The winter of change: A Romanian revolution, coup d’état or a civil war?

54
Author: Catalin Rolea 1 The winter of change: A Romanian revolution, coup d’état or a civil war? A theoretical perspective on the events that ended Ceausescu’s communist regime in December 1989 Name : Catalin Rolea School: School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham Degree Course: International Relations and Global Issues (MSci) Submission date: 29/08/2014

Transcript of The winter of change: A Romanian revolution, coup d’état or a civil war?

Author Catalin Rolea

1

The winter of change A Romanian revolution coup drsquoeacutetat or a

civil war

A theoretical perspective on the events that ended Ceausescursquos communist regime in

December 1989

Name Catalin Rolea

School School of Politics and International Relations University of Nottingham

Degree Course International Relations and Global Issues (MSci)

Submission date 29082014

Author Catalin Rolea

2

Abstract

The focus of this research is one of the most contentious political transitions in Eastern

Europe the case of Romania As there is still no official consensus on the nature of the

events that ousted Ceausescu in 1989 in Romania this dissertation provides an

alternative theoretical framework by analysing the events through the prism of the

broader literature on revolutions coups drsquoeacutetat and civil wars By adopting an

interpretative methodology and deploying qualitative methods the extent to which the

events of 1989 fit in each category are evaluated by isolating key criteria used to test

the validity and suitability of such explanations The findings of this research point

towards the hybridised nature of the events and the necessity of the development of

new all-encompassing theory of political change

Author Catalin Rolea

3

Table of Contents

I Introduction 4

a Background and purpose of research 4

b Methodology and structure 9

II Political change theory and the Romanian case 11

a Revolutions 11

b Coups 14

c Civil wars 17

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution 20

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat 31

V A Romanian Civil War 39

VI Conclusion 45

VII Bibliography 47

Articles 47

Books 48

Online sources 53

Author Catalin Rolea

4

I Introduction

Contentious political change has always been a fascinating topic for social sciences

scholars especially in the fields of political science history and sociology Whether

psychological or ethno-religious in nature national or triggered by the international

context revolutionary movements civil wars and coups have shaped world politics

throughout the world and still are as illustrated by the Arab Spring the civil war in Syria

or the events occurring in Ukraine at the moment As such a thorough analysis of such

events is of utmost importance to the understanding of the causes and nature of social

economic and political change The focus of this paper will be the contentious politics

that have dominated the Romanian political sphere both preceding and proceeding 1989

when the country began transitioning from a repressive communist regime to a

democratic society While the 1989rsquos wind of change that swept Eastern Europersquos

communist regimes and led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and implicitly to the

end of the Cold War represented turning points in the former satellitesrsquo history in the

case of Romania it also represented one of its greatest enigmas Almost 25 years after

Ceausescursquos ousting a lot of questions have still remained unanswered with no official

consensus of the nature of the events of 1989

a Background and purpose of research

Romania was unsurprisingly the last country where communism fell and the only one

that took a violent turn The reason it did not come as a surprise was due to its

uncommon regime different than the other Soviet Satellites While it was seen as a

potential anti-Soviet Western ally due to its nationalist form of communism at the same

time it also conducted one of the most repressive dictatorships in Eastern Europe and

refused to take consideration any reforms either from the West (the US the UN

regarding the treatment of minorities) or the East (Soviet Union glasnost perestroika)

(Scurtu 2000 89) Eventually both internal and external pressure turned the country

Author Catalin Rolea

5

into what Radio Free Europe called a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to be lit at any time

by any spark (Cesereanu 2009 48)

While anti-communist or pro-Gorbachev manifestations had previously occurred around

the country none escalated as the one in Timisoara in 1989 when the attempted

evacuation of a reformed Hungarian pastor that led to small-scale (20-30 people) protest

against the evacuation eventually escalated into an anti-Ceausescu popular uprising

consisting of thousands of people (Arpad 2011 15) Ceausescu convinced it was not a

genuine popular revolt but rather a foreign diversion endeavoured unsuccessfully to

repress the lsquohooligansrsquo as he called the protesters and unwisely planned a great popular

rally summoning tens of thousands of citizens in front of the Communist Partyrsquos Central

Committee in an attempt to condemn the unpatriotic acts in Timisoara As expected

despite Ceausescursquos efforts to appeal to the population the outcome was the decisive

anti-Ceausescu revolt ended with the storming in the central building and Ceausescu and

his wifersquos escape in a helicopter Soon after Ceausescursquos escape a committee entitled

lsquoThe National Salvation Frontrsquo (NSF) formed by ex-communist figures led by Iliescu

quickly filled the power void and seized power with the army and the Television at its

disposition (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 198) A day later Ceausescu was captured

and in the following couple of days on the 25th of December he and his wife were given

a mock trial sentenced to death and summarily executed In the meantime right after

Ceausescursquos escape psychological warfare and terrorist attacks were waged by still

unknown forces both against the army and the population attacks which diminished

after the execution of the Ceausescus According to official data released in 2008 over

1200 people were killed more than 5000 injured and other couple of thousands

unlawfully detained and mistreated during the events that led to the fall of communism

(ECHR 2011) The NSF organized free elections as promised but at the same time

quickly turned into a political party winning the majority of the votes When the NSF

was accused of lsquostealingrsquo the revolution and peaceful protests were organized in the

capital Bucharest the protesters were brutally repressed by the newly installed

Author Catalin Rolea

6

government in an old communist fashion (Adamson amp Florean 2013 175) These series

of events have shrouded the real nature of the alleged revolution and led to contentious

debates about it

The most asserted and commonly held opinion amongst Romaniarsquos population is that the

events constituted a popular revolution A survey circulated in 1996 revealed that 50

amongst respondents believed that Romania had experienced a revolution 30 that it

experienced a coup drsquoeacutetat and 20 that it was a foreign intervention (see Roper 2000

60) Fifteen years later a similar conducted survey revealed that opinions had not

significantly changed (BCS 2009) As Roper (1994 401) argues there is no single

theoretical framework that actually offers a satisfactory analysis of the events and

perhaps that is the main reason the population is so divided on the issue Despite the

great sacrifice that was necessary for the countryrsquos transition from communism there is

still no unanimity on either the nature of the events or on the ones to be blamed for the

crimes despite the several convictions that have already been made

There are several interpretations and theories which aim to explain the events with the

debate mainly revolving around the spontaneous revolution theory versus the coup

drsquoeacutetat one However some have also not excluded the possibility of a civil war to have

occurred (Ghaleb 2009)

Proponents of each of these variants can be also divided on certain points either on

minor or major issues Most of the contention lies as already pointed out on nature of

the terrorist attacks the seizure of power but also on the foreign element While deemed

to have been Ceausescursquos paranoia there at least several thousand foreign lsquotouristsrsquo

within the country during the events who left shortly after The extent to which they

influenced the revolution has been also debated ranging from a mere informative and

observational role to a facilitator and even vital role (Hall 1999 2)

The revolution theory is (rightfully) the most disseminated due to the context of social

revolutions it took place in but also due to the massive revolts that entangled Romania

Author Catalin Rolea

7

at the time First of all there are proponents of the Romanian spontaneous revolution

who have primarily consisted of revolutionaries themselves personalities that took part

in Ceausescursquos reprisal or members of the NSF who seized power Most of the books or

articles written on the events have been memoirs of the key leaders of the time Shortly

after the regime change Dumitru Mazilu former vice-president of the NSF wrote a book

entitled the lsquoStolen Revolutionrsquo1 (Mazilu 1991) advocating for a coup drsquoeacutetat position he

changed nevertheless 20 years later in a book entitled lsquo The Romanian Revolution

days and nights of drama and hopersquo (Mazilu 2011) where he strongly supports the

genuine revolutionary character2 The most prolific public figure which presented the

events as a genuine popular revolution was Ion Iliescu the leader of the NSF and

president of the country for 12 years who not only defended the revolutionary character

in writing (two published memoirs) but also on several occasions on televised debates

(Iliescu 1996) As part of the Institute of the Romanian Revolution of 1989 a series of

historians have also defended the revolution with figures such as Andreescu Bucur or

Scurtu Apart from Romanian public figures the Romanian events have also received

attention abroad Foreign scholars such as Vladimir Tismaneanu (2001) and Peter-Siani

Davies (2000) have defended the revolutionary character of the Romanian shift even

comparing it to the Great French Revolution McDermott and Stibbe consider 1989 as a

lsquogenuine popular revolution in both form and content with complex political and social

local national and international violent and non-violent long-term and short term

causesrsquo (McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 3)

Second there are those who reject the popular revolution and rather see the events as a

coup drsquoeacutetat Even proponents of the coup drsquoeacutetat theory are divided on the issue While

some credit an internal coup drsquoeacutetat organized by Iliescu and the NSF others argue that

everything was staged and planned ever since the Malta Summit at the beginning of

December 1989 Liviu Valenas (1990) considers the popular revolt only cosmetic to

brush the real plot coordinated by the KGB French writers such as Radu Portocala

1 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Furata memoriu pentru tara mearsquo

2 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Romana zile si nopti de dramatism si sperantarsquo

Author Catalin Rolea

8

(1990) Victor Loupan (1990) or Michel Castex (1990) believe it was an internal coup

backed by external support

Third there are some who saw the revolution as a hybrid between a revolution and a

coup Such figures represented by Romanian historians such as Lucian Boia (2001) or

Mihai Stoenescu (2004) consider that a spontaneous revolution did exist only until it was

either attempted to be stolen by foreign forces or was stolen by the NSF Jean-Marie Le

Breton then French ambassador to Romania (1987-1990) in comparison to the majority

of the French journalists who saw the revolution as an impostor a plot or a coup the ex-

ambassador considers a genuine revolution did happen although only until 22nd of

December when it was confiscated (Le Bretton 1996) Andrew Richard Hall also

suspects a revolution-hybrid palace coup (Hall 1999) while Anneli Ute Gabanyi (1999

48) considers that the events constituted a revolutionary coup preceded by a popular

revolt that was previously provoked by the couprsquos architects in order to use it

Fourth there is the civil war theory a less popular one which has not received as much

attention as the other two The high number of casualties combined with the ethno-

religious spark of the revolution has led captain Ghaleb (2011) to conclude that neither

revolution nor coup are sufficient in understanding the conflict and thus advocated for

the use of the term civil war as the most suitable Mihai Ungheanu (1977) believes the

events constituted a staged civil war deployed in favour of the coup While none of the

theories offer a full analytic account of the 1989 events all bring important elements

which can help their understanding As it has been pointed before none of the proposed

theories can fully explain the nature of the events but at the same time none can be

dismissed completely The problem with the theoretical accounts of the 1989 events has

been that no systematic analysis on the broader literature on revolutions coups and civil

wars has been used in support of the claims Rather most accounts have been based on

broad academic or sometimes even popular definitions of revolutions coups and civil

wars No thorough deconstruction of the broader literature drawing on empirical studies

of such contentious politics has been made nor a comparison between them Henceforth

Author Catalin Rolea

9

this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical

account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on

revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative

explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989

As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the

unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened

As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek

a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a

custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and

coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories

b Methodology and structure

The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts

(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature

dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and

state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge

to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been

released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files

highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist

methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at

this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and

interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key

aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal

inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)

The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case

studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political

change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will

attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events

Author Catalin Rolea

10

as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by

the broader literature on contentious politics

Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian

event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical

approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical

interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a

structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together

The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences

during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete

footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline

of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that

has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper

articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of

memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved

in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)

memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources

of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument

and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved

Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the

events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination

of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war

or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well

as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and

French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and

Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a

satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the

Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most

appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The

Author Catalin Rolea

11

limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain

certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the

diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The

only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs

that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless

even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a

conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate

framework of further analysing it shall still be possible

II Political change theory and the Romanian case

The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical

frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order

to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will

isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical

literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case

study

a Revolutions

As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms

they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the

context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal

revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality

and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the

socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division

Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa

rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a

society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity

policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)

Author Catalin Rolea

12

would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too

occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a

complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a

more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be

necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study

In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different

generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital

conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)

The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)

Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical

generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European

revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a

general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia

revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the

government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a

common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to

opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek

rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential

outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate

reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left

from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the

great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the

same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage

in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the

implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive

Author Catalin Rolea

13

rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to

move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical

phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone

2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria

framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution

While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus

on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation

complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary

sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation

of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering

expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school

presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect

that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that

offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that

sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to

Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp

economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination

(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent

and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the

discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal

The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus

on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a

revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation

between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests

between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by

the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income

might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in

discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be

Author Catalin Rolea

14

seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain

privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they

can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists

argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided

within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not

stay in place (Goldstone 200315)

While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology

of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but

rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which

to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of

revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred

in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing

whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for

the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the

development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by

the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second

third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-

curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the

external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary

forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the

other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise

from stage number 4

b Coups

There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions

and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but

soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all

three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-

Author Catalin Rolea

15

13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms

which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has

institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the

coup drsquoeacutetat framework

As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a

similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good

knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and

weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the

opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation

However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the

differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues

unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the

opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a

technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn

them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of

the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the

remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings

to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been

associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to

monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)

Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first

traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)

considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be

democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)

along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo

lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup

because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards

because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo

Author Catalin Rolea

16

(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the

essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is

not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the

grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup

would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening

fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the

strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to

dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and

attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)

On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that

democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the

world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others

Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol

argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat

and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to

democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition

against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes

free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960

Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on

the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones

Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events

through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat

As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil

war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of

the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will

come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary

for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the

population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting

Author Catalin Rolea

17

foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all

should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by

adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed

4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to

popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down

in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected

in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects

legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the

military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends

with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)

The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is

drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not

entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to

impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)

Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be

applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or

government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)

c Civil wars

Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state

recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed

conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition

movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their

nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes

one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars

involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly

forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according

to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

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Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

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48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

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52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

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CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

2

Abstract

The focus of this research is one of the most contentious political transitions in Eastern

Europe the case of Romania As there is still no official consensus on the nature of the

events that ousted Ceausescu in 1989 in Romania this dissertation provides an

alternative theoretical framework by analysing the events through the prism of the

broader literature on revolutions coups drsquoeacutetat and civil wars By adopting an

interpretative methodology and deploying qualitative methods the extent to which the

events of 1989 fit in each category are evaluated by isolating key criteria used to test

the validity and suitability of such explanations The findings of this research point

towards the hybridised nature of the events and the necessity of the development of

new all-encompassing theory of political change

Author Catalin Rolea

3

Table of Contents

I Introduction 4

a Background and purpose of research 4

b Methodology and structure 9

II Political change theory and the Romanian case 11

a Revolutions 11

b Coups 14

c Civil wars 17

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution 20

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat 31

V A Romanian Civil War 39

VI Conclusion 45

VII Bibliography 47

Articles 47

Books 48

Online sources 53

Author Catalin Rolea

4

I Introduction

Contentious political change has always been a fascinating topic for social sciences

scholars especially in the fields of political science history and sociology Whether

psychological or ethno-religious in nature national or triggered by the international

context revolutionary movements civil wars and coups have shaped world politics

throughout the world and still are as illustrated by the Arab Spring the civil war in Syria

or the events occurring in Ukraine at the moment As such a thorough analysis of such

events is of utmost importance to the understanding of the causes and nature of social

economic and political change The focus of this paper will be the contentious politics

that have dominated the Romanian political sphere both preceding and proceeding 1989

when the country began transitioning from a repressive communist regime to a

democratic society While the 1989rsquos wind of change that swept Eastern Europersquos

communist regimes and led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and implicitly to the

end of the Cold War represented turning points in the former satellitesrsquo history in the

case of Romania it also represented one of its greatest enigmas Almost 25 years after

Ceausescursquos ousting a lot of questions have still remained unanswered with no official

consensus of the nature of the events of 1989

a Background and purpose of research

Romania was unsurprisingly the last country where communism fell and the only one

that took a violent turn The reason it did not come as a surprise was due to its

uncommon regime different than the other Soviet Satellites While it was seen as a

potential anti-Soviet Western ally due to its nationalist form of communism at the same

time it also conducted one of the most repressive dictatorships in Eastern Europe and

refused to take consideration any reforms either from the West (the US the UN

regarding the treatment of minorities) or the East (Soviet Union glasnost perestroika)

(Scurtu 2000 89) Eventually both internal and external pressure turned the country

Author Catalin Rolea

5

into what Radio Free Europe called a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to be lit at any time

by any spark (Cesereanu 2009 48)

While anti-communist or pro-Gorbachev manifestations had previously occurred around

the country none escalated as the one in Timisoara in 1989 when the attempted

evacuation of a reformed Hungarian pastor that led to small-scale (20-30 people) protest

against the evacuation eventually escalated into an anti-Ceausescu popular uprising

consisting of thousands of people (Arpad 2011 15) Ceausescu convinced it was not a

genuine popular revolt but rather a foreign diversion endeavoured unsuccessfully to

repress the lsquohooligansrsquo as he called the protesters and unwisely planned a great popular

rally summoning tens of thousands of citizens in front of the Communist Partyrsquos Central

Committee in an attempt to condemn the unpatriotic acts in Timisoara As expected

despite Ceausescursquos efforts to appeal to the population the outcome was the decisive

anti-Ceausescu revolt ended with the storming in the central building and Ceausescu and

his wifersquos escape in a helicopter Soon after Ceausescursquos escape a committee entitled

lsquoThe National Salvation Frontrsquo (NSF) formed by ex-communist figures led by Iliescu

quickly filled the power void and seized power with the army and the Television at its

disposition (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 198) A day later Ceausescu was captured

and in the following couple of days on the 25th of December he and his wife were given

a mock trial sentenced to death and summarily executed In the meantime right after

Ceausescursquos escape psychological warfare and terrorist attacks were waged by still

unknown forces both against the army and the population attacks which diminished

after the execution of the Ceausescus According to official data released in 2008 over

1200 people were killed more than 5000 injured and other couple of thousands

unlawfully detained and mistreated during the events that led to the fall of communism

(ECHR 2011) The NSF organized free elections as promised but at the same time

quickly turned into a political party winning the majority of the votes When the NSF

was accused of lsquostealingrsquo the revolution and peaceful protests were organized in the

capital Bucharest the protesters were brutally repressed by the newly installed

Author Catalin Rolea

6

government in an old communist fashion (Adamson amp Florean 2013 175) These series

of events have shrouded the real nature of the alleged revolution and led to contentious

debates about it

The most asserted and commonly held opinion amongst Romaniarsquos population is that the

events constituted a popular revolution A survey circulated in 1996 revealed that 50

amongst respondents believed that Romania had experienced a revolution 30 that it

experienced a coup drsquoeacutetat and 20 that it was a foreign intervention (see Roper 2000

60) Fifteen years later a similar conducted survey revealed that opinions had not

significantly changed (BCS 2009) As Roper (1994 401) argues there is no single

theoretical framework that actually offers a satisfactory analysis of the events and

perhaps that is the main reason the population is so divided on the issue Despite the

great sacrifice that was necessary for the countryrsquos transition from communism there is

still no unanimity on either the nature of the events or on the ones to be blamed for the

crimes despite the several convictions that have already been made

There are several interpretations and theories which aim to explain the events with the

debate mainly revolving around the spontaneous revolution theory versus the coup

drsquoeacutetat one However some have also not excluded the possibility of a civil war to have

occurred (Ghaleb 2009)

Proponents of each of these variants can be also divided on certain points either on

minor or major issues Most of the contention lies as already pointed out on nature of

the terrorist attacks the seizure of power but also on the foreign element While deemed

to have been Ceausescursquos paranoia there at least several thousand foreign lsquotouristsrsquo

within the country during the events who left shortly after The extent to which they

influenced the revolution has been also debated ranging from a mere informative and

observational role to a facilitator and even vital role (Hall 1999 2)

The revolution theory is (rightfully) the most disseminated due to the context of social

revolutions it took place in but also due to the massive revolts that entangled Romania

Author Catalin Rolea

7

at the time First of all there are proponents of the Romanian spontaneous revolution

who have primarily consisted of revolutionaries themselves personalities that took part

in Ceausescursquos reprisal or members of the NSF who seized power Most of the books or

articles written on the events have been memoirs of the key leaders of the time Shortly

after the regime change Dumitru Mazilu former vice-president of the NSF wrote a book

entitled the lsquoStolen Revolutionrsquo1 (Mazilu 1991) advocating for a coup drsquoeacutetat position he

changed nevertheless 20 years later in a book entitled lsquo The Romanian Revolution

days and nights of drama and hopersquo (Mazilu 2011) where he strongly supports the

genuine revolutionary character2 The most prolific public figure which presented the

events as a genuine popular revolution was Ion Iliescu the leader of the NSF and

president of the country for 12 years who not only defended the revolutionary character

in writing (two published memoirs) but also on several occasions on televised debates

(Iliescu 1996) As part of the Institute of the Romanian Revolution of 1989 a series of

historians have also defended the revolution with figures such as Andreescu Bucur or

Scurtu Apart from Romanian public figures the Romanian events have also received

attention abroad Foreign scholars such as Vladimir Tismaneanu (2001) and Peter-Siani

Davies (2000) have defended the revolutionary character of the Romanian shift even

comparing it to the Great French Revolution McDermott and Stibbe consider 1989 as a

lsquogenuine popular revolution in both form and content with complex political and social

local national and international violent and non-violent long-term and short term

causesrsquo (McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 3)

Second there are those who reject the popular revolution and rather see the events as a

coup drsquoeacutetat Even proponents of the coup drsquoeacutetat theory are divided on the issue While

some credit an internal coup drsquoeacutetat organized by Iliescu and the NSF others argue that

everything was staged and planned ever since the Malta Summit at the beginning of

December 1989 Liviu Valenas (1990) considers the popular revolt only cosmetic to

brush the real plot coordinated by the KGB French writers such as Radu Portocala

1 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Furata memoriu pentru tara mearsquo

2 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Romana zile si nopti de dramatism si sperantarsquo

Author Catalin Rolea

8

(1990) Victor Loupan (1990) or Michel Castex (1990) believe it was an internal coup

backed by external support

Third there are some who saw the revolution as a hybrid between a revolution and a

coup Such figures represented by Romanian historians such as Lucian Boia (2001) or

Mihai Stoenescu (2004) consider that a spontaneous revolution did exist only until it was

either attempted to be stolen by foreign forces or was stolen by the NSF Jean-Marie Le

Breton then French ambassador to Romania (1987-1990) in comparison to the majority

of the French journalists who saw the revolution as an impostor a plot or a coup the ex-

ambassador considers a genuine revolution did happen although only until 22nd of

December when it was confiscated (Le Bretton 1996) Andrew Richard Hall also

suspects a revolution-hybrid palace coup (Hall 1999) while Anneli Ute Gabanyi (1999

48) considers that the events constituted a revolutionary coup preceded by a popular

revolt that was previously provoked by the couprsquos architects in order to use it

Fourth there is the civil war theory a less popular one which has not received as much

attention as the other two The high number of casualties combined with the ethno-

religious spark of the revolution has led captain Ghaleb (2011) to conclude that neither

revolution nor coup are sufficient in understanding the conflict and thus advocated for

the use of the term civil war as the most suitable Mihai Ungheanu (1977) believes the

events constituted a staged civil war deployed in favour of the coup While none of the

theories offer a full analytic account of the 1989 events all bring important elements

which can help their understanding As it has been pointed before none of the proposed

theories can fully explain the nature of the events but at the same time none can be

dismissed completely The problem with the theoretical accounts of the 1989 events has

been that no systematic analysis on the broader literature on revolutions coups and civil

wars has been used in support of the claims Rather most accounts have been based on

broad academic or sometimes even popular definitions of revolutions coups and civil

wars No thorough deconstruction of the broader literature drawing on empirical studies

of such contentious politics has been made nor a comparison between them Henceforth

Author Catalin Rolea

9

this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical

account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on

revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative

explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989

As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the

unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened

As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek

a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a

custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and

coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories

b Methodology and structure

The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts

(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature

dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and

state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge

to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been

released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files

highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist

methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at

this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and

interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key

aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal

inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)

The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case

studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political

change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will

attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events

Author Catalin Rolea

10

as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by

the broader literature on contentious politics

Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian

event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical

approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical

interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a

structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together

The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences

during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete

footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline

of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that

has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper

articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of

memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved

in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)

memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources

of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument

and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved

Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the

events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination

of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war

or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well

as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and

French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and

Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a

satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the

Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most

appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The

Author Catalin Rolea

11

limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain

certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the

diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The

only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs

that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless

even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a

conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate

framework of further analysing it shall still be possible

II Political change theory and the Romanian case

The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical

frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order

to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will

isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical

literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case

study

a Revolutions

As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms

they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the

context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal

revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality

and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the

socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division

Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa

rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a

society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity

policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)

Author Catalin Rolea

12

would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too

occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a

complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a

more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be

necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study

In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different

generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital

conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)

The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)

Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical

generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European

revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a

general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia

revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the

government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a

common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to

opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek

rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential

outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate

reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left

from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the

great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the

same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage

in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the

implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive

Author Catalin Rolea

13

rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to

move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical

phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone

2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria

framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution

While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus

on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation

complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary

sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation

of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering

expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school

presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect

that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that

offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that

sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to

Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp

economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination

(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent

and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the

discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal

The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus

on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a

revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation

between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests

between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by

the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income

might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in

discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be

Author Catalin Rolea

14

seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain

privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they

can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists

argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided

within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not

stay in place (Goldstone 200315)

While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology

of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but

rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which

to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of

revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred

in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing

whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for

the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the

development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by

the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second

third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-

curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the

external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary

forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the

other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise

from stage number 4

b Coups

There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions

and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but

soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all

three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-

Author Catalin Rolea

15

13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms

which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has

institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the

coup drsquoeacutetat framework

As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a

similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good

knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and

weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the

opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation

However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the

differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues

unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the

opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a

technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn

them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of

the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the

remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings

to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been

associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to

monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)

Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first

traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)

considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be

democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)

along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo

lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup

because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards

because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo

Author Catalin Rolea

16

(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the

essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is

not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the

grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup

would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening

fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the

strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to

dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and

attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)

On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that

democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the

world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others

Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol

argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat

and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to

democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition

against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes

free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960

Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on

the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones

Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events

through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat

As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil

war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of

the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will

come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary

for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the

population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting

Author Catalin Rolea

17

foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all

should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by

adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed

4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to

popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down

in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected

in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects

legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the

military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends

with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)

The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is

drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not

entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to

impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)

Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be

applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or

government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)

c Civil wars

Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state

recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed

conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition

movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their

nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes

one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars

involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly

forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according

to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

3

Table of Contents

I Introduction 4

a Background and purpose of research 4

b Methodology and structure 9

II Political change theory and the Romanian case 11

a Revolutions 11

b Coups 14

c Civil wars 17

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution 20

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat 31

V A Romanian Civil War 39

VI Conclusion 45

VII Bibliography 47

Articles 47

Books 48

Online sources 53

Author Catalin Rolea

4

I Introduction

Contentious political change has always been a fascinating topic for social sciences

scholars especially in the fields of political science history and sociology Whether

psychological or ethno-religious in nature national or triggered by the international

context revolutionary movements civil wars and coups have shaped world politics

throughout the world and still are as illustrated by the Arab Spring the civil war in Syria

or the events occurring in Ukraine at the moment As such a thorough analysis of such

events is of utmost importance to the understanding of the causes and nature of social

economic and political change The focus of this paper will be the contentious politics

that have dominated the Romanian political sphere both preceding and proceeding 1989

when the country began transitioning from a repressive communist regime to a

democratic society While the 1989rsquos wind of change that swept Eastern Europersquos

communist regimes and led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and implicitly to the

end of the Cold War represented turning points in the former satellitesrsquo history in the

case of Romania it also represented one of its greatest enigmas Almost 25 years after

Ceausescursquos ousting a lot of questions have still remained unanswered with no official

consensus of the nature of the events of 1989

a Background and purpose of research

Romania was unsurprisingly the last country where communism fell and the only one

that took a violent turn The reason it did not come as a surprise was due to its

uncommon regime different than the other Soviet Satellites While it was seen as a

potential anti-Soviet Western ally due to its nationalist form of communism at the same

time it also conducted one of the most repressive dictatorships in Eastern Europe and

refused to take consideration any reforms either from the West (the US the UN

regarding the treatment of minorities) or the East (Soviet Union glasnost perestroika)

(Scurtu 2000 89) Eventually both internal and external pressure turned the country

Author Catalin Rolea

5

into what Radio Free Europe called a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to be lit at any time

by any spark (Cesereanu 2009 48)

While anti-communist or pro-Gorbachev manifestations had previously occurred around

the country none escalated as the one in Timisoara in 1989 when the attempted

evacuation of a reformed Hungarian pastor that led to small-scale (20-30 people) protest

against the evacuation eventually escalated into an anti-Ceausescu popular uprising

consisting of thousands of people (Arpad 2011 15) Ceausescu convinced it was not a

genuine popular revolt but rather a foreign diversion endeavoured unsuccessfully to

repress the lsquohooligansrsquo as he called the protesters and unwisely planned a great popular

rally summoning tens of thousands of citizens in front of the Communist Partyrsquos Central

Committee in an attempt to condemn the unpatriotic acts in Timisoara As expected

despite Ceausescursquos efforts to appeal to the population the outcome was the decisive

anti-Ceausescu revolt ended with the storming in the central building and Ceausescu and

his wifersquos escape in a helicopter Soon after Ceausescursquos escape a committee entitled

lsquoThe National Salvation Frontrsquo (NSF) formed by ex-communist figures led by Iliescu

quickly filled the power void and seized power with the army and the Television at its

disposition (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 198) A day later Ceausescu was captured

and in the following couple of days on the 25th of December he and his wife were given

a mock trial sentenced to death and summarily executed In the meantime right after

Ceausescursquos escape psychological warfare and terrorist attacks were waged by still

unknown forces both against the army and the population attacks which diminished

after the execution of the Ceausescus According to official data released in 2008 over

1200 people were killed more than 5000 injured and other couple of thousands

unlawfully detained and mistreated during the events that led to the fall of communism

(ECHR 2011) The NSF organized free elections as promised but at the same time

quickly turned into a political party winning the majority of the votes When the NSF

was accused of lsquostealingrsquo the revolution and peaceful protests were organized in the

capital Bucharest the protesters were brutally repressed by the newly installed

Author Catalin Rolea

6

government in an old communist fashion (Adamson amp Florean 2013 175) These series

of events have shrouded the real nature of the alleged revolution and led to contentious

debates about it

The most asserted and commonly held opinion amongst Romaniarsquos population is that the

events constituted a popular revolution A survey circulated in 1996 revealed that 50

amongst respondents believed that Romania had experienced a revolution 30 that it

experienced a coup drsquoeacutetat and 20 that it was a foreign intervention (see Roper 2000

60) Fifteen years later a similar conducted survey revealed that opinions had not

significantly changed (BCS 2009) As Roper (1994 401) argues there is no single

theoretical framework that actually offers a satisfactory analysis of the events and

perhaps that is the main reason the population is so divided on the issue Despite the

great sacrifice that was necessary for the countryrsquos transition from communism there is

still no unanimity on either the nature of the events or on the ones to be blamed for the

crimes despite the several convictions that have already been made

There are several interpretations and theories which aim to explain the events with the

debate mainly revolving around the spontaneous revolution theory versus the coup

drsquoeacutetat one However some have also not excluded the possibility of a civil war to have

occurred (Ghaleb 2009)

Proponents of each of these variants can be also divided on certain points either on

minor or major issues Most of the contention lies as already pointed out on nature of

the terrorist attacks the seizure of power but also on the foreign element While deemed

to have been Ceausescursquos paranoia there at least several thousand foreign lsquotouristsrsquo

within the country during the events who left shortly after The extent to which they

influenced the revolution has been also debated ranging from a mere informative and

observational role to a facilitator and even vital role (Hall 1999 2)

The revolution theory is (rightfully) the most disseminated due to the context of social

revolutions it took place in but also due to the massive revolts that entangled Romania

Author Catalin Rolea

7

at the time First of all there are proponents of the Romanian spontaneous revolution

who have primarily consisted of revolutionaries themselves personalities that took part

in Ceausescursquos reprisal or members of the NSF who seized power Most of the books or

articles written on the events have been memoirs of the key leaders of the time Shortly

after the regime change Dumitru Mazilu former vice-president of the NSF wrote a book

entitled the lsquoStolen Revolutionrsquo1 (Mazilu 1991) advocating for a coup drsquoeacutetat position he

changed nevertheless 20 years later in a book entitled lsquo The Romanian Revolution

days and nights of drama and hopersquo (Mazilu 2011) where he strongly supports the

genuine revolutionary character2 The most prolific public figure which presented the

events as a genuine popular revolution was Ion Iliescu the leader of the NSF and

president of the country for 12 years who not only defended the revolutionary character

in writing (two published memoirs) but also on several occasions on televised debates

(Iliescu 1996) As part of the Institute of the Romanian Revolution of 1989 a series of

historians have also defended the revolution with figures such as Andreescu Bucur or

Scurtu Apart from Romanian public figures the Romanian events have also received

attention abroad Foreign scholars such as Vladimir Tismaneanu (2001) and Peter-Siani

Davies (2000) have defended the revolutionary character of the Romanian shift even

comparing it to the Great French Revolution McDermott and Stibbe consider 1989 as a

lsquogenuine popular revolution in both form and content with complex political and social

local national and international violent and non-violent long-term and short term

causesrsquo (McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 3)

Second there are those who reject the popular revolution and rather see the events as a

coup drsquoeacutetat Even proponents of the coup drsquoeacutetat theory are divided on the issue While

some credit an internal coup drsquoeacutetat organized by Iliescu and the NSF others argue that

everything was staged and planned ever since the Malta Summit at the beginning of

December 1989 Liviu Valenas (1990) considers the popular revolt only cosmetic to

brush the real plot coordinated by the KGB French writers such as Radu Portocala

1 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Furata memoriu pentru tara mearsquo

2 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Romana zile si nopti de dramatism si sperantarsquo

Author Catalin Rolea

8

(1990) Victor Loupan (1990) or Michel Castex (1990) believe it was an internal coup

backed by external support

Third there are some who saw the revolution as a hybrid between a revolution and a

coup Such figures represented by Romanian historians such as Lucian Boia (2001) or

Mihai Stoenescu (2004) consider that a spontaneous revolution did exist only until it was

either attempted to be stolen by foreign forces or was stolen by the NSF Jean-Marie Le

Breton then French ambassador to Romania (1987-1990) in comparison to the majority

of the French journalists who saw the revolution as an impostor a plot or a coup the ex-

ambassador considers a genuine revolution did happen although only until 22nd of

December when it was confiscated (Le Bretton 1996) Andrew Richard Hall also

suspects a revolution-hybrid palace coup (Hall 1999) while Anneli Ute Gabanyi (1999

48) considers that the events constituted a revolutionary coup preceded by a popular

revolt that was previously provoked by the couprsquos architects in order to use it

Fourth there is the civil war theory a less popular one which has not received as much

attention as the other two The high number of casualties combined with the ethno-

religious spark of the revolution has led captain Ghaleb (2011) to conclude that neither

revolution nor coup are sufficient in understanding the conflict and thus advocated for

the use of the term civil war as the most suitable Mihai Ungheanu (1977) believes the

events constituted a staged civil war deployed in favour of the coup While none of the

theories offer a full analytic account of the 1989 events all bring important elements

which can help their understanding As it has been pointed before none of the proposed

theories can fully explain the nature of the events but at the same time none can be

dismissed completely The problem with the theoretical accounts of the 1989 events has

been that no systematic analysis on the broader literature on revolutions coups and civil

wars has been used in support of the claims Rather most accounts have been based on

broad academic or sometimes even popular definitions of revolutions coups and civil

wars No thorough deconstruction of the broader literature drawing on empirical studies

of such contentious politics has been made nor a comparison between them Henceforth

Author Catalin Rolea

9

this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical

account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on

revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative

explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989

As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the

unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened

As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek

a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a

custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and

coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories

b Methodology and structure

The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts

(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature

dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and

state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge

to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been

released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files

highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist

methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at

this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and

interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key

aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal

inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)

The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case

studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political

change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will

attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events

Author Catalin Rolea

10

as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by

the broader literature on contentious politics

Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian

event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical

approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical

interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a

structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together

The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences

during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete

footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline

of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that

has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper

articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of

memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved

in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)

memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources

of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument

and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved

Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the

events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination

of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war

or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well

as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and

French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and

Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a

satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the

Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most

appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The

Author Catalin Rolea

11

limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain

certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the

diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The

only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs

that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless

even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a

conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate

framework of further analysing it shall still be possible

II Political change theory and the Romanian case

The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical

frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order

to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will

isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical

literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case

study

a Revolutions

As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms

they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the

context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal

revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality

and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the

socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division

Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa

rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a

society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity

policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)

Author Catalin Rolea

12

would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too

occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a

complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a

more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be

necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study

In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different

generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital

conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)

The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)

Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical

generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European

revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a

general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia

revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the

government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a

common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to

opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek

rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential

outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate

reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left

from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the

great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the

same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage

in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the

implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive

Author Catalin Rolea

13

rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to

move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical

phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone

2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria

framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution

While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus

on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation

complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary

sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation

of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering

expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school

presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect

that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that

offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that

sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to

Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp

economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination

(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent

and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the

discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal

The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus

on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a

revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation

between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests

between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by

the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income

might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in

discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be

Author Catalin Rolea

14

seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain

privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they

can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists

argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided

within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not

stay in place (Goldstone 200315)

While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology

of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but

rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which

to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of

revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred

in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing

whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for

the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the

development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by

the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second

third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-

curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the

external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary

forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the

other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise

from stage number 4

b Coups

There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions

and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but

soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all

three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-

Author Catalin Rolea

15

13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms

which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has

institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the

coup drsquoeacutetat framework

As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a

similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good

knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and

weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the

opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation

However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the

differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues

unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the

opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a

technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn

them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of

the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the

remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings

to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been

associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to

monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)

Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first

traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)

considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be

democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)

along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo

lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup

because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards

because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo

Author Catalin Rolea

16

(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the

essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is

not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the

grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup

would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening

fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the

strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to

dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and

attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)

On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that

democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the

world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others

Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol

argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat

and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to

democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition

against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes

free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960

Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on

the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones

Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events

through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat

As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil

war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of

the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will

come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary

for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the

population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting

Author Catalin Rolea

17

foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all

should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by

adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed

4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to

popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down

in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected

in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects

legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the

military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends

with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)

The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is

drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not

entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to

impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)

Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be

applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or

government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)

c Civil wars

Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state

recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed

conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition

movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their

nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes

one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars

involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly

forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according

to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

4

I Introduction

Contentious political change has always been a fascinating topic for social sciences

scholars especially in the fields of political science history and sociology Whether

psychological or ethno-religious in nature national or triggered by the international

context revolutionary movements civil wars and coups have shaped world politics

throughout the world and still are as illustrated by the Arab Spring the civil war in Syria

or the events occurring in Ukraine at the moment As such a thorough analysis of such

events is of utmost importance to the understanding of the causes and nature of social

economic and political change The focus of this paper will be the contentious politics

that have dominated the Romanian political sphere both preceding and proceeding 1989

when the country began transitioning from a repressive communist regime to a

democratic society While the 1989rsquos wind of change that swept Eastern Europersquos

communist regimes and led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and implicitly to the

end of the Cold War represented turning points in the former satellitesrsquo history in the

case of Romania it also represented one of its greatest enigmas Almost 25 years after

Ceausescursquos ousting a lot of questions have still remained unanswered with no official

consensus of the nature of the events of 1989

a Background and purpose of research

Romania was unsurprisingly the last country where communism fell and the only one

that took a violent turn The reason it did not come as a surprise was due to its

uncommon regime different than the other Soviet Satellites While it was seen as a

potential anti-Soviet Western ally due to its nationalist form of communism at the same

time it also conducted one of the most repressive dictatorships in Eastern Europe and

refused to take consideration any reforms either from the West (the US the UN

regarding the treatment of minorities) or the East (Soviet Union glasnost perestroika)

(Scurtu 2000 89) Eventually both internal and external pressure turned the country

Author Catalin Rolea

5

into what Radio Free Europe called a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to be lit at any time

by any spark (Cesereanu 2009 48)

While anti-communist or pro-Gorbachev manifestations had previously occurred around

the country none escalated as the one in Timisoara in 1989 when the attempted

evacuation of a reformed Hungarian pastor that led to small-scale (20-30 people) protest

against the evacuation eventually escalated into an anti-Ceausescu popular uprising

consisting of thousands of people (Arpad 2011 15) Ceausescu convinced it was not a

genuine popular revolt but rather a foreign diversion endeavoured unsuccessfully to

repress the lsquohooligansrsquo as he called the protesters and unwisely planned a great popular

rally summoning tens of thousands of citizens in front of the Communist Partyrsquos Central

Committee in an attempt to condemn the unpatriotic acts in Timisoara As expected

despite Ceausescursquos efforts to appeal to the population the outcome was the decisive

anti-Ceausescu revolt ended with the storming in the central building and Ceausescu and

his wifersquos escape in a helicopter Soon after Ceausescursquos escape a committee entitled

lsquoThe National Salvation Frontrsquo (NSF) formed by ex-communist figures led by Iliescu

quickly filled the power void and seized power with the army and the Television at its

disposition (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 198) A day later Ceausescu was captured

and in the following couple of days on the 25th of December he and his wife were given

a mock trial sentenced to death and summarily executed In the meantime right after

Ceausescursquos escape psychological warfare and terrorist attacks were waged by still

unknown forces both against the army and the population attacks which diminished

after the execution of the Ceausescus According to official data released in 2008 over

1200 people were killed more than 5000 injured and other couple of thousands

unlawfully detained and mistreated during the events that led to the fall of communism

(ECHR 2011) The NSF organized free elections as promised but at the same time

quickly turned into a political party winning the majority of the votes When the NSF

was accused of lsquostealingrsquo the revolution and peaceful protests were organized in the

capital Bucharest the protesters were brutally repressed by the newly installed

Author Catalin Rolea

6

government in an old communist fashion (Adamson amp Florean 2013 175) These series

of events have shrouded the real nature of the alleged revolution and led to contentious

debates about it

The most asserted and commonly held opinion amongst Romaniarsquos population is that the

events constituted a popular revolution A survey circulated in 1996 revealed that 50

amongst respondents believed that Romania had experienced a revolution 30 that it

experienced a coup drsquoeacutetat and 20 that it was a foreign intervention (see Roper 2000

60) Fifteen years later a similar conducted survey revealed that opinions had not

significantly changed (BCS 2009) As Roper (1994 401) argues there is no single

theoretical framework that actually offers a satisfactory analysis of the events and

perhaps that is the main reason the population is so divided on the issue Despite the

great sacrifice that was necessary for the countryrsquos transition from communism there is

still no unanimity on either the nature of the events or on the ones to be blamed for the

crimes despite the several convictions that have already been made

There are several interpretations and theories which aim to explain the events with the

debate mainly revolving around the spontaneous revolution theory versus the coup

drsquoeacutetat one However some have also not excluded the possibility of a civil war to have

occurred (Ghaleb 2009)

Proponents of each of these variants can be also divided on certain points either on

minor or major issues Most of the contention lies as already pointed out on nature of

the terrorist attacks the seizure of power but also on the foreign element While deemed

to have been Ceausescursquos paranoia there at least several thousand foreign lsquotouristsrsquo

within the country during the events who left shortly after The extent to which they

influenced the revolution has been also debated ranging from a mere informative and

observational role to a facilitator and even vital role (Hall 1999 2)

The revolution theory is (rightfully) the most disseminated due to the context of social

revolutions it took place in but also due to the massive revolts that entangled Romania

Author Catalin Rolea

7

at the time First of all there are proponents of the Romanian spontaneous revolution

who have primarily consisted of revolutionaries themselves personalities that took part

in Ceausescursquos reprisal or members of the NSF who seized power Most of the books or

articles written on the events have been memoirs of the key leaders of the time Shortly

after the regime change Dumitru Mazilu former vice-president of the NSF wrote a book

entitled the lsquoStolen Revolutionrsquo1 (Mazilu 1991) advocating for a coup drsquoeacutetat position he

changed nevertheless 20 years later in a book entitled lsquo The Romanian Revolution

days and nights of drama and hopersquo (Mazilu 2011) where he strongly supports the

genuine revolutionary character2 The most prolific public figure which presented the

events as a genuine popular revolution was Ion Iliescu the leader of the NSF and

president of the country for 12 years who not only defended the revolutionary character

in writing (two published memoirs) but also on several occasions on televised debates

(Iliescu 1996) As part of the Institute of the Romanian Revolution of 1989 a series of

historians have also defended the revolution with figures such as Andreescu Bucur or

Scurtu Apart from Romanian public figures the Romanian events have also received

attention abroad Foreign scholars such as Vladimir Tismaneanu (2001) and Peter-Siani

Davies (2000) have defended the revolutionary character of the Romanian shift even

comparing it to the Great French Revolution McDermott and Stibbe consider 1989 as a

lsquogenuine popular revolution in both form and content with complex political and social

local national and international violent and non-violent long-term and short term

causesrsquo (McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 3)

Second there are those who reject the popular revolution and rather see the events as a

coup drsquoeacutetat Even proponents of the coup drsquoeacutetat theory are divided on the issue While

some credit an internal coup drsquoeacutetat organized by Iliescu and the NSF others argue that

everything was staged and planned ever since the Malta Summit at the beginning of

December 1989 Liviu Valenas (1990) considers the popular revolt only cosmetic to

brush the real plot coordinated by the KGB French writers such as Radu Portocala

1 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Furata memoriu pentru tara mearsquo

2 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Romana zile si nopti de dramatism si sperantarsquo

Author Catalin Rolea

8

(1990) Victor Loupan (1990) or Michel Castex (1990) believe it was an internal coup

backed by external support

Third there are some who saw the revolution as a hybrid between a revolution and a

coup Such figures represented by Romanian historians such as Lucian Boia (2001) or

Mihai Stoenescu (2004) consider that a spontaneous revolution did exist only until it was

either attempted to be stolen by foreign forces or was stolen by the NSF Jean-Marie Le

Breton then French ambassador to Romania (1987-1990) in comparison to the majority

of the French journalists who saw the revolution as an impostor a plot or a coup the ex-

ambassador considers a genuine revolution did happen although only until 22nd of

December when it was confiscated (Le Bretton 1996) Andrew Richard Hall also

suspects a revolution-hybrid palace coup (Hall 1999) while Anneli Ute Gabanyi (1999

48) considers that the events constituted a revolutionary coup preceded by a popular

revolt that was previously provoked by the couprsquos architects in order to use it

Fourth there is the civil war theory a less popular one which has not received as much

attention as the other two The high number of casualties combined with the ethno-

religious spark of the revolution has led captain Ghaleb (2011) to conclude that neither

revolution nor coup are sufficient in understanding the conflict and thus advocated for

the use of the term civil war as the most suitable Mihai Ungheanu (1977) believes the

events constituted a staged civil war deployed in favour of the coup While none of the

theories offer a full analytic account of the 1989 events all bring important elements

which can help their understanding As it has been pointed before none of the proposed

theories can fully explain the nature of the events but at the same time none can be

dismissed completely The problem with the theoretical accounts of the 1989 events has

been that no systematic analysis on the broader literature on revolutions coups and civil

wars has been used in support of the claims Rather most accounts have been based on

broad academic or sometimes even popular definitions of revolutions coups and civil

wars No thorough deconstruction of the broader literature drawing on empirical studies

of such contentious politics has been made nor a comparison between them Henceforth

Author Catalin Rolea

9

this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical

account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on

revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative

explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989

As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the

unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened

As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek

a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a

custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and

coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories

b Methodology and structure

The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts

(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature

dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and

state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge

to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been

released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files

highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist

methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at

this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and

interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key

aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal

inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)

The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case

studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political

change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will

attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events

Author Catalin Rolea

10

as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by

the broader literature on contentious politics

Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian

event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical

approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical

interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a

structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together

The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences

during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete

footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline

of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that

has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper

articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of

memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved

in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)

memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources

of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument

and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved

Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the

events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination

of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war

or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well

as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and

French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and

Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a

satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the

Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most

appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The

Author Catalin Rolea

11

limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain

certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the

diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The

only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs

that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless

even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a

conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate

framework of further analysing it shall still be possible

II Political change theory and the Romanian case

The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical

frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order

to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will

isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical

literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case

study

a Revolutions

As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms

they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the

context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal

revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality

and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the

socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division

Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa

rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a

society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity

policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)

Author Catalin Rolea

12

would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too

occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a

complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a

more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be

necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study

In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different

generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital

conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)

The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)

Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical

generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European

revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a

general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia

revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the

government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a

common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to

opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek

rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential

outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate

reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left

from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the

great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the

same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage

in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the

implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive

Author Catalin Rolea

13

rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to

move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical

phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone

2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria

framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution

While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus

on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation

complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary

sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation

of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering

expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school

presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect

that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that

offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that

sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to

Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp

economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination

(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent

and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the

discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal

The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus

on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a

revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation

between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests

between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by

the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income

might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in

discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be

Author Catalin Rolea

14

seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain

privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they

can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists

argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided

within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not

stay in place (Goldstone 200315)

While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology

of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but

rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which

to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of

revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred

in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing

whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for

the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the

development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by

the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second

third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-

curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the

external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary

forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the

other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise

from stage number 4

b Coups

There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions

and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but

soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all

three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-

Author Catalin Rolea

15

13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms

which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has

institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the

coup drsquoeacutetat framework

As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a

similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good

knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and

weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the

opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation

However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the

differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues

unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the

opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a

technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn

them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of

the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the

remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings

to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been

associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to

monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)

Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first

traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)

considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be

democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)

along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo

lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup

because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards

because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo

Author Catalin Rolea

16

(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the

essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is

not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the

grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup

would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening

fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the

strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to

dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and

attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)

On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that

democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the

world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others

Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol

argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat

and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to

democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition

against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes

free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960

Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on

the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones

Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events

through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat

As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil

war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of

the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will

come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary

for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the

population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting

Author Catalin Rolea

17

foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all

should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by

adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed

4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to

popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down

in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected

in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects

legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the

military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends

with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)

The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is

drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not

entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to

impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)

Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be

applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or

government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)

c Civil wars

Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state

recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed

conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition

movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their

nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes

one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars

involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly

forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according

to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

5

into what Radio Free Europe called a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to be lit at any time

by any spark (Cesereanu 2009 48)

While anti-communist or pro-Gorbachev manifestations had previously occurred around

the country none escalated as the one in Timisoara in 1989 when the attempted

evacuation of a reformed Hungarian pastor that led to small-scale (20-30 people) protest

against the evacuation eventually escalated into an anti-Ceausescu popular uprising

consisting of thousands of people (Arpad 2011 15) Ceausescu convinced it was not a

genuine popular revolt but rather a foreign diversion endeavoured unsuccessfully to

repress the lsquohooligansrsquo as he called the protesters and unwisely planned a great popular

rally summoning tens of thousands of citizens in front of the Communist Partyrsquos Central

Committee in an attempt to condemn the unpatriotic acts in Timisoara As expected

despite Ceausescursquos efforts to appeal to the population the outcome was the decisive

anti-Ceausescu revolt ended with the storming in the central building and Ceausescu and

his wifersquos escape in a helicopter Soon after Ceausescursquos escape a committee entitled

lsquoThe National Salvation Frontrsquo (NSF) formed by ex-communist figures led by Iliescu

quickly filled the power void and seized power with the army and the Television at its

disposition (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 198) A day later Ceausescu was captured

and in the following couple of days on the 25th of December he and his wife were given

a mock trial sentenced to death and summarily executed In the meantime right after

Ceausescursquos escape psychological warfare and terrorist attacks were waged by still

unknown forces both against the army and the population attacks which diminished

after the execution of the Ceausescus According to official data released in 2008 over

1200 people were killed more than 5000 injured and other couple of thousands

unlawfully detained and mistreated during the events that led to the fall of communism

(ECHR 2011) The NSF organized free elections as promised but at the same time

quickly turned into a political party winning the majority of the votes When the NSF

was accused of lsquostealingrsquo the revolution and peaceful protests were organized in the

capital Bucharest the protesters were brutally repressed by the newly installed

Author Catalin Rolea

6

government in an old communist fashion (Adamson amp Florean 2013 175) These series

of events have shrouded the real nature of the alleged revolution and led to contentious

debates about it

The most asserted and commonly held opinion amongst Romaniarsquos population is that the

events constituted a popular revolution A survey circulated in 1996 revealed that 50

amongst respondents believed that Romania had experienced a revolution 30 that it

experienced a coup drsquoeacutetat and 20 that it was a foreign intervention (see Roper 2000

60) Fifteen years later a similar conducted survey revealed that opinions had not

significantly changed (BCS 2009) As Roper (1994 401) argues there is no single

theoretical framework that actually offers a satisfactory analysis of the events and

perhaps that is the main reason the population is so divided on the issue Despite the

great sacrifice that was necessary for the countryrsquos transition from communism there is

still no unanimity on either the nature of the events or on the ones to be blamed for the

crimes despite the several convictions that have already been made

There are several interpretations and theories which aim to explain the events with the

debate mainly revolving around the spontaneous revolution theory versus the coup

drsquoeacutetat one However some have also not excluded the possibility of a civil war to have

occurred (Ghaleb 2009)

Proponents of each of these variants can be also divided on certain points either on

minor or major issues Most of the contention lies as already pointed out on nature of

the terrorist attacks the seizure of power but also on the foreign element While deemed

to have been Ceausescursquos paranoia there at least several thousand foreign lsquotouristsrsquo

within the country during the events who left shortly after The extent to which they

influenced the revolution has been also debated ranging from a mere informative and

observational role to a facilitator and even vital role (Hall 1999 2)

The revolution theory is (rightfully) the most disseminated due to the context of social

revolutions it took place in but also due to the massive revolts that entangled Romania

Author Catalin Rolea

7

at the time First of all there are proponents of the Romanian spontaneous revolution

who have primarily consisted of revolutionaries themselves personalities that took part

in Ceausescursquos reprisal or members of the NSF who seized power Most of the books or

articles written on the events have been memoirs of the key leaders of the time Shortly

after the regime change Dumitru Mazilu former vice-president of the NSF wrote a book

entitled the lsquoStolen Revolutionrsquo1 (Mazilu 1991) advocating for a coup drsquoeacutetat position he

changed nevertheless 20 years later in a book entitled lsquo The Romanian Revolution

days and nights of drama and hopersquo (Mazilu 2011) where he strongly supports the

genuine revolutionary character2 The most prolific public figure which presented the

events as a genuine popular revolution was Ion Iliescu the leader of the NSF and

president of the country for 12 years who not only defended the revolutionary character

in writing (two published memoirs) but also on several occasions on televised debates

(Iliescu 1996) As part of the Institute of the Romanian Revolution of 1989 a series of

historians have also defended the revolution with figures such as Andreescu Bucur or

Scurtu Apart from Romanian public figures the Romanian events have also received

attention abroad Foreign scholars such as Vladimir Tismaneanu (2001) and Peter-Siani

Davies (2000) have defended the revolutionary character of the Romanian shift even

comparing it to the Great French Revolution McDermott and Stibbe consider 1989 as a

lsquogenuine popular revolution in both form and content with complex political and social

local national and international violent and non-violent long-term and short term

causesrsquo (McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 3)

Second there are those who reject the popular revolution and rather see the events as a

coup drsquoeacutetat Even proponents of the coup drsquoeacutetat theory are divided on the issue While

some credit an internal coup drsquoeacutetat organized by Iliescu and the NSF others argue that

everything was staged and planned ever since the Malta Summit at the beginning of

December 1989 Liviu Valenas (1990) considers the popular revolt only cosmetic to

brush the real plot coordinated by the KGB French writers such as Radu Portocala

1 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Furata memoriu pentru tara mearsquo

2 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Romana zile si nopti de dramatism si sperantarsquo

Author Catalin Rolea

8

(1990) Victor Loupan (1990) or Michel Castex (1990) believe it was an internal coup

backed by external support

Third there are some who saw the revolution as a hybrid between a revolution and a

coup Such figures represented by Romanian historians such as Lucian Boia (2001) or

Mihai Stoenescu (2004) consider that a spontaneous revolution did exist only until it was

either attempted to be stolen by foreign forces or was stolen by the NSF Jean-Marie Le

Breton then French ambassador to Romania (1987-1990) in comparison to the majority

of the French journalists who saw the revolution as an impostor a plot or a coup the ex-

ambassador considers a genuine revolution did happen although only until 22nd of

December when it was confiscated (Le Bretton 1996) Andrew Richard Hall also

suspects a revolution-hybrid palace coup (Hall 1999) while Anneli Ute Gabanyi (1999

48) considers that the events constituted a revolutionary coup preceded by a popular

revolt that was previously provoked by the couprsquos architects in order to use it

Fourth there is the civil war theory a less popular one which has not received as much

attention as the other two The high number of casualties combined with the ethno-

religious spark of the revolution has led captain Ghaleb (2011) to conclude that neither

revolution nor coup are sufficient in understanding the conflict and thus advocated for

the use of the term civil war as the most suitable Mihai Ungheanu (1977) believes the

events constituted a staged civil war deployed in favour of the coup While none of the

theories offer a full analytic account of the 1989 events all bring important elements

which can help their understanding As it has been pointed before none of the proposed

theories can fully explain the nature of the events but at the same time none can be

dismissed completely The problem with the theoretical accounts of the 1989 events has

been that no systematic analysis on the broader literature on revolutions coups and civil

wars has been used in support of the claims Rather most accounts have been based on

broad academic or sometimes even popular definitions of revolutions coups and civil

wars No thorough deconstruction of the broader literature drawing on empirical studies

of such contentious politics has been made nor a comparison between them Henceforth

Author Catalin Rolea

9

this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical

account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on

revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative

explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989

As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the

unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened

As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek

a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a

custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and

coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories

b Methodology and structure

The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts

(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature

dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and

state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge

to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been

released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files

highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist

methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at

this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and

interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key

aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal

inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)

The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case

studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political

change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will

attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events

Author Catalin Rolea

10

as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by

the broader literature on contentious politics

Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian

event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical

approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical

interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a

structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together

The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences

during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete

footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline

of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that

has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper

articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of

memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved

in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)

memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources

of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument

and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved

Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the

events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination

of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war

or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well

as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and

French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and

Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a

satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the

Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most

appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The

Author Catalin Rolea

11

limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain

certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the

diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The

only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs

that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless

even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a

conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate

framework of further analysing it shall still be possible

II Political change theory and the Romanian case

The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical

frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order

to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will

isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical

literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case

study

a Revolutions

As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms

they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the

context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal

revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality

and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the

socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division

Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa

rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a

society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity

policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)

Author Catalin Rolea

12

would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too

occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a

complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a

more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be

necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study

In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different

generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital

conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)

The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)

Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical

generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European

revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a

general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia

revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the

government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a

common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to

opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek

rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential

outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate

reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left

from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the

great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the

same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage

in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the

implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive

Author Catalin Rolea

13

rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to

move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical

phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone

2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria

framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution

While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus

on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation

complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary

sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation

of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering

expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school

presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect

that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that

offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that

sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to

Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp

economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination

(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent

and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the

discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal

The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus

on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a

revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation

between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests

between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by

the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income

might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in

discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be

Author Catalin Rolea

14

seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain

privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they

can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists

argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided

within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not

stay in place (Goldstone 200315)

While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology

of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but

rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which

to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of

revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred

in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing

whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for

the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the

development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by

the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second

third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-

curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the

external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary

forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the

other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise

from stage number 4

b Coups

There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions

and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but

soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all

three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-

Author Catalin Rolea

15

13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms

which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has

institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the

coup drsquoeacutetat framework

As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a

similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good

knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and

weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the

opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation

However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the

differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues

unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the

opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a

technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn

them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of

the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the

remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings

to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been

associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to

monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)

Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first

traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)

considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be

democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)

along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo

lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup

because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards

because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo

Author Catalin Rolea

16

(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the

essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is

not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the

grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup

would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening

fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the

strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to

dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and

attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)

On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that

democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the

world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others

Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol

argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat

and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to

democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition

against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes

free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960

Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on

the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones

Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events

through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat

As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil

war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of

the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will

come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary

for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the

population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting

Author Catalin Rolea

17

foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all

should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by

adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed

4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to

popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down

in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected

in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects

legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the

military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends

with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)

The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is

drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not

entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to

impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)

Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be

applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or

government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)

c Civil wars

Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state

recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed

conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition

movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their

nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes

one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars

involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly

forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according

to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

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Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

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48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

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52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

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CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

6

government in an old communist fashion (Adamson amp Florean 2013 175) These series

of events have shrouded the real nature of the alleged revolution and led to contentious

debates about it

The most asserted and commonly held opinion amongst Romaniarsquos population is that the

events constituted a popular revolution A survey circulated in 1996 revealed that 50

amongst respondents believed that Romania had experienced a revolution 30 that it

experienced a coup drsquoeacutetat and 20 that it was a foreign intervention (see Roper 2000

60) Fifteen years later a similar conducted survey revealed that opinions had not

significantly changed (BCS 2009) As Roper (1994 401) argues there is no single

theoretical framework that actually offers a satisfactory analysis of the events and

perhaps that is the main reason the population is so divided on the issue Despite the

great sacrifice that was necessary for the countryrsquos transition from communism there is

still no unanimity on either the nature of the events or on the ones to be blamed for the

crimes despite the several convictions that have already been made

There are several interpretations and theories which aim to explain the events with the

debate mainly revolving around the spontaneous revolution theory versus the coup

drsquoeacutetat one However some have also not excluded the possibility of a civil war to have

occurred (Ghaleb 2009)

Proponents of each of these variants can be also divided on certain points either on

minor or major issues Most of the contention lies as already pointed out on nature of

the terrorist attacks the seizure of power but also on the foreign element While deemed

to have been Ceausescursquos paranoia there at least several thousand foreign lsquotouristsrsquo

within the country during the events who left shortly after The extent to which they

influenced the revolution has been also debated ranging from a mere informative and

observational role to a facilitator and even vital role (Hall 1999 2)

The revolution theory is (rightfully) the most disseminated due to the context of social

revolutions it took place in but also due to the massive revolts that entangled Romania

Author Catalin Rolea

7

at the time First of all there are proponents of the Romanian spontaneous revolution

who have primarily consisted of revolutionaries themselves personalities that took part

in Ceausescursquos reprisal or members of the NSF who seized power Most of the books or

articles written on the events have been memoirs of the key leaders of the time Shortly

after the regime change Dumitru Mazilu former vice-president of the NSF wrote a book

entitled the lsquoStolen Revolutionrsquo1 (Mazilu 1991) advocating for a coup drsquoeacutetat position he

changed nevertheless 20 years later in a book entitled lsquo The Romanian Revolution

days and nights of drama and hopersquo (Mazilu 2011) where he strongly supports the

genuine revolutionary character2 The most prolific public figure which presented the

events as a genuine popular revolution was Ion Iliescu the leader of the NSF and

president of the country for 12 years who not only defended the revolutionary character

in writing (two published memoirs) but also on several occasions on televised debates

(Iliescu 1996) As part of the Institute of the Romanian Revolution of 1989 a series of

historians have also defended the revolution with figures such as Andreescu Bucur or

Scurtu Apart from Romanian public figures the Romanian events have also received

attention abroad Foreign scholars such as Vladimir Tismaneanu (2001) and Peter-Siani

Davies (2000) have defended the revolutionary character of the Romanian shift even

comparing it to the Great French Revolution McDermott and Stibbe consider 1989 as a

lsquogenuine popular revolution in both form and content with complex political and social

local national and international violent and non-violent long-term and short term

causesrsquo (McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 3)

Second there are those who reject the popular revolution and rather see the events as a

coup drsquoeacutetat Even proponents of the coup drsquoeacutetat theory are divided on the issue While

some credit an internal coup drsquoeacutetat organized by Iliescu and the NSF others argue that

everything was staged and planned ever since the Malta Summit at the beginning of

December 1989 Liviu Valenas (1990) considers the popular revolt only cosmetic to

brush the real plot coordinated by the KGB French writers such as Radu Portocala

1 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Furata memoriu pentru tara mearsquo

2 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Romana zile si nopti de dramatism si sperantarsquo

Author Catalin Rolea

8

(1990) Victor Loupan (1990) or Michel Castex (1990) believe it was an internal coup

backed by external support

Third there are some who saw the revolution as a hybrid between a revolution and a

coup Such figures represented by Romanian historians such as Lucian Boia (2001) or

Mihai Stoenescu (2004) consider that a spontaneous revolution did exist only until it was

either attempted to be stolen by foreign forces or was stolen by the NSF Jean-Marie Le

Breton then French ambassador to Romania (1987-1990) in comparison to the majority

of the French journalists who saw the revolution as an impostor a plot or a coup the ex-

ambassador considers a genuine revolution did happen although only until 22nd of

December when it was confiscated (Le Bretton 1996) Andrew Richard Hall also

suspects a revolution-hybrid palace coup (Hall 1999) while Anneli Ute Gabanyi (1999

48) considers that the events constituted a revolutionary coup preceded by a popular

revolt that was previously provoked by the couprsquos architects in order to use it

Fourth there is the civil war theory a less popular one which has not received as much

attention as the other two The high number of casualties combined with the ethno-

religious spark of the revolution has led captain Ghaleb (2011) to conclude that neither

revolution nor coup are sufficient in understanding the conflict and thus advocated for

the use of the term civil war as the most suitable Mihai Ungheanu (1977) believes the

events constituted a staged civil war deployed in favour of the coup While none of the

theories offer a full analytic account of the 1989 events all bring important elements

which can help their understanding As it has been pointed before none of the proposed

theories can fully explain the nature of the events but at the same time none can be

dismissed completely The problem with the theoretical accounts of the 1989 events has

been that no systematic analysis on the broader literature on revolutions coups and civil

wars has been used in support of the claims Rather most accounts have been based on

broad academic or sometimes even popular definitions of revolutions coups and civil

wars No thorough deconstruction of the broader literature drawing on empirical studies

of such contentious politics has been made nor a comparison between them Henceforth

Author Catalin Rolea

9

this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical

account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on

revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative

explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989

As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the

unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened

As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek

a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a

custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and

coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories

b Methodology and structure

The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts

(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature

dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and

state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge

to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been

released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files

highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist

methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at

this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and

interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key

aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal

inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)

The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case

studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political

change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will

attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events

Author Catalin Rolea

10

as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by

the broader literature on contentious politics

Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian

event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical

approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical

interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a

structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together

The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences

during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete

footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline

of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that

has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper

articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of

memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved

in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)

memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources

of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument

and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved

Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the

events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination

of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war

or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well

as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and

French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and

Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a

satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the

Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most

appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The

Author Catalin Rolea

11

limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain

certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the

diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The

only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs

that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless

even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a

conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate

framework of further analysing it shall still be possible

II Political change theory and the Romanian case

The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical

frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order

to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will

isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical

literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case

study

a Revolutions

As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms

they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the

context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal

revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality

and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the

socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division

Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa

rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a

society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity

policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)

Author Catalin Rolea

12

would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too

occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a

complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a

more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be

necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study

In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different

generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital

conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)

The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)

Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical

generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European

revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a

general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia

revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the

government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a

common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to

opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek

rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential

outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate

reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left

from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the

great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the

same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage

in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the

implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive

Author Catalin Rolea

13

rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to

move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical

phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone

2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria

framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution

While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus

on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation

complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary

sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation

of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering

expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school

presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect

that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that

offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that

sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to

Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp

economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination

(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent

and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the

discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal

The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus

on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a

revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation

between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests

between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by

the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income

might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in

discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be

Author Catalin Rolea

14

seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain

privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they

can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists

argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided

within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not

stay in place (Goldstone 200315)

While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology

of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but

rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which

to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of

revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred

in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing

whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for

the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the

development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by

the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second

third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-

curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the

external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary

forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the

other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise

from stage number 4

b Coups

There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions

and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but

soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all

three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-

Author Catalin Rolea

15

13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms

which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has

institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the

coup drsquoeacutetat framework

As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a

similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good

knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and

weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the

opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation

However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the

differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues

unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the

opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a

technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn

them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of

the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the

remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings

to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been

associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to

monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)

Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first

traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)

considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be

democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)

along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo

lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup

because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards

because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo

Author Catalin Rolea

16

(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the

essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is

not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the

grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup

would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening

fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the

strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to

dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and

attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)

On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that

democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the

world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others

Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol

argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat

and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to

democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition

against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes

free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960

Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on

the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones

Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events

through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat

As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil

war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of

the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will

come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary

for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the

population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting

Author Catalin Rolea

17

foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all

should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by

adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed

4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to

popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down

in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected

in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects

legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the

military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends

with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)

The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is

drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not

entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to

impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)

Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be

applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or

government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)

c Civil wars

Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state

recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed

conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition

movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their

nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes

one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars

involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly

forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according

to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

7

at the time First of all there are proponents of the Romanian spontaneous revolution

who have primarily consisted of revolutionaries themselves personalities that took part

in Ceausescursquos reprisal or members of the NSF who seized power Most of the books or

articles written on the events have been memoirs of the key leaders of the time Shortly

after the regime change Dumitru Mazilu former vice-president of the NSF wrote a book

entitled the lsquoStolen Revolutionrsquo1 (Mazilu 1991) advocating for a coup drsquoeacutetat position he

changed nevertheless 20 years later in a book entitled lsquo The Romanian Revolution

days and nights of drama and hopersquo (Mazilu 2011) where he strongly supports the

genuine revolutionary character2 The most prolific public figure which presented the

events as a genuine popular revolution was Ion Iliescu the leader of the NSF and

president of the country for 12 years who not only defended the revolutionary character

in writing (two published memoirs) but also on several occasions on televised debates

(Iliescu 1996) As part of the Institute of the Romanian Revolution of 1989 a series of

historians have also defended the revolution with figures such as Andreescu Bucur or

Scurtu Apart from Romanian public figures the Romanian events have also received

attention abroad Foreign scholars such as Vladimir Tismaneanu (2001) and Peter-Siani

Davies (2000) have defended the revolutionary character of the Romanian shift even

comparing it to the Great French Revolution McDermott and Stibbe consider 1989 as a

lsquogenuine popular revolution in both form and content with complex political and social

local national and international violent and non-violent long-term and short term

causesrsquo (McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 3)

Second there are those who reject the popular revolution and rather see the events as a

coup drsquoeacutetat Even proponents of the coup drsquoeacutetat theory are divided on the issue While

some credit an internal coup drsquoeacutetat organized by Iliescu and the NSF others argue that

everything was staged and planned ever since the Malta Summit at the beginning of

December 1989 Liviu Valenas (1990) considers the popular revolt only cosmetic to

brush the real plot coordinated by the KGB French writers such as Radu Portocala

1 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Furata memoriu pentru tara mearsquo

2 Translated from original title in Romanian lsquoRevolutia Romana zile si nopti de dramatism si sperantarsquo

Author Catalin Rolea

8

(1990) Victor Loupan (1990) or Michel Castex (1990) believe it was an internal coup

backed by external support

Third there are some who saw the revolution as a hybrid between a revolution and a

coup Such figures represented by Romanian historians such as Lucian Boia (2001) or

Mihai Stoenescu (2004) consider that a spontaneous revolution did exist only until it was

either attempted to be stolen by foreign forces or was stolen by the NSF Jean-Marie Le

Breton then French ambassador to Romania (1987-1990) in comparison to the majority

of the French journalists who saw the revolution as an impostor a plot or a coup the ex-

ambassador considers a genuine revolution did happen although only until 22nd of

December when it was confiscated (Le Bretton 1996) Andrew Richard Hall also

suspects a revolution-hybrid palace coup (Hall 1999) while Anneli Ute Gabanyi (1999

48) considers that the events constituted a revolutionary coup preceded by a popular

revolt that was previously provoked by the couprsquos architects in order to use it

Fourth there is the civil war theory a less popular one which has not received as much

attention as the other two The high number of casualties combined with the ethno-

religious spark of the revolution has led captain Ghaleb (2011) to conclude that neither

revolution nor coup are sufficient in understanding the conflict and thus advocated for

the use of the term civil war as the most suitable Mihai Ungheanu (1977) believes the

events constituted a staged civil war deployed in favour of the coup While none of the

theories offer a full analytic account of the 1989 events all bring important elements

which can help their understanding As it has been pointed before none of the proposed

theories can fully explain the nature of the events but at the same time none can be

dismissed completely The problem with the theoretical accounts of the 1989 events has

been that no systematic analysis on the broader literature on revolutions coups and civil

wars has been used in support of the claims Rather most accounts have been based on

broad academic or sometimes even popular definitions of revolutions coups and civil

wars No thorough deconstruction of the broader literature drawing on empirical studies

of such contentious politics has been made nor a comparison between them Henceforth

Author Catalin Rolea

9

this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical

account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on

revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative

explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989

As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the

unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened

As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek

a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a

custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and

coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories

b Methodology and structure

The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts

(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature

dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and

state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge

to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been

released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files

highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist

methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at

this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and

interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key

aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal

inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)

The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case

studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political

change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will

attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events

Author Catalin Rolea

10

as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by

the broader literature on contentious politics

Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian

event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical

approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical

interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a

structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together

The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences

during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete

footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline

of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that

has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper

articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of

memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved

in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)

memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources

of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument

and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved

Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the

events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination

of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war

or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well

as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and

French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and

Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a

satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the

Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most

appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The

Author Catalin Rolea

11

limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain

certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the

diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The

only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs

that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless

even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a

conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate

framework of further analysing it shall still be possible

II Political change theory and the Romanian case

The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical

frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order

to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will

isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical

literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case

study

a Revolutions

As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms

they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the

context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal

revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality

and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the

socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division

Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa

rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a

society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity

policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)

Author Catalin Rolea

12

would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too

occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a

complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a

more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be

necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study

In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different

generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital

conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)

The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)

Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical

generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European

revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a

general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia

revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the

government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a

common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to

opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek

rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential

outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate

reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left

from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the

great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the

same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage

in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the

implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive

Author Catalin Rolea

13

rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to

move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical

phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone

2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria

framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution

While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus

on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation

complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary

sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation

of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering

expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school

presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect

that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that

offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that

sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to

Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp

economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination

(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent

and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the

discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal

The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus

on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a

revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation

between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests

between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by

the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income

might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in

discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be

Author Catalin Rolea

14

seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain

privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they

can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists

argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided

within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not

stay in place (Goldstone 200315)

While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology

of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but

rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which

to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of

revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred

in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing

whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for

the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the

development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by

the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second

third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-

curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the

external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary

forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the

other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise

from stage number 4

b Coups

There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions

and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but

soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all

three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-

Author Catalin Rolea

15

13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms

which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has

institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the

coup drsquoeacutetat framework

As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a

similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good

knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and

weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the

opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation

However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the

differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues

unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the

opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a

technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn

them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of

the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the

remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings

to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been

associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to

monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)

Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first

traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)

considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be

democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)

along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo

lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup

because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards

because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo

Author Catalin Rolea

16

(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the

essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is

not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the

grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup

would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening

fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the

strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to

dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and

attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)

On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that

democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the

world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others

Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol

argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat

and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to

democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition

against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes

free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960

Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on

the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones

Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events

through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat

As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil

war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of

the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will

come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary

for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the

population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting

Author Catalin Rolea

17

foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all

should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by

adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed

4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to

popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down

in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected

in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects

legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the

military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends

with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)

The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is

drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not

entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to

impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)

Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be

applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or

government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)

c Civil wars

Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state

recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed

conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition

movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their

nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes

one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars

involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly

forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according

to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

8

(1990) Victor Loupan (1990) or Michel Castex (1990) believe it was an internal coup

backed by external support

Third there are some who saw the revolution as a hybrid between a revolution and a

coup Such figures represented by Romanian historians such as Lucian Boia (2001) or

Mihai Stoenescu (2004) consider that a spontaneous revolution did exist only until it was

either attempted to be stolen by foreign forces or was stolen by the NSF Jean-Marie Le

Breton then French ambassador to Romania (1987-1990) in comparison to the majority

of the French journalists who saw the revolution as an impostor a plot or a coup the ex-

ambassador considers a genuine revolution did happen although only until 22nd of

December when it was confiscated (Le Bretton 1996) Andrew Richard Hall also

suspects a revolution-hybrid palace coup (Hall 1999) while Anneli Ute Gabanyi (1999

48) considers that the events constituted a revolutionary coup preceded by a popular

revolt that was previously provoked by the couprsquos architects in order to use it

Fourth there is the civil war theory a less popular one which has not received as much

attention as the other two The high number of casualties combined with the ethno-

religious spark of the revolution has led captain Ghaleb (2011) to conclude that neither

revolution nor coup are sufficient in understanding the conflict and thus advocated for

the use of the term civil war as the most suitable Mihai Ungheanu (1977) believes the

events constituted a staged civil war deployed in favour of the coup While none of the

theories offer a full analytic account of the 1989 events all bring important elements

which can help their understanding As it has been pointed before none of the proposed

theories can fully explain the nature of the events but at the same time none can be

dismissed completely The problem with the theoretical accounts of the 1989 events has

been that no systematic analysis on the broader literature on revolutions coups and civil

wars has been used in support of the claims Rather most accounts have been based on

broad academic or sometimes even popular definitions of revolutions coups and civil

wars No thorough deconstruction of the broader literature drawing on empirical studies

of such contentious politics has been made nor a comparison between them Henceforth

Author Catalin Rolea

9

this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical

account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on

revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative

explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989

As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the

unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened

As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek

a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a

custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and

coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories

b Methodology and structure

The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts

(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature

dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and

state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge

to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been

released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files

highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist

methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at

this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and

interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key

aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal

inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)

The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case

studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political

change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will

attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events

Author Catalin Rolea

10

as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by

the broader literature on contentious politics

Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian

event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical

approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical

interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a

structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together

The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences

during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete

footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline

of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that

has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper

articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of

memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved

in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)

memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources

of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument

and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved

Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the

events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination

of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war

or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well

as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and

French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and

Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a

satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the

Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most

appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The

Author Catalin Rolea

11

limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain

certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the

diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The

only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs

that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless

even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a

conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate

framework of further analysing it shall still be possible

II Political change theory and the Romanian case

The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical

frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order

to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will

isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical

literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case

study

a Revolutions

As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms

they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the

context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal

revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality

and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the

socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division

Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa

rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a

society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity

policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)

Author Catalin Rolea

12

would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too

occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a

complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a

more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be

necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study

In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different

generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital

conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)

The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)

Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical

generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European

revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a

general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia

revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the

government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a

common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to

opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek

rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential

outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate

reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left

from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the

great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the

same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage

in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the

implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive

Author Catalin Rolea

13

rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to

move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical

phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone

2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria

framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution

While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus

on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation

complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary

sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation

of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering

expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school

presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect

that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that

offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that

sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to

Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp

economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination

(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent

and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the

discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal

The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus

on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a

revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation

between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests

between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by

the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income

might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in

discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be

Author Catalin Rolea

14

seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain

privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they

can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists

argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided

within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not

stay in place (Goldstone 200315)

While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology

of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but

rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which

to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of

revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred

in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing

whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for

the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the

development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by

the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second

third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-

curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the

external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary

forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the

other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise

from stage number 4

b Coups

There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions

and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but

soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all

three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-

Author Catalin Rolea

15

13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms

which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has

institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the

coup drsquoeacutetat framework

As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a

similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good

knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and

weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the

opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation

However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the

differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues

unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the

opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a

technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn

them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of

the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the

remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings

to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been

associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to

monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)

Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first

traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)

considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be

democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)

along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo

lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup

because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards

because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo

Author Catalin Rolea

16

(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the

essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is

not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the

grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup

would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening

fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the

strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to

dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and

attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)

On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that

democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the

world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others

Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol

argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat

and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to

democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition

against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes

free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960

Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on

the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones

Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events

through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat

As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil

war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of

the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will

come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary

for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the

population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting

Author Catalin Rolea

17

foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all

should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by

adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed

4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to

popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down

in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected

in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects

legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the

military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends

with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)

The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is

drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not

entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to

impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)

Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be

applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or

government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)

c Civil wars

Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state

recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed

conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition

movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their

nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes

one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars

involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly

forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according

to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

9

this paper will attempt to close the gap in the literature by providing a full theoretical

account of the Romanian events of 1989 through the prism of the broader literature on

revolutions coups and civil wars in an attempt to reconcile refute or find alternative

explanations to the events that have been classified as a revolution in 1989

As the Romanian Secret Services will only release official documents about the

unresolved issues in 2040 it is still difficult to know with exact precision what happened

As such this research piece will not revolve around finding the truth Rather it will seek

a convergence point amongst all interpretations and will test them along against a

custom theoretical framework for each interpretation popular revolution civil war and

coup drsquoeacutetat and conclude to what extent the events fit in these categories

b Methodology and structure

The historiography of the 1989 events is abundant with an estimated 4000 accounts

(mostly in Romanian French and English) mostly journalistic and reflective in nature

dominated by personal accounts and memoirs of direct participants in the revolution and

state officials (Scurtu 2004 5) Few historians or academics have taken the challenge

to systematically analyse the events as currently insufficient official information has been

released from the Romanian Russian Hungarian and American national archives files

highly vital information for a substantial reconstitution of the events As such a positivist

methodology entailing a scientific search for casual relations would be impossible at

this time Rather the methodology employed by this research will use qualitative and

interpretive methods in order to provide a basis for interpretation and observation of key

aspects of contentious politics as opposed to provide a firm positivistic basis for causal

inference or theory formation (Hart 2005 85)

The structure will be divided in two main parts the theoretical framework and the case

studies While the theoretical framework will draw on the literature of each political

change theory and will create a structural criteria-based pillar the case studies will

attempt to fit the already done research on the structural body In this way the events

Author Catalin Rolea

10

as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by

the broader literature on contentious politics

Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian

event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical

approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical

interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a

structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together

The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences

during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete

footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline

of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that

has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper

articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of

memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved

in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)

memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources

of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument

and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved

Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the

events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination

of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war

or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well

as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and

French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and

Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a

satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the

Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most

appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The

Author Catalin Rolea

11

limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain

certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the

diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The

only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs

that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless

even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a

conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate

framework of further analysing it shall still be possible

II Political change theory and the Romanian case

The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical

frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order

to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will

isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical

literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case

study

a Revolutions

As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms

they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the

context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal

revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality

and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the

socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division

Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa

rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a

society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity

policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)

Author Catalin Rolea

12

would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too

occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a

complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a

more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be

necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study

In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different

generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital

conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)

The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)

Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical

generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European

revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a

general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia

revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the

government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a

common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to

opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek

rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential

outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate

reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left

from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the

great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the

same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage

in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the

implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive

Author Catalin Rolea

13

rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to

move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical

phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone

2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria

framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution

While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus

on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation

complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary

sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation

of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering

expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school

presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect

that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that

offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that

sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to

Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp

economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination

(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent

and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the

discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal

The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus

on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a

revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation

between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests

between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by

the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income

might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in

discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be

Author Catalin Rolea

14

seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain

privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they

can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists

argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided

within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not

stay in place (Goldstone 200315)

While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology

of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but

rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which

to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of

revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred

in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing

whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for

the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the

development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by

the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second

third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-

curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the

external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary

forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the

other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise

from stage number 4

b Coups

There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions

and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but

soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all

three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-

Author Catalin Rolea

15

13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms

which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has

institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the

coup drsquoeacutetat framework

As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a

similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good

knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and

weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the

opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation

However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the

differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues

unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the

opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a

technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn

them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of

the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the

remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings

to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been

associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to

monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)

Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first

traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)

considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be

democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)

along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo

lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup

because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards

because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo

Author Catalin Rolea

16

(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the

essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is

not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the

grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup

would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening

fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the

strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to

dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and

attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)

On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that

democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the

world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others

Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol

argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat

and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to

democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition

against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes

free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960

Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on

the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones

Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events

through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat

As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil

war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of

the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will

come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary

for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the

population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting

Author Catalin Rolea

17

foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all

should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by

adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed

4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to

popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down

in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected

in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects

legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the

military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends

with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)

The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is

drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not

entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to

impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)

Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be

applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or

government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)

c Civil wars

Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state

recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed

conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition

movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their

nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes

one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars

involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly

forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according

to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

10

as well as the literature on the events will be tested against the criteria denominated by

the broader literature on contentious politics

Having established the three broad categories of political change theory the Romanian

event of 1989 might fit in an interpretative methodology shall be used Each theoretical

approach will critically engage both the events as well the various historical

interpretations The established criteria-based theoretical framework will be used as a

structure upon which research shall be built in an attempt to put the pieces together

The sources will consist of both primary and secondary sources As many sequences

during the Romanian events of 1989 have been recorded and broadcasted the complete

footage (about six hours) is available online which will be used to recreate the timeline

of the events as accurately as possible complemented by the secondary literature that

has already analysed the footage and also the officially released archives Newspaper

articles and radio broadcasts (especially from Radio Free Europe) as well as a series of

memoirs and interviews (whether written or broadcasted) with the main actors involved

in the 1989 uprising and seizure of power will be also analysed While most (if not all)

memoirs and interviews exhibit a strong bias they will be treated as important sources

of analysis By comparing and contrasting memoirs from different sides of the argument

and then to the official data a better understandings of the events can be achieved

Secondary sources will consist of the literature that has analysed and interpreted the

events through a journalistic political or historical perspective (as well as a combination

of the three) The various interpretations (spontaneous revolution coup drsquoeacutetat civil war

or a hybrid) will be evaluated contrasted and tested against the primary sources as well

as the criteria established above The sources used will be in Romanian English and

French and will draw on different perspectives (English American French Italian and

Romanian) on the nature of the events in an attempt to place the events in a

satisfactory theoretical framework Henceforth this paper will seek to present the

Romanian 1989 events in a comprehensive holistic way by selecting the most

appropriate theoretical approach (or combination of theoretical approaches) The

Author Catalin Rolea

11

limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain

certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the

diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The

only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs

that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless

even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a

conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate

framework of further analysing it shall still be possible

II Political change theory and the Romanian case

The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical

frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order

to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will

isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical

literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case

study

a Revolutions

As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms

they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the

context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal

revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality

and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the

socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division

Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa

rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a

society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity

policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)

Author Catalin Rolea

12

would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too

occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a

complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a

more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be

necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study

In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different

generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital

conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)

The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)

Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical

generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European

revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a

general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia

revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the

government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a

common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to

opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek

rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential

outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate

reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left

from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the

great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the

same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage

in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the

implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive

Author Catalin Rolea

13

rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to

move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical

phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone

2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria

framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution

While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus

on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation

complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary

sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation

of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering

expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school

presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect

that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that

offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that

sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to

Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp

economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination

(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent

and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the

discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal

The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus

on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a

revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation

between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests

between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by

the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income

might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in

discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be

Author Catalin Rolea

14

seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain

privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they

can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists

argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided

within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not

stay in place (Goldstone 200315)

While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology

of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but

rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which

to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of

revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred

in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing

whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for

the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the

development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by

the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second

third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-

curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the

external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary

forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the

other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise

from stage number 4

b Coups

There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions

and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but

soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all

three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-

Author Catalin Rolea

15

13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms

which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has

institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the

coup drsquoeacutetat framework

As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a

similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good

knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and

weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the

opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation

However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the

differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues

unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the

opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a

technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn

them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of

the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the

remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings

to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been

associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to

monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)

Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first

traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)

considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be

democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)

along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo

lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup

because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards

because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo

Author Catalin Rolea

16

(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the

essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is

not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the

grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup

would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening

fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the

strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to

dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and

attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)

On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that

democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the

world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others

Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol

argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat

and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to

democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition

against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes

free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960

Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on

the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones

Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events

through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat

As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil

war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of

the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will

come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary

for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the

population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting

Author Catalin Rolea

17

foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all

should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by

adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed

4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to

popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down

in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected

in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects

legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the

military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends

with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)

The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is

drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not

entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to

impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)

Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be

applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or

government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)

c Civil wars

Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state

recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed

conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition

movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their

nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes

one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars

involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly

forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according

to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

11

limitation of the methodology consists of the holes in the literature that fail to explain

certain phenomena that led to the death of around 900 people in a couple of days (the

diversion and the terrorist attacks) due to restricted access to all official archives The

only way these holes can be attempted to be filled in is through the various memoirs

that have been written on the issues as well as certain available archives Nevertheless

even if certain issues shall not be clarified by adopting an interpretative methodology a

conclusion regarding the current understanding of the literature and the most adequate

framework of further analysing it shall still be possible

II Political change theory and the Romanian case

The analysis of the 1989 Romanian contentious political transition requires theoretical

frameworks for each of the main theses analysed (revolutions civil wars coups) in order

to provide an internal structure upon which research can be built This chapter will

isolate key criteria from each process drawing on a broad academic and empirical

literature which will be used as a guide for the interpretation of the Romanian case

study

a Revolutions

As revolutions have happened throughout history in different circumstances and forms

they have been given several definitions and classified accordingly depending on the

context they occurred in Two broad classifications have differentiated between liberal

revolutions which are less violent and strive for more individual liberties and equality

and social revolutions which seek a fundamental and relatively rapid change in the

socio-economic nature of a country (Skocpol 1979 3) Beyond this division

Huntingtonrsquos definition broadly encompasses the main characteristics of a revolution lsquoa

rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a

society in its political institutions social structure leadership and government activity

policiesrsquo (as cited in Roper 1994 402) To this definition others such as Gurr (1970)

Author Catalin Rolea

12

would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too

occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a

complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a

more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be

necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study

In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different

generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital

conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)

The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)

Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical

generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European

revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a

general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia

revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the

government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a

common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to

opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek

rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential

outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate

reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left

from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the

great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the

same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage

in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the

implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive

Author Catalin Rolea

13

rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to

move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical

phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone

2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria

framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution

While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus

on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation

complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary

sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation

of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering

expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school

presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect

that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that

offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that

sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to

Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp

economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination

(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent

and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the

discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal

The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus

on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a

revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation

between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests

between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by

the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income

might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in

discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be

Author Catalin Rolea

14

seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain

privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they

can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists

argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided

within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not

stay in place (Goldstone 200315)

While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology

of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but

rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which

to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of

revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred

in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing

whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for

the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the

development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by

the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second

third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-

curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the

external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary

forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the

other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise

from stage number 4

b Coups

There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions

and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but

soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all

three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-

Author Catalin Rolea

15

13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms

which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has

institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the

coup drsquoeacutetat framework

As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a

similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good

knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and

weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the

opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation

However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the

differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues

unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the

opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a

technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn

them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of

the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the

remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings

to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been

associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to

monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)

Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first

traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)

considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be

democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)

along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo

lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup

because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards

because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo

Author Catalin Rolea

16

(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the

essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is

not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the

grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup

would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening

fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the

strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to

dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and

attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)

On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that

democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the

world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others

Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol

argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat

and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to

democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition

against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes

free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960

Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on

the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones

Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events

through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat

As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil

war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of

the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will

come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary

for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the

population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting

Author Catalin Rolea

17

foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all

should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by

adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed

4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to

popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down

in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected

in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects

legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the

military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends

with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)

The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is

drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not

entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to

impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)

Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be

applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or

government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)

c Civil wars

Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state

recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed

conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition

movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their

nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes

one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars

involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly

forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according

to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

12

would add class uprising and point out that non-violent or velvet revolutions can too

occur However for the purposes of this paper a definition alone does not suffice for a

complete analytical research of the events that ousted communism in Romania and a

more elaborate analysis of the development of the literature on revolutions would be

necessary in order to draw out key criteria to be used subsequently for the case study

In these respects Goldstonersquos proposition of splitting the literature into different

generations of theorists that have analysed revolutions is helpful in isolating vital

conditions to be met in a genuine revolution (Goldstone 2003)

The first generation of revolution theories pioneered by Le Bon (1897) Elwood (1925)

Chalmers (1966) and Sorokin (1967) came up with ten law-like empirical

generalizations a series of common features experienced throughout the great European

revolutions implicitly establishing certain lsquorevolutionary criteriarsquo as well as providing a

general descriptive framework of the proceedings of a revolution 1) the intelligentsia

revolt against the regime prior to the revolution 2)just prior to the revolution the

government takes measures and makes promises in order to calm down the population

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition 4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a

common goal at the beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to

opposing views of conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek

rapid and widespread change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential

outcomes could be coups or civil wars 5) the first group to seize power are moderate

reformers 6) while moderates seek still keep to some extent organizational forms left

from the old regime radicals centres spring up with new alternative reforms 7) the

great changes happen not when the regime falls as moderate reformists inherit the

same economic and social problems as the old regime but rather when radicals manage

in supplanting the moderates 8)the disorder brought by the revolution and the

implementation of radical control usually leads to forced imposition of order by coercive

Author Catalin Rolea

13

rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to

move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical

phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone

2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria

framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution

While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus

on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation

complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary

sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation

of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering

expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school

presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect

that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that

offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that

sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to

Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp

economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination

(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent

and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the

discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal

The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus

on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a

revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation

between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests

between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by

the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income

might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in

discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be

Author Catalin Rolea

14

seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain

privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they

can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists

argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided

within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not

stay in place (Goldstone 200315)

While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology

of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but

rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which

to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of

revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred

in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing

whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for

the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the

development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by

the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second

third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-

curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the

external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary

forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the

other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise

from stage number 4

b Coups

There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions

and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but

soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all

three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-

Author Catalin Rolea

15

13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms

which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has

institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the

coup drsquoeacutetat framework

As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a

similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good

knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and

weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the

opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation

However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the

differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues

unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the

opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a

technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn

them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of

the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the

remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings

to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been

associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to

monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)

Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first

traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)

considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be

democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)

along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo

lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup

because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards

because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo

Author Catalin Rolea

16

(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the

essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is

not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the

grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup

would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening

fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the

strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to

dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and

attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)

On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that

democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the

world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others

Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol

argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat

and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to

democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition

against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes

free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960

Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on

the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones

Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events

through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat

As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil

war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of

the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will

come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary

for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the

population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting

Author Catalin Rolea

17

foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all

should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by

adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed

4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to

popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down

in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected

in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects

legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the

military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends

with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)

The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is

drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not

entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to

impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)

Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be

applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or

government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)

c Civil wars

Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state

recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed

conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition

movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their

nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes

one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars

involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly

forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according

to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

13

rule 9) the struggles between radical and moderates give military leaders the chance to

move from obscurity to commanding and even absolute power 10) once the radical

phase has gone way is made for a moderate one which allows progress (Goldstone

2000 4) These first generation requirements constitute a fundamental criteria

framework for analysing the Romanian events of 1989 through the lens of a revolution

While these first generational lsquocommandmentsrsquo are predominantly descriptive and focus

on the development rather on the causes of revolution the second generation

complements specifically looks at the background and reason of the revolutionary

sparks Pioneered by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1970) the second generation

of analysts has built upon and reformed the lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo conception offering

expanded criteria of analysis specifically analysing the causes of revolutions This school

presumes that people tend to accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect

that such discomfort is the natural course of their lives It is only when changes that

offer better expectations without favourable prognosis occur in the society that

sentiments of agitation could potentially lead to political destabilization According to

Daviesrsquo J curve of economic growth a period of growing prosperity followed by a sharp

economic decrease that withers expectations away can become a lethal combination

(Davies 1962 45) Further building on this Tilly (1978 13) argues that while discontent

and conflict will always characterize politics revolution would not be imminent unless the

discontented are organized and have sufficient resources to mobilize at their disposal

The third and fourth generations of theories also known as lsquostructuralistrsquo theories focus

on both the internal and the external system that can lead to state weakness and fuel a

revolution Internally as Skocpol (1979) argues the threat relies on the relation

between the state and its elites and many times tensions and conflicting interests

between the two might arise also due to external pressures For example attempts by

the state to meet international competitive pressure by increasing government income

might result in suspending elitesrsquo privileges or resources consequently resulting in

discontent A strong independent elite group is not necessary as power can also be

Author Catalin Rolea

14

seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain

privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they

can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists

argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided

within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not

stay in place (Goldstone 200315)

While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology

of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but

rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which

to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of

revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred

in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing

whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for

the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the

development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by

the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second

third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-

curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the

external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary

forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the

other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise

from stage number 4

b Coups

There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions

and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but

soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all

three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-

Author Catalin Rolea

15

13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms

which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has

institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the

coup drsquoeacutetat framework

As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a

similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good

knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and

weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the

opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation

However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the

differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues

unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the

opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a

technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn

them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of

the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the

remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings

to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been

associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to

monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)

Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first

traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)

considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be

democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)

along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo

lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup

because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards

because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo

Author Catalin Rolea

16

(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the

essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is

not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the

grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup

would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening

fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the

strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to

dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and

attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)

On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that

democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the

world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others

Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol

argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat

and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to

democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition

against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes

free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960

Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on

the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones

Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events

through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat

As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil

war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of

the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will

come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary

for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the

population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting

Author Catalin Rolea

17

foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all

should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by

adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed

4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to

popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down

in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected

in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects

legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the

military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends

with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)

The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is

drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not

entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to

impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)

Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be

applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or

government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)

c Civil wars

Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state

recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed

conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition

movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their

nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes

one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars

involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly

forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according

to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

14

seized by state or military officials and even civilians who have been granted certain

privileges When these elites feel that the state cannot face international pressure they

can step in and seize power (Trimberger 1978 23-27) As fourth generation theorists

argue for a revolution to take place elites and certain groups have to become divided

within the state disagreeing sharply on whether the government should or should not

stay in place (Goldstone 200315)

While each generation offers a different perspective as well as a different methodology

of analysing and interpreting revolutions they shall not be regarded as conflicting but

rather as complementary in establishing a complex theoretical framework against which

to test the Romanian events of 1989 Thus drawing on the four generations of

revolutions the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the events that occurred

in Romania in 1989 will be structured around the above-presented criteria in assessing

whether the lsquospontaneous popular revolutionrsquo thesis is the most plausible In order for

the events to qualify as a revolution they will have to fit in both the causes and the

development models While the development model has been perfectly exemplified by

the first generation theorists through their ten law like-empirical criteria the second

third and fourth generations have complemented and offered a model for causes the J-

curve model the structural division of elites and groupings within the country the

external pressure and the organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary

forces The most important test of the revolution thesis is its ability to stand against the

other two courses that it can take a civil war or a coup drsquoeacutetat which can easily arise

from stage number 4

b Coups

There is a thin line separating revolutions from coups and civil wars Both revolutions

and coups come from the inside and events can start or take the form of revolutions but

soon unveil as coups or escalate into civil wars The common starting ground for all

three occurrences is intensified discontent and rivalries According to Calvert (2010 12-

Author Catalin Rolea

15

13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms

which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has

institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the

coup drsquoeacutetat framework

As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a

similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good

knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and

weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the

opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation

However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the

differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues

unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the

opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a

technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn

them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of

the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the

remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings

to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been

associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to

monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)

Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first

traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)

considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be

democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)

along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo

lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup

because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards

because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo

Author Catalin Rolea

16

(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the

essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is

not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the

grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup

would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening

fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the

strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to

dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and

attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)

On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that

democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the

world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others

Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol

argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat

and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to

democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition

against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes

free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960

Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on

the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones

Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events

through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat

As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil

war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of

the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will

come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary

for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the

population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting

Author Catalin Rolea

17

foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all

should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by

adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed

4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to

popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down

in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected

in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects

legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the

military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends

with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)

The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is

drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not

entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to

impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)

Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be

applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or

government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)

c Civil wars

Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state

recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed

conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition

movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their

nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes

one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars

involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly

forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according

to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

15

13) revolution can also actually be a myth lsquodescribing the sequence of events in terms

which serve to legitimize the actions of the incoming government and the program it has

institutedrsquo This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the events in 1989 fit in the

coup drsquoeacutetat framework

As Goodspeed (1967 18) argues revolutions and coups are closely related exhibiting a

similar process preparation action and consolidation First insurgents require good

knowledge and information about the state apparatus as well as its strengths and

weaknesses before proceeding Second both entail the action of overthrowing the

opposition by either peaceful or forceful means and third both need consolidation

However while there are common grounds between coups and revolutions the

differences are not to be ignored (Goodspeed 196719) As Luttwak (1968 30) argues

unlike revolutions coups are politically neutral and do not seek to overwhelm the

opposition by power be it non-violent or violent In his own words a coup is lsquolike a

technique of judo using its adversariesrsquo own advantages in weight and balance to turn

them against him lsquoThe coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of

the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control to the

remainderrsquo (Luttwakl 1968 5) A coup drsquoeacutetat meaning stroke of state in French brings

to mind staged coups of corrupt officers such as Gaddafi and has traditionally been

associated with non-democratic principles and power-hungry military officers seeking to

monopolize state power (Varol 2012 312)

Just like revolutions two generations of theorists can be distinguished The first

traditional view perpetrated by scholars such as Luttwak (1968) and Janos (1964)

considers coups illegitimate According to Albert by definition a coup cannot be

democratic as it constitutes an affront to legitimacy and stability Janos (1964 36)

along similar lines has characterized coups as lsquothe reversal of the process of revolutionrsquo

lsquoA coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behaviour during the coup

because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers afterwards

because the value of the levers depends on the fact that the state is a machinersquo

Author Catalin Rolea

16

(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the

essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is

not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the

grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup

would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening

fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the

strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to

dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and

attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)

On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that

democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the

world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others

Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol

argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat

and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to

democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition

against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes

free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960

Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on

the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones

Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events

through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat

As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil

war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of

the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will

come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary

for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the

population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting

Author Catalin Rolea

17

foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all

should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by

adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed

4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to

popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down

in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected

in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects

legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the

military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends

with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)

The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is

drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not

entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to

impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)

Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be

applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or

government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)

c Civil wars

Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state

recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed

conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition

movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their

nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes

one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars

involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly

forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according

to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

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Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

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52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

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53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

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translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

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20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

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20082014

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httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

16

(Luttwak 1968 30) After the execution of the coup maintaining it is important and the

essential tools become the mass-media (the television and the radio) whose purpose is

not to inform about the situation but rather affect its development by exploiting the

grouprsquos monopoly The two main objectives of the mass-media straight after the coup

would be the discouragement of resistance by emphasizing its power and dampening

fears that would lead to that resistance The first objective would be conveying the

strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it and the second objective would be to

dispel fears of foreign intervention achieved through manipulating national symbols and

attacking foreign agencies(Luttwak 1968 170-172)

On the other hand the second generation following Roperrsquos (1994405) thesis that

democracy is society-specific and can have different dimensions in different parts of the

world argues that some coups can actually be more democracy promoting than others

Hence a democratic coup would not necessarily be classified as an oxymoron As Varol

argues although coups may exhibit anti-democratic features by using military threat

and force to seize power some have actually transitioned authoritarian regimes to

democracies (Varol 2012 292)The military thus responds to the popular opposition

against an authoritarian regime overthrows it and within a short span of time organizes

free and fair elections for a smooth transition like it happened in Turkey in 1960

Portugal in 1974 and Egypt in 2011 (Varol 2012 293-294) While Luttwak focuses on

the illegitimate and negative character of a coup Varol focuses on the positive ones

Combining the two approaches offers a suitable framework for analysing the events

through the prism of a coup drsquoeacutetat

As Luttwak argues a coup drsquoeacutetat involves some elements both of revolution and civil

war but lsquounlike most of them it is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of

the masses or to any significant degree by military-type force Instead its power will

come from the state itselfrsquo (Luttwak 1968 30) Three pre-conditions are thus necessary

for a coup to take place 1) political participation is restricted to a small segment of the

population 2) the state is independent and freely conducts its internal affairs limiting

Author Catalin Rolea

17

foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all

should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by

adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed

4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to

popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down

in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected

in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects

legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the

military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends

with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)

The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is

drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not

entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to

impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)

Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be

applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or

government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)

c Civil wars

Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state

recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed

conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition

movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their

nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes

one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars

involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly

forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according

to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

17

foreign influence 3) the state has a political centre or in the case of more they all

should be political as opposed to ethnical (Luttwak 1968 20-21) Subsequently by

adding combining Varolrsquos criteria with Luttwakrsquos a set of 10 criteria can be completed

4)the military coup is staged against an authoritarian regime 5) the military responds to

popular opposition against that regime 6) the authoritarian leader refuses to step down

in response to the popular opposition 7) the coup is staged by a military highly respected

in the country in order to overthrow the authoritarian leader 8) the coup architects

legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating national symbols 9) the

military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time 10) the coup ends

with the transfer of power to democratic elected people (Varol 2012 296)

The transition typically lasts for one to two years and one important action taken is

drafting a new constitution to replace the authoritarian one The transition process is not

entirely democratic as the coup authors still act as self-interested actors attempted to

impose their policy preferences into the new constitution (Varol 2012 295-296)

Although Varol specifies his theory rests primarily on military coups it can also be

applied to palace coups defined as a lsquonon-violent overthrow of a sovereign or

government by senior officials within the ruling grouprsquo (Oxford Dictionary 2014)

c Civil wars

Hironaka broadly defines civil wars as armed conflicts that occur within a nation state

recognized by the nation-state system (Hironaka 2005 12) They involve armed

conflicts between the nationsrsquo governments and organized domestic opposition

movements that recruit their members predominantly from the population of their

nations (Midlarsky 2009 68) The large scale organized and sustained conflict excludes

one-sided violence such as the massacre of the population or genocide Civil wars

involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources in contrast to less deadly

forms of social conflicts such as riots or social movements Civil wars classify according

to Correlates of War data when more than a thousand casualties per year occur

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

18

(Hironaka 2005 p18) Barbieri and Reuveny (2005 1235) also use the 1000 casualtiesrsquo

threshold-orientated criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of contentious

politics

As both revolutions and civil wars belong to the same family of contentious politics they

share many elements in common especially at a causal level Waltzrsquos first level of

analysis can be also used to analyse causal factors that lead to large-scale conflicts The

lsquomisery breeds revoltrsquo can also be valid in the case of civil wars which can have as

starting points revolutions (Waltz 2001 17)

The differentiating point here would be when the popular revolt meets opposition from

the current regime or other factions replacing the transition from the revolutionary

situation to the revolutionary outcome with prolonged violence between the two (or

more) factions According to the nature of the causes civil wars can take various forms

1)ethnic conflicts (which occur due to political rather than economic grievances )

ethnicity in this case can also coincide with class 2)secessionist conflicts in which

rebels attempt to secede from the current government instead of overthrowing it 3)

Revolutionary or ideological conflicts in which the goal of the rebels is to supplant the

current regime mainly fuelled by economic grievances (Midlarsky 2009 85) According

to Reynal-Querol (2002 39) lsquoa presidential system with a low level of democracy is the

most important political cause of an ideological civil warrsquo

Structurally civil wars can be classified into three types 1) Irregular civil wars erupt

incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a slow process of building state

institutions by the insurgent group(Civil wars in Malaya Mozambique during the

Portuguese colonisation Kashmir) 2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are

fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that

reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor

(Lebanese civil war wars that erupted post-cold war) The state army is disintegrated

into militias which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies 3) conventional which

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

19

take place when an army splits a) either because of an attempted coup (short-lived civil

wars) or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of

the army attempts to secede (eg Spanish civil war) (Kalyvas 2005 92) The coup-

related variation deserves special attention as it is the most complex one suggesting a

hybrid (Ghaleb 2011 7) David Armitage (2014) considers revolutions civil wars in

nature revolutions when popular revolts meet opposition from the regime they revolt

against According to him the terms have been more of a play of semantics civil wars

have been depicted as lsquosterile and destructiversquo while revolutions as lsquofertile with

innovation and productive possibilityrsquo (Armitage 2014 349) While lsquorevolutions mark the

unfolding and realization of the emancipated human spirit civil wars herald only its

blighting and collapsersquo (Armitage 2014 349) Marx and Engels in the communist

manifesto also talk about a veiled civil war between the two classes up to the point it

breaks into open revolution(Marx amp Engels 2002 230) Lenin also argued in 1916 that

the intensification of class struggle leads to civil war lsquoconfirmed by every great

revolutionrsquo (Lenin 1916 78) Even Stalin when talking about the Russian Revolution

affirmed that it was lsquoa form of civil warrsquo (as quoted in Rieber 2003 140)

Charles Tilly agrees as well arguing that lsquomany civil wars qualify as revolutions just as

long as power eventually changes hands after a forcible break in sovereigntyrsquo (Tilly

1993 15-16) In these respects the possibility of a revolution turned into civil war or

coup drsquoeacutetat will be also considered Thus from the analysis until here a correlation

between the three types of political change seems very likely to make sense While

David Armitage has depicted the semantic difference in referring he has not gone into

full depth analysis of how these interact On the other hand James D Fearon (2004)

uses the causal relation between revolutions coups and civil wars almost inter-

changeably While he argues that revolutions and coups might lead to short lived civil

wars he also defines popular revolution as civil wars that at their outset lsquoinvolved mass

demonstrations in the capital city in favour of deposing the regime in powerrsquo (Fearon

2004 299) According to this logic then the causal relation is as follows then if the

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

20

events can be classified as a popular revolution then by default they involve a civil war

potentially sparked by a coup drsquoeacutetat

The Romanian events will thus be tested against both the causal structural and

threshold criteria presented above In order to qualify as a civil war the 1989 events will

have to fit in one of the three causal natures (ethnic revolutionaryideological or

secessionist) in one of the four structural models (conventional irregular symmetric or

coup-related) and also meet the threshold (at least 1000 people killed overall at least

100 people killed on each side) The possibility of the events matching within this

category will be analysed as hinted in the previous sub-section through the

revolutionary criteria number 4 (the emergent conflicts due to opposing views of

conservative radicals and moderates groups whose potential outcomes could be civil

war or coups)

Now that the theoretical frameworks for each political change category have been

established the events shall be tested against the isolated criteria of the three

processes In the case the events would fit in the coup-related category a hybrid theory

will be considered In order for the events to fit in the hybrid the Romanian case-study

should largely fit in all three categories and also exhibit the causal relation presented in

this sub-section

III The spontaneous Romanian Revolution

The Romanian revolution has had its genuine character questioned on many occasions

having been characterized as stolen aborted kidnapped confiscated manipulated

recycled failed betrayed polluted profaned desacralized cosmeticized covered

shadowed controlled directed pulverized ambiguous dubious killed assassinated

abandoned unfinished altered twisted etc (Cesereanu 2009 1) In 1996 a survey

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

21

circulated amongst the population revealed that about 50 of the population agreed

that the events that overthrew communism in Romania in 1989 constituted a

spontaneous popular revolution and ten years later about 36(BCS 2009) This chapter

will test the events against the previously established revolution theoretical framework

and conclude the extent to which the events can be classified as a popular revolution

Broadly defined using Huntingtonrsquos (1968) definition the shift that occurred in Romania

in 1989 seems to classify as lsquoa rapid fundamental and violent domestic change (the

overthrow of and execution of Ceausescu between 16-25th of December) in the dominate

values and myths of a society (fall of communism) in its political institutions social

structure leadership and government activity policies(free elections free speech

democracy etc) rsquo However having a systematic look at who the new power holders were

and how they consolidated their position questions the extent to such a characterisation

would be valid

As previously established the criteria for revolutionary causes includes the J-curve

model the external pressure the structural division of elites and groupings within the

country and their organization and mobilization of resources of the revolutionary forces

According to Daviesrsquos J-curve (1962) a sharp economic downturn in combination with

high expectations from a population that cannot be met is very likely to lead to more

than just popular discontent and to revolt In the Romanian case both lsquothe misery

breeds revoltrsquo proposition and the J-curve model fit in the framework Ceausescursquos

regime was notoriously known as the most oppressive dictatorship in Eastern Europe

having greatly impinged on human rights and liberties and as the J-curve claims

revolutions are most likely to occur in times when expectations increase but they seem

impossible to satisfy During the 1960s and 1970s Romania experienced a relatively

prosperous situation (Steele 1974 110-115) and its international prestige had also

increased due to its anti-Soviet stance First the Romanian population enjoyed a strong

nationalism and ideological independence from the Soviet Union In the early 1960rsquos the

government imposed many nationalist reforms such as dropping off Russian language

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

22

classes in schools and changing street names from Russian to Romanian and also

published the lsquoStatement on the Stand of the Romanian Workersrsquo Party Concerning the

Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movementrsquo also known as the

lsquoRomanian declaration of independencersquo which harshly criticized the Cominternrsquos policies

of the 1920s and 1930s arguing that socialist states should have their own national

policies work closely together instead of under inter-state authority (Steele 1974

125)In 1976 Romania became the first country of the Warsaw Pact to establish

democratic relations with the West and in 1975 it was given the Most Favoured Nation

Status by the United States and also received visits from two American Presidents

(Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) as well as from countless European leaders (Roper

2000 45) Second its trade policies made it less dependent by the Soviet Union

Virtually it had become self-sufficient on the production of energy and by the end of the

1960s industrial production had raised by 67 above the level from 1955 (Roper 2000

50)

However from the 1970rsquos onwards the situation started slowly degrading In the

beginning although the economy remained relatively strong the quality of life highly

decreased Between 1972 and 1982 the country experienced the largest emissions of

sulphur per capita in Europe Subsequently during the 80rsquos brown coal and lignite

production increased over 100 leading to a high incidence of water contamination

which had exceeded plant purification capacity Out of the 2 767 pre-treatment and

treatment facilities 844 were operating below standards and about 64 were out of order

As a result due to heavy rivers pollution less than 20 of the main waterways provided

clean drinkable water (Roper 2000 56) Although life quality had drastically fallen

down discontent did not truly emerge to the surface until the sharp economic downturn

the country experienced throughout the 1980s which can be partly explained by the

external pressure As Skocpol (1979) argues countries at disadvantage in the

international system are most likely to experience revolutions

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

23

Romania had amassed a total external debt of around 10 billion dollars (CIA Handbook

1990 p 48) which in Ceausescursquos opinion had threatened its economic and political

autonomy More debt would have meant dependence both on the West and on the East

and lack of decision power in certain areas which would have interfered with Ceausescursquos

ideology of a non-interference policy As a result he implemented a severe austerity

program designed to rid the country of debt until 1989 which he actually succeeded in

doing Nevertheless the price paid was the drastic reducing of social welfare and medical

care As living standards decreased malnutrition and AIDS incidence increased placing

the Romanian infant mortality at the top of the list amongst European countries

(Roper 200057) This combined with the personality cult he had implemented and

infringement on human liberties such as free speech represented the causes of

discontent and revolutionary attitudes

Nevertheless as Gilberg (1990 24) argues lsquopublic discontent could not have toppled

the Ceausescu regime without being organized The security forces could have

effectively dealt with the population if it had not been mobilizedrsquo Usually the

organization comes from political elites but in the Romanian case political elites even

those against the Ceausescu regime had little power and influence The elites that turned

against Ceausescu did not play an important role until later on In fact they did not hold

that much power due to Ceausescursquos rotational system policy This way they could be

easily kept at bay but at the same time were also given an extra reason to plot against

Ceausescu However the internal divisions that led to the revolution did not start as

political but rather as ethnic It was the eviction of a reformed Hungarian Pastor that

mobilized a couple of protesters to gather in front of his house and it was Pastor Tokesrsquos

dissident activity that encouraged the population to rebel against Ceausescu (East

1992 140) Subsequently the National Democratic Front which took control of the

central building in Timisoara had a more important role for the spread of the revolution

to Bucharest A foreign element is also present here and as many have pointed out

outside forces did play a role For example Tokesrsquo evacuation came as a result of a

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

24

notorious documentary criticizing Ceausescursquos policies towards ethnic Hungarians

secretly filmed by Canadian Hungarians which was broadcasted in the West (Arpad

2011 289) In 1989 the service for foreign intelligence informed that the lsquoCIA set up

trust organisations to encourage and support the dissident movement in the socialist

countries to organise and manage informative activity among the immigration coming

from such countries and to initiate actions against socialist states through the means of

hostile elements among the immigrants or dissidents (Dutu 2012 68)

As there was no real leadership a combination of factors mobilized and organized the

population Nonetheless as files of foreign secret services have still not been revealed

the extent to which such forces played a role and the importance of the role has yet to

be established

It might be very well that without Pastor Tokesrsquo eviction those events could have taken

a different turn However the support he gained from the Hungarian minority

represented the spark for the other ethnic Romanians to address their grievances as

well As the Hungarians had experienced harsh assimilation policies throughout

Ceausescursquos regime they had a strong stance While ethnic Hungarians were prevented

from any position of power within the states their ethnic identity was also destroyed

through destruction of villages and churches as well as the cultural discrimination in

Banat and Transylvania Ethnic Hungarians were portrayed as having promoted the

elimination of Romanian culture and the Transylvaniarsquos reincorporation into Hungary

(Roper 2000 54)

Certainly the circumstances under Ceausescursquos regime fit the revolutionary causal model

but in order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on the development and outcome of

such conditions a comparison against the first generationrsquos descriptive criteria is

essential

1) The intelligentsia revolt against the regime prior to the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

25

Between January and March 1977 Paul Goma wrote a number of letters concerning

human rights abuses that were made public on Radio Free Europe and in February he

sent a letter to Ceausescu urging him to support charter rsquo77 Finally in March he sent a

letter to the Helsinki committee demanding the implementation of human rights

enshrined in Romaniarsquos constitution The regime acted swiftly arrested Goma in April

and exiled him Less than a decade later on September 21st 1985 engineer Gheorghe

Ursu was arrested in Bucharest for anti-communist manifestations (Dutu 2012 56) On

November 21st archivist Razvan Theodorescu and historians Vasile Dragut and Virgil

Candea signed a protest against demolition of the Vacaresti Monastery considered an

lsquoarchitectural and artistic work of first rank the last of a series of medieval buildings

started in the 14th and 15th centuries through the foundations of Curtea de Arges

Targoviste and Putnarsquo (Dutu 201256) The Romanian intellectuals argued that that lsquothe

destruction of that monument was lsquoan irreversible loss for the Romanian culture and

creation an injustice made to our history and national identityrsquo (Dutu 2012 56) While

the reasons for this protests were rather cultural than political it represented another

element of the snowball effect adding up to general discontent slowly escalating into

political grievances Two years later a workersrsquo revolt took place in Brasov where many

intellectuals also took part of While the revolt was easily suppressed and the most

prominent figures were arrested and publicly presented as delinquents the intellectuals

were silently pardoned as Ceausescu did not want the revolt to take a dissident

character but rather remain as he portrayed it an act of lsquohooliganismrsquo (Cesereanu

2009 42)

In March 1989 radio free Europe and BBC broadcasted the lsquoopen letterrsquo in which six

former personalities of the RCP (Gheorghe Apostol Alexandru Barladeanu Corneliu

Manescu Constantin Parvulescu Grigore Raceanu Silviu Brucan) criticised Ceausescu

for undermining socialism and that through the policies he implemented he isolated

Romania on the global scale and violated human rights (Tismaneanu 200156) They

condemned the lsquovillage systematizationrsquo the interdiction of Romanians to communicate

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

26

with foreigners the construction of the civic centre the forced assimilation of Germans

and Hungarians and the Jews who were forced to emigrate (Roper 2000 60) After a

short while the signatories of the letter were placed under house arrest although no

harsh measures were taken against them as they were respected and popular political

figures both nationally and internationally (Dutu 2012 64) In March 17th the

lsquoLiberationrsquo published an interview with Mircea Dinescu where the dissident poet

condemned the communist regime approaching it in an ironical way (Dutu 2012 65)

Until then it was clear that Romania was a gunpowder-filled barrel ready to explode and

a revolution was anticipated both inside and outside However the only one who did not

want to see nor accept reality was Ceausescu blinded by his utopian communist goal

Even Marin Ceausescu brother and head of the economic agency of Romania in Vienna

prophetically warned him in June

lsquoThere is no escape Nicule as the Russians and the Americans are both involved

Each of them has people here who collude you know but they havenrsquot found the

right moment yet but they wonrsquot miss the opportunityDonrsquot make it easy for

them Donrsquot play as they expect you to do it will be the end for us and of the

whole country Save yourself Resign on illness reasons and put Iliescu in your

stead anyway he is the one designated to comersquo (Dutu 2012 68)

2) Just prior to the revolution the government takes measures and makes promises in

order to calm down the population

As expected the revolution rapidly spread around the country In an attempt to

condemn the revolutionary events in Timisoara which had gone out of control

Ceausescu organized a lsquopopular general meetingrsquo again proof of his disillusion of 100

000 people in front of the partyrsquos headquarter His last speech can be fully seen online

in a dramatic depiction of his last attempt to calm the population down before the

Central Communist Building is stormed in by the protesters As it can be seen on the

footage while it is not clear what sets the population angry Ceausescu is baffled and

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

27

seemingly in shock taking a few moments of silence to grasp the situation (OTV 2010)

Nevertheless he proceeds with the speech promising to increase salaries by 20 from

2000 lei per month to 2200 child allowance by 30-50 lei and also a birth allowance

worth 1000-2000 lei However some participants soon flee the square and others break

in the building Ceausescu completely losing control of the situation and escaping

together with his wife in a helicopter afraid of the angry mob (East 1992 140)

3) the fall of the regime is an outcome of a recent acute political economic or military

crisis which the state cannot deal with adequately as opposed to action undertaken by

the revolutionary opposition

This was perfectly exemplified previously through Ceausescursquos attempt to pay off the

countryrsquos huge debt by imposing austerity measures plunging the country into an

economic and political crisis However the crisis that Ceausescu could not handle

properly and proved to be fatal was an ethno-religious crisis the attempted eviction of a

reformed Hungarian pastor seen as a representative of the Hungarian minority Had

Ceausescu handled the situation right the events could have taken a different turn First

of all people did not revolt against Ceausescu but rather for minority rights They asked

for reforms not revolution As Ceausescu failed to understand the important ehno-

religious aspect of the society he attempted to supress the ethno-religious small uprising

(20-30 people) which as a result attracted the majority of Timisoara and eventually

turned into a revolution Due to his previous anti-Soviet stance and several criticisms in

the West (the retrieval of MFN status) Ceausescu had become paranoid about a

potential foreign intervention and mishandled the situation in Timisoara treating it as

part of a bigger plot meant to secede Banat and Transylvania and integrate it into

Hungary (Ghaleb 2011 15) In his eyes the protesters were not the public expressing

grievances but rather foreign agents creating diversions threatening national integrity

As a result he sent the Army and the Securitate to violently supress the protests and

when the population was fired at the majority of the cityrsquos population came out in the

streets (Ghaleb 2011 59)

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

28

4) even though the revolutionaries might seem united for a common goal at the

beginning after the regime change internal conflicts emerge due to opposing views of

conservatives (who seek to minimize change) radicals (who seek rapid and widespread

change) and moderates (who seek a middle course) and potential outcomes could be

coups or civil wars It was the same in the Romanian case in the beginning seemingly

everyone was united for the same goal but soon there were protests against the National

Salvation Front which eventually established itself as a party after having already

monopolized the media and taken credit for the revolution (Verdery amp Kligman 1992

125) Dumitru Mazilu former US ambassador for example served as a vice-president of

the NSF initially but later on resigned due to opposing ideologies accusing Ion Iliescu of

conservative communist practices (Andreescu et all 2009 272) In the early 1990rsquos the

NSF witnessed severe opposition from the newly emerging lsquohistoricrsquo parties (The National

Peasant Party The National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) which held

radical views as opposed to the moderate nature of the Front Radicals asked that no

previous high-ranking communist party officials be allowed to take office again which

the NSF categorically opposed (Adamson amp Florean 2013 174)

5) The first group to seize power are moderate reformers and (6) still keep to some

extent organizational forms left from the old regime opposed by radical centres

springing up with new alternative reforms While the National Salvation Front

established in Bucharest presented a radical program similar to the one in Timisoara

incorporating the National Democratic Front old structures were still maintained Ion

Iliescu and Silviu Brucan one of the leaders of the National Salvation Front had both

been high-placed members of the party while General Militaru was part of the army

While Iliescu claimed to have been a dissident he had never in fact been persecuted by

Ceausescu due to his reputation and high positions he had previously held (Ghaleb

2011 53) Secondly while the program of the NSF included the organization of free

elections and plurality in 1990 they turned into a political party having already

monopolized the media There is no agreement as to whether Romania experienced a

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

29

revolution or a coup as until 1996 there was no fundamental change Gilberg (199015)

points out that communists and not the communist party exerted influence immediately

after the revolution However all revolutions have a period of rapid change followed by

incremental consolidation as evidenced by the approximate the Bolsheviks took to

finally consolidate the power after the 1917 revolution Katherine Verdery and Gail

Klingman argue that some form of popular uprising was necessary to end the Ceausescu

regime They believe that a coup alone would not have overthrown him (1992134)

Adrian Marino talks about 2 revolutions one from above led by a small circle of

reformed communists anti-Ceausescu but gorbachevists nevertheless and a revolution

from below with truly anti-communist ideas While the first one was planned out the

second was spontaneous The first was the old one the second was the young(As cited

in Cesereanu 2009 69) According to Alexandru Sauca (1994 78) there were two

revolutions an anti-communist and an anti-Ceausescu and the Ceausescu part was

the only one were the public met the NSF

According to Stelian Tanase (academic) the FSN was not guilty for taking power but

rather because it dictated after taking it using the state as an instrument of empowering

itself From an illegitimate force the FSN turned into a lsquotentacularrsquo grouping with the

same mischievous presence just like the old PCR (Tanase 1999 p359) When in 1990rsquos

protests took place against the newly elected government calling the elections unfair

instead of engaging into political dialogue Iliescu violently repressed the protests using

miners which aggressed students and set university buildings on fire Ironically Iliescu

called the protesters fascists and also hooligans one of Ceausescursquos favourite words for

each protest that ever occurred (Verdery amp Kligman 1992 130) Iliescu practically

reformulated communism through gorbachevist practices while maintaining some

previous elements The radical changes never really came as a result of the regime

change but rather through time through the retirement of former communists and the

accession to the European Union In these respects (7) radicals (anti-communists)

never really managed in supplanting the moderates as they were too effective at seizing

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

30

and maintaining power Henceforth the character of a genuine popular revolution is

contestable invalidating the final two points (9 10) strictly referring to the struggle

between radical and moderates

8) While disorder was not brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical

control but rather by diversionist terrorist attacks which started in the aftermath of the

creation of the NSF These diversionist attacks accompanied by rumours spread on the

TV not only created mass confusion and chaos but also led to massive loss of lives (more

than 900) While some foreign elements were also involved the conflict was mainly due

between Romanians and a lot of the times they shot each-other out of sheer confusion

as former president Iliescu (1999) argued This in turn poses serious questions about

the outcome of the revolution that took form in Timisoara First of all the diversion

especially the rumours poses questions about the genuine spontaneous character of the

revolution pointed towards the fact it might have been lsquoguidedrsquo and secondly the bloody

conflict that resulted in the death of more than 1000 people suggests a potential civil

war The outcome of the revolutionary events were not the seizure of power from the old

regime by the popular movement but rather in the appropriation of the revolution by a

political formation constituted after the flight of a dictator that came from the same

structure The FSN depicted a struggle for control a civil war between the people the

army and the NSF on one side and the dictator namely the terrorists and the Securitate

on the other (McDermott amp Stibbe 201343)

While there is no question about the causes and the outset of the revolution the

revolutionary outcome seems to prevent the events to fully classify as a revolution

While the NFSrsquos seizure of power indicates a potential coup drsquoeacutetat the resulting bloody

conflict indicates a potential civil war

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

31

IV The Coup drsquoeacutetat

While until now it has become quite clear that the Romanian events perfectly fit the

frame of a popular revolution up until a certain point there is a considerable evidence

pointing towards a complete or partial a coup drsquoeacutetat While Iliescu (1999) claimed the

NSF was the emanation of the peoplersquos will and thus the rightful governing body the

manner it has consolidated power has raised questions about its legitimacy This chapter

will test the events surrounding the NSFrsquos seizure of power against the established coup

drsquoeacutetat theoretical framework in an attempt to conclude the extent to which the seizure

was illegitimate and the extent to which it would classify as a coup drsquoeacutetat

Before proceeding to the testing of the previously established criteria the external plot

and the staged war theory deserve attention as would they be correct they would

invalidate the theories analysed by this thesis

Proponents of the two theories not only consider the events the staging of the ousting of

Ceausescu but also the staging of a war against the Romanian people As such the

terrorist attacks and the more than 1000 deaths in December 1989 are attributed to

foreign agencies be it Soviet American Israeli or Palestinian The main arguments of

this side rest on the Malta meeting as the defining moment where the fall of Ceausescu

was agreed upon Bush and Gorbachev Radu Portocala (1991) points out that Iliescu

was schooled in Moscow where he met Gorbachev at an early age (although this has

been refuted by Iliescu) and has thus been chosen by the Russians as Ceausescursquos

predecessor Filip Teodorescu (1992) And Ilie Stoian (1993) both point out that pastor

Tokes was recruited by foreign agents while Alexandru Sauca (1994) and Angela

Bacescu (1995) argue that the revolution could not have been possible without the joint

efforts of the KGB CIA MOSSAD DST AVO

The problem with the foreign intervention theory is that it is mostly based on speculation

or comes in the forms of memoirs of agents of Securitate USLA or military officials

involved in the Timisoara repressions tried for crimes as justification for the high death

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

32

toll (Hall 1999 13) As Cesereanu (2009 99-118) argues General Ion Coman accused

for the repression of Timisoara and condemned in the Timisoara Process sustained the

external plot theory as part of his plead of innocence (Cesereanu 2009 99-118) If the

foreign element theory is correct then Romanians were killed and fought foreign Soviet

forces whose aim was creating panic and confusion as to facilitate Ceausescursquos ousting

The foreign intervention theory is fuelled by examples of Arabs or mixed race agents

which were captured or taken to the hospital having been wounded by gunfire as well as

the high number (20-30 000) of alleged lsquotouristsrsquo that entered Romania in 1989 and

stayed until early 1990 (Portocala 1990 21) Both in the Timis and Braila county at the

border crossing points from Yugoslavia massive groups of Soviet and Hungarian tourists

especially travelling in groups of 20-30 cars were registered some transiting the

country while some staying Such vehicles would contain 2-3 generally lsquoyoung-athletic

menrsquo (Dutu 2012 88-89)

The problem with this theory is that first of all does not fit in the international context

and that secondly there is not enough evidence to support it remaining pure

speculation To begin with the Soviet Union at the time explicitly stated its

renouncement to its interventionist policies and also explicitly stated it would intervene

in Romania although the US indicated it would not have anything against it Second if

truly 30 000 soviet agents infiltrated the country at the time they would have probably

left a lot of documents behind not only in Romania but also in the countries they were

recruited from A great number of 30 000 could have not only been sent from Moscow

but from all Soviet States but despite this no clear evidence nor indication of their role

exists either from KGB CIA or any other secret services organisation that have been

mentioned by proponents of such theory Even so while there is evidence to support the

presence of such tourists there is no evidence to support their terrorist activities There

is available footage online that shows the capture of the so called terrorist all of which

were Romanians (RTV 1989b) As Virgil Magureanu put it even if foreign forces had

indeed acted they could not have done so without internal complicity (Roper 2000 45)

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

33

On the other hand that is not to say that external forces did not play a role in Romaniarsquos

transition After all as Buckley (cited by McDermott amp Stibbe 2013 14) described

Gorbachevrsquos role he was a lsquofacilitator trigger approver persuader andhellip[ultimately]

essential enabler of revolutions in Eastern Europersquo Nevertheless at the same time he

ruled out intervention in hard-line regimes such as Czech Republic GDR BG and

Romania (Rothschild amp Wingfield 2008 29)

The Romanian Secret Services report indicated the presence of some of foreign agents

with informative and lsquofacilitatingrsquo roles but strictly referring to the the armed conflict

against the military and the seizure of power by the NSF a vital foreign role is not

plausible There is no evidence (yet) to fully support the external plot theory While

former intelligence officials of the time have written memoirs and claimed to have

provided classified information the veracity of such claims would only be validated after

official releases Having refuted an external coup and staged war theory attention will

be now directed to the internal coup supposition

Taking into consideration Luttwakrsquos (1968 5) broad definition of a coup the NSF

infiltrated a small but critical segment of the state apparatus (the Television) which was

then used to displace the government (Ceausescu) from control to the remainderrsquo The

three pre-conditions to a coup must be taken into consideration first

1) The social and economic conditions of the country must be such as to confine political

participation to a small fraction of the population

As it has been previously shown Ceausescu had used the Securitate to suppress and

eliminate all opposition to the single party in power Unlike Poland or the Czech

Republic Ceausescu had no opposition not even within the party By adopting the

principle of cadre rotation the creation of power bases opposed to had been practically

rendered impossible (Scurtu 2009 80) This in turn alienated certain party elites and

the rank-and-file from the ruling leadership

2) Political participation is restricted to a small segment of the population

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

34

As previously shown Romania was at the time the most independent in the Warsaw pact

countries as evidenced by the 1968rsquos refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as

by its refusal to adopt Soviet internal or interventionist policies

3) The state must have a political centre or in the case of more they all should be

political as opposed to ethnical

Although the revolution was sparked by an ethno-religious event there was no

Hungarian centre The political centres in Romania were the pro-Gorbachev reformist

and the Nationalist Ceausescu one against reformations The NSF had existed as a n

organization since July 1989 as Gusa states it in the raw footage and had plans of

ousting Ceausescu plans which nevertheless did not work out (RTV 1989a)

4) The coup was staged against an authoritarian regime East Europersquos most repressive

one which used (5) the military in order to respond to popular opposition against the

regime Ceausescu ordered armed repression of the uprisings in Timisoara and although

after he attempted to calm down the population during an organized popular gathering

(6) he refused to step down in response to the popular opposition While number 6 and 7

are valid the couprsquos staging point is debatable Previous plans of staging a coup were

planned out and discussed but nevertheless not put in action due to their high risk they

posed lsquoBaricada Magazinersquo and Liviu Valenas published in 1990 a series entitled lsquoThe

palace coup in Romaniarsquo through which it elaborated how the plot came to being

(Cesereanu 2009 122) In 1970 Virgil Magureanu initially supported by the KGB put a

plan together His plan was that young specialists (graduates) would infiltrate the

Security creating in time a different structure controlling the organism and backing up

Ceausescursquos removal and his replace with a pro-Moscow reformist The envisioned leader

at the time was Iliescu In 1980 the plotters decided to recruit generals from the

Ministry of Defence and from the Securitate both active and passive In the mid-80s

there were talks of a special armed operation however which was rejected by Iliescu

(Cesereanu 2009 82) Brucan (1993 52) former ambassador to the US claims that an

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

35

anti-Ceausescu nucleus had been formed ever since its inauguration as president

Supposedly it was created around Ion Ionita minister of national Defence Nicolae

Militaru and Stefan Kostyal Nicolae Militaru in an interview claims that in the 70rsquos the

conditions were not favourable enough for a coup and only when the economic situation

worsened could they go on with the plan (Cesereanu p59)

7) the coup was staged not by a military highly respected in the country but rather by

respected figures (Iliescu Petre Roman) which organized everything in (8) order to

overthrow the authoritarian leader by quickly seizing power once Ceausescu fled

9) The coup architects legitimize their actions using mass-media and manipulating

national symbols

As Roper (2000 60) the FSNrsquos success came from the lsquolack of any real opposition the

manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the countryrsquos transitionrsquo as

well as due to Ceausescursquos cult of personality Because of the cult of the personality

frustrations were focused more on the individual the family than on the institution of the

party The party never addressed the communist legacy nor the origin of the December

revolution The dominance of the FSN after the first post-communist elections prevented

such discussion from occurring and when opponents brought attention to this by getting

out in the streets they were violently repressed (Roper 2000 67-68) In June 1990 in

Bucharest students assembled at University Square protesting the against the newly

established government Instead of engaging students in discussions the government

called on the miners from the Jiu Valley to violently disperse the students Iliescu went

so far as to describe the students as lsquohooligansrsquo a favourite Ceausescu expression

(Verdery amp Kligman 132) In addition the party suppressed debate by using the newly

reconstituted Securitate the Romanian Information Service headed by Virgil

Magureanu a close associate of Iliescu As a consequence of the electoral success the

party and the country never engaged in any serious soul searching after the events of

December 1989 (Roper 2000 69)

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

36

Many unfounded rumours found to be untrue were broadcasted such as the poisoning

of water or Russian military interventions Heavy words instilling fear were used on TV

For example an lsquourgent appealrsquo at the time warned about lsquoan armoured motorized

convoy heading towards Pitesti city to occupy the atomic point the refinery the cyanide

reservoirs the Barage threatening the utter destruction of the city from the maprsquo

(Mihalache 2012) It requested not only the armyrsquos intervention but also the civilians in a

joint effort to fight off the threat The TV thus depicted no real alternative of the people

they would either be with the NSF or face destruction in face of the terrorists Through

mass-media the NSF depicted lsquo civil war a struggle for control of the streets of

institutions between the people the army and the FSN on one hand and the dictator

namely the terrorists and the Securitate on the other The newspaper lsquoScanteiarsquo (the

Spark) changed its name to Scanteia poporului (The Peoplersquos Spark) As the number of

the edition stated lsquoour newspaper comes out today in a few hours in a special edition

in a patriotic version new real as the peoplersquos newspaperrsquo (Mihalache 2012) There was

an appeal to nationalism and even instigation to violence The first number of the called

people to arms to fight off the terrorists lsquoEveryone that can use a weapon to armsrsquo

(Mihalache 2012)

According to Adamson and Florean (2013 173) the lsquoFSN carefully fashioned a new

political legitimacy through the successful re-articulation of the popular uprising of 12-22

December into a narrative sequence that supported a political mythologisation of the

Romanian revolutionrsquo While Ceausescu was depicted as the main problem his

elimination was the only solution to the stopping of the terrorist attacks and thus his

prompt execution was a necessity for the revolution to continue even though the trial

was a mockery

The old regime acted as a provisional power and assured a transition to democratic

institutions but subsequently instead of dissolving it turned into a political party having

already successfully appropriated the name and the symbolism of the revolution

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

37

lsquoThe fronthellipwas born as a creation of our life from our own experience Its law is

our life our blood our sweat our needs [hellip]It is written with the blood of the

revolution[hellip]It is the expression of their ideas and their demands[hellip]From this

this platform written with the blood of the martyrs has created a national

consensus And at present time the only political structure capanle standing on

their shoulders is the Frontrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 183)

In the absence of any party capable of contesting the role of the NSF in the first days of

the revolution as well as the role of the Television as the bastion of the revolutionary

leaders (now subordinate do the NSF)

The period from mid-January to May 1990 when the first free elections following the

flight of Ceausescu took place was one in which serious political antagonisms developed

over the very meaning of the revolution Many parties contested FSNrsquos legitimacy and

pointed towards it monopolization of the press into winning the elections Perhaps the

best articulation of the the NSFrsquos illegitimate consolidation of power has been an article

published in the Adevarul newspaper by the contending parties

lsquoThrough this decision the FSN has lost its neutrality and its role as aprovisional

government as well as its credibility vis-agrave-vis public opinion How can there be

talk of free elections and equitable conditions for all political formations when the

NSF holds a monopoly on all levels of the state in a completely totalitarian

manner The front has discretionary access to funds and economic means to

television radio and newspapers the people are subject to biased information

and disinformationrsquo (Adamson amp Florean 2013 185)

(10) Free and fair elections were facilitated although the extent to which they were free

and fair is still questionable as well as the transfer of power to democratic elected

people Although many people contested the elections as having been fair Iliescu was

not only elected once in 1990 but twice as well in 1992 As many authors have argued

democracy is a highly country-specific issue especially for a country with few democratic

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

38

principles such as Romania The important issue was how the NSF consolidated power

first by Machiavellically appropriating the revolution and second by forcefully repressing

the peaceful protesters in January 1990 The second round of elections in 1992 have

demonstrated according to Roper (2000 97) greater political pluralism than the

previous ones demonstrating that Romania had embarked on a steady process of

learning democratic practices

As evidenced in this chapter the manner in which the National Salvation Front infiltrated

and used the state apparatus in order to consolidate its power resorting from

propaganda to violence to gain support and silence opponents remarkably exhibits the

traits of a coup drsquoeacutetat unveiling both its positive (preventing chaos by quickly creating

institutions) and negative (silencing opposition) connotations

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

39

V A Romanian Civil War

The remaining element to be analysed is the bloody conflict that emerged immediately

after Ceausescursquos escape and the NSFrsquos seizure of power Constantine Pleshakov

differentiates the events in Romania lsquoa clash of classes revealed as civil warrsquo from the

lsquonon-violent revolutions in the Czech Republic and peaceful transfer of power in Hungary

and Bulgariarsquo (McDermott and Stibbe 2013 2) Broadly defined the civil war in Romania

was an armed conflict between the government (Ceausescu and the military and then his

lsquoterroristsrsquo) and organized domestic opposition movements (the revolutionaries and the

NSF and subsequently the army)

The civil war gradually erupted as a result of the counter-revolution deployed by

Ceausescu (repressing the protesters in Timisoara) As the power structures changed

the actors of the war also changed The confusion here lies in the switching of sides the

army as well as the identity of the so called terrorists that waged war against both the

population and the army

The first criterion which is met by the Romanian revolution is the overall death toll The

threshold was over 1000 people with at least 100 deaths on each side (ECHR 2011 4)

Ghaleb believes there is enough evidence to support a coup related civil-war and

furthermore that lsquoThe fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil

war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only

against the families of the victims of the conflict but also against the study of

contemporary history itselfrsquo (Ghaleb 2011 1)

Causally the Romanian events would have to fit into an ethnic secessionist or

ideological conflict type Although Ceausescu saw the protests against Laszlorsquos removal

as a potential secessionist conflict (aiming at the separation of Transylvania and

integration into Hungary) none of the main actors nor any revolutionary decisions were

undertaken by ethnic Hungarians Indeed the Hungarians did indeed have many

grievances but they had no political nucleum and moreover they were dispersed

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

40

amongst the country and poorly organized While externally ethnic Hungarians managed

to express anger and organized massive anti-Communist rallies when Ceausescu visited

the United States or Canada internally they were confined to producing pamphlets and

sending letters concerning the internal anti-Hungarian policies abroad (Szoczi 2011 86)

Their grievances (expressed by a handful on the 18th of December) were further taken

upon by Romanians which slowly turned from political grievances (the deportation of the

reformed pastor) to economic ones escalating the conflict into a 3) revolutionary or

ideological one with the goal of supplanting the Ceausescu regime While initial protests

and demands were against the removal of Laszlo when Ceausescu sent authorities to

disperse the population the anger of the people increased Scans escalated from broad

ones demanding lsquolibertyrsquo lsquobreadrsquo and lsquomilkrsquo to focalized anti-Ceausescu ones demanding

an end to the lsquodictatorshiprsquo an lsquoend to Ceausescursquo Red flags and portraits of Ceausescu

were set on fire and shops were vandalized resulting in a clash with the police forces

shield bearers and firefighters which used tear gas and water cannons to calm down the

lsquohooligansrsquo and maintain order (Dutu 2012 95-96) Hence causally the events would

fit in the ideological conflict

Structurally it seems that the Romanian events exhibit a combination of the three with a

particular closeness to the third variation

1) Irregular civil wars erupt incrementally and slowly from the periphery They entail a

slow process of building state institutions by the insurgent group

The Romanian uprising began at the periphery with the first failed uprising in Iasi and

then Timisoara not with the capital Bucharest (Stoenescu 2012 18) They did

incrementally spread across the country but due to the lack of organisation of the

revolutionaries there was no slow process of building state institutions as well as no

insurgent group to have carefully made its way to the capital Rather the National

Salvation Front figures from the old regime quickly monopolized power and created

institutions unveiled as a coup drsquoeacutetat in the previous chapter While the NSF has been

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

41

accused of illegitimately seizing power had it not done so it is most probable that chaos

could have dominated the country for more than just a week The NSF were the only

ones capable at the moment and the time to create viable state institutions as they

came from inside the system knew the structures and how to reformulate tem and was

also in good terms with the army (Stoenescu 2012 232)

2) Symmetric and non-conventional wars which are fought on both sides by irregular

armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and

eventual implosion of the incumbent actor The state army is disintegrated into militias

which plunder the equipment of disbanded armies

Romania did not collapse as a state as the vacuum created by the death of Ceausescu

was quickly filled in by the National Salvation Front However the state was still frail due

to the fighting that continued over 5 days after power was seized There was no split into

militias but rather the army civilian combatants (which did not plunder but rather were

given weapons) and the terrorists fought a guerrilla war (RTV 1989c)

3) Conventional civil wars take place when an army splits either because of a) a failed

coup or b) because a unit of a federal or quasi federal state which can take a part of the

army attempts to secede Although the spark of the revolution was of ethno-religious

nature there was no secessionist intent as the events quickly turned anti-Ceausescu

Perhaps the most difficult task in analysing the events of 1989 as a civil war is

identifying the two sides that shot at each other While it was clear that the army sided

with the new governing body the NSF was one side that took part of the conflict what is

not that clear is who the other part was Theories range from soviet special units to

members of the Securitate to an elite guerrilla warfare trained unit to defend Ceausescu

While the foreign intervention theory has been dismissed in the previous chapter three

options remain to be considered Securitate members specially trained agents of

Ceausescursquos guard or a military segment

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

42

Romaniarsquos defence was managed by four entities the army (140 000 personnel border

guards (15 000) and security forces from the Ministry of interior (33 000) which also

included a fourth unit the Securitate the second largest with almost 37 000 (Szozci

2011 70) Although Ceausescu had fled and the population had seemingly gained

control there were still a lot of mixed feelings across the defence departments The

Army had a dissident part called CADA (The Committee of Action for the Democratization

of the Army) which was feared to take over (Ceseranu 2009 183) while other parts

especially officers were in a state of confusion while Ceausescu was alive as they were

feeling they were betraying the supreme commander of the army As Domenico (1992

119) described the situation lsquoThere were many moments when anyone could have either

saved or killed Ceausescursquo(Domenico 1992 119) The army was not the only one divided

on the issue but the population as well According to Stoenescu (2012 196) during the

Timisoara protests police stations had received more than 20 000 calls from civilians

demanding the protesters were neutralized

The debates surrounding the identity of the terrorists has revolved around the Securitate

members versus USLA (anti-terrorist brigade) (Hall 1999 502) troops but some as

Petre Roman have also blamed the National Salvation Front and the army for organizing

attacks against civilians and the army thus having staged the civil war in order to

maintain power (Mihalache 2012) While there is not enough official evidence to

support the identity of the terrorists as having come either from the Securitate the

USLA the army or Ceausescursquos personal elite division there is enough evidence to

support the existence of the terrorists First of all different contending officials have

similar things to say about the terrorists While Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Militaru on one

side and Dumitru Mazilu on the other all three former NSF officials have had opposing

ideologies they all agree that the terrorists did exist and that they were members of

the Securitate (whether true or not) Secondly there are numerous accounts of captured

terrorists and their statements as captured Official archives have depicted such

terrorists as specially trained forces indoctrinated and versed in martial arts and gunfire

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

43

since childhood without any emotions which carried no ID documents (Perva amp Roman

2009 77) Their declarations had also been illustrative of their nature lsquodo what you want

to me I can die now Irsquove had a lot of fun these 3 daysrsquo or lsquomy mission is death why not

fight when wersquove been paid wellrsquo (Perva amp Roman 2009 78) Third online footage is

also available depicting the capture of terrorists all of which were Romanian (RTV

1989b)

As stated previously this research does not revolve around finding or pointing towards

the true version but rather depicting the situation using the established theoretical

frameworks As such regardless of the identity of the terrorists one thing is clear there

was a split in the defence forces and two Romanian sides collapsed into a civil war The

Army was not the only one fighting the terrorists but also civilians The first issue of the

Scanteia (the Spark) newspaper called civilians that could use weapons to arms and

around 1000 firearms were distributed at the Heavy Machinery Enterprise in Bucharest

(IMGB) There are several footage online depicting no longer civilians but rather

combatants engaging into guerrilla warfare against snipers or concealed shooters (RTV

1989c) There were obviously two sides of the conflict one for the new government and

one against it and it was sparked by NSFrsquos seizure of power which has been unveiled as

a coup drsquoeacutetat The bloody conflict only ended when one side was defeated and that was

Ceausescursquos execution In this case the most plausible explanation is a civil war

between the newly established government and the old regime supporting Ceausescu

ended with the defeat of the latter Henceforth the 3a proposition that of a coup-

related civil war seems to fit best the events that ousted Ceausescu According to Ghaleb

(2011 53) a coup-related civil war is lsquoa civil war between groups that aim to take

control of a state and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the

statersquos central government including the armed forcesrsquo(Ghaleb 2011 53) As it has been

shown members of the statersquos central government (Iliescu and Brucan) who led the NSF

and the army on one side fought anti-revolutionary forces for the control of the state

and won by executing Ceausescu

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

44

As previously suggested in the case a coup-related civil war fitted best a hybrid theory

has to be considered encompassing revolutionary coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war features

which have been demonstrated by the unfolding of the Romanian events of December

1989 While there was a revolutionary situation there was no immediate revolutionary

outcome The National Salvation Frontrsquos consolidation and maintenance of power

resembled almost flawlessly a coup drsquoeacutetat Best summed up the revolutionrsquos scope was

to abolish communism while the couprsquos scope was Ceausescursquos ousting While the

revolutionrsquos goals were liberty western values and free market-economy the couprsquos goal

was Soviet reforms and liberalization The spontaneous revolution emerged as a result of

Ceausescursquos harsh policies and at its peak (Ceausescursquos escape) the NSF quickly seized

power and maintained it through a coup The combination of the two unfolded into a civil

war claiming the lives of more than 1000 people which only ended with the execution of

Ceausescu which paved the way for a slow transition The link between the three

processes thus becomes obvious Had it not been for the coup drsquoeacutetat of the NSF

Ceausescursquos counter-revolution might have intensified the civil war as institutions would

have not been built as fast and as efficiently by the NSF As the NSF had good

connections with the army it was also a lot easier to get the army on their side On the

other side nevertheless without a coup and appropriating the population more divisions

could have sprung which would have threatened national sovereignty

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

45

VI Conclusion

As it has been shown each of the interpretations analysed above have fitted to some

extent to the theoretical framework This research has shown that the Romanian events

were a hybrid of revolution coup drsquoeacutetat and civil war The events started as a revolution

and due to a coup drsquoeacutetat and counter-revolution experienced a short lived civil war

While the events seemed to have perfectly fit in the coup drsquoeacutetat framework the

revolutionary and civil war elements should not be ignored Fearonrsquos theory of

interconnecting elements from all three categories is insightful in connecting the dots but

nevertheless still insufficient in providing an explanatory framework The events of 1989

have been shown to have fitted within the revolution theory up until a certain extent the

seizure of power by the NSF under Iliescursquos command on the 21st of December This in

turn coincides with many of the Timisoara revolutionariesrsquo theses about Iliescu having

stolen the revolution Nevertheless the revolution was not stolen by Iliescu when the

NSF seized power as that act was necessary to prevent chaos and rapidly build

institutions but rather when it Machiavellicaly manipulated the state system to hold on

to power after it was contested in 1990 by the protests The popular uprising combined

with the seizure of power sparked a gruesome counter-revolution from forces still

unknown but most probably loyal to Ceausescu as their attacks diminished and

eventually stopped after the dictatorrsquos execution In that case as it was shown the

coup-related civil war thesis fits at least partly While there is some evidence evidence

pointing towards foreign intervention such intervention seems to have been limited to

observation Until further secret services archives in Romania and abroad will be open it

will be hard to give a conclusion on the extent to which they were involved in the

demonstrations While there is not enough evidence to back up the external coup drsquoeacutetat

theory there is enough to back the internal one As it has been shown the NSF

monopolized state media and engaged into propaganda dissemination taking credit for

the revolution while virtually eliminating al opposition Even when it was brought to its

attention its illegitimate seizes of power it brutally chose to supress the protesters All

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

46

of the three presented theories are interconnected and seem to be indispensable to one

another While the revolutionrsquos outcome can only be explained through the prism of a

coup drsquoeacutetat the internal coup drsquoeacutetat cannot be explained without the revolution The

same is valid for the coup related civil war unexplainable without to coup to have outset

it

These three categories are interlinked and see to perfectly fit in the Romanian case Only

with time when the archives will be open will an accurate re-constitution of the events

be made possible The identity of the terrorists and the role of foreign forces has yet to

be elucidated as well as the authors of the crimes The European Human Rights court

has concluded in 2011 that proper investigations regarding the committed crimes have

not been conducted by the Romanian state as there are currently more than 100 cases

against the state alleging the statersquos violation of article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights that protects the right to life (EHRC) These issues still haunt and will

haunt the Romanian population until the truth will come out

While in the academic setting such analysis might be acceptable and understandable a

simplified definition is required widely accessible to the public as well Dividing the event

into three different dimensions will leave people unsatisfied Rather in order to provide a

satisfactory explanation an all-inclusive contentious politics theory should be developed

to illustrate such a hybrid There are still academics that vehemently reject the

democratic coup theory As Ropert (2000156) argues they would call it lsquoa distinct

revolutionrsquo In this case an all-encompassing theory for contentious politics would help

unshroud not only the Romanian events of 1989 but perhaps also others around the

globe

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

47

VII Bibliography

Articles

Armitage D (2014) lsquoEvery Great Revolution is a Civil Warrsquo Scripting Revolution 342-351

Barbieri K amp Reuveny R (2005) lsquoEconomic globalization and civil warrsquo Journal of

Politics 67(4) 1228-1247

Collier P Anke H (2004) Greed And Grievance In Civil War Oxford Economic Papers

56 (4) 563-595

Davies J C (1962) Toward A Theory Of Revolution American Sociological Review 5-

19

Fearon J D (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others

Journal Of Peace Research 41 (3) 275--301

Ghaleb A (2011) lsquoThe Romanian Civil War A Theoretical Discussion on the Proximate

Causes of Violencersquo Sfera Politicii (165) 20-33

Hall R A (1999) lsquoThe uses of absurdity The staged war theory and the Romanian

revolution of December 1989rsquo East European Politics amp Societies 13(3) 501-542

Huntington SP (1968) lsquoPolitical Order in Changing Societiesrsquo New Haven Political

Order in Changing Societies 110

Reynal-Querol M (2002) lsquoEthnicity political systems and civil warsrsquo Journal of Conflict

Resolution 46(1) 29-54

Rieber A J (2003) lsquoCivil wars in the Soviet Unionrsquo Kritika Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 4(1) 129-162

Roper S D (1994) The Romanian Revolution from a theoretical perspective

Communist And Post-Communist Studies 27 (4) 401-410

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

48

Siani-Davies P (1996) Romanian Revolution Or Coup Detat A Theoretical View Of

The Events Of December 1989 Communist And Post-Communist Studies 29 (4) 453-

465

Varol O O (2012) lsquoThe Democratic Coup drsquoeacutetatrsquo The Harvard International Law Journal

53 291

Books

Adamson K Florean S (2013) lsquoDiscourse and power the FSN and the mythologisation

of the Romanian revolutionrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989

Revolutions In Central And Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press

172-191

Andreescu M Bucur I and Marin V (2009) Revolutia Romana din Decembrie 1989 in

Bucuresti [English translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution of 1989 in

Bucharest] Cluj-Napoca Editura Mega

Băcescu A (1994) Din nou icircn calea năvălirilor barbare Romania 1989 [English

translation from Romanian Again facing barbarian invasions 1989 Romania] Cluj-

Napoca Zalmoxis

Boia L (2001) History and myth in Romanian consciousness Budapest Central

European University Press

Brinton C (1965) The Anatomy Of Revolution New York Vintage Books

Brucan S (1993) The Wasted Generation Boulder Westview Press

Calvert P (2010) Terrorism Civil War And Revolution New York Continuum

Castex M (1990) Un Mensonge Gros Comme Le Siecle [English translation from

French A lie big as a century] Paris Albin Michel

Cesereanu R (2009) Decembrie 89 Deconstructia unei revolutii [English translation

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

49

from Romanian December rsquo89 The deconstruction of a revolution] Bucharest Polirom

Codrescu A (1991) The Hole In The Flag New York William Morrow amp Co

Davies J C (1970) When Men Revolt And Why New York Free Press

Domenico V (2011) După execuţie a nins [English translation from Romanian After the

execution it snowed] Bucharest Adevărul Holding

East R (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe London Pinter Publishers

Eisenstadt S N (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy Washington DC Woodrow Wilson

Center Press

Ellwood C A (1925) The psychology of human society an introduction to sociological

theory Chicago Appleton

Filip T (1999) Secretele USLA [English Translation from Romanian USLArsquos Secrets]

Bucharest Editura Obiectiv

Gabanyi A U (1991) Romanias Unfinished Revolution Washington DC Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars

Gilberg T (1990) Nationalism and Communism in Romania Boulder Westview Press

Goldstone J A (2003) Revolutions Theoretical Comparative And Historical Studies

Stamford Wadsworth Publishing

Goodspeed D J (1967) The conspirators a study of the coup deacutetat (Vol 3) Ontario

Macmillan

Gurr T R (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Hansmann M (2011) 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall Berlin Berliner

Wissenschafts-VerlagIntersentia

Hart C (2005) Doing your masters dissertation London Sage Publications

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

50

Hironaka Ann (2005) Neverending Wars Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Huntington S P (2006) Political order in changing societies New Haven Yale

University Press

Iliescu I (1994) Romania At The Moment Of Truth Paris Editions Henri Berger

Janos A C (1964) The Seizure of power a study of force and popular consent (Vol

16) Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Johnson C (1966) Revolutionary Change Boston Little Brown

Kalyvas SN (2005) lsquoWarfare in civil warsrsquo in Duyvesteyn I amp Angstrom J (eds)

Rethinking The Nature Of War London Frank Cass

Le Bon G amp Miall B (1995) The psychology of revolution Charlottesville Va

University of Virginia Library

Le Bon G (1897) The crowd A study of the popular mind New York Macmillan

Le Breton J (1996) La Fin de Ceausescu [English translation from French The end of

Ceausescu] Paris LHarmattan

Leacutevesque J (1997) The enigma of 1989 Berkeley University of California Press

Loupan V (1990) La Revolution Na Pas Eu Lieu [English translation from French The

revolution did not take place] Paris R Laffont

Luttwak E (1968) Coup Drsquoeacutetat A Practical Handbook Cambridge Mass Harvard

University Press

Marx K amp Engels F (2002) The communist manifesto London Penguin

Mazilu D (2011) Revolutia Romana ndash zile si nopti de dramatism si sperante [English

translation from Romanian The Romanian Revolution days and nights of drama and

hop] Bucharest IRRD

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

51

Mazilu D 1991 Revolutia Furata ndash memoriu pentru tara mea [English translation from

Romanian The stolen revolution ndash a memoir for my country] Bucharest Cozia Ed

McDermott K amp Stibbe M (2013) lsquoThe collapse of communism in Eastern Europe

originsrsquo in McDermott K and Stibbe M (eds) The 1989 Revolutions In Central And

Eastern Europe Manchester Manchester University Press 1-22

Midlarsky M I (2009) Handbook Of War Studies III Ann Arbor University Of Michigan

Press

Mioc M (2002) The anticommunist Romanian revolution of 1989 Timis oara Marineasa

Pub House

Perva A and Roman C (2009) Misterele Revolutiei Romane [English translation from

Romanian the Mysteries of the Romanian Revolution] Bucuresti Editura SEMNE

Portocala R (1990) Autopsie Du Coup Deacutetat Roumain [English translation from French

The autopsy of the Romanian coup drsquoetat] Paris Calmann-Leacutevy

Prins G (1990) Spring in winter Manchester Manchester University Press

Roper S D (2000) Romania the unfinished revolution Amsterdam Harwood

Academic

Roskin M G (1991) The Rebirth Of East Europe Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall

Rothschild J amp Wingfield N M (2008) Return to diversity New York Oxford University

Press

Sauca A (1994) KGB-ul si Revolutia Romana [English translation from Romanian the

KGB and the Romanian Revolution] Braila Miracol

Scurtu I (2009) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 In International Context

Bucharest Redactia Publicatiilor pentru Strainatate

Siani-Davies P (2005) The Romanian Revolution Of December 1989 Ithaca Cornell

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

52

University Press

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge Cambridge University

Press

Sorokin P A (1967) The sociology of revolution New York H Fertig

Steele J (1974) Eastern Europe since Stalin New York Crane Russak

Stoenescu A M (2012) Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania- Revolutia din Decembrie

1989 -O tragedie romaneasca[ English translated from Romanian The history of coup

drsquoeacutetats in Romania ndash The December 1989 Revolution ndash A Romanian Tragedy] Bucharest

Ed RAO

Szoczi A (2013) Timisoara The real story behind Romaniarsquos revolution Bloomington

IN iUniverse

Tanase Stelian (1999) Miracolul Revolutiei [English translation from Romanian The

Miracle of the revolution] Bucharest Humanitas

Teodorescu F (1992) Un risc asumat Timişoara decembrie 1989 [English translation

from Romanian A taken risk Timisoara December 1989] Timisoara Editura Viitorul

Romacircnesc

Tilly C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution Mass Addison-Wesley Pub Co

Tilly C (1993) European Revolutions 1492-1992 Oxford UK Blackwell

Tismaneanu V (1999) The Revolutions of 1989 London Routledge

Tismaneanu V and Shapiro J (1991) Debates On The Future Of Communism New

York St Martins Press

Trimberger E K (1978) Revolution From Above New Brunswick NJ Transaction

Books

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

53

Ungheanu M (1997) Un Razboi Civil Regizat [English translation from Romanian A

staged civil war] Bucharest Editura Romcartexim

Valenas L (2002) Memorialul apocalipsei [English translation from Romanian The

apocalypsersquos memorial] Bucharest Saeculum IO

Verdery K amp Kligman G (1992) lsquoRomania After Ceausescu Post-Communist

Communismrsquo in Banac I (ed) Eastern Europe in revolution 117-47

Waltz K N (2001) Man the state and war a theoretical analysis New York Columbia

University Press

Zamfirescu D (1993) Războiul icircmpotriva poporului roman [English translation from

Romanian The war against the Romanian people] Roza Vacircnturilor

Online sources

BCS (2009) rsquo20 de ani de la evenimentele din 1989 sondaj de opinie publicarsquo [English

translation lsquoThe 1989 events 20 years later public opinion surveyrsquo] retrieved from

http1948814810369ee2795sondaj_BCS_dupa_20_de_anipdf date accessed

20082014

CIA (1990) The 1990 CIA World Factbook by United States Central Intelligence Agency

retrieved from httpwwwgutenbergorgebooks14 date accessed 20082014

ECHR (2011) lsquoChamber judgment Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania

24052011rsquo retrieved from httphudocechrcoeintsiteseng-

presspagessearchaspxdisplay[1]dmdocnumber[885687] date accessed

20082014

Iliescu I (1999) lsquo10 ani de la revolutia din Decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from

Romanian lsquoDecember 1989 Ten years onrsquo] retrieved from

httpyoutubeqDeL9YqB3TE date accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014

Author Catalin Rolea

54

Lenin V I (1916) lsquoThe Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolutionrsquo retrieved from

httpwwwmarxistsorgarchiveleninworks1916miliprogindexhtm date accessed

20082014

Merriam Webster Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwmerriam-webstercom on

20082014

Mihalache C (2013) lsquoPiepturi goale si buzunare plinersquo [English translation from

Romanian Empty chests and full pockets] retrieved from httpyoutubeoyDGVjr4-88

date accessed 20082014

OTV (2010) lsquoNicolae Ceausescursquos Last Speech (English subtitles)lsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubewWIbCtz_Xwk date accessed 20082014

Oxford Dictionary Online accessed at httpwwwoxforddictionariescom on

20082014

RTV (1989a) lsquoDecember 22 The Romanian Revolution Uncutrsquo retrieved from

httpyoutubeQM2ZiFmOICc date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989b) lsquoTerorişti prinşi icircn decembrie 1989rsquo [English translation from Romanian

Caught terrorists in December 1989rsquo retrieved from

httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pjMZl3DptAM date accessed 20082014

RTV (1989c) lsquoImpuscaturi in timpul revolutieirsquo [English translation from Romanian

Shooting during the revolutionrsquo retrieved from httpyoutube_jPIDuzlYvE date

accessed 20082014