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to be lit at any time
by any spark (Cesereanu 2009 48)
While anti-communist or pro-Gorbachev manifestations had previously occurred around
the country none escalated as the one in Timisoara in 1989 when the attempted
evacuation of a reformed Hungarian pastor that led to small-scale (20-30 people) protest
against the evacuation eventually escalated into an anti-Ceausescu popular uprising
consisting of thousands of people (Arpad 2011 15) Ceausescu convinced it was not a
genuine popular revolt but rather a foreign diversion endeavoured unsuccessfully to
repress the lsquohooligansrsquo as he called the protesters and unwisely planned a great popular
rally summoning tens of thousands of citizens in front of the Communist Partyrsquos Central
Committee in an attempt to condemn the unpatriotic acts in Timisoara As expected
despite Ceausescursquos efforts to appeal to the population the outcome was the decisive
anti-Ceausescu revolt ended with the storming in the central building and Ceausescu and
his wifersquos escape in a helicopter Soon after Ceausescursquos escape a committee entitled
lsquoThe National Salvation Frontrsquo (NSF) formed by ex-communist figures led by Iliescu
quickly filled the power void and seized power with the army and the Television at its
disposition (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 198) A day later Ceausescu was captured
and in the following couple of days on the 25th of December he and his wife were given
a mock trial sentenced to death and summarily executed In the meantime right after
Ceausescursquos escape psychological warfare and terrorist attacks were waged by still
unknown forces both against the army and the population attacks which diminished
after the execution of the Ceausescus According to official data released in 2008 over
1200 people were killed more than 5000 injured and other couple of thousands
unlawfully detained and mistreated during the events that led to the fall of communism
(ECHR 2011) The NSF organized free elections as promised but at the same time
quickly turned into a political party winning the majority of the votes When the NSF
was accused of lsquostealingrsquo the revolution and peaceful protests were organized in the
capital Bucharest the protesters were brutally repressed by the newly installed
Author Catalin Rolea
6
government in an old communist fashion (Adamson amp Florean 2013 175) These series
of events have shrouded the real nature of the alleged revolution and led to contentious
debates about it
The most asserted and commonly held opinion amongst Romaniarsquos population is that the
events constituted a popular revolution A survey circulated in 1996 revealed that 50
amongst respondents believed that Romania had experienced a revolution 30 that it
experienced a coup drsquoeacutetat and 20 that it was a foreign intervention (see Roper 2000
60) Fifteen years later a similar conducted survey revealed that opinions had not
significantly changed (BCS 2009) As Roper (1994 401) argues there is no single
theoretical framework that actually offers a satisfactory analysis of the events and
perhaps that is the main reason the population is so divided on the issue Despite the
great sacrifice that was necessary for the countryrsquos transition from communism there is
still no unanimity on either the nature of the events or on the ones to be blamed for the
crimes despite the several convictions that have already been made
There are several interpretations and theories which aim to explain the events with the
debate mainly revolving around the spontaneous revolution theory versus the coup
drsquoeacutetat one However some have also not excluded the possibility of a civil war to have
occurred (Ghaleb 2009)
Proponents of each of these variants can be also divided on certain points either on
minor or major issues Most of the contention lies as already pointed out on nature of
the terrorist attacks the seizure of power but also on the foreign element While deemed
to have been Ceausescursquos paranoia there at least several thousand foreign lsquotouristsrsquo
within the country during the events who left shortly after The extent to which they
influenced the revolution has been also debated ranging from a mere informative and
observational role to a facilitator and even vital role (Hall 1999 2)
The revolution theory is (rightfully) the most disseminated due to the context of social
revolutions it took place in but also due to the massive revolts that entangled Romania
Author Catalin Rolea
7
at the time First of all there are proponents of the Romanian spontaneous revolution
who have primarily consisted of revolutionaries themselves personalities that took part
in Ceausescursquos reprisal or members of the NSF who seized power Most of the books or
articles written on the events have been memoirs of the key leaders of the time Shortly
after the regime change Dumitru Mazilu former vice-president of the NSF wrote a book
entitled the lsquoStolen Revolutionrsquo1 (Mazilu 1991) advocating for a coup drsquoeacutetat position he
changed nevertheless 20 years later in a book entitled lsquo The Romanian Revolution
days and nights of drama and hopersquo (Mazilu 2011) where he strongly supports the
genuine revolutionary character2 The most prolific public figure which presented the
events as a genuine popular revolution was Ion Iliescu the leader of the NSF and
president of the country for 12 years who not only defended the revolutionary character
in writing (two published memoirs) but also on several occasions on televised debates
(Iliescu 1996) As part of the Institute of the Romanian Revolution of 1989 a series of
historians have also defended the revolution with figures such as Andreescu Bucur or
Scurtu Apart from Romanian public figures the Romanian events have also received
attention abroad Foreign scholars such as Vladimir Tismaneanu (2001) and Peter-Siani
Davies (2000) have defended the revolutionary character of the Romanian shift even
comparing it to the Great French Revolution McDermott and Stibbe consider 1989 as a
lsquogenuine popular revolution in both form and content with complex political and social
local national and international violent and non-violent long-term and short term
causesrsquo (McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 3)
Second there are those who reject the popular revolution and rather see the events as a
coup drsquoeacutetat Even proponents of the coup drsquoeacutetat theory are divided on the issue While
some credit an internal coup drsquoeacutetat organized by Iliescu and the NSF others argue that
everything was staged and planned ever since the Malta Summit at the beginning of
December 1989 Liviu Valenas (1990) considers the popular revolt only cosmetic to
brush the real plot coordinated by the KGB French writers such as Radu Portocala
1 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Furata memoriu pentru tara mearsquo
2 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Romana zile si nopti de dramatism si sperantarsquo
Author Catalin Rolea
8
(1990) Victor Loupan (1990) or Michel Castex (1990) believe it was an internal coup
backed by external support
Third there are some who saw the revolution as a hybrid between a revolution and a
coup Such figures represented by Romanian historians such as Lucian Boia (2001) or
Mihai Stoenescu (2004) consider that a spontaneous revolution did exist only until it was
either attempted to be stolen by foreign forces or was stolen by the NSF Jean-Marie Le
Breton then French ambassador to Romania (1987-1990) in comparison to the majority
of the French journalists who saw the revolution as an impostor a plot or a coup the ex-
ambassador considers a genuine revolution did happen although only until 22nd of
December when it was confiscated (Le Bretton 1996) Andrew Richard Hall also
suspects a revolution-hybrid palace coup (Hall 1999) while Anneli Ute Gabanyi (1999
48) considers that the events constituted a revolutionary coup preceded by a popular
revolt that was previously provoked by the couprsquos architects in order to use it
Fourth there is the civil war theory a less popular one which has not received as much
attention as the other two The high number of casualties combined with the ethno-
religious spark of the revolution has led captain Ghaleb (2011) to conclude that neither
revolution nor coup are sufficient in understanding the conflict and thus advocated for
the use of the term civil war as the most suitable Mihai Ungheanu (1977) believes the
events constituted a staged civil war deployed in favour of the coup While none of the
theories offer a full analytic account of the 1989 events all bring important elements
which can help their understanding As it has been pointed before none of the proposed
theories can fully explain the nature of the events but at the same time none can be
dismissed completely The problem with the theoretical accounts of the 1989 events has
been that no systematic analysis on the broader literature on revolutions coups and civil
wars has been used in support of the claims Rather most accounts have been based on
broad academic or sometimes even popular definitions of revolutions coups and civil
wars No thorough deconstruction of the broader literature drawing on empirical studies
of such contentious politics has been made nor a comparison between them Henceforth
Author Catalin Rolea
9
this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical
account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on
revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative
explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989
As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the
unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened
As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek
a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a
custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and
coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories
b Methodology and structure
The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts
(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature
dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and
state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge
to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been
released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files
highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist
methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at
this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and
interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key
aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal
inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)
The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case
studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political
change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will
attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events
Author Catalin Rolea
10
as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by
the broader literature on contentious politics
Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian
event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical
approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical
interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a
structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together
The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences
during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete
footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline
of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that
has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper
articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of
memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved
in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)
memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources
of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument
and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved
Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the
events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination
of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war
or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well
as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and
French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and
Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a
satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the
Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most
appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The
Author Catalin Rolea
11
limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain
certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the
diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The
only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs
that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless
even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a
conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate
framework of further analysing it shall still be possible
II Political change theory and the Romanian case
The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical
frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order
to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will
isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical
literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case
study
a Revolutions
As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms
they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the
context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal
revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality
and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the
socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division
Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa
rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a
society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity
policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)
Author Catalin Rolea
12
would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too
occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a
complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a
more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be
necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study
In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different
generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital
conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)
The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)
Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical
generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European
revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a
general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia
revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the
government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a
common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to
opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek
rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential
outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate
reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left
from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the
great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the
same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage
in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the
implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive
Author Catalin Rolea
13
rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to
move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical
phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone
2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria
framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution
While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus
on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation
complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary
sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation
of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering
expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school
presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect
that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that
offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that
sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to
Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp
economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination
(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent
and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the
discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal
The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus
on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a
revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation
between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests
between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by
the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income
might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in
discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be
Author Catalin Rolea
14
seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain
privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they
can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists
argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided
within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not
stay in place (Goldstone 200315)
While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology
of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but
rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which
to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of
revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred
in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing
whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for
the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the
development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by
the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second
third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-
curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the
external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary
forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the
other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise
from stage number 4
b Coups
There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions
and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but
soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all
three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-
Author Catalin Rolea
15
13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms
which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has
institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the
coup drsquoeacutetat framework
As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a
similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good
knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and
weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the
opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation
However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the
differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues
unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the
opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a
technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn
them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of
the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the
remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings
to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been
associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to
monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)
Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first
traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)
considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be
democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)
along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo
lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup
because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards
because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo
Author Catalin Rolea
16
(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the
essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is
not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the
grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup
would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening
fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the
strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to
dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and
attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)
On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that
democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the
world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others
Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol
argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat
and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to
democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition
against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes
free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960
Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on
the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones
Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events
through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat
As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil
war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of
the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will
come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary
for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the
population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting
Author Catalin Rolea
17
foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all
should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by
adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed
4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to
popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down
in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected
in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects
legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the
military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends
with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)
The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is
drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not
entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to
impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)
Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be
applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or
government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)
c Civil wars
Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state
recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed
conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition
movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their
nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes
one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars
involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly
forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according
to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
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Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
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48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
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Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
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Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
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50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
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51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
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52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
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53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
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CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
2
Abstract
The focus of this research is one of the most contentious political transitions in Eastern
Europe the case of Romania As there is still no official consensus on the nature of the
events that ousted Ceausescu in 1989 in Romania this dissertation provides an
alternative theoretical framework by analysing the events through the prism of the
broader literature on revolutions coups drsquoeacutetat and civil wars By adopting an
interpretative methodology and deploying qualitative methods the extent to which the
events of 1989 fit in each category are evaluated by isolating key criteria used to test
the validity and suitability of such explanations The findings of this research point
towards the hybridised nature of the events and the necessity of the development of
new all-encompassing theory of political change
Author Catalin Rolea
3
Table of Contents
I Introduction 4
a Background and purpose of research 4
b Methodology and structure 9
II Political change theory and the Romanian case 11
a Revolutions 11
b Coups 14
c Civil wars 17
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution 20
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat 31
V A Romanian Civil War 39
VI Conclusion 45
VII Bibliography 47
Articles 47
Books 48
Online sources 53
Author Catalin Rolea
4
I Introduction
Contentious political change has always been a fascinating topic for social sciences
scholars especially in the fields of political science history and sociology Whether
psychological or ethno-religious in nature national or triggered by the international
context revolutionary movements civil wars and coups have shaped world politics
throughout the world and still are as illustrated by the Arab Spring the civil war in Syria
or the events occurring in Ukraine at the moment As such a thorough analysis of such
events is of utmost importance to the understanding of the causes and nature of social
economic and political change The focus of this paper will be the contentious politics
that have dominated the Romanian political sphere both preceding and proceeding 1989
when the country began transitioning from a repressive communist regime to a
democratic society While the 1989rsquos wind of change that swept Eastern Europersquos
communist regimes and led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and implicitly to the
end of the Cold War represented turning points in the former satellitesrsquo history in the
case of Romania it also represented one of its greatest enigmas Almost 25 years after
Ceausescursquos ousting a lot of questions have still remained unanswered with no official
consensus of the nature of the events of 1989
a Background and purpose of research
Romania was unsurprisingly the last country where communism fell and the only one
that took a violent turn The reason it did not come as a surprise was due to its
uncommon regime different than the other Soviet Satellites While it was seen as a
potential anti-Soviet Western ally due to its nationalist form of communism at the same
time it also conducted one of the most repressive dictatorships in Eastern Europe and
refused to take consideration any reforms either from the West (the US the UN
regarding the treatment of minorities) or the East (Soviet Union glasnost perestroika)
(Scurtu 2000 89) Eventually both internal and external pressure turned the country
Author Catalin Rolea
5
into what Radio Free Europe called a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to be lit at any time
by any spark (Cesereanu 2009 48)
While anti-communist or pro-Gorbachev manifestations had previously occurred around
the country none escalated as the one in Timisoara in 1989 when the attempted
evacuation of a reformed Hungarian pastor that led to small-scale (20-30 people) protest
against the evacuation eventually escalated into an anti-Ceausescu popular uprising
consisting of thousands of people (Arpad 2011 15) Ceausescu convinced it was not a
genuine popular revolt but rather a foreign diversion endeavoured unsuccessfully to
repress the lsquohooligansrsquo as he called the protesters and unwisely planned a great popular
rally summoning tens of thousands of citizens in front of the Communist Partyrsquos Central
Committee in an attempt to condemn the unpatriotic acts in Timisoara As expected
despite Ceausescursquos efforts to appeal to the population the outcome was the decisive
anti-Ceausescu revolt ended with the storming in the central building and Ceausescu and
his wifersquos escape in a helicopter Soon after Ceausescursquos escape a committee entitled
lsquoThe National Salvation Frontrsquo (NSF) formed by ex-communist figures led by Iliescu
quickly filled the power void and seized power with the army and the Television at its
disposition (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 198) A day later Ceausescu was captured
and in the following couple of days on the 25th of December he and his wife were given
a mock trial sentenced to death and summarily executed In the meantime right after
Ceausescursquos escape psychological warfare and terrorist attacks were waged by still
unknown forces both against the army and the population attacks which diminished
after the execution of the Ceausescus According to official data released in 2008 over
1200 people were killed more than 5000 injured and other couple of thousands
unlawfully detained and mistreated during the events that led to the fall of communism
(ECHR 2011) The NSF organized free elections as promised but at the same time
quickly turned into a political party winning the majority of the votes When the NSF
was accused of lsquostealingrsquo the revolution and peaceful protests were organized in the
capital Bucharest the protesters were brutally repressed by the newly installed
Author Catalin Rolea
6
government in an old communist fashion (Adamson amp Florean 2013 175) These series
of events have shrouded the real nature of the alleged revolution and led to contentious
debates about it
The most asserted and commonly held opinion amongst Romaniarsquos population is that the
events constituted a popular revolution A survey circulated in 1996 revealed that 50
amongst respondents believed that Romania had experienced a revolution 30 that it
experienced a coup drsquoeacutetat and 20 that it was a foreign intervention (see Roper 2000
60) Fifteen years later a similar conducted survey revealed that opinions had not
significantly changed (BCS 2009) As Roper (1994 401) argues there is no single
theoretical framework that actually offers a satisfactory analysis of the events and
perhaps that is the main reason the population is so divided on the issue Despite the
great sacrifice that was necessary for the countryrsquos transition from communism there is
still no unanimity on either the nature of the events or on the ones to be blamed for the
crimes despite the several convictions that have already been made
There are several interpretations and theories which aim to explain the events with the
debate mainly revolving around the spontaneous revolution theory versus the coup
drsquoeacutetat one However some have also not excluded the possibility of a civil war to have
occurred (Ghaleb 2009)
Proponents of each of these variants can be also divided on certain points either on
minor or major issues Most of the contention lies as already pointed out on nature of
the terrorist attacks the seizure of power but also on the foreign element While deemed
to have been Ceausescursquos paranoia there at least several thousand foreign lsquotouristsrsquo
within the country during the events who left shortly after The extent to which they
influenced the revolution has been also debated ranging from a mere informative and
observational role to a facilitator and even vital role (Hall 1999 2)
The revolution theory is (rightfully) the most disseminated due to the context of social
revolutions it took place in but also due to the massive revolts that entangled Romania
Author Catalin Rolea
7
at the time First of all there are proponents of the Romanian spontaneous revolution
who have primarily consisted of revolutionaries themselves personalities that took part
in Ceausescursquos reprisal or members of the NSF who seized power Most of the books or
articles written on the events have been memoirs of the key leaders of the time Shortly
after the regime change Dumitru Mazilu former vice-president of the NSF wrote a book
entitled the lsquoStolen Revolutionrsquo1 (Mazilu 1991) advocating for a coup drsquoeacutetat position he
changed nevertheless 20 years later in a book entitled lsquo The Romanian Revolution
days and nights of drama and hopersquo (Mazilu 2011) where he strongly supports the
genuine revolutionary character2 The most prolific public figure which presented the
events as a genuine popular revolution was Ion Iliescu the leader of the NSF and
president of the country for 12 years who not only defended the revolutionary character
in writing (two published memoirs) but also on several occasions on televised debates
(Iliescu 1996) As part of the Institute of the Romanian Revolution of 1989 a series of
historians have also defended the revolution with figures such as Andreescu Bucur or
Scurtu Apart from Romanian public figures the Romanian events have also received
attention abroad Foreign scholars such as Vladimir Tismaneanu (2001) and Peter-Siani
Davies (2000) have defended the revolutionary character of the Romanian shift even
comparing it to the Great French Revolution McDermott and Stibbe consider 1989 as a
lsquogenuine popular revolution in both form and content with complex political and social
local national and international violent and non-violent long-term and short term
causesrsquo (McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 3)
Second there are those who reject the popular revolution and rather see the events as a
coup drsquoeacutetat Even proponents of the coup drsquoeacutetat theory are divided on the issue While
some credit an internal coup drsquoeacutetat organized by Iliescu and the NSF others argue that
everything was staged and planned ever since the Malta Summit at the beginning of
December 1989 Liviu Valenas (1990) considers the popular revolt only cosmetic to
brush the real plot coordinated by the KGB French writers such as Radu Portocala
1 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Furata memoriu pentru tara mearsquo
2 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Romana zile si nopti de dramatism si sperantarsquo
Author Catalin Rolea
8
(1990) Victor Loupan (1990) or Michel Castex (1990) believe it was an internal coup
backed by external support
Third there are some who saw the revolution as a hybrid between a revolution and a
coup Such figures represented by Romanian historians such as Lucian Boia (2001) or
Mihai Stoenescu (2004) consider that a spontaneous revolution did exist only until it was
either attempted to be stolen by foreign forces or was stolen by the NSF Jean-Marie Le
Breton then French ambassador to Romania (1987-1990) in comparison to the majority
of the French journalists who saw the revolution as an impostor a plot or a coup the ex-
ambassador considers a genuine revolution did happen although only until 22nd of
December when it was confiscated (Le Bretton 1996) Andrew Richard Hall also
suspects a revolution-hybrid palace coup (Hall 1999) while Anneli Ute Gabanyi (1999
48) considers that the events constituted a revolutionary coup preceded by a popular
revolt that was previously provoked by the couprsquos architects in order to use it
Fourth there is the civil war theory a less popular one which has not received as much
attention as the other two The high number of casualties combined with the ethno-
religious spark of the revolution has led captain Ghaleb (2011) to conclude that neither
revolution nor coup are sufficient in understanding the conflict and thus advocated for
the use of the term civil war as the most suitable Mihai Ungheanu (1977) believes the
events constituted a staged civil war deployed in favour of the coup While none of the
theories offer a full analytic account of the 1989 events all bring important elements
which can help their understanding As it has been pointed before none of the proposed
theories can fully explain the nature of the events but at the same time none can be
dismissed completely The problem with the theoretical accounts of the 1989 events has
been that no systematic analysis on the broader literature on revolutions coups and civil
wars has been used in support of the claims Rather most accounts have been based on
broad academic or sometimes even popular definitions of revolutions coups and civil
wars No thorough deconstruction of the broader literature drawing on empirical studies
of such contentious politics has been made nor a comparison between them Henceforth
Author Catalin Rolea
9
this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical
account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on
revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative
explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989
As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the
unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened
As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek
a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a
custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and
coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories
b Methodology and structure
The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts
(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature
dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and
state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge
to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been
released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files
highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist
methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at
this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and
interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key
aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal
inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)
The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case
studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political
change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will
attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events
Author Catalin Rolea
10
as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by
the broader literature on contentious politics
Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian
event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical
approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical
interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a
structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together
The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences
during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete
footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline
of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that
has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper
articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of
memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved
in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)
memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources
of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument
and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved
Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the
events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination
of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war
or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well
as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and
French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and
Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a
satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the
Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most
appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The
Author Catalin Rolea
11
limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain
certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the
diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The
only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs
that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless
even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a
conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate
framework of further analysing it shall still be possible
II Political change theory and the Romanian case
The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical
frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order
to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will
isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical
literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case
study
a Revolutions
As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms
they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the
context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal
revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality
and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the
socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division
Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa
rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a
society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity
policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)
Author Catalin Rolea
12
would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too
occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a
complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a
more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be
necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study
In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different
generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital
conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)
The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)
Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical
generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European
revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a
general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia
revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the
government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a
common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to
opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek
rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential
outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate
reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left
from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the
great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the
same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage
in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the
implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive
Author Catalin Rolea
13
rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to
move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical
phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone
2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria
framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution
While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus
on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation
complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary
sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation
of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering
expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school
presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect
that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that
offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that
sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to
Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp
economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination
(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent
and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the
discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal
The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus
on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a
revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation
between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests
between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by
the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income
might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in
discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be
Author Catalin Rolea
14
seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain
privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they
can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists
argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided
within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not
stay in place (Goldstone 200315)
While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology
of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but
rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which
to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of
revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred
in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing
whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for
the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the
development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by
the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second
third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-
curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the
external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary
forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the
other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise
from stage number 4
b Coups
There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions
and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but
soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all
three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-
Author Catalin Rolea
15
13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms
which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has
institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the
coup drsquoeacutetat framework
As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a
similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good
knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and
weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the
opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation
However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the
differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues
unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the
opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a
technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn
them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of
the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the
remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings
to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been
associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to
monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)
Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first
traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)
considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be
democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)
along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo
lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup
because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards
because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo
Author Catalin Rolea
16
(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the
essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is
not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the
grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup
would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening
fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the
strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to
dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and
attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)
On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that
democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the
world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others
Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol
argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat
and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to
democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition
against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes
free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960
Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on
the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones
Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events
through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat
As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil
war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of
the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will
come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary
for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the
population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting
Author Catalin Rolea
17
foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all
should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by
adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed
4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to
popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down
in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected
in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects
legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the
military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends
with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)
The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is
drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not
entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to
impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)
Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be
applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or
government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)
c Civil wars
Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state
recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed
conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition
movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their
nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes
one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars
involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly
forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according
to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
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Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
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48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
3
Table of Contents
I Introduction 4
a Background and purpose of research 4
b Methodology and structure 9
II Political change theory and the Romanian case 11
a Revolutions 11
b Coups 14
c Civil wars 17
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution 20
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat 31
V A Romanian Civil War 39
VI Conclusion 45
VII Bibliography 47
Articles 47
Books 48
Online sources 53
Author Catalin Rolea
4
I Introduction
Contentious political change has always been a fascinating topic for social sciences
scholars especially in the fields of political science history and sociology Whether
psychological or ethno-religious in nature national or triggered by the international
context revolutionary movements civil wars and coups have shaped world politics
throughout the world and still are as illustrated by the Arab Spring the civil war in Syria
or the events occurring in Ukraine at the moment As such a thorough analysis of such
events is of utmost importance to the understanding of the causes and nature of social
economic and political change The focus of this paper will be the contentious politics
that have dominated the Romanian political sphere both preceding and proceeding 1989
when the country began transitioning from a repressive communist regime to a
democratic society While the 1989rsquos wind of change that swept Eastern Europersquos
communist regimes and led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and implicitly to the
end of the Cold War represented turning points in the former satellitesrsquo history in the
case of Romania it also represented one of its greatest enigmas Almost 25 years after
Ceausescursquos ousting a lot of questions have still remained unanswered with no official
consensus of the nature of the events of 1989
a Background and purpose of research
Romania was unsurprisingly the last country where communism fell and the only one
that took a violent turn The reason it did not come as a surprise was due to its
uncommon regime different than the other Soviet Satellites While it was seen as a
potential anti-Soviet Western ally due to its nationalist form of communism at the same
time it also conducted one of the most repressive dictatorships in Eastern Europe and
refused to take consideration any reforms either from the West (the US the UN
regarding the treatment of minorities) or the East (Soviet Union glasnost perestroika)
(Scurtu 2000 89) Eventually both internal and external pressure turned the country
Author Catalin Rolea
5
into what Radio Free Europe called a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to be lit at any time
by any spark (Cesereanu 2009 48)
While anti-communist or pro-Gorbachev manifestations had previously occurred around
the country none escalated as the one in Timisoara in 1989 when the attempted
evacuation of a reformed Hungarian pastor that led to small-scale (20-30 people) protest
against the evacuation eventually escalated into an anti-Ceausescu popular uprising
consisting of thousands of people (Arpad 2011 15) Ceausescu convinced it was not a
genuine popular revolt but rather a foreign diversion endeavoured unsuccessfully to
repress the lsquohooligansrsquo as he called the protesters and unwisely planned a great popular
rally summoning tens of thousands of citizens in front of the Communist Partyrsquos Central
Committee in an attempt to condemn the unpatriotic acts in Timisoara As expected
despite Ceausescursquos efforts to appeal to the population the outcome was the decisive
anti-Ceausescu revolt ended with the storming in the central building and Ceausescu and
his wifersquos escape in a helicopter Soon after Ceausescursquos escape a committee entitled
lsquoThe National Salvation Frontrsquo (NSF) formed by ex-communist figures led by Iliescu
quickly filled the power void and seized power with the army and the Television at its
disposition (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 198) A day later Ceausescu was captured
and in the following couple of days on the 25th of December he and his wife were given
a mock trial sentenced to death and summarily executed In the meantime right after
Ceausescursquos escape psychological warfare and terrorist attacks were waged by still
unknown forces both against the army and the population attacks which diminished
after the execution of the Ceausescus According to official data released in 2008 over
1200 people were killed more than 5000 injured and other couple of thousands
unlawfully detained and mistreated during the events that led to the fall of communism
(ECHR 2011) The NSF organized free elections as promised but at the same time
quickly turned into a political party winning the majority of the votes When the NSF
was accused of lsquostealingrsquo the revolution and peaceful protests were organized in the
capital Bucharest the protesters were brutally repressed by the newly installed
Author Catalin Rolea
6
government in an old communist fashion (Adamson amp Florean 2013 175) These series
of events have shrouded the real nature of the alleged revolution and led to contentious
debates about it
The most asserted and commonly held opinion amongst Romaniarsquos population is that the
events constituted a popular revolution A survey circulated in 1996 revealed that 50
amongst respondents believed that Romania had experienced a revolution 30 that it
experienced a coup drsquoeacutetat and 20 that it was a foreign intervention (see Roper 2000
60) Fifteen years later a similar conducted survey revealed that opinions had not
significantly changed (BCS 2009) As Roper (1994 401) argues there is no single
theoretical framework that actually offers a satisfactory analysis of the events and
perhaps that is the main reason the population is so divided on the issue Despite the
great sacrifice that was necessary for the countryrsquos transition from communism there is
still no unanimity on either the nature of the events or on the ones to be blamed for the
crimes despite the several convictions that have already been made
There are several interpretations and theories which aim to explain the events with the
debate mainly revolving around the spontaneous revolution theory versus the coup
drsquoeacutetat one However some have also not excluded the possibility of a civil war to have
occurred (Ghaleb 2009)
Proponents of each of these variants can be also divided on certain points either on
minor or major issues Most of the contention lies as already pointed out on nature of
the terrorist attacks the seizure of power but also on the foreign element While deemed
to have been Ceausescursquos paranoia there at least several thousand foreign lsquotouristsrsquo
within the country during the events who left shortly after The extent to which they
influenced the revolution has been also debated ranging from a mere informative and
observational role to a facilitator and even vital role (Hall 1999 2)
The revolution theory is (rightfully) the most disseminated due to the context of social
revolutions it took place in but also due to the massive revolts that entangled Romania
Author Catalin Rolea
7
at the time First of all there are proponents of the Romanian spontaneous revolution
who have primarily consisted of revolutionaries themselves personalities that took part
in Ceausescursquos reprisal or members of the NSF who seized power Most of the books or
articles written on the events have been memoirs of the key leaders of the time Shortly
after the regime change Dumitru Mazilu former vice-president of the NSF wrote a book
entitled the lsquoStolen Revolutionrsquo1 (Mazilu 1991) advocating for a coup drsquoeacutetat position he
changed nevertheless 20 years later in a book entitled lsquo The Romanian Revolution
days and nights of drama and hopersquo (Mazilu 2011) where he strongly supports the
genuine revolutionary character2 The most prolific public figure which presented the
events as a genuine popular revolution was Ion Iliescu the leader of the NSF and
president of the country for 12 years who not only defended the revolutionary character
in writing (two published memoirs) but also on several occasions on televised debates
(Iliescu 1996) As part of the Institute of the Romanian Revolution of 1989 a series of
historians have also defended the revolution with figures such as Andreescu Bucur or
Scurtu Apart from Romanian public figures the Romanian events have also received
attention abroad Foreign scholars such as Vladimir Tismaneanu (2001) and Peter-Siani
Davies (2000) have defended the revolutionary character of the Romanian shift even
comparing it to the Great French Revolution McDermott and Stibbe consider 1989 as a
lsquogenuine popular revolution in both form and content with complex political and social
local national and international violent and non-violent long-term and short term
causesrsquo (McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 3)
Second there are those who reject the popular revolution and rather see the events as a
coup drsquoeacutetat Even proponents of the coup drsquoeacutetat theory are divided on the issue While
some credit an internal coup drsquoeacutetat organized by Iliescu and the NSF others argue that
everything was staged and planned ever since the Malta Summit at the beginning of
December 1989 Liviu Valenas (1990) considers the popular revolt only cosmetic to
brush the real plot coordinated by the KGB French writers such as Radu Portocala
1 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Furata memoriu pentru tara mearsquo
2 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Romana zile si nopti de dramatism si sperantarsquo
Author Catalin Rolea
8
(1990) Victor Loupan (1990) or Michel Castex (1990) believe it was an internal coup
backed by external support
Third there are some who saw the revolution as a hybrid between a revolution and a
coup Such figures represented by Romanian historians such as Lucian Boia (2001) or
Mihai Stoenescu (2004) consider that a spontaneous revolution did exist only until it was
either attempted to be stolen by foreign forces or was stolen by the NSF Jean-Marie Le
Breton then French ambassador to Romania (1987-1990) in comparison to the majority
of the French journalists who saw the revolution as an impostor a plot or a coup the ex-
ambassador considers a genuine revolution did happen although only until 22nd of
December when it was confiscated (Le Bretton 1996) Andrew Richard Hall also
suspects a revolution-hybrid palace coup (Hall 1999) while Anneli Ute Gabanyi (1999
48) considers that the events constituted a revolutionary coup preceded by a popular
revolt that was previously provoked by the couprsquos architects in order to use it
Fourth there is the civil war theory a less popular one which has not received as much
attention as the other two The high number of casualties combined with the ethno-
religious spark of the revolution has led captain Ghaleb (2011) to conclude that neither
revolution nor coup are sufficient in understanding the conflict and thus advocated for
the use of the term civil war as the most suitable Mihai Ungheanu (1977) believes the
events constituted a staged civil war deployed in favour of the coup While none of the
theories offer a full analytic account of the 1989 events all bring important elements
which can help their understanding As it has been pointed before none of the proposed
theories can fully explain the nature of the events but at the same time none can be
dismissed completely The problem with the theoretical accounts of the 1989 events has
been that no systematic analysis on the broader literature on revolutions coups and civil
wars has been used in support of the claims Rather most accounts have been based on
broad academic or sometimes even popular definitions of revolutions coups and civil
wars No thorough deconstruction of the broader literature drawing on empirical studies
of such contentious politics has been made nor a comparison between them Henceforth
Author Catalin Rolea
9
this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical
account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on
revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative
explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989
As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the
unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened
As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek
a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a
custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and
coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories
b Methodology and structure
The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts
(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature
dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and
state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge
to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been
released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files
highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist
methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at
this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and
interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key
aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal
inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)
The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case
studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political
change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will
attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events
Author Catalin Rolea
10
as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by
the broader literature on contentious politics
Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian
event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical
approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical
interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a
structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together
The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences
during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete
footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline
of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that
has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper
articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of
memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved
in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)
memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources
of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument
and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved
Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the
events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination
of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war
or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well
as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and
French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and
Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a
satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the
Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most
appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The
Author Catalin Rolea
11
limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain
certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the
diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The
only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs
that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless
even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a
conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate
framework of further analysing it shall still be possible
II Political change theory and the Romanian case
The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical
frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order
to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will
isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical
literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case
study
a Revolutions
As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms
they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the
context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal
revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality
and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the
socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division
Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa
rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a
society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity
policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)
Author Catalin Rolea
12
would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too
occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a
complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a
more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be
necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study
In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different
generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital
conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)
The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)
Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical
generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European
revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a
general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia
revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the
government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a
common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to
opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek
rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential
outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate
reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left
from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the
great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the
same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage
in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the
implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive
Author Catalin Rolea
13
rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to
move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical
phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone
2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria
framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution
While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus
on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation
complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary
sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation
of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering
expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school
presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect
that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that
offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that
sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to
Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp
economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination
(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent
and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the
discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal
The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus
on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a
revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation
between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests
between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by
the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income
might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in
discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be
Author Catalin Rolea
14
seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain
privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they
can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists
argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided
within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not
stay in place (Goldstone 200315)
While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology
of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but
rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which
to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of
revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred
in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing
whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for
the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the
development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by
the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second
third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-
curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the
external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary
forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the
other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise
from stage number 4
b Coups
There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions
and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but
soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all
three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-
Author Catalin Rolea
15
13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms
which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has
institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the
coup drsquoeacutetat framework
As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a
similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good
knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and
weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the
opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation
However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the
differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues
unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the
opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a
technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn
them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of
the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the
remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings
to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been
associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to
monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)
Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first
traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)
considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be
democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)
along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo
lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup
because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards
because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo
Author Catalin Rolea
16
(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the
essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is
not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the
grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup
would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening
fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the
strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to
dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and
attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)
On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that
democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the
world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others
Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol
argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat
and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to
democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition
against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes
free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960
Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on
the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones
Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events
through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat
As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil
war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of
the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will
come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary
for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the
population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting
Author Catalin Rolea
17
foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all
should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by
adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed
4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to
popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down
in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected
in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects
legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the
military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends
with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)
The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is
drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not
entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to
impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)
Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be
applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or
government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)
c Civil wars
Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state
recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed
conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition
movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their
nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes
one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars
involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly
forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according
to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
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Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
4
I Introduction
Contentious political change has always been a fascinating topic for social sciences
scholars especially in the fields of political science history and sociology Whether
psychological or ethno-religious in nature national or triggered by the international
context revolutionary movements civil wars and coups have shaped world politics
throughout the world and still are as illustrated by the Arab Spring the civil war in Syria
or the events occurring in Ukraine at the moment As such a thorough analysis of such
events is of utmost importance to the understanding of the causes and nature of social
economic and political change The focus of this paper will be the contentious politics
that have dominated the Romanian political sphere both preceding and proceeding 1989
when the country began transitioning from a repressive communist regime to a
democratic society While the 1989rsquos wind of change that swept Eastern Europersquos
communist regimes and led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and implicitly to the
end of the Cold War represented turning points in the former satellitesrsquo history in the
case of Romania it also represented one of its greatest enigmas Almost 25 years after
Ceausescursquos ousting a lot of questions have still remained unanswered with no official
consensus of the nature of the events of 1989
a Background and purpose of research
Romania was unsurprisingly the last country where communism fell and the only one
that took a violent turn The reason it did not come as a surprise was due to its
uncommon regime different than the other Soviet Satellites While it was seen as a
potential anti-Soviet Western ally due to its nationalist form of communism at the same
time it also conducted one of the most repressive dictatorships in Eastern Europe and
refused to take consideration any reforms either from the West (the US the UN
regarding the treatment of minorities) or the East (Soviet Union glasnost perestroika)
(Scurtu 2000 89) Eventually both internal and external pressure turned the country
Author Catalin Rolea
5
into what Radio Free Europe called a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to be lit at any time
by any spark (Cesereanu 2009 48)
While anti-communist or pro-Gorbachev manifestations had previously occurred around
the country none escalated as the one in Timisoara in 1989 when the attempted
evacuation of a reformed Hungarian pastor that led to small-scale (20-30 people) protest
against the evacuation eventually escalated into an anti-Ceausescu popular uprising
consisting of thousands of people (Arpad 2011 15) Ceausescu convinced it was not a
genuine popular revolt but rather a foreign diversion endeavoured unsuccessfully to
repress the lsquohooligansrsquo as he called the protesters and unwisely planned a great popular
rally summoning tens of thousands of citizens in front of the Communist Partyrsquos Central
Committee in an attempt to condemn the unpatriotic acts in Timisoara As expected
despite Ceausescursquos efforts to appeal to the population the outcome was the decisive
anti-Ceausescu revolt ended with the storming in the central building and Ceausescu and
his wifersquos escape in a helicopter Soon after Ceausescursquos escape a committee entitled
lsquoThe National Salvation Frontrsquo (NSF) formed by ex-communist figures led by Iliescu
quickly filled the power void and seized power with the army and the Television at its
disposition (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 198) A day later Ceausescu was captured
and in the following couple of days on the 25th of December he and his wife were given
a mock trial sentenced to death and summarily executed In the meantime right after
Ceausescursquos escape psychological warfare and terrorist attacks were waged by still
unknown forces both against the army and the population attacks which diminished
after the execution of the Ceausescus According to official data released in 2008 over
1200 people were killed more than 5000 injured and other couple of thousands
unlawfully detained and mistreated during the events that led to the fall of communism
(ECHR 2011) The NSF organized free elections as promised but at the same time
quickly turned into a political party winning the majority of the votes When the NSF
was accused of lsquostealingrsquo the revolution and peaceful protests were organized in the
capital Bucharest the protesters were brutally repressed by the newly installed
Author Catalin Rolea
6
government in an old communist fashion (Adamson amp Florean 2013 175) These series
of events have shrouded the real nature of the alleged revolution and led to contentious
debates about it
The most asserted and commonly held opinion amongst Romaniarsquos population is that the
events constituted a popular revolution A survey circulated in 1996 revealed that 50
amongst respondents believed that Romania had experienced a revolution 30 that it
experienced a coup drsquoeacutetat and 20 that it was a foreign intervention (see Roper 2000
60) Fifteen years later a similar conducted survey revealed that opinions had not
significantly changed (BCS 2009) As Roper (1994 401) argues there is no single
theoretical framework that actually offers a satisfactory analysis of the events and
perhaps that is the main reason the population is so divided on the issue Despite the
great sacrifice that was necessary for the countryrsquos transition from communism there is
still no unanimity on either the nature of the events or on the ones to be blamed for the
crimes despite the several convictions that have already been made
There are several interpretations and theories which aim to explain the events with the
debate mainly revolving around the spontaneous revolution theory versus the coup
drsquoeacutetat one However some have also not excluded the possibility of a civil war to have
occurred (Ghaleb 2009)
Proponents of each of these variants can be also divided on certain points either on
minor or major issues Most of the contention lies as already pointed out on nature of
the terrorist attacks the seizure of power but also on the foreign element While deemed
to have been Ceausescursquos paranoia there at least several thousand foreign lsquotouristsrsquo
within the country during the events who left shortly after The extent to which they
influenced the revolution has been also debated ranging from a mere informative and
observational role to a facilitator and even vital role (Hall 1999 2)
The revolution theory is (rightfully) the most disseminated due to the context of social
revolutions it took place in but also due to the massive revolts that entangled Romania
Author Catalin Rolea
7
at the time First of all there are proponents of the Romanian spontaneous revolution
who have primarily consisted of revolutionaries themselves personalities that took part
in Ceausescursquos reprisal or members of the NSF who seized power Most of the books or
articles written on the events have been memoirs of the key leaders of the time Shortly
after the regime change Dumitru Mazilu former vice-president of the NSF wrote a book
entitled the lsquoStolen Revolutionrsquo1 (Mazilu 1991) advocating for a coup drsquoeacutetat position he
changed nevertheless 20 years later in a book entitled lsquo The Romanian Revolution
days and nights of drama and hopersquo (Mazilu 2011) where he strongly supports the
genuine revolutionary character2 The most prolific public figure which presented the
events as a genuine popular revolution was Ion Iliescu the leader of the NSF and
president of the country for 12 years who not only defended the revolutionary character
in writing (two published memoirs) but also on several occasions on televised debates
(Iliescu 1996) As part of the Institute of the Romanian Revolution of 1989 a series of
historians have also defended the revolution with figures such as Andreescu Bucur or
Scurtu Apart from Romanian public figures the Romanian events have also received
attention abroad Foreign scholars such as Vladimir Tismaneanu (2001) and Peter-Siani
Davies (2000) have defended the revolutionary character of the Romanian shift even
comparing it to the Great French Revolution McDermott and Stibbe consider 1989 as a
lsquogenuine popular revolution in both form and content with complex political and social
local national and international violent and non-violent long-term and short term
causesrsquo (McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 3)
Second there are those who reject the popular revolution and rather see the events as a
coup drsquoeacutetat Even proponents of the coup drsquoeacutetat theory are divided on the issue While
some credit an internal coup drsquoeacutetat organized by Iliescu and the NSF others argue that
everything was staged and planned ever since the Malta Summit at the beginning of
December 1989 Liviu Valenas (1990) considers the popular revolt only cosmetic to
brush the real plot coordinated by the KGB French writers such as Radu Portocala
1 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Furata memoriu pentru tara mearsquo
2 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Romana zile si nopti de dramatism si sperantarsquo
Author Catalin Rolea
8
(1990) Victor Loupan (1990) or Michel Castex (1990) believe it was an internal coup
backed by external support
Third there are some who saw the revolution as a hybrid between a revolution and a
coup Such figures represented by Romanian historians such as Lucian Boia (2001) or
Mihai Stoenescu (2004) consider that a spontaneous revolution did exist only until it was
either attempted to be stolen by foreign forces or was stolen by the NSF Jean-Marie Le
Breton then French ambassador to Romania (1987-1990) in comparison to the majority
of the French journalists who saw the revolution as an impostor a plot or a coup the ex-
ambassador considers a genuine revolution did happen although only until 22nd of
December when it was confiscated (Le Bretton 1996) Andrew Richard Hall also
suspects a revolution-hybrid palace coup (Hall 1999) while Anneli Ute Gabanyi (1999
48) considers that the events constituted a revolutionary coup preceded by a popular
revolt that was previously provoked by the couprsquos architects in order to use it
Fourth there is the civil war theory a less popular one which has not received as much
attention as the other two The high number of casualties combined with the ethno-
religious spark of the revolution has led captain Ghaleb (2011) to conclude that neither
revolution nor coup are sufficient in understanding the conflict and thus advocated for
the use of the term civil war as the most suitable Mihai Ungheanu (1977) believes the
events constituted a staged civil war deployed in favour of the coup While none of the
theories offer a full analytic account of the 1989 events all bring important elements
which can help their understanding As it has been pointed before none of the proposed
theories can fully explain the nature of the events but at the same time none can be
dismissed completely The problem with the theoretical accounts of the 1989 events has
been that no systematic analysis on the broader literature on revolutions coups and civil
wars has been used in support of the claims Rather most accounts have been based on
broad academic or sometimes even popular definitions of revolutions coups and civil
wars No thorough deconstruction of the broader literature drawing on empirical studies
of such contentious politics has been made nor a comparison between them Henceforth
Author Catalin Rolea
9
this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical
account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on
revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative
explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989
As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the
unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened
As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek
a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a
custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and
coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories
b Methodology and structure
The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts
(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature
dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and
state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge
to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been
released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files
highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist
methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at
this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and
interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key
aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal
inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)
The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case
studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political
change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will
attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events
Author Catalin Rolea
10
as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by
the broader literature on contentious politics
Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian
event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical
approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical
interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a
structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together
The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences
during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete
footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline
of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that
has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper
articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of
memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved
in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)
memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources
of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument
and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved
Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the
events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination
of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war
or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well
as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and
French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and
Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a
satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the
Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most
appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The
Author Catalin Rolea
11
limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain
certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the
diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The
only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs
that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless
even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a
conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate
framework of further analysing it shall still be possible
II Political change theory and the Romanian case
The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical
frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order
to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will
isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical
literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case
study
a Revolutions
As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms
they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the
context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal
revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality
and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the
socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division
Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa
rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a
society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity
policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)
Author Catalin Rolea
12
would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too
occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a
complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a
more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be
necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study
In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different
generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital
conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)
The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)
Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical
generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European
revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a
general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia
revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the
government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a
common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to
opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek
rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential
outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate
reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left
from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the
great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the
same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage
in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the
implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive
Author Catalin Rolea
13
rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to
move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical
phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone
2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria
framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution
While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus
on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation
complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary
sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation
of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering
expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school
presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect
that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that
offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that
sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to
Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp
economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination
(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent
and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the
discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal
The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus
on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a
revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation
between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests
between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by
the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income
might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in
discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be
Author Catalin Rolea
14
seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain
privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they
can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists
argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided
within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not
stay in place (Goldstone 200315)
While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology
of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but
rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which
to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of
revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred
in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing
whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for
the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the
development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by
the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second
third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-
curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the
external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary
forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the
other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise
from stage number 4
b Coups
There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions
and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but
soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all
three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-
Author Catalin Rolea
15
13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms
which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has
institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the
coup drsquoeacutetat framework
As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a
similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good
knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and
weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the
opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation
However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the
differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues
unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the
opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a
technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn
them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of
the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the
remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings
to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been
associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to
monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)
Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first
traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)
considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be
democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)
along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo
lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup
because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards
because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo
Author Catalin Rolea
16
(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the
essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is
not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the
grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup
would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening
fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the
strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to
dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and
attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)
On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that
democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the
world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others
Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol
argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat
and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to
democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition
against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes
free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960
Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on
the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones
Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events
through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat
As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil
war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of
the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will
come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary
for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the
population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting
Author Catalin Rolea
17
foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all
should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by
adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed
4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to
popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down
in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected
in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects
legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the
military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends
with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)
The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is
drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not
entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to
impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)
Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be
applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or
government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)
c Civil wars
Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state
recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed
conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition
movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their
nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes
one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars
involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly
forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according
to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
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Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
5
into what Radio Free Europe called a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to be lit at any time
by any spark (Cesereanu 2009 48)
While anti-communist or pro-Gorbachev manifestations had previously occurred around
the country none escalated as the one in Timisoara in 1989 when the attempted
evacuation of a reformed Hungarian pastor that led to small-scale (20-30 people) protest
against the evacuation eventually escalated into an anti-Ceausescu popular uprising
consisting of thousands of people (Arpad 2011 15) Ceausescu convinced it was not a
genuine popular revolt but rather a foreign diversion endeavoured unsuccessfully to
repress the lsquohooligansrsquo as he called the protesters and unwisely planned a great popular
rally summoning tens of thousands of citizens in front of the Communist Partyrsquos Central
Committee in an attempt to condemn the unpatriotic acts in Timisoara As expected
despite Ceausescursquos efforts to appeal to the population the outcome was the decisive
anti-Ceausescu revolt ended with the storming in the central building and Ceausescu and
his wifersquos escape in a helicopter Soon after Ceausescursquos escape a committee entitled
lsquoThe National Salvation Frontrsquo (NSF) formed by ex-communist figures led by Iliescu
quickly filled the power void and seized power with the army and the Television at its
disposition (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 198) A day later Ceausescu was captured
and in the following couple of days on the 25th of December he and his wife were given
a mock trial sentenced to death and summarily executed In the meantime right after
Ceausescursquos escape psychological warfare and terrorist attacks were waged by still
unknown forces both against the army and the population attacks which diminished
after the execution of the Ceausescus According to official data released in 2008 over
1200 people were killed more than 5000 injured and other couple of thousands
unlawfully detained and mistreated during the events that led to the fall of communism
(ECHR 2011) The NSF organized free elections as promised but at the same time
quickly turned into a political party winning the majority of the votes When the NSF
was accused of lsquostealingrsquo the revolution and peaceful protests were organized in the
capital Bucharest the protesters were brutally repressed by the newly installed
Author Catalin Rolea
6
government in an old communist fashion (Adamson amp Florean 2013 175) These series
of events have shrouded the real nature of the alleged revolution and led to contentious
debates about it
The most asserted and commonly held opinion amongst Romaniarsquos population is that the
events constituted a popular revolution A survey circulated in 1996 revealed that 50
amongst respondents believed that Romania had experienced a revolution 30 that it
experienced a coup drsquoeacutetat and 20 that it was a foreign intervention (see Roper 2000
60) Fifteen years later a similar conducted survey revealed that opinions had not
significantly changed (BCS 2009) As Roper (1994 401) argues there is no single
theoretical framework that actually offers a satisfactory analysis of the events and
perhaps that is the main reason the population is so divided on the issue Despite the
great sacrifice that was necessary for the countryrsquos transition from communism there is
still no unanimity on either the nature of the events or on the ones to be blamed for the
crimes despite the several convictions that have already been made
There are several interpretations and theories which aim to explain the events with the
debate mainly revolving around the spontaneous revolution theory versus the coup
drsquoeacutetat one However some have also not excluded the possibility of a civil war to have
occurred (Ghaleb 2009)
Proponents of each of these variants can be also divided on certain points either on
minor or major issues Most of the contention lies as already pointed out on nature of
the terrorist attacks the seizure of power but also on the foreign element While deemed
to have been Ceausescursquos paranoia there at least several thousand foreign lsquotouristsrsquo
within the country during the events who left shortly after The extent to which they
influenced the revolution has been also debated ranging from a mere informative and
observational role to a facilitator and even vital role (Hall 1999 2)
The revolution theory is (rightfully) the most disseminated due to the context of social
revolutions it took place in but also due to the massive revolts that entangled Romania
Author Catalin Rolea
7
at the time First of all there are proponents of the Romanian spontaneous revolution
who have primarily consisted of revolutionaries themselves personalities that took part
in Ceausescursquos reprisal or members of the NSF who seized power Most of the books or
articles written on the events have been memoirs of the key leaders of the time Shortly
after the regime change Dumitru Mazilu former vice-president of the NSF wrote a book
entitled the lsquoStolen Revolutionrsquo1 (Mazilu 1991) advocating for a coup drsquoeacutetat position he
changed nevertheless 20 years later in a book entitled lsquo The Romanian Revolution
days and nights of drama and hopersquo (Mazilu 2011) where he strongly supports the
genuine revolutionary character2 The most prolific public figure which presented the
events as a genuine popular revolution was Ion Iliescu the leader of the NSF and
president of the country for 12 years who not only defended the revolutionary character
in writing (two published memoirs) but also on several occasions on televised debates
(Iliescu 1996) As part of the Institute of the Romanian Revolution of 1989 a series of
historians have also defended the revolution with figures such as Andreescu Bucur or
Scurtu Apart from Romanian public figures the Romanian events have also received
attention abroad Foreign scholars such as Vladimir Tismaneanu (2001) and Peter-Siani
Davies (2000) have defended the revolutionary character of the Romanian shift even
comparing it to the Great French Revolution McDermott and Stibbe consider 1989 as a
lsquogenuine popular revolution in both form and content with complex political and social
local national and international violent and non-violent long-term and short term
causesrsquo (McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 3)
Second there are those who reject the popular revolution and rather see the events as a
coup drsquoeacutetat Even proponents of the coup drsquoeacutetat theory are divided on the issue While
some credit an internal coup drsquoeacutetat organized by Iliescu and the NSF others argue that
everything was staged and planned ever since the Malta Summit at the beginning of
December 1989 Liviu Valenas (1990) considers the popular revolt only cosmetic to
brush the real plot coordinated by the KGB French writers such as Radu Portocala
1 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Furata memoriu pentru tara mearsquo
2 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Romana zile si nopti de dramatism si sperantarsquo
Author Catalin Rolea
8
(1990) Victor Loupan (1990) or Michel Castex (1990) believe it was an internal coup
backed by external support
Third there are some who saw the revolution as a hybrid between a revolution and a
coup Such figures represented by Romanian historians such as Lucian Boia (2001) or
Mihai Stoenescu (2004) consider that a spontaneous revolution did exist only until it was
either attempted to be stolen by foreign forces or was stolen by the NSF Jean-Marie Le
Breton then French ambassador to Romania (1987-1990) in comparison to the majority
of the French journalists who saw the revolution as an impostor a plot or a coup the ex-
ambassador considers a genuine revolution did happen although only until 22nd of
December when it was confiscated (Le Bretton 1996) Andrew Richard Hall also
suspects a revolution-hybrid palace coup (Hall 1999) while Anneli Ute Gabanyi (1999
48) considers that the events constituted a revolutionary coup preceded by a popular
revolt that was previously provoked by the couprsquos architects in order to use it
Fourth there is the civil war theory a less popular one which has not received as much
attention as the other two The high number of casualties combined with the ethno-
religious spark of the revolution has led captain Ghaleb (2011) to conclude that neither
revolution nor coup are sufficient in understanding the conflict and thus advocated for
the use of the term civil war as the most suitable Mihai Ungheanu (1977) believes the
events constituted a staged civil war deployed in favour of the coup While none of the
theories offer a full analytic account of the 1989 events all bring important elements
which can help their understanding As it has been pointed before none of the proposed
theories can fully explain the nature of the events but at the same time none can be
dismissed completely The problem with the theoretical accounts of the 1989 events has
been that no systematic analysis on the broader literature on revolutions coups and civil
wars has been used in support of the claims Rather most accounts have been based on
broad academic or sometimes even popular definitions of revolutions coups and civil
wars No thorough deconstruction of the broader literature drawing on empirical studies
of such contentious politics has been made nor a comparison between them Henceforth
Author Catalin Rolea
9
this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical
account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on
revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative
explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989
As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the
unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened
As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek
a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a
custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and
coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories
b Methodology and structure
The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts
(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature
dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and
state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge
to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been
released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files
highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist
methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at
this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and
interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key
aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal
inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)
The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case
studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political
change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will
attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events
Author Catalin Rolea
10
as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by
the broader literature on contentious politics
Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian
event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical
approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical
interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a
structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together
The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences
during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete
footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline
of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that
has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper
articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of
memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved
in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)
memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources
of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument
and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved
Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the
events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination
of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war
or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well
as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and
French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and
Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a
satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the
Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most
appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The
Author Catalin Rolea
11
limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain
certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the
diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The
only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs
that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless
even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a
conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate
framework of further analysing it shall still be possible
II Political change theory and the Romanian case
The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical
frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order
to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will
isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical
literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case
study
a Revolutions
As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms
they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the
context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal
revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality
and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the
socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division
Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa
rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a
society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity
policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)
Author Catalin Rolea
12
would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too
occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a
complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a
more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be
necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study
In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different
generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital
conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)
The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)
Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical
generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European
revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a
general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia
revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the
government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a
common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to
opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek
rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential
outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate
reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left
from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the
great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the
same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage
in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the
implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive
Author Catalin Rolea
13
rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to
move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical
phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone
2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria
framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution
While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus
on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation
complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary
sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation
of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering
expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school
presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect
that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that
offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that
sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to
Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp
economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination
(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent
and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the
discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal
The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus
on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a
revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation
between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests
between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by
the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income
might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in
discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be
Author Catalin Rolea
14
seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain
privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they
can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists
argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided
within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not
stay in place (Goldstone 200315)
While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology
of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but
rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which
to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of
revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred
in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing
whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for
the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the
development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by
the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second
third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-
curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the
external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary
forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the
other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise
from stage number 4
b Coups
There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions
and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but
soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all
three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-
Author Catalin Rolea
15
13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms
which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has
institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the
coup drsquoeacutetat framework
As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a
similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good
knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and
weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the
opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation
However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the
differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues
unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the
opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a
technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn
them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of
the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the
remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings
to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been
associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to
monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)
Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first
traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)
considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be
democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)
along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo
lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup
because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards
because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo
Author Catalin Rolea
16
(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the
essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is
not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the
grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup
would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening
fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the
strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to
dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and
attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)
On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that
democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the
world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others
Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol
argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat
and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to
democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition
against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes
free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960
Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on
the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones
Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events
through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat
As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil
war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of
the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will
come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary
for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the
population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting
Author Catalin Rolea
17
foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all
should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by
adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed
4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to
popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down
in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected
in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects
legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the
military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends
with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)
The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is
drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not
entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to
impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)
Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be
applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or
government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)
c Civil wars
Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state
recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed
conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition
movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their
nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes
one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars
involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly
forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according
to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
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Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
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48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
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Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
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Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
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50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
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51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
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52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
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53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
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CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
6
government in an old communist fashion (Adamson amp Florean 2013 175) These series
of events have shrouded the real nature of the alleged revolution and led to contentious
debates about it
The most asserted and commonly held opinion amongst Romaniarsquos population is that the
events constituted a popular revolution A survey circulated in 1996 revealed that 50
amongst respondents believed that Romania had experienced a revolution 30 that it
experienced a coup drsquoeacutetat and 20 that it was a foreign intervention (see Roper 2000
60) Fifteen years later a similar conducted survey revealed that opinions had not
significantly changed (BCS 2009) As Roper (1994 401) argues there is no single
theoretical framework that actually offers a satisfactory analysis of the events and
perhaps that is the main reason the population is so divided on the issue Despite the
great sacrifice that was necessary for the countryrsquos transition from communism there is
still no unanimity on either the nature of the events or on the ones to be blamed for the
crimes despite the several convictions that have already been made
There are several interpretations and theories which aim to explain the events with the
debate mainly revolving around the spontaneous revolution theory versus the coup
drsquoeacutetat one However some have also not excluded the possibility of a civil war to have
occurred (Ghaleb 2009)
Proponents of each of these variants can be also divided on certain points either on
minor or major issues Most of the contention lies as already pointed out on nature of
the terrorist attacks the seizure of power but also on the foreign element While deemed
to have been Ceausescursquos paranoia there at least several thousand foreign lsquotouristsrsquo
within the country during the events who left shortly after The extent to which they
influenced the revolution has been also debated ranging from a mere informative and
observational role to a facilitator and even vital role (Hall 1999 2)
The revolution theory is (rightfully) the most disseminated due to the context of social
revolutions it took place in but also due to the massive revolts that entangled Romania
Author Catalin Rolea
7
at the time First of all there are proponents of the Romanian spontaneous revolution
who have primarily consisted of revolutionaries themselves personalities that took part
in Ceausescursquos reprisal or members of the NSF who seized power Most of the books or
articles written on the events have been memoirs of the key leaders of the time Shortly
after the regime change Dumitru Mazilu former vice-president of the NSF wrote a book
entitled the lsquoStolen Revolutionrsquo1 (Mazilu 1991) advocating for a coup drsquoeacutetat position he
changed nevertheless 20 years later in a book entitled lsquo The Romanian Revolution
days and nights of drama and hopersquo (Mazilu 2011) where he strongly supports the
genuine revolutionary character2 The most prolific public figure which presented the
events as a genuine popular revolution was Ion Iliescu the leader of the NSF and
president of the country for 12 years who not only defended the revolutionary character
in writing (two published memoirs) but also on several occasions on televised debates
(Iliescu 1996) As part of the Institute of the Romanian Revolution of 1989 a series of
historians have also defended the revolution with figures such as Andreescu Bucur or
Scurtu Apart from Romanian public figures the Romanian events have also received
attention abroad Foreign scholars such as Vladimir Tismaneanu (2001) and Peter-Siani
Davies (2000) have defended the revolutionary character of the Romanian shift even
comparing it to the Great French Revolution McDermott and Stibbe consider 1989 as a
lsquogenuine popular revolution in both form and content with complex political and social
local national and international violent and non-violent long-term and short term
causesrsquo (McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 3)
Second there are those who reject the popular revolution and rather see the events as a
coup drsquoeacutetat Even proponents of the coup drsquoeacutetat theory are divided on the issue While
some credit an internal coup drsquoeacutetat organized by Iliescu and the NSF others argue that
everything was staged and planned ever since the Malta Summit at the beginning of
December 1989 Liviu Valenas (1990) considers the popular revolt only cosmetic to
brush the real plot coordinated by the KGB French writers such as Radu Portocala
1 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Furata memoriu pentru tara mearsquo
2 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Romana zile si nopti de dramatism si sperantarsquo
Author Catalin Rolea
8
(1990) Victor Loupan (1990) or Michel Castex (1990) believe it was an internal coup
backed by external support
Third there are some who saw the revolution as a hybrid between a revolution and a
coup Such figures represented by Romanian historians such as Lucian Boia (2001) or
Mihai Stoenescu (2004) consider that a spontaneous revolution did exist only until it was
either attempted to be stolen by foreign forces or was stolen by the NSF Jean-Marie Le
Breton then French ambassador to Romania (1987-1990) in comparison to the majority
of the French journalists who saw the revolution as an impostor a plot or a coup the ex-
ambassador considers a genuine revolution did happen although only until 22nd of
December when it was confiscated (Le Bretton 1996) Andrew Richard Hall also
suspects a revolution-hybrid palace coup (Hall 1999) while Anneli Ute Gabanyi (1999
48) considers that the events constituted a revolutionary coup preceded by a popular
revolt that was previously provoked by the couprsquos architects in order to use it
Fourth there is the civil war theory a less popular one which has not received as much
attention as the other two The high number of casualties combined with the ethno-
religious spark of the revolution has led captain Ghaleb (2011) to conclude that neither
revolution nor coup are sufficient in understanding the conflict and thus advocated for
the use of the term civil war as the most suitable Mihai Ungheanu (1977) believes the
events constituted a staged civil war deployed in favour of the coup While none of the
theories offer a full analytic account of the 1989 events all bring important elements
which can help their understanding As it has been pointed before none of the proposed
theories can fully explain the nature of the events but at the same time none can be
dismissed completely The problem with the theoretical accounts of the 1989 events has
been that no systematic analysis on the broader literature on revolutions coups and civil
wars has been used in support of the claims Rather most accounts have been based on
broad academic or sometimes even popular definitions of revolutions coups and civil
wars No thorough deconstruction of the broader literature drawing on empirical studies
of such contentious politics has been made nor a comparison between them Henceforth
Author Catalin Rolea
9
this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical
account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on
revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative
explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989
As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the
unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened
As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek
a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a
custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and
coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories
b Methodology and structure
The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts
(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature
dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and
state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge
to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been
released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files
highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist
methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at
this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and
interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key
aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal
inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)
The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case
studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political
change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will
attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events
Author Catalin Rolea
10
as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by
the broader literature on contentious politics
Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian
event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical
approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical
interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a
structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together
The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences
during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete
footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline
of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that
has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper
articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of
memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved
in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)
memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources
of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument
and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved
Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the
events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination
of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war
or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well
as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and
French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and
Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a
satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the
Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most
appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The
Author Catalin Rolea
11
limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain
certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the
diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The
only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs
that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless
even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a
conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate
framework of further analysing it shall still be possible
II Political change theory and the Romanian case
The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical
frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order
to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will
isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical
literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case
study
a Revolutions
As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms
they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the
context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal
revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality
and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the
socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division
Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa
rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a
society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity
policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)
Author Catalin Rolea
12
would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too
occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a
complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a
more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be
necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study
In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different
generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital
conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)
The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)
Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical
generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European
revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a
general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia
revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the
government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a
common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to
opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek
rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential
outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate
reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left
from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the
great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the
same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage
in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the
implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive
Author Catalin Rolea
13
rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to
move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical
phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone
2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria
framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution
While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus
on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation
complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary
sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation
of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering
expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school
presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect
that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that
offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that
sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to
Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp
economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination
(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent
and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the
discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal
The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus
on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a
revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation
between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests
between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by
the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income
might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in
discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be
Author Catalin Rolea
14
seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain
privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they
can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists
argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided
within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not
stay in place (Goldstone 200315)
While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology
of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but
rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which
to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of
revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred
in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing
whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for
the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the
development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by
the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second
third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-
curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the
external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary
forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the
other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise
from stage number 4
b Coups
There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions
and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but
soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all
three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-
Author Catalin Rolea
15
13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms
which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has
institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the
coup drsquoeacutetat framework
As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a
similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good
knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and
weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the
opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation
However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the
differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues
unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the
opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a
technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn
them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of
the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the
remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings
to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been
associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to
monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)
Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first
traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)
considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be
democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)
along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo
lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup
because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards
because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo
Author Catalin Rolea
16
(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the
essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is
not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the
grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup
would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening
fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the
strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to
dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and
attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)
On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that
democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the
world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others
Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol
argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat
and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to
democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition
against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes
free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960
Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on
the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones
Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events
through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat
As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil
war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of
the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will
come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary
for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the
population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting
Author Catalin Rolea
17
foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all
should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by
adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed
4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to
popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down
in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected
in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects
legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the
military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends
with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)
The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is
drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not
entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to
impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)
Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be
applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or
government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)
c Civil wars
Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state
recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed
conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition
movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their
nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes
one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars
involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly
forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according
to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
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52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
7
at the time First of all there are proponents of the Romanian spontaneous revolution
who have primarily consisted of revolutionaries themselves personalities that took part
in Ceausescursquos reprisal or members of the NSF who seized power Most of the books or
articles written on the events have been memoirs of the key leaders of the time Shortly
after the regime change Dumitru Mazilu former vice-president of the NSF wrote a book
entitled the lsquoStolen Revolutionrsquo1 (Mazilu 1991) advocating for a coup drsquoeacutetat position he
changed nevertheless 20 years later in a book entitled lsquo The Romanian Revolution
days and nights of drama and hopersquo (Mazilu 2011) where he strongly supports the
genuine revolutionary character2 The most prolific public figure which presented the
events as a genuine popular revolution was Ion Iliescu the leader of the NSF and
president of the country for 12 years who not only defended the revolutionary character
in writing (two published memoirs) but also on several occasions on televised debates
(Iliescu 1996) As part of the Institute of the Romanian Revolution of 1989 a series of
historians have also defended the revolution with figures such as Andreescu Bucur or
Scurtu Apart from Romanian public figures the Romanian events have also received
attention abroad Foreign scholars such as Vladimir Tismaneanu (2001) and Peter-Siani
Davies (2000) have defended the revolutionary character of the Romanian shift even
comparing it to the Great French Revolution McDermott and Stibbe consider 1989 as a
lsquogenuine popular revolution in both form and content with complex political and social
local national and international violent and non-violent long-term and short term
causesrsquo (McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 3)
Second there are those who reject the popular revolution and rather see the events as a
coup drsquoeacutetat Even proponents of the coup drsquoeacutetat theory are divided on the issue While
some credit an internal coup drsquoeacutetat organized by Iliescu and the NSF others argue that
everything was staged and planned ever since the Malta Summit at the beginning of
December 1989 Liviu Valenas (1990) considers the popular revolt only cosmetic to
brush the real plot coordinated by the KGB French writers such as Radu Portocala
1 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Furata memoriu pentru tara mearsquo
2 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Romana zile si nopti de dramatism si sperantarsquo
Author Catalin Rolea
8
(1990) Victor Loupan (1990) or Michel Castex (1990) believe it was an internal coup
backed by external support
Third there are some who saw the revolution as a hybrid between a revolution and a
coup Such figures represented by Romanian historians such as Lucian Boia (2001) or
Mihai Stoenescu (2004) consider that a spontaneous revolution did exist only until it was
either attempted to be stolen by foreign forces or was stolen by the NSF Jean-Marie Le
Breton then French ambassador to Romania (1987-1990) in comparison to the majority
of the French journalists who saw the revolution as an impostor a plot or a coup the ex-
ambassador considers a genuine revolution did happen although only until 22nd of
December when it was confiscated (Le Bretton 1996) Andrew Richard Hall also
suspects a revolution-hybrid palace coup (Hall 1999) while Anneli Ute Gabanyi (1999
48) considers that the events constituted a revolutionary coup preceded by a popular
revolt that was previously provoked by the couprsquos architects in order to use it
Fourth there is the civil war theory a less popular one which has not received as much
attention as the other two The high number of casualties combined with the ethno-
religious spark of the revolution has led captain Ghaleb (2011) to conclude that neither
revolution nor coup are sufficient in understanding the conflict and thus advocated for
the use of the term civil war as the most suitable Mihai Ungheanu (1977) believes the
events constituted a staged civil war deployed in favour of the coup While none of the
theories offer a full analytic account of the 1989 events all bring important elements
which can help their understanding As it has been pointed before none of the proposed
theories can fully explain the nature of the events but at the same time none can be
dismissed completely The problem with the theoretical accounts of the 1989 events has
been that no systematic analysis on the broader literature on revolutions coups and civil
wars has been used in support of the claims Rather most accounts have been based on
broad academic or sometimes even popular definitions of revolutions coups and civil
wars No thorough deconstruction of the broader literature drawing on empirical studies
of such contentious politics has been made nor a comparison between them Henceforth
Author Catalin Rolea
9
this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical
account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on
revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative
explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989
As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the
unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened
As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek
a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a
custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and
coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories
b Methodology and structure
The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts
(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature
dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and
state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge
to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been
released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files
highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist
methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at
this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and
interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key
aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal
inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)
The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case
studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political
change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will
attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events
Author Catalin Rolea
10
as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by
the broader literature on contentious politics
Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian
event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical
approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical
interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a
structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together
The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences
during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete
footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline
of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that
has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper
articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of
memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved
in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)
memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources
of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument
and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved
Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the
events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination
of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war
or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well
as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and
French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and
Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a
satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the
Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most
appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The
Author Catalin Rolea
11
limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain
certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the
diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The
only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs
that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless
even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a
conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate
framework of further analysing it shall still be possible
II Political change theory and the Romanian case
The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical
frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order
to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will
isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical
literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case
study
a Revolutions
As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms
they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the
context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal
revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality
and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the
socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division
Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa
rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a
society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity
policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)
Author Catalin Rolea
12
would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too
occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a
complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a
more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be
necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study
In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different
generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital
conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)
The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)
Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical
generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European
revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a
general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia
revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the
government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a
common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to
opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek
rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential
outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate
reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left
from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the
great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the
same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage
in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the
implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive
Author Catalin Rolea
13
rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to
move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical
phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone
2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria
framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution
While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus
on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation
complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary
sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation
of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering
expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school
presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect
that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that
offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that
sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to
Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp
economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination
(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent
and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the
discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal
The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus
on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a
revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation
between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests
between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by
the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income
might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in
discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be
Author Catalin Rolea
14
seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain
privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they
can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists
argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided
within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not
stay in place (Goldstone 200315)
While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology
of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but
rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which
to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of
revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred
in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing
whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for
the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the
development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by
the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second
third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-
curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the
external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary
forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the
other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise
from stage number 4
b Coups
There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions
and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but
soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all
three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-
Author Catalin Rolea
15
13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms
which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has
institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the
coup drsquoeacutetat framework
As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a
similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good
knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and
weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the
opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation
However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the
differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues
unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the
opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a
technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn
them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of
the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the
remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings
to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been
associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to
monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)
Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first
traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)
considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be
democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)
along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo
lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup
because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards
because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo
Author Catalin Rolea
16
(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the
essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is
not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the
grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup
would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening
fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the
strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to
dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and
attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)
On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that
democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the
world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others
Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol
argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat
and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to
democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition
against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes
free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960
Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on
the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones
Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events
through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat
As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil
war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of
the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will
come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary
for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the
population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting
Author Catalin Rolea
17
foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all
should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by
adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed
4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to
popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down
in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected
in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects
legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the
military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends
with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)
The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is
drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not
entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to
impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)
Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be
applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or
government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)
c Civil wars
Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state
recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed
conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition
movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their
nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes
one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars
involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly
forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according
to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
8
(1990) Victor Loupan (1990) or Michel Castex (1990) believe it was an internal coup
backed by external support
Third there are some who saw the revolution as a hybrid between a revolution and a
coup Such figures represented by Romanian historians such as Lucian Boia (2001) or
Mihai Stoenescu (2004) consider that a spontaneous revolution did exist only until it was
either attempted to be stolen by foreign forces or was stolen by the NSF Jean-Marie Le
Breton then French ambassador to Romania (1987-1990) in comparison to the majority
of the French journalists who saw the revolution as an impostor a plot or a coup the ex-
ambassador considers a genuine revolution did happen although only until 22nd of
December when it was confiscated (Le Bretton 1996) Andrew Richard Hall also
suspects a revolution-hybrid palace coup (Hall 1999) while Anneli Ute Gabanyi (1999
48) considers that the events constituted a revolutionary coup preceded by a popular
revolt that was previously provoked by the couprsquos architects in order to use it
Fourth there is the civil war theory a less popular one which has not received as much
attention as the other two The high number of casualties combined with the ethno-
religious spark of the revolution has led captain Ghaleb (2011) to conclude that neither
revolution nor coup are sufficient in understanding the conflict and thus advocated for
the use of the term civil war as the most suitable Mihai Ungheanu (1977) believes the
events constituted a staged civil war deployed in favour of the coup While none of the
theories offer a full analytic account of the 1989 events all bring important elements
which can help their understanding As it has been pointed before none of the proposed
theories can fully explain the nature of the events but at the same time none can be
dismissed completely The problem with the theoretical accounts of the 1989 events has
been that no systematic analysis on the broader literature on revolutions coups and civil
wars has been used in support of the claims Rather most accounts have been based on
broad academic or sometimes even popular definitions of revolutions coups and civil
wars No thorough deconstruction of the broader literature drawing on empirical studies
of such contentious politics has been made nor a comparison between them Henceforth
Author Catalin Rolea
9
this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical
account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on
revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative
explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989
As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the
unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened
As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek
a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a
custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and
coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories
b Methodology and structure
The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts
(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature
dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and
state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge
to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been
released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files
highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist
methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at
this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and
interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key
aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal
inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)
The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case
studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political
change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will
attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events
Author Catalin Rolea
10
as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by
the broader literature on contentious politics
Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian
event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical
approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical
interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a
structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together
The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences
during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete
footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline
of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that
has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper
articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of
memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved
in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)
memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources
of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument
and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved
Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the
events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination
of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war
or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well
as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and
French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and
Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a
satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the
Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most
appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The
Author Catalin Rolea
11
limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain
certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the
diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The
only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs
that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless
even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a
conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate
framework of further analysing it shall still be possible
II Political change theory and the Romanian case
The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical
frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order
to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will
isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical
literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case
study
a Revolutions
As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms
they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the
context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal
revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality
and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the
socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division
Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa
rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a
society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity
policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)
Author Catalin Rolea
12
would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too
occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a
complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a
more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be
necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study
In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different
generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital
conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)
The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)
Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical
generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European
revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a
general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia
revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the
government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a
common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to
opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek
rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential
outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate
reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left
from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the
great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the
same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage
in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the
implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive
Author Catalin Rolea
13
rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to
move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical
phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone
2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria
framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution
While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus
on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation
complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary
sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation
of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering
expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school
presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect
that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that
offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that
sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to
Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp
economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination
(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent
and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the
discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal
The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus
on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a
revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation
between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests
between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by
the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income
might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in
discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be
Author Catalin Rolea
14
seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain
privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they
can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists
argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided
within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not
stay in place (Goldstone 200315)
While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology
of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but
rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which
to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of
revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred
in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing
whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for
the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the
development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by
the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second
third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-
curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the
external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary
forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the
other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise
from stage number 4
b Coups
There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions
and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but
soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all
three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-
Author Catalin Rolea
15
13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms
which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has
institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the
coup drsquoeacutetat framework
As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a
similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good
knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and
weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the
opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation
However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the
differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues
unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the
opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a
technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn
them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of
the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the
remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings
to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been
associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to
monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)
Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first
traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)
considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be
democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)
along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo
lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup
because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards
because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo
Author Catalin Rolea
16
(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the
essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is
not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the
grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup
would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening
fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the
strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to
dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and
attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)
On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that
democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the
world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others
Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol
argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat
and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to
democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition
against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes
free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960
Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on
the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones
Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events
through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat
As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil
war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of
the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will
come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary
for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the
population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting
Author Catalin Rolea
17
foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all
should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by
adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed
4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to
popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down
in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected
in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects
legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the
military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends
with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)
The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is
drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not
entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to
impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)
Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be
applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or
government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)
c Civil wars
Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state
recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed
conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition
movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their
nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes
one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars
involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly
forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according
to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
9
this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical
account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on
revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative
explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989
As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the
unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened
As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek
a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a
custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and
coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories
b Methodology and structure
The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts
(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature
dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and
state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge
to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been
released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files
highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist
methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at
this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and
interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key
aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal
inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)
The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case
studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political
change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will
attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events
Author Catalin Rolea
10
as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by
the broader literature on contentious politics
Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian
event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical
approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical
interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a
structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together
The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences
during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete
footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline
of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that
has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper
articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of
memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved
in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)
memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources
of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument
and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved
Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the
events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination
of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war
or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well
as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and
French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and
Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a
satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the
Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most
appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The
Author Catalin Rolea
11
limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain
certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the
diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The
only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs
that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless
even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a
conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate
framework of further analysing it shall still be possible
II Political change theory and the Romanian case
The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical
frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order
to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will
isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical
literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case
study
a Revolutions
As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms
they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the
context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal
revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality
and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the
socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division
Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa
rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a
society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity
policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)
Author Catalin Rolea
12
would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too
occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a
complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a
more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be
necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study
In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different
generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital
conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)
The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)
Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical
generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European
revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a
general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia
revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the
government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a
common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to
opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek
rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential
outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate
reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left
from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the
great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the
same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage
in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the
implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive
Author Catalin Rolea
13
rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to
move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical
phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone
2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria
framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution
While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus
on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation
complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary
sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation
of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering
expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school
presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect
that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that
offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that
sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to
Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp
economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination
(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent
and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the
discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal
The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus
on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a
revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation
between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests
between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by
the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income
might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in
discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be
Author Catalin Rolea
14
seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain
privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they
can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists
argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided
within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not
stay in place (Goldstone 200315)
While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology
of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but
rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which
to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of
revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred
in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing
whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for
the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the
development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by
the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second
third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-
curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the
external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary
forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the
other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise
from stage number 4
b Coups
There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions
and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but
soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all
three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-
Author Catalin Rolea
15
13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms
which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has
institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the
coup drsquoeacutetat framework
As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a
similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good
knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and
weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the
opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation
However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the
differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues
unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the
opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a
technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn
them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of
the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the
remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings
to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been
associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to
monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)
Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first
traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)
considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be
democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)
along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo
lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup
because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards
because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo
Author Catalin Rolea
16
(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the
essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is
not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the
grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup
would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening
fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the
strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to
dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and
attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)
On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that
democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the
world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others
Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol
argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat
and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to
democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition
against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes
free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960
Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on
the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones
Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events
through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat
As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil
war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of
the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will
come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary
for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the
population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting
Author Catalin Rolea
17
foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all
should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by
adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed
4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to
popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down
in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected
in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects
legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the
military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends
with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)
The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is
drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not
entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to
impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)
Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be
applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or
government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)
c Civil wars
Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state
recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed
conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition
movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their
nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes
one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars
involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly
forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according
to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
10
as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by
the broader literature on contentious politics
Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian
event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical
approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical
interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a
structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together
The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences
during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete
footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline
of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that
has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper
articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of
memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved
in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)
memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources
of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument
and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved
Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the
events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination
of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war
or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well
as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and
French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and
Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a
satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the
Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most
appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The
Author Catalin Rolea
11
limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain
certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the
diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The
only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs
that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless
even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a
conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate
framework of further analysing it shall still be possible
II Political change theory and the Romanian case
The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical
frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order
to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will
isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical
literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case
study
a Revolutions
As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms
they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the
context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal
revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality
and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the
socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division
Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa
rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a
society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity
policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)
Author Catalin Rolea
12
would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too
occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a
complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a
more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be
necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study
In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different
generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital
conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)
The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)
Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical
generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European
revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a
general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia
revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the
government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a
common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to
opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek
rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential
outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate
reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left
from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the
great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the
same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage
in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the
implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive
Author Catalin Rolea
13
rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to
move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical
phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone
2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria
framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution
While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus
on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation
complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary
sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation
of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering
expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school
presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect
that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that
offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that
sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to
Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp
economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination
(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent
and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the
discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal
The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus
on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a
revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation
between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests
between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by
the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income
might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in
discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be
Author Catalin Rolea
14
seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain
privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they
can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists
argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided
within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not
stay in place (Goldstone 200315)
While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology
of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but
rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which
to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of
revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred
in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing
whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for
the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the
development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by
the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second
third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-
curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the
external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary
forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the
other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise
from stage number 4
b Coups
There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions
and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but
soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all
three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-
Author Catalin Rolea
15
13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms
which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has
institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the
coup drsquoeacutetat framework
As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a
similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good
knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and
weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the
opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation
However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the
differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues
unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the
opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a
technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn
them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of
the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the
remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings
to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been
associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to
monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)
Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first
traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)
considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be
democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)
along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo
lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup
because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards
because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo
Author Catalin Rolea
16
(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the
essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is
not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the
grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup
would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening
fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the
strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to
dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and
attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)
On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that
democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the
world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others
Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol
argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat
and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to
democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition
against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes
free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960
Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on
the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones
Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events
through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat
As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil
war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of
the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will
come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary
for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the
population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting
Author Catalin Rolea
17
foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all
should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by
adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed
4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to
popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down
in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected
in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects
legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the
military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends
with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)
The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is
drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not
entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to
impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)
Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be
applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or
government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)
c Civil wars
Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state
recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed
conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition
movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their
nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes
one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars
involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly
forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according
to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
11
limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain
certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the
diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The
only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs
that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless
even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a
conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate
framework of further analysing it shall still be possible
II Political change theory and the Romanian case
The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical
frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order
to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will
isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical
literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case
study
a Revolutions
As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms
they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the
context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal
revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality
and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the
socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division
Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa
rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a
society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity
policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)
Author Catalin Rolea
12
would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too
occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a
complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a
more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be
necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study
In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different
generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital
conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)
The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)
Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical
generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European
revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a
general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia
revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the
government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a
common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to
opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek
rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential
outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate
reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left
from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the
great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the
same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage
in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the
implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive
Author Catalin Rolea
13
rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to
move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical
phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone
2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria
framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution
While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus
on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation
complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary
sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation
of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering
expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school
presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect
that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that
offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that
sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to
Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp
economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination
(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent
and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the
discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal
The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus
on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a
revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation
between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests
between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by
the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income
might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in
discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be
Author Catalin Rolea
14
seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain
privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they
can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists
argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided
within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not
stay in place (Goldstone 200315)
While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology
of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but
rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which
to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of
revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred
in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing
whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for
the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the
development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by
the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second
third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-
curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the
external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary
forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the
other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise
from stage number 4
b Coups
There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions
and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but
soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all
three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-
Author Catalin Rolea
15
13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms
which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has
institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the
coup drsquoeacutetat framework
As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a
similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good
knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and
weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the
opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation
However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the
differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues
unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the
opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a
technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn
them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of
the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the
remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings
to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been
associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to
monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)
Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first
traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)
considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be
democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)
along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo
lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup
because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards
because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo
Author Catalin Rolea
16
(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the
essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is
not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the
grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup
would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening
fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the
strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to
dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and
attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)
On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that
democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the
world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others
Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol
argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat
and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to
democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition
against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes
free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960
Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on
the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones
Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events
through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat
As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil
war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of
the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will
come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary
for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the
population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting
Author Catalin Rolea
17
foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all
should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by
adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed
4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to
popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down
in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected
in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects
legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the
military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends
with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)
The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is
drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not
entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to
impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)
Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be
applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or
government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)
c Civil wars
Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state
recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed
conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition
movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their
nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes
one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars
involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly
forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according
to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
12
would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too
occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a
complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a
more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be
necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study
In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different
generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital
conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)
The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)
Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical
generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European
revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a
general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia
revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the
government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a
common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to
opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek
rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential
outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate
reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left
from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the
great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the
same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage
in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the
implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive
Author Catalin Rolea
13
rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to
move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical
phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone
2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria
framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution
While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus
on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation
complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary
sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation
of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering
expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school
presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect
that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that
offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that
sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to
Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp
economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination
(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent
and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the
discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal
The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus
on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a
revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation
between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests
between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by
the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income
might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in
discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be
Author Catalin Rolea
14
seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain
privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they
can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists
argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided
within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not
stay in place (Goldstone 200315)
While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology
of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but
rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which
to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of
revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred
in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing
whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for
the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the
development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by
the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second
third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-
curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the
external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary
forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the
other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise
from stage number 4
b Coups
There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions
and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but
soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all
three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-
Author Catalin Rolea
15
13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms
which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has
institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the
coup drsquoeacutetat framework
As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a
similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good
knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and
weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the
opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation
However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the
differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues
unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the
opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a
technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn
them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of
the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the
remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings
to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been
associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to
monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)
Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first
traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)
considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be
democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)
along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo
lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup
because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards
because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo
Author Catalin Rolea
16
(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the
essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is
not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the
grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup
would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening
fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the
strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to
dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and
attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)
On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that
democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the
world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others
Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol
argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat
and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to
democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition
against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes
free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960
Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on
the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones
Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events
through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat
As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil
war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of
the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will
come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary
for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the
population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting
Author Catalin Rolea
17
foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all
should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by
adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed
4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to
popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down
in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected
in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects
legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the
military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends
with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)
The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is
drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not
entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to
impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)
Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be
applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or
government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)
c Civil wars
Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state
recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed
conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition
movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their
nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes
one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars
involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly
forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according
to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
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52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
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53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
13
rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to
move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical
phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone
2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria
framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution
While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus
on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation
complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary
sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation
of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering
expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school
presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect
that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that
offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that
sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to
Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp
economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination
(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent
and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the
discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal
The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus
on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a
revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation
between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests
between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by
the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income
might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in
discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be
Author Catalin Rolea
14
seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain
privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they
can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists
argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided
within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not
stay in place (Goldstone 200315)
While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology
of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but
rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which
to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of
revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred
in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing
whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for
the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the
development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by
the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second
third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-
curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the
external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary
forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the
other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise
from stage number 4
b Coups
There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions
and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but
soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all
three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-
Author Catalin Rolea
15
13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms
which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has
institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the
coup drsquoeacutetat framework
As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a
similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good
knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and
weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the
opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation
However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the
differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues
unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the
opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a
technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn
them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of
the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the
remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings
to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been
associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to
monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)
Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first
traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)
considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be
democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)
along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo
lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup
because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards
because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo
Author Catalin Rolea
16
(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the
essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is
not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the
grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup
would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening
fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the
strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to
dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and
attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)
On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that
democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the
world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others
Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol
argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat
and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to
democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition
against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes
free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960
Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on
the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones
Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events
through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat
As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil
war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of
the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will
come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary
for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the
population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting
Author Catalin Rolea
17
foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all
should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by
adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed
4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to
popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down
in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected
in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects
legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the
military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends
with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)
The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is
drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not
entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to
impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)
Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be
applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or
government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)
c Civil wars
Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state
recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed
conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition
movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their
nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes
one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars
involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly
forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according
to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
14
seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain
privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they
can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists
argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided
within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not
stay in place (Goldstone 200315)
While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology
of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but
rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which
to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of
revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred
in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing
whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for
the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the
development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by
the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second
third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-
curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the
external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary
forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the
other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise
from stage number 4
b Coups
There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions
and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but
soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all
three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-
Author Catalin Rolea
15
13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms
which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has
institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the
coup drsquoeacutetat framework
As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a
similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good
knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and
weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the
opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation
However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the
differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues
unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the
opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a
technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn
them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of
the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the
remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings
to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been
associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to
monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)
Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first
traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)
considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be
democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)
along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo
lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup
because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards
because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo
Author Catalin Rolea
16
(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the
essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is
not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the
grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup
would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening
fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the
strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to
dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and
attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)
On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that
democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the
world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others
Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol
argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat
and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to
democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition
against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes
free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960
Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on
the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones
Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events
through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat
As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil
war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of
the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will
come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary
for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the
population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting
Author Catalin Rolea
17
foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all
should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by
adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed
4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to
popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down
in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected
in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects
legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the
military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends
with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)
The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is
drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not
entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to
impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)
Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be
applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or
government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)
c Civil wars
Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state
recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed
conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition
movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their
nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes
one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars
involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly
forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according
to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
15
13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms
which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has
institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the
coup drsquoeacutetat framework
As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a
similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good
knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and
weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the
opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation
However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the
differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues
unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the
opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a
technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn
them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of
the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the
remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings
to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been
associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to
monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)
Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first
traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)
considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be
democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)
along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo
lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup
because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards
because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo
Author Catalin Rolea
16
(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the
essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is
not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the
grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup
would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening
fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the
strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to
dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and
attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)
On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that
democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the
world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others
Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol
argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat
and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to
democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition
against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes
free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960
Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on
the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones
Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events
through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat
As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil
war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of
the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will
come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary
for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the
population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting
Author Catalin Rolea
17
foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all
should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by
adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed
4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to
popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down
in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected
in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects
legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the
military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends
with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)
The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is
drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not
entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to
impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)
Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be
applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or
government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)
c Civil wars
Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state
recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed
conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition
movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their
nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes
one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars
involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly
forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according
to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
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Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
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Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
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48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
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Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
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172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
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Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
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Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
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Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
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Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
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51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
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Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
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Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
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52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
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Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
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53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
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translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
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httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
16
(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the
essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is
not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the
grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup
would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening
fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the
strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to
dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and
attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)
On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that
democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the
world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others
Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol
argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat
and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to
democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition
against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes
free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960
Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on
the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones
Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events
through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat
As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil
war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of
the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will
come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary
for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the
population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting
Author Catalin Rolea
17
foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all
should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by
adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed
4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to
popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down
in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected
in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects
legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the
military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends
with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)
The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is
drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not
entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to
impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)
Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be
applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or
government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)
c Civil wars
Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state
recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed
conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition
movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their
nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes
one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars
involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly
forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according
to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
17
foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all
should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by
adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed
4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to
popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down
in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected
in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects
legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the
military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends
with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)
The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is
drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not
entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to
impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)
Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be
applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or
government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)
c Civil wars
Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state
recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed
conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition
movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their
nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes
one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars
involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly
forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according
to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
18
(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo
threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious
politics
As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they
share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of
analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The
lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as
starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)
The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from
the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary
situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or
more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms
1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )
ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which
rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)
Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the
current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According
to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the
most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo
Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt
incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state
institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the
Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are
fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that
reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor
(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated
into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
19
take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil
wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of
the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-
related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a
hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in
nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt
against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars
have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with
innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the
unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its
blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist
manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it
breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that
the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great
revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution
affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)
Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as
long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly
1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or
coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation
between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While
David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into
full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)
uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-
changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil
wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass
demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon
2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
20
events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war
potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat
The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and
threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will
have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or
secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or
coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least
100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this
category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the
revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of
conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil
war or coups)
Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been
established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three
processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory
will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study
should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in
this sub-section
III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution
The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions
having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated
recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered
shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated
abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
21
circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed
that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a
spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter
will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework
and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution
Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania
in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the
overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate
values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social
structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech
democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were
and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation
would be valid
As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve
model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the
country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces
According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with
high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more
than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery
breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos
regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe
having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims
revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem
impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively
prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also
increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong
nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the
government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
22
classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also
published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the
lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies
of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national
policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974
125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish
democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation
Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents
(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper
2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union
Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the
1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000
50)
However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the
beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly
decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of
sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite
production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination
which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and
treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order
As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided
clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen
down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn
the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the
external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the
international system are most likely to experience revolutions
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
23
Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook
1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political
autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East
and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos
ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity
program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in
doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical
care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing
the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries
(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and
infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of
discontent and revolutionary attitudes
Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled
the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have
effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the
organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even
those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned
against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold
that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be
easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against
Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as
political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that
mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos
dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East
1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the
central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution
to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out
outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
24
notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians
secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad
2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up
trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist
countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming
from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of
hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)
As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the
population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed
the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to
be established
It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken
a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority
represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as
well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout
Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented
from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed
through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in
Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the
elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary
(Roper 2000 54)
Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model
but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of
such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is
essential
1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
25
Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning
human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he
sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a
letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights
enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April
and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe
Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On
November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil
Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an
lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings
started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges
Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe
destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and
creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While
the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another
element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into
political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many
intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most
prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals
were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident
character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu
2009 42)
In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six
former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu
Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu
for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated
Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They
condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
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52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
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53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
26
with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans
and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a
short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no
harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political
figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the
lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet
condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)
Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and
a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not
want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal
Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna
prophetically warned him in June
lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved
Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the
right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for
them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the
whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your
stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)
2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in
order to calm down the population
As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to
condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control
Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100
000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online
in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the
Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the
footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
27
seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)
Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from
2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance
worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break
in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping
together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)
3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military
crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by
the revolutionary opposition
This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the
countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an
economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle
properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a
reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had
Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First
of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked
for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-
religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising
(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually
turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in
the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a
potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as
part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into
Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing
grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity
As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and
when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the
streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
28
4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the
beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of
conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread
change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be
coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly
everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National
Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already
monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992
125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of
the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of
conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the
NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National
Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held
radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no
previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which
the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)
5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some
extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres
springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front
established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara
incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion
Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both
been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army
While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by
Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb
2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free
elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already
monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
29
revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)
points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately
after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by
incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to
finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail
Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu
regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)
Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of
reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution
from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the
second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited
in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two
revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was
the only one were the public met the NSF
According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but
rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering
itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the
same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos
protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair
instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using
miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu
called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for
each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically
reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some
previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime
change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the
accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)
never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
30
and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is
contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle
between radical and moderates
8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical
control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the
creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the
TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more
than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due
between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion
as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about
the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion
especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the
revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody
conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil
war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old
regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a
political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same
structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the
army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate
on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)
While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the
revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution
While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody
conflict indicates a potential civil war
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
31
IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat
While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the
frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence
pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the
NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the
manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter
will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup
drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure
was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat
Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot
and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would
invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis
Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of
Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the
terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to
foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of
this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu
was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu
was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has
been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos
predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor
Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela
Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint
efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO
The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation
or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials
involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
32
toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused
for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the
external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the
foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet
forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting
The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents
which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as
the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and
stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the
border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists
especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the
country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic
menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)
The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context
and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure
speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its
renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene
in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if
truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably
left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were
recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow
but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role
exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been
mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the
presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There
is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which
were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had
indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
33
On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos
transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described
Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]
essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he
ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and
Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)
The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents
with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict
against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not
plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While
former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have
provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after
official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will
be now directed to the internal coup supposition
Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF
infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was
then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The
three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first
1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political
participation to a small fraction of the population
As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and
eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech
Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the
principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically
rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and
the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership
2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
34
As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact
countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as
by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies
3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be
political as opposed to ethnical
Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no
Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist
and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n
organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of
ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)
4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive
one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the
regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although
after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering
(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7
are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were
planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they
posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe
palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being
(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a
plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the
Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up
Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader
at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the
Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s
there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu
(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
35
anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president
Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae
Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the
conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation
worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)
7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by
respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to
overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled
9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating
national symbols
As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the
manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as
well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality
frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the
party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December
revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented
such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting
out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in
Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly
established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government
called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went
so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression
(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly
reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil
Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the
party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of
December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
36
Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning
of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV
For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized
convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide
reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo
(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a
joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people
they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through
mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of
institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator
namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the
Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of
the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition
in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was
an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called
people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo
(Mihalache 2012)
According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new
political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22
December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the
Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his
elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his
prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial
was a mockery
The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic
institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having
already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
37
lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is
our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the
revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this
this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national
consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on
their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)
In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of
the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary
leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)
The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the
flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed
over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and
pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the
best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article
published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties
lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional
government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be
talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the
NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian
manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to
television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information
and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)
(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free
and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected
people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was
not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued
democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
38
principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power
first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing
the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have
demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the
previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of
learning democratic practices
As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated
and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from
propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the
traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating
institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
39
V A Romanian Civil War
The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately
after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov
differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the
lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary
and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania
was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his
lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the
NSF and subsequently the army)
The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by
Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed
the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the
army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the
population and the army
The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The
threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)
Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and
furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil
war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only
against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of
contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)
Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or
ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal
as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and
integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were
undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many
grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
40
amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed
to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited
the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and
sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)
Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken
upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the
reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or
ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests
and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to
disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad
ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding
an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu
were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces
shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the
lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would
fit in the ideological conflict
Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a
particular closeness to the third variation
1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a
slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group
The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and
then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did
incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the
revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no
insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National
Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created
institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
41
accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos
could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only
ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they
came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was
also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)
2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular
armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and
eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias
which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies
Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu
was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due
to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into
militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were
given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)
3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed
coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the
army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious
nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu
Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is
identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided
with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is
not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to
members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu
While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three
options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of
Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
42
Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border
guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also
included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci
2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained
control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The
Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization
of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts
especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were
feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992
119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either
saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided
on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the
Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians
demanding the protesters were neutralized
The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate
members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as
Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing
attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to
maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to
support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the
USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to
support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have
similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one
side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing
ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of
the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured
terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such
terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
43
since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman
2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want
to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not
fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is
also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV
1989b)
As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards
the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical
frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there
was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The
Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the
Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and
around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest
(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather
combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV
1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and
one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as
a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was
Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war
between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu
ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-
related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb
(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take
control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the
statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been
shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF
and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state
and won by executing Ceausescu
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
44
As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory
has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features
which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December
1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary
outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power
resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was
to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the
revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal
was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of
Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized
power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil
war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of
Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three
processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF
Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would
have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good
connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the
other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions
could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
45
VI Conclusion
As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some
extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events
were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution
and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war
While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the
revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of
interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but
nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989
have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the
seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in
turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having
stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the
NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build
institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on
to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined
with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still
unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and
eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the
coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence
pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to
observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it
will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the
demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat
theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF
monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for
the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its
attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
46
of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one
another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a
coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The
same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset
it
These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only
with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events
be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to
be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court
has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have
not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases
against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will
haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out
While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a
simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event
into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a
satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed
to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the
democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct
revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help
unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the
globe
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
47
VII Bibliography
Articles
Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351
Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of
Politics 67(4) 1228-1247
Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers
56 (4) 563-595
Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-
19
Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others
Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301
Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate
Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33
Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian
revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542
Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political
Order in Changing Societies 110
Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1) 29-54
Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162
Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective
Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
48
Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of
The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-
465
Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal
53 291
Books
Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation
of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989
Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press
172-191
Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in
Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in
Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega
Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English
translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-
Napoca Zalmoxis
Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central
European University Press
Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books
Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press
Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum
Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from
French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel
Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
49
from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom
Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co
Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press
Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the
execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding
East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers
Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson
Center Press
Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological
theory Chicago Appleton
Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]
Bucharest Editura Obiectiv
Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press
Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies
Stamford Wadsworth Publishing
Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario
Macmillan
Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner
Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia
Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
50
Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press
Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale
University Press
Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger
Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol
16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press
Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown
Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)
Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass
Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va
University of Virginia Library
Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan
Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of
Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan
Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press
Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The
revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont
Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard
University Press
Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin
Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English
translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and
hop] Bucharest IRRD
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
51
Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from
Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed
McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And
Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22
Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan
Press
Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa
Pub House
Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from
Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE
Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French
The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy
Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press
Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood
Academic
Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University
Press
Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the
KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol
Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context
Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate
Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
52
University Press
Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University
Press
Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig
Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak
Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie
1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup
drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest
Ed RAO
Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington
IN iUniverse
Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The
Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas
Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation
from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul
Romacircnesc
Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell
Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge
Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New
York St Martins Press
Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction
Books
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
53
Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A
staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim
Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The
apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO
Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist
Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47
Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia
University Press
Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from
Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor
Online sources
BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English
translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from
http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed
20082014
CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency
retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014
ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania
24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-
presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed
20082014
Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from
Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from
httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014
Author Catalin Rolea
54
Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from
httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed
20082014
Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on
20082014
Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from
Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88
date accessed 20082014
OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014
Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on
20082014
RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from
httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian
Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from
httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014
RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian
Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date
accessed 20082014